Re: Irreducible randomness in QM

[Bruce Kellett]

On Sat, Dec 26, 2020 at 4:02 PM Stathis Papaioannou 
wrote:

> On Sat, 26 Dec 2020 at 14:14, Bruce Kellett  wrote:
>
>> On Sat, Dec 26, 2020 at 2:08 PM Stathis Papaioannou 
>> wrote:
>>
>>> On Sat, 26 Dec 2020 at 13:01, Bruce Kellett 
>>> wrote:
>>>
 On Sat, Dec 26, 2020 at 12:32 PM Stathis Papaioannou <
 stath...@gmail.com> wrote:

> On Sat, 26 Dec 2020 at 09:02, Bruce Kellett 
> wrote:
>
>> On Fri, Dec 25, 2020 at 11:29 PM Stathis Papaioannou <
>> stath...@gmail.com> wrote:
>>
>>> On Fri, 25 Dec 2020 at 22:17, Bruce Kellett 
>>> wrote:
>>>

 It can be a metaphysical truth without there being any dualist
 underpinnings. The problem, as you point out, is when there are 
 multiple
 copies of you extant at a single time. If you consider yourself to be a
 random selection from this reference class, then you have made the 
 dualist
 assumption that there is something that picks you out -- something that
 distinguishes you from all the other copies. Whereas, in reality, all 
 the
 copies are the same and must think the same: they can deduce that they 
 are
 not special, and that the probability for the existence of each copy is
 exactly one -- the Born probabilities have no bearing on their 
 existence
 because they inevitably exist regardless of the magnitude of the
 mod-squared quantum amplitude. There is no process that selects just 
 one
 individual copy at random from a distribution, whether it be the 
 uniform
 distribution over branches, or the probability distribution obtained by
 Born weighting each branch.

>>>
>>> I know that all the other copies feel as I do, that they are the
>>> unique continuation of the original. For an entity that feels this way, 
>>> the
>>> Born probabilities apply.
>>>
>>
>> The Born probabilities apply because a single-world model has been
>> adopted by default. You cannot prove that there are any intrinsic
>> probabilities in a deterministic branching world.
>>
>
> People in a deterministic branching world will say “I tossed a coin
> many times and about half the time it came up heads”. They will then 
> assign
> a probability of 1/2 to heads coming up on the next toss. I don’t know if
> you would call this an “intrinsic probability”, but that is what would
> happen.
>

 That is probability coming from ignorance of initial conditions. Sure,
 that applies in a deterministic world too. But the intrinsic probability of
 interest is specifically quantum: the probability that a radioactive
 nucleus will decay within the next specific time period; or the probability
 that you will get spin-up on a S-G measurement of a left-spin atom. This is
 the probability of the Born rule, and that cannot be derived in a
 deterministic theory.

>>>
>>> Well, what you call the “probability coming from ignorance of initial
>>> conditions” is the probability that everyone is interested in when it comes
>>> to making decisions about their everyday lives.
>>>
>>
>>
>> Is that relevant to a discussion of probability in quantum mechanics?
>>
>
> Yes, because it is the only probability relevant to beings like us when
> they make observations while embedded in the many worlds.
>

That is a surprising admission. So you are claiming that there are no
intrinsic probabilities other than those due to ignorance of initial
conditions and the like? In other words, the Born probabilities based on
the mod-square of quantum amplitudes are irrelevant to beings in many
worlds. That is what I have been arguing all along -- the Born
probabilities are inconsistent with the unit probabilities and
deterministic outcomes of Everettian QM. The only chances in your view of
the world are those due to ignorance -- and there is no ignorance of either
the initial state, or of the possible outcomes, in a standard quantum
experiment. Such a view is, of course, at variance with the results of
quantum mechanics.

Bruce

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Re: Irreducible randomness in QM

[Alan Grayson]

*You could have omitted your snotty second sentence. Why is it OK for you 
to use the List to mentally jerk off about the applicability of Born's rule 
in the context of an interpretation you know is false, the MWI, than not 
for me to ask a question which might have a simple answer, or path to take 
to answer MY question? Being well informed about physics doesn't mean 
you're not behaving like an arrogant schmuck. AG*
On Thursday, December 24, 2020 at 11:49:42 PM UTC-7 Bruce wrote:

> On Fri, Dec 25, 2020 at 5:29 PM Alan Grayson  wrote:
>
>>
>> *Now I raise a similar question I posed to Bruce, thrice, with no 
>> replies. Why does the unpredictability of measured values and the intrinsic 
>> randomness protect relativity theory? This is really a huge conceptual 
>> leap. How would you argue for that conclusion, as distinguished from 
>> asserting it? TIA, AG*
>
>
> You need to do some research on the no-signalling theorems. This list does 
> not exist to answer your elementary questions.
>
> Bruce
>

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Re: Irreducible randomness in QM

[Stathis Papaioannou]

On Sat, 26 Dec 2020 at 14:14, Bruce Kellett  wrote:

> On Sat, Dec 26, 2020 at 2:08 PM Stathis Papaioannou 
> wrote:
>
>> On Sat, 26 Dec 2020 at 13:01, Bruce Kellett 
>> wrote:
>>
>>> On Sat, Dec 26, 2020 at 12:32 PM Stathis Papaioannou 
>>> wrote:
>>>
 On Sat, 26 Dec 2020 at 09:02, Bruce Kellett 
 wrote:

> On Fri, Dec 25, 2020 at 11:29 PM Stathis Papaioannou <
> stath...@gmail.com> wrote:
>
>> On Fri, 25 Dec 2020 at 22:17, Bruce Kellett 
>> wrote:
>>
>>>
>>> It can be a metaphysical truth without there being any dualist
>>> underpinnings. The problem, as you point out, is when there are multiple
>>> copies of you extant at a single time. If you consider yourself to be a
>>> random selection from this reference class, then you have made the 
>>> dualist
>>> assumption that there is something that picks you out -- something that
>>> distinguishes you from all the other copies. Whereas, in reality, all 
>>> the
>>> copies are the same and must think the same: they can deduce that they 
>>> are
>>> not special, and that the probability for the existence of each copy is
>>> exactly one -- the Born probabilities have no bearing on their existence
>>> because they inevitably exist regardless of the magnitude of the
>>> mod-squared quantum amplitude. There is no process that selects just one
>>> individual copy at random from a distribution, whether it be the uniform
>>> distribution over branches, or the probability distribution obtained by
>>> Born weighting each branch.
>>>
>>
>> I know that all the other copies feel as I do, that they are the
>> unique continuation of the original. For an entity that feels this way, 
>> the
>> Born probabilities apply.
>>
>
> The Born probabilities apply because a single-world model has been
> adopted by default. You cannot prove that there are any intrinsic
> probabilities in a deterministic branching world.
>

 People in a deterministic branching world will say “I tossed a coin
 many times and about half the time it came up heads”. They will then assign
 a probability of 1/2 to heads coming up on the next toss. I don’t know if
 you would call this an “intrinsic probability”, but that is what would
 happen.

>>>
>>> That is probability coming from ignorance of initial conditions. Sure,
>>> that applies in a deterministic world too. But the intrinsic probability of
>>> interest is specifically quantum: the probability that a radioactive
>>> nucleus will decay within the next specific time period; or the probability
>>> that you will get spin-up on a S-G measurement of a left-spin atom. This is
>>> the probability of the Born rule, and that cannot be derived in a
>>> deterministic theory.
>>>
>>
>> Well, what you call the “probability coming from ignorance of initial
>> conditions” is the probability that everyone is interested in when it comes
>> to making decisions about their everyday lives.
>>
>
>
> Is that relevant to a discussion of probability in quantum mechanics?
>

Yes, because it is the only probability relevant to beings like us when
they make observations while embedded in the many worlds.


-- 
Stathis Papaioannou

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Re: Irreducible randomness in QM

[Bruce Kellett]

On Sat, Dec 26, 2020 at 2:08 PM Stathis Papaioannou 
wrote:

> On Sat, 26 Dec 2020 at 13:01, Bruce Kellett  wrote:
>
>> On Sat, Dec 26, 2020 at 12:32 PM Stathis Papaioannou 
>> wrote:
>>
>>> On Sat, 26 Dec 2020 at 09:02, Bruce Kellett 
>>> wrote:
>>>
 On Fri, Dec 25, 2020 at 11:29 PM Stathis Papaioannou <
 stath...@gmail.com> wrote:

> On Fri, 25 Dec 2020 at 22:17, Bruce Kellett 
> wrote:
>
>>
>> It can be a metaphysical truth without there being any dualist
>> underpinnings. The problem, as you point out, is when there are multiple
>> copies of you extant at a single time. If you consider yourself to be a
>> random selection from this reference class, then you have made the 
>> dualist
>> assumption that there is something that picks you out -- something that
>> distinguishes you from all the other copies. Whereas, in reality, all the
>> copies are the same and must think the same: they can deduce that they 
>> are
>> not special, and that the probability for the existence of each copy is
>> exactly one -- the Born probabilities have no bearing on their existence
>> because they inevitably exist regardless of the magnitude of the
>> mod-squared quantum amplitude. There is no process that selects just one
>> individual copy at random from a distribution, whether it be the uniform
>> distribution over branches, or the probability distribution obtained by
>> Born weighting each branch.
>>
>
> I know that all the other copies feel as I do, that they are the
> unique continuation of the original. For an entity that feels this way, 
> the
> Born probabilities apply.
>

 The Born probabilities apply because a single-world model has been
 adopted by default. You cannot prove that there are any intrinsic
 probabilities in a deterministic branching world.

>>>
>>> People in a deterministic branching world will say “I tossed a coin many
>>> times and about half the time it came up heads”. They will then assign a
>>> probability of 1/2 to heads coming up on the next toss. I don’t know if you
>>> would call this an “intrinsic probability”, but that is what would happen.
>>>
>>
>> That is probability coming from ignorance of initial conditions. Sure,
>> that applies in a deterministic world too. But the intrinsic probability of
>> interest is specifically quantum: the probability that a radioactive
>> nucleus will decay within the next specific time period; or the probability
>> that you will get spin-up on a S-G measurement of a left-spin atom. This is
>> the probability of the Born rule, and that cannot be derived in a
>> deterministic theory.
>>
>
> Well, what you call the “probability coming from ignorance of initial
> conditions” is the probability that everyone is interested in when it comes
> to making decisions about their everyday lives.
>


Is that relevant to a discussion of probability in quantum mechanics?

Bruce

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Re: Irreducible randomness in QM

[Stathis Papaioannou]

On Sat, 26 Dec 2020 at 13:01, Bruce Kellett  wrote:

> On Sat, Dec 26, 2020 at 12:32 PM Stathis Papaioannou 
> wrote:
>
>> On Sat, 26 Dec 2020 at 09:02, Bruce Kellett 
>> wrote:
>>
>>> On Fri, Dec 25, 2020 at 11:29 PM Stathis Papaioannou 
>>> wrote:
>>>
 On Fri, 25 Dec 2020 at 22:17, Bruce Kellett 
 wrote:

>
> It can be a metaphysical truth without there being any dualist
> underpinnings. The problem, as you point out, is when there are multiple
> copies of you extant at a single time. If you consider yourself to be a
> random selection from this reference class, then you have made the dualist
> assumption that there is something that picks you out -- something that
> distinguishes you from all the other copies. Whereas, in reality, all the
> copies are the same and must think the same: they can deduce that they are
> not special, and that the probability for the existence of each copy is
> exactly one -- the Born probabilities have no bearing on their existence
> because they inevitably exist regardless of the magnitude of the
> mod-squared quantum amplitude. There is no process that selects just one
> individual copy at random from a distribution, whether it be the uniform
> distribution over branches, or the probability distribution obtained by
> Born weighting each branch.
>

 I know that all the other copies feel as I do, that they are the unique
 continuation of the original. For an entity that feels this way, the Born
 probabilities apply.

>>>
>>> The Born probabilities apply because a single-world model has been
>>> adopted by default. You cannot prove that there are any intrinsic
>>> probabilities in a deterministic branching world.
>>>
>>
>> People in a deterministic branching world will say “I tossed a coin many
>> times and about half the time it came up heads”. They will then assign a
>> probability of 1/2 to heads coming up on the next toss. I don’t know if you
>> would call this an “intrinsic probability”, but that is what would happen.
>>
>
> That is probability coming from ignorance of initial conditions. Sure,
> that applies in a deterministic world too. But the intrinsic probability of
> interest is specifically quantum: the probability that a radioactive
> nucleus will decay within the next specific time period; or the probability
> that you will get spin-up on a S-G measurement of a left-spin atom. This is
> the probability of the Born rule, and that cannot be derived in a
> deterministic theory.
>

Well, what you call the “probability coming from ignorance of initial
conditions” is the probability that everyone is interested in when it comes
to making decisions about their everyday lives.

> --
Stathis Papaioannou

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Re: Irreducible randomness in QM

[Bruce Kellett]

On Sat, Dec 26, 2020 at 12:32 PM Stathis Papaioannou 
wrote:

> On Sat, 26 Dec 2020 at 09:02, Bruce Kellett  wrote:
>
>> On Fri, Dec 25, 2020 at 11:29 PM Stathis Papaioannou 
>> wrote:
>>
>>> On Fri, 25 Dec 2020 at 22:17, Bruce Kellett 
>>> wrote:
>>>

 It can be a metaphysical truth without there being any dualist
 underpinnings. The problem, as you point out, is when there are multiple
 copies of you extant at a single time. If you consider yourself to be a
 random selection from this reference class, then you have made the dualist
 assumption that there is something that picks you out -- something that
 distinguishes you from all the other copies. Whereas, in reality, all the
 copies are the same and must think the same: they can deduce that they are
 not special, and that the probability for the existence of each copy is
 exactly one -- the Born probabilities have no bearing on their existence
 because they inevitably exist regardless of the magnitude of the
 mod-squared quantum amplitude. There is no process that selects just one
 individual copy at random from a distribution, whether it be the uniform
 distribution over branches, or the probability distribution obtained by
 Born weighting each branch.

>>>
>>> I know that all the other copies feel as I do, that they are the unique
>>> continuation of the original. For an entity that feels this way, the Born
>>> probabilities apply.
>>>
>>
>> The Born probabilities apply because a single-world model has been
>> adopted by default. You cannot prove that there are any intrinsic
>> probabilities in a deterministic branching world.
>>
>
> People in a deterministic branching world will say “I tossed a coin many
> times and about half the time it came up heads”. They will then assign a
> probability of 1/2 to heads coming up on the next toss. I don’t know if you
> would call this an “intrinsic probability”, but that is what would happen.
>

That is probability coming from ignorance of initial conditions. Sure, that
applies in a deterministic world too. But the intrinsic probability of
interest is specifically quantum: the probability that a radioactive
nucleus will decay within the next specific time period; or the probability
that you will get spin-up on a S-G measurement of a left-spin atom. This is
the probability of the Born rule, and that cannot be derived in a
deterministic theory.

Bruce

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Re: Irreducible randomness in QM

[Stathis Papaioannou]

On Sat, 26 Dec 2020 at 09:02, Bruce Kellett  wrote:

> On Fri, Dec 25, 2020 at 11:29 PM Stathis Papaioannou 
> wrote:
>
>> On Fri, 25 Dec 2020 at 22:17, Bruce Kellett 
>> wrote:
>>
>>>
>>> It can be a metaphysical truth without there being any dualist
>>> underpinnings. The problem, as you point out, is when there are multiple
>>> copies of you extant at a single time. If you consider yourself to be a
>>> random selection from this reference class, then you have made the dualist
>>> assumption that there is something that picks you out -- something that
>>> distinguishes you from all the other copies. Whereas, in reality, all the
>>> copies are the same and must think the same: they can deduce that they are
>>> not special, and that the probability for the existence of each copy is
>>> exactly one -- the Born probabilities have no bearing on their existence
>>> because they inevitably exist regardless of the magnitude of the
>>> mod-squared quantum amplitude. There is no process that selects just one
>>> individual copy at random from a distribution, whether it be the uniform
>>> distribution over branches, or the probability distribution obtained by
>>> Born weighting each branch.
>>>
>>
>> I know that all the other copies feel as I do, that they are the unique
>> continuation of the original. For an entity that feels this way, the Born
>> probabilities apply.
>>
>
> The Born probabilities apply because a single-world model has been adopted
> by default. You cannot prove that there are any intrinsic probabilities in
> a deterministic branching world.
>

People in a deterministic branching world will say “I tossed a coin many
times and about half the time it came up heads”. They will then assign a
probability of 1/2 to heads coming up on the next toss. I don’t know if you
would call this an “intrinsic probability”, but that is what would happen.

> --
Stathis Papaioannou

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Re: Irreducible randomness in QM

[Bruce Kellett]

On Fri, Dec 25, 2020 at 11:29 PM Stathis Papaioannou 
wrote:

> On Fri, 25 Dec 2020 at 22:17, Bruce Kellett  wrote:
>
>>
>> It can be a metaphysical truth without there being any dualist
>> underpinnings. The problem, as you point out, is when there are multiple
>> copies of you extant at a single time. If you consider yourself to be a
>> random selection from this reference class, then you have made the dualist
>> assumption that there is something that picks you out -- something that
>> distinguishes you from all the other copies. Whereas, in reality, all the
>> copies are the same and must think the same: they can deduce that they are
>> not special, and that the probability for the existence of each copy is
>> exactly one -- the Born probabilities have no bearing on their existence
>> because they inevitably exist regardless of the magnitude of the
>> mod-squared quantum amplitude. There is no process that selects just one
>> individual copy at random from a distribution, whether it be the uniform
>> distribution over branches, or the probability distribution obtained by
>> Born weighting each branch.
>>
>
> I know that all the other copies feel as I do, that they are the unique
> continuation of the original. For an entity that feels this way, the Born
> probabilities apply.
>

The Born probabilities apply because a single-world model has been adopted
by default. You cannot prove that there are any intrinsic probabilities in
a deterministic branching world.

Bruce


Call it delusional, call it dualist, but it’s the way everyone’s mind works.
>
>> --
> Stathis Papaioannou
>

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Re: Irreducible randomness in QM

['Brent Meeker' via Everything List]

On 12/25/2020 3:17 AM, Bruce Kellett wrote:
On Fri, Dec 25, 2020 at 9:41 PM Stathis Papaioannou 
mailto:stath...@gmail.com>> wrote:


On Fri, 25 Dec 2020 at 21:32, Bruce Kellett mailto:bhkellet...@gmail.com>> wrote:

On Fri, Dec 25, 2020 at 6:27 PM Stathis Papaioannou
mailto:stath...@gmail.com>> wrote:

On Fri, 25 Dec 2020 at 12:29, Bruce Kellett
mailto:bhkellet...@gmail.com>> wrote:

On Fri, Dec 25, 2020 at 12:13 PM Stathis Papaioannou
mailto:stath...@gmail.com>> wrote:


One is the probability that a certain branch
exists, the other is the subjective probability
that a being with the feeling that he is a unique
individual persisting through time will experience
a particular branch.



According to the individual on the branch, the Born
probability is the probability that that branch will
exist -- it is an objective property of the branch. It
is a subjective probability only to the extent to
which the individual believes in Lewis's Principal
Principle!


The probability that the branch exists under MWI, as you
have rightly pointed out, is 1. The probability that an
entity that can randomly land in any branch lands in one
particular branch is given by the Born rule.


In other words, you have a dualist interpretation of
personhood. There is an exact copy of 'you' on every branch.
'You' do not randomly land on any branch unless there is a
unique 'you' specified in some dualst manner.


Like everyone, I feel that I am a unique individual persisting
through time, which does not cause conceptual problems if there is
only one extant version of me at a time, but does if there are
multiple versions. I know that this feeling I have is just a
contingent fact about human psychology. If I were a dualist, I
would believe that it was some sort of metaphysical truth.


It can be a metaphysical truth without there being any dualist 
underpinnings. The problem, as you point out, is when there are 
multiple copies of you extant at a single time. If you consider 
yourself to be a random selection from this reference class, then you 
have made the dualist assumption that there is something that picks 
you out -- something that distinguishes you from all the other copies. 
Whereas, in reality, all the copies are the same and must think the same:


If they were really the same they wouldn't be distinct, by Leibniz's 
principle of the identity of indiscernibles.  The MWI hypothesis is that 
the copies are different if they have perceived a different result.  
This would deny the possibility of branch counting.  Two copies who saw 
the same result wouldn't really be two; they'd only be one.  Decoherence 
might be a way out of this since what appears as "the same result" to 
physically distinct persons can be different in random ways in it's 
interactions at the micro level.  But then this brings back randomness, 
which MWI seeks to avoid.


Brent

they can deduce that they are not special, and that the probability 
for the existence of each copy is exactly one -- the Born 
probabilities have no bearing on their existence because they 
inevitably exist regardless of the magnitude of the mod-squared 
quantum amplitude. There is no process that selects just one 
individual copy at random from a distribution, whether it be the 
uniform distribution over branches, or the probability distribution 
obtained by Born weighting each branch.


Bruce
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Re: Irreducible randomness in QM

[John Clark]

On Thu, Dec 24, 2020 at 10:55 AM  wrote:

*> There are three possible ways out this problem of course. One is to say
> these string must be finite and thus the set of them enumerable. The other
> is to abandon the axiom of choice which permits the ordering I mention
> above. The third would be to abandon MWI. This looks to be an informal
> demonstration that MWI + QM(with Born rule) is not consistent with there
> being an infinite set of possible outcomes. *


There may be a fourth way. I think you're assuming that in Many Worlds only
one observer sees one precise quantum event, but when you observe an
electron do one particular thing there may be an infinite number of other
Lawrence Crowells that live in a universe where the electron does something
very slightly different, but the difference is so Infinitesimally tiny that
no conscious observer could possibly tell the difference, so there is no
difference between those infinite number of conscious beings that call
themselves Lawrence Crowell either.

Also, it seems that when the axiom of choice is allowed you can
mathematically prove all sorts of things that seem very unphysical, like
the Banach-Tarski paradox and many others. It makes life easier for
mathematicians who like to prove things but can you think of an example of
a physicist, and not a pure mathematician, that found the axiom of choice
to be a useful tool in predicting the outcome of an experiment? Mathematics
is the language of physics but like any language it can be used to write
fiction as well as nonfiction, physics is only concerned with the
nonfiction part.

John K Clark

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Re: Irreducible randomness in QM

[John Clark]

On Thu, Dec 24, 2020 at 11:37 PM 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List <
everything-list@googlegroups.com> wrote:

* >That the Born rule doesn't derive from the Schroedinger equation doesn't
> bother me. *
>

We don't need to derive the Born Rule from the Schroedinger equation or
from anything else to know it's true because we already know from
experimentation that it's true. But Copenhagen, Many Worlds, Pilot Wave and
every other quantum interpretation needs to derive the Born Rule to prove
that it has the right interpretation. If Many Worlds hasn't managed to
achieve that high goal it has at least come closer to doing so than any
other interpretation, at least so far.

* > Gleason's theorem guarantees it's the only consistent probability
> measure in the eigenstates of an observable.  The question seems to be why
> is there probability at all. *
>

Yes!


> * > But I see the unpredictability of measured values and that intrinsic
> randomness is necessary to protect relativity theory.*
>

I see it is simply a result of the fact that you can't be sure where you
are until you open your eyes and look, aka make an observation. If I use
Bruno's patented You Duplicating Machine then even after Brent Meeker has
been duplicated "You" will not know if "you" are in Moscow or Washington
until "you" open the door of the duplicating chamber and look out; until
that point "you" could be said to exist in both cities, or in neither city,
or in whatever place you happen to be thinking about because contrary to
what generations have been taught in grammar school "you" Is not a pronoun,
"you"  is an adjective; you are the way matter behaves when it is organized
in a Brentmeekerian way. And until the instant the doors are open and the 2
see 2 different things those 2 chunks of matter have the same memories and
behave exactly the same way.

John K Clark

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Re: Irreducible randomness in QM

[Stathis Papaioannou]

On Fri, 25 Dec 2020 at 22:17, Bruce Kellett  wrote:

> On Fri, Dec 25, 2020 at 9:41 PM Stathis Papaioannou 
> wrote:
>
>> On Fri, 25 Dec 2020 at 21:32, Bruce Kellett 
>> wrote:
>>
>>> On Fri, Dec 25, 2020 at 6:27 PM Stathis Papaioannou 
>>> wrote:
>>>
 On Fri, 25 Dec 2020 at 12:29, Bruce Kellett 
 wrote:

> On Fri, Dec 25, 2020 at 12:13 PM Stathis Papaioannou <
> stath...@gmail.com> wrote:
>
>>
>> One is the probability that a certain branch exists, the other is the
>> subjective probability that a being with the feeling that he is a unique
>> individual persisting through time will experience a particular branch.
>>
>
>
> According to the individual on the branch, the Born probability is the
> probability that that branch will exist -- it is an objective property of
> the branch. It is a subjective probability only to the extent to which the
> individual believes in Lewis's Principal Principle!
>

 The probability that the branch exists under MWI, as you have rightly
 pointed out, is 1. The probability that an entity that can randomly land in
 any branch lands in one particular branch is given by the Born rule.

>>>
>>> In other words, you have a dualist interpretation of personhood. There
>>> is an exact copy of 'you' on every branch. 'You' do not randomly land on
>>> any branch unless there is a unique 'you' specified in some dualst manner.
>>>
>>
>> Like everyone, I feel that I am a unique individual persisting through
>> time, which does not cause conceptual problems if there is only one extant
>> version of me at a time, but does if there are multiple versions. I know
>> that this feeling I have is just a contingent fact about human psychology.
>> If I were a dualist, I would believe that it was some sort of metaphysical
>> truth.
>>
>
> It can be a metaphysical truth without there being any dualist
> underpinnings. The problem, as you point out, is when there are multiple
> copies of you extant at a single time. If you consider yourself to be a
> random selection from this reference class, then you have made the dualist
> assumption that there is something that picks you out -- something that
> distinguishes you from all the other copies. Whereas, in reality, all the
> copies are the same and must think the same: they can deduce that they are
> not special, and that the probability for the existence of each copy is
> exactly one -- the Born probabilities have no bearing on their existence
> because they inevitably exist regardless of the magnitude of the
> mod-squared quantum amplitude. There is no process that selects just one
> individual copy at random from a distribution, whether it be the uniform
> distribution over branches, or the probability distribution obtained by
> Born weighting each branch.
>

I know that all the other copies feel as I do, that they are the unique
continuation of the original. For an entity that feels this way, the Born
probabilities apply. Call it delusional, call it dualist, but it’s the way
everyone’s mind works.

> --
Stathis Papaioannou

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Re: Irreducible randomness in QM

[Bruce Kellett]

On Fri, Dec 25, 2020 at 9:41 PM Stathis Papaioannou 
wrote:

> On Fri, 25 Dec 2020 at 21:32, Bruce Kellett  wrote:
>
>> On Fri, Dec 25, 2020 at 6:27 PM Stathis Papaioannou 
>> wrote:
>>
>>> On Fri, 25 Dec 2020 at 12:29, Bruce Kellett 
>>> wrote:
>>>
 On Fri, Dec 25, 2020 at 12:13 PM Stathis Papaioannou <
 stath...@gmail.com> wrote:

>
> One is the probability that a certain branch exists, the other is the
> subjective probability that a being with the feeling that he is a unique
> individual persisting through time will experience a particular branch.
>


 According to the individual on the branch, the Born probability is the
 probability that that branch will exist -- it is an objective property of
 the branch. It is a subjective probability only to the extent to which the
 individual believes in Lewis's Principal Principle!

>>>
>>> The probability that the branch exists under MWI, as you have rightly
>>> pointed out, is 1. The probability that an entity that can randomly land in
>>> any branch lands in one particular branch is given by the Born rule.
>>>
>>
>> In other words, you have a dualist interpretation of personhood. There is
>> an exact copy of 'you' on every branch. 'You' do not randomly land on any
>> branch unless there is a unique 'you' specified in some dualst manner.
>>
>
> Like everyone, I feel that I am a unique individual persisting through
> time, which does not cause conceptual problems if there is only one extant
> version of me at a time, but does if there are multiple versions. I know
> that this feeling I have is just a contingent fact about human psychology.
> If I were a dualist, I would believe that it was some sort of metaphysical
> truth.
>

It can be a metaphysical truth without there being any dualist
underpinnings. The problem, as you point out, is when there are multiple
copies of you extant at a single time. If you consider yourself to be a
random selection from this reference class, then you have made the dualist
assumption that there is something that picks you out -- something that
distinguishes you from all the other copies. Whereas, in reality, all the
copies are the same and must think the same: they can deduce that they are
not special, and that the probability for the existence of each copy is
exactly one -- the Born probabilities have no bearing on their existence
because they inevitably exist regardless of the magnitude of the
mod-squared quantum amplitude. There is no process that selects just one
individual copy at random from a distribution, whether it be the uniform
distribution over branches, or the probability distribution obtained by
Born weighting each branch.

Bruce

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Re: Irreducible randomness in QM

[Stathis Papaioannou]

On Fri, 25 Dec 2020 at 21:32, Bruce Kellett  wrote:

> On Fri, Dec 25, 2020 at 6:27 PM Stathis Papaioannou 
> wrote:
>
>> On Fri, 25 Dec 2020 at 12:29, Bruce Kellett 
>> wrote:
>>
>>> On Fri, Dec 25, 2020 at 12:13 PM Stathis Papaioannou 
>>> wrote:
>>>

 One is the probability that a certain branch exists, the other is the
 subjective probability that a being with the feeling that he is a unique
 individual persisting through time will experience a particular branch.

>>>
>>>
>>> According to the individual on the branch, the Born probability is the
>>> probability that that branch will exist -- it is an objective property of
>>> the branch. It is a subjective probability only to the extent to which the
>>> individual believes in Lewis's Principal Principle!
>>>
>>
>> The probability that the branch exists under MWI, as you have rightly
>> pointed out, is 1. The probability that an entity that can randomly land in
>> any branch lands in one particular branch is given by the Born rule.
>>
>
> In other words, you have a dualist interpretation of personhood. There is
> an exact copy of 'you' on every branch. 'You' do not randomly land on any
> branch unless there is a unique 'you' specified in some dualst manner.
>

Like everyone, I feel that I am a unique individual persisting through
time, which does not cause conceptual problems if there is only one extant
version of me at a time, but does if there are multiple versions. I know
that this feeling I have is just a contingent fact about human psychology.
If I were a dualist, I would believe that it was some sort of metaphysical
truth.

> --
Stathis Papaioannou

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Re: Irreducible randomness in QM

[Bruce Kellett]

On Fri, Dec 25, 2020 at 6:27 PM Stathis Papaioannou 
wrote:

> On Fri, 25 Dec 2020 at 12:29, Bruce Kellett  wrote:
>
>> On Fri, Dec 25, 2020 at 12:13 PM Stathis Papaioannou 
>> wrote:
>>
>>>
>>> One is the probability that a certain branch exists, the other is the
>>> subjective probability that a being with the feeling that he is a unique
>>> individual persisting through time will experience a particular branch.
>>>
>>
>>
>> According to the individual on the branch, the Born probability is the
>> probability that that branch will exist -- it is an objective property of
>> the branch. It is a subjective probability only to the extent to which the
>> individual believes in Lewis's Principal Principle!
>>
>
> The probability that the branch exists under MWI, as you have rightly
> pointed out, is 1. The probability that an entity that can randomly land in
> any branch lands in one particular branch is given by the Born rule.
>

In other words, you have a dualist interpretation of personhood. There is
an exact copy of 'you' on every branch. 'You' do not randomly land on any
branch unless there is a unique 'you' specified in some dualst manner.

Bruce

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Re: Irreducible randomness in QM

[Alan Grayson]

*FY interest and information, the two prior links you supplied are within 
my pay grade and have high priority on my reading to-do list. The same 
hopefully applies to your links below. Also, of course, I will be studying 
the no-go theorems suggested by Bruce. TY, AG*
On Friday, December 25, 2020 at 12:54:58 AM UTC-7 sce...@libero.it wrote:

>
> Il 25/12/2020 07:29 Alan Grayson  ha scritto: 
>
>
> *Now I raise a similar question I posed to Bruce, thrice, with no replies. 
> Why does the unpredictability of measured values and the intrinsic 
> randomness protect relativity theory? This is really a huge conceptual 
> leap. How would you argue for that conclusion, as distinguished from 
> asserting it? TIA, AG* 
>
>
> there is some literature, under the name of 'uncontrollable signaling' 
> (Abner Shimony)
>
> https://arxiv.org/abs/0912.0177
>
> https://arxiv.org/abs/0808.2178
>
> https://arxiv.org/abs/1010.3714
>
> https://arxiv.org/abs/1402.0351
>
> https://aapt.scitation.org/doi/abs/10.1119/1.15059
>

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Re: Irreducible randomness in QM

[Alan Grayson]

*In fact, if you could set your arrogance and ego aside for a moment, you'd 
see that I am raising a serious issue, albeit INDIRECTLY. Even if no FTL 
signaling is possible in QM according to the no-signaling theorems (and 
thereby saving relativity), this is "guaranteed" by assuming "intrinsic 
randomness". That is, the "guarantee" flows from that which is inherently 
unintelligible!  Why unintelligible? Why does the King have no clothes? 
Because for human beings "intelligible" anything requires some definable 
PROCESS to account for the observations. In effect, I claim that knowledge 
requires determinism, in the absence of which we find ourselves with a 
non-explanation of observations, and no way to find one.  Assuming the 
non-existence of LOCAL hidden variables (that is, affirming Bell's 
theorem), there must be NON-LOCAL hidden variables whose existence restores 
explanatory value to physical theories. So I think Bohm's project was on 
the right track, but nonetheless remains a work in progress. AG*


*As for why the Born's rule discussion is, from my pov, silly, is because 
the MWI is easily demonstrated as having no merit. So what's to be gained 
from establishing its incompatibility from an interpretation of QM that has 
zero merit? AG*
On Friday, December 25, 2020 at 12:19:56 AM UTC-7 Alan Grayson wrote:

> *Well, if what you're sure of, that is "guarantees" -- that intrinsic 
> randomness guarantees no FTL signaling -- the issue would have already been 
> settled. But apparently it isn't. Time to get off your high horse. I'd say 
> that time arrived long ago. Instead you prefer indulging silly issues like 
> Born's rule in the context of MWI. No accounting for taste. AG*
>
> On Thursday, December 24, 2020 at 11:49:42 PM UTC-7 Bruce wrote:
>
>> On Fri, Dec 25, 2020 at 5:29 PM Alan Grayson  wrote:
>>
>>>
>>> *Now I raise a similar question I posed to Bruce, thrice, with no 
>>> replies. Why does the unpredictability of measured values and the intrinsic 
>>> randomness protect relativity theory? This is really a huge conceptual 
>>> leap. How would you argue for that conclusion, as distinguished from 
>>> asserting it? TIA, AG*
>>
>>
>> You need to do some research on the no-signalling theorems. This list 
>> does not exist to answer your elementary questions.
>>
>> Bruce
>>
>

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