Re: STEP 3

[Dan Sonik]

Seconded, 

I made an independent post topic about the tight relation between brain and 
behavior. If you are talking "substitution level," you may as well include 
the entire goddam universe if you are going to get a guy to go from A to B 
in some teleporter, let alone even just "replicate" his consciousness. 

Mathematical reasoning can be very deceptive because it totally sums over 
any possibility that the replication is identical - in the strong sense. 

And if the assumption is already smuggled in that "the copy is identical to 
the original," then we may as well just be arguing about a tautology. 

Mathematics is useful to the extent that it abstracts from particulars. But 
empiricism is needed to show what particulars can't be abstracted. 

On Monday, July 22, 2019 at 8:50:04 PM UTC-5, Brent wrote:
>
>
>
> On 7/22/2019 1:35 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>
> Brain scans might have some bearing on whether not your brain can be 
>> replaced by some equivalent digital device. Once you can do this, questions 
>> about personal identity become an empirical matter, as has been pointed out 
>> several times.
>>
>
> The substantive problem is a philosophical one, since by assumption in 
> these debates the copied brain is identical by any empirical test.
>
>
> But what if, as seems likely to me, it is theoretically impossible to copy 
> a brain to a level that it undetectable, i.e. it will necessarily be 
> possible to distinguish physical differences.  Now these differences may 
> not matter to consciousness, or they may imply only a brief glitch at the 
> conscious/classical level, but we know from Holevo's theorem that the 
> duplicate can't be known to be in the same state.
>
> Brent
>

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Re: A Brief Comment on Traumatic Brain Injury and Its Effects on Cognitive and Behavioral Performance

[Dan Sonik]

On Monday, July 22, 2019 at 9:14:30 PM UTC-5, Brent wrote:
>
>
>
> On 7/22/2019 6:39 PM, Dan Sonik wrote: 
> > So would you ever say yes to the doctor? Why? What kind of confidence 
> > would you need to be willing to bet such a duplication/replacement 
> > would be successful? 
>
> Someone who is, otherwise, about to die. 
>
> Brent 
>


Buddha told a parable in sutra: 


A man traveling across a field encountered a tiger. He fled, the tiger 
after him. Coming to a precipice, he caught hold of the root of a wild vine 
and swung himself down over the edge. The tiger sniffed at him from above. 
Trembling, the man looked down to where, far below, another tiger was 
waiting to eat him. Only the vine sustained him. 


Two mice, one white and one black, little by little started to gnaw away 
the vine. The man saw a luscious strawberry near him. Grasping the vine 
with one hand, he plucked the strawberry with the other. How sweet it 
tasted! 
 

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Donald Hoffman - Conscious Realism

[Dan Sonik]

Hello List, 

Here's a neat theory of everything. 
 Here's another paper... 
same idea, different facet elaborated. 
 I don't think it is 
correct, but it has some interesting advantages to other competitors in the 
field:

a) the primary assumption is consciousness 
b) it can be given multiple isomorphic treatments in such fields as quantum 
physics and relativity, therefore "saving the appearances" of the world 
given the axiom of consciousness. 
c) it takes evolution into account 

Please let me know your thoughts. 

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A Brief Comment on Traumatic Brain Injury and Its Effects on Cognitive and Behavioral Performance

[Dan Sonik]

Hello List, 

In my extracurricular studies, I have been reading Kolb's "An Introduction 
to Brain and Behavior" (2e, 2005), specifically the opening chapter on the 
origins of the feedback loop between brain and behavior, and the dramatic 
impact that small lesions throughout the brain have on ones behavior.  

This is relevant to a number of discussions on this list (to my mind/brain) 
as it seems to create some rather severe constraints surrounding the 
success criteria of a "duplication" of a brain. 

>From the reading, it would appear that, in order to a proper digital 
duplication of a brain to take place, the so-called "substitution level" at 
which you would be willing to say "Yes doctor" would actually have to be 
satisfied at multiple levels of analysis (i.e. chemically, neurochemically, 
biologically, physically, socially, psychologically, interpersonally). 
These levels of analysis are not captured in any complete mathematical 
formalism that I know of. 

A doctor intending to "duplicate your brain" would have to plan on a) 
copying your brain in a current state (statically + dynamic equations to 
fill in details of "next state" operation; b) destroying some or all parts 
of your brain to be replaced/duplicated; c) reconstituting your brain (in 
either the biological way (probably absolutely intractable) or some 
sufficiently digitally exact copy (today, practically intractable) such 
that it replicated the function of what was to be replaced/duplicated. This 
would have to be perfect enough to keep all of the levels of 
substitution/analysis described above in tact. 

We know from even seemingly minor cases of brain damage that the "person" 
before the damage (i.e. YOU) and the "person" after the damage (YOU?) are 
not the same... memories are fragmented, behavioral patterns change, and 
significant others who would previously have enjoyed YOUR company might now 
be frustrated when spending time with YOU.  

So would you ever say yes to the doctor? Why? What kind of confidence would 
you need to be willing to bet such a duplication/replacement would be 
successful? 

I submit that your confidence would (and should) be quite low. This is 
because a) there could be more than one substitution level; b) dynamical 
properties of the brain are just as important (if not more) as their 
general static properties (eg. the connectome); c) intersubjective 
agreement about whether  you are the same person is just as (if not more) 
important after duplication, as it is assumed after the duplication that 
you will go on to join society in whatever capacity you did before the 
duplication. 

My computer earlier today wouldn't boot up. Apparently, one of the key 
files it needed got corrupted and I needed to replace it using a restore 
disk. It took about an hour to fix. This is for an actual full fledged 
honest-to-goodness digital machine. And its failure was completely 
unpredictable based on previous behavior of the machine.Either a) I did 
something in my previous session to cause the corruption or b) the 
corruption happened randomly.  

What about something as complex (and integrated into its environment) as 
the brain? What could go wrong in a duplication here? 

TL;DR CONCLUSIONS -- 

1) Thought experiments about the completion of duplications/destructions of 
brains gloss over so many necessary empirical details regarding brain 
function and continual identity that they can come to no useful conclusions 
about anything.  

2) "Mechanism" as used on this list (i.e. the computational hypothesis that 
our minds can (and indeed are) replicated in the structure of the natural 
numbers is FALSE. 

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Re: subjective experience

[Dan Sonik]

On Saturday, July 20, 2019 at 5:16:29 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 19 Jul 2019, at 22:47, Dan Sonik > 
> wrote:
>
>
>
> On Friday, July 19, 2019 at 6:17:56 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>
>> Hi Dan,
>>
>> It is OK to be critical. I always welcome this.
>>
>
> Thank you.
>
>  
>
>> But you are a bit short of argument. You seem convince by John Clark’s 
>> posts. At least John Clark told us where in the reasoning he thinks there 
>> is a mistake, but has not yet been able to explain it, or convince anybody.
>>
>
> On the contrary, I just think the criticism has fallen on deaf ears -- 
> reading some of these threads puts me in mind of those unfortunate 
> individuals who are struck with agnosia. No matter how blatant and 
> paramount the input for people with this condition, they simply pass it 
> over, unaware of what is right under their noses. 
>
>>
>> So, if you understand his critics of the step 3 in the 8-steps version of 
>> the Universal Dovetailer argument, you are welcome to explain it to us. If 
>> you want, I re-explain the argument, but most people in this list have no 
>> problem with it, so you might insist, or just read it here:
>> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/publications/SANE2004MARCHALAbstract.html 
>> <http://www.google.com/url?q=http%3A%2F%2Firidia.ulb.ac.be%2F~marchal%2Fpublications%2FSANE2004MARCHALAbstract.html=D=1=AFQjCNEfo8XeSgWTqK6OJMQHTel31OtZbQ>
>>
>> Sure, I'll take a crack. Referring to your paper... 
>
> "Computationalism", or "comp" for short-- the idea that 1) our brains are 
> made of some digitally fungible units
>
>
>
> That is already a bit implicitly physicalist. Once, I suggested to abandon 
> the expression “made of” because it is misleading. But OK, I will not cut 
> the air. Computationalism is just the digital version of Descartes 
> mechanism. Once (informal and colloquial) version is that there is no magic 
> nor use of any actual infinities in the brain (that will entail later that 
> there are some infinities at play for the mind, soul or consciousness).
>
>
>
> (at a level of description which is unknowable) 
>
>
> Yes, although that is proved later.
>
>
> such that if some or all of it were replaced it would make no difference 
> to that individual 2) computers themselves are equivalent at some level of 
> description (Church Turing hypothesis) 3) arithmetical realism -- true 
> statements about numbers are true absent any observers. Step 1: 
> Computationalism implies the possibility of teleportation "in principle" -- 
> that, according to you, is sufficient to prove your conclusion. 
>
>
> I prove only at step 1 that computationalism entails the possibility of 
> (classical) teleportation. (I am unsure which conclusion is alluded here).
>
 
I don't know that it does -- I think there would have to be a contribution 
from quantum mechanics in order to derive that entailment. The three 
premises alone are not strong enough to do the work you want them to, from 
what I can see.  Teleportation is not just a theoretical problem, it's also 
an engineering problem -- this distinction is something I see you elide 
quite frequently, eg. in your hand waving responses to JKC. And I'm not 
sure what "classical teleportation" could mean -- quantum physics might 
allow some form of teleportation, but classical physics would almost 
certainly forbid it, no? Wouldn't you have to manage the conservation of 
matter/energy law that is the cornerstone of classical physics? 

 

> To be clear, I never try to prove computationalism to be true. It is my 
> working hypothesis. I study the consequences, and show them testable and 
> well tested by QM (which proves nothing of course).
>
>
> Step 2: Consider the difference between the first and third person 
> perspectives, where the third person perspective is ascertained from a 
> record contained in a personal diary. 
>
>
> By an observer which does not enter the cut-and-copy bow. 
>

Sorry, what is a "cut-and-copy bow"? 
 

> The important point here is the definition of the first person view, which 
> is the content of the diary that the candidate take with him in the 
> teleportation box. That plays an important role in the sequel.
> The first person is also the content of a diary. 
>
 
No, it's not. I can read diaries I wrote from years ago, and I would hardly 
say that they are equivalent to my "first person view." Not in any sense of 
the term equivalent that I can think of, anyway. 

 

> It is 3P operational approximation of the first person experience: the 
> personal diary content. Everett use something equivalent.
&

Re: Observation versus assumption

[Dan Sonik]

On Friday, July 19, 2019 at 12:33:05 PM UTC-5, telmo wrote:
>
>
>
> On Fri, Jul 19, 2019, at 16:01, John Clark wrote:
>
> On Fri, Jul 19, 2019 at 4:52 AM Telmo Menezes  > wrote:
>
>
>
> > *Nobody ever used the Turing Machine as an architecture for 
> computation,*
>
>
> Everybody's architecture for computation without exception can be reduced 
> to a Turing Machine and nobody has ever found anything simpler, aka more 
> fundamental, that could be implemented physically.
>
>
>
> Well... meet the domino computer:
> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Domino_computer
>
>  
>  
>
> > *outside of theoretical domains. Not even Turing himself, for the 
> simple reason that it would be terribly inefficient.*
>
>
> Yes, obviously a paper tape would be very very slow so for economic 
> reasons a vast number of bells and whistles are added, but those are all 
> just a matter of engineering convenience, so if you're just talking about 
> philosophy, and for most on this list that's all they're interested in, 
> then they are all irrelevant.  
>
> *> Computers to this day mostly follow the Von Neumann architecture,*
>
>
> Most do some don't, such as Dataflow Machines or Graph Reduction Machines. 
> But talking about the difference between Von Neumann architecture and non Von 
> Neumann architecture is like talking about the difference between a steam 
> engine and a gasoline engine while Turing was talking about the laws of 
> thermodynamics. 
>
>
> Exactly, that is my point.
>
>
> *> It seems clear to me that Turing Machines, Van Neumann Machines and 
> GPUs are just implementations of something which is purely abstract -- 
> computation.*
>
>
> Turing Machines are in a more fundamental category than the other two. 
> All Van Neumann Machines and GPUs are Turing Machines but not all Turing 
> Machines are Van Neumann Machines or GPUs.
>
>
> The only equivalence used in Computer Science is in completeness: Van 
> Neumann Machines and GPUs are Turing Complete, in the sense that they are 
> as general a computational device as a Turing Machine. I never heard or 
> read anyone before claiming that Turing Machines are physically more 
> fundamental, in the sense that they are at some root of a category to which 
> modern digital computers belong. My question to you then, is this:
>
> How do you decide if something is a Turing Machine or not? Is Domino a 
> Turing Machine? What about my brain? What about the billiard ball computer?
>
> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Billiard-ball_computer
>
>
>
> *> You insist that nobody has been able to produce a computer without 
> using matter. I agree. What you refuse to consider is the possibility that 
> matter is the dream of computations,*
>
>
> All theories need experimental conformation and the above theory has been 
> tested many times and the results have always been negative, people have 
> dreamed of computation but nothing happens, the law of the conservation of 
> mass/energy has always remained true regardless of dreams.
>
>
> Most people can remember having dreams, I imagine you can too. Then you 
> know that your brain is somehow capable of generating a "fake" reality just 
> for you. So can you ever prove to yourself that you are not dreaming?
>
> Telmo.
>
> This takes a bit of practice to develop the habit, but if you do it long 
enough you can actually "wake up" in your dreams and become lucid. (And 
conversely, prove you are not dreaming when awake.)  During your day to day 
wakeful life, three or four times a day, look at a piece of text... then 
look away for a few seconds, then look back at the text. When awake, the 
text you read will be the same on each sample, because the text is "real" 
and exists. In your dream, if you do this, you will find that the text 
changes each time you try to read it again. Probably because your brain 
cannot make a persistent, law like reality on its own, but needs something 
(i.e. reality) to remain consistent. Try it! It's fun...  

>
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>  
> 
> .
>
>
>

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Re: subjective experience

[Dan Sonik]

 one -- it's not a monism, and therefore to 
conflate it with materialism and continually refer to it as Aristotelian 
belief in primary substance seems a bit careless. The modern notion of 
matter has no telos.   

>
> Concerning Craig Weinberg, we have agreed on everything. He just choose 
> the option “weak-materialism” instead of mechanism, but seem to understand 
> there incompatibility. 
>

I would say here that you grossly mischaracterize his ideas as "weak 
materialism"... but if you are going to go off using words in special ways 
(as is your wont), then no one can stop you. His website is called 
"Multisense realism." As far as I can tell, he argues for the ontological 
primacy of sensation diffracted across multiple modes of interpretation-- 
not sure how that can be put in the "materialist" box. Sounds more like a 
brand of idealism to me...

Most of its philosophy is very close to what I extract from the theaetetus’ 
> definition of knowledge, when applied to Gödel’s provability predicate 
> (which I motivate either through thought experiments or by referring to 
> Plato). We opus quasi everyday since the dialog on Facebook, as Craig seems 
> to prefer.
>

Glad to hear! (what is "opus quasi"?)  

>
> Please, explain John Clark’s argument, if you understand it. Brent has 
> acknowledge having no problem up to step 6, and is unclear (or undecided 
> perhaps) on step 7.
>
>
See above.  

> You might ignored like many that all computations occurs in already a tiny 
> segment of the arithmetical reality: the truth of the sigma_1 sentences 
> (which is indeed equivalent to a universal dovetailing). 
>
OK, that's what you say. (??) Not sure how it's relevant to the objection 
1) counterfactual worlds with teleportation devices need clearer ways of 
referring to those who are duplicated. 2) Computations don't compute 
anything without something on which to compute (paper and pencil, a machine 
(in the commonly used sense, not in your neologized sense), a brain). 

 

> That is required for step seven. This is well known by logicians since 
> almost Gödel’s 1931 paper. That makes the believer in “Matter"forced to 
> explain how their “Matter” can influence or interfere with the statistics 
> on computations which are run in arithmetic (where “run” is taken in the 
> sense of Church, Kleene, Turing, etc.
>
I think the main "leap of faith" that you make (and many others simply 
can't, because it appears absurd) is somehow thinking that the completed 
computations are already "out there," in some sort of Platonic superspace. 
Perhaps this is what the implication of AR is, although it seems a somewhat 
stronger claim than just AR. This takes far more suspension of disbelief 
than assuming (and then getting actual, real world consequences from) a 
material world that needs to be engineered in order to deliver the results 
we expect from our computations. You can't build something with only 
equations, and all the computations being "out there" are as good as none 
of them being out there if you can't distinguish correct from incorrect 
ones. And the only way you can distinguish them is by actually building a 
real machine made out of stuff of some kind and go ahead and run the 
computation and wait for the answer. This has been mentioned multiple 
times, but again, agnosia. 
 
Seeing how previous threads go, I am holding little hope in persuading you 
that your thought experiment does not establish what you want it to,(i.e. 
we are eternal computations in an ever unfolding dovetailer algorithm) but 
that's fine... the thinking and writing process is fun and it would be 
really cool if it were true (but it probably ain't). And I could be full of 
shit myself, so there's that. 

All the Best,

Dan 

>
> Bruno
>
>
>
>
> On 19 Jul 2019, at 05:18, Dan Sonik > 
> wrote:
>
> Bravo PGC. Very Well Said. 
>
> Delusions of reality as based in a purely mathematical scheme will never 
> amount to a "theory of everything..." 
>
> Just another quaint, historically bounded, and deeply ontologically 
> committed idea with absolutely no practical relevance, much like Thales' 
> commitment that "all is water" or Anaximander's idea of the "apeiron" as a 
> metaphysical absolute. Sounds great on paper... try to do something with 
> it... well, that's a Turing TarPit right there. 
>
> And just a further comment to Bruno's constant use of "Aristotelian 
> assumption" of "primary matter." Can I have primary source citation, 
> please? From what I recall of my Aristotle, a fair bit of it, I can't even 
> once remember him talking about "matter" in the ordinary, "post-Cartesian" 
> sense of the term. And you know why? Because he didn't have that

Re: subjective experience

[Dan Sonik]

Bravo PGC. Very Well Said. 

Delusions of reality as based in a purely mathematical scheme will never 
amount to a "theory of everything..." 

Just another quaint, historically bounded, and deeply ontologically 
committed idea with absolutely no practical relevance, much like Thales' 
commitment that "all is water" or Anaximander's idea of the "apeiron" as a 
metaphysical absolute. Sounds great on paper... try to do something with 
it... well, that's a Turing TarPit right there. 

And just a further comment to Bruno's constant use of "Aristotelian 
assumption" of "primary matter." Can I have primary source citation, 
please? From what I recall of my Aristotle, a fair bit of it, I can't even 
once remember him talking about "matter" in the ordinary, "post-Cartesian" 
sense of the term. And you know why? Because he didn't have that 
distinction in his lexicon!!! In his metaphysics, he talks of 
"particulars," not "matter" per se, unless you think this is based on his 
idea of one of the four forms of causation. And he argued that all four 
need to be present before a thing comes to be (efficient, formal, 
teleological, final). Nowhere does he mention the very modern (i.e. 
post-Descartes) idea of "matter" in this metaphysic. 

Please defend your claims philologically, and not by way of obscure 
mathematical formula supposedly designed to lead us to some sort of 
ultimate Platonic conclusion. And also not by way of convenient 
redefinitions of common words (God, matter, machine) that leave most people 
in a dust of confusion. (but maybe that's your intent?)

I can already feel you writing... "but the hypothesis of mechanism dictates 
that ... x must be y " ... "numbers must have dreams, and they must be 
us... " the hypostases of the ultimate one talked about by plotinus (which 
numbered 8) must be the only way if we assume mechanism... " 

ENOUGH! 

Your rhetoric and constant pompous references to your previous posts have 
chased many great minds away from this list. (Craig Weinberg comes to 
mind.) And I mostly come here to see John Clark constantly body slam you 
with respect to the question of hardware implementation of computations... 
which you never answer... like a true cultist... "Go back to step 3" -- 
fuck step three. There are no matter duplicating machines. There is no 
"absolute first person perspective"... referred to by a pronoun "I". And 
even if there were a matter duplicating machine, it would have to be made 
of "matter" (pace John Clark) and so couldn't simply just happen by virtue 
of the mathematical formalism. (Remember Pythagoras? See where he ended up? 
Not because what he said was true... because it was ANNOYINGLY FALSE) 
Therefore, your mind experiment is done as far as practical consequences. 
So what? Who cares? What are we even doing here?

God bless John Clark for fighting this nonsense. 

Remember what this list was meant to do -- CULTIVATE THEORIES OF 
EVERYTHING... NOT "Cultivate what conforms to Bruno's idea of a Theory of 
Everything Is." 

And, please, no disrepect to any of the other participants on this thread. 
I have followed you all for so long (10+) years that you are all family 
(including Bruno, you silly bastard)

I love the salutary conclusions that seem to emerge from your speculations, 
Bruno, I really do... but so much effort has been dedicated to trying to 
make you see that you have blindspots (Brent Meeker, John Clark, Craig 
Weinberg) and you never modify your theory to cover them, you only insist 
that they don't understand your genius plan. 

Let me ask you: if you are the only car traveling in a certain direction 
(let's call it North) and you encounter multiple cars traveling at other 
directions (namely, South), are the other guys driving in the wrong 
direction? Or are you? 

And before anyone charges me of just dropping in uninvited, my claimed 10+ 
years experience a lie, I have posted here before, in different guises. 
I'll leave it up to the readers (if they're interested) in figuring out who 
I am.

Doesn't matter now, though, my anonymity is blown. 

Please be kind (or not, this is the internet, after all...) 

Anyway, I found it irresistible to drop in and let you all know I love you 
all and this forum, and Bruno too for being so god damned STUBBORN!! But 
it's looking like you might need to re evaluate some stuff? 

Go ahead, cut me up in the comments...



 



On Thursday, July 18, 2019 at 5:06:10 AM UTC-5, PGC wrote:
>
> On Wednesday, July 17, 2019 at 9:58:31 AM UTC+2, telmo wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Wed, Jul 17, 2019, at 00:37, Bruce Kellett wrote:
>>
>> On Wed, Jul 17, 2019 at 12:55 AM Bruno Marchal  wrote:
>>
>> On 16 Jul 2019, at 13:44, PGC  wrote:
>>
>> On Monday, July 15, 2019 at 1:53:11 PM UTC+2, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>
>>
>> I don’t understand well what you say. 
>>
>>
>> Nobody, including yourself, understands what you say generally.
>>
>>
>>
>> Just tell me what you don’t understand specifically, and avoid ad hominem 
>> 

Re: Mind Uploading and NP-completeness

[Dan Sonik]

Based on everything I have read of John K Clark's contributions to this 
list, I do solemnly hope he will be one of the first brains to be revived 
-- hope they give you the body of a mid- to late-eighties Van Damme, my 
friend! 

On Sunday, March 25, 2018 at 1:16:03 PM UTC-4, John Clark wrote:
>
> On Sun, Mar 25, 2018 at 11:34 AM, Lawrence Crowell <
> goldenfield...@gmail.com > wrote:
>
> *> This further might connect with the whole idea of up-loading minds into 
>> computers. Brains and their states are not just localized states but 
>> networks, and it could well be that this is not tractable.*
>
>
> If the brain is a network it is a network with a finite number of vertices 
> and a finite number of lines connecting those vertices. For uploading 
> you’re not trying to optimize or do anything with the network except to 
> just list all the lines and vertices in a network that already exists. You 
> don’t need to find some exotic new algorithm that can solve NP complete 
> problems in polynomial time to do that, you just need a few trillion 
> nano-machines that can feel around inside a brain and report back on what 
> they’ve discovered. And as I said before, even if a general class of 
> problems has been proven to be difficult that just means some specific 
> examples of it are, it doesn’t mean all or even most are and in fact some 
> could be quite easy. In general factoring large numbers is hard and 2^1000 
> is huge but it would be remarkably easy to factor.
>
> There is another thing that confuses me, you seem to be implying nobody 
> should engage in Cryonics unless it has been proven with mathematical 
> certainty to work, and that doesn’t seem wise to me unless you know of a 
> reason that being frozen will make 
> ​me​
>  deader than being eaten by worms. 
>
> *> As a general rule once these threads gets past 100 I tend not to post 
>> any more. It becomes to annoying to find my way around them.*
>
>
> I can sympathize, I’ve been complaining about that for years, but the 
> problem really isn’t 100 posts its that most people refuse to trim anything 
> when they respond so you end up with a vast iterated sea of quotes of quote 
> of quotes of quotes of quotes of quotes of quotes of quotes and its very 
> hard to tell who said what. Its frustrating to scroll down through page 
> after page of quotes only to be rewarded at the end with one cryptic new 
> line like “that’s not true”. 
>
>  John K Clark
>

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