Re: Uploaded Worm Mind

[Bruno Marchal]

On 02 Sep 2015, at 22:48, meekerdb wrote:


On 9/2/2015 8:25 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
So now you agree with me that there are different kinds and  
degrees of consciousness; that it is not just a binary attribute  
of an axiom + inference system.


?

Either you are conscious, or you are not.


But is a roundworm either conscious or not?  an amoeba?


I don't know, but i think they are. Even bacteria, and perhaps even  
some viruses, but on a different time scale than us.




If they can be conscious, but not self-conscious then there are  
two kinds of "being conscious".


Yes, at least two kinds, but each arithmetical hypostases having  
either "<>t" or "& p" describes a type of consciousness, I would say.
And they all differentiate on the infinitely many version of "[]A",  
be it the "[]" predicate of PA, ZF, an amoeba or you and me ...


So if there are different kinds of consciousness then a being with  
more kinds is  more conscious.  It seems that your dictum, "Your  
either conscious or not." is being diluted away to mere slogan.



There are basically two levels, without criterion of decidability, but  
with simple operational definition:


1) something is conscious if it is torturable, and arguably ethically  
wrong of doing so. I think all invertebrates are already at that  
level, and in arithmetic that might correspond to the sigma_1 complete  
(Turing universality). Robinson Arithmetic, the universal dovetailer,  
are at that level.


2) something is self-conscious if it is Löbian, basically he is aware  
of its unnameable name. PA, ZF, are "at that level", like all their  
sound recursively enumerable extensions. At that level, the entity is  
able to ascribe consciousness to another, and can get the the moral  
understanding of good and wrong (with or without a forbidden fruit).


But the content of the consciousness can be extremely variable, and  
then there are many different types of consciousness states. By  
incompleteness, machine's psychology is transfinitely rich. The first  
person self is not a machine from the machine first person  
perspective. Machines are naturally non computationalist, and the  
origin of consciousness is plausibly more on the side of the truth  
than on the representation.


Bruno







Brent

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http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



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Re: Uploaded Worm Mind

[meekerdb]

On 9/3/2015 8:35 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 02 Sep 2015, at 22:48, meekerdb wrote:


On 9/2/2015 8:25 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
So now you agree with me that there are different kinds and degrees of 
consciousness; that it is not just a binary attribute of an axiom + inference system.


?

Either you are conscious, or you are not.


But is a roundworm either conscious or not?  an amoeba?


I don't know, but i think they are. Even bacteria, and perhaps even some viruses, but 
on a different time scale than us.




If they can be conscious, but not self-conscious then there are two kinds of "being 
conscious".


Yes, at least two kinds, but each arithmetical hypostases having either "<>t" or "& p" 
describes a type of consciousness, I would say.
And they all differentiate on the infinitely many version of "[]A", be it the "[]" 
predicate of PA, ZF, an amoeba or you and me ...


So if there are different kinds of consciousness then a being with more kinds is more 
conscious.  It seems that your dictum, "Your either conscious or not." is being diluted 
away to mere slogan.



There are basically two levels, without criterion of decidability, but with simple 
operational definition:


1) something is conscious if it is torturable, and arguably ethically wrong of 
doing so.


So when Capt Sequra tells Wormold that he's "not of the torturable class" he means he's 
not conscious.  :-)


How is this an operational defintion?  What is the operation to determine whether a being 
is torturable?


I think all invertebrates are already at that level, and in arithmetic that might 
correspond to the sigma_1 complete (Turing universality). Robinson Arithmetic, the 
universal dovetailer, are at that level.


2) something is self-conscious if it is Löbian, basically he is aware of its unnameable 
name. PA, ZF, are "at that level", like all their sound recursively enumerable 
extensions. At that level, the entity is able to ascribe consciousness to another, and 
can get the the moral understanding of good and wrong (with or without a forbidden fruit).


What's the operation to determine it is aware of its unamable name?

Brent



But the content of the consciousness can be extremely variable, and then there are many 
different types of consciousness states. By incompleteness, machine's psychology is 
transfinitely rich. The first person self is not a machine from the machine first person 
perspective. Machines are naturally non computationalist, and the origin of 
consciousness is plausibly more on the side of the truth than on the representation.


Bruno


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Re: 1P/3P CONFUSION again and again

[Bruno Marchal]

On 03 Sep 2015, at 02:31, chris peck wrote:


Bruno

>> And someone asked JC, before the duplication, what do you expect  
to live. JC remarked that "you" is ambiguous. Oh, but you agreed  
that you will survive, so you expect to live some experience, no?  
Let me ask you this how to you evaluate the chance to see 0 on the  
paper after opening the drawer.


'You' is ambiguous *because* we agree that 'you' will survive. If we  
agreed 'you' wouldn't survive then its meaning is clear. 'You'  
denotes just JC at Helsinki.


>> Surely, you can't be serious, as this is not a first experience.  
It is a list of first person experiences. "


Don't call me Shirley, and 'I will see 0 or I will see 1' is a list  
just as really as 'I will see 0 and I will see 1'. Whats your point?



"I will see 0 or I will see 1" *remains a true prediction for all  
continuations.


"I will see 0 and I will see 1" is 1-false for all continuations,  
althoughtrivially 3-1 true, but the question was about the next life  
experience, not a third person description of them.











>> After pushing the button, you will live only one realization of  
the experience just listed above.


This explicitly violates the agreement that 'you' survives in both  
rooms when duplicated.


I usually agree on this, but John Clark is used to make sense of it,  
and it is indeed what yoy get in the third person description talking  
about that"I" in the third person way. I void doing this, and do it  
only because John C makes that move. It is unecessary.





Also, its when you phrase things this way that it becomes clear that  
you are violating 'comp' because it is equivolent to saying that  
'you' survives in only one branch, that despite the copy being made  
at the right substitution level in both rooms, something else is  
carrying over to one or the other room that is not contained in the  
description. You're language makes it clear that you believe,  
implicitly if not explicitly, that the description is incomplete.


The whole magic comes from the fact that the level is right, and the  
evolution is 3p deterministic, but then this why the 1p evolution is  
not deterministic. The 0 v 1 is a necessarily non constructive OR.


There is no problem once you distinguish well if the question bear on  
the subjective experience, or on objective 3p communicable predicate.







>> you really maintain that the result of JC opening the drawer will  
be "0 and 1"?


yes in the following sense. I survive in both rooms. In both rooms I  
open the drawer. So I will 'live' the experience of 0 and I will  
'live' the experience of 1.


That is a 3p description of what you will live. But no continuations  
will live that from their 1p view. They will live only the experience  
of 0, or the experience of 1. Not both, as they are exclusive (John  
agrees that they are exclsuive).







>> So JC predicts "0 and 1". Then I interview JC-0. Did you observe  
"0 and 1". Yes, JC told me.

How come? JC -1 has not yet been reconstituted, may be ...

Perhaps the question that needs to be asked of JC-H is whether he  
can expect to see 0 and 1 at precisely the same moment? Is that the  
question you are trying to formulate?


That is made explicit at step 4. in Step 3 the question is  
operational: you *will* push on the button, and open a drawer. What do  
you expect to live as experience. the comp answer is that I expect to  
see a 0, or a 1, and I don't expect to see a blurred combination of 0  
or 1. After the experience, both JC-0 and JC-1 will confirm that this  
is indeed verified.








Also, you have to be clear about how 'you' operates. It can track  
'you' backwards in time from JC-0 to JC-H and from JC-1 to JC-H, but  
it doesn't work well tracking duplicates across space at a  
particular time. So JC-0 can't track to JC-1. So, for example whilst  
it is true that JC-0-'you' is not JC-1-'you', both are JC-H-'you'.


No problem.



In otherwords, because JC-0 and JC-1's experiences are exclusive  
relative to one another, they are not exclusive relative to JC-H.


Right.

We have discuss this already. It means that personal identity is an  
intensional notion, or a modal notion, in which the Leibniz identity  
principle (a = b and a = c ->. b = c) is not valid. No problem, this  
is illustrated also in the math part, and indeed it explains why we  
can't avoid modal logic. But this does not refute the FPI, if that is  
what you were trying to do.



Bruno






From: marc...@ulb.ac.be
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
Subject: Re: 1P/3P CONFUSION again and again
Date: Wed, 2 Sep 2015 19:40:16 +0200


On 31 Aug 2015, at 23:58, John Clark wrote:

On Mon, Aug 31, 2015 at 4:30 AM, Bruno Marchal   
wrote:


​>>​Bruno Marcha​l  was alluding on how you predict your  
subjective experience when you do an experience in physics​ ​ 
where "you" has been duplicated and thus making that personal  
pronoun ambiguous.


​>​I have repeated 

Re: 1P/3P CONFUSION again and again

[John Clark]

Bruno Marchal  wrote:

> ​> ​
> Just one remark: we cannot make a piece of matter wet in arithmetic
>

​I know, but why not? If arithmetic is more fundamental than physics as you
say then we should be able to write a program that would get the computer
wet, and yet we can't and your theory can not give an adequate explanation
of why not.
  ​


> ​> ​
> but once we postulate computationalism, we can prove that all the piece of
> computations leading to the first person experience of feeling wet, or
> clenching your thirst, exist in arithmetic
>

​C
omputationalism
​ postulates that the computations a* PHYSICAL* computer produce can create
intelligent behavior and consciousness, but computationalism does *NOT*
postulate that
computations ​exist in arithmetic
​independent of physics. ​Show me a example of arithmetic all by itself
making a calculation and you have won this argument, not a definition, not
a proof, an *EXAMPLE*. Stop talking about it and just show me!

​> ​
> I will please you and not use pronouns
> ​
>

Bruno Marchal
​just did.​



> ​> ​
> someone asked JC, before the duplication, what do you expect to live. JC
> remarked that "you" is ambiguous. Oh, but you agreed that you will survive,
>

​And JC responded: "Yes "you" will survive provided that "you" is defined
as somebody who remembers ​being a man in Helsinki, but if that personal
pronoun is defined in some other way or, as often happens on this list, not
defined at all then JC might have a different answer to "will you survive"
or have no answer at all because gibberish has no answer".



> ​>​
> so you expect to live some experience, no?
>

​Explain what that *GODDAMN* ​personal pronoun "you" means and JC will
provide an answer!

​ Bruno's "
I will please you and not use pronouns
​" promise sure didn't last long.

  John K Clark

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Fwd: Robot hallucinations

[meekerdb]

 Forwarded Message 


If You Give a Robot Acid 



image 






If You Give a Robot Acid 


What do Google's trippy neural network-generated images tell us about the human 
mind?

View on www.theatlantic.com 



Preview by Yahoo




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Re: Uploaded Worm Mind

[Jason Resch]

Brent,

We had this exact discussion several months ago.

Perhaps this discussion is better suited for an English mailing list, but
last time the conclusion reached was that consciousness vs. unconsciousness
could be likened to zero vs. positive.

You seem to be making the argument that it is like finite vs. infinite,
with many ways of being finite and many ways of being infinite.

I lean towards Quentin's usage wherein there is only one way of being
unconscious, and many ways of being conscious. Sure, different states of
consciousness are conscious of different things, and you might say a
certain conscious being is not conscious of a certain thing, but I would
not say that the general English usage of "unconscious" could be applied to
that being, just because it lacks some God like omniscient consciousness.

Jason

On Wednesday, September 2, 2015, meekerdb  wrote:
> On 9/2/2015 2:23 PM, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
>
>> So if there are different kinds of consciousness then a being with more
kinds is more conscious.  It seems that your dictum, "Your either conscious
or not." is being diluted away to mere slogan.
>
> There is only one way of not being conscious, so you're either not
conscious or you're conscious whatever level it is.
>
> Question begging.  If there's more than one kind of consciousness, then
there is more than one kind of being unconscious.  Per Bruno's example one
could be unconscious of your self.
>
> Brent
>
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