Re: substitution level

[John Clark]

On Mon, Jun 5, 2017 , spudboy100 via Everything List <
everything-list@googlegroups.com> wrote:

>

> > c​
> onsciousness may be profitable field of learning, or it may stand still
> forever, as is surmised. Of course doing experiments with living things,
> including ourselves
> ​ [...]
>

​Not ​

​"​
including ourselves
​", only ourselves. You are the only one​ you can
perform consciousness experiments on, and that's not enough to learn much.

 John K Clark

​

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Re: A thought on MWI and its alternative(s)

[Bruce Kellett]

On 6/06/2017 10:21 am, David Nyman wrote:
On 6 June 2017 at 00:23, Bruce Kellett > wrote:


On 5/06/2017 8:42 pm, Bruno Marchal wrote:

I am not alone skeptical about inferring that the violation of
the Bell inequalities shows action at a distance. What is
wrong in Deutsch and Hayden? What is wrong in Rubin (Rubin,
M.A. Found Phys Lett (2001) 14: 301.
doi:10.1023/A:1012357515678), or in Maudlin's book?


They don't all necessarily make the same mistake as Price, but
they all make equally silly mistakes, and build in the
non-locality without realizing it. Last year I analysed the
argument by Tipler (arxiv:quant-ph/0003146v1) in detail and showed
where he made exactly this mistake of building the non-locality in
without realizing it. 



​Bruce, I'm reading The Emergent Multiverse by David Wallace at the 
moment. He's well known as a prominent theorist of MWI. I don't know 
whether he falls under your definition of competence in this area, but 
as far as I've understood him, he fully accepts that MWI must be 
consistent with QM in all respects, including of course nonlocality.​ 
The distinction he makes is between nonlocality and the question of 
whether this requires us to think in terms of instantaneous transfer 
of information at greater-than-light speed, or "action at a distance". 
I can't say I've been able to get my head around his full exposition 
of this yet, but I'm pretty sure he doesn't  go along with your 
exposition of Price's seemingly faulty version of this.


It is interesting that Wallace has come to this view. He, with Deutsch, 
was one of those who attempted to argue that MWI restored full locality. 
They also tried to derive the Born Rule from within MWI, and failed in 
that too.


I do not know the book you refer to, but if Wallace now accepts that QM 
and Bell implies non-locality, then I fully agree. I have always argued, 
on this list and elsewhere, that non-locality does not mean the 
instantaneous transfer of physical information -- if you think about it, 
that would, in a sense, be a local, albeit FTL, effect. The core of the 
quantum singlet state is that it does not involve the physical positions 
of the particles. It is expressed in configuration space, and the 
difficulties appear to arise from interpreting configuration space as 
though it were the same as ordinary 3-space. What has been said is that 
the singlet state is always local in configuration space, which 
translates to non-locality in 3-space. And this without some FTL 
information transfer. If there were FTL information transfer, then that 
could be manipulated to give FTL signalling, and there are all sorts of 
theorems in QM that show that FTL signalling is not possible.


But it seems as though Wallace is coming to see these things as do the 
majority of other physicists -- non-locality is intrinsic to quantum 
entanglement.


As we know, MWI hypothesises multiple outcomes for each measurement 
event. So on this basis, when Alice makes a measurement there is an 
immediate split into branches consistent both with the measurement she 
records and with its counterfactual partner. The same considerations 
must apply equally to Bob. So we now have a spectrum of available 
branches in which exist potential pairings of recorded measurements 
that would be consistent with QM. The question then concerns which 
pairings of Alice and Bob we (or they) should expect to observe in the 
form of actual encounters for the purpose of comparing notes. QM tells 
us that the results of any such observable pairings must be consistent 
with violation of Bell's inequalities. Can we say, in terms of the 
logic of MWI, why this might be so?


Yes. This is essentially the Tipler calculation that I have summarized 
elsewhere. It is non-local, but it shows how the different branches 
arising from each measurement must always match up to give the correct 
correlations. Conceptually, what goes on is easier to understand if you 
consider an EPR experiment at time-like separations. Then Bob can always 
be in Alice's forward light cone, and there is no ambiguity as to what 
splits occur, and when they occur.


Bruce

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Re: A thought on MWI and its alternative(s)

[David Nyman]

On 6 June 2017 at 00:23, Bruce Kellett  wrote:

> On 5/06/2017 8:42 pm, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>> On 05 Jun 2017, at 05:52, Bruce Kellett wrote:
>>
>>> On 5/06/2017 12:19 pm, Bruce Kellett wrote:
>>>
 On 4/06/2017 10:05 pm, Bruno Marchal wrote:

> On 02 Jun 2017, at 03:01, Bruce Kellett wrote:
>
> Your claim appears to be that Bell's theorem is not valid in MWI.
>>
>
> Bell's theorem is valid. His inequality does not even assume QM, but
> just locality.
>

 I agree, but that is not what you were implying above. It seems that
 now you agree that the Bell inequalities assume only locality.

>>>
>> And a mono-universe, or a conservation of identity of Alice and Bob from
>> the beginning to the end of the experience. But that is no more the case in
>> the MWI. Everett explains already this when he introduces what will be
>> called decoherence. Decpherence is local.
>>
>
> Believe it or not, those things are not relevant to the derivation of
> Bell's results. Besides, you simply contradict yourself -- you said exactly
> the opposite a line or two ago.
>
> But these inequalities are violated by experiment.

>>>
>> Yes.
>>
>> That can only mean that the assumption of locality was wrong -- whatever
 interpretation of QM you adopt.

>>>
>> It means that locality and mono-universe cannot be maintained at once.
>> But non-locality is not proved, unless you believe that Alice and Bob
>> remains the same unique person all along, which is necessarlly not the case
>> in the MWI of the EPR-Bell situation.
>>
>
> They split, but they retain identity in each branch.
>
> I think that this important part of recent exchanges might have got lost
>>> in the welter of to-and-fro.
>>>
>>> Bruno accepts:
>>>
>>> 1. Bell's theorem (and the associated inequalities) are valid in MWI.
>>> 2. Bell's theorem assumes only locality (not even QM -- it is valid in
>>> classical physics also).
>>>
>>
>> Locality, and identity preservation (or mono-universe, or counterfactual
>> definiteness: all go away with Everett).
>>
>
> No, they do not. And these are not essential for Bell's derivation anyway.
>
> 3. The Aspect et al., and subsequent, experiments demonstrate that the
>>> Bell inequalities are violated.
>>>
>>
>> Yes, but only from the points of view of one branch. But when we look how
>> the singlet state is handled in the MWI, the correlation are apparent, but
>> the results obtained by space-separated person does not need to be
>> correlated, in some absolute sense, they need to be correlated with anyone
>> interacting with both of them later, so that in all branches, it will look
>> like if there has been an action at a distance, but all influence and
>> information flows, and splitting, go at a speed lower than light.
>>
>
> It might have escaped your attention, but Alice and Bob need not be
> spacelike separated when they do their measurements on the spin singlet.
> For example, Bob could be at all times in Alice's forward light cone, so
> they are always in the same world -- as Alice splits with her measurement,
> Bob splits along with her, so that when he does his measurement he is in
> the same world as Alice with her result as recorded in her lab book.
>
> A lot of your prevarications over EPR stem from a failure to realize that
> spacelike separations are not essential -- the proof is valid for *any*
> separation. Usually, spacelike is assumed only to assure the independence
> of the measurements made by Alice and Bob. But as long as they are truly
> independent, they can be at any separation.
>
> It seems to follow with the force of simple logic that:
>>>
>>> 4. Experiment shows that QM is non-local, even in MWI.
>>>
>>> Bruno appears to reject this conclusion. I conclude that Bruno's
>>> position is incoherent.
>>>
>>
>> I will again ask you to tell me what is wrong with Michael Clive Price
>> explanation ... except that the web page is not available.
>>
>
> I have been through this before. I looked at Price again this morning and
> was frankly appalled at the stupidity of what I saw. Let me summarize
> briefly what he did. He has a very cumbersome notation, but I will attempt
> to simplify as far as is possible. I will use '+' and '-' as spin states,
> rather than his 'left', 'right'.
>
> He write the initial wave function as for the case when you and I agree in
> advance to have aligned polarizers:
>
> |psi_1> = }me, electrons,you> = |me>(|+-> - |-+>)|you>
>  = |me, +,-,you> - |me,-,+,you>
>
> He says that at this point no measurements have been made, and neither
> observer is split. But his fundamental mistake is already present.
>
> A little test for you: what is wrong with the above set of equations from
> a no-collapse pov?
>
> skipping some tedium, he then gets
>
> |psi_3> = |me[+],+,-,you[-]> - |me[-],-,+,you[+]>
>
> where the notation me[+] etc means I have measured '+', you[-] means you
> have measured '-'.
>

Re: substitution level

[spudboy100 via Everything List]

It's a waste of time because we know about as much as we are ever going to know 
a about that? Naw! There has to be computer oriented neurobiologists, and 
physicists who are willing to push the envelope a bit. Consciousness may be 
profitable field of learning, or it may stand still forever, as is surmised. Of 
course doing experiments with living things, including ourselves, and 
quantum-photonic-dna-computing, will prove this true or false. I am guessing in 
a round-about way we will gain more knowledge, otherwise, its like drawing a 
line in the sand and saying nothing beyond it exists. An anti-Xeno sort of 
thing.


-Original Message-
From: John Clark 
To: everything-list 
Sent: Mon, Jun 5, 2017 12:35 pm
Subject: Re: substitution level



On Mon, Jun 5, 2017 at 10:11 AM, Telmo Menezes  wrote:






>
​>​
 Besides that Mrs. Lincoln how did you like the play?


 

​> ​
Why so nasty?



​It's been 152 years. Too soon?​
 


 
​> ​
All I was saying is that quantum computers are not
​ ​
qualitatively different in a way that could help explain
​ ​
consciousness.



​And all I was saying is that quantum computers ARE
 ​
qualitatively different in the way they could perform intelligent actions, and 
all this hand wringing over consciousness is a waste of time because we already 
know as much as we're ever going to know about that.


 John K Clark 










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“Could a Quantum Computer Have Subjective Experience?”

[Brent Meeker]

Here Scott Aaronson addresses the "pretty-hard problem of consciousness"

http://www.scottaaronson.com/blog/?p=1951

His idea of "participation in the Arrow of Time" is a narrower and more 
technical version of my idea that consciousness only exists in the 
context of an environment in which it can both perceive and act.


A lot of good comments too.

Brent

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Re: A thought on MWI and its alternative(s)

[David Nyman]

On 5 June 2017 at 17:38, Bruno Marchal  wrote:

>
> On 05 Jun 2017, at 15:48, David Nyman wrote:
>
> On 5 June 2017 at 14:22, Bruno Marchal  wrote:
>
>>
>> On 04 Jun 2017, at 14:48, David Nyman wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On 4 Jun 2017 1:05 p.m., "Bruno Marchal"  wrote:
>>
>>
>> On 02 Jun 2017, at 03:01, Bruce Kellett wrote:
>>
>> On 1/06/2017 10:19 pm, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>
 On 01 Jun 2017, at 02:26, Bruce Kellett wrote:
 On 1/06/2017 4:43 am, Bruno Marchal wrote:

> On 31 May 2017, at 04:01, Bruce Kellett wrote:
>>
>>> On 30/05/2017 9:35 pm, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>
 On 30 May 2017, at 11:28, Telmo Menezes wrote:

 snip


>>
>>> Your claim appears to be that Bell's theorem is not valid in MWI.
>>>
>>
>> Bell's theorem is valid. His inequality does not even assume QM, but just
>> locality. It is violate when we do the experience, like Aspect, and this
>> shows non-locality in our branch, but when looking at the big picture, we
>> see that this non-locality has a local origin. It would need an action at a
>> distance to destroy the alternante branches alwailable to Bob, but without
>> collapse, non-locality is a local, branch-owned, phenomenon. I take Bells
>> theorem + Aspect as a quasi definite proof that if there is one universe,
>> then there are many universes.
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> This is nonsense. Bell's theorem is a theorem of quantum mechanics, and
>>> it is therefore valid in all interpretations of that theory.
>>>
>>
>> Yes, in all interpretation of quantum mechanics, the relevant branches
>> violate the inequality, but they do that without involving an action at a
>> distance when we look at the entire wave. It is phenomenological.
>>
>>
>> Suppose one were to enquire what makes those branches "relevant". One
>> answer is that other pairings would be in conflict both with the
>> predictions of QM and with observation, but that is circular. What then?
>> Perhaps one might speculate that other pairings would somehow be
>> fundamentally inconsistent with any physics that would permit its own
>> coherent (or for that matter decoherent) observation.
>>
>>
>> The branches are just the superposed states, and with singlet or with
>> simple qubit, the other branches are just the other term of the
>> superposition which describes ourselves. To get rid of such superposition,
>> we need to get rid of quantum mechanics, *and* of mechanism.
>>
>
> ​I'm not sure I made myself clear. What I meant by "other pairings"​ was
> the ones we never expect to witness - e.g. the ones that presumably might
> not violate Bell's inequalities.
>
>
> OK. You mean this in the context of assuming quantum mechanics. If we say
> that we don't see them because QM disallows them, or because things just
> aren't that way, that is circular.
>

> I am not sure I understand this. If we assume QM, it is standard. Unlike
> Mechanism, somehow QM solves the measure problem.
>

So is the idea then that all possible 'measurements that Alice and Bob
could possibly make are already 'paired', in terms of superpositions, in
the MWI view? And then the question of which branch either of them is
situated in, and consequently which pairing they will be associated with,
is determined by the measurement subsequently performed (apparently
individually) by each of them?

ISTM that saying it's "just the other term of the superposition which
> describes ourselves" is equally circular. What about superpositions that
> don't "describe ourselves"?
>
>
> With Copenhagen, all superposition don't describe the observers, and we
> get standard QM with collapse. Then with Everett, we have an explanation
> why, even without collapse, the average observer, when doing a measurement,
> entangled itself and correlate his brain with the outcome, and the proba
> are justify by the FPI. may be I still miss something?
>

> (here, by superposition which describes ourself, I meant only something
> like (me -- cat alive + me -- cat dead).
>
> So my question was about whether there is a non-circular answer to the
> question of why we don't expect observations by Alice and Bob to lead to
> the correlation of such 'malformed' pairs. Perhaps because such correlation
> might entail a 'physics' that precluded the act of observation itself.
>
>
> I am not sure what you are asking. If we suppose QM, the reason why the
> "malformed pair" are not seen is that QM disallow them, or makes them very
> rare.
> If we don't suppose QM, like when assuming mechanism, we have to derive
> QM, or the correct theory in case QM is incorrect, to answer this.
>
> But the context here was the question "does the abandon of the collapse
> prevents influence at a distance". Bruce claims it does not, and me (but
> here there are many others, even on this list) claims it does, or at the
> least, that we cannot use the Bell violation to claim MWI is not local. In
> that thread we fully 

Re: A thought on MWI and its alternative(s)

[Bruno Marchal]

On 05 Jun 2017, at 15:48, David Nyman wrote:


On 5 June 2017 at 14:22, Bruno Marchal  wrote:

On 04 Jun 2017, at 14:48, David Nyman wrote:




On 4 Jun 2017 1:05 p.m., "Bruno Marchal"  wrote:

On 02 Jun 2017, at 03:01, Bruce Kellett wrote:

On 1/06/2017 10:19 pm, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 01 Jun 2017, at 02:26, Bruce Kellett wrote:
On 1/06/2017 4:43 am, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 31 May 2017, at 04:01, Bruce Kellett wrote:
On 30/05/2017 9:35 pm, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 30 May 2017, at 11:28, Telmo Menezes wrote:

snip


Your claim appears to be that Bell's theorem is not valid in MWI.

Bell's theorem is valid. His inequality does not even assume QM,  
but just locality. It is violate when we do the experience, like  
Aspect, and this shows non-locality in our branch, but when looking  
at the big picture, we see that this non-locality has a local  
origin. It would need an action at a distance to destroy the  
alternante branches alwailable to Bob, but without collapse, non- 
locality is a local, branch-owned, phenomenon. I take Bells theorem  
+ Aspect as a quasi definite proof that if there is one universe,  
then there are many universes.







This is nonsense. Bell's theorem is a theorem of quantum mechanics,  
and it is therefore valid in all interpretations of that theory.


Yes, in all interpretation of quantum mechanics, the relevant  
branches violate the inequality, but they do that without involving  
an action at a distance when we look at the entire wave. It is  
phenomenological.


Suppose one were to enquire what makes those branches "relevant".  
One answer is that other pairings would be in conflict both with  
the predictions of QM and with observation, but that is circular.  
What then? Perhaps one might speculate that other pairings would  
somehow be fundamentally inconsistent with any physics that would  
permit its own coherent (or for that matter decoherent) observation.


The branches are just the superposed states, and with singlet or  
with simple qubit, the other branches are just the other term of the  
superposition which describes ourselves. To get rid of such  
superposition, we need to get rid of quantum mechanics, *and* of  
mechanism.


​I'm not sure I made myself clear. What I meant by "other  
pairings"​ was the ones we never expect to witness - e.g. the ones  
that presumably might not violate Bell's inequalities.


OK. You mean this in the context of assuming quantum mechanics.



If we say that we don't see them because QM disallows them, or  
because things just aren't that way, that is circular.


I am not sure I understand this. If we assume QM, it is standard.  
Unlike Mechanism, somehow QM solves the measure problem.




ISTM that saying it's "just the other term of the superposition  
which describes ourselves" is equally circular. What about  
superpositions that don't "describe ourselves"?


With Copenhagen, all superposition don't describe the observers, and  
we get standard QM with collapse. Then with Everett, we have an  
explanation why, even without collapse, the average observer, when  
doing a measurement, entangled itself and correlate his brain with the  
outcome, and the proba are justify by the FPI. may be I still miss  
something?


(here, by superposition which describes ourself, I meant only  
something like (me -- cat alive + me -- cat dead).






So my question was about whether there is a non-circular answer to  
the question of why we don't expect observations by Alice and Bob to  
lead to the correlation of such 'malformed' pairs. Perhaps because  
such correlation might entail a 'physics' that precluded the act of  
observation itself.


I am not sure what you are asking. If we suppose QM, the reason why  
the "malformed pair" are not seen is that QM disallow them, or makes  
them very rare.
If we don't suppose QM, like when assuming mechanism, we have to  
derive QM, or the correct theory in case QM is incorrect, to answer  
this.


But the context here was the question "does the abandon of the  
collapse prevents influence at a distance". Bruce claims it does not,  
and me (but here there are many others, even on this list) claims it  
does, or at the least, that we cannot use the Bell violation to claim  
MWI is not local. In that thread we fully assume QM (without collapse).







This might ultimately be related to the speculation that the  
appearance of spacetime itself may emerge as a consequence of  
entanglement.



Possibly, although you might elaborate a little bit.

​Well, my (admittedly vague) speculation was that the  
'entanglements'​ we never expect to observe might be 'malformed' in  
some way that precluded the emergence of a spacetime within which  
such observation could occur.


It is a bit vague indeed. I think our allusion between space and  
entanglement is related to some approach trying to derive the space- 
time-gravity structure of the physical universe from the quantum 

Re: substitution level

[John Clark]

On Mon, Jun 5, 2017 at 10:11 AM, Telmo Menezes 
wrote:

>
>> ​>​
>> Besides that Mrs. Lincoln how did you like the play?
>
>

​> ​
> Why so nasty?


​It's been 152 years. Too soon?​



> ​> ​
> All I was saying is that quantum computers are not
> ​ ​
> qualitatively different in a way that could help explain
> ​ ​
> consciousness.


​And all I was saying is that quantum computers *ARE*
 ​
qualitatively different in the way they could perform intelligent actions,
and all this hand wringing over consciousness is a waste of time because we
already know as much as we're ever going to know about that.

 John K Clark

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Re: substitution level

[Bruno Marchal]

On 05 Jun 2017, at 16:07, Telmo Menezes wrote:


I guess you mean that it does not violate Church thesis.


Yes.


Of course, it can
"do" things impossible to do in real time, or without emulating the  
subject,
that a classical computer cannot do. For example, it can generate a  
genuine
random bit. To do emulate this with a non-quantum computer, you  
need to

emulate the duplication of the observer, like in the WM duplication.


Well ok, but this part is easy to solve on a classical computer:
https://www.random.org/

:)


Using atmospheric noise as an oracle.

OK, it is better than than using PI or sqrt(2), but is really a  
computer with an oracle (which by the way has the same theology than a  
computer without oracle, but this is just a note in passing).


Now, prove me that random.org really use the oracle. May be it uses Pi  
or 1/Pi. Not sure we could see the difference, if they change the seed  
regularly.


Well, thanks for letting me know that you are not serious :)






but with comp it would have consequences regarding
our "insertion" in reality, so to say. Correct?



I am not sure of what you mean exactly. It would not change the  
physics, but

allow us to exploit more directly the FPI.


Yes, I meant simply that our mind would supervene on more branches.


And we would become able to compute Fourier transform on the result of  
some computations made in all branches. According to Deustch we would  
be able to detect the "parallel universes".  We would be able to find  
quickly a needle in a stack, and I would have less problem to find my  
glasses on my dekstop :)






I am completely agnostic on this,
but I am not convince by the current argument that there are  
evidences that
a brain could be a quantum computer. They might be right, but I  
wait for

more evidences.


Me too.

Elementary arithmetic is full of quantum computing machineries. I  
even
suspect that the prime number distribution encodes a universal  
quantum

chaotic dovetailing,



Can you explain what you mean by chaotic dovetailing?



Have you heard about quantum chaos?


No, interesting. I'm starting to read about it. I always loved
standard chaos theory. It was one of the first things that profoundly
changed my map of reality.


A not to bad intro is "http://assets.cambridge.org/97805210/27151/excerpt/9780521027151_excerpt.pdf 
"






Here I meant classical usual dovetailing
on the classical emulation of quantum chaos. From the FPI, it can  
converge
on "genuine" quantum chaos. There are some evidences, related to  
the Riemann
hypothesis that the "spectrum" or he critical zero of zeta might  
correspond
to some quantum chaoitic hamiltonian's eigenvalue. I read that a  
long time
ago. If quantum chaos is Turing universal, it could even be quantum- 
Turing
universal, and generate a quantum universal dovetailer. But that  
would not
solve the mind-body problem. The machine-theological solution can  
work only

if we can explain why the measure which would be associated to that
particular quantum chaos win the arithmetical (classical,  
mechanist) FPI

problem. The Rieman hypothesis would help but is far from sufficiant.


I am too ignorant on number theory to understand this.


I might say some words on this when I have more time, but I will  
resist for now.








but even if that is true, that should not be used to
justify physics, because we would get the quanta, and not the  
qualia

(unless
the Riemann hypothesis is shown undecidable in PA (and thus true!).

Only Penrose asks for an explicit non computable physical  
reduction of

the
waves, with some role for gravity, and is authentically
non-computationalist. Penrose is coherent with computationalism.  
He keep
physics as fundamental, but accept the price: the abandon of  
mechanism.

But
his argument aganist mechanism is not valid, and already defeated  
by

machines like PA, ZF, etc.



You mean is maligned statement that the human brain is capable of
accessing truths that lie beyond the Gödelian veil?



I mean all Löbian machine are capable of accessing truths that lie  
to the

Gödelian veil, and use this to refute Penrose. Already in 1931, Gödel
realized that PA (or equivalently his own theory P) was proving its  
own
Gödel's second incompleteness theorem, and is perfectly able to  
sort out his
own undecidable proposition. Gödel's proof is constructive. It  
limits the
formalism, but shows them how to improve themselves accordingly,  
leading to
transfinite possible self-improvement. The machine can find its  
undecidable
statement, and bet on them with the interrogation mark, or discuss  
them as

mysteries (consciousness).


And what leads to machine to drop the interrogation mark?


The confusion between two hypostases. Either willingly, to make easy  
profit, like with the clergy, which can confuse man and god for  
example, or unwillingly, by repeating lies, or by pure ignorance. You  
can see the machine's enlightenment as the realization 

Re: substitution level

[Telmo Menezes]

On Sun, Jun 4, 2017 at 6:01 PM, John Clark  wrote:
> On Sun, Jun 4, 2017 at 3:05 AM, Telmo Menezes 
> wrote:
>
>> >
>> There is nothing that a quantum
>> computer can do that a classical computer cannot do,
>
>
> There are problems a
> classical computer
> can't solve in polynomial time that a quantum computer can.
>
>> >
>> given sufficient
>> time.
>
>
> Besides that Mrs. Lincoln how did you like the play?

Why so nasty? I agree with you on this. Quantum computers are great,
faster computers open very exciting possibilities. Look, you know I
play with genetic programming, don't you think I want faster
computers? All I was saying is that quantum computers are not
qualitatively different in a way that could help explain
consciousness.

Telmo.

>   John K Clark
>
>
>
>
>
>
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Re: substitution level

[Telmo Menezes]

> I guess you mean that it does not violate Church thesis.

Yes.

> Of course, it can
> "do" things impossible to do in real time, or without emulating the subject,
> that a classical computer cannot do. For example, it can generate a genuine
> random bit. To do emulate this with a non-quantum computer, you need to
> emulate the duplication of the observer, like in the WM duplication.

Well ok, but this part is easy to solve on a classical computer:
https://www.random.org/

:)

>> but with comp it would have consequences regarding
>> our "insertion" in reality, so to say. Correct?
>
>
> I am not sure of what you mean exactly. It would not change the physics, but
> allow us to exploit more directly the FPI.

Yes, I meant simply that our mind would supervene on more branches.

> I am completely agnostic on this,
> but I am not convince by the current argument that there are evidences that
> a brain could be a quantum computer. They might be right, but I wait for
> more evidences.

Me too.

>>> Elementary arithmetic is full of quantum computing machineries. I even
>>> suspect that the prime number distribution encodes a universal quantum
>>> chaotic dovetailing,
>>
>>
>> Can you explain what you mean by chaotic dovetailing?
>
>
> Have you heard about quantum chaos?

No, interesting. I'm starting to read about it. I always loved
standard chaos theory. It was one of the first things that profoundly
changed my map of reality.

> Here I meant classical usual dovetailing
> on the classical emulation of quantum chaos. From the FPI, it can converge
> on "genuine" quantum chaos. There are some evidences, related to the Riemann
> hypothesis that the "spectrum" or he critical zero of zeta might correspond
> to some quantum chaoitic hamiltonian's eigenvalue. I read that a long time
> ago. If quantum chaos is Turing universal, it could even be quantum-Turing
> universal, and generate a quantum universal dovetailer. But that would not
> solve the mind-body problem. The machine-theological solution can work only
> if we can explain why the measure which would be associated to that
> particular quantum chaos win the arithmetical (classical, mechanist) FPI
> problem. The Rieman hypothesis would help but is far from sufficiant.

I am too ignorant on number theory to understand this.

>>> but even if that is true, that should not be used to
>>> justify physics, because we would get the quanta, and not the qualia
>>> (unless
>>> the Riemann hypothesis is shown undecidable in PA (and thus true!).
>>>
>>> Only Penrose asks for an explicit non computable physical reduction of
>>> the
>>> waves, with some role for gravity, and is authentically
>>> non-computationalist. Penrose is coherent with computationalism. He keep
>>> physics as fundamental, but accept the price: the abandon of mechanism.
>>> But
>>> his argument aganist mechanism is not valid, and already defeated by
>>> machines like PA, ZF, etc.
>>
>>
>> You mean is maligned statement that the human brain is capable of
>> accessing truths that lie beyond the Gödelian veil?
>
>
> I mean all Löbian machine are capable of accessing truths that lie to the
> Gödelian veil, and use this to refute Penrose. Already in 1931, Gödel
> realized that PA (or equivalently his own theory P) was proving its own
> Gödel's second incompleteness theorem, and is perfectly able to sort out his
> own undecidable proposition. Gödel's proof is constructive. It limits the
> formalism, but shows them how to improve themselves accordingly, leading to
> transfinite possible self-improvement. The machine can find its undecidable
> statement, and bet on them with the interrogation mark, or discuss them as
> mysteries (consciousness).

And what leads to machine to drop the interrogation mark?

> Of course, they cannot prove them, nor even
> assert them as new axiom, but they can understand them, and use them,
> notably by becoming "mystical" and "religious",

And artists too, I would say...

> and distinguishing *their*
> science from *their* religion, in the scientific way, like they can develop
> the non-monotonical layers of mind on which Gödel's incompleteness will not
> apply: they need only to be able to say something like "Oops, I was wrong",
> which is the beginning of the manifestation of intelligence/doubt (already
> present in the Löb formula).

What can one base such bets on? It seems to me that most "betting" is
more or less a Bayesian process, based on priors that are fine-tuned
throughout life in an endless process. For example, I suspect that the
main difference between adherents of different ideologies is that they
have different priors for questions such as ("how likely is one to
become rich while being ethical"; "how likely is the government to be
corrupt"; etc.). How does one estimate probabilities beyond the veil?
Or do you think that this sort of betting transcends probabilistic
thinking?

Telmo.

> Bruno
>
>
>
>
>
>>
>> T.
>>
>>> Bruno
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>

 Telmo.

 --

Re: A thought on MWI and its alternative(s)

[David Nyman]

On 5 June 2017 at 14:22, Bruno Marchal  wrote:

>
> On 04 Jun 2017, at 14:48, David Nyman wrote:
>
>
>
> On 4 Jun 2017 1:05 p.m., "Bruno Marchal"  wrote:
>
>
> On 02 Jun 2017, at 03:01, Bruce Kellett wrote:
>
> On 1/06/2017 10:19 pm, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>
>>> On 01 Jun 2017, at 02:26, Bruce Kellett wrote:
>>> On 1/06/2017 4:43 am, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>
 On 31 May 2017, at 04:01, Bruce Kellett wrote:
>
>> On 30/05/2017 9:35 pm, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>
>>> On 30 May 2017, at 11:28, Telmo Menezes wrote:
>>>
>>> I get your point with decoherence.
 Again, I would say that it all depends on theories of mind. What
 does
 mind supervene on? Perhaps it is true that every single coupling
 with
 the environment prevents the current observer state to become
 compatible with other branches. But can we be sure? I feel that such
 certainties come from a strong belief in emergentism (which I cannot
 disprove, but find problematic).

>>>
>>> It is impossible to recohere the past, FAPP.
>>>
>>> But only FAPP. To make the blue T-rex interfereing with the
>>> red-T-rex, we must erase the trace of particle interaction between the
>>> T-rex in its whole light-cone, and this without forgetting the particles
>>> "swallowed" by the black-holes, etc. It is just completely impossible, 
>>> but
>>> to derive from that the unicity of the past, is, it seems to me (and 
>>> you if
>>> I understood well) is invalid.
>>>
>>
>> I think the recoherence of paths that have completely decohered is
>> more than just FAPP impossible, I think it is impossible in principle. 
>> One
>> major problem with recoherence in general is that information leaks from
>> the paths at the speed of light (as well as less slowly for other
>> interactions). Since this vital information goes out along the light 
>> cone,
>> it can never be recaptured and returned to the original interaction.
>>
>
> In QM + special relativity OK. (note that to me QM + special
> relativity => no collapse (and even the Many dreams, but we have agreed to
> disagree on this if I remember well).
>

 Reasoning in QM without SR is not very profitable. Besides, QM + SR
 does not particularly imply MWI -- it is perfectly possible to have a
 consistent collapse model of QM+SR. I know you don't agree because of the
 non-locality implied by EPR, but this non-locality is not removed in MWI,
 regardless of what you might say.

>>>
>>> I don't see it, and the mast time we discuss this, we conclude on some
>>> vocabulary problem. When there is no collapse, measurement tells to people
>>> light separated in which branch theiy belongs, but to exploits that
>>> information, they need to come into contact.
>>>
>>
>> Last time we discussed this, no resolution was achieved.
>>
>
> That is not what I remembered, but I will not insist.
>
>
>
>
>
> In QM, with or without collapse, decoherence and the transition from the
>> pure state to a mixture gives a definite measurement result.
>>
>
> In particular branches only. When looking at the whole wave including the
> observers, decoherence explain why it *looks*, to all observers in the
> different branches, that mixed states have been obtained, but that is not
> the case in the global description.
>
>
>
>
>
> Without collapse, different branches get different results, but once
>> obtained, these results are fixed, and are not affected by whether Alice
>> and Bob exchange information or not.
>>
>
> I agree. That is used in the fact that in EPR like situation, when Alice
> and Bob are space-time separated, what we have is "only" an infinity of
> Alices and Bobs, all with their spin correlated, and when Alice makes her
> measurement, at any angle, she will know Bob's possible result, without
> needing any action at a distance. She just localize herself, and her
> corresponding Bob, in which branch they belong. There is no influence at a
> distance, although we would need it to talk of token unique Alice and Bob
> in case there would be only one universe.
>
>
>
>
>
>> Consequently, indispensable phase information is lost *in principle*, so
>> the recoherence is, in general, impossible.
>>
>
> OK. (I was reasoning in naive classical QM)
>
> Of course, with carefully constructed systems, where the loss of
>> information along the light cone is prevented, recoherence is possible in
>> special circumstances, but not in general.
>>
>> From this, the uniqueness of the past of any decoherent history is
>> assured. So deriving the unicity (if I understand this use of the word) 
>> is
>> by no means invalid -- it is proved.
>>
>
> In QM + SR. OK.
>
> Even if one encounters one of those rare situations in which
>> 

Re: A thought on MWI and its alternative(s)

[Bruno Marchal]

On 04 Jun 2017, at 14:48, David Nyman wrote:




On 4 Jun 2017 1:05 p.m., "Bruno Marchal"  wrote:

On 02 Jun 2017, at 03:01, Bruce Kellett wrote:

On 1/06/2017 10:19 pm, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 01 Jun 2017, at 02:26, Bruce Kellett wrote:
On 1/06/2017 4:43 am, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 31 May 2017, at 04:01, Bruce Kellett wrote:
On 30/05/2017 9:35 pm, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 30 May 2017, at 11:28, Telmo Menezes wrote:

I get your point with decoherence.
Again, I would say that it all depends on theories of mind. What does
mind supervene on? Perhaps it is true that every single coupling with
the environment prevents the current observer state to become
compatible with other branches. But can we be sure? I feel that such
certainties come from a strong belief in emergentism (which I cannot
disprove, but find problematic).

It is impossible to recohere the past, FAPP.

But only FAPP. To make the blue T-rex interfereing with the red-T- 
rex, we must erase the trace of particle interaction between the T- 
rex in its whole light-cone, and this without forgetting the  
particles "swallowed" by the black-holes, etc. It is just completely  
impossible, but to derive from that the unicity of the past, is, it  
seems to me (and you if I understood well) is invalid.


I think the recoherence of paths that have completely decohered is  
more than just FAPP impossible, I think it is impossible in  
principle. One major problem with recoherence in general is that  
information leaks from the paths at the speed of light (as well as  
less slowly for other interactions). Since this vital information  
goes out along the light cone, it can never be recaptured and  
returned to the original interaction.


In QM + special relativity OK. (note that to me QM + special  
relativity => no collapse (and even the Many dreams, but we have  
agreed to disagree on this if I remember well).


Reasoning in QM without SR is not very profitable. Besides, QM + SR  
does not particularly imply MWI -- it is perfectly possible to have  
a consistent collapse model of QM+SR. I know you don't agree because  
of the non-locality implied by EPR, but this non-locality is not  
removed in MWI, regardless of what you might say.


I don't see it, and the mast time we discuss this, we conclude on  
some vocabulary problem. When there is no collapse, measurement  
tells to people light separated in which branch theiy belongs, but  
to exploits that information, they need to come into contact.


Last time we discussed this, no resolution was achieved.

That is not what I remembered, but I will not insist.





In QM, with or without collapse, decoherence and the transition from  
the pure state to a mixture gives a definite measurement result.


In particular branches only. When looking at the whole wave  
including the observers, decoherence explain why it *looks*, to all  
observers in the different branches, that mixed states have been  
obtained, but that is not the case in the global description.






Without collapse, different branches get different results, but once  
obtained, these results are fixed, and are not affected by whether  
Alice and Bob exchange information or not.


I agree. That is used in the fact that in EPR like situation, when  
Alice and Bob are space-time separated, what we have is "only" an  
infinity of Alices and Bobs, all with their spin correlated, and  
when Alice makes her measurement, at any angle, she will know Bob's  
possible result, without needing any action at a distance. She just  
localize herself, and her corresponding Bob, in which branch they  
belong. There is no influence at a distance, although we would need  
it to talk of token unique Alice and Bob in case there would be only  
one universe.






Consequently, indispensable phase information is lost *in  
principle*, so the recoherence is, in general, impossible.


OK. (I was reasoning in naive classical QM)

Of course, with carefully constructed systems, where the loss of  
information along the light cone is prevented, recoherence is  
possible in special circumstances, but not in general.


From this, the uniqueness of the past of any decoherent history is  
assured. So deriving the unicity (if I understand this use of the  
word) is by no means invalid -- it is proved.


In QM + SR. OK.

Even if one encounters one of those rare situations in which  
recoherence is achieved, that still does not invalidate the  
uniqueness of the past history -- recoherence, if it occurs, simply  
means that no new branches are formed at that point, so the  
decoherent history remains unique.


OK. That might suggest that we identify our indistinguishible past  
in arithmetic, if we assume mechanism. I use the Y = II principle,  
or the "quantum" linearity of the tensor product "@": we have that   
a @ (b + c) = (a @ b) + (a @ c).


That makes sense.

Linearity is the heart of QM. It is linearity that allows  
superpositions, and leads to all the 

Re: substitution level

[Bruno Marchal]

On 05 Jun 2017, at 04:44, Russell Standish wrote:


On Sun, Jun 04, 2017 at 11:48:23AM -0400, John Clark wrote:
On Sat, Jun 3, 2017 at 9:48 PM, Russell Standish 

wrote:




​> ​
That is not the same thing. The largest prime number doesn't  
exist, so

​ ​
there's no answer to find there, but the halting problem always  
has an

​ ​
answer - a program either halts, or it does not.



​But that's not ​the Halting Problem, it's is there a general  
way, in a
finite number of steps, to separate all programs into these 3  
categories?


1) Programs that will halt and there is a proof they will halt
2) Programs that will not halt and there is a proof they will not  
halt
3) Programs that will either halt or will not halt but have no  
proof they

will not halt.

Turing gave us the answer to that 80 years ago and it's no. Yes a  
program
will either stop or it won't but the Halting Problem isn't about  
truth it's
about proof. Mathematicians worry that some important problems,  
like the
Goldbach Conjecture, may be in category #3, but if it is we will  
never know
that it is. Goldbach could be true but a proof it is true does not  
exist,
so a billion years from now, whatever hyper intelligent entities we  
will have
evolved into will still be deep in thought looking, unsuccessfully,  
for a

proof that it is true and still grinding away at numbers looking,
unsuccessfully, for a counterexample to show it is false.




​> ​

In fact, there are a variety of hypercomputers that can solve the
​ ​
halting problem in finite time.



​It sounds to me like you're talking about one of Bruno's very  
silly book
computers that are just ink squiggles on dried wood pulp that are  
unable to

calculate 2+2 even if an infinite amount of time were available.



Not at all. Bruno's ontology implicitly assumes such hypercomputers
don't exist.


At the bare level, where only 0, s(0) ... exists. OK.

It is more than we don't need to assume them. We don't have to assume  
they do not exist. the assumption is that we can say yes to a doctor  
who propose computer for a body/brain. That does not entail we would  
die if he gives an hypercomputer, as usually they can emulate all  
computers.



The arithmetical truth contains, provably so, all hypercomputers, and  
even many "gods/oracles" (not necessary computable).


The computationalist hypothesis assumes only that our brain/body are  
computer emulable. That does not entail the non existence of  
hypercomputing machinery in the *physical* reality, which on the  
contrary should have a non computable first person plural component.


Bruno




It was David Deutsch who initially made the point, with a Hilbert
Hotel computer.




​> ​
Basically, any machine capable of
​ ​
executing an infinite number of computational steps will be able to
​ ​
solve the halting problem in finite time.



​Right,
​
executing an infinite number of computations in a finite number of  
seconds.

How hard can that be?​



There are a number of proposals for for doing so, probably the most
interesting is Malament-Hogarth spacetime, which is a solution to
general relativity that permits such a possibility. It is similar to a
Tipler cyclinder, which is a solution for a time machine that travels
back in time, in the sense that a seemingly impossible physical
situation is allowed by General Relativity.







​>​
​Anything that can be done a Turing Machine can do, if it can't  
be done

​ ​
then a Turing Machine can't do it, and neither can anything  
else.​



​>​
That is a thesis about the physical world
​



​Yes.​



​>​
​
It is quite a strong assumption about reality, and appears to be  
true



​Yes, but it's no stronger than the assumption perpetual motion  
machines
can't be built, or that the Second Law of Thermodynamics is  
correct. It is

no stronger than​

​the assumption everything we know about physics isn't complete  
bullshit.​




I disagree. There is nothing in conventional physics that rules out
the possibility of a hypercomputer. David Deutsch has proposed a
principle that effectively says "hypercomputers are not possible", but
the fact that hypercomputing solutions of General Relativity exist,
such a principle would mean that something must be up the spout with
that.

But then, we know that QM is incompatible with GR, and I strongly
suspect it is GR that will need modification, so it doesn't bother me
if this is just something else that needs changing in Einstein's
theory. But it may well be that the physical CT thesis is itself only
some classical approximation. We just don't know at this stage.


--


Dr Russell StandishPhone 0425 253119 (mobile)
Principal, High Performance Coders
Visiting Senior Research Fellowhpco...@hpcoders.com.au
Economics, Kingston University http://www.hpcoders.com.au

Re: A thought on MWI and its alternative(s)

[Bruno Marchal]

On 05 Jun 2017, at 05:52, Bruce Kellett wrote:


On 5/06/2017 12:19 pm, Bruce Kellett wrote:

On 4/06/2017 10:05 pm, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 02 Jun 2017, at 03:01, Bruce Kellett wrote:


Your claim appears to be that Bell's theorem is not valid in MWI.


Bell's theorem is valid. His inequality does not even assume QM,  
but just locality.


I agree, but that is not what you were implying above. It seems  
that now you agree that the Bell inequalities assume only locality.


And a mono-universe, or a conservation of identity of Alice and Bob  
from the beginning to the end of the experience. But that is no more  
the case in the MWI. Everett explains already this when he introduces  
what will be called decoherence. Decpherence is local.





But these inequalities are violated by experiment.


Yes.



That can only mean that the assumption of locality was wrong --  
whatever interpretation of QM you adopt.


It means that locality and mono-universe cannot be maintained at once.  
But non-locality is not proved, unless you believe that Alice and Bob  
remains the same unique person all along, which is necessarlly not the  
case in the MWI of the EPR-Bell situation.







I think that this important part of recent exchanges might have got  
lost in the welter of to-and-fro.


Bruno accepts:

1. Bell's theorem (and the associated inequalities) are valid in MWI.
2. Bell's theorem assumes only locality (not even QM -- it is valid  
in classical physics also).


Locality, and identity preservation (or mono-universe, or  
counterfactual definiteness: all go away with Everett).



3. The Aspect et al., and subsequent, experiments demonstrate that  
the Bell inequalities are violated.


Yes, but only from the points of view of one branch. But when we look  
how the singlet state is handled in the MWI, the correlation are  
apparent, but the results obtained by space-separated person does not  
need to be correlated, in some absolute sense, they need to be  
correlated with anyone interacting with both of them later, so that in  
all branches, it will look like if there has been an action at a  
distance, but all influence and information flows, and splitting, go  
at a speed lower than light.





It seems to follow with the force of simple logic that:

4. Experiment shows that QM is non-local, even in MWI.

Bruno appears to reject this conclusion. I conclude that Bruno's  
position is incoherent.


I will again ask you to tell me what is wrong with Michael Clive Price  
explanation ... except that the web page is not available.


I am not alone skeptical about inferring that the violation of the  
Bell inequalities shows action at a distance. What is wrong in Deutsch  
and Hayden? What is wrong in Rubin (Rubin, M.A. Found Phys Lett (2001)  
14: 301. doi:10.1023/A:1012357515678), or in Maudlin's book?


It seems obvious that both Bell and EPR assumes the identity of the  
observers, who prepare the singlet state and measure the correlation,  
but this is simply made false in the MWI.


I have to go.

Bruno





Bruce

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Re: A thought on MWI and its alternative(s)

[Bruno Marchal]

On 05 Jun 2017, at 04:19, Bruce Kellett wrote:


On 4/06/2017 10:05 pm, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 02 Jun 2017, at 03:01, Bruce Kellett wrote:

In QM, with or without collapse, decoherence and the transition  
from the pure state to a mixture gives a definite measurement  
result.


In particular branches only. When looking at the whole wave  
including the observers, decoherence explain why it *looks*, to all  
observers in the different branches, that mixed states have been  
obtained, but that is not the case in the global description.


The transition to the mixed state is essential for one to get a  
definite experimental result.


I agree. But this needs to happen from the subject point of view only.  
If Alice looks at a dead+alive cat, she split/differentiate in seeing  
a cat alive or a cat dead, although in the big picture she put herself  
in the superposition seeing the cat alive = seeing the cat dead. OK?





Physicists realized a long time ago that the pure unreduced state of  
the MWI does not work. The difficulty is known as the 'basis  
problem'. If you retain the full superposition of the pure state,  
there is no preferred basis, and expanding this superposition in  
terms of different bases gives different -- usually nonsensical --  
physical results. It is only when you reduce to a mixed state that  
the basis is fixed, and results are definite.


This will happen in the relevant basis, and *that* happens whatever  
base is chosen for the universal wave.





This does not mean, as you appear to think, that you have lost the  
other branches. All the branches of the MWI are still present,  
except that now there is a different definite measurement result in  
each branch.


That is exactly what I meant.






Without collapse, different branches get different results, but  
once obtained, these results are fixed, and are not affected by  
whether Alice and Bob exchange information or not.


I agree. That is used in the fact that in EPR like situation, when  
Alice and Bob are space-time separated, what we have is "only" an  
infinity of Alices and Bobs,


This is wrong. There is no "infinity of Alices and Bobs".


?

There is one Alice-Bob pair for each possible spin direction, or  
polarizer angle. Contrary to what the notation of the singlet state  
suggest, there is no preferential polarizer angle.







all with their spin correlated, and when Alice makes her  
measurement, at any angle, she will know Bob's possible result,


Bobs possible results, as far as Alice knows, is 50/50 for '+' or '-'.

without needing any action at a distance. She just localize  
herself, and her corresponding Bob, in which branch they belong.


That is not correct. You keep saying it, but you offer no proof or  
mechanism whereby such a thing could happen.


I did, and Saibal Mitra have point on the same reasoning done, many  
times. I have referred to Steven Price, also.






There is no influence at a distance, although we would need it to  
talk of token unique Alice and Bob in case there would be only one  
universe.


That is a total misunderstanding as well. All branches might exist  
(two for Alice in this case, one where she got '+' and one where she  
got '-'), but we need consider only one typical branch to get the  
general result -- that is how things are done in physics when you  
have superpositions.


When they are space separated, and make both measurement in non  
perpendicular angle, I don't see how we could talk of any typical  
branch. In that case thay might find any random result, even  
uncorrelated one. But they will never be aware of this, as they will  
compare the results later only with the part of the multiverse on  
which their respective (uncorrelated a priori) outcome will contagiate  
to the Alice (resp. Bob) they will be able to communicate with.


So, it is only because you maintain the identity of Alice and Bob  
throughout the experience, that you can interpret the violation of the  
inequality as an influence at a distance. That does not make sense  
once you keep track of the "slow" spreading of the superposition on  
their respective environment, in all relevant branches we started with.


Bruno








But there is non-locality -- non-local influence -- in all  
interpretations since it is inherent in the quantum formalism.


I don't see any non-locality in the MWI. EPR, Bell, assumes always  
one Alice and Bob, and as Everett shows, decoherence explains the  
manitenance of coherent first person plural description, and the  
absence of collapse prevent any non-local influence.


That is not the case either. Bell does not assume a necessary  
collapse. Bell's theorem is a mathematical theorem, it is true  
whatever interpretation of QM you adopt. You seem to be suggesting  
(and you are more explicit in this suggestion elsewhere) that Bell's  
theorem is invalid for MWI.


1. That is not true -- Bell's theorem is valid in all interpretations.
2. Even 

Re: Answers to David 4

[Bruno Marchal]

On 04 Jun 2017, at 13:31, David Nyman wrote:


On 4 June 2017 at 11:47, Bruno Marchal  wrote:

On 02 Jun 2017, at 00:29, David Nyman wrote:


On 1 June 2017 at 18:00, Bruno Marchal  wrote:

On 01 Jun 2017, at 16:42, David Nyman wrote:




On 1 Jun 2017 15:20, "Bruno Marchal"  wrote:

On 01 Jun 2017, at 15:59, David Nyman wrote:




On 1 Jun 2017 14:01, "Bruno Marchal"  wrote:

On 01 Jun 2017, at 12:44, David Nyman wrote:






Yes, but doesn't the comp theory itself assume the relation as if  
true, in order for mechanism to make sense (which was my caveat)?



The point here is very subtle. We cannot assume Mechanism is true,  
we can only assume Mechanism. We can assume it as a sort of meta- 
level hypothesis. It is indeed the reason why I insist on an act of  
faith, and why it is a theology.


Now, you might ask me what is the difference between assuming X,  
and assuming X is true. The difference is that when we assume X,  
but don't invoke the full semantic of X, and we can preserve our  
consistency. By saying "mechanism is true", even in an hypothesis,  
you refer to the God of mechanism at a place that is impossible.


We have something similar, but slightly simpler, for the notion of  
self-consistency. Take PA. It has 6 axioms + the infinity of  
induction axioms


1) Ax (0 ≠ s(x))
2) AxAy (s(x) = s(y) -> x = y)
3) Ax (x+0 = x)
4) AxAy (x+s(y) = s(x+y))
5) Ax (x*0=0)
6) AxAy (x*s(y)=(x*y)+x)
7) the infinity) (F(0) & Ax(F(x) -> F(s(x -> AxF(x)

PA is consistent (I hope you are OK with this, as all  
mathematicians are, except nelson)


Imagine I add to PA the axiom 8) PA is consistent. That is

8) consistent(1+2+3+4+5+6+7)

In that case there is no problem that new theory, PA+con(PA)  is  
consistent, and even much more powerful than PA. It proves new  
theorems and it shorten many proofs.


But imagine we add the following to PA

8') consistent(1+2+3+4+5+6+7+8')

That is self-referential, but using the diagonal lemma (the D'X' =  
'X'X'' trick), we can build that formula in arithmetic and add it  
to PA as axiom.


In that case, we get a theory which can prove, indeed in one line  
proof, its own consistency, and so, by Gödel II, that theory is  
inconsistent.


The case above is more complex to describe, because it refers to  
"arithmetical truth", which cannot even be defined in arithmetic.  
It is almost the nuance between (Bp & p), and (Bp & V(p)). For each  
partuclar p, you can write Bp & p, but you cannot define knowledge  
by a general (Bx & x).  It is the nuance between assuming that x +  
0 = x, and using only that, and assuming True('x + 0 = x'), which  
cannot be express in the arithmetical language.
Mechanism is awkward on this. Yet, this ​sustains your intuition  
that the ultimate 3p, the outer God view, is a 0p pov.


"Out of sight, out of mind" as the proverb has it.


"Loin des yeux, loin du coeur", we say in french (which has not  
exactly the same intent).






It works well with Plotinus idea that God does not exist, as it is  
the ultimate reason why everything exists without mentioning ever  
itself in the creation (making the idea that God can talk with us  
in a direct public way nonsensical). Only the first person has  
access to this, but can only stay mute.



Another example is that even if someone survives the classical  
teleportation experience, he/she cannot claim that he/she knows  
that mechanism is true.


​OK
​
 Still another example, even closer to what is alluded above is the  
case of the notion of sigma_1 truth, or simply sigma-truth. The  
notion of sigma-truth *is* definable in arithmetic, and the self- 
referential sentences saying that she is sigma-true appears to be a  
sigma proposition, yet it can be shown to be ... false! This is  
very unlike the sigma proposition saying "I am provable", which is  
always true! All this despite G* proves (sigma-true <-> sigma  
provable), but again, only G* says this, the machine has to be mute.


​The machine would appear to take Wittgenstein's dictum to heart.  
But its guardian angel is able nonetheless to intuit a truth in  
what it cannot say.


I would not use "intuit" for the guardian angel. he is not a  
subject. just a machinery who knows everything about the machine(s).  
At the propositional level, he knows/proves the whole truth about  
the self-referential sentence. We know it is true, only because we  
limit ourselves to true machine, by decision.


​So the angel is not conceived as self-referential, hence cannot be  
said to possess intuition. Is that it?


Yes. Only G is self-referential, and only the provability predicate  
that G models can be said self-referential. The soul can be said to  
refer to itself implicitly, given that it has no name. G* is entirely  
devolved in talking about G, or the machine. That makes it being both  
consistent and having a sort of omniscience-about-the-machine, but he  
never