RE: For John Clark
Hi jason I think in that last sentence you misuse the term subjective. In what way? Also, in what way could uncertainty be anything other than subjective? Have you ever seen an rock quivering in doubt? Certainty/uncertainty are properties of 1-p experiences and can't be anything but. I refer you to the Everett quote above where he says the usual QM probabilities arise in the subjective views, not expectations of 100%. Are you going to show an error of reasoning or are you going to point to a dead physicist? I see your reference and raise you a reference back to section 4.1 of http://arxiv.org/abs/quant-ph/0312136 There are multiple experiencers, each having possibly different experiences. For some class of those experiencers you can attach the label chris peck. This allows you to say: chris peck experiences all outcomes but that does not imply each experiencer experiences all experiences, each experiencer has only one experience. The subjective first person view, of what any experiencer can claim to experience, is a single outcome. The experiences are fractured and distinct because there is no communication between the decohered worlds. ISTM that you're missing the point of my argument. You don't seem to get that it is very well understood that there is only one stream of experience per 'I'. The trouble is that in step 3 these 'I's get duplicated from one 'I' to two 'I's AND I am obliged axiomatically to assume my 'I'ness survives in both duplicates. So, when asked what will I experience ... and remember, there is only one 'I' at this point ... how can I answer 'either or' without violating this axiom I am obliged to accept? Alternatively, perhaps neither of the future 'I's are this earlier 'I'. In which case, I am forced to predict I will experience nothing and again that violates the axiom. The only choice I can make here is to predict this single 'I' will experience each outcome once duplicated. This is the only prediction I can make which doesn't violate the survival axiom I am bound to. In any event, you have at least seen how the appearance of subjective randomness can appear through duplication of continuation paths, which is enough to continue to step 4 in the UDA. On the contrary, Jason, I find the concept of subjective uncertainty extremely unlikely in both MWI and COMP and find the 50/50 prediction particularly a little bit silly. Nevertheless, I am not Clark, and have already raced ahead. I find myself tracking dropped pens through UD*, wallowing in a morass of an unseemly dream argument and furrowing my brow over strange interpretations of modal logic. Im not sure what to make of any of it but Im certain Bruno is happy to have you on board. regards. Date: Thu, 17 Oct 2013 11:36:06 +1300 Subject: Re: For John Clark From: lizj...@gmail.com To: everything-list@googlegroups.com On 17 October 2013 09:49, Jason Resch jasonre...@gmail.com wrote: On Wed, Oct 16, 2013 at 12:48 PM, John Clark johnkcl...@gmail.com wrote: And I don't understand the difference between first person uncertainty and plain old fashioned uncertainty. The difference arises when you are the system which is behaving probablistically. Presumably a sentient dice (or die*) would feel the same way. * Take the dice or die! as my son once said while playing Monopoly. He was just being pedantic but it got my attention. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: WSJ Article On Why Computers Make Lame Supermarket Cashiers
On 17 Oct 2013, at 03:19, LizR wrote: On 17 October 2013 14:08, Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.com wrote: How could a machine be racist if it is totally incapable of any form of relation or sentience, according to you? Not according to me, I'm going along with Bruno. By his view, I am a machine, or a product of a machine, so if I am racist against machines, then it is inevitable that there will be machines who are similarly racist against humans or biology - the only difference being that they may be placed in a position to exert much more control on the world. I don't remember Bruno saying that. (Unless one considers arithmetic to be a machine?) Just to be clear, I use often the term elementary arithmetic to denote some (Robinsonian or not) theories or machine. Those are finite entities (with an infinite set of beliefs/theorems). I use Arithmetic or Arithmetical truth for the set of true arithmetical proposition. The first is a machine, the second is not. Arithmetical truth is not Turing emulable. It is very big, even from outside. Then it is non- conceivably big when seen from inside. Bruno -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Human Thought Can Voluntarily Control Neurons in Brain
On 17 Oct 2013, at 04:04, Craig Weinberg wrote: Right, but the mechanistic model of the brain would not fit very well with that capacity. It would be like each part of a program being able to control other parts by feel. It is like that. here is a recursive definition of a brain. It is either a universal machine controlling a second universal machine, or it is a brain controlling another brain. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: WSJ Article On Why Computers Make Lame Supermarket Cashiers
On 17 October 2013 16:58, Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.com wrote: I would have agreed with Bruno completely a few years ago, but since then I think that it makes more sense that arithmetic is a kind of sense than that sense could be a kind of arithmetic. I think that mechanism is a kind of arithmetic and arithmetic is a kind of sense, as is private awareness a kind of sense. I'm sure that makes sense! (Even multisense, perhaps.) But I may need a bit more explanation...which I hope I will get once I have read what's at those links you posted. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: WSJ Article On Why Computers Make Lame Supermarket Cashiers
On 17 October 2013 21:36, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: Arithmetical truth is not Turing emulable. Is that anything to do with the halting problem ? -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
The Panopticon: QM and Relativity
A quote I got somewhere: Understanding that the world is a Panopticon is the easy part; the hard part is figuring out whether you're on the inside looking out or the outside looking in. Anyone have any thoughts? :) Personally, I find it interesting that quantum physics allows _either_ non-determinism or non-local determinism, and relativity seems to imply that non-local determinism, if it exists, can never be proven without violating causality. Very much a Panopticon: there's plausibly anyone watching and also plausibly everyone watching, and no way of finding out which. Furthermore, if physics is always symmetric, then you can't tell if, in the process of watching, you're actually the one being watched instead :) -Stephen -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Human Thought Can Voluntarily Control Neurons in Brain
On Thursday, October 17, 2013 4:37:58 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 17 Oct 2013, at 04:04, Craig Weinberg wrote: Right, but the mechanistic model of the brain would not fit very well with that capacity. It would be like each part of a program being able to control other parts by feel. It is like that. here is a recursive definition of a brain. It is either a universal machine controlling a second universal machine, or it is a brain controlling another brain. Bruno The recursiveness is ok, but why would there be a feeling associated with it? Why and how would one brain control another by feeling and willing rather than modally believing and doing? Craig http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: The Panopticon: QM and Relativity
To make matters worse, I think that it is a nesting panopticon. As individuals we are watching others watch us. As social participants we are part of society's watching of individuals. As members of human civilization, we are a spectator of the collective voyeurism of biology, chemistry, and physics, who are not completely privy to our watching, as we are not privy to what our unconscious presence knows about us. It's all awareness that is masked and masked again, with each mask susceptible to occasional leakage or translucence. Thanks, Craig On Thursday, October 17, 2013 5:46:14 AM UTC-4, Stephen Lin wrote: A quote I got somewhere: Understanding that the world is a Panopticon is the easy part; the hard part is figuring out whether you're on the inside looking out or the outside looking in. Anyone have any thoughts? :) Personally, I find it interesting that quantum physics allows _either_ non-determinism or non-local determinism, and relativity seems to imply that non-local determinism, if it exists, can never be proven without violating causality. Very much a Panopticon: there's plausibly anyone watching and also plausibly everyone watching, and no way of finding out which. Furthermore, if physics is always symmetric, then you can't tell if, in the process of watching, you're actually the one being watched instead :) -Stephen -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: For John Clark
2013/10/17 John Clark johnkcl...@gmail.com On Wed, Oct 16, 2013 at 1:56 PM, Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.comwrote: And I don't understand the difference between first person uncertainty and plain old fashioned uncertainty. The difference is that from 3rd POV it is deterministic. As I've said many times, being deterministic and being predictable is NOT the same thing. There is not *uncertainty* from the 3rd POV... nothing, zip, nada (both event happen) and it is fully deterministic. There is uncertainty from the 1st POV, and it is random. Even if we restrict ourselves to just Newtonian physics something can be 100% deterministic and still be 100% unpredictable even in theory. Even with all the information in the world sometimes the only way to know what something will do is watch it an see because by the time you've finished the calculation about what it will do it will have already done it. POV plays a role. It's not exactly a grand new discovery that point of view can play a role. So as I said to you before, be consistent and reject MWI. If you accept assigning a probability of seeing spin up/down before measuring, you should accept the same for Bruno's thought experiment, or you must reject both I have absolutely no objection to assigning probability when it is appropriate to do so, but I do object to using probability to assign identity, because predictions, both good ones and bad, have nothing to do with a feeling of self. or look like a fool. In Bruno's thought experiment [YOU] walk into a duplicating chamber and Bruno asks after the duplication, that is to say after you has been duplicated, what is the probability that [YOU] will see this or that. When John Clark asks who is you? Bruno responds that he could no more answer that question than he could square a circle. But even though Bruno admits that he doesn't know what he means when he says [YOU] he still demands to know what [YOU] will see. So who's the real fool around here? In MWI thought experiment, *you* (John Clark) measure the spin, and before doing so, *you* ask *yourself* what is the probability that *you* will see spin up... and John Clark says 50%... somehow John Clark will not ask who is *you* and proceed unlike with Bruno's thought experiment beside being the same thing, John Clark is thus not consistent. Quentin John K Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. -- All those moments will be lost in time, like tears in rain. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: For John Clark
On 17 Oct 2013, at 08:04, chris peck wrote:
Also, in what way could uncertainty be anything other than subjective?
The uncertainty is objective (indeed provable) but it bears on set of
alternative *subjective* experiences. It is an objective probability
on subjective experiences, not to be confused with the (mathematical)
notion of subjective probability (which is Bayesian probability). They
are related, but are different notions.
To insist, I use first person indeterminacy instead of subjective
indeterminacy, because there is a notion of subjective probability
(Bayesian probability) which is not related with the objective
indeterminacy *on* the subjective experiences possible in the self-
duplication (comp) or self-superposition (Everett QM)
As many pointed out, self-duplication and self-superposition leads, in
theoretical protocols, to equivalent phenomenological experiences.
Chris, you have not answered the question where you are duplicated
into 2^(16180 * 1) * (60 * 90) * 24.
I multiply you 24 times per second (24) during 1h30 (60 * 90), into as
many copies can be sent in front of one of the 2^(16180 * 1)
possible images on a screen with 16180 * 1 pixels, which can be
black or white each.
Put in another way, I make you (from the 3p view) seen simultaneously
all black and white movies.
The question is what do you expect to live as an experience, that you
will certainly have (as we assume comp).
***
You can also answer the corresponding following feasible (in near
futures) experiences (assuming QM). I use a screen where the 2^(16180
* 1) * (60 * 90) * 24 pixels are quantum devices measuring, in the
{0, 1} base, the state of a photon prepared in the 0 + 1 state,
and such that if the device measure 1 it makes the pixel white, and
if it measures 0, it makes the pixel black.
What do you expect to see if you were looking at such a screen?
Bruno
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
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Re: The Panopticon: QM and Relativity
Oops, I meant plausibly no one watching :) I don't know how I slipped that one up! On Thu, Oct 17, 2013 at 2:46 AM, Stephen Lin sw...@post.harvard.edu wrote: A quote I got somewhere: Understanding that the world is a Panopticon is the easy part; the hard part is figuring out whether you're on the inside looking out or the outside looking in. Anyone have any thoughts? :) Personally, I find it interesting that quantum physics allows _either_ non-determinism or non-local determinism, and relativity seems to imply that non-local determinism, if it exists, can never be proven without violating causality. Very much a Panopticon: there's plausibly anyone watching and also plausibly everyone watching, and no way of finding out which. Furthermore, if physics is always symmetric, then you can't tell if, in the process of watching, you're actually the one being watched instead :) -Stephen -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: WSJ Article On Why Computers Make Lame Supermarket Cashiers
On 17 Oct 2013, at 11:08, LizR wrote: On 17 October 2013 21:36, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: Arithmetical truth is not Turing emulable. Is that anything to do with the halting problem ? The halting problem gives an example of a simple problem, which is not mechanically solvable. For all theories, there will be machines x such that those theories cannot prove proposition like machine 567 does not halt, which will, when translated into arithmetic, defined an arithmetical truth escaping the power of that machine. But there is the more complex problem x is the code of a total computable function. As being more complex, it is simpler to show it being non soluble, (as we did if you see what I am thinking about) and so from it, you get that there is no general theory for deciding between totality and strict partiallity of machines, which for any machines will generates deeper and more complex functions to compute, or arithmetical set to decide, and that will define more complex arithmetical propositions. When you look at computability in term of arithmetical provability, Turing universality correspond to the sigma_1 complete set. A proposition sigma_1 as the shape EnP(n), with P(n) being completely decidable (can even be a diophantine equation). A machine, an entity, a set, a number... is said sigma_1 complete if, each time a proposition EnP(n) is true, it can prove it. It is complete in the sense of proving all true sigma_1 sentences. You, Liz, are sigma_1 complete, (assuming you are immortal, we are working in Plato heaven, OK?). Indeed if there is a number n such that P(n), that is if EnP(n) is true, you can, given that P is easy to verify, verify P for 0, and if O does not very P, look at s(0), etc. If EnP(n) is true, that method guaranty that you will find it. Sigma_1 completeness is one of the many characterization of Turing universality. The price of universality? The existence, for all universal machines, to be in front of proposition like ~EnP(n), which are true but cannot be proved by them. Note that those propositions ~EnP(n) are equivalent with An~P(n) (to say that there is no ferocious number is the same as saying that all numbers are not-ferocious). And if P(n) is completely verifiable, decidable, ~P(n) is too. So the type of formula An~P(n) is really the same as the type AnP(n). Those are the pi_1 sentences, typically negation of sigma_1 sentences. Then you have the sigma_2 sentences, with the shape EnAmP(n, m), with P(n, m) easily decidable. And their negations, the pi_2 sentences, AnEmP(n, m), and so one. The computable = the sigma_1 But arithmetical truth contains the true sigma_1, and the true pi_1 (which might, or not, contains Riemann hypothesis), the true sigma_2, etc. It is the union of all *true* sigma_i and pi_i formula. That set is not just non computable, but it is not definable in the arithmetic language (like the first person will be to). The computable is only a very tiny part of arithmetical truth, but (with comp) the sigma_1 complete is already clever enough to get an idea how hard it is for itself to solve pi_problems, and above. It can also understand why it is concerned by those truth. Machines can climbs those degrees of non solvability by the use of oracles, which are nothing more that the answer to some non solvable problems. This is useful to classify the degrees of insolubility. Imagine an oracle for the halting problem, well, that would help to solve pi_1 problems, but that would not provide a solution to the sigma_2 problems. Hope I was not too much technical, we an come back on this, soon or later. Bruno -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Human Thought Can Voluntarily Control Neurons in Brain
On 17 Oct 2013, at 13:34, Craig Weinberg wrote: On Thursday, October 17, 2013 4:37:58 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 17 Oct 2013, at 04:04, Craig Weinberg wrote: Right, but the mechanistic model of the brain would not fit very well with that capacity. It would be like each part of a program being able to control other parts by feel. It is like that. here is a recursive definition of a brain. It is either a universal machine controlling a second universal machine, or it is a brain controlling another brain. Bruno The recursiveness is ok, but why would there be a feeling associated with it? OK. Let me try to say more. Because all those pairs of brains are pairs left-brain and right brain. The right brain is specialized in the connection with God, I mean Truth, and first person realities (1p). The left brain is specialized in logic, and assertable beliefs (3p). They can never agree. But if each part respect the other, they will have pretty good communications, to relate on some truth they live and this is what gives feeling to machines and/or relative numbers. Why and how would one brain control another by feeling and willing rather than modally believing and doing? OK. The left brain believes and want to do, but it controls only one half of the body. The right brain is all impression, feeling, and willing, and control the other half. Keep in mind that each brain, is itself a couple left-brain/right brain. Which makes the natural tension between all the couples very distributed. The hypostases shows that this picture is incomplete, somehow. You might need to use 8 brains to get one, and not two, assuming specialization area for each points of view. And thus 8*8*8*8*8*... Keep in mind that a brain does not think nor feel. Only the abstract true person that uses that brain, can think and feel. Bruno Craig http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: For John Clark
On 17 Oct 2013, at 16:53, John Clark wrote: On Wed, Oct 16, 2013 at 1:56 PM, Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.com wrote: And I don't understand the difference between first person uncertainty and plain old fashioned uncertainty. The difference is that from 3rd POV it is deterministic. As I've said many times, being deterministic and being predictable is NOT the same thing. Even if we restrict ourselves to just Newtonian physics something can be 100% deterministic and still be 100% unpredictable even in theory. Even with all the information in the world sometimes the only way to know what something will do is watch it an see because by the time you've finished the calculation about what it will do it will have already done it. True, but non relevant. POV plays a role. It's not exactly a grand new discovery that point of view can play a role. Then why don't you take into account. If it is so easy, please proceed to step 4. So as I said to you before, be consistent and reject MWI. If you accept assigning a probability of seeing spin up/down before measuring, you should accept the same for Bruno's thought experiment, or you must reject both I have absolutely no objection to assigning probability when it is appropriate to do so, but I do object to using probability to assign identity, No identity is ever assigned. I showed this more than one. You come back circularly on points without having answer or comment the relevant posts with the previews explanation. because predictions, both good ones and bad, have nothing to do with a feeling of self. This is not entirely true either. Even if you just throw a dice, you have to stay yourself in the process to win or lose a game of chance. usually this is an implicit default assumption, but to do the math, we have to take this into account (and later will explain the role of the Dt arithmetical nuance) (I say this for those interested in the math). or look like a fool. In Bruno's thought experiment [YOU] walk into a duplicating chamber and Bruno asks after the duplication, that is to say after you has been duplicated, what is the probability that [YOU] will see this or that. For the billion times, this is wrong, and even nonsensical, and will never see any post or papers or book by me saying such a stupidity. You did this already. Please stop. The evaluation of the probability is asked to the H-man. He has to write it in his diary in Helsinki. Only the validation/non-validation of the prediction is done after, by each copies. When John Clark asks who is you? Bruno responds that he could no more answer that question than he could square a circle. The quote, please. But even though Bruno admits that he doesn't know what he means when he says [YOU] he still demands to know what [YOU] will see. So who's the real fool around here? YOU (You criticize things I never say. Please provide the quotes). You agreed on the FPI, as you admit it is like throwing a coin, which was exactly my point, so proceed to step 4, where you will see an invariance for that FPI, which is not definable in term of coin throwing. This might help you to get the idea and where we are are going to. Ask specific questions. Bruno John K Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: For John Clark
On 17 Oct 2013, at 18:07, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 17 Oct 2013, at 08:04, chris peck wrote:
Also, in what way could uncertainty be anything other than
subjective?
The uncertainty is objective (indeed provable) but it bears on set
of alternative *subjective* experiences. It is an objective
probability on subjective experiences, not to be confused with the
(mathematical) notion of subjective probability (which is Bayesian
probability). They are related, but are different notions.
To insist, I use first person indeterminacy instead of subjective
indeterminacy, because there is a notion of subjective probability
(Bayesian probability) which is not related with the objective
indeterminacy *on* the subjective experiences possible in the self-
duplication (comp) or self-superposition (Everett QM)
As many pointed out, self-duplication and self-superposition leads,
in theoretical protocols, to equivalent phenomenological experiences.
Chris, you have not answered the question where you are duplicated
into 2^(16180 * 1) * (60 * 90) * 24.
I multiply you 24 times per second (24) during 1h30 (60 * 90), into
as many copies can be sent in front of one of the 2^(16180 * 1)
possible images on a screen with 16180 * 1 pixels, which can be
black or white each.
Put in another way, I make you (from the 3p view) seen
simultaneously all black and white movies.
The question is what do you expect to live as an experience, that
you will certainly have (as we assume comp).
***
You can also answer the corresponding following feasible (in near
futures) experiences (assuming QM). I use a screen where the
2^(16180 * 1) * (60 * 90) * 24 pixels are quantum devices
measuring, in the {0, 1} base, the state of a photon prepared in
the 0 + 1 state, and such that if the device measure 1 it makes
the pixel white, and if it measures 0, it makes the pixel black.
I meant of course (16180 * 1) devices! That's the quantum pixels.
(not 2^(16180 * 1) * (60 * 90) * 24, which is the number of
movies).
Hope you rectify such kind of mistakes ... Sorry. (wrong cut, wrong
paste, that happens when flies enter the teleportation machine ... :)
Bruno
What do you expect to see if you were looking at such a screen?
Bruno
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
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Re: Human Thought Can Voluntarily Control Neurons in Brain
On Thursday, October 17, 2013 1:18:21 PM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 17 Oct 2013, at 13:34, Craig Weinberg wrote: On Thursday, October 17, 2013 4:37:58 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 17 Oct 2013, at 04:04, Craig Weinberg wrote: Right, but the mechanistic model of the brain would not fit very well with that capacity. It would be like each part of a program being able to control other parts by feel. It is like that. here is a recursive definition of a brain. It is either a universal machine controlling a second universal machine, or it is a brain controlling another brain. Bruno The recursiveness is ok, but why would there be a feeling associated with it? OK. Let me try to say more. Because all those pairs of brains are pairs left-brain and right brain. The right brain is specialized in the connection with God, I mean Truth, and first person realities (1p). Ok but if Comp were true, why wouldn't the first person realities just be topologies or some other directly isomorphic compression? The left brain is specialized in logic, and assertable beliefs (3p). They can never agree. I think that they can agree in two different ways (superstitious fusion at the top end, where coincidence becomes synchronicity, and hypo-stitious fission at the bottom end, where probability decoheres to thermodynamic irreversibility) and they can disagree in more and more ways between those two. That's what I am calling eigenmorphism. In the middle, were creatures like us live, not only to 1p and 3p disagree, they are contra-isomorphic. To be more accurate, there would not even be a right brain, only an 'experiences itself' as 'not the (left) brain'. But if each part respect the other, they will have pretty good communications, to relate on some truth they live and this is what gives feeling to machines and/or relative numbers. I agree about having good communications (even in contra-isomorphism, sense provides the pass through of metaphor and symmetry), but I don't see that the relation between left and right would necessitate a feeling. Again, if comp were true, the good communications would not need additional representation, or if it did for some reason, some kind of topology or other quantitative compression would make more sense than a 'feeling'. Where would machines or numbers get the idea for feelings? Why and how would one brain control another by feeling and willing rather than modally believing and doing? OK. The left brain believes and want to do, but it controls only one half of the body. The right brain is all impression, feeling, and willing, and control the other half. Keep in mind that each brain, is itself a couple left-brain/right brain. Which makes the natural tension between all the couples very distributed. I don't disagree, but still, you are saying that feeling is a given - it's just the nature of the right brain...which is fine but it seems to contradict Comp. It's an unacknowledged dualism. Consciousness can be explained by computation, and everything else is feelings and thoughts and stuff. The hypostases shows that this picture is incomplete, somehow. You might need to use 8 brains to get one, and not two, assuming specialization area for each points of view. And thus 8*8*8*8*8*... http://www.vintage-technology.info/pages/calculators/display/disp9dflatvfd.jpg Keep in mind that a brain does not think nor feel. Only the abstract true person that uses that brain, can think and feel. I can agree with that. Craig Bruno Craig http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-li...@googlegroups.com javascript:. To post to this group, send email to everyth...@googlegroups.comjavascript: . Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: The Panopticon: QM and Relativity
On 10/17/2013 2:46 AM, Stephen Lin wrote: A quote I got somewhere: Understanding that the world is a Panopticon is the easy part; the hard part is figuring out whether you're on the inside looking out or the outside looking in. I thought the Panopticon was conceived as a way that everyone could be watched - an concept since realized by the NSA. Brent Anyone have any thoughts? :) Personally, I find it interesting that quantum physics allows _either_ non-determinism or non-local determinism, and relativity seems to imply that non-local determinism, if it exists, can never be proven without violating causality. Very much a Panopticon: there's plausibly anyone watching and also plausibly everyone watching, and no way of finding out which. Furthermore, if physics is always symmetric, then you can't tell if, in the process of watching, you're actually the one being watched instead :) -Stephen -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. No virus found in this message. Checked by AVG - www.avg.com http://www.avg.com Version: 2014.0.4158 / Virus Database: 3614/6756 - Release Date: 10/16/13 -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Human Thought Can Voluntarily Control Neurons in Brain
On 17 October 2013 12:52, Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.com wrote: Whichever way you look at it with the heart, the cars or the brain, it is a sequence of physical events A-B-C etc. It's not a sequence, it's different scopes of simultaneous. I decide to go to the store. That's A. I get in the car and the car drives to the store. That's B. The physical event B is cause by personal motive A. There is no physical event which specifically would have caused A if it were not for my personal contribution in 'clutching' together various histories and narratives to arrive at a novel cause which is entering the public universe from a private vantage point that I am saying is trans-ontological. The decision to go to the store, A, is associated with certain brain processes, and the getting in the car and driving to the store, B, is associated with different brain processes. The brain processes associated with A *cause* the brain processes associated with B. That is to say, a scientist anywhere in the universe could observe the physical processes A and the physical processes B and see how the former lead to the latter without necessarily having any idea about the supervenient consciousness. This is according to the scientific account of nature. If the scientific account of nature is wrong then the scientist would look at the physical processes B and declare that there must be some supernatural influence, as he cannot explain how they come about given the antecedent A and the laws of physics. -- Stathis Papaioannou -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: For John Clark
On Thu, Oct 17, 2013 at 6:23 PM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote: On 10/16/2013 11:55 PM, Jason Resch wrote: I see your reference and raise you a reference back to section 4.1 of http://arxiv.org/abs/quant-ph/0312136 From the paper: What of the crucial question: should Alice1 feel uncertain? Why, Alice1 is a good PI-reductionist Everettian, and she has followed what we’ve said so far. So she1 knows that she1 will see spin-up, and that she1 will see spin-down. There is nothing left for her to be uncertain about. What (to address Saunders’ question) should Alice1 expect to see? Here I invoke the following premise: whatever she1 knows she1 will see, she1 should expect (with certainty!) to see. So, she1 should (with certainty) expect to see spin-up, and she1 should (with certainty) expect to see spin-down. (Not that she1 should expect to see both: she1 should expect to see each.) But this is where the basis problem comes in. The basis problem is no different from the present problem under special relativity: If we exist in many times across space time, why do we find ourselves in this particular now? I believe it is a matter of what information the brain has access to within the context of the conscious moments it supports. The now brain doesn't have access to the information in future brain states, and only limited access to information from past brain states, so any particular conscious experience appears to be an isolated moment in time. Why is the experience classical? Why doesn't Alice simply experience the superposition? There various elements of the wavefunction corresponding to different experiences for Alice are macroscopically distinct and thus they have decohered and will never interact again. Without a classical information exchange between the various Alices there is can be no awareness of the experiences of the others. Is there something about superpositions that makes them inherently inexperiential? Nothing more than what makes your state of 5 minutes ago inexperiential. It is only inexperiential from the viewpoint of Brents in other times. Jason Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: The Panopticon: QM and Relativity
Whoa, dude... you just blew my mind! I love this list! On Thursday, October 17, 2013 5:46:14 AM UTC-4, Stephen Lin wrote: A quote I got somewhere: Understanding that the world is a Panopticon is the easy part; the hard part is figuring out whether you're on the inside looking out or the outside looking in. Anyone have any thoughts? :) Personally, I find it interesting that quantum physics allows _either_ non-determinism or non-local determinism, and relativity seems to imply that non-local determinism, if it exists, can never be proven without violating causality. Very much a Panopticon: there's plausibly anyone watching and also plausibly everyone watching, and no way of finding out which. Furthermore, if physics is always symmetric, then you can't tell if, in the process of watching, you're actually the one being watched instead :) -Stephen -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: For John Clark
On 18 October 2013 13:42, Jason Resch jasonre...@gmail.com wrote: The basis problem is no different from the present problem under special relativity: If we exist in many times across space time, why do we find ourselves in this particular now? I don't know about the basis problem, but the now problem is simple to solve - we don't find ourselves in a particular now, find ourselves in all the nows. Unless you mean why do we find ourselves in this particular now, now? - which kind of answers itself, when you think about it! -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: The Panopticon: QM and Relativity
It gets better... On 18 October 2013 14:01, freqflyer07281972 thismindisbud...@gmail.comwrote: Whoa, dude... you just blew my mind! I love this list! On Thursday, October 17, 2013 5:46:14 AM UTC-4, Stephen Lin wrote: A quote I got somewhere: Understanding that the world is a Panopticon is the easy part; the hard part is figuring out whether you're on the inside looking out or the outside looking in. Anyone have any thoughts? :) Personally, I find it interesting that quantum physics allows _either_ non-determinism or non-local determinism, and relativity seems to imply that non-local determinism, if it exists, can never be proven without violating causality. Very much a Panopticon: there's plausibly anyone watching and also plausibly everyone watching, and no way of finding out which. Furthermore, if physics is always symmetric, then you can't tell if, in the process of watching, you're actually the one being watched instead :) -Stephen -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Human Thought Can Voluntarily Control Neurons in Brain
On Thursday, October 17, 2013 8:10:50 PM UTC-4, stathisp wrote: On 17 October 2013 12:52, Craig Weinberg whats...@gmail.com javascript: wrote: Whichever way you look at it with the heart, the cars or the brain, it is a sequence of physical events A-B-C etc. It's not a sequence, it's different scopes of simultaneous. I decide to go to the store. That's A. I get in the car and the car drives to the store. That's B. The physical event B is cause by personal motive A. There is no physical event which specifically would have caused A if it were not for my personal contribution in 'clutching' together various histories and narratives to arrive at a novel cause which is entering the public universe from a private vantage point that I am saying is trans-ontological. The decision to go to the store, A, is associated with certain brain processes, and the getting in the car and driving to the store, B, is associated with different brain processes. The brain processes associated with A *cause* the brain processes associated with B. That is to say, a scientist anywhere in the universe could observe the physical processes A and the physical processes B and see how the former lead to the latter without necessarily having any idea about the supervenient consciousness. Ok, I can work with this. First let me say that, given your assumptions, your reasoning is absolutely correct. The assumptions themselves, although I don't think they are even conscious, are also completely reasonable. That is a perfectly reasonable expectation about nature, and it is one that I myself shared until fairly recently. Starting with the first assumption: The decision to go to the store, A, is associated with certain brain processes To that I say, lets slow down a moment. What do we know about about the association? As far as I know, what we know is that 1) measurable changes in brain activity occur in synchronization to self-reported or experimentally inferred changes in subjective states. 2) the regions of the brain affected have been mapped with a high degree of consistency and specificity (although the anomalies, such as with people who live seemingly normal lives with large parts of their brain 'missing' makes that kind of morphological approach potentially naive) 3) that externally induced brain changes will induce changes in subjective experience (so that brain changes cannot be epiphenomenal). What we do *not* know is that 4) the entirety of our experiences are literally contained within the tissues of the brain, or its activities. 5) that the brain activity which we can observe with our contemporary instruments is the only causal agent of subjective experience. 6) that subjective experiences cannot cause observable brain changes (to the contrary, we count on subjects being able to voluntarily and spontaneously change their own brain activity). 7) that neuronal activity is not also associated with microphenomenal experiences which are subconscious to us at the personal level. (The article at the top of the thread shows that the opposite is true, in the sense that we can access and control individual neuron behaviors strictly through direct subjective attention). The next assumption I think takes a turn from the relatively innocuous to the ideologically biased. To say The brain processes associated with A *cause* the brain processes associated with B. doesn't really work. Let's say that some alien neurologist thinks that the world financial markets are the activity of a global brain. She observes that certain numbers that come out of the NASDAQ are associated with the construction of new suburban houses. Having access to a precision magnetic stimulation instruments, she is able to change the numbers in the NASDAQ computers, and sure enough, most times the expected effect materializes. She concludes therefore, as you would in her position, that the market indicators associated with the real estate development A *cause* the market indicators associated with commercial development months later (B). This view assumes that the actual participants in the economy, and the actual conditions of their experienced lives are not functionally necessary to transform A into B. In the same way, we could say that a drug like cocaine changes brain activity to match that of a person who was living a very exhilarating life, and by the logic that you are suggesting, as long as the drug supply did not run out, the person's life would eventually have to change automatically to match the enhanced brain activity. By underestimating the role of consciousness, and overlooking its obvious significance in creating and shaping its activities *through* the brain, rather than activities *of* the brain, you wind up with a worldview in which no form of consciousness could plausibly exist. For that reason, the hypothesis you assume must be abandoned
RE: For John Clark
Hi Jason Subject refers to the I, the indexical first-person. The word 'I' is indexical, like 'now' and 'here'. The experience isn't indexical, its just me. This page offers some examples of the distinction ( http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/indexicals/#PurIndTruDem ). Thanks. Im still confused as to how my use of 'subjective certainty' does not imply the certainty applies to the indexical 'I'ity of me. It certainly does in my head. When I say I am uncertain/certain of things I am definately saying I am having the 1-p experience of certainty/uncertainty. Knowing that she becomes all does not allow her (prior to the splitting, or prior to the duplication) to know where the photon will be observed (or what city she finds herself in). This is the subjective uncertainty. Certainty only exists when talking about the experiences of others from the standpoint of some external impartial observer. You're begging the question here. You're just reasserting your conclusion about what is infact up for grabs. You're effectively arguing that unless I agree that there is subjective uncertainty then I am confusing 1-p for 3-p. Interestingly, Everett was allegedly certain of his own immortality. One of the reasons he specified in his will that his ashes should be ditched alongside the trash. I can't imagine a more morbid yet expressive demonstration of subjective certainty about MWI and all outcomes obtaining. I mean subjective in a stronger sense than just that it is experienced by someone, rather that it is experienced by the I. Without begging the question, in what way is that a stronger sense than the one I have used? It seems identical to me. The particular error that I am pointing out is that the branching in MWI and the duplication in the UDA are in a certain sense equivalent and result in similar consequences from the viewpoint of those being multiplied. yes. I agree they are equivolent in the relevant respects. All the experiencers you might say she becomes only have access to one outcome, and if she had bet on having (access to) all the possible experiences, then she would find herself to be wrong (all of her copies would conclude, oh I was wrong, I thought I would experience this outcome with 100% probability but instead I am experiencing this one). I think Greaves point is more subtle than you give credit for. The point is that at any point where all relevant facts are known subjective uncertainty can not arise. I don't think that is contentious at all. There is a difference though between what is known before teleportation and after. Immediately after teleportation there will be uncertainty because you are no longer sure of your location but are sure that you have been duplicated and sent to one place or the other. This gives room for doubt. Before teleportation there is no room for doubt. I often think the responses I've had try to inject doubt from the future. They dwell on the doubt that would be had once duplication and teleportation have taken place. This is illegitimate in my view. Besides which, If i bet on being in both Moscow and in Washington with certainty, then if I end up in either place I win the bet. In the same way if I bet that a coin toss will be either heads or tails I win the bet. So do you think you could tell whether a transporter was sending you to one of two locations with a 50% probability, or sending you to both locations? I think we're going around in circles here. The transporter is sending me to both locations and it is axiomatic that I survive in both locations. Could you be more specific regarding what you consider the problems to be? Not at the moment. As i said, Im not sure what to make of any of it. regards. Date: Fri, 18 Oct 2013 14:04:58 +1300 Subject: Re: For John Clark From: lizj...@gmail.com To: everything-list@googlegroups.com On 18 October 2013 13:42, Jason Resch jasonre...@gmail.com wrote: The basis problem is no different from the present problem under special relativity: If we exist in many times across space time, why do we find ourselves in this particular now? I don't know about the basis problem, but the now problem is simple to solve - we don't find ourselves in a particular now, find ourselves in all the nows. Unless you mean why do we find ourselves in this particular now, now? - which kind of answers itself, when you think about it! -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. -- You received this message because you
Re: For John Clark
On 18 October 2013 15:04, chris peck chris_peck...@hotmail.com wrote: Immediately after teleportation there will be uncertainty because you are no longer sure of your location but are sure that you have been duplicated and sent to one place or the other. This gives room for doubt. Before teleportation there is no room for doubt. I often think the responses I've had try to inject doubt from the future. I keep saying this, too. The only reason it feels like uncertainty is because we automatically assume we're one continuous person - even if we know intellectually that there is going to be a duplication, we don't experience it, in the MWI or the teleporter. From that point of view the 1-p uncertainty makes sense. Since that's the POV we're used to, it's legitimate for us to at least feel as though we've experienced 1-p uncertainty, since that's the state both of us end up in. Doubt from the future is a very good description. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
RE: For John Clark
Hi Bruno Hi Bruno The uncertainty is objective How can uncertainty be objective Bruno? Uncertainty is a predicate applicable to experiences only. To insist, I use first person indeterminacy instead of subjective indeterminacy In step 3 you ask the reader to assess what he would 'feel' about the chances of turning up in either location. When I use the term 'subjective certainty' by 'subjective' I mean to refer the to feelings I would have, and by 'certainty' I mean that I would bet 100% on both outcomes. Chris, you have not answered the question where you are duplicated into 2^(16180 * 1) * (60 * 90) * 24...The question is what do you expect to live as an experience, that you will certainly have (as we assume comp). My answer is that it would violate axioms you stipulate in COMP to suggest that we should expect anything other than to see each film. Following Greaves I would add that my decision whether to let you do this to me should be governed by my concern for all future mes. And since a vast amount of them are going to sit infront of 90 minutes of static, worse still, 80 minutes of movie with the ending just static, I wouldn't let you do it to me. I hate missing the ending of movies and I would be certain that I would experience that exact fate. Regards. From: chris_peck...@hotmail.com To: everything-list@googlegroups.com Subject: RE: For John Clark Date: Fri, 18 Oct 2013 02:04:27 + Hi Jason Subject refers to the I, the indexical first-person. The word 'I' is indexical, like 'now' and 'here'. The experience isn't indexical, its just me. This page offers some examples of the distinction ( http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/indexicals/#PurIndTruDem ). Thanks. Im still confused as to how my use of 'subjective certainty' does not imply the certainty applies to the indexical 'I'ity of me. It certainly does in my head. When I say I am uncertain/certain of things I am definately saying I am having the 1-p experience of certainty/uncertainty. Knowing that she becomes all does not allow her (prior to the splitting, or prior to the duplication) to know where the photon will be observed (or what city she finds herself in). This is the subjective uncertainty. Certainty only exists when talking about the experiences of others from the standpoint of some external impartial observer. You're begging the question here. You're just reasserting your conclusion about what is infact up for grabs. You're effectively arguing that unless I agree that there is subjective uncertainty then I am confusing 1-p for 3-p. Interestingly, Everett was allegedly certain of his own immortality. One of the reasons he specified in his will that his ashes should be ditched alongside the trash. I can't imagine a more morbid yet expressive demonstration of subjective certainty about MWI and all outcomes obtaining. I mean subjective in a stronger sense than just that it is experienced by someone, rather that it is experienced by the I. Without begging the question, in what way is that a stronger sense than the one I have used? It seems identical to me. The particular error that I am pointing out is that the branching in MWI and the duplication in the UDA are in a certain sense equivalent and result in similar consequences from the viewpoint of those being multiplied. yes. I agree they are equivolent in the relevant respects. All the experiencers you might say she becomes only have access to one outcome, and if she had bet on having (access to) all the possible experiences, then she would find herself to be wrong (all of her copies would conclude, oh I was wrong, I thought I would experience this outcome with 100% probability but instead I am experiencing this one). I think Greaves point is more subtle than you give credit for. The point is that at any point where all relevant facts are known subjective uncertainty can not arise. I don't think that is contentious at all. There is a difference though between what is known before teleportation and after. Immediately after teleportation there will be uncertainty because you are no longer sure of your location but are sure that you have been duplicated and sent to one place or the other. This gives room for doubt. Before teleportation there is no room for doubt. I often think the responses I've had try to inject doubt from the future. They dwell on the doubt that would be had once duplication and teleportation have taken place. This is illegitimate in my view. Besides which, If i bet on being in both Moscow and in Washington with certainty, then if I end up in either place I win the bet. In the same way if I bet that a coin toss will be either heads or tails I win the bet. So do you think you could tell whether a transporter was sending you to one of two locations with a 50% probability, or sending you to both locations? I think we're going around in circles here. The
Re: For John Clark
On 10/17/2013 6:04 PM, LizR wrote: On 18 October 2013 13:42, Jason Resch jasonre...@gmail.com mailto:jasonre...@gmail.com wrote: The basis problem is no different from the present problem under special relativity: If we exist in many times across space time, why do we find ourselves in this particular now? I don't know about the basis problem, but the now problem is simple to solve - we don't find ourselves in a particular now, find ourselves in all the nows. But I don't find myself in all the nows. Why not? Note that in some basis I *am* in a superposition. Brent Unless you mean why do we find ourselves in this particular now, now? - which kind of answers itself, when you think about it! -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. No virus found in this message. Checked by AVG - www.avg.com http://www.avg.com Version: 2014.0.4158 / Virus Database: 3614/6756 - Release Date: 10/16/13 -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: For John Clark
On 10/17/2013 7:04 PM, chris peck wrote: Interestingly, Everett was allegedly certain of his own immortality. One of the reasons he specified in his will that his ashes should be ditched alongside the trash. I can't imagine a more morbid yet expressive demonstration of subjective certainty about MWI and all outcomes obtaining. I think more indicative is that apparently he took no care for his health. He evidently didn't think about ALL outcomes obtaining; since most of those might be experiencing nothing at all. Brent I do not fear death, in view of the fact that I had been dead for billions and billions of years before I was born, and had not suffered the slightest inconvenience from it.' --- Mark Twain -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: For John Clark
On 10/17/2013 5:42 PM, Jason Resch wrote: On Thu, Oct 17, 2013 at 6:23 PM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net mailto:meeke...@verizon.net wrote: On 10/16/2013 11:55 PM, Jason Resch wrote: I see your reference and raise you a reference back to section 4.1 of http://arxiv.org/abs/quant-ph/0312136 From the paper: What of the crucial question: should Alice1 feel uncertain? Why, Alice1 is a good PI-reductionist Everettian, and she has followed what we’ve said so far. So she1 knows that she1 will see spin-up, and that she1 will see spin-down. There is nothing left for her to be uncertain about. What (to address Saunders’ question) should Alice1 expect to see? Here I invoke the following premise: whatever she1 knows she1 will see, she1 should expect (with certainty!) to see. So, she1 should (with certainty) expect to see spin-up, and she1 should (with certainty) expect to see spin-down. (Not that she1 should expect to see both: she1 should expect to see each.) But this is where the basis problem comes in. The basis problem is no different from the present problem under special relativity: If we exist in many times across space time, why do we find ourselves in this particular now? I believe it is a matter of what information the brain has access to within the context of the conscious moments it supports. The now brain doesn't have access to the information in future brain states, and only limited access to information from past brain states, so any particular conscious experience appears to be an isolated moment in time. That is really just restating the problem in other words: Why does the brain have access to this and not that? Of course the materialist answer is that there are two brains and they are not in a superposition in the basis we can agree on as being this world. But that's not compatible with Bruno's idea of eliminating the physical - at least not unless he can solve the basis problem. Why is the experience classical? Why doesn't Alice simply experience the superposition? There various elements of the wavefunction corresponding to different experiences for Alice are macroscopically distinct and thus they have decohered and will never interact again. Without a classical information exchange between the various Alices there is can be no awareness of the experiences of the others. Is there something about superpositions that makes them inherently inexperiential? Nothing more than what makes your state of 5 minutes ago inexperiential. It is only inexperiential from the viewpoint of Brents in other times. But there is a basis in which Brent is a superposition...maybe even a state that is a superposition of Brent-now and Brent-5min-ago given that QM is time symmetric. The question is why does experience adhere only with these certain states which we call 'classical'. Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
