date:20150927

Re: seizing private pensions

2015-09-27 Thread Telmo Menezes

Hi Brent,

This is common practice in Europe, it just might be more or less blatantly
done. My mother had her pension cut several times in the last few years.
Even though she payed full contributions her entire life, at some point the
state decides it needs the money for other stuff and that's that.

Notice that in (continental) Europe social security contributions are not
an investment. Instead, the current generation of workers is directly
paying for the pensions of the current generation of retired workers. There
is simply a social contract, that the same will be done for them when the
time comes. Of course, this is highly vulnerable to demographic changes,
and that is part of what we are seeing now. It is also highly vulnerable to
mob rule. Governments gain full control over pension funds, so they can
redistribute money as they see fit. A common strategy to get elected has
been to cut pensions from people who contributed the most money during
their working careers to give it to people who didn't so much. You never
know what will happen when the next government comes into power.

This is not to say that letting Wall Street manage pensions funds turns out
to be any better. A reasonable solution doesn't seem to exist so far.

Best,
Telmo.

On Sun, Sep 27, 2015 at 6:31 AM, Brent Meeker  wrote:

> Bruno, do you know anything about this:
>
>
> http://www.csmonitor.com/Business/The-Adam-Smith-Institute-Blog/2011/0102/European-nations-begin-seizing-private-pensions
>
> Brent
>
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Re: 1P/3P CONFUSION again and again

2015-09-27 Thread Bruno Marchal

On 25 Sep 2015, at 19:47, John Clark wrote:

On Thu, Sep 24, 2015 at 1:25 PM, Bruno Marchal   
wrote:

>> I don't want proof of computations, I want  
computations!

> If you prove the existence of something in something else,  
you have that something,

Euclid proved 2500 years ago that there are infinitely many  
primes, so if what you say above is true you must have the 423rd  
prime greater than 10^100^100.

Now you equate existence with constructive existence, but that  
contradict your acceptance of the excluded middle principle. You have  
already agree that we can prove the existence of something without us  
being able to show an example. This is also needed to accept the  
classical Church-Turing thesis.

So tell me what it is! You can't because to have that example,  
that something, it would have to be calculated; and neither you nor  
Euclid can do that.

As you said, Euclid proves the existence of infinitely many prime  
numbers, so we (the classical mathematicians) knows that there is a  
prime bigger than 10^(100^100). No need to be able to give an example  
to believe in its existence independently of us.

> indeed a universal machine cannot distinguihs a physical  
computation from a non physical one,

I know, and that lack of ability is yet another example of  
something a non-physical machine can't do that a physical machine  
can. A physical machine, such as myself, has no difficulty  
whatsoever in making that distinction.

Then you have magical abilities not shared by any Turing machine,  
physical or non physical.

>> I can provide something much much better than a  
definition, I can give A EXAMPLE.

> I gave you an example of an immaterial computation too.

Somehow I must have missed that post, but if you did it once you  
can do it again,

KKK
K

I gave you another example, but the one above is simpler, and I expect  
the same non-sense from you. Please don't confuse the computation with  
anything we use to represent and communicate about that computation.

so just use immaterial computation to find the 423rd prime  
greater than 10^100^100 and tell me what it is and you have won  
this argument. How hard can that be?

Just define what *you* mean by "physical computation" without using  
the mathematical notion. You are the one using the term in highly non  
standard sense.

Bruno

  John K Clark

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Re: The Axiom Of Choice and ComputationalismT

2015-09-27 Thread Bruno Marchal

On 26 Sep 2015, at 23:36, John Clark wrote:

On Sat, Sep 26, 2015  Bruno Marchal  wrote:
 >>Paul Cohen not Godel proved that arithmetical reality is  
independent of the Axiom of Choice

> I don't think so. The independence of arithmetic from AC in  
ZF follows from Gödel's proof that V=L -> AC. A model of ZF where  
all sets are "constructible" (V = L) verifies the choice axiom

If a axiom has been verified, that is to say if it can be derived  
from other axioms,

I meant verified in a model, not prove in a theory. If a proposition  
is verified in a model, its negation can still be verified in another  
model. That proves only the consistency of the proposition.

then it no longer needs to be a axiom and is just the result of more  
fundamental axioms.   Paul Cohen proved that AC can not be  
derived from ZF.

>>Godel proved that if you assume that AC is true ZF will  
produce no contradictions, 25 years later Paul Cohen proved that  
if you assume AC is false ZF will STILL not produce any  
contradictions, and so AC must be independent of ZF and can not be  
derived from ZF.

> Yes, but this has nothing to do with what I am saying. The  
fact that the arithmetical truth is independent of the choice axiom

Then a lot of stuff that mathematicians think is true is not true,  
or at least can't be proven to be part of "arithmetical truth 
" because the Axiom of Choice is needed to prove them. 

The constructible set of Gödel can be use to show that ZF and ZFC  
proves the same arithmetical theorems. But of course richer theory can  
prove more theorem. ZF proves much more than PA, and ZF+kappa proves  
much more (purely arithmetical) proposition than ZF. It is  
inexhaustible. No axiomatisable theory at all proves all arithmetical  
propositions. Arithmetical truth is just not axiomatizable. That  
follows from Gödel's incompleteness or from theorem by Skolem, etc.

> can be seen as a corollary of Gödel's proof that AC is  
consistent with ZF,

Godel proved in 1938 that AC was consistent with ZF but for all  
Godel knew The Axiom of Choice could be derived from Zermelo- 
Fraenkel; and that is in fact what Godel believed at the time and  
what most mathematicians thought, even Paul Cohen thought so  
and was as surprised as anyone when he found in 1963 that the  
negation of AC was consistent with ZF too and thus independent of ZF.

>>> Physics is a theory about a possible physical reality

>> I know. So if physical reality is ZFC ( a big "if"  
I admit but it could be) then physical reality has something that  
arithmetic derived from just ZF does not have.

>> "physical reality is ZFC" means nothing to me.

Physical reality is Zermelo-Fraenkel plus the Axiom of  
Choice,  "arithmetical truth" is just Zermelo-Fraenkel.

This is a bit of non-sense. ZF see only a fragment of the arithmetical  
truth, and "physical reality" is a god in which I tend to be rather  
skeptical about.
I can explain why it makes no sense once we postulate  
computationalisme, but you need to grasp the UD argument step 3 to get  
this.

I'm not saying it's true, I'm just saying that's what it means; it  
might be wrong but it's not gibberish.

> Anyway, I do not assume that there is a physical reality.

Hmm. Margaret Fuller once said "I accept the universe" to which  
Thomas Carlyle replied "Gad, you'd better". Unlike you at  
leas Fuller accepted the universe, I wonder what Carlyle would say  
to you.

I believe in a physical reality, but not in one that we have to  
assume. I can prove that physicalism is meaningless once we bet the  
physical brain can be emulated by a physical Turing machine.

>> And yet despite repeated requests you are unable or  
unwilling to explain why you can't start the Tiny Sigma_1  
Computer Hardware Corporation and become the richest man on the  
planet.

> Not at all. I think you don't read the answer. The  
answer, I repeat again, is that to build an hardware corporation I  
need hardware

Yes perfectly true, you need physical hardware. But my question is  
WHY? The only answer can be that physical hardware has something  
that "arithmetical truth" does not.

Then you artificial brain is not Turing emulable, and computationalism  
is false.

We may not be certain what that something is but the fact that  
computer hardware companies have non zero manufacturing costs is  
proof that one has something the other does not.

No, because that relative cost exost also in arithmetic reelatively to  
the people emulated in arithmetic. There too some John Clark pretends  
there is a physical universe, and we know he is wrong, even when it  
hits on the table and say "looks that is hardware".

> and I need to implement the universal machine in that  
hardware.

Yes exactly you need to implement it, but to implement it  
mathematics needs help, it needs physics!

We agree on this, but that is n

Re: seizing private pensions

2015-09-27 Thread Bruno Marchal

On 27 Sep 2015, at 07:31, Brent Meeker wrote:

Bruno, do you know anything about this:

http://www.csmonitor.com/Business/The-Adam-Smith-Institute-Blog/2011/0102/European-nations-begin-seizing-private-pensions

All I know is that when I was 55, five years ago, there was a slight
pressure to take pension, but now, if I get it well, it is pushed from
60 to 65 or 67 years old. If ever I get that old, I guess pension will
be at 75, or 80.

It has been a constant in politics; the non solubility problem of
pension. We made too much babies after the world war II, and never
really voted for the necessary action by a sort of blind
procrastination, but then realism in politics does not so much rule on
the planet .

Now, I can't guarantie anything in your link, there might be
exaggeration or misrepresentation of the facts, I really cannot know,
it concerns the "young democracies" of the East, mainly, and France. I
don't know. What I know, is that we talk on this seemingly insoluble
pension problem since I am born, at the end of the baby-boom.

Too much small baby fishes attracts the sharks.

Bruno

Brent

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Re: seizing private pensions

2015-09-27 Thread Bruno Marchal

Hi Telmo,

On 27 Sep 2015, at 13:34, Telmo Menezes wrote:

Hi Brent,

This is common practice in Europe, it just might be more or less
blatantly done. My mother had her pension cut several times in the
last few years. Even though she payed full contributions her entire
life, at some point the state decides it needs the money for other
stuff and that's that.

Notice that in (continental) Europe social security contributions
are not an investment. Instead, the current generation of workers is
directly paying for the pensions of the current generation of
retired workers. There is simply a social contract, that the same
will be done for them when the time comes. Of course, this is highly
vulnerable to demographic changes, and that is part of what we are
seeing now. It is also highly vulnerable to mob rule. Governments
gain full control over pension funds, so they can redistribute money
as they see fit. A common strategy to get elected has been to cut
pensions from people who contributed the most money during their
working careers to give it to people who didn't so much. You never
know what will happen when the next government comes into power.

This is not to say that letting Wall Street manage pensions funds
turns out to be any better. A reasonable solution doesn't seem to
exist so far.

In Belgium we have come up with euthanasia.

But apparently it is the depressed youth which benefits of it.
"Laura" a young belgian of 24 get the right and help to be medically
'suicided' in Belgium recently. Her real name has never been given.

This suicide depress me. I am for the right of suicide, including
possible medical help or assistance, but not for a young person for a
reason of depression, in a country where known medications against
depression exist and are just not tried due to absurd prohibition law.
This is insane.

I defend euthanasia, but not with prohibition laws around.

(For possible help for severe depression, I am thinking about
Tabernanthe iboga and Salvia divinorum.
"Laura" should have tried this before. If it does not work, we can
still kill her if she ask).

Best,

Bruno

Best,
Telmo.

On Sun, Sep 27, 2015 at 6:31 AM, Brent Meeker
wrote:

Bruno, do you know anything about this:

http://www.csmonitor.com/Business/The-Adam-Smith-Institute-Blog/2011/0102/European-nations-begin-seizing-private-pensions

Brent

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Re: seizing private pensions

2015-09-27 Thread Brent Meeker




On 9/27/2015 4:34 AM, Telmo Menezes wrote:

Hi Brent,

This is common practice in Europe, it just might be more or less 
blatantly done. My mother had her pension cut several times in the 
last few years. Even though she payed full contributions her entire 
life, at some point the state decides it needs the money for other 
stuff and that's that.


Notice that in (continental) Europe social security contributions are 
not an investment. Instead, the current generation of workers is 
directly paying for the pensions of the current generation of retired 
workers.


That's the same as Social Security in the U.S.I suppose the 
difference is that Social Security is only supposed to be a kind of 
minimal pension and people are expected to have private pensions or 
savings in addition.


Brent

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Re: A scary theory about IS

2015-09-27 Thread John Mikes

Bruno, it seems I cannot shake you out from the 'classical' format that
 -WHOEVER (Nominative, not: "whomever" which is Accusative) *lies* himself
into getting the (questionable?) majority of the voting population (and
THEN can do WHATEVER his interest dictates - in the name of such majority
 - )
means *D E M O C R A C Y *.  NO, it does not. You may call it a distortion,
or any political malaise, but democracy (the cratos of the demos) is the
rule of the (entire) population, not a select majority only, leaving any
size of minority suppressed in the system.
It is not timely, to implement such system in our (ongoing) World. - So be
it. - I try to keep the vocabulary clean and do not compromise for ongoing
corruptions.

Religious authoritarian systems are not apt for a democratic instalment,
unless *every member* of the society is equally devout to that religion.
 (I don't mean the 'IS' method: to cut off the heads of all the infidels).

An example of the efficiency of the ongoing voting technique: We changed
domicile (State) before election, so we could not vote. We wanted to vote
for candidate* A* and in the new state candidate* B* got the majority of
votes. We were not upset, because in the nationwide election candidate *A*
became the president anyway. Our vote - if cast - would have been wasted, *yet
efficient*.

Regards

John M



On Thu, Sep 24, 2015 at 12:00 PM, Bruno Marchal  wrote:

>
> On 23 Sep 2015, at 21:24, Brent Meeker wrote:
>
>
>>
>> On 9/23/2015 3:15 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>
>>>
>>> On 22 Sep 2015, at 23:55, John Mikes wrote:
>>>
>>> Bruno, I am at a loss with your explanation. I lived the active first 50
 years of my life in Europe and never heard about such 'liberalism' (for a
 short time was even connected to the Hungarian Liberal Democratic Party).

>>>
>>> In my counntry the right party has the name "parti libéral", for
>>> example. Liberal means "open to free markets".
>>> May be that is only in West Europa.
>>>
>>>
>>> "Liberal" was in no connection with right/wrong, or even right/left,
 only pointed to some freedom of action in the political arena. And the
 other thing:

 Democracy IMO is an oxymoron, the full "demos" cannot exercise it's
 full "cratos" for ruling,

>>>
>>>
>>> Democracy means, for me, presence of election. It can be partial, like
>>> in the beginning where woman did not have the right to vote, or like in the
>>> antic greece were election was for the educated class, and not for slaves,
>>> or it is "universal", meaning everyone can vote. In some country it is
>>> "everyone *must* vote (in Belgium election are obligatory).
>>>
>>> Then a democracy can be corrupted, and/or under the influence of
>>> corporatism, and/or sick etc. Democracy is not the final state of politics,
>>> it is the prerequisite of having a representative politics. If the main
>>> powers (mainly justice and press) are not independent, a democracy can be
>>> de facto a tyranny disguised into democracy. I think that is the case today
>>> (since prohibition).
>>>
>>> It is the like the Islamic bill or right, which is a copy of the
>>> universal definition except that they have added "as long as it verifies
>>> the Charia" for each principle (which of course changes the very idea). The
>>> same with Obama who signed a text which respect the human right except for
>>> a category or people, but something have to be universal to make sense. The
>>> human right applies to all humans, or there is no more human right at all.
>>>
>>>
>> Democracy is necessary but not sufficient for good government.
>>
>
> I agree.
>
>
> Supposing that democracy is enough was the mistake of George W. Bush and
>> the neo-conservatives.
>>
>
> That mistake, but also the mistake that we can impose democracy to others,
> or the even more naïve idea that by eliminating a dictator will make people
> opting for a democracy.
>
> A democracy needs a lot of generation of thinking people.
>
> And just one generation of people can make it disappear, or weakened so
> much that it "stays" as a democracy only for a part of the population.
>
>
>
>
>  They thought that if we just held elections in Iraq all would be well.
>> But there must be limitations on government, constitutional restraints and
>> traditional restraints.  Otherwise whomever has the majority assumes that
>> democracy means they can oppress the minority.
>>
>
> The case of Egypt is quite remarkable in that respect. They made a
> successful revolution to set back a military dictatorship. They succeeded
> in making a democracy, that is, organizing election. They vote for the
> Muslim Brotherhood, and when they realized the Muslim Brotherhood was
> killing the democracy and imposing a religious dictatorship, the people
> made a second revolution to re-install the military dictatorship, and even
> to fight the Muslim Brotherhood (courtized and encouraged by Obama, by the
> way). They have understood that a secular military dictatorship is

Re: A scary theory about IS

2015-09-27 Thread Brent Meeker




On 9/27/2015 12:55 PM, John Mikes wrote:
Bruno, it seems I cannot shake you out from the 'classical' format 
that  -WHOEVER (Nominative, not: "whomever" which is Accusative) 
*lies* himself into getting the (questionable?) majority of the voting 
population (and THEN can do WHATEVER his interest dictates - in the 
name of such majority  - )
means /D E M O C R A C Y /. NO, it does not. You may call it a 
distortion, or any political malaise, but democracy (the cratos of the 
demos) is the rule of the (entire) population, not a select majority 
only, leaving any size of minority suppressed in the system.
It is not timely, to implement such system in our (ongoing) World. - 
So be it. - I try to keep the vocabulary clean and do not compromise 
for ongoing corruptions.


That's not even a system.  Rule by the entire population would require 
the entire population to agree on rules.  As Lyndon Johnson once said, 
"If two people agree on everything only one of them is doing the 
thinking."  A democracy necessarily must have some way of deciding rules 
that people do not all agree on.  Majority vote seem to be the only 
workable one; although there are many variants to deal with multiple 
choices (plurality, ranking, run-offs...).  The way to avoid suppression 
of minorities is to limit the range of action of the government.  Define 
individual rights which are beyond the reach of majority vote.


Brent

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Re: The Axiom Of Choice and ComputationalismT

2015-09-27 Thread John Clark

On Sun, Sep 27, 2015 at 12:04 PM, Bruno Marchal  wrote:

> 
> The constructible set of Gödel can be use to show that ZF and ZFC proves
> the same arithmetical theorems.

That is incorrect, ZF can not prove that the Banach-Tarski construction
works, ZFC can. What Godel discovered in 1938 was that the theorems that ZF
can prove will produce  no contradictions if you assume that the Axiom of
Choice is TRUE; what Paul Cohen discovered in 1963 was that the theorems
that ZF can prove will produce  no contradictions if you assume that the
Axiom of Choice is FALSE, thus in 1963 we knew that ZF has nothing to with
choice and that's why it's called a axiom.

>> 
>> If a axiom has been verified, that is to say if it can be derived from
>> other axioms,
>
>
> > 
> I meant verified in a model, not prove in a theory.
>

In this case ZF is the model. 

> > 
> If a proposition is verified in a model, its negation can still be
> verified in another model.
>

Yes,
 a set of axioms other than ZF could
derive
the Axiom Of Choice and yet another set
of axioms 
could
derive the negation of 
the Axiom Of Choice
.

> 
> But of course richer theory can prove more theorem

ZF is intuitively true and it is powerful, although not powerful enough to
derive the Axiom of Choice; finding another set of axioms that are equally
intuitive but even more powerful is not easy. 

>> >>
>> Yes perfectly true, you need physical hardware. But my question is* WHY*?
>> The only answer can be that physical hardware has something that
>> "arithmetical truth" does not.
>
>
> > 
> Then you artificial brain is not Turing emulable, and computationalism is
> false.
>

The above statement does not compute. In other word the above statement is
bullshit.

> >> 
>> We may not be certain what that something is but the fact that computer
>> hardware companies have non zero manufacturing costs is proof that one
>> has something the other does not.
>
>
> > 
> No, because that relative cost exost also in arithmetic reelatively to the
> people emulated in arithmetic.
>

That is another statement that does not compute; emulated people have
access to arithmetic just like non emulated people, so regardless of if
they are emulated or not why do the employees at INTEL bother to use
silicon?  

>>>   
>>  I need to implement the universal machine in that hardware.
>
>
> 
>> >
>> > 
>> Y
>> es exactly you need to implement it, but to implement it mathematics
>> needs help, it needs physics!
>>
>
> > 
> We agree on this,
>

Good.

> but that is not a proof that hardware exist,
>

If "

W
e agree on this
" and if computations exist then physical hardware exists.

>
>> >>
>> 
>> Numbers ==> computations ==> dreams ===> physical reality ===> physical
>> computation ===> hardware company
>>
>
> 
> >> 
> OK, but the hardware company certainly has access to numbers so why
> doesn't INTEL just make calculations directly and forget about all that
> unnecessary and expensive messing around with silicon?
>
> > 
> Because if we want to share computations, we need to implement them
>

And you agreed above that physics is needed to do that, physics can do
something that arithmetic can not.

> > 
> in the first person plural reality that we share to begin with. but that
> reality is itself emerging from infinitely many computations in arithmetic
>

Then I was right, matter can do something arithmetic can't, a finite
amount of 

matter can embody a infinite amount of mathematics but a finite amount of
mathematics can not.

>> 
>> arithmetical truth
>>  is certainly lacking something that physics has.
>>
>
> > 
> That is a theorem in machine's theology.
>

No, that is a machine in theology's theorem. Hey... if words no longer
have any meaning I can arrange them in any sequence I want just like you
do.

> >
>> >>
>> 
>> like someone can emulate Einstein's brain
>>
>
> 
> >> 
> Then that emulation is Einstein.
>
>
> > 
> Better: that emulation makes it possible for Einstein to manifest itself.
>

You can call it "manifest" if you like or "implement" or "emulate" or
"simulate" but the fact remains that if you want anything to change
anything in any way you're going to need physics, there is no evidence
 that mathematics by itself can do a damn thing.

> >
>> >> 
>> 
>> making a course in GR without any understanding of GR.
>>
>
> 
> >> 
> Then Einstein didn't "understand" GR
>
> > 
> No, you confuse the level.
>

Like hell I do!

> 
The guy who manipulate the pages of the book can talk with Einstein, but it
does not become Einstein by emulating it!

I really REALLY hope I'm misunderstanding you and you're not refereeing to

S
earle
 and his imbecilic Chinese room. 

> > 
> ZF can prove that PA is consistent.
>

But can not prove that PA is complete and that's a good thing because if
it could then ZF would be inconsistent because there are true statements
that PA can

Re: What day is it?

2015-09-27 Thread Bruce Kellett


On 25/09/2015 2:58 pm, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
On 24 Sep 2015, at 6:07 PM, Bruce Kellett > wrote:

On 25/09/2015 12:53 am, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
You present "closest continuer theory" as if it is 
obviously correct, and it is not. In any case, even granting the 
theory, why should the causal or physical connection make a 
difference? I've sometimes encountered this claim in these 
discussions but it is just ad hoc. 
The theory is no more ad hoc than any other theory of personal 
identity. When we seek to encapsulate an intuitive notion in 
language, any attempt could be criticized as being ad hoc, so that 
charge is of no substance.
It's ad hoc to say that if one copy differed from the original by 1% 
and the other copy by 1.001%, then the 1% copy is the continuation of 
the original and the other copy a different person. It sounds like 
something made up by legislators rather than philosophers, like an 
arbitrary cutoff for a speed limit.


That is a contrived situation. The full theory has a defined metric 
(which may or may not be a personal preference) by which one quantifies 
the differences between copies (or potential other persons). That metric 
will specify when differences become too small to be significant -- we 
then claim ties for 'closest' continuer. There need be no conundrums if 
one does things sensibly.


If you can't "encapsulate an intuitive concept in language" then you 
should state that, or conclude that there is something wrong with the 
intuitive notion.


I suggest you tell this to Plato and suggest that he withdraws his 
Theaetetus! The majority of philosophy (100% for linguistic 
philosophers) is the attempt to make the intuitive concepts of language 
more precise -- to encapsulate an intuitive notion is language. Ad hoc 
means only that something is devised for a purpose -- literally, 'to 
this', or 'for this'. The term is used in this sense every day, in 
things like "An ad hoc committee was formed to investigate". Ad hoc 
has a pejorative use only in science when an arbitrary adjustment is 
made to a theory in order to account for an anomaly (or some similar 
circumstance). The closest continuer theory of personal identity is not 
ad hoc in this pejorative sense.


But my more substantive dispute was with your assertion that if a copy 
arose through random processes then it wouldn't really count as a 
continuation of the original. That's like saying that if car fell 
together from parts in a junkyard stirred up by a whirlwind it 
wouldn't really be a car - even though it functioned exactly like a 
car made in a factory.


That analogy does not fly. Your random car is not the continuation of 
any previously existing car: the random person appearing in the 
Andromeda galaxy is not a continuation of me, no mater how similar it is 
to me on the relevant metric. That random object may well be a person, 
just as the car in your junk yard is a car -- it is just that neither is 
the continuer of any existing person or car.





The Copernican Principle in conjunction with the observation that 
the universe is uniform in all directions is enough.
No, that is not enough. The Copernician principle is not a law of 
physics -- or of anything else, for that matter. It is a useful 
heuristic, nothing more. The so-called "uniformity of the universe 
(isotropy and homogeneity)" is also nothing more than a useful 
approximation that can be used only on the largest scales -- when you 
average over all local structure. Such arguments have no force 
against the position I am arguing.


Your argument misses the point, which is that IF the universe is 
infinite and uniform THEN there would be infinite copies of you and 
everything you see, and you could not know which of these copies you 
were at any moment.


This is false. It is like the old probability problem of how many people 
you need in a room for there to be a greater than 50% probability of two 
having the same birthday. The answer, iirc, is 23. However, the number 
required in order for there to be a greater than 50% chance for there to 
be a person who has the same birthday as you do is substantially 
greater. The necessity for copies does not imply that you are copied.


Think of it this way. Take the Tegmark Type I multiverse and suppose 
that you are unique (no copies anywhere. Or better, that our 
life-friendly universe is unique). Then, by time reversal invariance, 
continue that universe back to the big bang to recover the initial 
state. Is that initial state impossible? Or any less likely than any 
other potential initial state? Duplicates there will be in the 
multiverse, but there is no necessity that you, or our observed 
O-region, be duplicated.


And even if you are duplicated as Tegmark suggests, so that there are 
many copies far outside our O-region, or even our particle horizon, then 
there is absolutely no possibilitiy of any interaction between these 
copies, so t

Re: What day is it?

2015-09-27 Thread Stathis Papaioannou



> On 27 Sep 2015, at 10:32 PM, Bruce Kellett  wrote:
> 
>> On 25/09/2015 2:58 pm, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>>> On 24 Sep 2015, at 6:07 PM, Bruce Kellett  wrote:
 On 25/09/2015 12:53 am, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
 You present "closest continuer theory" as if it is obviously correct, and 
 it is not. In any case, even granting the theory, why should the causal or 
 physical connection make a difference? I've sometimes encountered this 
 claim in these discussions but it is just ad hoc.
>>> The theory is no more ad hoc than any other theory of personal identity. 
>>> When we seek to encapsulate an intuitive notion in language, any attempt 
>>> could be criticized as being ad hoc, so that charge is of no substance.
>> It's ad hoc to say that if one copy differed from the original by 1% and the 
>> other copy by 1.001%, then the 1% copy is the continuation of the original 
>> and the other copy a different person. It sounds like something made up by 
>> legislators rather than philosophers, like an arbitrary cutoff for a speed 
>> limit.
> 
> That is a contrived situation. The full theory has a defined metric (which 
> may or may not be a personal preference) by which one quantifies the 
> differences between copies (or potential other persons). That metric will 
> specify when differences become too small to be significant -- we then claim 
> ties for 'closest' continuer. There need be no conundrums if one does things 
> sensibly.
> 
>> If you can't "encapsulate an intuitive concept in language" then you should 
>> state that, or conclude that there is something wrong with the intuitive 
>> notion.
> 
> I suggest you tell this to Plato and suggest that he withdraws his 
> Theaetetus! The majority of philosophy (100% for linguistic philosophers) is 
> the attempt to make the intuitive concepts of language more precise -- to 
> encapsulate an intuitive notion is language.

But sometimes the conclusion is that the intuitive concept is wrong or useless. 
Derek Parfit came to essentially that conclusion about personal identity  by 
considering duplication thought experiments.

>> But my more substantive dispute was with your assertion that if a copy arose 
>> through random processes then it wouldn't really count as a continuation of 
>> the original. That's like saying that if car fell together from parts in a 
>> junkyard stirred up by a whirlwind it wouldn't really be a car - even though 
>> it functioned exactly like a car made in a factory.
> 
> That analogy does not fly. Your random car is not the continuation of any 
> previously existing car: the random person appearing in the Andromeda galaxy 
> is not a continuation of me, no mater how similar it is to me on the relevant 
> metric. That random object may well be a person, just as the car in your junk 
> yard is a car -- it is just that neither is the continuer of any existing 
> person or car.

The person's psychological continuity would be preserved. I consider I would 
survive if my psychological continuity was preserved without my physical 
continuity necessarily being preserved; in fact, the only reason I endeavour to 
have my physical continuity preserved is because it's the easiest way to 
preserve psychological continuity. Preservation of physical continuity without 
psychological continuity, for example if someone has a head injury that wipes 
out all cognitive function, is not something anyone aspires to.

>> 
>>> 
 The Copernican Principle in conjunction with the observation that the 
 universe is uniform in all directions is enough.
>>> No, that is not enough. The Copernician principle is not a law of physics 
>>> -- or of anything else, for that matter. It is a useful heuristic, nothing 
>>> more. The so-called "uniformity of the universe (isotropy and homogeneity)" 
>>> is also nothing more than a useful approximation that can be used only on 
>>> the largest scales -- when you average over all local structure. Such 
>>> arguments have no force against the position I am arguing.
>> 
>> Your argument misses the point, which is that IF the universe is infinite 
>> and uniform THEN there would be infinite copies of you and everything you 
>> see, and you could not know which of these copies you were at any moment.
> 
> This is false. It is like the old probability problem of how many people you 
> need in a room for there to be a greater than 50% probability of two having 
> the same birthday. The answer, iirc, is 23. However, the number required in 
> order for there to be a greater than 50% chance for there to be a person who 
> has the same birthday as you do is substantially greater. The necessity for 
> copies does not imply that you are copied.
> 
> Think of it this way. Take the Tegmark Type I multiverse and suppose that you 
> are unique (no copies anywhere. Or better, that our life-friendly universe is 
> unique). Then, by time reversal invariance, continue that universe back to 
> the big bang t

Re: What day is it?

2015-09-27 Thread Bruce Kellett

On 28/09/2015 2:35 pm, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:On 27 Sep 2015, at 
10:32 PM, Bruce Kellett > wrote:

On 25/09/2015 2:58 pm, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
On 24 Sep 2015, at 6:07 PM, Bruce Kellett  
wrote:

On 25/09/2015 12:53 am, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
You present "closest continuer theory" as if it is 
obviously correct, and it is not. In any case, even granting the 
theory, why should the causal or physical connection make a 
difference? I've sometimes encountered this claim in these 
discussions but it is just ad hoc. 
The theory is no more ad hoc than any other theory of personal 
identity. When we seek to encapsulate an intuitive notion in 
language, any attempt could be criticized as being ad hoc, so that 
charge is of no substance.
It's ad hoc to say that if one copy differed from the original by 1% 
and the other copy by 1.001%, then the 1% copy is the continuation of 
the original and the other copy a different person. It sounds like 
something made up by legislators rather than philosophers, like an 
arbitrary cutoff for a speed limit.


That is a contrived situation. The full theory has a defined metric 
(which may or may not be a personal preference) by which one 
quantifies the differences between copies (or potential other 
persons). That metric will specify when differences become too small 
to be significant -- we then claim ties for 'closest' continuer. There 
need be no conundrums if one does things sensibly.


If you can't "encapsulate an intuitive concept in language" then you 
should state that, or conclude that there is something wrong with the 
intuitive notion.


I suggest you tell this to Plato and suggest that he withdraws his 
Theaetetus! The majority of philosophy (100% for linguistic 
philosophers) is the attempt to make the intuitive concepts of 
language more precise -- to encapsulate an intuitive notion is language.


But sometimes the conclusion is that the intuitive concept is wrong or 
useless. Derek Parfit came to essentially that conclusion about 
personal identity  by considering duplication thought experiments.
One does not have to follow Parfit in this, or anything else. I think 
the confusion arising from thought experiments about duplication of 
computerized simulations is just that, confusion. It is only when we 
have actually achieved full AI and we can proceed to duplicate that we 
can ask those thereby duplicated what they think about it. Until then, 
it is all hypothetical, and our common experiences of personal identity, 
and the way we judge the identity of others we meet will govern how we 
think about personal identity. The concept is not wrong or useless, and 
will not be made so by any number of duplication experiences.


But my more substantive dispute was with your assertion that if a 
copy arose through random processes then it wouldn't really count as 
a continuation of the original. That's like saying that if car fell 
together from parts in a junkyard stirred up by a whirlwind it 
wouldn't really be a car - even though it functioned exactly like a 
car made in a factory.


That analogy does not fly. Your random car is not the continuation of 
any previously existing car: the random person appearing in the 
Andromeda galaxy is not a continuation of me, no mater how similar it 
is to me on the relevant metric. That random object may well be a 
person, just as the car in your junk yard is a car -- it is just that 
neither is the continuer of any existing person or car.


The person's psychological continuity would be preserved. I consider I 
would survive if my psychological continuity was preserved without my 
physical continuity necessarily being preserved; in fact, the only 
reason I endeavour to have my physical continuity preserved is because 
it's the easiest way to preserve psychological continuity. 
Preservation of physical continuity without psychological continuity, 
for example if someone has a head injury that wipes out all cognitive 
function, is not something anyone aspires to.


That might be your opinion, but others beg to differ. It is a common 
experience that people feel crises of personal identity after losing 
limbs; after mastectomy for breast cancer; after severe facial 
disfigurement. I suggest that since it is unlikely that you have 
undergone any of these in their more extreme forms, your personal 
opinions on the matter count for very little. I have had very close and 
personal experience of the latter case -- loss of most cognitive 
function with essentially no visible physical change to the body. There 
was never any doubt that that body continued to be the person I knew. 
One certainly does not aspire to that situation, but if it arises by 
mischance, personal identity is not destroyed. Why do many people 
continue to love and care for their loved ones, even when they are in 
the extreme end states of Alzheimer's? Or in a long lasting coma?




The Copernican Principle in conju

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