date:20131008



On 07 Oct 2013, at 17:20, Craig Weinberg wrote:




On Monday, October 7, 2013 3:56:55 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 06 Oct 2013, at 22:00, Craig Weinberg wrote:



Qualia is experience which contains the felt relation to all other  
experiences; specific experiences which directly relate, and  
extended experiential contexts which extent to eternity (totality  
of manifested events so far relative to the participant plus semi- 
potential events which relate to higher octaves of their  
participation...the bigger picture with the larger now.)


Then qualia are infinite. This contradict some of your previous  
statement.


It's not qualia that is finite or infinite, it is finity-infinity  
itself that is an intellectual quale.


OK. But this does not mean it is not also objective. The set of  
dividers of 24 is finite. The set of multiple of 24 is infinite. For  
example.



Quanta is derived from qualia, so quantitative characteristics have  
ambiguous application outside of quanta.


Yes, quanta comes from the Löbian qualia, in a 100% verifiable way.  
Indeed. But that is again a consequence of computationalism.








Qualia is what we are made of. As human beings at this stage of  
human civilization, our direct qualia is primarily cognitive- 
logical-verbal. We identify with our ability to describe with words  
- to qualify other qualia as verbal qualia. We name our perceptions  
and name our naming power 'mind', but that is not consciousness.  
Logic and intellect can only name public-facing reductions of  
certain qualia (visible and tangible qualia - the stuff of public  
bodies). The name for those public-facing reductions is quanta, or  
numbers, and the totality of the playing field which can be used  
for the quanta game is called arithmetic truth.


Arithmetical truth is full of non nameable things. Qualia refer to  
non verbally describable first person truth.


Can arithmetical truth really name anything?


I am not sure Arithmetical Truth can be seen as a person, or anything  
capable of naming things. You are stretching the words too much. I  
guess that if you make your statement more precise, it will lead to an  
open problem in comp.




It seems to me that we can use arithmetic truth to locate a number  
within the infinity of computable realtions, but any 'naming' is  
only our own attempt to attach a proprietary first person sense to  
that which is irreducibly generic and nameless. The thing about  
qualia is not that it is non-nameable, it is the specific aesthetic  
presence that is manifested. Names are just qualia of mental  
association - a rose by any other name, etc.


I think this could be made more precise by taking "our" in the Löbian  
sense.


Bruno



http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



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Re: The ultimate reason of knowledge faith power and entrophy reduction, computabilty, evolution, the universe and everithing

On 8 October 2013 17:45, meekerdb  wrote:

>  Suppose his research showed that liberalized concealed carry laws
> reduced gun violence (a popular argument among gun-rights advocates).  Then
> he wouldn't be gagged.  So he was assuming the opposite conclusion in order
> to infer reporting the study would be a crime.
>

The point is that whatever conclusions are reached, it should be possible
to report them.

>
>   Well, if it wouldn't be advocacy then he's OK to report whatever he
> sees fit. Personally I would think it shouldn't be considered advocacy, but
> he's closer to the whole thing and he seems to think it would.
>
>
> Bureaucrats tend to be timid about offending Congress and may self-censor.
>
> Yes, I can well believe that.

>
>  No, nobody who is an employee of the U.S. government is allowed
> to lobby it.  Civil service employees and uniformed military are not
> allowed to campaign for any partisan candidates either (even in local
> elections if they are partisan).
>

Ah, right, I see what you mean.

Yes, it's unfortunate that the psychology seems to be "It's dangerous out
> there.  So I should be able to have a gun to protect myself."  That's what
> defeated a gun ban in Brazil, which has even more shootings than the U.S.,
> in spite of requirements to register and license all guns.
>
> Well the situation is self-perpetuating, I imagine.

So there's somewhere that has more shootings than the USA - I did know
that, but it generally tends to be the "Developing World" that has this
problem, I believe, together with places with ongoing wars.
[image: Inline images 1]
Graph is from here:
http://mark.reid.name/blog/gun-deaths-vs-gun-ownership.html

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Re: What gives philosophers a bad name?



On 07 Oct 2013, at 18:23, John Clark wrote:




Pointless unless you think it is a virtue to quite literally know  
what you are talking about. Bruno keeps throwing around words like  
"I" and "you" and "he" and it is very clear that Bruno doesn't know  
what those words mean in a world with duplicating chambers.


Very clear?
Each time I gave you the definition, you mocked it with "pee pee", and  
two post later you come back with the idea that it is not clear,  
without ever quoting and cricticizing the definitions. I have  
introduced the key 1-person/3-person distinction, presented in a pure  
third person way, to address this issue, but you never commented it  
nor make any clearer.





Bruno says "he" has been duplicated, so now there are TWO,


In the third person sense. But the chance evaluation have been asked  
on the possible (accessible from Helsinki) first person experiences.





but then Bruno demands to know the ONE thing


Yes, because in the comp context, you can, in Helsinki, understand  
that, although your body-copy will be in two places, you can feel to  
be in only one place.





and only the ONE thing that "he" will do; and this is nonsense.


Not" will do". The question is which city will he observed. It can  
only be one city, unless you introduce some non-comp telepathy.


That is why it is "like" the throw of a coin, like you have already  
agreed, or like a quantum superposition, but for a different reason,  
and that is exploited in the next steps.


Nobody seems to understand your point, so try to make it more precise,  
and stop pretending it is "very clear", as nobody understand you. I am  
still waiting for Chris explanation, as he pretend to follow your  
point, but I see not the explanation coming.


Bruno




http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



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Re: What gives philosophers a bad name?

On 07 Oct 2013, at 19:38, John Clark wrote:

On Mon, Oct 7, 2013 at 3:50 AM, Bruno Marchal   
wrote:

> > Rhetorical tricks my ass! These are details of profound  
importance  simply glossed over with the slapdash use of personal  
pronouns. And that's pretty damn sloppy for a mathematician.

> That's again an unconvincing rhetorical tricks. Be specific please.

Bruno, are you trying to convince people that I haven't made DOZENS  
of specific complaints about your sloppy use of personal pronouns  
that is unacceptable in a world with duplicating chambers?

I have introduced the duplicating chamber to explain the difference of  
the 1-I and 3-I, and all I got from you where that is pee-pee stuff.

people can verify: you have not produced any specific complain.

On the contrary you have pretended that it is like antic throw of a  
coin, but that was exactly my point.

You are stuck in a denying psychological state.

Are you saying I've never asked "Who the hell is "he" ?" and gotten  
no reply?

I have always replied. Always. You have ignored the answer, and never  
comment them, except sometimes with your "pee-pee" vocabulary.

If duplicating chambers were not involved then it would indeed be  
ridiculous nit picking, but NOT if they do exist. In your thought  
experiments typically "the guy" is duplicated so now there are TWO,

Like in Everett QM self-superposition, but then you should condemn, as  
Quentin told you more than once, the use of probability in QM.

and then

?
Le us not mix the experiment that e are comparing.

"the guy" flips a coin and you demand to know what the ONE and only  
ONE result that "the guy" will see. And this is not just ridiculous  
it is logically inconsistent.

?
If a guy throws a coin, he will see only one outcome among two possible.

Bruno

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/

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Re: What gives philosophers a bad name?

Hi John,

Bruno, I tried to control my mouse for a long time

The M guy is NOT the Y guy, when he remembers having been the Y guy.

Who is the Y guy? I guess you mean the guy in Helsinki.

Yes, you said it many times, but NOW again! Has this list no
consequential resolution?

Some people seem to have inexhaustible patience!

"It" was in the past and in the meantime lots happened to 'M"

Not with the protocol in step 3. You just push on a button, and you
are read, annihilated, and reconstituted in two places (W and M) in
the state which has just been scanned in Helsinki.
Some times go by, but not a lot, and the question is about what you
will live. With comp, it is clear that you will live in W OR in M, but
that any more precise prediction will fail.

that probably did (not? or quite differently?) happen to 'Y' and you
are not that youngster who went to school, no matter how identical
you 'feel' to be.
That argument (taking thousands times more on this list than it
deserves) is false:
it leaves out the CHANGING of the world we LIVE IN (considered
usually as time???)

Then both the probability used in the throwing on a coin, or in QM, in
fact all use of prediction become useless. You argument condemns the
whole field of statistics and probability. If the whether broadcast
says that if will rain at the end of the day, you might say that is
nonsense, as we will be all dead before.

So I try to stay in the reality where 'panta rhei'.

I can see that 'panta rhei', because I stay myself enough in the
process.

...and I am not identical to the guy I WAS. (Some accused people use
such arguments as well in court, but that is another table.)

The question is not about identity, but about predicting some
happenings to first person view. With your argument I cannot believe
that I will drink a cup of coffee when I am preparing it.
In fact your argument would entail that the probability is zero to
survive with an artificial brain, so you are assuming non-comp. No
problem with that, but my goal is the study of the consequence of comp.

Bruno

On Mon, Oct 7, 2013 at 3:31 AM, Bruno Marchal
wrote:

On 06 Oct 2013, at 19:03, meekerdb wrote:

On 10/6/2013 12:43 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 05 Oct 2013, at 19:55, John Clark wrote:

On Sat, Oct 5, 2013 at 12:28 PM, Bruno Marchal
wrote:

> you have agreed that all "bruno marchal" are the original one
(a case where Leibniz identity rule fails,

If you're talking about Leibniz Identity of indiscernibles it
most certainly has NOT failed.

I was talking on the rule:

a = b
a = c
entails that b = c

The M-guy is the H-guy (the M-guy remembers having been the H-guy)
The W-guy is the H-guy (the W-guy remembers having been the H-guy)
But the M-guy is not the W-guy (in the sense that the M-guy will
not remember having been the W-guy, and reciprocally).

The rest are unconvincing rhetorical tricks, already answered, and
which, btw, can be done for the quantum indeterminacy, as many
people showed to you. Each time we talk about the prediction the
"he" refer to the guy in Helsinki before the duplication, after
the duplication, we mention if we talk of the guy in M or in W, or
of both, and look at their individual confirmation or refutation
of their prediction done in Helsinki. We just look at diaries, and
I have made those things clear, but you talk like if you don't try
to understand.

There is nothing controversial, and you fake misunderstanding of
the most easy part of the reasoning.
Not sure what is your agenda, but it is clear that you are not
interested in learning.

Well there is still *some* controversy; mainly about how the
indeterminancy is to be interpreted as a probability. There's some
good discussion here, http://physics.stackexchange.com/questions/20802/why-is-gleasons-theorem-not-enough-to-obtain-born-rule-in-many-worlds-interpret
especially the last comment by Ron Maimon.

I was talking on the arithmetical FPI, or even just the local
probability for duplication protocol. This has nothing to do with
QM, except when using the MWI as a confirmation of the mùany dreams.

Having said that I don't agree with the preferred base problem. That
problem comes from the fact that our computations can make sense
only in the base where we have evolved abilities to make some
distinction. The difficulty is for physicists believing in worlds,
but there are only knowledge states of observer/dreamers.

But I insist, here, what I said was not controversial is that in the
WM duplication thought experience, *with the precise protocol
given*, we have an indeterminacy, indeed even a P = 1/2 situation.
The quantum case is notoriously more difficult (due indeed to the
lack of definition of "world"), but it seems to me that Everett use
both Gleason theorem + a sort of FPI (more or less implicitly).

Bruno

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/

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You rece

Re: The ultimate reason of knowledge faith power and entrophy reduction, computabilty, evolution, the universe and everithing



On 07 Oct 2013, at 22:58, John Mikes wrote:


Bruno: you wrote:

The US constitution is very good, but is not really followed, and  
things like prohibition have put bandits into power, who have broken  
the important separation of powers.
Lobbying and the role of money in politics should be revised. But we  
are a bit out of topic here, I think.


Out of topic of "everything"? OK, OK, I know. But the US  
Constitution (IMO) HAS BEEN very good in a 300+ year old societal  
view - drawn by duelling, pipe-smoking, hunting male chauvinist  
slave-owner despots to organize the 'colonies' NOT TO PAY taxes to  
the King of England. Now, the Supreme Court's "oldies" (probably  
younger than me) valuate the 18th c. language for the 21st c. life  
in a many times skewed sense.
Lobbying I call "buying votes" for a special interest, money is not  
"talk" and corporation is not a 'person' (as e.g. a citizen). And so  
on.


OK. especially with "lobbying = buying votes".

Bruno




JM


On Mon, Oct 7, 2013 at 3:39 AM, Bruno Marchal   
wrote:


On 06 Oct 2013, at 18:08, Alberto G. Corona wrote:

Some academies are just prostituted to rotten (sometime) politics,  
often just to get enough funding to survive.


Money is not the problem. Black, obscure and grey money is the  
problem.


Wait, this is indeed the most fundamental question!

How knowledge interact with money and power in society and convert  
itself in beliefs as a system that prevent further knowledge must  
be an integral part of research.


For me this meta-knowledge about knowledge faith and power is a  
more fundamental question than knowledge itself.

---

I think that people don' t want knowledge primarily.


Ha Ha ... That reminds me when my father told me that truth is what  
humans fear the most and like the less.




What they aim at, is like any living being, and in fact, like any  
stable dynamic auto-regulated structure, is  to reduce uncertainty.


The humans oscillate between security/certainty/control and freedom/ 
uncertainty/universality. Basically that is why we vote, to have a  
sort of equilibrium in between.






That fit with many considerations at different levels, and embrace  
conclussions of evolution, game theory, computability, social  
science psychology and entropy.



 That explain how knowledge interact with power (and money and you  
wish) and faith. As I will explain:


To reduce uncertainty can be achieved adquiring pure knowledge of  
the world around in order to predict better the future.


But it can also be achieved by adquiring for themselves money or  
power, or love from other people, or commitment from tem, or  
respect, or common commintment to something or someone.


The fact is that pure knowledge is not enoug. Money is not enough,  
power is not enough, since neither of them work without a committed  
society that make use of this knowledge in an organized way, that  
respect the money value and other properties, that has fair  
mechanism for adquiring power and legitimacy, and more that that, a  
society with a  clear plan for our sibiling and generations to come.


Thinking materialistically (I´m not but for a matter of argument)  
there is no social vehicle for our genes if the society have all  
these requirements, and, more important, no people that had not  
these requirements ullfilled survived, so we have inherited this  
natural seeking for all these kinds of uncertainty reduction  
mechanism around us.


Some societies make enphasis in one kind of uncertainty reduction.  
Others rely more in other different in this equation. These  
different uncertainty reduction alternatives are one against the  
other. A strict hiearchi of power and legitimacy based on an  
enforced supernatural plan is a excellent uncertainty reduction for  
a stable society that does not need to change. In the other side,  
adquring knowledge is good, but that may challenge the structure,  
questionin legitimacies and creating civil wars, that can be  
pacific or violent. When there is no common plans nor loyaltyes,  
the pacific disputes become violent almos by defintion.


A lot of philosophy on all their branches can be extracted from  
this starting point.


The US constitution is very good, but is not really followed, and  
things like prohibition have put bandits into power, who have broken  
the important separation of powers.


Lobbying and the role of money in politics should be revised. But we  
are a bit out of topic here, I think.


Bruno








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http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~mar

Re: The ultimate reason of knowledge faith power and entrophy reduction, computabilty, evolution, the universe and everithing



On 08 Oct 2013, at 00:01, LizR wrote:

One thing wrong with the US constitution is that the "right to bear  
arms" meant muskets and flintlock pistols at the time, but has been  
extended to, for example, semi-automatic weapons. The people who  
wrote it were only aware of single-shot weapons, even the colt  
revolver hadn't been invented! If they're so keen to extend the  
original meaning to what are in effect weapons of mass destruction,  
why not, say, let citizens build nuclear bombs if they want to?



They have the right. Some did it (but I'm not sure they got the  
Uranium). It is not illegal, even the uranium (I think).
Hemp is illegal, like french cheese, but not guns, alcohol, tobacco,  
dangerous antidepressant, poisonous schrooms, etc.


I am advocating the personal atomic bombs.

I wish I have many, to offer to friends, as I cannot imagine a better  
gift for saying to someone "I fully trust you".


;)

Bruno










On 8 October 2013 09:58, John Mikes  wrote:
Bruno: you wrote:

The US constitution is very good, but is not really followed, and  
things like prohibition have put bandits into power, who have broken  
the important separation of powers.
Lobbying and the role of money in politics should be revised. But we  
are a bit out of topic here, I think.


Out of topic of "everything"? OK, OK, I know. But the US  
Constitution (IMO) HAS BEEN very good in a 300+ year old societal  
view - drawn by duelling, pipe-smoking, hunting male chauvinist  
slave-owner despots to organize the 'colonies' NOT TO PAY taxes to  
the King of England. Now, the Supreme Court's "oldies" (probably  
younger than me) valuate the 18th c. language for the 21st c. life  
in a many times skewed sense.
Lobbying I call "buying votes" for a special interest, money is not  
"talk" and corporation is not a 'person' (as e.g. a citizen). And so  
on.

JM


On Mon, Oct 7, 2013 at 3:39 AM, Bruno Marchal   
wrote:


On 06 Oct 2013, at 18:08, Alberto G. Corona wrote:

Some academies are just prostituted to rotten (sometime) politics,  
often just to get enough funding to survive.


Money is not the problem. Black, obscure and grey money is the  
problem.


Wait, this is indeed the most fundamental question!

How knowledge interact with money and power in society and convert  
itself in beliefs as a system that prevent further knowledge must  
be an integral part of research.


For me this meta-knowledge about knowledge faith and power is a  
more fundamental question than knowledge itself.

---

I think that people don' t want knowledge primarily.


Ha Ha ... That reminds me when my father told me that truth is what  
humans fear the most and like the less.




What they aim at, is like any living being, and in fact, like any  
stable dynamic auto-regulated structure, is  to reduce uncertainty.


The humans oscillate between security/certainty/control and freedom/ 
uncertainty/universality. Basically that is why we vote, to have a  
sort of equilibrium in between.






That fit with many considerations at different levels, and embrace  
conclussions of evolution, game theory, computability, social  
science psychology and entropy.



 That explain how knowledge interact with power (and money and you  
wish) and faith. As I will explain:


To reduce uncertainty can be achieved adquiring pure knowledge of  
the world around in order to predict better the future.


But it can also be achieved by adquiring for themselves money or  
power, or love from other people, or commitment from tem, or  
respect, or common commintment to something or someone.


The fact is that pure knowledge is not enoug. Money is not enough,  
power is not enough, since neither of them work without a committed  
society that make use of this knowledge in an organized way, that  
respect the money value and other properties, that has fair  
mechanism for adquiring power and legitimacy, and more that that, a  
society with a  clear plan for our sibiling and generations to come.


Thinking materialistically (I´m not but for a matter of argument)  
there is no social vehicle for our genes if the society have all  
these requirements, and, more important, no people that had not  
these requirements ullfilled survived, so we have inherited this  
natural seeking for all these kinds of uncertainty reduction  
mechanism around us.


Some societies make enphasis in one kind of uncertainty reduction.  
Others rely more in other different in this equation. These  
different uncertainty reduction alternatives are one against the  
other. A strict hiearchi of power and legitimacy based on an  
enforced supernatural plan is a excellent uncertainty reduction for  
a stable society that does not need to change. In the other side,  
adquring knowledge is good, but that may challenge the structure,  
questionin legitimacies and creating civil wars, that can be  
pacific or violent. When there is no common plans nor loyaltyes,  
the pacific disputes become violent

Re: The ultimate reason of knowledge faith power and entrophy reduction, computabilty, evolution, the universe and everithing

On 8 October 2013 21:24, Bruno Marchal  wrote:

>
> On 08 Oct 2013, at 00:01, LizR wrote:
>
> One thing wrong with the US constitution is that the "right to bear arms"
> meant muskets and flintlock pistols at the time, but has been extended to,
> for example, semi-automatic weapons. The people who wrote it were only
> aware of single-shot weapons, even the colt revolver hadn't been invented!
> If they're so keen to extend the original meaning to what are in effect
> weapons of mass destruction, why not, say, let citizens build nuclear bombs
> if they want to?
>
>
>
> They have the right. Some did it (but I'm not sure they got the Uranium).
> It is not illegal, even the uranium (I think).
> Hemp is illegal, like french cheese, but not guns, alcohol, tobacco,
> dangerous antidepressant, poisonous schrooms, etc.
>
> I am advocating the personal atomic bombs.
>
> I wish I have many, to offer to friends, as I cannot imagine a better gift
> for saying to someone "I fully trust you".
>
> Yes indeed.

Or "I hope your party goes with a bang!"

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Re: AUDA and pronouns

2013-10-08 Thread Russell Standish

On Mon, Oct 07, 2013 at 10:20:14AM +0200, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
> On 07 Oct 2013, at 07:36, Russell Standish wrote:
> 
> >Unfortunately, the thread about AUDA and its relation to pronouncs got
> >mixed up with another thread, and thus got delete on my computer.
> >
> >Picking up from where we left off, I'm still trying to see the
> >relationship between Bp, Bp&p, 1-I, 3-I and the plain ordinary I
> >pronoun in English.
> 
> As I said, in natural language we usually mix 1-I (Bp) and 3-I (Bp & p).
> The reason is that we think we have only one body, and so, in all
> practical situation it does not matter. (That's also why some people
> will say I am my body, or I am my brain, like Searles, which used
> that against comp, but if that was valid, the math shows that
> machines can validly shows that they are not machine, which is
> absurd).
> 
> The difference 1-I/3-I is felt sometimes by people looking at a
> video of themselves. The objective situation can describe many
> people, and you feel bizarre that you are one of them. That video
> lacks of course the first person perspective.
> 
> The distinction is brought when we study the mind body problem. You
> might red the best text ever on this: the Theaetetus of Plato. But
> the indians have written many texts on this, and some are
> chef-d'oeuvre (rigorous).
> 

OK, although I don't have time to read those ancient texts, alas :(.

> 
> 
> >
> >I understand Bp can be read as "I can prove p", and "Bp&p" as "I know
> >p". But in the case, the difference between Bp and Bp&p is entirely in
> >the verb, the pronoun "I" stays the same, AFAICT.
> 
> Correct. Only the perspective change. "Bp" is "Toto proves p", said
> by Toto.
> "Bp & p" is "Toto proves p" and p is true, as said by Toto (or not),
> and the math shows that this behaves like a knowledge opertaor (but
> not arithmetical predicate). 

It's the same Toto in both cases... What's the point?

> So, the ideally correct machine will
> never been able to ascribe a name or a description to it.
> Intuitively, for the machine, that "I" is not assertable, and indeed
> such opertair refer to something without a name.
> 

What does it mean to assert an "I"?

> 
> 
> >
> >Also, switching viewpoints, one could equally say the Bp can be read
> >as "he can prove p",
> 
> but the point is that it is asserted by "he", in the language of "he".
> 

But the statements can also be asserted by some other agent?

> 
> 
> >and Bp&p as "he knows p", so the person order of
> >the pronoun is also not relevant.
> 
> Yes, you can read that in that way, but you get only the 3-view of
> the 1-view.
> 
> Let us define [o]p by Bp & p
> 
> I am just pointing on the difference between B([o]p) and [o]([o]p).
> 

???

> Best,
> 
> Bruno
> 
> 
> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
> 
> 
> 
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Re: The ultimate reason of knowledge faith power and entrophy reduction, computabilty, evolution, the universe and everithing



On Tuesday, October 8, 2013 4:15:29 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 07 Oct 2013, at 22:58, John Mikes wrote:
>
> Bruno: you wrote:
>
> *The US constitution is very good, but is not really followed, and things 
> like prohibition have put bandits into power, who have broken the important 
> separation of powers.*
> *Lobbying and the role of money in politics should be revised. But we are 
> a bit out of topic here, I think.*
> *
> *
> Out of topic of "everything"? OK, OK, I know. But the US Constitution 
> (IMO) HAS BEEN very good in a 300+ year old societal view - drawn by 
> duelling, pipe-smoking, hunting male chauvinist slave-owner despots to 
> organize the 'colonies' NOT TO PAY taxes to the King of England. Now, the 
> Supreme Court's "oldies" (probably younger than me) valuate the 18th c. 
> language for the 21st c. life in a many times skewed sense. 
> *Lobbying *I call "buying votes" for a special interest, *money* is not 
> "talk" and *corporation* is not a 'person' (as e.g. a citizen). And so on.
>
>
> OK. especially with "lobbying = buying votes".
>
> Bruno
>
>
>
> JM
>
>
> On Mon, Oct 7, 2013 at 3:39 AM, Bruno Marchal 
> > wrote:
>
>>
>> On 06 Oct 2013, at 18:08, Alberto G. Corona wrote:
>>
>> Some academies are just prostituted to rotten (sometime) politics, often 
>>> just to get enough funding to survive.
>>>
>>> Money is not the problem. Black, obscure and grey money is the problem.
>>>
>>> Wait, this is indeed the most fundamental question!
>>
>> *How knowledge interact with money and power in society and convert 
>> itself in beliefs as a system that prevent further knowledge must be an 
>> integral part of research. *
>> *
>> *
>> *For me this meta-knowledge about knowledge faith and power is a more 
>> fundamental question than knowledge itself.*
>>
>>> ---
>>
>> I think that people don' t want knowledge primarily.  
>>
>>
>> Ha Ha ... That reminds me when my father told me that truth is what 
>> humans fear the most and like the less.
>>
>>
>>
>> What they aim at, is like any living being, and in fact, like any stable 
>> dynamic auto-regulated structure, is * to reduce uncertainty*. 
>>
>>
>> The humans oscillate between security/certainty/control and 
>> freedom/uncertainty/universality. Basically that is why we vote, to have a 
>> sort of equilibrium in between.
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> That fit with many considerations at different levels, and embrace 
>> conclussions of evolution, game theory, computability, social science 
>> psychology and entropy.
>>
>>
>>  That explain how knowledge interact with power (and money and you wish) 
>> and faith. As I will explain:
>>
>> To reduce uncertainty can be achieved adquiring pure knowledge of the 
>> world around in order to predict better the future.
>>
>> But it can also be achieved by adquiring for themselves money or power, 
>> or love from other people, or commitment from tem, or respect, or common 
>> commintment to something or someone.  
>>
>> The fact is that pure knowledge is not enoug. Money is not enough, power 
>> is not enough, since neither of them work without a committed society that 
>> make use of this knowledge in an organized way, that respect the money 
>> value and other properties, that has fair mechanism for adquiring power and 
>> legitimacy, and more that that, a society with a  clear plan for our 
>> sibiling and generations to come. 
>>
>> Thinking materialistically (I´m not but for a matter of argument) there 
>> is no social vehicle for our genes if the society have all these 
>> requirements, and, more important, no people that had not these 
>> requirements ullfilled survived, so we have inherited this natural seeking 
>> for all these kinds of uncertainty reduction mechanism around us.  
>>
>> Some societies make enphasis in one kind of uncertainty reduction. Others 
>> rely more in other different in this equation. These different uncertainty 
>> reduction alternatives are one against the other. A strict hiearchi of 
>> power and legitimacy based on an enforced supernatural plan is a excellent 
>> uncertainty reduction for a stable society that does not need to change. In 
>> the other side, adquring knowledge is good, but that may challenge the 
>> structure, questionin legitimacies and creating civil wars, that can be 
>> pacific or violent. When there is no common plans nor loyaltyes, the 
>> pacific disputes become violent almos by defintion.
>>
>> A lot of philosophy on all their branches can be extracted from this 
>> starting point.
>>
>>
>> The US constitution is very good, but is not really followed, and things 
>> like prohibition have put bandits into power, who have broken the important 
>> separation of powers.
>>
>> Lobbying and the role of money in politics should be revised. But we are 
>> a bit out of topic here, I think.
>>
>> Bruno
>>
>>
I can actually bring the topic back around to Symbol Grounding/AI. The 
issue of corporate personhood has always struck me as a variant of the 
Ch

Re: A challenge for Craig

2013-10-08 Thread Jason Resch

On Sun, Oct 6, 2013 at 3:00 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote:

>
>
> On Sunday, October 6, 2013 5:06:31 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>>
>> On 06 Oct 2013, at 03:17, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>>
>> > On 5 October 2013 00:40, Bruno Marchal  wrote:
>> >
>> >>> The argument is simply summarised thus: it is impossible even for
>> >>> God
>> >>> to make a brain prosthesis that reproduces the I/O behaviour but has
>> >>> different qualia. This is a proof of comp,
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> Hmm... I can agree, but eventually no God can make such a
>> >> prothesis, only
>> >> because the qualia is an attribute of the "immaterial person", and
>> >> not of
>> >> the brain, body, or computer.  Then the prosthesis will manifest
>> >> the person
>> >> if it emulates the correct level.
>> >
>> > But if the qualia are attributed to the substance of the physical
>> > brain then where is the problem making a prosthesis that replicates
>> > the behaviour but not the qualia?
>> > The problem is that it would allow
>> > one to make a partial zombie, which I think is absurd. Therefore, the
>> > qualia cannot be attributed to the substance of the physical brain.
>>
>> I agree.
>>
>> Note that in that case the qualia is no more attributed to an
>> immaterial person, but to a piece of primary matter.
>> In that case, both comp and functionalism (in your sense, not in
>> Putnam's usual sense of functionalism which is a particular case of
>> comp) are wrong.
>>
>> Then, it is almost obvious that an immaterial being cannot distinguish
>> between a primarily material incarnation, and an immaterial one, as it
>> would need some magic (non Turing emulable) ability to make the
>> difference.  People agreeing with this do no more need the UDA step 8
>> (which is an attempt to make this more rigorous or clear).
>>
>> I might criticize, as a devil's advocate, a little bit the partial-
>> zombie argument. Very often some people pretend that they feel less
>> conscious after some drink of vodka, but that they are still able to
>> behave normally. Of course those people are notoriously wrong. It is
>> just that alcohol augments a fake self-confidence feeling, which
>> typically is not verified (in the laboratory, or more sadly on the
>> roads). Also, they confuse "less conscious" with "blurred
>> consciousness",
>>
>
> Why wouldn't less consciousness have the effect of seeming blurred? If
> your battery is dying in a device, the device might begin to fail in
> numerous ways, but those are all symptoms of the battery dying - of the
> device becoming less reliable as different parts are unavailable at
> different times.
>
> Think of qualia as a character in a long story, which is divided into
> episodes. If, for instance, someone starts watching a show like Breaking
> Bad only in the last season, they have no explicit understanding of who
> Walter White is or why he behaves like he does, where Jesse came from, etc.
> They can only pick up what is presented directly in that episode, so his
> character is relatively flat. The difference between the appreciation of
> the last episode by someone who has seen the entire series on HDTV and
> someone who has only read the closed captioning of the last episode on
> Twitter is like the difference between a human being's qualia and the
> qualia which is available through a logical imitation of a human bring.
>
> Qualia is experience which contains the felt relation to all other
> experiences; specific experiences which directly relate, and extended
> experiential contexts which extent to eternity (totality of manifested
> events so far relative to the participant plus semi-potential events which
> relate to higher octaves of their participation...the bigger picture with
> the larger now.)
>
>

Craig,

I agree with you that there is some "building up" required to create a full
and rich human experience, which cannot happen in a single instance or with
a single CPU instruction being executed. However, where I disagree with you
is in how long it takes for all the particulars of the experience to be
generated from the computation.  I don't think it requires re-calculating
the entire history of the human race, or life itself on some planet.  I
think it can be done by comparing relations to memories and data stored
entirely within the brain itself; say within 0.1 to 0.5 seconds of
computation by the brain, not the eons of life's evolution.

So perhaps we are on the same page, but merely disagree on how detailed the
details of the computation need to be.  i.e., what is the substitution
layer (atomic interactions, or the history of atomic interactions on a
global scale?).

Jason

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Re: What gives philosophers a bad name?

2013-10-08 Thread Telmo Menezes

On Mon, Oct 7, 2013 at 8:42 PM, meekerdb  wrote:
> On 10/7/2013 7:02 AM, Telmo Menezes wrote:
>>
>> On Mon, Oct 7, 2013 at 3:20 PM, chris peck 
>> wrote:
>>>
>>> Quentin
>>>
>>>
> Either you should say probability are non sensical in the MWI or if you
> accept them with the MWI, you should accept them the same way with the
> comp
> duplication experience.
>>>
>>> But MWI does have a problem when it comes to probabilities and it is
>>> taken
>>> very seriously by Everetians and their critics.
>>>
>>> In MWI any probabilities are a measure of ignorance rather than genuine
>>> chance, because all outcomes are realised. Any theory of everything will,
>>> I
>>> suspect, be similar in that regard.
>>>
>>> So what sense does it make in MWI to ask of the probabilities associated
>>> with one of two outcomes, if both are certain? It doesn't really make
>>> sense
>>> at all.
>>>
>>> It seems particularly acute to me for Bruno's experiment because at least
>>> in
>>> MWI worlds split on the basis of things we can not predict. There is no
>>> equivalent 'roll of the die' in Bruno's step 3. I know I am going to be
>>> duplicated. I know where I am going to be sent. I know by 'yes doctor' I
>>> will survive. Why shouldn't I expect to see both outcomes? After all,
>>> there
>>> is not two of me yet ...
>>>
>>> But I think you are right. In general it would be inconsistent to regard
>>> Bruno's theory, but not MWI, of having issues here.
>>
>> I propose that the main insight that is necessary here is that, when
>> there is some split (quantum choice, duplication machine, whatever),
>> _both_ copies are conscious and _both_ feel that they are a real
>> continuation of the original. But looking at it from the first person,
>> each copy has no way of accessing the point of view of the other copy.
>> Uncertainty arises from the lack of information that each first person
>> perspective has about the entire picture. This, in fact, explains
>> probabilities in a more convincing way than the more conventional
>> models, because in more conventional models you have to live with this
>> weird idea of "randomness" that seems to defy explanation.
>

Hi Brent,

> But the complete symmetry of the duplication makes it too easy.  If the
> probabilities are 1/3 and 2/3 are three worlds instantiated in MWI or only
> two worlds with different "weights".

Three world at least, I would say. Of course, I imagine n worlds where
n/3 worlds contain one outcome and 2n/3 the other. I imagine n to be a
very large number and each slice to contain many variations of other
outcomes we are not controlling for in this case.

>  What if the probabilities are 1/pi and
> (1-1/pi)?

I don't think a probability with an irrational value would make sense
in this model.

>  Or (1-epsilon) and epsilon, where epsilon is just to account for
> all those things you haven't thought of, but are really improbable?

No problem. A very small percentage of the gazillion worlds will
contain the improbable outcome.

>>
>> So when you make a statement about the probability of something
>> happening, you are always making a statement about a possible
>
>
> There's where the problem comes in - what does "possible" cover?

It's easier to explain what impossible means - I die (not that it's
impossible for me to die, but that no continuation exists from that
state).
Possible means anything else, but specific outcomes will be more or
less numerous in the gazillion continuations. We are already in a very
specific are of the multiverse -- one where human beings exit on earth
and so forth. This comes with asymmetries.

I'm not surprised if this is very naif though, and I have no intention
of postulating.

Telmo.

> Brent
>
>> continuation of your first person experience and nothing more. In
>> fact, "happening" becomes an entirely 1p concept. This does not prove
>> anything but it does fit what we observe without the need for a
>> mysterious property called "randomness".
>>
>> You don't have to be suicidal to say yes to the doctor because what
>> the doctor is going to do to you happens all the time anyway.
>>
>> I think.
>>
>> Telmo.
>>
>>> 
>>> From: allco...@gmail.com
>>> Date: Mon, 7 Oct 2013 14:03:53 +0200
>>>
>>>
>>> Subject: Re: What gives philosophers a bad name?
>>> To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> 2013/10/7 chris peck 
>>>
>>> Hi Bruno
>>>
>>>
> Are you saying that the step 3 would provide a logical reason to say
> "no"
> to the doctor, and thus abandoning comp?
>>>
>>> I'm saying only the suicidal would expect a 50/50 chance of experiencing
>>> Moscow (or Washington) after teleportation and then say yes to the
>>> doctor.
>>>
>>> regards
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> It makes no sense, in the comp settings it is 100% sure you'll experience
>>> a
>>> next moment... the thing is, it's that there is two of you after
>>> duplication, both experience something M o W, the 50/50 is a probability
>>> expectat

Re: A challenge for Craig



On Tuesday, October 8, 2013 3:40:53 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 07 Oct 2013, at 17:20, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>
>
>
> On Monday, October 7, 2013 3:56:55 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>
>>
>> On 06 Oct 2013, at 22:00, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> Qualia is experience which contains the felt relation to all other 
>> experiences; specific experiences which directly relate, and extended 
>> experiential contexts which extent to eternity (totality of manifested 
>> events so far relative to the participant plus semi-potential events which 
>> relate to higher octaves of their participation...the bigger picture with 
>> the larger now.)
>>
>>
>> Then qualia are infinite. This contradict some of your previous 
>> statement. 
>>
>
> It's not qualia that is finite or infinite, it is finity-infinity itself 
> that is an intellectual quale. 
>
>
> OK. But this does not mean it is not also objective. The set of dividers 
> of 24 is finite. The set of multiple of 24 is infinite. For example.
>

It might not be objective, just common and consistent because it ultimately 
reflects itself, and because it reflects reflection. It may be the essence 
of objectivity, but from the absolute perspective, objectivity is the 
imposter - the power of sense to approximate itself without genuine 
embodiment.

Is the statement that the set of dividers is finite objectively true, or is 
it contingent upon ruling out rational numbers? Can't we just designate a 
variable, k = {the imaginary set of infinite dividers of 24}? 


>
> Quanta is derived from qualia, so quantitative characteristics have 
> ambiguous application outside of quanta.
>
>
> Yes, quanta comes from the Löbian qualia, in a 100% verifiable way. 
> Indeed. But that is again a consequence of computationalism.
>

Why isn't computationalism the consequence of quanta though? What can be 
computed other than quantities?
 

>
>
>
>
>
>>
>> Qualia is what we are made of. As human beings at this stage of human 
>> civilization, our direct qualia is primarily cognitive-logical-verbal. We 
>> identify with our ability to describe with words - to qualify other qualia 
>> as verbal qualia. We name our perceptions and name our naming power 'mind', 
>> but that is not consciousness. Logic and intellect can only name 
>> public-facing reductions of certain qualia (visible and tangible qualia - 
>> the stuff of public bodies). The name for those public-facing reductions is 
>> quanta, or numbers, and the totality of the playing field which can be used 
>> for the quanta game is called arithmetic truth.
>>
>>
>> Arithmetical truth is full of non nameable things. Qualia refer to non 
>> verbally describable first person truth.
>>
>
> Can arithmetical truth really name anything? 
>
>
> I am not sure Arithmetical Truth can be seen as a person, or anything 
> capable of naming things. You are stretching the words too much. I guess 
> that if you make your statement more precise, it will lead to an open 
> problem in comp.
>

If Arithmetic truth is full of non nameable things, what nameable things 
does it also contain, and what or who is naming them? Otherwise wouldn't it 
be tautological to say that it is full of non nameable things, as it would 
be to say that water is full of non dry things.
 

>
>
>
> It seems to me that we can use arithmetic truth to locate a number within 
> the infinity of computable realtions, but any 'naming' is only our own 
> attempt to attach a proprietary first person sense to that which is 
> irreducibly generic and nameless. The thing about qualia is not that it is 
> non-nameable, it is the specific aesthetic presence that is manifested. 
> Names are just qualia of mental association - a rose by any other name, 
> etc. 
>
>
> I think this could be made more precise by taking "our" in the Löbian 
> sense.
>

If quanta is Löbian qualia, why would it need any non-quantitative names?

Craig


> Bruno
>
>
>
> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
>
>
>
>

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Re: What gives philosophers a bad name?

2013-10-08 Thread John Clark

On Mon, Oct 7, 2013 at 12:31 PM, Quentin Anciaux  wrote:

> You are spitting non-sense... that's not what is asked. He will do *both*
> from a 3rd POV but each Bruno can only live *ONE* stream of
> consciousness which is *either* M or W, it's not both. So before
> duplication, the probability (or measure of you prefer) is 50/50 for the
> destinations from the POV if the guy standing in H. *IT'S THE SAME THING IN
> MWI SETTING AND I DON'T HEAR YOU CRYING NONSENSE ABOUT IT ON EVERY POST*.
> Be consistant and reject MWI as an obvious BS crap.
>

 And You are mixing apples and oranges and bananas:

*Quantum Mechanics is about finding a probability that works better than
random guessing in predicting if a event will be seen.

*Many Worlds is a theory that explains why Quantum Mechanics works as well
as it does that some think (including me) is a little (but only a little)
less odd than competing explanations.

*Bruno's "proof" is about the continuous feeling of self, and that has
nothing to do with predictions in general or probabilities in particular;
it is about remembering who you were yesterday.

  John K Clark

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Re: The ultimate reason of knowledge faith power and entrophy reduction, computabilty, evolution, the universe and everithing



On 08 Oct 2013, at 14:06, Craig Weinberg wrote:




On Tuesday, October 8, 2013 4:15:29 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 07 Oct 2013, at 22:58, John Mikes wrote:


Bruno: you wrote:

The US constitution is very good, but is not really followed, and  
things like prohibition have put bandits into power, who have  
broken the important separation of powers.
Lobbying and the role of money in politics should be revised. But  
we are a bit out of topic here, I think.


Out of topic of "everything"? OK, OK, I know. But the US  
Constitution (IMO) HAS BEEN very good in a 300+ year old societal  
view - drawn by duelling, pipe-smoking, hunting male chauvinist  
slave-owner despots to organize the 'colonies' NOT TO PAY taxes to  
the King of England. Now, the Supreme Court's "oldies" (probably  
younger than me) valuate the 18th c. language for the 21st c. life  
in a many times skewed sense.
Lobbying I call "buying votes" for a special interest, money is not  
"talk" and corporation is not a 'person' (as e.g. a citizen). And  
so on.


OK. especially with "lobbying = buying votes".

Bruno




JM


On Mon, Oct 7, 2013 at 3:39 AM, Bruno Marchal   
wrote:


On 06 Oct 2013, at 18:08, Alberto G. Corona wrote:

Some academies are just prostituted to rotten (sometime) politics,  
often just to get enough funding to survive.


Money is not the problem. Black, obscure and grey money is the  
problem.


Wait, this is indeed the most fundamental question!

How knowledge interact with money and power in society and convert  
itself in beliefs as a system that prevent further knowledge must  
be an integral part of research.


For me this meta-knowledge about knowledge faith and power is a  
more fundamental question than knowledge itself.

---

I think that people don' t want knowledge primarily.


Ha Ha ... That reminds me when my father told me that truth is what  
humans fear the most and like the less.




What they aim at, is like any living being, and in fact, like any  
stable dynamic auto-regulated structure, is  to reduce uncertainty.


The humans oscillate between security/certainty/control and freedom/ 
uncertainty/universality. Basically that is why we vote, to have a  
sort of equilibrium in between.






That fit with many considerations at different levels, and embrace  
conclussions of evolution, game theory, computability, social  
science psychology and entropy.



 That explain how knowledge interact with power (and money and you  
wish) and faith. As I will explain:


To reduce uncertainty can be achieved adquiring pure knowledge of  
the world around in order to predict better the future.


But it can also be achieved by adquiring for themselves money or  
power, or love from other people, or commitment from tem, or  
respect, or common commintment to something or someone.


The fact is that pure knowledge is not enoug. Money is not enough,  
power is not enough, since neither of them work without a  
committed society that make use of this knowledge in an organized  
way, that respect the money value and other properties, that has  
fair mechanism for adquiring power and legitimacy, and more that  
that, a society with a  clear plan for our sibiling and  
generations to come.


Thinking materialistically (I´m not but for a matter of argument)  
there is no social vehicle for our genes if the society have all  
these requirements, and, more important, no people that had not  
these requirements ullfilled survived, so we have inherited this  
natural seeking for all these kinds of uncertainty reduction  
mechanism around us.


Some societies make enphasis in one kind of uncertainty reduction.  
Others rely more in other different in this equation. These  
different uncertainty reduction alternatives are one against the  
other. A strict hiearchi of power and legitimacy based on an  
enforced supernatural plan is a excellent uncertainty reduction  
for a stable society that does not need to change. In the other  
side, adquring knowledge is good, but that may challenge the  
structure, questionin legitimacies and creating civil wars, that  
can be pacific or violent. When there is no common plans nor  
loyaltyes, the pacific disputes become violent almos by defintion.


A lot of philosophy on all their branches can be extracted from  
this starting point.


The US constitution is very good, but is not really followed, and  
things like prohibition have put bandits into power, who have  
broken the important separation of powers.


Lobbying and the role of money in politics should be revised. But  
we are a bit out of topic here, I think.


Bruno




I can actually bring the topic back around to Symbol Grounding/AI.  
The issue of corporate personhood has always struck me as a variant  
of the Chinese Room or China Brain, but recently the concept of  
money as free speech caught my attention also. Money is used in many  
different ways. from small personal transactions involving a loaf of  
bread an

Re: A challenge for Craig



On Tuesday, October 8, 2013 10:10:25 AM UTC-4, Jason wrote:
>
>
>
>
> On Sun, Oct 6, 2013 at 3:00 PM, Craig Weinberg 
> 
> > wrote:
>
>>
>>
>> On Sunday, October 6, 2013 5:06:31 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>
>>>  
>>> On 06 Oct 2013, at 03:17, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: 
>>>
>>> > On 5 October 2013 00:40, Bruno Marchal  wrote: 
>>> > 
>>> >>> The argument is simply summarised thus: it is impossible even for   
>>> >>> God 
>>> >>> to make a brain prosthesis that reproduces the I/O behaviour but has 
>>> >>> different qualia. This is a proof of comp, 
>>> >> 
>>> >> 
>>> >> Hmm... I can agree, but eventually no God can make such a   
>>> >> prothesis, only 
>>> >> because the qualia is an attribute of the "immaterial person", and   
>>> >> not of 
>>> >> the brain, body, or computer.  Then the prosthesis will manifest   
>>> >> the person 
>>> >> if it emulates the correct level. 
>>> > 
>>> > But if the qualia are attributed to the substance of the physical 
>>> > brain then where is the problem making a prosthesis that replicates 
>>> > the behaviour but not the qualia? 
>>> > The problem is that it would allow 
>>> > one to make a partial zombie, which I think is absurd. Therefore, the 
>>> > qualia cannot be attributed to the substance of the physical brain. 
>>>
>>> I agree. 
>>>
>>> Note that in that case the qualia is no more attributed to an   
>>> immaterial person, but to a piece of primary matter. 
>>> In that case, both comp and functionalism (in your sense, not in   
>>> Putnam's usual sense of functionalism which is a particular case of   
>>> comp) are wrong. 
>>>
>>> Then, it is almost obvious that an immaterial being cannot distinguish   
>>> between a primarily material incarnation, and an immaterial one, as it   
>>> would need some magic (non Turing emulable) ability to make the   
>>> difference.  People agreeing with this do no more need the UDA step 8   
>>> (which is an attempt to make this more rigorous or clear). 
>>>
>>> I might criticize, as a devil's advocate, a little bit the partial- 
>>> zombie argument. Very often some people pretend that they feel less   
>>> conscious after some drink of vodka, but that they are still able to   
>>> behave normally. Of course those people are notoriously wrong. It is   
>>> just that alcohol augments a fake self-confidence feeling, which   
>>> typically is not verified (in the laboratory, or more sadly on the   
>>> roads). Also, they confuse "less conscious" with "blurred   
>>> consciousness",
>>>
>>
>> Why wouldn't less consciousness have the effect of seeming blurred? If 
>> your battery is dying in a device, the device might begin to fail in 
>> numerous ways, but those are all symptoms of the battery dying - of the 
>> device becoming less reliable as different parts are unavailable at 
>> different times.
>>
>> Think of qualia as a character in a long story, which is divided into 
>> episodes. If, for instance, someone starts watching a show like Breaking 
>> Bad only in the last season, they have no explicit understanding of who 
>> Walter White is or why he behaves like he does, where Jesse came from, etc. 
>> They can only pick up what is presented directly in that episode, so his 
>> character is relatively flat. The difference between the appreciation of 
>> the last episode by someone who has seen the entire series on HDTV and 
>> someone who has only read the closed captioning of the last episode on 
>> Twitter is like the difference between a human being's qualia and the 
>> qualia which is available through a logical imitation of a human bring. 
>>
>> Qualia is experience which contains the felt relation to all other 
>> experiences; specific experiences which directly relate, and extended 
>> experiential contexts which extent to eternity (totality of manifested 
>> events so far relative to the participant plus semi-potential events which 
>> relate to higher octaves of their participation...the bigger picture with 
>> the larger now.) 
>>
>>
>
> Craig,
>
> I agree with you that there is some "building up" required to create a 
> full and rich human experience, which cannot happen in a single instance or 
> with a single CPU instruction being executed. However, where I disagree 
> with you is in how long it takes for all the particulars of the experience 
> to be generated from the computation.  I don't think it requires 
> re-calculating the entire history of the human race, or life itself on some 
> planet.  I think it can be done by comparing relations to memories and data 
> stored entirely within the brain itself; say within 0.1 to 0.5 seconds of 
> computation by the brain, not the eons of life's evolution.
>

That could be true in theory but it does not seem to be supported by 
nature. In reality, there is no way to watch a movie in less time than the 
movie takes to be watched without sacrificing some qualities of the 
experience. Experience is nothing like data, as data is compressible since 
it has no qua

Re: A challenge for Craig



On 08 Oct 2013, at 17:59, Craig Weinberg wrote:




On Tuesday, October 8, 2013 3:40:53 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 07 Oct 2013, at 17:20, Craig Weinberg wrote:




On Monday, October 7, 2013 3:56:55 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 06 Oct 2013, at 22:00, Craig Weinberg wrote:



Qualia is experience which contains the felt relation to all other  
experiences; specific experiences which directly relate, and  
extended experiential contexts which extent to eternity (totality  
of manifested events so far relative to the participant plus semi- 
potential events which relate to higher octaves of their  
participation...the bigger picture with the larger now.)


Then qualia are infinite. This contradict some of your previous  
statement.


It's not qualia that is finite or infinite, it is finity-infinity  
itself that is an intellectual quale.


OK. But this does not mean it is not also objective. The set of  
dividers of 24 is finite. The set of multiple of 24 is infinite. For  
example.


It might not be objective, just common and consistent because it  
ultimately reflects itself, and because it reflects reflection. It  
may be the essence of objectivity, but from the absolute  
perspective, objectivity is the imposter - the power of sense to  
approximate itself without genuine embodiment.


Is the statement that the set of dividers is finite objectively  
true, or is it contingent upon ruling out rational numbers? Can't we  
just designate a variable, k = {the imaginary set of infinite  
dividers of 24}?


"Absolute" can be used once we agree on the definition. The fact that  
some alien write 1+1=4 for our 1+1=2, just because they define 4 by  
s(s(0)), would not made 1+1=2 less absolute.


The fact that we are interested in integers dividing integers might be  
contingent, but that does not make contingent the fact that the set of  
dividers of 24 is a finite set of integers.








Quanta is derived from qualia, so quantitative characteristics have  
ambiguous application outside of quanta.


Yes, quanta comes from the Löbian qualia, in a 100% verifiable way.  
Indeed. But that is again a consequence of computationalism.


Why isn't computationalism the consequence of quanta though?


Human computationalism does.

But I want the simplest conceptual theory, and integers are easier to  
define than human integers.







What can be computed other than quantities?


Quantities are easily computed by stopping machines, but most machines  
does not stop, and when they introspect, the theory explains why they  
get troubled by consciousness, qualia, etc. Those qualia are not  
really computed, they are part of non computable truth, but which  
still bear on machines or machine's perspective.
















Qualia is what we are made of. As human beings at this stage of  
human civilization, our direct qualia is primarily cognitive- 
logical-verbal. We identify with our ability to describe with  
words - to qualify other qualia as verbal qualia. We name our  
perceptions and name our naming power 'mind', but that is not  
consciousness. Logic and intellect can only name public-facing  
reductions of certain qualia (visible and tangible qualia - the  
stuff of public bodies). The name for those public-facing  
reductions is quanta, or numbers, and the totality of the playing  
field which can be used for the quanta game is called arithmetic  
truth.


Arithmetical truth is full of non nameable things. Qualia refer to  
non verbally describable first person truth.


Can arithmetical truth really name anything?


I am not sure Arithmetical Truth can be seen as a person, or  
anything capable of naming things. You are stretching the words too  
much. I guess that if you make your statement more precise, it will  
lead to an open problem in comp.


If Arithmetic truth is full of non nameable things, what nameable  
things does it also contain,


The numbers, the recursive properties, the recursively enumarable  
properties, the Sigma_i truth, well a lot of things.
You have the recursive (the simplest in our comp setting), then the  
recursively enumerable (the universal machines, notably), then a whole  
hierarchy of non computable, but still nameable set of numbers, or  
machine's properties, then you got the non nameable properties, like  
true (for number relations) but very plausibly, things like  
consciousness, persons, etc.
Some of those non nameable things can still be studied by machines,  
through assumptions, and approximations.

Above that you have the truth that you cannot even approximated, etc.
Arithmetical truth is big, *very* big.




and what or who is naming them?


The machines. (in the comp setting, despite the machines theology does  
refer to higher non-machine entities capable of naming things. That's  
the case for the first order logical G* (which I note usually qG*,  
this one needs more than arithmetical truth, but it is normal as it  
describes an intensional (modal) view

Re: A challenge for Craig

2013-10-08 Thread Jason Resch

On Tue, Oct 8, 2013 at 11:18 AM, Craig Weinberg wrote:

>
>
> On Tuesday, October 8, 2013 10:10:25 AM UTC-4, Jason wrote:
>
>>
>>
>>
>> On Sun, Oct 6, 2013 at 3:00 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Sunday, October 6, 2013 5:06:31 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>

 On 06 Oct 2013, at 03:17, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:

 > On 5 October 2013 00:40, Bruno Marchal  wrote:
 >
 >>> The argument is simply summarised thus: it is impossible even for
 >>> God
 >>> to make a brain prosthesis that reproduces the I/O behaviour but
 has
 >>> different qualia. This is a proof of comp,
 >>
 >>
 >> Hmm... I can agree, but eventually no God can make such a
 >> prothesis, only
 >> because the qualia is an attribute of the "immaterial person", and
 >> not of
 >> the brain, body, or computer.  Then the prosthesis will manifest
 >> the person
 >> if it emulates the correct level.
 >
 > But if the qualia are attributed to the substance of the physical
 > brain then where is the problem making a prosthesis that replicates
 > the behaviour but not the qualia?
 > The problem is that it would allow
 > one to make a partial zombie, which I think is absurd. Therefore, the
 > qualia cannot be attributed to the substance of the physical brain.

 I agree.

 Note that in that case the qualia is no more attributed to an
 immaterial person, but to a piece of primary matter.
 In that case, both comp and functionalism (in your sense, not in
 Putnam's usual sense of functionalism which is a particular case of
 comp) are wrong.

 Then, it is almost obvious that an immaterial being cannot distinguish

 between a primarily material incarnation, and an immaterial one, as it

 would need some magic (non Turing emulable) ability to make the
 difference.  People agreeing with this do no more need the UDA step 8
 (which is an attempt to make this more rigorous or clear).

 I might criticize, as a devil's advocate, a little bit the partial-
 zombie argument. Very often some people pretend that they feel less
 conscious after some drink of vodka, but that they are still able to
 behave normally. Of course those people are notoriously wrong. It is
 just that alcohol augments a fake self-confidence feeling, which
 typically is not verified (in the laboratory, or more sadly on the
 roads). Also, they confuse "less conscious" with "blurred
 consciousness",

>>>
>>> Why wouldn't less consciousness have the effect of seeming blurred? If
>>> your battery is dying in a device, the device might begin to fail in
>>> numerous ways, but those are all symptoms of the battery dying - of the
>>> device becoming less reliable as different parts are unavailable at
>>> different times.
>>>
>>> Think of qualia as a character in a long story, which is divided into
>>> episodes. If, for instance, someone starts watching a show like Breaking
>>> Bad only in the last season, they have no explicit understanding of who
>>> Walter White is or why he behaves like he does, where Jesse came from, etc.
>>> They can only pick up what is presented directly in that episode, so his
>>> character is relatively flat. The difference between the appreciation of
>>> the last episode by someone who has seen the entire series on HDTV and
>>> someone who has only read the closed captioning of the last episode on
>>> Twitter is like the difference between a human being's qualia and the
>>> qualia which is available through a logical imitation of a human bring.
>>>
>>> Qualia is experience which contains the felt relation to all other
>>> experiences; specific experiences which directly relate, and extended
>>> experiential contexts which extent to eternity (totality of manifested
>>> events so far relative to the participant plus semi-potential events which
>>> relate to higher octaves of their participation...the bigger picture with
>>> the larger now.)
>>>
>>>
>>
>> Craig,
>>
>> I agree with you that there is some "building up" required to create a
>> full and rich human experience, which cannot happen in a single instance or
>> with a single CPU instruction being executed. However, where I disagree
>> with you is in how long it takes for all the particulars of the experience
>> to be generated from the computation.  I don't think it requires
>> re-calculating the entire history of the human race, or life itself on some
>> planet.  I think it can be done by comparing relations to memories and data
>> stored entirely within the brain itself; say within 0.1 to 0.5 seconds of
>> computation by the brain, not the eons of life's evolution.
>>
>
> That could be true in theory but it does not seem to be supported by
> nature. In reality, there is no way to watch a movie in less time than the
> movie takes to be watched without sacrificing some qualities of the
> experience.
>

But when

Pedagogy of the Anti-Miraculous

http://multisenserealism.com/2013/10/08/pedagogy-of-the-anti-miraculous/

Possibly it is not that our human experience is derived from mechanical 
fundamentals, it is merely customized, and it is customized because 
experience can be understood as customization itself. Every moment that we 
live in and live through is tailor-made for “us”, not just as individuals, 
but as also as the living history of all that has gone before us. “We” are 
an influx of proprietary relativism against a backdrop of the same, but 
twisted 180 degrees so that it is a representation of its opposite.

If private sense is the experienced ratio of all that is directly 
historical to the self against all that is indirectly historical, then its 
opposite would be a sense of public generality and fundamentalism in which 
privacy is granulated and diagonalized into oblivion. We call this 
diagonalization entropy, where all that has form and function begins to 
break down and decay before our eyes, while its continuous replenishment 
leads and follows behind our backs. The idea of emulation is to escape 
entropy by building a conscious machine from generic digits. It is to build 
the driver of a car from the car’s exhaust.

As our consciousness does its job of tuning us in to a personalized and 
familiar experience, the unseen effect is that we are tuned out to the 
unfamiliar by perceptual approximation. That which is unique is elided and 
generalized. When we look casually at a thousand oranges, we can’t tell 
them apart. Each one is, from an absolute perspective, a unique and 
unrepeatable event in the universe, but because we cannot identify with a 
fruit tree’s experience, it becomes just ‘an orange’ to us. Behind the 
absolute uniqueness of every experience is uniqueness itself – an 
impossible improbability which teases itself into a kind of self-hypnosis 
of pantomimed multiplicity and repetition.

That which is initiated manually as custom intent is reverberated back to 
us in countless extensions, each conspiring with the other to effect a 
consensus in the image of futility. The universe’s mute response, “the 
silence of God” is, surprisingly, evidence of our own prominent exception 
to the rule of indifference. Our struggle against entropy, as individuals 
and as living ecosystems dating back to the Pre-Cambrian is in stark 
contrast to the representation of all that is public. That we can tell the 
difference is the difference. That we can sense and make sense is not just 
a miracle, it is the miracle which makes the appearance of ordinary 
possible. It is through that appearance that we can forget the past, while 
still remembering it, and build new worlds without risk of repeating 
ourselves exactly.

The trick is to rig the reflection so that it hides the absolute truth, so 
that the miraculous appears ordinary and generic and the proprietary 
appears as an unexplainable fluke.

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Re: What gives philosophers a bad name?



On 08 Oct 2013, at 18:05, John Clark wrote:





On Mon, Oct 7, 2013 at 12:31 PM, Quentin Anciaux  
 wrote:


> You are spitting non-sense... that's not what is asked. He will do  
*both* from a 3rd POV but each Bruno can only live *ONE* stream  
of consciousness which is *either* M or W, it's not both. So before  
duplication, the probability (or measure of you prefer) is 50/50 for  
the destinations from the POV if the guy standing in H. *IT'S THE  
SAME THING IN MWI SETTING AND I DON'T HEAR YOU CRYING NONSENSE ABOUT  
IT ON EVERY POST*. Be consistant and reject MWI as an obvious BS crap.


 And You are mixing apples and oranges and bananas:

*Quantum Mechanics is about finding a probability that works better  
than random guessing in predicting if a event will be seen.


*Many Worlds is a theory that explains why Quantum Mechanics works  
as well as it does that some think (including me) is a little (but  
only a little) less odd than competing explanations.


*Bruno's "proof" is about the continuous feeling of self,


It is a reasoning starting from the invariance of consciousness for a  
digital substitution (computationalism).




and that has nothing to do with predictions in general or  
probabilities in particular;



That invariance entails that physics has to emerge from a statistics  
on computations, and we can already technically compare many things in  
the comp-physics and the usual physics, so that we can already refute  
a version of comp (comp + the classical theory of knowledge).





it is about remembering who you were yesterday.


With a self-duplication in between. Yes, that step 3. You remember  
that you were in Helsinki, and you see that you are in Washington, for  
example. You see also that in the notebook you predicted that you will  
feel to be in Washington and in Moscow, but obviously you see only  
Washington, so you conclude that you were wrong or did not understand  
the question (and with some chance, now you know better, as we will  
reiterate the experience.


With step seven, there will be (like in Deutsch interpretation of  
Everett QM) aleph_0 copies "in between", and things will get more  
interesting and precise about the relationship between consciousness  
and physical realities (and other realities). It might be better, at  
some point, to talk, like Deutsch, on consciousness differentiation,  
instead of universe multiplication, as the term "universe" is quite  
fuzzy.


IN AUDA (arithmetical universal dovetailer argument), we "model" the  
machine's believability by the assertability by an ideal correct  
universal machine believing in induction, which makes their logic of  
provability axiomatized by Löb's formula, and derive the quantum logic  
by defining the probability one by Bp & Dt (with all the technical  
details provided).


We exploit the gap between G and G*, to get namable but non rationally  
believable  truth for those machines, which provides natural candidate  
for qualia, and here too there are formal confirmations. this has been  
verified by many people, but you can verify it by yourself, in you  
study a bit of logic.


Bruno


http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



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Re: What gives philosophers a bad name?


On 10/8/2013 9:05 AM, John Clark wrote:




On Mon, Oct 7, 2013 at 12:31 PM, Quentin Anciaux > wrote:


> You are spitting non-sense... that's not what is asked. He will do *both* 
from a
3rd POV but each Bruno can only live *ONE* stream of consciousness 
which is
*either* M or W, it's not both. So before duplication, the probability (or 
measure
of you prefer) is 50/50 for the destinations from the POV if the guy 
standing in H.
*IT'S THE SAME THING IN MWI SETTING AND I DON'T HEAR YOU CRYING NONSENSE 
ABOUT IT ON
EVERY POST*. Be consistant and reject MWI as an obvious BS crap.


 And You are mixing apples and oranges and bananas:

*Quantum Mechanics is about finding a probability that works better than random guessing 
in predicting if a event will be seen.


*Many Worlds is a theory that explains why Quantum Mechanics works as well as it does 
that some think (including me) is a little (but only a little) less odd than competing 
explanations.


How do you explain quantum mechanical probabilities in the Many Worlds 
interpretation?

Brent

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Re: A challenge for Craig

On Tuesday, October 8, 2013 12:41:26 PM UTC-4, Jason wrote:
>
>
>
>

>>>
>>> Craig,
>>>
>>> I agree with you that there is some "building up" required to create a 
>>> full and rich human experience, which cannot happen in a single instance or 
>>> with a single CPU instruction being executed. However, where I disagree 
>>> with you is in how long it takes for all the particulars of the experience 
>>> to be generated from the computation.  I don't think it requires 
>>> re-calculating the entire history of the human race, or life itself on some 
>>> planet.  I think it can be done by comparing relations to memories and data 
>>> stored entirely within the brain itself; say within 0.1 to 0.5 seconds of 
>>> computation by the brain, not the eons of life's evolution.
>>>
>>
>> That could be true in theory but it does not seem to be supported by 
>> nature. In reality, there is no way to watch a movie in less time than the 
>> movie takes to be watched without sacrificing some qualities of the 
>> experience. 
>>
>
> But when you watch the last 5 seconds of the movie, your brain has the 
> context/memories of all the previous parts of the movie.  If you 
> instantiated a brain from scratch with all the same memories of someone who 
> watched the first 2 hours of the movie,
>

That's what I am saying is not necessarily possible. A brain is not a 
receptacle of memories any more than a body is a person's autobiography. We 
are not a brain - the brain mostly does things that have nothing to do with 
our awareness, and we do things which have mostly nothing to do with our 
brains. Filling someone's library with books they have never read does not 
give them the experience of having read them. You are assuming that 
experience is in fact unnecessary and can be transplanted out of context 
into another life. If that could happen, I think that no living organism 
would ever forget anything, and there would never be any desire to repeat 
any experience. Why eat an apple when you can remember eating one in the 
past? Why have any experiences at all if we can just compute data? What is 
the benefit of experience?

> and then showed them the last 5 seconds, they would understand the ending 
> as well as anyone made to sit through the whole thing.
>

You wouldn't need to show them anything, just implant the memory of having 
seen the whole thing. That would work if the universe was based on 
mechanism instead of experience, but a universe based on mechanism makes 
experience redundant and superfluous.

>  
>
>> Experience is nothing like data, as data is compressible since it has no 
>> qualitative content to be lost in translation. In all cases, calculation is 
>> used to eliminate experience - to automate and anesthetize. 
>>
>
> For you to make such a claim, you would have to experience life as one of 
> those automatons.  But you have not, so I don't see where you get this 
> knowledge about what entities are or or are not conscious.
>

It's knowledge, it's an understanding about what data can be used for and 
what it can't be. There are no entities which are not conscious. 
Consciousness is what defines an entity. We have only to look at our uses 
of computations and machines - how they relieve us of our conscious burdens 
with automatic and impersonal service. We have to look at our confirmation 
bias in the desire to animate puppets, in pareidolia, apophenia, and the 
pathetic fallacy. I like science fiction and technology as much as anyone, 
but if we are serious about turning a program into a person, we would have 
a lot of absurdities to overcome. Why is anything presented instead of just 
computed invisibly? Why do we care about individuality or authenticity? Why 
do we care about anything? So many dead ends with Comp.

>
>> It cannot imitate experience, any more than an HSV coordinate can look 
>> like a particular color. 
>>
>
> I believe it is the machine's interpretation of the input (however it is 
> represented), and in the context of the rest of its mind, which manifests 
> as the experience of color.  You could say an HSV coordinate is not a 
> color, but neither is the electrical signaling of the optic nerve a color.
>

Right, but I would never say that the electrical signaling of the optic 
nerve is a color any more than I would say that the Eiffel Tower has a 
French accent. We can't look assume that a brain is a complete description 
of a human life, otherwise the human life would be redundant. The brain 
would simply be there, running computations, measuring acoustic and optical 
vibrations, analyzing aerosol chemistry, etc - all in complete blind 
silence. Memories would simply be logs of previous computations, not 
worldly fictions.

If you start from the perspective that what is outside of your personal 
experience must be the only reality, then you are taking a description of 
yourself from something that knows almost nothing about you. Trying to 
recreate yourself from that descr

Re: A challenge for Craig



On Tuesday, October 8, 2013 12:34:57 PM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 08 Oct 2013, at 17:59, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>
>
>
> On Tuesday, October 8, 2013 3:40:53 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>
>>
>> On 07 Oct 2013, at 17:20, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Monday, October 7, 2013 3:56:55 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>> On 06 Oct 2013, at 22:00, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> Qualia is experience which contains the felt relation to all other 
>>> experiences; specific experiences which directly relate, and extended 
>>> experiential contexts which extent to eternity (totality of manifested 
>>> events so far relative to the participant plus semi-potential events which 
>>> relate to higher octaves of their participation...the bigger picture with 
>>> the larger now.)
>>>
>>>
>>> Then qualia are infinite. This contradict some of your previous 
>>> statement. 
>>>
>>
>> It's not qualia that is finite or infinite, it is finity-infinity itself 
>> that is an intellectual quale. 
>>
>>
>> OK. But this does not mean it is not also objective. The set of dividers 
>> of 24 is finite. The set of multiple of 24 is infinite. For example.
>>
>
> It might not be objective, just common and consistent because it 
> ultimately reflects itself, and because it reflects reflection. It may be 
> the essence of objectivity, but from the absolute perspective, objectivity 
> is the imposter - the power of sense to approximate itself without genuine 
> embodiment.
>
> Is the statement that the set of dividers is finite objectively true, or 
> is it contingent upon ruling out rational numbers? Can't we just designate 
> a variable, k = {the imaginary set of infinite dividers of 24}? 
>
>
> "Absolute" can be used once we agree on the definition. The fact that some 
> alien write 1+1=4 for our 1+1=2, just because they define 4 by s(s(0)), 
> would not made 1+1=2 less absolute.
>
> The fact that we are interested in integers dividing integers might be 
> contingent, but that does not make contingent the fact that the set of 
> dividers of 24 is a finite set of integers.
>

Sure, but anything that is natural has self-consistent wholeness and can 
seem like a universal given if we focus our attention only on that. If it 
were truly not contingent it would be impossible for anyone to get a math 
problem wrong. As far as I can tell, the idea of an integer is an 
abstraction of countable solid objects that we use to objectify our own 
cognitive products. It doesn't seem very useful when it comes to 
representing non-solids, non-objects, or non-cognitive phenomenology.


>
>
>
>
>>
>> Quanta is derived from qualia, so quantitative characteristics have 
>> ambiguous application outside of quanta.
>>
>>
>> Yes, quanta comes from the Löbian qualia, in a 100% verifiable way. 
>> Indeed. But that is again a consequence of computationalism.
>>
>
> Why isn't computationalism the consequence of quanta though? 
>
>
> Human computationalism does.
>
> But I want the simplest conceptual theory, and integers are easier to 
> define than human integers.
>

I'm not sure how that relates to computationalism being something other 
than quanta. Humans are easier to define to themselves than integers. A 
baby can be themselves for years before counting to 10. 
 

>
>
>
>
>
> What can be computed other than quantities?
>
>
> Quantities are easily computed by stopping machines, but most machines 
> does not stop, and when they introspect, the theory explains why they get 
> troubled by consciousness, qualia, etc. Those qualia are not really 
> computed, they are part of non computable truth, but which still bear on 
> machines or machine's perspective.
>

Then you still have an explanatory gap. How can anything which is 
non-computable bear on the computation of an ideal machine? What connects 
the qualia to the quanta, and why isn't the qualia just quantitative 
summaries of quanta?
 

>
>
>
>
>
>
>  
>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>>
>>> Qualia is what we are made of. As human beings at this stage of human 
>>> civilization, our direct qualia is primarily cognitive-logical-verbal. We 
>>> identify with our ability to describe with words - to qualify other qualia 
>>> as verbal qualia. We name our perceptions and name our naming power 'mind', 
>>> but that is not consciousness. Logic and intellect can only name 
>>> public-facing reductions of certain qualia (visible and tangible qualia - 
>>> the stuff of public bodies). The name for those public-facing reductions is 
>>> quanta, or numbers, and the totality of the playing field which can be used 
>>> for the quanta game is called arithmetic truth.
>>>
>>>
>>> Arithmetical truth is full of non nameable things. Qualia refer to non 
>>> verbally describable first person truth.
>>>
>>
>> Can arithmetical truth really name anything? 
>>
>>
>> I am not sure Arithmetical Truth can be seen as a person, or anything 
>> capable of naming things. You are stretching the words too much. I guess 
>> tha

Re: AUDA and pronouns



On 08 Oct 2013, at 11:51, Russell Standish wrote:


On Mon, Oct 07, 2013 at 10:20:14AM +0200, Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 07 Oct 2013, at 07:36, Russell Standish wrote:

Unfortunately, the thread about AUDA and its relation to pronouncs  
got

mixed up with another thread, and thus got delete on my computer.

Picking up from where we left off, I'm still trying to see the
relationship between Bp, Bp&p, 1-I, 3-I and the plain ordinary I
pronoun in English.


As I said, in natural language we usually mix 1-I (Bp) and 3-I (Bp  
& p).

The reason is that we think we have only one body, and so, in all
practical situation it does not matter. (That's also why some people
will say I am my body, or I am my brain, like Searles, which used
that against comp, but if that was valid, the math shows that
machines can validly shows that they are not machine, which is
absurd).

The difference 1-I/3-I is felt sometimes by people looking at a
video of themselves. The objective situation can describe many
people, and you feel bizarre that you are one of them. That video
lacks of course the first person perspective.

The distinction is brought when we study the mind body problem. You
might red the best text ever on this: the Theaetetus of Plato. But
the indians have written many texts on this, and some are
chef-d'oeuvre (rigorous).



OK, although I don't have time to read those ancient texts, alas :(.


OK. I can understand.
The Theaetetus is very short, though.










I understand Bp can be read as "I can prove p", and "Bp&p" as "I  
know
p". But in the case, the difference between Bp and Bp&p is  
entirely in

the verb, the pronoun "I" stays the same, AFAICT.


Correct. Only the perspective change. "Bp" is "Toto proves p", said
by Toto.
"Bp & p" is "Toto proves p" and p is true, as said by Toto (or not),
and the math shows that this behaves like a knowledge opertaor (but
not arithmetical predicate).


It's the same Toto in both cases... What's the point?


The difference is crucial. Bp obeys to the logic G, which does not  
define a knower as we don't have Bp -> p.

At best, it defines a rational believer, or science. Not knowledge.
But differentiating W from M, is knowledge, even non communicable  
knowledge. You can't explain to another, that you are the one in  
Washington, as for the other, you are also in Moscow. Knowledge logic  
invite us to define the first person by the knower. He is the only one  
who can know that his pain is not fake, for example.








So, the ideally correct machine will
never been able to ascribe a name or a description to it.
Intuitively, for the machine, that "I" is not assertable, and indeed
such opertair refer to something without a name.



What does it mean to assert an "I"?


I was meaning to assert "I", with the idea that you refer to something  
understandable for another.

You can assert the 3-I, in this sense, but not the 1-I.

Now, without duplication, it looks all the time like there is a simple  
link between 3-I, and 1-I, and that is why we confuse them, but with  
the experience of duplication, at some point, the distinction is  
unavoidable, and crucial, and the simple link between is broken,  
forcing the reversal between math and physics (arithmetic and physics).












Also, switching viewpoints, one could equally say the Bp can be read
as "he can prove p",


but the point is that it is asserted by "he", in the language of  
"he".




But the statements can also be asserted by some other agent?


Of course. But in that case it is no more a third person *self*- 
reference (3-I).


"My hat is green" contains a third person self-reference.

My wife's hat is green" contains a third person self-reference.

"The hat of Napoleon is green" does not. Only third person references.

The logic of provable (third person) self-reference is given by the  
modal logic G (by Gödel, Löb, Solovay).

The logic of true (third person) self-reference is given by G*.

It always concerns, in our setting, what an ideally correct machine  
can rationally believe on itself.


The interesting thing is that G* proves Bp <-> (Bp & p), but G does  
not prove it. It shows that both the rational believer and the knower  
see the same (tiny) part of Arithmetic, yet see it from different  
points of view, and the logic will mathematically differ. The logic of  
B is G, and the logic of Bp & p is S4Grz.










and Bp&p as "he knows p", so the person order of
the pronoun is also not relevant.


Yes, you can read that in that way, but you get only the 3-view of
the 1-view.

Let us define [o]p by Bp & p

I am just pointing on the difference between B([o]p) and [o]([o]p).



???



B([o]p) is the statement made by the ideal rationalist believer (B) on  
a first person point of view ([o]). Here [o]p can be seen as an  
abbreviation for Bp & p.



[o]([o]p is the first person statement ([o]) on a first person point  
of view ([o]).


Just to illustrate John Clark's probable confusion, roughly translated

WSJ Article On Why Computers Make Lame Supermarket Cashiers

http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052702303492504579115310362925246.html

*Humans 1, Robots 0*
Cashiers Trump Self-Checkout Machines at the Grocery Store

Computers seem to be replacing humans across many industries, and we're all 
getting very nervous.

But if you want some reason for optimism, visit your local supermarket. See 
that self-checkout machine? It doesn't hold a candle to the humans—and its 
deficiencies neatly illustrate the limits of computers' abilities to mimic 
human skills.

The human supermarket checker is superior to the self-checkout machine in 
almost every way. The human is faster. The human has a more pleasing, less 
buggy interface. The human doesn't expect me to remember or look up codes 
for produce, she bags my groceries, and unlike the machine, she isn't on 
hair-trigger alert for any sign that I might be trying to steal toilet 
paper. Best of all, the human does all the work while I'm allowed to stand 
there and stupidly stare at my phone, which is my natural state of being.

There is only one problem with human checkers: They're in short supply. At 
my neighborhood big-box suburban supermarket, the lines for human checkers 
are often three or four deep, while the self-checkout queue is usually 
sparse. Customers who are new to self-checkout might take their short lines 
to mean that the machines are more efficient than the humans, but that 
would be a gross misunderstanding.

As far as I can tell, the self-checkout lines are short only because the 
machines aren't very good.

They work well enough in a pinch—when you want to check out just a handful 
of items, when you don't have much produce, when you aren't loaded down 
with coupons. But for any standard order, they're a big pain. Perversely, 
then, self-checkout machines' shortcomings are their best feature: because 
they're useless for most orders, their lines are shorter, making the 
machines seem faster than humans.

In most instances where I'm presented with a machine instead of a human, I 
rejoice. I prefer an ATM to a flesh-and-blood banker, and I find airport 
check-in machines more efficient than the unsmiling guy at the desk. But 
both these tasks—along with more routine computerized skills like robotic 
assembly lines—share a common feature: They're very narrow, specific, 
repeatable problems, ones that require little physical labor and not much 
cognitive flexibility.

Supermarket checkout—a low-wage job that doesn't require much 
training—sounds like it should be similarly vulnerable to robotic invasion. 
But it turns out that checking out groceries requires just enough 
mental-processing skills to be a prohibitive challenge for computers. In 
that way, supermarket checkout represents a class of jobs that computers 
can't yet match because, for now, they're just not very good substituting 
key human abilities.

What's so cognitively demanding about supermarket checkout? I spoke to 
several former checkout people, and they all pointed to the same skill: 
Identifying fruits and vegetables. Some supermarket produce is tagged with 
small stickers carrying product-lookup codes, but a lot of stuff isn't. 
It's the human checker's job to tell the difference between green leaf 
lettuce and green bell peppers, and then to remember the proper code.

"It took me about three or four weeks to get to the point where I wouldn't 
have to look up most items that came by," said Sam Orme, a 30-year-old grad 
student who worked as a checker when he was a teenager.

Another one-time checker, Ken Haskell, explained that even after months of 
doing the job, he would often get stumped. "Every once in a while I'd get a 
papaya or a mango and I'd have to reach for the book," he said.

In a recent research paper called "Dancing With Robots," the economists 
Frank Levy and Richard Murnane point out that computers replace human 
workers only when machines meet two key conditions. First, the information 
necessary to carry out the task must be put in a form that computers can 
understand, and second, the job must be routine enough that it can be 
expressed in a series of rules.

Supermarket checkout machines meet the second of these conditions, but they 
fail on the first. They lack proper information to do the job a human would 
do. To put it another way: They can't tell shiitakes from Shinola. Instead 
of identifying your produce, the machine asks you, the customer, to type in 
a code for every leafy green in your cart. Many times you'll have to look 
up the code in an on-screen directory. If a human checker asked you to 
remind him what that bunch of the oblong yellow fruit in your basket was, 
you'd ask to see his boss.

This deficiency extends far beyond the checkout lane.

"In the '60s people assumed you'd be reading X-rays and CT scans by 
computers within years," Mr. Levy said. "But it's nowhere near anything 
like that. You have certain computerized enhancements for simple images, 
but nothing like a real CT scan can be read

Re: AUDA and pronouns


On 10/8/2013 2:51 AM, Russell Standish wrote:

On Mon, Oct 07, 2013 at 10:20:14AM +0200, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 07 Oct 2013, at 07:36, Russell Standish wrote:
...

and Bp&p as "he knows p", so the person order of
the pronoun is also not relevant.

Yes, you can read that in that way, but you get only the 3-view of
the 1-view.

Let us define [o]p by Bp & p

I am just pointing on the difference between B([o]p) and [o]([o]p).


Isn't B(Bp)=Bp so:

B(Bp & p)  =?   B(Bp & p) & (Bp & P)

Bp  =?  Bp & p  -> false

Brent

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Re: WSJ Article On Why Computers Make Lame Supermarket Cashiers

2013-10-08 Thread smitra


Citeren Craig Weinberg :


http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052702303492504579115310362925246.html

*Humans 1, Robots 0*
Cashiers Trump Self-Checkout Machines at the Grocery Store

Computers seem to be replacing humans across many industries, and we're all
getting very nervous.

But if you want some reason for optimism, visit your local supermarket. See
that self-checkout machine? It doesn't hold a candle to the humans--and its
deficiencies neatly illustrate the limits of computers' abilities to mimic
human skills.

The human supermarket checker is superior to the self-checkout machine in
almost every way. The human is faster. The human has a more pleasing, less
buggy interface. The human doesn't expect me to remember or look up codes
for produce, she bags my groceries, and unlike the machine, she isn't on
hair-trigger alert for any sign that I might be trying to steal toilet
paper. Best of all, the human does all the work while I'm allowed to stand
there and stupidly stare at my phone, which is my natural state of being.

There is only one problem with human checkers: They're in short supply. At
my neighborhood big-box suburban supermarket, the lines for human checkers
are often three or four deep, while the self-checkout queue is usually
sparse. Customers who are new to self-checkout might take their short lines
to mean that the machines are more efficient than the humans, but that
would be a gross misunderstanding.

As far as I can tell, the self-checkout lines are short only because the
machines aren't very good.

They work well enough in a pinch--when you want to check out just a handful
of items, when you don't have much produce, when you aren't loaded down
with coupons. But for any standard order, they're a big pain. Perversely,
then, self-checkout machines' shortcomings are their best feature: because
they're useless for most orders, their lines are shorter, making the
machines seem faster than humans.

In most instances where I'm presented with a machine instead of a human, I
rejoice. I prefer an ATM to a flesh-and-blood banker, and I find airport
check-in machines more efficient than the unsmiling guy at the desk. But
both these tasks--along with more routine computerized skills like robotic
assembly lines--share a common feature: They're very narrow, specific,
repeatable problems, ones that require little physical labor and not much
cognitive flexibility.

Supermarket checkout--a low-wage job that doesn't require much
training--sounds like it should be similarly vulnerable to robotic invasion.
But it turns out that checking out groceries requires just enough
mental-processing skills to be a prohibitive challenge for computers. In
that way, supermarket checkout represents a class of jobs that computers
can't yet match because, for now, they're just not very good substituting
key human abilities.

What's so cognitively demanding about supermarket checkout? I spoke to
several former checkout people, and they all pointed to the same skill:
Identifying fruits and vegetables. Some supermarket produce is tagged with
small stickers carrying product-lookup codes, but a lot of stuff isn't.
It's the human checker's job to tell the difference between green leaf
lettuce and green bell peppers, and then to remember the proper code.

"It took me about three or four weeks to get to the point where I wouldn't
have to look up most items that came by," said Sam Orme, a 30-year-old grad
student who worked as a checker when he was a teenager.

Another one-time checker, Ken Haskell, explained that even after months of
doing the job, he would often get stumped. "Every once in a while I'd get a
papaya or a mango and I'd have to reach for the book," he said.

In a recent research paper called "Dancing With Robots," the economists
Frank Levy and Richard Murnane point out that computers replace human
workers only when machines meet two key conditions. First, the information
necessary to carry out the task must be put in a form that computers can
understand, and second, the job must be routine enough that it can be
expressed in a series of rules.

Supermarket checkout machines meet the second of these conditions, but they
fail on the first. They lack proper information to do the job a human would
do. To put it another way: They can't tell shiitakes from Shinola. Instead
of identifying your produce, the machine asks you, the customer, to type in
a code for every leafy green in your cart. Many times you'll have to look
up the code in an on-screen directory. If a human checker asked you to
remind him what that bunch of the oblong yellow fruit in your basket was,
you'd ask to see his boss.

This deficiency extends far beyond the checkout lane.

"In the '60s people assumed you'd be reading X-rays and CT scans by
computers within years," Mr. Levy said. "But it's nowhere near anything
like that. You have certain computerized enhancements for simple images,
but nothing like a real CT scan can be read by a computer--and the

Re: WSJ Article On Why Computers Make Lame Supermarket Cashiers


On 10/8/2013 1:22 PM, smi...@zonnet.nl wrote:


A lot of what I am always talking about is in there...computers don't
understand produce because they have no aesthetic sensibility. A mechanical
description of a function is not the same thing as participating in an
experience.


So when the check-out robot can recognize okra - which the cashiers always have to look up 
- you'll agree that robots have aesthetic sensibilty.




Craig




You can't expect a machine with the computational capabilities of less than an insect 
brain to the job most people do. 


And they don't even give the machine two weeks to learn.

It's actually amazing that such machines can do quite a lot, but some tasks we perform 
are the result of a significant part of our brain power.


Most of the problem is in recognizing 3D objects.  It may prove easier to create sniffers 
and chemical detectors.  I'll bet my dog could tell papaya from mango blindfolded.


Brent

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Re: Pedagogy of the Anti-Miraculous

Wow. Far out. I'm afraid I may have to await the "For Dummies" guide on
this one.

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Re: What gives philosophers a bad name?

On 9 October 2013 06:19, meekerdb  wrote:

>  On 10/8/2013 9:05 AM, John Clark wrote:
>
>
> On Mon, Oct 7, 2013 at 12:31 PM, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
>
>  > You are spitting non-sense... that's not what is asked. He will do
>> *both* from a 3rd POV but each Bruno can only live *ONE* stream of
>> consciousness which is *either* M or W, it's not both. So before
>> duplication, the probability (or measure of you prefer) is 50/50 for the
>> destinations from the POV if the guy standing in H. *IT'S THE SAME THING IN
>> MWI SETTING AND I DON'T HEAR YOU CRYING NONSENSE ABOUT IT ON EVERY POST*.
>> Be consistant and reject MWI as an obvious BS crap.
>>
>
>  And You are mixing apples and oranges and bananas:
>
> *Quantum Mechanics is about finding a probability that works better than
> random guessing in predicting if a event will be seen.
>
> *Many Worlds is a theory that explains why Quantum Mechanics works as well
> as it does that some think (including me) is a little (but only a little)
> less odd than competing explanations.
>
>
> How do you explain quantum mechanical probabilities in the Many Worlds
> interpretation?
>

That is the $64000 question! But surely it also equally applies to other
interpretations, e.g. Copenhagen has an infinity of values to select from,
so how do you get the Born rule there? (for example).

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Re: WSJ Article On Why Computers Make Lame Supermarket Cashiers

On Tuesday, October 8, 2013 4:33:32 PM UTC-4, Brent wrote:
>
> On 10/8/2013 1:22 PM, smi...@zonnet.nl  wrote: 
> >> 
> >> A lot of what I am always talking about is in there...computers don't 
> >> understand produce because they have no aesthetic sensibility. A 
> mechanical 
> >> description of a function is not the same thing as participating in an 
> >> experience. 
>
> So when the check-out robot can recognize okra - which the cashiers always 
> have to look up 
> - you'll agree that robots have aesthetic sensibilty. 
>

Aesthetic sensibility is not something that we can agree that something has 
except for ourselves. I mention aesthetic sensibility because the things 
that computers fail at in the article are related to sensation and the fact 
that it is different from states of computation. Similarly, a traffic 
signal is not the same thing as a traffic cop, even if they perform the 
same function relative to the flow of traffic. We get a robot to identify 
something which matches a description as 'okra' in the most primitive sense 
of matching, but that doesn't mean that it has any sense of what it is. A 
weighted picture of okra, or some plastic okra would probably do just as 
well.

>> 
> >> Craig 
> >> 
> > 
> > 
> > You can't expect a machine with the computational capabilities of less 
> than an insect 
> > brain to the job most people do. 
>
> And they don't even give the machine two weeks to learn. 
>
> > It's actually amazing that such machines can do quite a lot, but some 
> tasks we perform 
> > are the result of a significant part of our brain power. 
>
> Most of the problem is in recognizing 3D objects.  It may prove easier to 
> create sniffers 
> and chemical detectors.  I'll bet my dog could tell papaya from mango 
> blindfolded. 
>
> Brent 
>

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Re: Pedagogy of the Anti-Miraculous

One of these days I want try to do a kids version of Multisense Realism. 
That might be a good way of getting it out in a more accessible form.

On Tuesday, October 8, 2013 4:47:58 PM UTC-4, Liz R wrote:
>
> Wow. Far out. I'm afraid I may have to await the "For Dummies" guide on 
> this one.
>
>

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Re: What gives philosophers a bad name?


On 10/8/2013 1:50 PM, LizR wrote:
On 9 October 2013 06:19, meekerdb mailto:meeke...@verizon.net>> 
wrote:


On 10/8/2013 9:05 AM, John Clark wrote:


On Mon, Oct 7, 2013 at 12:31 PM, Quentin Anciaux mailto:allco...@gmail.com>> wrote:

> You are spitting non-sense... that's not what is asked. He will do 
*both*
from a 3rd POV but each Bruno can only live *ONE* stream of 
consciousness
which is *either* M or W, it's not both. So before duplication, the 
probability
(or measure of you prefer) is 50/50 for the destinations from the POV 
if the
guy standing in H. *IT'S THE SAME THING IN MWI SETTING AND I DON'T HEAR 
YOU
CRYING NONSENSE ABOUT IT ON EVERY POST*. Be consistant and reject MWI 
as an
obvious BS crap.


 And You are mixing apples and oranges and bananas:

*Quantum Mechanics is about finding a probability that works better than 
random
guessing in predicting if a event will be seen.

*Many Worlds is a theory that explains why Quantum Mechanics works as well 
as it
does that some think (including me) is a little (but only a little) less 
odd than
competing explanations.


How do you explain quantum mechanical probabilities in the Many Worlds 
interpretation?


That is the $64000 question! But surely it also equally applies to other 
interpretations, e.g. Copenhagen has an infinity of values to select from, so how do you 
get the Born rule there? (for example).


In the CI the Born rule is just a postulate.  There are never an infinity of possible 
observed values because the finite resolution of all instruments.  If you can associate 
probabilities to worlds then you can apply Gleason's theorem to get the Born rule.  But 
it's not clear what constitutes 'a world' apart from the circular requirement that it's 
something you get a measurement in.


But I'm asking JKC specifically, because I'm curious as to how his explanation of 
probabilities under MWI is different from Bruno's in his duplication experiment?


Brent

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Re: What gives philosophers a bad name?


On 10/8/2013 1:50 PM, LizR wrote:

That is the $64000 question!


Incidentally I haven't heard anyone use that expression in thirty years.  But I'm old 
enough to remember when Johnny Carson was the quiz master on the radio program "The $64 
Question".


How old are you Liz?

Brent

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And the 2013 Nobel Prize in Physics goes to…

http://www.quantumdiaries.org/2013/10/08/and-the-2013-nobel-prize-in-physics-goes-to/

Today the 2013 Nobel Prize in
Physicswas
awarded to François Englert (Université Libre de Bruxelles, Belgium)
and Peter W. Higgs (University of Edinburgh, UK). The official citation is
“for the theoretical discovery of a mechanism that contributes to our
understanding of the origin of mass of subatomic particles, and which
recently was confirmed through the discovery of the predicted fundamental
particle, by the ATLAS and CMS experiments at CERN’s Large Hadron Collider.”

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Re: What gives philosophers a bad name?