On 05 Jun 2017, at 16:07, Telmo Menezes wrote:
I guess you mean that it does not violate Church thesis.
Yes.
Of course, it can
"do" things impossible to do in real time, or without emulating the
subject,
that a classical computer cannot do. For example, it can generate a
genuine
random bit. To do emulate this with a non-quantum computer, you
need to
emulate the duplication of the observer, like in the WM duplication.
Well ok, but this part is easy to solve on a classical computer:
https://www.random.org/
:)
Using atmospheric noise as an oracle.
OK, it is better than than using PI or sqrt(2), but is really a
computer with an oracle (which by the way has the same theology than a
computer without oracle, but this is just a note in passing).
Now, prove me that random.org really use the oracle. May be it uses Pi
or 1/Pi. Not sure we could see the difference, if they change the seed
regularly.
Well, thanks for letting me know that you are not serious :)
but with comp it would have consequences regarding
our "insertion" in reality, so to say. Correct?
I am not sure of what you mean exactly. It would not change the
physics, but
allow us to exploit more directly the FPI.
Yes, I meant simply that our mind would supervene on more branches.
And we would become able to compute Fourier transform on the result of
some computations made in all branches. According to Deustch we would
be able to detect the "parallel universes". We would be able to find
quickly a needle in a stack, and I would have less problem to find my
glasses on my dekstop :)
I am completely agnostic on this,
but I am not convince by the current argument that there are
evidences that
a brain could be a quantum computer. They might be right, but I
wait for
more evidences.
Me too.
Elementary arithmetic is full of quantum computing machineries. I
even
suspect that the prime number distribution encodes a universal
quantum
chaotic dovetailing,
Can you explain what you mean by chaotic dovetailing?
Have you heard about quantum chaos?
No, interesting. I'm starting to read about it. I always loved
standard chaos theory. It was one of the first things that profoundly
changed my map of reality.
A not to bad intro is "http://assets.cambridge.org/97805210/27151/excerpt/9780521027151_excerpt.pdf
"
Here I meant classical usual dovetailing
on the classical emulation of quantum chaos. From the FPI, it can
converge
on "genuine" quantum chaos. There are some evidences, related to
the Riemann
hypothesis that the "spectrum" or he critical zero of zeta might
correspond
to some quantum chaoitic hamiltonian's eigenvalue. I read that a
long time
ago. If quantum chaos is Turing universal, it could even be quantum-
Turing
universal, and generate a quantum universal dovetailer. But that
would not
solve the mind-body problem. The machine-theological solution can
work only
if we can explain why the measure which would be associated to that
particular quantum chaos win the arithmetical (classical,
mechanist) FPI
problem. The Rieman hypothesis would help but is far from sufficiant.
I am too ignorant on number theory to understand this.
I might say some words on this when I have more time, but I will
resist for now.
but even if that is true, that should not be used to
justify physics, because we would get the quanta, and not the
qualia
(unless
the Riemann hypothesis is shown undecidable in PA (and thus true!).
Only Penrose asks for an explicit non computable physical
reduction of
the
waves, with some role for gravity, and is authentically
non-computationalist. Penrose is coherent with computationalism.
He keep
physics as fundamental, but accept the price: the abandon of
mechanism.
But
his argument aganist mechanism is not valid, and already defeated
by
machines like PA, ZF, etc.
You mean is maligned statement that the human brain is capable of
accessing truths that lie beyond the Gödelian veil?
I mean all Löbian machine are capable of accessing truths that lie
to the
Gödelian veil, and use this to refute Penrose. Already in 1931, Gödel
realized that PA (or equivalently his own theory P) was proving its
own
Gödel's second incompleteness theorem, and is perfectly able to
sort out his
own undecidable proposition. Gödel's proof is constructive. It
limits the
formalism, but shows them how to improve themselves accordingly,
leading to
transfinite possible self-improvement. The machine can find its
undecidable
statement, and bet on them with the interrogation mark, or discuss
them as
mysteries (consciousness).
And what leads to machine to drop the interrogation mark?
The confusion between two hypostases. Either willingly, to make easy
profit, like with the clergy, which can confuse man and god for
example, or unwillingly, by repeating lies, or by pure ignorance. You
can see the machine's enlightenment as the realization that G1* proves
the equivalence of all hypostases:
G1* proves p <-> Bp <-> (Bp & p) <-> (Bp & Dt) <-> (Bp & Dt &
p) (p is restricted to the sigma propositions, the leaves of
the UD).
But all those equivalence are solution of the formula B x -> ~x. It is
true only in God's eye, and false on the terrestrial plane. G1 does
not prove any of those equivalence, with some exception, like p -> Bp
(keep in mind that true sigma proposition are always provable by a
universal system).
Of course, they cannot prove them, nor even
assert them as new axiom, but they can understand them, and use them,
notably by becoming "mystical" and "religious",
And artists too, I would say...
And poets. Certainly (as long as they do not believe doing science in
the process).
and distinguishing *their*
science from *their* religion, in the scientific way, like they can
develop
the non-monotonical layers of mind on which Gödel's incompleteness
will not
apply: they need only to be able to say something like "Oops, I was
wrong",
which is the beginning of the manifestation of intelligence/doubt
(already
present in the Löb formula).
What can one base such bets on? It seems to me that most "betting" is
more or less a Bayesian process, based on priors that are fine-tuned
throughout life in an endless process.
I feel myself more frequentist than Bayesian. Bayes works when we have
good reason to have the indifference principle true, but that tend to
exist only in mathematics.
For example, I suspect that the
main difference between adherents of different ideologies is that they
have different priors for questions such as ("how likely is one to
become rich while being ethical"; "how likely is the government to be
corrupt"; etc.). How does one estimate probabilities beyond the veil?
I would say that there are no probabilities at all in such context,
only credibilities and plausibilities.
I will judge a government corrupt when he lies on something for a long
time, or make dubious propositions. It will be a personal judgment,
unless I can rove that it lies on something specific.
Or do you think that this sort of betting transcends probabilistic
thinking?
I think that an ideology, like a theory, is based on judgements. It is
based on personal intuition, related to one personal life, experience
and character, and our personal influence (parents school, ...).
Probabilies can be used to study population, make poll, etc. But will
not work to get an information on particular individuals. For ideas,
in the human science, we can hardly build the Omega space (the
universe of elementary statistical results), unless we use very
special protocols, like with the WM-duplication, or applying quantum
mechanics on oneself.
There are as much notion of probability and credibility than there are
modal logic for which []p entails <>p. <>p is a default meta-
hypothesis. Somehow it assumes that when you throw a dice, 1) there is
some reality in which the dice will fall; 2) you will exclude all
anomalies (like the dice falling and rolling under the heavy wardrobe).
That is why to get probability, we need to conjunct the <>t to the box
[]p. To have at least one universe/computation/situation accessible to
verify the prediction.
Bruno
Telmo.
Bruno
T.
Bruno
Telmo.
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