Re: A profound lack of profundity

[Stathis Papaioannou]

On 13 August 2017 at 11:16, John Clark  wrote:

> On Sat, Aug 12, 2017  Stathis Papaioannou  wrote:
>
> ​> ​
>> You call yourself "I" and I call myself "I", simultaneously, and we don't
>> fight over who deserves the title, because that is how pronouns work.
>>
>
> ​Pronouns work fine today because nobody has yet made a "I" duplicating
> machine, but when they do the English language is going to need a massive
> overhaul.
>

There are already billions of "I's" in the world without such a duplicating
machine, and no-one is confused by the large number of them.


> ​> ​
>> If the bet is that "SP1 will see W" then this will happen as a matter of
>> definition, and it isn't an interesting bet.
>>
>
> ​I know that's the problem. But there are worse things than being
> uninteresting, like being incoherent.   ​
>
>
> ​> ​
>> If the bet is that "I will see W" it may look like a similar bet but it
>> is in fact different
>>
>
> ​I agree it is different. One may be boring and predictable and pointless
> but it ​is a bet, the other is not a bet, it's just a sequence of words.
>
>
>
>> ​> ​
>> So one copy wins the bet
>>
>
> ​So which one wins the bet? The one that sees W. But which one sees W?
> The one that wins the bet. And round and round we go.​
>
>
> ​> ​
>> and everyone agrees on this.
>>
>
> ​And everyone correctly predicted this. And I correctly predicted it would
> be silly.
>

If the subject predicts, prior to duplication, "I will see W" then one copy
will be correct and the other copy will be wrong. If the subject predicts,
prior to duplication,  "SP1 will see W" then both copies will be correct.
They are different bets, but both are coherent, and it is clear who has won
and who has lost.


-- 
Stathis Papaioannou

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Re: A profound lack of profundity

[John Clark]

On Sat, Aug 12, 2017  Stathis Papaioannou  wrote:

​> ​
> You call yourself "I" and I call myself "I", simultaneously, and we don't
> fight over who deserves the title, because that is how pronouns work.
>

​Pronouns work fine today because nobody has yet made a "I" duplicating
machine, but when they do the English language is going to need a massive
overhaul.  ​



> ​> ​
> If the bet is that "SP1 will see W" then this will happen as a matter of
> definition, and it isn't an interesting bet.
>

​I know that's the problem. But there are worse things than being
uninteresting, like being incoherent.   ​


​> ​
> If the bet is that "I will see W" it may look like a similar bet but it is
> in fact different
>

​I agree it is different. One may be boring and predictable and pointless
but it ​is a bet, the other is not a bet, it's just a sequence of words.



> ​> ​
> So one copy wins the bet
>

​So which one wins the bet? The one that sees W. But which one sees W? The
one that wins the bet. And round and round we go.​


​> ​
> and everyone agrees on this.
>

​And everyone correctly predicted this. And I correctly predicted it would
be silly.

John K Clark​



>

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Re: A profound lack of profundity

[Stathis Papaioannou]

On Sun, 13 Aug 2017 at 9:19 am, Bruce Kellett 
wrote:

> On 13/08/2017 9:05 am, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>
> On 13 August 2017 at 08:48, Bruce Kellett 
> wrote:
>
>> On 13/08/2017 12:04 am, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>>
>> On Sat, 12 Aug 2017 at 4:52 pm, Bruce Kellett <
>> bhkell...@optusnet.com.au> wrote:
>>
>>> On 12/08/2017 1:42 pm, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>> First person experience is individual and private. The third person
>>> point of view is the view of an external observer. Suppose person A is
>>> observed laughing by person B. The behaviour - the laughing - can be
>>> observed by anyone; this is the third person point of view. Person A might
>>> be experiencing happiness or amusement; this is the first person point of
>>> view and only person A himself has it. Finally, person B has visual and
>>> auditory experiences and knowledge of the outside world (there are laughing
>>> entities in it), and this is again from the first person point of view. I
>>> would say that knowledge is a type of experience, and therefore always
>>> first person and private; information is that which is third person
>>> communicable. But perhaps this last point is a matter of semantics.
>>>
>>>
>>> If your knowledge is gained from someone else, it is necessarily
>>> communicable information, and thus third person. First person is your
>>> personal experience, which is not communicable. However, knowledge gained
>>> by experience is communicable, and thus third person. Otherwise, all that
>>> you say above is mere logic chopping.
>>>
>>
>> Most first person experiences are based on third person information,
>> namely sensory data.
>>
>>
>> How is sensory data 'third person information'? That would make
>> everything 3p, and you have eliminated the first person POV. If I
>> experience the pleasure of sitting in the sun on a fine spring morning,
>> that is surely a first person experience, and entirely sensory in origin.
>>
>> Even a priori knowledge, such mathematical knowledge, starts with
>> learning about the subjectvfrom outside sources.
>>
>> Returning to the point, why were you claiming that the subject on a
>> duplication experiment cannot have first person knowledge of duplication?
>> That would mean no-one could ever have first person knowledge of anything.
>>
>>
>> If you go into the duplicating machine without being told what it is,
>> then you are duplicated and come out in Moscow, you will know that you have
>> been transported from Helsinki, but how can you know anything about any
>> duplicates? As far as you know -- not knowing the protocol -- you could
>> simply have been rendered unconscious and flown to Moscow. How does 1p
>> experience tell the difference?
>>
>> This is why I think some 3p is being mixed in with 1p experiences in this
>> duplication protocol. The subject only knows the protocol by being told
>> about it. How does he know he is not being lied to?
>>
>
> This is the case with any experience whatsoever: you come to a conclusion
> about what has happened based on your observations and deductions, but you
> could be mistaken.
>
>
> That would appear to put a large hole in Bruno's distinction between
> quanta and qualia. The sensation of the sun on my face is veridicial -- I
> might be mistaken about it being the sun, but the sensation is
> incontrovertible. But things that I am told about are in a different
> category -- I have no immediate incontrovertible experience associated with
> them. I am aware of words being spoken, but I am not immediately aware of
> their veracity.
>

You feel the Sun on your face, see the Sun in the sky and make deductions
about a hot, bright object in space. It is an analogous process when you
hear human speech and come to conclusions about the world.

> --
Stathis Papaioannou

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Re: A profound lack of profundity

[Telmo Menezes]

On Sat 12. Aug 2017 at 03:12, Bruce Kellett 
wrote:

> On 12/08/2017 3:22 am, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> > On 11 Aug 2017, at 13:40, Bruce Kellett wrote:
> >>
> >>> Are you telling us that P(W) ≠ P(M) ≠ 1/2. What do *you* expect when
> >>> pushing the button in Helsinki?
> >>
> >> I expect to die, to be 'cut', according to the protocol. The guys in
> >> W and M are two new persons, and neither was around in H to make any
> >> prediction whatsoever.
> >
> > Fair enough.
> >
> > You think the digital mechanism thesis is wrong.
>
> Correct.
>
> There is a fundamental problem with your person-duplication thought
> experiments. This is that the way in which you interpret the scenario
> inherently involves an irreducible 1p-3p confusion. The first person
> (1p) concerns only things that the person can experience directly for
> himself. It cannot, therefore, involve things that he is told by other
> people, because such things are necessarily third person (3p) knowledge


Things that are told by othet people reach us as 1p experiences. We accept
them (or not) based on our own internal models of reality. Some people
trust evangelical preachers, others trust what is published in Nature. It
is only by personal cognitive processes that we can make such choices.
There is no such thing as pure 3p knowledge, that is nonsensical.


> -- knowledge which he does not have by direct personal experience. So
> our subject does not know the protocol of the thought experiment from
> direct experience (he has only been told about it, 3p). When he presses
> the button in the machine, he can have no 1p expectations about what
> will happen (because he has not yet experienced it). He presses the
> button in the spirit of pure experimental enquiry -- "what will happen
> if I do this?" His prior probability for any particular outcome is zero.
> So when he presses the button in Helsinki, and opens the door to find
> himself in Moscow, he will say, "WTF!". In particular, he will not have
> gained any 1p knowledge of duplication. In fact, he is for ever barred
> from any such knowledge.
>
> If he repeats the experiment many times, he will simply see his
> experiences as irreducibly random between M and W, with some probability
> that he can estimate by keeping records over a period of time. If you
> take the strict 1p view of the thought experiment, the parallel with the
> early development of QM is more evident. In QM, no-one has the 3p
> knowledge that all possible outcomes are realized (in different worlds).
>
> So, before pressing the button in H, his prior probabilities are p(M) =
> p(W) = 0, with probably, p(H) = 1. On the other hand, if you allow 3p
> knowledge of the protocol to influence his estimation of probabilities
> before the experiment, you can't rule out 3p knowledge that he can gain
> at any time after pressing the button. In which case, the 1p-3p
> confusion is complete, p(M) = p(W) = 1, and he can expect to see both
> cities. In that case, the pure 1p view becomes irrelevant.


This argument can be applied to any scientific theory whatsoever. That is
what hardcore postmodernists do. Ok, but then you are just rejecting
science as a whole.

Also, you are in profound disagreement with John Clark. The only thing your
positions have in common is your disagreement with Bruno.

Telmo.


>
> Bruce
>
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Re: A profound lack of profundity

[Bruce Kellett]

On 13/08/2017 9:05 am, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
On 13 August 2017 at 08:48, Bruce Kellett > wrote:


On 13/08/2017 12:04 am, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:

On Sat, 12 Aug 2017 at 4:52 pm, Bruce Kellett
> wrote:

On 12/08/2017 1:42 pm, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:


First person experience is individual and private. The third
person point of view is the view of an external observer.
Suppose person A is observed laughing by person B. The
behaviour - the laughing - can be observed by anyone; this
is the third person point of view. Person A might be
experiencing happiness or amusement; this is the first
person point of view and only person A himself has it.
Finally, person B has visual and auditory experiences and
knowledge of the outside world (there are laughing entities
in it), and this is again from the first person point of
view. I would say that knowledge is a type of experience,
and therefore always first person and private; information
is that which is third person communicable. But perhaps this
last point is a matter of semantics.


If your knowledge is gained from someone else, it is
necessarily communicable information, and thus third person.
First person is your personal experience, which is not
communicable. However, knowledge gained by experience is
communicable, and thus third person. Otherwise, all that you
say above is mere logic chopping.


Most first person experiences are based on third person
information, namely sensory data.


How is sensory data 'third person information'? That would make
everything 3p, and you have eliminated the first person POV. If I
experience the pleasure of sitting in the sun on a fine spring
morning, that is surely a first person experience, and entirely
sensory in origin.


Even a priori knowledge, such mathematical knowledge, starts with
learning about the subjectvfrom outside sources.

Returning to the point, why were you claiming that the subject on
a duplication experiment cannot have first person knowledge of
duplication? That would mean no-one could ever have first person
knowledge of anything.


If you go into the duplicating machine without being told what it
is, then you are duplicated and come out in Moscow, you will know
that you have been transported from Helsinki, but how can you know
anything about any duplicates? As far as you know -- not knowing
the protocol -- you could simply have been rendered unconscious
and flown to Moscow. How does 1p experience tell the difference?

This is why I think some 3p is being mixed in with 1p experiences
in this duplication protocol. The subject only knows the protocol
by being told about it. How does he know he is not being lied to?


This is the case with any experience whatsoever: you come to a 
conclusion about what has happened based on your observations and 
deductions, but you could be mistaken.


That would appear to put a large hole in Bruno's distinction between 
quanta and qualia. The sensation of the sun on my face is veridicial -- 
I might be mistaken about it being the sun, but the sensation is 
incontrovertible. But things that I am told about are in a different 
category -- I have no immediate incontrovertible experience associated 
with them. I am aware of words being spoken, but I am not immediately 
aware of their veracity.


Bruce

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Re: A profound lack of profundity

[Stathis Papaioannou]

On 13 August 2017 at 08:48, Bruce Kellett  wrote:

> On 13/08/2017 12:04 am, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>
> On Sat, 12 Aug 2017 at 4:52 pm, Bruce Kellett 
> wrote:
>
>> On 12/08/2017 1:42 pm, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>>
>>
>> First person experience is individual and private. The third person point
>> of view is the view of an external observer. Suppose person A is observed
>> laughing by person B. The behaviour - the laughing - can be observed by
>> anyone; this is the third person point of view. Person A might be
>> experiencing happiness or amusement; this is the first person point of view
>> and only person A himself has it. Finally, person B has visual and auditory
>> experiences and knowledge of the outside world (there are laughing entities
>> in it), and this is again from the first person point of view. I would say
>> that knowledge is a type of experience, and therefore always first person
>> and private; information is that which is third person communicable. But
>> perhaps this last point is a matter of semantics.
>>
>>
>> If your knowledge is gained from someone else, it is necessarily
>> communicable information, and thus third person. First person is your
>> personal experience, which is not communicable. However, knowledge gained
>> by experience is communicable, and thus third person. Otherwise, all that
>> you say above is mere logic chopping.
>>
>
> Most first person experiences are based on third person information,
> namely sensory data.
>
>
> How is sensory data 'third person information'? That would make everything
> 3p, and you have eliminated the first person POV. If I experience the
> pleasure of sitting in the sun on a fine spring morning, that is surely a
> first person experience, and entirely sensory in origin.
>
> Even a priori knowledge, such mathematical knowledge, starts with learning
> about the subjectvfrom outside sources.
>
> Returning to the point, why were you claiming that the subject on a
> duplication experiment cannot have first person knowledge of duplication?
> That would mean no-one could ever have first person knowledge of anything.
>
>
> If you go into the duplicating machine without being told what it is, then
> you are duplicated and come out in Moscow, you will know that you have been
> transported from Helsinki, but how can you know anything about any
> duplicates? As far as you know -- not knowing the protocol -- you could
> simply have been rendered unconscious and flown to Moscow. How does 1p
> experience tell the difference?
>
> This is why I think some 3p is being mixed in with 1p experiences in this
> duplication protocol. The subject only knows the protocol by being told
> about it. How does he know he is not being lied to?
>

This is the case with any experience whatsoever: you come to a conclusion
about what has happened based on your observations and deductions, but you
could be mistaken.


-- 
Stathis Papaioannou

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Re: A profound lack of profundity

[Bruce Kellett]

On 12/08/2017 5:56 pm, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 12 Aug 2017, at 04:12, Bruce Kellett wrote:

On 12/08/2017 3:22 am, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 11 Aug 2017, at 13:40, Bruce Kellett wrote:


Are you telling us that P(W) ≠ P(M) ≠ 1/2. What do *you* expect 
when pushing the button in Helsinki?


I expect to die, to be 'cut', according to the protocol. The guys 
in W and M are two new persons, and neither was around in H to make 
any prediction whatsoever.


Fair enough.

You think the digital mechanism thesis is wrong.


Correct.

There is a fundamental problem with your person-duplication thought 
experiments. This is that the way in which you interpret the scenario 
inherently involves an irreducible 1p-3p confusion. The first person 
(1p) concerns only things that the person can experience directly for 
himself. It cannot, therefore, involve things that he is told by 
other people, because such things are necessarily third person (3p) 
knowledge -- knowledge which he does not have by direct personal 
experience. So our subject does not know the protocol of the thought 
experiment from direct experience (he has only been told about it, 
3p). When he presses the button in the machine, he can have no 1p 
expectations about what will happen (because he has not yet 
experienced it). He presses the button in the spirit of pure 
experimental enquiry -- "what will happen if I do this?" His prior 
probability for any particular outcome is zero.


That is just plain false. The guy in Helsinki knows the protocol, and 
he assumes Mechanism. So he knows that P(W) = P(M) , and that P(W) ≠ 
0, and P(M) ≠ 0, and P(X) for any X different from W and M is equal to 0.


He only knows the protocol because he has been told about it. How does 
he know that he isn't being lied to? Knowledge of the protocol is 3p 
knowledge.



So when he presses the button in Helsinki, and opens the door to find 
himself in Moscow, he will say, "WTF!". In particular, he will not 
have gained any 1p knowledge of duplication. In fact, he is for ever 
barred from any such knowledge.


Yes, that is the 3p/1p confusion that John Clark is doing. He told me 
that the guy in Moscow says "I knew it", or I predicted it, by saying 
that P(W & M) = 1.


You try to help John C., but you contradict his "theory" (which is 
indeed based on the 1p/3p confusion).


I suggest that the whole of step 3 is based on a 1p/3p confusion. If the 
duplicated subject does not have 3p knowledge of the protocol, he will 
never be aware of being duplicated. In fact, he can never get first 
person knowledge of that duplication, even if he is, in fact, duplicated.


If he repeats the experiment many times, he will simply see his 
experiences as irreducibly random between M and W, with some 
probability that he can estimate by keeping records over a period of 
time. If you take the strict 1p view of the thought experiment, the 
parallel with the early development of QM is more evident. In QM, 
no-one has the 3p knowledge that all possible outcomes are realized 
(in different worlds).


So, before pressing the button in H, his prior probabilities are p(M) 
= p(W) = 0, with probably, p(H) = 1.


What?

(I recall that in H the person is annihilated).


He doesn't know this because he doesn't know the protocol.

On the other hand, if you allow 3p knowledge of the protocol to 
influence his estimation of probabilities before the experiment, you 
can't rule out 3p knowledge that he can gain at any time after 
pressing the button. In which case, the 1p-3p confusion is complete, 
p(M) = p(W) = 1, and he can expect to see both cities. In that case, 
the pure 1p view becomes irrelevant.


W and M, as they have defined (they concern the experience of opening 
a door and describing which city is seen) are incompatible experience, 
and the protocol entails that P(W) = P(M). If P(M) = P(W) = 1, you get 
a probability equal to 2.


Rubbish. You have no basis for adding these probabilities because they 
are not independent events.


With the UD, eventually we will have a notion of credibility in place 
of probability, but this does not happen in the self-duplication 
protocol. You just cannot have P(M), or P(W) = 1, because that is 
refuted directly by both copies, when asked about their first person 
experience.


Before the procedure, neither has any probability estimate. After the 
procedure, p(M) = p(W) = 1 because they know with certainty where they 
are, and the results are not independent.


Bruce

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Re: A profound lack of profundity

[Bruce Kellett]

On 13/08/2017 12:04 am, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
On Sat, 12 Aug 2017 at 4:52 pm, Bruce Kellett 
> wrote:


On 12/08/2017 1:42 pm, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:


First person experience is individual and private. The third
person point of view is the view of an external observer. Suppose
person A is observed laughing by person B. The behaviour - the
laughing - can be observed by anyone; this is the third person
point of view. Person A might be experiencing happiness or
amusement; this is the first person point of view and only person
A himself has it. Finally, person B has visual and auditory
experiences and knowledge of the outside world (there are
laughing entities in it), and this is again from the first person
point of view. I would say that knowledge is a type of
experience, and therefore always first person and private;
information is that which is third person communicable. But
perhaps this last point is a matter of semantics.


If your knowledge is gained from someone else, it is necessarily
communicable information, and thus third person. First person is
your personal experience, which is not communicable. However,
knowledge gained by experience is communicable, and thus third
person. Otherwise, all that you say above is mere logic chopping.


Most first person experiences are based on third person information, 
namely sensory data.


How is sensory data 'third person information'? That would make 
everything 3p, and you have eliminated the first person POV. If I 
experience the pleasure of sitting in the sun on a fine spring morning, 
that is surely a first person experience, and entirely sensory in origin.


Even a priori knowledge, such mathematical knowledge, starts with 
learning about the subjectvfrom outside sources.


Returning to the point, why were you claiming that the subject on a 
duplication experiment cannot have first person knowledge of 
duplication? That would mean no-one could ever have first person 
knowledge of anything.


If you go into the duplicating machine without being told what it is, 
then you are duplicated and come out in Moscow, you will know that you 
have been transported from Helsinki, but how can you know anything about 
any duplicates? As far as you know -- not knowing the protocol -- you 
could simply have been rendered unconscious and flown to Moscow. How 
does 1p experience tell the difference?


This is why I think some 3p is being mixed in with 1p experiences in 
this duplication protocol. The subject only knows the protocol by being 
told about it. How does he know he is not being lied to?


Bruce

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Re: A profound lack of profundity

[Stathis Papaioannou]

On Sun, 13 Aug 2017 at 1:01 am, John Clark  wrote:

> On Fri, Aug 11, 2017 at 9:43 PM, Stathis Papaioannou 
> wrote:
>
> ​> ​
>> Before the duplication SP bet that "I will see W".
>>
>
> ​And that's the problem right there. The above is about the "I" BEFORE
> the duplication but ​AFTER the duplication 2 people can make a equally
> strong case that they and they alone are deserving of the grand title Mr.
> I.  So who is the real Mr. I?
>

You call yourself "I" and I call myself "I", simultaneously, and we don't
fight over who deserves the title, because that is how pronouns work.

After the duplication both are identical and, presuming one city doesn't
> have a special magic the other city lacks, we can logically
> ​ ​
> conclude that
> ​ ​
> either both are Mr. I or neither are Mr. I. If both are then "I" will see
> W *AND* M. If neither are then "I" will not see any cities at all. In NO
> case will the "I" before the duplication see one city but not the other, so
> W *OR *M can never be the correct answer. We can always find a "I"  that
> remembers being I before the duplication that is in W, and we
> ​can ​
> always find a "I" that remembers being I before the duplication that is in
> M.
>
> Of course untangling the above would be completely unnecessary if personal
> pronouns were ditched and only the proper noun the pronouns are suposed to
> refer to were used, but the complicated tangle is not a bug it's a feature,
> it's a great place to hide fuzzy thinking. Hence the refusal of Bruno to
> stop using personal pronouns.
>
>
>> ​> ​
>> After the duplication SP1 sees W
>>
>
> ​And what is the one and only one ​definition of "SP1"? SP1 is the SP
> that will see W. And who will see W?
>
> ​SP1.​
> And round and round we go
> ​.​
>
>
>> ​> ​
>> and SP2 sees M.
>>
>
> And what is the one and only ​one definition of "SP2"? SP2 is the SP that
> will see M. And who will see M?
>
> ​SP2.​ And round and round we go.
>
>
>> ​> ​
>> Everyone agrees that this is fair
>>
>
> ​And everyone also agrees it's silly to make a bet on something that is
> possible ​to predict with 100% accuracy. It's actually even worse than
> that, it's not only
> possible
> ​ to make such a prediction it's EASY.​ And that explains the title of
> this thread.
>

If the bet is that "SP1 will see W" then this will happen as a matter of
definition, and it isn't an interesting bet. If the bet is that "I will see
W" it may look like a similar bet but it is in fact different because of
the nature of personal pronouns, which can be correctly used to refer to
multiple different people at the same time. So one copy wins the bet and
the other loses, and everyone agrees on this. The fact that everyone can
understand it well enough to agree on who wins is not consistent with the
bet being "gibberish".

>

-- 
Stathis Papaioannou

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Re: A profound lack of profundity

[John Clark]

On Fri, Aug 11, 2017 at 9:43 PM, Stathis Papaioannou 
wrote:

​> ​
> Before the duplication SP bet that "I will see W".
>

​And that's the problem right there. The above is about the "I" BEFORE the
duplication but ​AFTER the duplication 2 people can make a equally strong
case that they and they alone are deserving of the grand title Mr. I.  So
who is the real Mr. I?

After the duplication both are identical and, presuming one city doesn't
have a special magic the other city lacks, we can logically
​ ​
conclude that
​ ​
either both are Mr. I or neither are Mr. I. If both are then "I" will see W
*AND* M. If neither are then "I" will not see any cities at all. In NO case
will the "I" before the duplication see one city but not the other, so W *OR
*M can never be the correct answer. We can always find a "I"  that
remembers being I before the duplication that is in W, and we
​can ​
always find a "I" that remembers being I before the duplication that is in
M.

Of course untangling the above would be completely unnecessary if personal
pronouns were ditched and only the proper noun the pronouns are suposed to
refer to were used, but the complicated tangle is not a bug it's a feature,
it's a great place to hide fuzzy thinking. Hence the refusal of Bruno to
stop using personal pronouns.


> ​> ​
> After the duplication SP1 sees W
>

​And what is the one and only one ​definition of "SP1"? SP1 is the SP that
will see W. And who will see W?

​SP1.​
And round and round we go
​.​


> ​> ​
> and SP2 sees M.
>

And what is the one and only ​one definition of "SP2"? SP2 is the SP that
will see M. And who will see M?

​SP2.​ And round and round we go.


> ​> ​
> Everyone agrees that this is fair
>

​And everyone also agrees it's silly to make a bet on something that is
possible ​to predict with 100% accuracy. It's actually even worse than
that, it's not only
possible
​ to make such a prediction it's EASY.​ And that explains the title of this
thread.

John K Clark

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Re: A profound lack of profundity

[Stathis Papaioannou]

On Sat, 12 Aug 2017 at 4:52 pm, Bruce Kellett 
wrote:

> On 12/08/2017 1:42 pm, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>
> On 12 August 2017 at 13:13, Bruce Kellett 
> wrote:
>
>> On 12/08/2017 12:23 pm, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>>
>> On 12 August 2017 at 12:12, Bruce Kellett < 
>> bhkell...@optusnet.com.au> wrote:
>>
>>> On 12/08/2017 3:22 am, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>
 On 11 Aug 2017, at 13:40, Bruce Kellett wrote:

>
> Are you telling us that P(W) ≠ P(M) ≠ 1/2. What do *you* expect when
>> pushing the button in Helsinki?
>>
>
> I expect to die, to be 'cut', according to the protocol. The guys in W
> and M are two new persons, and neither was around in H to make any
> prediction whatsoever.
>

 Fair enough.

 You think the digital mechanism thesis is wrong.

>>>
>>> Correct.
>>>
>>> There is a fundamental problem with your person-duplication thought
>>> experiments. This is that the way in which you interpret the scenario
>>> inherently involves an irreducible 1p-3p confusion. The first person (1p)
>>> concerns only things that the person can experience directly for himself.
>>> It cannot, therefore, involve things that he is told by other people,
>>> because such things are necessarily third person (3p) knowledge --
>>> knowledge which he does not have by direct personal experience. So our
>>> subject does not know the protocol of the thought experiment from direct
>>> experience (he has only been told about it, 3p). When he presses the button
>>> in the machine, he can have no 1p expectations about what will happen
>>> (because he has not yet experienced it). He presses the button in the
>>> spirit of pure experimental enquiry -- "what will happen if I do this?" His
>>> prior probability for any particular outcome is zero. So when he presses
>>> the button in Helsinki, and opens the door to find himself in Moscow, he
>>> will say, "WTF!". In particular, he will not have gained any 1p knowledge
>>> of duplication. In fact, he is for ever barred from any such knowledge.
>>>
>>> If he repeats the experiment many times, he will simply see his
>>> experiences as irreducibly random between M and W, with some probability
>>> that he can estimate by keeping records over a period of time. If you take
>>> the strict 1p view of the thought experiment, the parallel with the early
>>> development of QM is more evident. In QM, no-one has the 3p knowledge that
>>> all possible outcomes are realized (in different worlds).
>>>
>>> So, before pressing the button in H, his prior probabilities are p(M) =
>>> p(W) = 0, with probably, p(H) = 1. On the other hand, if you allow 3p
>>> knowledge of the protocol to influence his estimation of probabilities
>>> before the experiment, you can't rule out 3p knowledge that he can gain at
>>> any time after pressing the button. In which case, the 1p-3p confusion is
>>> complete, p(M) = p(W) = 1, and he can expect to see both cities. In that
>>> case, the pure 1p view becomes irrelevant.
>>
>>
>> The subject directly experiences the details of the experimental
>> protocol, through hearing or reading about it. All knowledge is 1p;
>> information from the external world comes to me via my senses and affects
>> my knowledge.
>>
>>
>> You render the 1p-3p distinction meaningless.
>>
>
> First person experience is individual and private. The third person point
> of view is the view of an external observer. Suppose person A is observed
> laughing by person B. The behaviour - the laughing - can be observed by
> anyone; this is the third person point of view. Person A might be
> experiencing happiness or amusement; this is the first person point of view
> and only person A himself has it. Finally, person B has visual and auditory
> experiences and knowledge of the outside world (there are laughing entities
> in it), and this is again from the first person point of view. I would say
> that knowledge is a type of experience, and therefore always first person
> and private; information is that which is third person communicable. But
> perhaps this last point is a matter of semantics.
>
>
> If your knowledge is gained from someone else, it is necessarily
> communicable information, and thus third person. First person is your
> personal experience, which is not communicable. However, knowledge gained
> by experience is communicable, and thus third person. Otherwise, all that
> you say above is mere logic chopping.
>

Most first person experiences are based on third person information, namely
sensory data. Even a priori knowledge, such mathematical knowledge, starts
with learning about the subjectvfrom outside sources.

Returning to the point, why were you claiming that the subject on a
duplication experiment cannot have first person knowledge of duplication?
That would mean no-one could ever have first person knowledge of anything.

> --
Stathis Papaioannou

-- 

Re: A profound lack of profundity

[Bruno Marchal]

On 12 Aug 2017, at 04:12, Bruce Kellett wrote:


On 12/08/2017 3:22 am, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 11 Aug 2017, at 13:40, Bruce Kellett wrote:


Are you telling us that P(W) ≠ P(M) ≠ 1/2. What do *you*  
expect when pushing the button in Helsinki?


I expect to die, to be 'cut', according to the protocol. The guys  
in W and M are two new persons, and neither was around in H to  
make any prediction whatsoever.


Fair enough.

You think the digital mechanism thesis is wrong.


Correct.

There is a fundamental problem with your person-duplication thought  
experiments. This is that the way in which you interpret the  
scenario inherently involves an irreducible 1p-3p confusion. The  
first person (1p) concerns only things that the person can  
experience directly for himself. It cannot, therefore, involve  
things that he is told by other people, because such things are  
necessarily third person (3p) knowledge -- knowledge which he does  
not have by direct personal experience. So our subject does not know  
the protocol of the thought experiment from direct experience (he  
has only been told about it, 3p). When he presses the button in the  
machine, he can have no 1p expectations about what will happen  
(because he has not yet experienced it). He presses the button in  
the spirit of pure experimental enquiry -- "what will happen if I do  
this?" His prior probability for any particular outcome is zero.


That is just plain false. The guy in Helsinki knows the protocol, and  
he assumes Mechanism. So he knows that P(W) = P(M) , and that P(W) ≠  
0, and P(M) ≠ 0, and P(X) for any X different from W and M is equal  
to 0.




So when he presses the button in Helsinki, and opens the door to  
find himself in Moscow, he will say, "WTF!". In particular, he will  
not have gained any 1p knowledge of duplication. In fact, he is for  
ever barred from any such knowledge.


Yes, that is the 3p/1p confusion that John Clark is doing. He told me  
that the guy in Moscow says "I knew it", or I predicted it, by saying  
that P(W & M) = 1.


You try to help John C., but you contradict his "theory" (which is  
indeed based on the 1p/3p confusion).





If he repeats the experiment many times, he will simply see his  
experiences as irreducibly random between M and W, with some  
probability that he can estimate by keeping records over a period of  
time. If you take the strict 1p view of the thought experiment, the  
parallel with the early development of QM is more evident. In QM, no- 
one has the 3p knowledge that all possible outcomes are realized (in  
different worlds).


So, before pressing the button in H, his prior probabilities are  
p(M) = p(W) = 0, with probably, p(H) = 1.


What?

(I recall that in H the person is annihilated).



On the other hand, if you allow 3p knowledge of the protocol to  
influence his estimation of probabilities before the experiment, you  
can't rule out 3p knowledge that he can gain at any time after  
pressing the button. In which case, the 1p-3p confusion is complete,  
p(M) = p(W) = 1, and he can expect to see both cities. In that case,  
the pure 1p view becomes irrelevant.


W and M, as they have defined (they concern the experience of opening  
a door and describing which city is seen) are incompatible experience,  
and the protocol entails that P(W) = P(M). If P(M) = P(W) = 1, you get  
a probability equal to 2. With the UD, eventually we will have a  
notion of credibility in place of probability, but this does not  
happen in the self-duplication protocol. You just cannot have P(M), or  
P(W) = 1, because that is refuted directly by both copies, when asked  
about their first person experience.


Bruno






Bruce

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http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



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Re: A profound lack of profundity

[Bruce Kellett]

On 12/08/2017 1:42 pm, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
On 12 August 2017 at 13:13, Bruce Kellett > wrote:


On 12/08/2017 12:23 pm, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:

On 12 August 2017 at 12:12, Bruce Kellett
> wrote:

On 12/08/2017 3:22 am, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 11 Aug 2017, at 13:40, Bruce Kellett wrote:


Are you telling us that P(W) ≠ P(M) ≠ 1/2. What
do *you* expect when pushing the button in Helsinki?


I expect to die, to be 'cut', according to the
protocol. The guys in W and M are two new persons,
and neither was around in H to make any prediction
whatsoever.


Fair enough.

You think the digital mechanism thesis is wrong.


Correct.

There is a fundamental problem with your person-duplication
thought experiments. This is that the way in which you
interpret the scenario inherently involves an irreducible
1p-3p confusion. The first person (1p) concerns only things
that the person can experience directly for himself. It
cannot, therefore, involve things that he is told by other
people, because such things are necessarily third person (3p)
knowledge -- knowledge which he does not have by direct
personal experience. So our subject does not know the
protocol of the thought experiment from direct experience (he
has only been told about it, 3p). When he presses the button
in the machine, he can have no 1p expectations about what
will happen (because he has not yet experienced it). He
presses the button in the spirit of pure experimental enquiry
-- "what will happen if I do this?" His prior probability for
any particular outcome is zero. So when he presses the button
in Helsinki, and opens the door to find himself in Moscow, he
will say, "WTF!". In particular, he will not have gained any
1p knowledge of duplication. In fact, he is for ever barred
from any such knowledge.

If he repeats the experiment many times, he will simply see
his experiences as irreducibly random between M and W, with
some probability that he can estimate by keeping records over
a period of time. If you take the strict 1p view of the
thought experiment, the parallel with the early development
of QM is more evident. In QM, no-one has the 3p knowledge
that all possible outcomes are realized (in different worlds).

So, before pressing the button in H, his prior probabilities
are p(M) = p(W) = 0, with probably, p(H) = 1. On the other
hand, if you allow 3p knowledge of the protocol to influence
his estimation of probabilities before the experiment, you
can't rule out 3p knowledge that he can gain at any time
after pressing the button. In which case, the 1p-3p confusion
is complete, p(M) = p(W) = 1, and he can expect to see both
cities. In that case, the pure 1p view becomes irrelevant.


The subject directly experiences the details of the experimental
protocol, through hearing or reading about it. All knowledge is
1p; information from the external world comes to me via my senses
and affects my knowledge.


You render the 1p-3p distinction meaningless.


First person experience is individual and private. The third person 
point of view is the view of an external observer. Suppose person A is 
observed laughing by person B. The behaviour - the laughing - can be 
observed by anyone; this is the third person point of view. Person A 
might be experiencing happiness or amusement; this is the first person 
point of view and only person A himself has it. Finally, person B has 
visual and auditory experiences and knowledge of the outside world 
(there are laughing entities in it), and this is again from the first 
person point of view. I would say that knowledge is a type of 
experience, and therefore always first person and private; information 
is that which is third person communicable. But perhaps this last 
point is a matter of semantics.


If your knowledge is gained from someone else, it is necessarily 
communicable information, and thus third person. First person is your 
personal experience, which is not communicable. However, knowledge 
gained by experience is communicable, and thus third person. Otherwise, 
all that you say above is mere logic chopping.


Bruce

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