Re: 1P/3P CONFUSION again and again
On Saturday, August 8, 2015 at 5:09:49 AM UTC+10, John Clark wrote: > > On Thu, Aug 6, 2015 at 8:40 PM, Pierz > > wrote: > >> > > >> My point isn't that MWI is true. My point is you understand it and how it >> leads to the appearance of indeterminacy in a completely determined system. >> >> Indeterminacy is a 1-p illusion >> > > It's either an illusion or it is not > > and peepee is not involved. > And you wonder why people think you're a troll. > And it is an experimental fact that > Bell's inequality > is violated therefore we know for certain that if things really are > deterministic then even stranger things must be true; either things are not > realistic (an electron is not spinning clockwise or > counterclockwise until it is measured, nothing exists until it is observed) > or non-local (forget the butterfly effect, a hurricane arrived in Miami > today because one year in the **future** a butterfly in Australia will > flap his wings). > So we know for sure that Einstein's idea that > things > are realistic > , > local > , > and deterministic can > not > be correct > , at least one of them must be false and all 3 could be. > > >> >>> If the multiverse really exists then that explains quantum >>> indeterminacy, but Bruno claims he has found a new sort of indeterminacy >>> independent of both the quantum type and also of the Godel/Turing type and >>> I don't think he has. >>> >> >> > >> To my mind, the logic is completely isomorphic with MWI. >> > > MWI says everything that can happen > to you will happen to you, so you can see everything that can happen; the > only way these 2 things can be consistent with experience is if there are > lots and lots of "yous" but the laws of physics only allow an observer (or > a you) to see one of them. And that is why Bruno loves pronouns and that is > why despite the criticism Bruno insists on continuing to use the word > "you"; pronouns like that disguise the fact that "you" is not singular, it > is plural. > Bruno knows that observer or 'you' is plural, and in fact that plurality is the basis of the first person indeterminacy. If you're an amoeba and you divide, there are now two amoebas who remember having been you (if amoebas had memories). That's it. Post duplication there's an illusion of indeterminacy about which amoeba 'you' became, but the pronoun here is just a figure of speech. I'm starting to think from this and the statements below that you actually have misunderstood what Bruno is claiming. In the above statement you say that the laws of physics only allow you to see one universe. In Bruno's formulation it's not the laws of physics but the definition of the observer as comprised in the digital state of some machine, that has now been replicated. Obviously such a duplicated observer can't observe the other machine's environment or internal state, so the same separation has been achieved as the laws of physics achieve in MWI. No 'peepee' involved. > > Admittedly Bruno does say "THE 1p you" but unfortunately always neglects > to mention which 1p you. Well OK Bruno does say > THE 1p you > who wrote all that stuff in the diary, but that does no good because > after the duplication Bruno is unable to point to the one guy who wrote all > that stuff in the diary. > > Don't be daft. There are two people writing in diaries after the duplication, and Bruno knows it. You've misunderstood the claim. > > >> If Bruno is claiming there is some striking originality about his idea of >> FPI then I'd point to Everett and say, that guy thought of it first. >> > > Everett said nothing about consciousness and didn't need to, one great > strength of Many Worlds is that unlike some other quantum interpretations > it doesn't need to explain what consciousness is or how it works because > consciousness has nothing to do with it. Bruno's great discovery is in > finding out that sometimes "you" doesn't know what "you" will see next, but > I think Og The Caveman beat him to the punch on that by a few years. > You have the wit of a Wilde. > > >> > >> Obviously Bruno's argument hypothesises this first-person indeterminacy >> occurring in a context of computationally defined observers (whether in a >> physical machine, a duplication experiment, or pure mathematics) rather >> than the multiverse, but that context is irrelevant to the question of the >> validity of the logic >> > > But it is not > irrelevant to the question > of pronouns and Bruno's arguments are always filled wall to wall with > pronouns. When discussing the multiverse the very laws of physics ensure > that pronouns cause no ambiguity, but that is certainly not the case with > people duplicating machines. > Stage magicians use pretty > assistants > to distract > the audience > > from > their sleight of hand, Bruno uses pronouns. > > Bruno says that c > omputationalism >
Re: The Mental Being
> On 07-Aug-2015, at 9:46 pm, Bruno Marchal wrote: > > >> On 07 Aug 2015, at 05:54, Samiya Illias wrote: >> >> Bruno, >> I'm reading R.A. Schwaller de Lubicz. In the Introduction to A Study of >> Numbers, they quote his last words. It reminds me of your salvia beings. >> Thought the attached might be of interest to you. >> Regards, >> Samiya > > Nice quote Samya. > > I love "He [Schwaller I guess] applied himself relentlessly to the apparently > impossible task of using reason to surmount reason." > > This is what Gödel illustrates: the use of reason to study the limit of > reason, for example reason cannot produce a mean to decide if a diophantine > (polynomial in integers) equation has or not some solution. > > Mathematicians have shown the non solubility of many problems, accepting (as > most does) Church's thesis or Church's definition of computable/algorithm. > > But Gödel already saw that the machine or formal systems (which really means > systems described by they local forms) can prove their own incompleteness > theorem, so that machine reasoning about themselves can get the fact that if > they are consistent, then they can't justify it rationally. Consistency is > equivalent with the existence of a reality which satisfies my beliefs (in the > sense that they render my beliefs true). So, machine looking inward > (reasoning on themselves, but also trying to figure out their own > semantic/reality can prove, infer and intuit (correctly or not) that "there > is a reality", and can justify that if there is a reality then we cannot > justify rationally the "existence" of that reality. > > It is also the intuition of the Platonist and Neoplatonist: we can use reason > to develop confidence in what extends necessarility reason, "The Reality", > which might be only the semantic of oneself, the reality which satisfies my > beliefs, in the sense of the logiciens, where a reality (called Model) is > what makes a belief true of false (to stay in classical logic). > > The machines can already do the impossible task: use reason to surmount > reason. > > All self-referentially correct machine get mystical, ... for good reason. > > The "authorties" or simply those who want to control you cannot accept the > mysticals as this one will take its order from something they cannot control. > The self-referentically correct machine is Groucho-Marxiste, she refutes all > categorzation made by others. > > About the entity that Schwaller describes, I don't know what relation you see > with salvia. Earlier you once explained the salvia experience to me as: "Salvia is a logical drug, it provides counter-example to any certainty you might have in theology. It provides an epimenidian sort of super-dream argument: a sort of hallucination saying of itself that it is an hallucination." Similar to your 'counter-example to any certainty', Schwaller speaks of the mental being as the source of all doubt. That is why it reminded me of Salvia entity: perhaps both of you experience different manifestations of the same mental being? Samiya > > With any entheogen (psychotrope) it is the mental being which create the > fears and the resistance. Dying, sleep and altered consciousness exploration > requires the ability to "let it go". To accept losing control. That mental > being is the little ego, but on earth, he *has* good reason to "create fear", > if you agree that it is better to eat than being eaten. But the kind of > technic to get "religious" state always involved a sort of acceotance of > dying and let reason expands on the meaning of the possible "hallucination". > Here salvia is the most cartesian teacher i could have dreamed of, as it > offers the "dream argument on a plate". > > I know that not all person are prepared, and for those who are concerned with > the mundane life, cannabis is better as it open the appetite for life, and > can ease the pain. > > Salvia is for the theologian, i.e. those interested in the after life, the > prelife, the parallel lives, or who haved lived situation to search a meaning > of life. > > Note that computationalism makes clear also the existence of the theological > trap: to take for granted a statement belonging in G* minus G, that is a > truth which cannot be justified. It maks a part of theology secret, or > derivable partially by the "dangerous" meta-assumption of self-correctness: > this comp explains that it is your free choice, at your risk and peril. You > have local means for harm reduction. > > Still about salvia, I explained yesterday to some friend asking about COMP, > that a rough description of logical entailment would be > > NUMBER = > CONSCIOUSNESS-FLUX => PHYSICAL REALITY => HUMAN CONSCIOUSNESS > > But then I dared to redescribe this by: > > NUMBER = > DIVINE CONSCIOUSNESS => PHYSICAL REALITY => HUMAN CONSCIOUSNESS > > Which makes sense with the Plotinian morphism. Then the salvia experience is >
Re: 1P/3P CONFUSION again and again
On Thu, Aug 6, 2015 smitra wrote: > > You can just define personal identity as a single observer moment, which > includes any memories of the outcomes of the duplication experiments, so > the string of the "W"'s and "M"'should be included in the definition of > "you". > OK. > > But there is not problem here if you just take the formal description of > any conscious being as defining its personal identity. But if that definition of "you" is used then the question "What one and only one city did you end up seeing?" has no answer because it is not a question at all, it is just a sequence of ASCII characters the last of which happens to be a question mark. John K Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: 1P/3P CONFUSION again and again
On Thu, Aug 6, 2015 at 8:40 PM, Pierz wrote: > > > My point isn't that MWI is true. My point is you understand it and how it > leads to the appearance of indeterminacy in a completely determined system. > > Indeterminacy is a 1-p illusion > It's either an illusion or it is not and peepee is not involved. And it is an experimental fact that Bell's inequality is violated therefore we know for certain that if things really are deterministic then even stranger things must be true; either things are not realistic (an electron is not spinning clockwise or counterclockwise until it is measured, nothing exists until it is observed) or non-local (forget the butterfly effect, a hurricane arrived in Miami today because one year in the **future** a butterfly in Australia will flap his wings). So we know for sure that Einstein's idea that things are realistic , local , and deterministic can not be correct , at least one of them must be false and all 3 could be. >> >> If the multiverse really exists then that explains quantum indeterminacy, >> but Bruno claims he has found a new sort of indeterminacy independent of >> both the quantum type and also of the Godel/Turing type and I don't think >> he has. >> > > > > To my mind, the logic is completely isomorphic with MWI. > MWI says everything that can happen to you will happen to you, so you can see everything that can happen; the only way these 2 things can be consistent with experience is if there are lots and lots of "yous" but the laws of physics only allow an observer (or a you) to see one of them. And that is why Bruno loves pronouns and that is why despite the criticism Bruno insists on continuing to use the word "you"; pronouns like that disguise the fact that "you" is not singular, it is plural. Admittedly Bruno does say "THE 1p you" but unfortunately always neglects to mention which 1p you. Well OK Bruno does say THE 1p you who wrote all that stuff in the diary, but that does no good because after the duplication Bruno is unable to point to the one guy who wrote all that stuff in the diary. > > > If Bruno is claiming there is some striking originality about his idea of > FPI then I'd point to Everett and say, that guy thought of it first. > Everett said nothing about consciousness and didn't need to, one great strength of Many Worlds is that unlike some other quantum interpretations it doesn't need to explain what consciousness is or how it works because consciousness has nothing to do with it. Bruno's great discovery is in finding out that sometimes "you" doesn't know what "you" will see next, but I think Og The Caveman beat him to the punch on that by a few years. > > > Obviously Bruno's argument hypothesises this first-person indeterminacy > occurring in a context of computationally defined observers (whether in a > physical machine, a duplication experiment, or pure mathematics) rather > than the multiverse, but that context is irrelevant to the question of the > validity of the logic > But it is not irrelevant to the question of pronouns and Bruno's arguments are always filled wall to wall with pronouns. When discussing the multiverse the very laws of physics ensure that pronouns cause no ambiguity, but that is certainly not the case with people duplicating machines. Stage magicians use pretty assistants to distract the audience from their sleight of hand, Bruno uses pronouns. Bruno says that c omputationalism can't predict what *YOU* will see next so there must be some aspect of consciousness that the computational theory of mind can not explain, but in reality what c omputationalism (or anything else) can't explain is what the hell Bruno means by "you". John K Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: The Mental Being
On 07 Aug 2015, at 05:54, Samiya Illias wrote: Bruno, I'm reading R.A. Schwaller de Lubicz. In the Introduction to A Study of Numbers, they quote his last words. It reminds me of your salvia beings. Thought the attached might be of interest to you. Regards, Samiya Nice quote Samya. I love "He [Schwaller I guess] applied himself relentlessly to the apparently impossible task of using reason to surmount reason." This is what Gödel illustrates: the use of reason to study the limit of reason, for example reason cannot produce a mean to decide if a diophantine (polynomial in integers) equation has or not some solution. Mathematicians have shown the non solubility of many problems, accepting (as most does) Church's thesis or Church's definition of computable/algorithm. But Gödel already saw that the machine or formal systems (which really means systems described by they local forms) can prove their own incompleteness theorem, so that machine reasoning about themselves can get the fact that if they are consistent, then they can't justify it rationally. Consistency is equivalent with the existence of a reality which satisfies my beliefs (in the sense that they render my beliefs true). So, machine looking inward (reasoning on themselves, but also trying to figure out their own semantic/reality can prove, infer and intuit (correctly or not) that "there is a reality", and can justify that if there is a reality then we cannot justify rationally the "existence" of that reality. It is also the intuition of the Platonist and Neoplatonist: we can use reason to develop confidence in what extends necessarility reason, "The Reality", which might be only the semantic of oneself, the reality which satisfies my beliefs, in the sense of the logiciens, where a reality (called Model) is what makes a belief true of false (to stay in classical logic). The machines can already do the impossible task: use reason to surmount reason. All self-referentially correct machine get mystical, ... for good reason. The "authorties" or simply those who want to control you cannot accept the mysticals as this one will take its order from something they cannot control. The self-referentically correct machine is Groucho- Marxiste, she refutes all categorzation made by others. About the entity that Schwaller describes, I don't know what relation you see with salvia. With any entheogen (psychotrope) it is the mental being which create the fears and the resistance. Dying, sleep and altered consciousness exploration requires the ability to "let it go". To accept losing control. That mental being is the little ego, but on earth, he *has* good reason to "create fear", if you agree that it is better to eat than being eaten. But the kind of technic to get "religious" state always involved a sort of acceotance of dying and let reason expands on the meaning of the possible "hallucination". Here salvia is the most cartesian teacher i could have dreamed of, as it offers the "dream argument on a plate". I know that not all person are prepared, and for those who are concerned with the mundane life, cannabis is better as it open the appetite for life, and can ease the pain. Salvia is for the theologian, i.e. those interested in the after life, the prelife, the parallel lives, or who haved lived situation to search a meaning of life. Note that computationalism makes clear also the existence of the theological trap: to take for granted a statement belonging in G* minus G, that is a truth which cannot be justified. It maks a part of theology secret, or derivable partially by the "dangerous" meta- assumption of self-correctness: this comp explains that it is your free choice, at your risk and peril. You have local means for harm reduction. Still about salvia, I explained yesterday to some friend asking about COMP, that a rough description of logical entailment would be NUMBER = > CONSCIOUSNESS-FLUX => PHYSICAL REALITY => HUMAN CONSCIOUSNESS But then I dared to redescribe this by: NUMBER = > DIVINE CONSCIOUSNESS => PHYSICAL REALITY => HUMAN CONSCIOUSNESS Which makes sense with the Plotinian morphism. Then the salvia experience is like remembering the divine consciousness, which is the state of the "virgin" Löbian machine, the one described by the principal Plotinian hypostases. It produces this by a strong dissociation: like going not just out of the body, but out of the physical reality. (what mathematicians do already, somehow). Of course, I might be biased, so I am the last one to ask how to interpret the salvia experience. The "lady salvia" is a fierce entity only for those who create their daemons. It is a fierce entity for what Schwaller called the "mental being" (the "little ego" naive enough to take a psycho-trope ... and resist). You can't sleep well if you are not sure the gas trigger is in the right po
Re: 1P/3P CONFUSION again and again
On 06 Aug 2015, at 19:23, John Clark wrote: On Thu, Aug 6, 2015 at 5:13 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: >>> the nuance is not in the name or in the pronouns, but in the 1p/3p difference, or in the 1-1p/3-1p difference. >> In a world with people duplicating machines what exactly is the difference betweenTHE1p and the 3p difference and the difference between THE 1-1p and the 3-1p difference? And whose "1p" is it anyway? > It is the difference between what is written in a diary of a person, and what an outsider can describe If after the duplication Bruno Marchal can point to the one and only person that unambiguously wrote all that stuff in that diary then it will have been proven that there really is such a thing as *THE* 1P, if not then Bruno Marchal is talking gibberish. >> Expects? That depends entirely on who the Helsinki guy is, as interminable posts on this subject have conclusively shown John Clark and Bruno Marchal expect very different things. > But we do agree on who the guy is. He is the guy who remember Helsinki. But today is thursday so we don't agree. Lie. >> But why is this even relevant? > You would read step 4, 5, ... you would have a pretty clear idea why it is relevant If step 4 is built on the foundations of step 3 then it would be pointless to read step 4 until the blunders in step 3 are repaired, and if it is not built on those foundations then it was unnecessary and foolish to include step 3 at all in your "proof". Lol. >> The Helsinki guy will have whatever future subjective experience he has > The point is that there are more than one which is available. So you agree the Helsinki guy will have a future subjective experience of Moscow and you agree the Helsinki guy will have a future subjective experience of Washington Yes, in the 3p view. but insist the Helsinki guy will not experience Moscow and Washington in the future. Yes, in the 1p view. Are you sure you're a logician? Yes, you do just for the bilionth time the 1p-3p confusion. > and his expectations, correct or incorrect, have absolutely positively NOTHING to do with it. ? Which word didn't you understand? I have no clue to what "it" is referring. >>> we have agreed on: both the M and W men are the same person as the H-man >> Yes the Moscow man and the Washington man are the Helsinki man, but it's important to remember that the Washington man is NOT the Moscow man; and that's why personal identity can only be traced from the past to the present, never from the present to the future. > Your own copies in W and M refute this immediately. Bullshit. W says I remember seeing Washington one minute ago, and M says I remember seeing Moscow one minute ago, so W is NOT M . Correct. But both W and M say I remember seeing Helsinki one hour ago so both W and M are H. Correct. But you don't give any clue explaining why this prevents any of the copies to refute that we can predict what will happen in the future. > Until a city was spotted John Clark would know that John Clark had NOT been duplicated, although John Clark's body may or may not have been. > So you say that at a time he might know what happened. Pure nonsense. Until different outside stimulation is received, like seeing a different city, both brains would be running identical programs in parallel, so John Clark would have only one conscious experience regardless of how many identical brains were involved. True, but what is the relevance? The differentiation *has* already occurred. > He should just never expect experiencing being in two cities, and the point is that the guy cannot see the difference, unless telepathy Telepathy?? Oh for christ sake! Ok, nice. No telepathy, but then you are the one who seem to imply that we can distinguish a simple teleportation from a duplication- differentiation. If that is not telepathy ... Of course comp disallow such telepathy, thus you can't distinguish a simple teleportation from a duplication, and thus my point in the preceding post was not refuted. Try again, Bruno John K Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-l
Re: 1P/3P CONFUSION again and again
On 07 Aug 2015, at 02:59, Pierz wrote: On Thursday, August 6, 2015 at 8:06:31 PM UTC+10, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 06 Aug 2015, at 02:39, Pierz wrote: > Mein Gott, this argument reminds me of the fire in Siberia that > started burning in the Holocene and is still going. Why do you keep > taking the troll bait Bruno? Because it is not under my back, and I want to make clear that the person who have a problem with this are troll. > JC is a physicist so I presume he understands Everett. Ergo, he > understands, in principle, first person indeterminacy. See the attempt by Quentin and others to make John C realizing this, but he answers by the same hand-waving method, confirming (that's the goal of answering) that he is a troll. > He just loves tormenting you. Possible. But then why? Jealousy? Inability to say "I was wrong"? I try to understand such "bad faith" as this might make the difference between coming back to the scientific attitude in theology next century or next millennium. My goal is harm reduction, and the sooner we can be serious on this, the less useless suffering for humans. > You can ask the simple question: if the quantum state evolves > deterministically where does randomness come from according to MWI? > I'd like to hear JC's answer to that. If he says it's due to > multiple versions of the observer ending up in different branches of > the multiverse, he's shown he understands. If he refuses to > acknowledge MWI as a valid account due to his pronoun concerns, then > fine, maybe he should publish a refutation of Everett to that > effect. I'm sure the physics world would be fascinated to learn of > its error. John Clark has given already both answers, and has oscillate between accepting the FPI o-and rejecting it. When he accepts it, he insist it is trivial and does not deserve the Nobel Prize (like if that was on the table!), but fail to explain why he still does not address the next step in the reasoning. I think that to avoid this, he knows prefer to stick on his 1p3p-difference abstraction of. Keep in mind that I got the 1p-indeterminacy more than 40 years ago, and that I have never had any problem in explaining it to scientist. But then some scientist decided that it was philosophy, and hired some (non-analytical) philosopher who pretended that the FPI does not exist. As I have never been able to met them, I felt frustated (for 40 years) I see, I think. JC is a proxy for the guy who robbed you of your prize, and you're still hoping for a victory of logic over malice. Actually, that is what I try to see. I am still not sure. Sometimes ago there was a guy named "digital physics". That was a proxy if not one of the main guy, perhaps push by his own colleagues. You're still trying to deal with your hurt. Certainly. But not to ease the hurting (I know very good medication for that), but to grasp where such "malice" comes from, as eventually, those people only advertize their own dumbness (and then are forced to not deviate from it as they thought that would it more publicly palpable). But, yes, when I got the price, I really thought that this was the end of 20 years of harassment. But then the price has only spread the harrasment in other countries. Once that kind of things happens, it concerns no more just me, but everyone. It means we are confronted with either bandits (like in the health politics) or a dangerous form of fundamentalism. In Australia we have a term for what John is doing; it's considered a national pastime: cutting down the tall poppies. Whenever someone sticks their head up above the crowd with a claim to greatness or originality, somebody will try to lop their head off out of jealousy and small-mindedness. John tries to act as if it's all about the logic, but his nastiness and sarcasm give away the underlying emotional motivations of a thwarted embittered person who hasn't achieved the recognition he craves and so feels compelled to cut down anyone who dares to stand out with a claim for attention. I am afraid you are right. so I still try to see where is the problem: and JC helps a lot in showing that the problem is simply its inability, or unwillingness, to take the 1p/3p difference into account in the question and verification. But he has show to grasp the difference, so it is probably just unwillingness. Then the question remains: why such unwillingness? I'm afraid it is just jealousy or something of that type. each post by JC confirms that, and it *might* someday help people to understand how obscurantist people can be on this subject. Then JC, like Jean-Paul Delahaye, makes me think that maybe the FPI does deserve the Nobel Prize after all. If it is that subtle to grasp for grown up, it might be worth to make clearer. After all, all the rest of the work exploit that FPI. Tegmark and Schmidhuber missed it, as Tegmark confirms by "rediscovering it" in his book (as Jason Resch quo
Re: 1P/3P CONFUSION again and again
On 06 Aug 2015, at 19:38, smitra wrote:
You can just define personal identity as a single observer moment,
That is dangerous talk, but i see what you mean.
which includes any memories of the outcomes of the duplication
experiments, so the string of the "W"'s and "M"'should be included
in the definition of "you".
That is implied by the definition: content of the diary taken by the
experiencer in the teleportation box. OK.
You can also invent a machine that creates a consciousness that has
false memories of having been Bruno and also John Clark in the past,
but such that these memories are inconsistent with each other. E.g.
it has the memory of having been at Brussels, but also in New York
at the same time.
But there is not problem here if you just take the formal
description of any conscious being as defining its personal identity.
Yes, but usually we prefer to avoid the term "conscious" too early. In
fact, I agree on this last sentence, but only because we recover that
when we translate the 3p self by the arithmetical provability (Gödel's
beweisbar) predicate "[]A", and the 1p self by the conjunction of the
provability and truth ("[]p & p"). Here we get an explanation of a
difficulty which is hidden in step 3 (but withoit making the reasoning
invalid as it is not used thanks to the 3p definition of the 1p), and
which is that the 1p cannot be defined by the machine. This is
coherent with introspection, with duplication, with the fact that
"consciousness" is not definable (like truth), and with the greek
notion of inner God (which does play the role of the universal first-
person, the one described by the logic of []p & p (S4Grz1).
Thanks for the suggestion, but I am not sure that any help can change
John Clark's behavior. I am not sure he believes himself that his
prose is related to the subject.
Bruno
Saibal
On 06-08-2015 11:27, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 06 Aug 2015, at 02:37, John Clark wrote:
On Wed, Aug 5, 2015 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> But there is no genuine reason to prefer one over the
other.
> Thta's the point, and that is why they both get one bit of
information,
No new information has been received. Long before the duplication
button was pressed John Clark already knew that one John Clark would
receive a W bit and one John Clark would get a M bit. No new
information was generated.
You go ou of your body to get the 3-1 view, but forget that from the
copies perspective, it does look like they are in only one place, and
looking at which one, they do get 1 bit of information.
So, what you say is that in the 3-view, there is no new information.
Indeed the 3-view is the protocol itself.
But the question was about the expected 1p experience, and both
confirm that they got one bit of information. The result of "pushing
on the button and deciding which cities is behind" is always either W
or M, and never both.
> You
[
Chris
Peck
] seem to just persist ignoring the question like John
Clark.
Ignore isn't the right word, there is no question to ignore;
there is just a sequence of personal pronouns, none of which has a
referent but all are liberally spiced with peepee and with a
question mark at the very end. A question needs more than a
question mark.
The question is what do you expect to live, and every one grasp,
without any trouble, that it can only be W, or M, and never both.
"W &
M" is never written in any copies' diary, except when they describe
the 3-1 view that they *imagine* correct instead of the 1p-experience
that they directly live (which was what the question is all about).
Sorry John, but your hand-waving does not succeed in hiding that you
avoid the question asked. We have agreed on all definitions, but you
keep talking like if someone can distinguish, directly from its
subjective experience, the difference between a simple teleportation
and a duplication. So you need some magic to get your point
meaningful. But mechanism does not allow it. Without magic, both
copies see only one city, and cannot decide if there is or not a
doppelganger in the other city.
Bruno
John K Clark
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Re: 1P/3P CONFUSION again and again
On Friday, August 7, 2015 at 1:41:51 PM UTC+10, chris peck wrote: > > @ Pierz > > >> If he refuses to > > acknowledge MWI as a valid account due to his pronoun concerns, then > > fine, maybe he should publish a refutation of Everett to that > > effect. > > but isn't John's point that pro-nouns do not cause much trouble when > duplicates end up in separate universes? Thats a fair point right? > Is it? To be honest I can't make sense of his objection and the so-called "trouble" caused by pronouns. To me step 3 is obvious, as it seems to be to most people. Bruno's argument could just as easily run: person A ends up in universe 1 and person B ends up in universe 2, or two different simulations which do not allow either copy to meet again. What relevance does this have to the logic of the situation? Would JC then say, "oh well that's OK then! Now they of course will experience indeterminacy!" Of course he won't, and he can't if he's to be consistent. > So, Im not sure he feels his concerns are relevent to Everett. Ive never > seen Bruno respond adequately to that point. > > All this 'troll' baiting reminds me of when I first came into contact with > step 3. Bruno and a bunch of others were mocking John for saying that 1 > person could experience being in moscow and washington at the same time. I > thought it was odd that someone like John would think that, so I looked up > what he had actually written and lo and behold Bruno and co. were just > lying. lying out of their lazy fat academic arses! lol. > lol? Whatever you might think of his ideas, I've never known Bruno to be intellectually dishonest and deliberately misrepresent someone's position. Mockery is not part of his standard polemical armoury either AFAICT. The problem is that what John is actually arguing is unclear, and therefore easily misunderstood. It seemed to me early in this interminable debate that he was indeed saying that the person could experience Moscow and Washington simultaneously. That was from reading his words, not Bruno's. In that case the problem *was* pronouns, because it is both true and untrue to say that "I" will experience both Moscow and Washington simultaneously if I am duplicated in those cities. True in Bruno's 3p sense, and false in the 1p sense. > He'ld said nothing of the sort. So you have to be careful to read what > John says rather than rely what Bruno says John says. The two can be very > different. > > -- > Date: Thu, 6 Aug 2015 17:59:25 -0700 > From: pie...@gmail.com > To: everyth...@googlegroups.com > Subject: Re: 1P/3P CONFUSION again and again > > > > On Thursday, August 6, 2015 at 8:06:31 PM UTC+10, Bruno Marchal wrote: > > > On 06 Aug 2015, at 02:39, Pierz wrote: > > > Mein Gott, this argument reminds me of the fire in Siberia that > > started burning in the Holocene and is still going. Why do you keep > > taking the troll bait Bruno? > > Because it is not under my back, and I want to make clear that the > person who have a problem with this are troll. > > > > > JC is a physicist so I presume he understands Everett. Ergo, he > > understands, in principle, first person indeterminacy. > > See the attempt by Quentin and others to make John C realizing this, > but he answers by the same hand-waving method, confirming (that's the > goal of answering) that he is a troll. > > > > > > > He just loves tormenting you. > > Possible. But then why? Jealousy? Inability to say "I was wrong"? > > I try to understand such "bad faith" as this might make the difference > between coming back to the scientific attitude in theology next > century or next millennium. My goal is harm reduction, and the sooner > we can be serious on this, the less useless suffering for humans. > > > > > You can ask the simple question: if the quantum state evolves > > deterministically where does randomness come from according to MWI? > > I'd like to hear JC's answer to that. If he says it's due to > > multiple versions of the observer ending up in different branches of > > the multiverse, he's shown he understands. If he refuses to > > acknowledge MWI as a valid account due to his pronoun concerns, then > > fine, maybe he should publish a refutation of Everett to that > > effect. I'm sure the physics world would be fascinated to learn of > > its error. > > John Clark has given already both answers, and has oscillate between > accepting the FPI o-and rejecting it. When he accepts it, he insist it > is trivial and does not deserve the Nobel Prize (like if that was on > the table!), but fail to explain why he still does not address the > next step in the reasoning. I think that to avoid this, he knows > prefer to stick on his 1p3p-difference abstraction of. > > Keep in mind that I got the 1p-indeterminacy more than 40 years ago, > and that I have never had any problem in explaining it to scientist.
