Re: That stupid diary
On 9 August 2016 at 03:27, John Clark wrote: And as I've explained several times MWI does NOT have the same problem. Before *you* perform the 2 slit experiment it would NOT be gibberish to ask* you* "After the experiment what do *you* expect to see?", because both before and after the experiment the meaning of the personal pronoun "*you*" is crystal clear unique and unambiguous, "*you*" is the only chunk of matter in the observable universe that behaves in a Telmomenezesian way. And because things are stated so clearly after it's all over we can check and see if the prediction *you* made about *you* turned out to be correct or not; it might have been right and it might have been wrong but it wasn't gibberish. It's entirely different with a duplicating machine, "What one and only one city will *you* see after *you* are duplicated?" is just words with a question mark at the end and is not a question because after "*you*" is duplicated there would be 2 chunks of matter that behaves in a Telmomenezesian way . The distinction you insist on seems arbitrary. Whether the two versions of you can meet or not, there are still two versions of you. -- Stathis Papaioannou -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: "We spent a long time trying to convince ourselves this wasn’t real"
On Tue, Aug 9, 2016 at 1:49 AM, John Clark wrote: > On Sun, Aug 7, 2016 spudboy100 via Everything List > wrote: > >> > >> What do you feel would be the reaction of our species if magically, it >> gets determined that it is indeed Dyson builders? > > > It would be a very odd star system for the Evolution of Dyson builders to > evolve on. The star has 1.43 times the mass of our sun and a star's lifetime > is inversely proportional to the cube of its mass, so that star's lifetime > would only be about a third of the sun's. The sun and the Earth are about > the same age, 4 and a half billion years, and in another half a billion > years the sun will be too hot for life on Earth. So the sun can provide > about 5 billion year window for intelligent life to evolve. On Earth it took > 4 billion years to go from chemicals to worms and another half a billion > years to go from worms to present day people. > The star you're talking about would only have a 1.6 billion year window for > life, and that doesn't seem like enough time > for Evolution > to > turn chemicals into > Dyson > builders > . If you were on the Earth when the sun was > only > 1.6 billion years old you'd have to wait another 2.4 billion years to see > the first worm. > > We only have one example to look at so maybe life on Earth evolved unusually > slowly but I think it much more likely that life on Earth evolved unusually > rapidly, because Earth not only produced life it produced intelligent life. > And however common intelligence is in the universe bacteria must be even > more common. Those are all good points, but it is not necessary that the Dyson builders are native of the star where they are building a certain sphere, right? Of course it is still much more reasonable to assume that this is just some unknown natural phenomena, but it is exciting that there is a small possibility that it is not. If they do exist, I agree with a point you made some time ago that they would probably not need anything from us or our planet, and thus not represent a threat. I guess the only possible reason why such an advanced civilization could be interested in us would be scientific curiosity. Telmo. > John K Clark > > > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. > To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. > Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Holiday Exercise
On 09 Aug 2016, at 01:15, Bruce Kellett wrote: On 9/08/2016 12:39 am, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 08 Aug 2016, at 01:26, Bruce Kellett wrote: On 8/08/2016 1:30 am, Bruno Marchal wrote: But in step 3, I ma very careful to not use the notion of "consciousness", and instead a simple 3p notion of first person. usually many relates it two consciousness and assumes that when the guy say "I see Moscow", they are conscious, but that is not needed to get the reversal. Maybe that is the basis of the problem. In step 3 you seem to be claiming nothing that could not be achieved by a non-conscious machine: Yes. take a machine that can take photographs and compare the resulting images with a data base of images of certain cities. When a match is found, the machine outputs the corresponding name of the city from the data base. Send one such machine to Washington and an identical machine to Moscow. They will fulfill your requirements, the W-machine will output W and the M-machine will output M. This is what you are now seeming to describe. But that is not FPI. How could the machine predict the result of the match? Give me the algorithm used by that machine. The machine program knows the protocol -- it knows that one copy will be transported to M and one to W. The machines are already physically different (different locations if nothing else), so it is a matter of a coin toss as to which goes where. The machines do not, however, share a consciousness, so this does not answer what will happen with a conscious being. You forget that we assume comp. So we are machine ourselves, and so, for the first person points of view, it is indeed like tossing a coin, and that's the FPI. Consciousness is treated later. For the reversal, only the notion of knowledge and/or first person is enough. Otherwise your prediction is no different from predicting the outcome of a coin toss. Think of one machine, it will be unaware of the other, if it knows that it will go to either W or M on the result of a coin toss... prediction, 50/50. (But if the machine doesn't have the protocol programmed in, it will simply answer: "What?") You make my point. Just apply computationalism. The "P" in the acronym stands for "person", and if the "person" is not conscious, it is a zombie and any output you get has no bearing on what will happen to conscious persons. The problem is a problem of prediction of future first person account. That is a problem only if you have a person -- a conscious being. Not at all. You forget we *assume* computationalism. Without the reconstitution in W, we have already agreed that P(M) = 1, and vice- versa, so that the guy's consciousness is linked to its first person experience in the usual way. So all you need is to assume that when you teleported on Mars, seeing Mars is a (personal) confirmation of your survival. Your consciousness and identity remains invariant by definition of computationalism. We agreed that both copies are genuine survivor of the duplication experience, and computationalism does not make them able to share consciousness "here-and-now". They share only the (non transitive) personal identity, that the memory of who they are (here: the guy who was in Helsinki and pushed on the button). Bruno Bruce The zombie machines will probably not be aware of each other, but from that you cannot conclude that the conscious persons will not be aware of each other, or that consciousness necessarily differentiates on different inputs. Well, you need the inputs being enough different (like seeing W, resp. M) so that the machine can take notice of the difference, and write distinct outcome in the diary, of course. Bruno -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Holiday Exercise
On 09 Aug 2016, at 01:37, Bruce Kellett wrote: On 9/08/2016 9:05 am, Russell Standish wrote: On Mon, Aug 08, 2016 at 10:01:49AM -0700, Brent Meeker wrote: I think Russell is just saying we take it as an added axiom/assumption that the duplicated brain/bodies must have separate consciousnesses at least as soon as they have different perceptions. This is exactly what you would predict from supposing that consciousness is a product of physical processes in the brain - something that is supported by lots and lots of evidence. I don't think this does much to invalidate Bruno's argument. He just wants to show that the physical is derivative, not that it's irrelevant. Brent Physicality in the thought experiment seems like a red herring to me. We can just as easily consider running the duplicated consciousnesses in virtual reality simulators of the two cities. You would still have to build into your simulation whether or not the consciousness differentiates -- begging the question yet again. Of course, not for the same reason. Once the program are duplicated virtually in different virtual environment, very elementary computer science justifies why their memories and first person records diverge. No need to invoke consciousness at this stage, which is a subtle concept in need of explanation itself. But of course, computationalism is the doctrine that we can *associate* some consciousness of the first person experience to the first person account made by machine and humans, duplicated or not. Maybe you are just arguing against computationalism, but then we have changed the topic without saying. I am agnostic, that is indeed why motivates me for testing it, or test some version of it. The interest in computationalism stems from its testable character. you have not answered many questions I asked you, which were suppose to show that the differentiation of consciousness is unvaoidable, once we assume computationalism, and are OK that our children marry people having a digital brain. Bruno Bruce -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: That stupid diary
On 08 Aug 2016, at 19:27, John Clark wrote: On Sun, Aug 7, 2016 Telmo Menezes wrote: >> Is this really that difficult to comprehend? If computationalism is true then the machine will be able to make 2 copies that are identical to each other in every way and will remain identical until the outside environment or perhaps random quantum variations changes one but not the other. > I agree and never argued the opposite. I'm glad to hear we agree on that, then we both disagree with Bruno because Bruno said: "Nothing can duplicate a first person view from its first person point of view, with or without computationalism." I think that is the key to Bruno's confusion; that and trying to establish personal identity by looking from the present to the future rather than by remembering the past from the present. >> Bruno asks "before the duplication what is the probability that "YOU" will be inside the house looking out?". That is not a question that is gibberish because Bruno isn't asking about what will happen to Telmo Menezes, in a world with personal pronoun duplicating machines Bruno wants to know about the one and only one thing that will happen to YOU. And that's just silly. > We discussed this before. The MWI introduces the same problem. And as I've explained several times MWI does NOT have the same problem. Before you perform the 2 slit experiment it would NOT be gibberish to ask you "After the experiment what do you expect to see?", because both before and after the experiment the meaning of the personal pronoun "you" is crystal clear unique and unambiguous, "you" is the only chunk of matter in the observable universe that behaves in a Telmomenezesian way. And because things are stated so clearly after it's all over we can check and see if the prediction you made about you turned out to be correct or not; it might have been right and it might have been wrong but it wasn't gibberish. It's entirely different with a duplicating machine, "What one and only one city will you see after you are duplicated?" is just words with a question mark at the end and is not a question because after "you" is duplicated there would be 2 chunks of matter that behaves in a Telmomenezesian way. > If I am about to open Schrödinger's cat box, then one branch of me will see a live cat and another one a dead one. OK, and personal pronouns cause no confusion because with Schrödinger's cat box there is only one "me" per multiverse branch; a situation that is not true with duplication machines. And I might add that if "me" is defined as the person having this thought right now then "me" will have no future at all and has had no past. > By your reasoning, the probability of Telmo Menezes seeing a dead cat is 1, Correct. And by my reasoning the probability of Telmo Menezes seeing a live cat is also 1, always assuming that MWI is correct and we don't know for a fact that it is. > but from the first person perspective of any of the branches it is 1/2. Yes but you almost make that sound like a contradiction. All the above means is that if the experiment is performed many times about half the time "you", that is to say the only chunk of matter in the observable universe that behaves in a Telmomenezesian way, will see a live cat and about half the time the only chunk of matter in the observable universe that behaves in a Telmomenezesian way will see a dead cat. > Bruno's argument only move this to a scenario where both copies can coexist in the same branch, which can lead to some social awkwardness but does not fundamentally change the first person / third person distinction One thing does change when both copies coexist in the same observable universe, "What will you see next?" changes from a meaningful question into a meaningless sequence of words with a question mark at the end. > Duplicating a first person view is the same as doing nothing. 1=1. No, something has changed. Before the duplication only one chunk of matter in the observable universe behaves in a Telmmenezesian way, but after the duplication there are two chunks of matter in the observable universe that behave in a Telmmenezesian way. > If you are facing your clone, the content of your respective experiences is already different. Do you disagree? Yes I disagree. Your clone is also facing its clone so you both change in exactly the same way, so both chunks of matter still behave in the same identical way. >> Until that divergence there is no Moscow man or Washington man, there is still only the Helsinki man regardless of how many bodies are around. > True. Then if the definition of the Helsinki man is the man who is currently seeing Helsinki right now it would be rather silly to ask the Helsinki man
Re: Holiday Exercise
On 08 Aug 2016, at 19:52, Brent Meeker wrote: On 8/8/2016 6:18 AM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: On Monday, 8 August 2016, Brent Meeker wrote: On 8/7/2016 11:20 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: Not necessarily. A digital computer also requires that time be digitized so that its registers run synchronously. Otherwise "the state" is ill defined. The finite speed of light means that spacially separated regions cannot be synchronous. Even if neurons were only ON or OFF, which they aren't, they have frequency modulation, they are not synchronous. Synchronous digital machine can emulate asynchronous digital machine, and that is all what is needed for the reasoning. If the time variable is continuous, i.e. can't be digitized, I don't think you are correct. If time is continuous, you would need infinite precision to exactly define the timing of a neuron's excitation, so you are right, that would not be digitisable. Practically, however, brains would have to have a non-zero engineering tolerance, or they would be too unstable. The gravitational attraction of a passing ant would slightly change the timing of neural activity, leading to a change in mental state and behaviour. I agree that brains must be essentially classical computers, but no necessarily digital. The question arose as to what was contained in an Observer Moment and whether, in an infinite universe there would necessarily be infinitely many exact instances of the same OM. But having a continuous variable doesn't imply instability. First, the passing ant is also instantiated infinitely many times. Second, if a small cause has only a proportionately small effect then there is no "instability", more likely the dynamics diverge as in deterministic chaos. But in any case it would allow an aleph-1 order infinity of OMs which would differ by infinitesimal amounts. But I also question the coherence of this idea. As discussed (at great length) by Bruno and JKC, two or more identical brains must instantiate the same experience, i.e. the same OM. "OM" is ambiguous. I guess you mean the same 1-OM. I say this, because many people can easily confuse a "OM" with a computational state, when in the computationalist frame. But the whole goal here is to show that a "1-OM" is associated, from the 1-OMs' view, to an infinity of 3p-OM. So if there are only a finite number of possible brain-states and universes are made of OMs, then there can only be a finite number of finite universes. There can only be a finite number of finite universes, if there are universes. But with the FPI, universe are emerging pattern coming from a statistics on all infinite works of all finite universal machine/ number, so the physical reality is somehow constrained to have an infinite and continuous, and non computable, components. If only the random oracle generated by the iterated self-duplication, from the first person views. Theoretical computer science makes sense of all this, thanks to the incompleteness phenomenon, and the intensional nuances it brings for knowledge and observation, as opposed to relative belief/or proof. Bruno Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Holiday Exercise
On 09 Aug 2016, at 01:03, Russell Standish wrote: On Mon, Aug 08, 2016 at 09:06:20PM +1000, Bruce Kellett wrote: On 8/08/2016 8:38 pm, Russell Standish wrote: On Sun, Aug 07, 2016 at 09:24:31AM +1000, Bruce Kellett wrote: However, still no justification has been given for the assumption that the duplicated consciousness differentiates on different inputs. And consciousness is what computationalism is supposed to be giving an account of. Obviously different inputs does not entail the differentiation of consciousness. In duplication there is still only one consciousness: and as you say, different inputs do not entail the differentiation of a single consciousness (associated with a single brain/body). So why would it be different if the body were also duplicated? However computational supervenience does imply the opposite: differentiated consciousness entails a difference in inputs. There is no difficulty in understanding that differentiated consciousness entails different persons, who may or may not experience different inputs, but I doubt that differentiation of consciousness necessarily entails different inputs - two people can experience the same stimuli. This directly contradicts computational supervenience. I'm pretty sure that if you read the fine print, you'll find that computational supervenience is part of the YD assumption, although that fact is often glossed over. I vaguely recall challenging Bruno on this a couple of years ago. The computationalist assumption is, a priori: the physical-and- computational supervenience, then step 8 shows that the "physical", in this case, is not usable if not derived from arithmetic. That means that physics is a branch of universal number theology (itself derivable from Peano Arithmetic, or meta-derivable from Robinson Arithmetic). And that theology get testable through its physical part that we can compare with nature. I think our disagreement was on a subtler question concerning the very sense of supervenience. But it is prematured to discuss this, I think, with respect of the current thread. Bruno In the W/M experiment we are asked to suppose that the duplicated persons do, in fact, notice that they've been teleported to a different city, and recognise where they they've been teleported to. There is no difficulty in accepting that there is consciousness of two cities, but is that one consciousness, or two? You beg the question by referring to plural 'persons'. Two, because each consciousness is aware of different cities. They each answer the question "Which city I am in?" in a different way, iw it is a difference that makes a difference. -- Dr Russell StandishPhone 0425 253119 (mobile) Principal, High Performance Coders Visiting Senior Research Fellowhpco...@hpcoders.com.au Economics, Kingston University http://www.hpcoders.com.au -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: That stupid diary
On Tue, Aug 9, 2016 at 9:12 AM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: On 9 August 2016 at 03:27, John Clark wrote: > > > >> >> >> And as I've explained several times MWI does NOT have the same problem. >> Before *you* perform the 2 slit experiment it would NOT be gibberish to >> ask* you* "After the experiment what do *you* expect to see?", because >> both before and after the experiment the meaning of the personal pronoun " >> *you*" is crystal clear unique and unambiguous, "*you*" is the only >> chunk of matter in the observable universe that behaves in a >> Telmomenezesian way. It's entirely different with a duplicating machine, >> "What one and only one city will *you* see after *you* are duplicated?" >> is just words with a question mark at the end and is not a question >> because after "*you*" is duplicated there would be 2 chunks of matter >> >> that behaves in a Telmomenezesian way >> . >> And because things are stated so clearly >> >> after it's all over we can check and see if the prediction *you* made >> about *you* turned out to be correct or not; it might have been right >> and it might have been wrong but it wasn't gibberish. > > > > > The distinction you insist on seems arbitrary. > It is. The definitions given to words are always arbitrary, but the important thing is they not be contradictory. The definition I have given to the personal pronoun "you" is specific and uncontradictory, Bruno's definition is unspecific and contradictory. > > > Whether the two versions of you can meet or not, there are still two > versions of you. > I f the laws of physics prevent them from meeting then no experiment can be performed on them, not even a thought experiment. The personal pronoun "you" is clearly and rigidly defined as any chunk of matter in the observable universe that behaves in a Stathispapaioannouian way, so MWI or no MWI if people duplicating machines are not around then only one chunk of matter fits that description and the personal pronoun "you" can be freely used to describe a experimental setup with no fear of ambiguity or logical contradiction. But anybody who talks about duplicating machines and also about "you" quite literally doesn't know what (or who) he's talking about. John K Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: That stupid diary
On Tue, Aug 9, 2016 at 11:58 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: > > > I am still waiting for an explanation about your two recent posts which > contradicted themselves. What are you talking about? > > The first person remains singular for both copies. Yes, and BOTH copies are absolutely convinced that they are the Helsinki man and BOTH are correct, I think you agree on that. So it makes sense to ask what one city the Moscow man sees and it makes sense to ask what one city the Washington man sees but it makes no sense to ask what one city the Helsinki man will see. > > One is: > > I am in Helsinki. I push on a button. I find myself in a box, I open the > door, and I see Moscow. (and for Bruce: and yes, I am conscious of Moscow > and of my consciousness (life, experience, first person stories) here in > Moscow. > > I definitely get the bit "M". Bruno continues to use a personal pronoun smokescreen to cover logical contradictions. *I* have defined "*I*" as any chunk of matter that behaves in a Johnkclarkian way, and before* I *pushed the button *I *already said that* I* would see Moscow and turn into the Moscow man, and that is exactly precisely what happened. So *I *did not receive one single bit of new information after *I* pushed the button. > > The other is: > > I am in Helsinki. I push on a button. I find myself in a box, I open the > door, and I see Washington. (and for Bruce: and I am conscious > of Washington and of my consciousness (life, experience, first person > stories) here in Washington. I definitely get the bit "W". *I* have defined "*I*" as any chunk of matter that behaves in a Johnkclarkian way, and before* I *pushed the button *I *already said that * I* would see Washington and turn into the Washington man, and that is exactly precisely what happened. So *I *did not receive one single bit of new information after *I* pushed the button. No need for Bruno to post a reply, *I* already know Bruno's response,* I *confuse the peepee with the poopoo (or maybe it's the poopoo with the peepee). But *I *have already given a clear non contradictory definition of the personal pronoun "*I*", what is Bruno Marchal 's meaning of that word? John K Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Step 4? (Re: QUESTION 2 (Re: Holiday Exercise
On Sun, Aug 7, 2016 at 10:40 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: > > a nine years old child get the point And I might get your point if I had the mentality of a nine year old child, or of something similar like an ancient Greek. John K Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Holiday Exercise
On Mon, Aug 8, 2016 at 8:51 PM, Brent Meeker wrote: > > > I think the default assumption is that consciousness supervenes on the > brain, so two different brains will realize two different consciousnesses > because they are at different locations and perceiving different things. But in general it's not true that they will perceiving different things , if you were the identical copy and in a symmetrical environment and facing your original the two of you would see identical things, and if your position was instantaneously exchanged with the original there would be no change in your consciousness or of that of the original, neither of you could even tell an exchange had occurred. So in that situation how could it make sense to talk of " two different consciousnesses" when there is clearly no difference between them? John K Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
