Re: A (somewhat) different angle on the reversal
On Friday, June 12, 2015 at 9:52:05 PM UTC-7, Bruce wrote: meekerdb wrote: On 6/12/2015 6:29 PM, Bruce Kellett wrote: LizR wrote: On 12 June 2015 at 17:40, Bruce Kellett bhke...@optusnet.com.au javascript: Arithmetic is, after all, only an axiomatic system. We can make up an indefinite number of axiomatic systems whose theorems are every bit as 'independent of us' as those of arithmetic. Are these also to be accepted as 'really real!'? Standard arithmetic is only important to us because it is useful in the physical world. It is invented, not fundamental. So you say, and you may be right. Or you may not. The question is whether 2+2=4 independently of human beings (and aliens who may have invented, or discovered as the case may be, arithmetic). It may well be independent of humans or other (alien) beings, but it has no meaning until you have defined what the symbols '2','4','+', and '=' mean. Then it is a tautology. Bruce It is commonly thought to be discovered and so to be ought there independent of human beings or any cognition. But when considered more carefully what was discovered is that one can group pairs to things together (at least in imagination) and have four things. So two fathers grouped with two sons is four people. Except when it's three people. So we said OK we'll *define* units to be things that obey the rules that 2+2=4. Then we discovered that these rules implied a lot of things we hadn't thought of. But they aren't out there, they're in our language. Brent I agree. But I think that the attraction of Platonism lies in the fact that if you abstract the notion of 'twoness' from all groups of two things, such as fathers, sons, pebbles, and so on, then you get an underlying perfect form that is independent of imperfections: such as the possibility that two fathers plus two sons might be only three people (or even only two people); or the unpleasant fact that two drops of water plus two drops of water might make only one drop of water. Platonism is a search for an escape from the 'ugliness' of reality. Bruce Another POV: Other than two-ness, etc. as in quantities, consider sequence position such as first-ness, second-ness, third-ness etc. These refer to a state/condition as to that specific relational position in order sequence. E.g. Every horse race jockey and those who bet money on them fully realize that there is a different instantiated feeling or experience of that of the position of 1st-ness as opposed to that of 4th-ness at the race finish line. These are very real to both the bettor and jockey for either positive or negative (ugliness) view of reality. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Notion of (mathematical) reason
Hi Bruno: You made this statement recently in the scope of physical law thread . There is no event notion in mathematics, nor is there any notion of cause, unless you enlarge the notion of cause to the notion of (mathematical) reason. . You appear to be stating that mathematics exists in a timeless universe (no event notion), which makes sense. This would leave mathematics in a role of modeling/describing or measuring both instantiations of causes and their effects/events. You further refer to the notion of (mathematical) reason. Question: If chains of causes are preceded by chains of reasons (and your reference to mathematics) doesn't that infer some form of duality? IOW, the duality being (a) abstract reasons (that precede causes) and (b) their complementary realities (effects/events). Thanks. Pzomby -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Questions about simulations, emulations, etc.
On Friday, June 8, 2012 1:36:31 PM UTC-7, Craig Weinberg wrote: On Jun 8, 3:00 pm, Pzomby htra...@gmail.com wrote: Using mathematics, computations and symbols; human embodied consciousness can (using computers) create models, simulations, emulations, depictions, replications, representations etc. of observations of the physical universe and its processes. We can create models for ourselves, but nothing else in the universe reads them that way. This assumes that the actual observable physical universe is exemplified by, and is, instantiations of, mathematics and computations. 1) Does this mean that mathematics is *en-coded* as formulas in matter and energy? If so that would mean that mathematics is either: a) encoded in something other than mathematics - if so, whatever it is that math can be encoded into (matter) makes encoding redundant and unexplainable. If you have something other than math, then why does math need to be encoded as it? b) encoded as some other mathematical formula - if so, then the appearance of the encoded non-math is redundant and unexplainable. 2) If so, are models, simulations, emulations, depictions, replications, representations, a mathematical computational *decoding* of an *en-coded* mathematical physical reality? They are a partial decoding. The modeling process allows our mind to recover some essential sense experience of the physics, thereby superimposing a supersignifying abstraction layer on our experience of it's reality. My view in a nutshell: Sense is not an emergent property of information. Significance is a recovered property* of sense. Thanks for your input. Some of what you state I follow, but some I do not, but I set that aside. To further clarify: The best analogy as to what I was considering is the role of DNA in biological processes. DNA is coded by/with classified amino acids that eventually through time and growth display the physical results of the coding. Interpreting the DNA code or *decoding* gives rise to theoretical mathematically described simulations, emulations or models, etc of a physical body containing a physical brain. DNA is a dimensional physical exemplification or instantiation that can be *decoded* and then be simulated or modeled as a complete body brain (if there is such a thing). If it is assumed the brain is a natural computer, the DNA should contain an encoded version of that same brain. This in turn gives rise to the questions of interpretations or maybe more importantly misinterpretations (beliefs) by the brain (natural computer) of what the 6 senses observe. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msg/everything-list/-/ml2ND3NB_XAJ. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Questions about simulations, emulations, etc.
Using mathematics, computations and symbols; human embodied consciousness can (using computers) create models, simulations, emulations, depictions, replications, representations etc. of observations of the physical universe and its processes. This assumes that the actual observable physical universe is exemplified by, and is, instantiations of, mathematics and computations. 1) Does this mean that mathematics is *en-coded* as formulas in matter and energy? 2) If so, are models, simulations, emulations, depictions, replications, representations, a mathematical computational *decoding* of an *en-coded* mathematical physical reality? Thanks -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: The limit of all computations
On Saturday, May 26, 2012 7:48:41 AM UTC-7, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote: On 26.05.2012 11:30 Bruno Marchal said the following: On 26 May 2012, at 08:47, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote: ... In my view, it would be nicer to treat such a question historically. Your position based on your theorem, after all, is one of possible positions. What do you mean by my position? I don't think I defend a position. I do study the consequence of comp, if only to give a chance to a real non-comp theory. A position that the natural numbers are the foundation of the world. I agree that you often repeat the assumption for your theorem but I believe that your answers to my question have been answered exactly from such a position. In your paper to express your position you employ a normal human language. Hence I believe that that the question about general terms in the human language is the same as about the natural numbers. ? (I can agree and disagree, it is too vague) When we talk with each other and make proofs we use a human language. Hence to make sure that we can make universal proofs by means of a human language, it might be good to reach an agreement on what it is. Again, the ideal world of Plato was not designed for natural numbers only. Sure. Although it begins with natural numbers only, and it ended on this, somehow, because the neoplatonists were aware of the importance of numbers and were coming back to Pythagorean form of platonism. Now, with comp, or just with Church thesis, there is a sort of rehabilitation of the Pythagorean view, for the non natural numbers reappears in the natural number realm as unavoidable epistemic tools for the natural numbers to understand themselves, and anymore than numbers (and their basic laws) is not just unnecessary, it is that it cannot work without adding some explicit non-comp magic. I am not against non-comp, but I am against any gap-theory, where we introduce something in the ontology to make a problem unsolvable leading to don't ask policy. We are back to a human language. It seems that you mean that some constructions expressed by it do not make sense. It well might be but again we have to discuss the language then. Hi Evgenii Here is another opinion on the need for language: Simulations, models, emulations, replications, depictions, representations, symbols, are different then existent instantiations, exemplifications of the observable universe that are described by mathematics combined with the human language constructs of units of measurement. It seems that the existent observable physical universe *encodes* mathematics that human observers combine it with *necessary* language created conventions of units of measurement that can be computed and it (mathematics language) then describes its appearance. As for comp, I have written once Simulation Hypothesis and Simulation Technology http://blog.rudnyi.ru/2011/09/simulation-hypothesis-and-simulation-technology.html that practically speaking it just does not work. I understand that you talk in principle but how could we know if comp in principle is true if we cannot check it in practice? I personally find an extrapolation of a working model outside of its scope that has been researched pretty dangerous. Evgenii -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msg/everything-list/-/2lGTlFGP-4UJ. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Two Mathematicians in a Bunker and Existence of Pi
On Mar 7, 5:29 am, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 06 Mar 2012, at 20:44, Pzomby wrote: On Mar 6, 10:14 am, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 06 Mar 2012, at 17:32, meekerdb wrote: On 3/6/2012 4:26 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: It's a language game. The word game is so fuzzy that this says nothing at all. Game theory is a branch of mathematics. But language says something. It says mathematics is about description. Mathematicians search what is language independent, and description independent. They don't like when a result depends on the choice of a base. Mathematics is more about structures and laws. Math uses languages, but is not a language, even if it can be used as such in physics. But there is more to that. Bruno: “Cardinal” numbers with values appear to necessarily use language to describe the unit being measured or quantified (tons, kilos, etc.)? Quantitative description. OK. But it is not valid to infer from this, that mathematics is *about* description. On the contrary, mathematicians reason on models (realities, structures), and they use description like all scientists. mathematical logic is the science which study precisely the difference between description (theories) and their interpretations (in from of mathematical structure). As you mention the notion of cardinal, a discovery here made by logicians is that the notion of cardinal is relative. A set can have a high cardinality in one model, and yet admit a bijection with N in another model. Yes, but even the symbols =, +, x, *, are notations that are substitutes for words. Eg. Equals, addition or union, multiplication. The operational notations are words used to describe the formulation of the model. “In common usage, an ordinal number is an adjective which describes the numerical position of an object, e.g., first, second, third, etc.” http://mathworld.wolfram.com/OrdinalNumber.html Are the “ordinal” numbers actually adjectives describing the relational position in a sequence (first, second,…one-ness, two-ness etc.)? They can be used for that. But they can be much more than that. Yes. Then it is Ok to use it for that. eg. 1stness, 2ndness, 3rdness in sport races gives a quality of feeling to the participants, observers/bettors. Are numbers (ordinal) necessarily qualitative descriptions? Perhaps. In the comp frame, I prefer to ascribe the qualities of numbers, by the possible computational relation that they have with respect to their most probable universal environment. This is more akin with the human conception of quality as being a lived experience. But what you say might make sense in some other contexts. It is the “lived experience” that is reality as I understand. The condition of the universal environment is influenced by an event at a point in time of the evolutionary process. eg. Certain qualitative conditions existed in Oct. 1066 in Britain. Also, 9/11/2001. In nature: January in central Europe exudes certain environmental qualitative conditions. Numerals symbolize number position (as in particular instants in the sequence of the continuum of time). OK. But that's quantitative for me, or at least a 3p type of notion. Quality is more 1p, and can be handled at the meta-level by modal logic, or by (often non standard) logics. Bruno Duration of time is quantitative. Existing conditions in the duration are qualitative. You state: “Quality is more 1p” but it is not exclusive to 1p. Humans observe and have empathy for others qualitative conditions and states. Pz -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: The consciousness singularity
Brent You state: Physical laws are models we make up to explain and predict the world. Are properties of mathematics then dual, being both representational (models) and encoded (rules) as instantiated brain functions? Mathematics is a subset of language in which propositions are related by rules of inference that preserve truth. We can use it to talk about all kinds of things, both real and fictional. We try to create mathematical models where possible because then we have the rules of inference to make predictions that are precise. Where our models are not mathematical, e.g. in politics or psychology, it's never clear exactly what the model predicts. I think the rules of inference are encoded in our brains. See William S. Coopers book The Evolution of Reason. In other words could the singularity in mathematics you refer to be further divided? The singularity I was referring to is the hypersurface of infinite energy density and curvature which general relativity predicts at the center of a black hole and the Big Bang. It is in the mathematical model - which only shows that the model doesn't apply at these extreme conditions. This was not a surprise to anyone, since it was already known that general relativity isn't compatible with quantum mechanics and is expected to breakdown at extremely high energies and short distances. Brent Brent I was attempting to go down another layer of understanding as I see it. I will restate an abbreviated opinion: Numerals (mathematics) and languages are themselves fundamental instantiations of the laws/rules/inferences of truth abstract mathematics representing the precise observed or discovered structure and order of the universe and the semantically less precise languages are used to interpret and communicate the mathematical models in descriptions and predictions of the universe. I think it's a mistake to think mathematics has something to do with truth. Truth is an attribute of a proposition that expresses a fact. Mathematics consists of relations of inference between propositions - which may or may not express anything at all beyond the relations. Mathematics...has multi faceted properties, being at least (1) representational numbers as in descriptively enumerated models as well as adjective position in spatiotemporal sequence (ordinals) and (2) computable numbers as in counting and arithmetic. Mathematics doesn't exist in space and time; although it may be used to describe them. Exactly, that is what I was attempting to state. You, and most other contributors to this list are very knowledgeable but I believe that some of the properties of numbers and mathematics may be overlooked as to their relevance, but I may be wrong as I have only been observing the “Everything” list for a short time. Ordinal numbers are “descriptive adjectives” as to relational position. The relative position of an event in order being 1st, 2nd, 3rd etc. has describable meaning. The representational description of mental events and external existent conditions are related as to their position in the sequence of time. Time and place both exude conditions that are describable and somewhat predictable. The representational and descriptive conditional position of the earth to the sun, moon and stars gives rise to conditions at a relational position in time. The point is that numbers represent computation (counting and arithmetic) and the ordinal attribute of numbers represent words that communicate descriptive relational meaning. This appears to give dual meaning to numbers that human brain/consciousness can distinguish, represent, organize and compute. An example: The mathematical “golden ratio” as observed in art and nature appears to be pleasant in a geometrically way to the human vision and brain/consciousness. Your statement: I think the rules of inference are encoded in our brains , This, I think, infers that primitive mathematics and languages are instantiated in the biological brain and can, *potentially*, represent or reflect any and all laws and rules fundamental to the real (even abstract) and fictional universe. I don't think laws/rules are fundamental. They are compact models we make up to explain and predict facts. Brent The role of human embodied consciousness in any theory of everything is established by this fact. Mathematics may be a subset of language as you state or language could also be an extension or instantiation (as a concrete verbal idea) of what primitive mathematics represents (abstract rules/laws). In either case it becomes circular as to what is more relevant mathematics or the language to understand what the mathematics represents or enumerates. It is my opinion that there is no singularity but a duality which roughly could be stated as both a state of being (quanta) and the
Re: The consciousness singularity
On Dec 8, 12:20 pm, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote: On 12/8/2011 10:18 AM, Pzomby wrote: On Dec 7, 10:31 am, meekerdbmeeke...@verizon.net wrote: On 12/7/2011 8:14 AM, benjayk wrote: Most materialist just say: Well, the natural laws are just there, without any particular reason or meaning behind them, we have to take them for granted. But this is almost as unconvincing as saying A creator God is just there, we have to take him for granted. It makes no sense (it would be a totally absurd universe), and there also is no evidence that natural laws are primary (we don't find laws to describe the Big Bang and very plausibly, there are none because it is a mathematical singularity). You are attributing a naive concept of physical laws to we. Physical laws are models we make up to explain and predict the world. That's why they change when we get new information. Mathematical singularities are in the mathematics. Nobody supposes they are in the world. Brent Brent You state: Physical laws are models we make up to explain and predict the world. Are properties of mathematics then dual, being both representational (models) and encoded (rules) as instantiated brain functions? Mathematics is a subset of language in which propositions are related by rules of inference that preserve truth. We can use it to talk about all kinds of things, both real and fictional. We try to create mathematical models where possible because then we have the rules of inference to make predictions that are precise. Where our models are not mathematical, e.g. in politics or psychology, it's never clear exactly what the model predicts. I think the rules of inference are encoded in our brains. See William S. Coopers book The Evolution of Reason. In other words could the singularity in mathematics you refer to be further divided? The singularity I was referring to is the hypersurface of infinite energy density and curvature which general relativity predicts at the center of a black hole and the Big Bang. It is in the mathematical model - which only shows that the model doesn't apply at these extreme conditions. This was not a surprise to anyone, since it was already known that general relativity isn't compatible with quantum mechanics and is expected to breakdown at extremely high energies and short distances. Brent Brent I was attempting to go down another layer of understanding as I see it. I will restate an abbreviated opinion: Numerals (mathematics) and languages are themselves fundamental instantiations of the laws/rules/inferences of truth… abstract mathematics representing the precise observed or discovered structure and order of the universe and the semantically less precise languages are used to interpret and communicate the mathematical models in descriptions and predictions of the universe. Mathematics...has multi faceted properties, being at least (1) representational numbers as in descriptively enumerated models as well as adjective position in spatiotemporal sequence (ordinals) and (2) computable numbers as in counting and arithmetic. Your statement: “I think the rules of inference are encoded in our brains”, This, I think, infers that primitive mathematics and languages are instantiated in the biological brain and can, *potentially*, represent or reflect any and all laws and rules fundamental to the real (even abstract) and fictional universe. The role of human embodied consciousness in any “theory of everything” is established by this fact. Mathematics may be “a subset of language” as you state or language could also be an extension or instantiation (as a concrete verbal idea) of what primitive mathematics represents (abstract rules/laws). In either case it becomes circular as to what is more relevant… mathematics or the language to understand what the mathematics represents or enumerates. It is my opinion that there is no singularity but a duality which roughly could be stated as both “a state of being” (quanta) and the “reason of being” (qualia) (access to abstract primitive laws/rules or as you state “newer information”). Perhaps monistic materialism and monistic idealism are semantically created notions that lack “newer information”. Thanks for your comments. - Show quoted text -- Hide quoted text - - Show quoted text - -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: The consciousness singularity
On Dec 7, 10:31 am, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote: On 12/7/2011 8:14 AM, benjayk wrote: Most materialist just say: Well, the natural laws are just there, without any particular reason or meaning behind them, we have to take them for granted. But this is almost as unconvincing as saying A creator God is just there, we have to take him for granted. It makes no sense (it would be a totally absurd universe), and there also is no evidence that natural laws are primary (we don't find laws to describe the Big Bang and very plausibly, there are none because it is a mathematical singularity). You are attributing a naive concept of physical laws to we. Physical laws are models we make up to explain and predict the world. That's why they change when we get new information. Mathematical singularities are in the mathematics. Nobody supposes they are in the world. Brent Brent You state: “Physical laws are models we make up to explain and predict the world.” Are properties of mathematics then dual, being both representational (models) and encoded (rules) as instantiated brain functions? In other words could the singularity in mathematics you refer to be further divided? Thanks -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
David Deutsch interview
Interview of physicist David Deutsch by science journalist John Horgan http://bloggingheads.tv/diavlogs/3 -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Why is there something rather than nothing?
On Sep 23, 8:41 am, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: Hi Roger, On 23 Sep 2011, at 07:37, Roger Granet wrote: Bruno, Hi. Yes, I am pretty much a materialist/physicalist. So, you cannot defend the idea that the brain (or whatever responsible for our consciousness) is Turing emulable. OK? Bruno: When you state “that the brain (or whatever responsible for our consciousness) is Turing emulable”…in using the term Turing “emulable” do you mean that the brain is being imitated, is represented, is an instantiation, or something stronger such as the Turing machine actually having inducted number properties of “encoded” information. Could you clarify why the term Turing “emulable” is used and not Turing “represented” or Turing “instantiated” or even Turing “encoded”? Thanks -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Math Question
On Aug 1, 5:24 am, Stephen P. King stephe...@charter.net wrote: On 7/31/2011 7:40 PM, Pzomby wrote: The following quote is from the book What is Mathematics Really? by Reuben Hersh 0 (zero) is particularly nice. It is the class of sets equivalent to the set of all objects unequal to themselves! No object is unequal to itself, so 0 is the class of all empty sets. But all empty sets have the same members .none! So they re not merely equivalent to each other they are all the same set. There s only one empty set! (A set is characterized by its membership list. There s no way to tell one empty membership list from another. Therefore all empty sets are the same thing!) Once I have the empty sets, I can use a trick of Von Neumann as an alternative way to construct the number 1. Consider the class of all empty sets. This class has exactly one member: the unique empty set. It s a singleton. Out of nothing I have made a singleton set a canonical representative for the cardinal number 1. 1 is the class of all singletons all sets but with a single element. To avoid circularity: 1 is the class of all sets equivalent to the set whose only element is the empty set. Continuing, you get pairs, triplets, and so on. Von Neumann recursively constructs the whole set of natural numbers out of sets of nothing. .The idea of set any collection of distinct objects was so simple and fundamental; it looked like a brick out of which all mathematics could be constructed. Even arithmetic could be downgraded (or upgraded) from primary to secondary rank, for the natural numbers could be constructed, as we have just seen, from nothing ie., the empty set by operations of set theory. Any comments or opinions on whether this theory is the basis for the natural numbers and their relations as is described in the quote above? Thanks Hi Pzomby, Nice post, but I need to point out that that von Neumann's construction depends on the ability to bracket the singleton an arbitrary number of times to generate the pairs, triplets, etc. which implies that more exists than just the singleton. What is the source of the bracketing? I have long considered that this bracketing is a primitive form of 'making distinctions' which is one of the necessary (but not sufficient) properties of consciousness. Onward! Stephen- Hide quoted text - - Stephen: The full three paragraphs are from the book. The sentence ‘Once I have the empty sets, I can use a trick of Von Neumann as an alternative way to construct the number 1.’ is Hersh’s words. I was looking for opinions, as you have given, on Hersh’s conclusions. Your comment on ‘making distinctions’ is the direction I was heading in understanding the role of primitive mathematics (sets, numbers) underlying human consciousness. Thanks Pzomby -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Math Question
The following quote is from the book “What is Mathematics Really?” by Reuben Hersh “0 (zero) is particularly nice. It is the class of sets equivalent to the set of all objects unequal to themselves! No object is unequal to itself, so 0 is the class of all empty sets. But all empty sets have the same members….none! So they’re not merely equivalent to each other…they are all the same set. There’s only one empty set! (A set is characterized by its membership list. There’s no way to tell one empty membership list from another. Therefore all empty sets are the same thing!) Once I have the empty sets, I can use a trick of Von Neumann as an alternative way to construct the number 1. Consider the class of all empty sets. This class has exactly one member: the unique empty set. It’s a singleton. ‘Out of nothing’ I have made a singleton set…a “canonical representative” for the cardinal number 1. 1 is the class of all singletons…all sets but with a single element. To avoid circularity: 1 is the class of all sets equivalent to the set whose only element is the empty set. Continuing, you get pairs, triplets, and so on. Von Neumann recursively constructs the whole set of natural numbers out of sets of nothing. ….The idea of set…any collection of distinct objects…was so simple and fundamental; it looked like a brick out of which all mathematics could be constructed. Even arithmetic could be downgraded (or upgraded) from primary to secondary rank, for the natural numbers could be constructed, as we have just seen, from nothing…ie., the empty set…by operations of set theory.” Any comments or opinions on whether this theory is the basis for the natural numbers and their relations as is described in the quote above? Thanks -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: consciousness
On Jul 5, 10:06 am, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 04 Jul 2011, at 21:55, meekerdb wrote: On 7/4/2011 12:38 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote: The mathematical science is certainly not causally inert. Without math, no chips, no internet, no man on the moon, etc. But the form of argument, Without X we wouldn't have Y, therefore X caused Y. is invalid. Agreed. But the notion of cause is not the notion of implication. I was just saying that the use of human mathematics was responsible for the acceleration of progress. The mathematical discovery of logarithms has multiplied the travel distances. The existence of mathematics change the world. And not just human mathematics. Any brain already exists by virtue of some mathematical, representational, machine to emulate other machine, leading to relative self-acceleration. I can understand that a materialist can still believe that the mathematical reality does not act physically on our reality, but mathematics acts, in that respect, by allowing the physical to obeys mathematical laws, and some of those laws, to make sense, assume primitive arithmetical law. The basic intuition of number is the idea that we can distinguish something from something else. If I understand you correctly, this would mean that all physical matter, forces and energies are actually encoded with the same mathematical rules that the brain/mind/consciousness distinguishes using mathematics. Then would not brain/mind/consciousness itself be subject to the same rules? Are you stating that the rules (laws) themselves have some kind of dispositional property (like a magnet with positive and negative attraction poles)? Thanks Pzomby Consider, without space we wouldn't have gone to the Moon, therefore space caused us to go to the Moon. The point is that space makes it possible, to start with. If you stretch causes to include everything that must have been the case for Y to happen then you end up with a meaningless plethora of causes: The universe caused Y. Addition and multiplication causes the belief in universes and universe. The 8 'hypostases' from God (Arithmetical truth) to Matter (what is sigma_1, provable, consistent, and true). And from inside the computationalist mindscape, the dynamics emerge as internal (arithmetical) indexicals. But this is the fate of any TOE, or better ROE (realm of everything, the theories themselves only scratches the surface). Yet it's existence is debatable and it's certainly interesting to discuss. And in any case, the elan vital was endlessly debate for centuries and was eventually discarded as nonexistent. Like mechanism justifies that the material force will be discarded as non existent, but explainable in term of number theoretical relations (coherent number's beliefs). Forces are explainable by many things. I'll be more impressed when you predict one. It will take time before we get something like F = ma or the Feynman integral, especially if people don't search. My point is only that it is the only way to explain force without making the qualia disappear, or without violating the comp principle, or without putting consciousness under the rug. The point is not to submit a new physics, just a translation of a problem into another problem, (complex, but purely mathematical). The understanding of the arithmetical origin of the physical laws might help to avoid senseless question. Physics is very mathematical by itself, and has already palpable relation with number theory. An application of the bosonic string theory = To prove the four squares theorem in number theory! The distribution of prime numbers might emulate a sort of quantum computer. Even without comp, I find rather natural that the physical laws expresses internally observable number symmetries. It might be that the theory of finite simple groups is at play. But justifying this by using the self-reference logics allows us to take into account the first person perspectives of the relative numbers, and it should explain the winning symmetries by a measure argument. Meanwhile it gives a different (non aristotelician picture of the ontological everything (I will called that the realm, or the ROE, the ontology of the everything). Now we can like that, dislike that. Take time to swallow, I don't know. Comp might be false. We have to keep this in mind. Comp might be true with a very low substitution level. The level could be so low that it is virtually very similar to materialism (and in practice it makes the digitalist doctor inexistant). What I do like in comp, and in the universal machine discourse, it the theory of virtue (the type Dt). It is really a sort of vaccine about the argument by authority. It makes the universal machine a sort of universal dissident. *you* are your own
Re: consciousness
Perhaps if I restate my opinion as: In my opinion, yes, if in simple terms it is logically correct to state: A property of “human embodied’ consciousness is….the capacity and ability of individual ‘human embodied’ consciousness to create intentionally desired physical and mental effects. On Jul 2, 12:25 pm, B Soroud bsor...@gmail.com wrote: furthermore you seem to conceive of a consciousness apart from its properties... you are making the erroneous distinction of attribute and essence you sound much like Descartes. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Caenorhabditis elegans
On Jun 21, 11:47 am, Rex Allen rexallen31...@gmail.com wrote: Brain uploading for worms... http://www.nytimes.com/2011/06/21/science/21brain.html The human brain, though vastly more complex than the worm’s, uses many of the same components, from neuropeptides to transmitters. So everything that can be learned about the worm’s nervous system is likely to help with the human system. Though the worm’s nervous system is routinely described as simple, that is true only in comparison with the human brain. The worm has 22,000 genes, almost as many as a person, and its brain is a highly complex piece of biological machinery. The work of Dr. Bargmann’s and other labs has deconstructed many of its operational mechanisms. . Does the fact that round worms have just as many genes as humans indicate that because of the sheer magnitude of the complexity of human intelligence/mind/consciousness as a opposed to the round worm’s behavior functions mean that there is little correlation of complexity of intelligence/consciousness to genetics? Thanks -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Reversal without primary matter elimination (step 7)
On Mar 5, 1:50 pm, Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com wrote: On 3/5/2011 7:05 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 04 Mar 2011, at 19:41, Brent Meeker wrote: On 3/4/2011 6:13 AM, 1Z wrote: On Mar 4, 7:57 am, Bruno Marchalmarc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: If you still don't see this, ask for clarification of the sane04 paper(*), because it seems to me that the first seven steps are rather clear, there. You have mentioned the WR. I take from this that you do understand the six first steps, don't you? The seven step follows mainly from the invariance of first person experience for change in the delays of the (virtual) 'reconstitutions'. The eighth step is really more conceptually subtle, and the clearer presentation I have done until now is in this list in the MGA thread (the Movie Graph Argument). It shows that the real concrete UD is not needed for the reversal to occur. This touches on my doubts about the MGA. I think that instantiate consciousness would require a lot of environment outside just the brain. I base this in part on experiments with sense deprivation which showed that after a short while, absent any external stimulation, the brain tends to go into a loop. Bruno has answered this by saying that the MG is not limited to a brain but can be as comprehensive as necessary, a whole universe. But in that limit it becomes clear that the consciousness realized is not in our world but is in another virtual world. I am not sure I understand. That there might, given a suitable interpretation, be computations and consciousness in some other virtual world ... Tthat is consequence of comp. Step six. Step 1-6 use a generalized brain = biological brain only for pedagogical purpose, and then step 7 relaxes that constraint, and the brain can be as big as any finite digital approximate body (like the Heisenberg matrix of the galaxy with 10^100 decimals, at the level of strings: the UD, by sheer stupidity if you want, does go through such program. ... raises the paradox of the self-conscious rock which Stathis and I discussed at length. But the UD Argument provides the solution. The rock emerges itself, relatively to us, But that's the point. It isn't relative to us, the virtual world is self-contained. It's the difference between putting a simulated brain into this world and creating a separate world in which there is a simulated brain. The latter is self-contained and the consciousness that is instantiated is relative to that world. It is inaccessible from this world and might as well be the rock that computes everything. from an infinity of (shared) computations. It emulates all consciousness only in a trivial sense. It is only an object in our sharable experience. Mind and matter emerges in a non trivial sense as internal self-measurement or self-observation possible. Consciousness is not even supervenient on a brain. (directly from MGA). But that is dependent on the assumption that the MG instantiates a consciousness. I think a consciousness is relative to an environment; and the consciousness that the MG would instantiate is not one relative to us and our environment - whereas what the doctor proposes to put in my skull is. Brent Not sure if I follow your wording . The wording appears to be not consistent with your prior statement. Would the altered wording below be what you are meaning or have I got it wrong? But that is dependent on the assumption *that consciousness is an instantiation of MG*. I think a consciousness is relative to an environment; and *the MG that the consciousness would instantiate* is one relative to us and our environment - whereas what the doctor proposes to put in my skull is. Thanks for this and your prior astute and stimulating postings. The reversal makes the rock argument non sensical in the comp frame. It seems to me that you just put some doubt on comp, not on the fact that if comp is correct physics is not fundamental but is one of the modality of (arithmetical) self-reference. I doubt that Stathis use the rock argument against comp. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/- Hide quoted text - - Show quoted text -- Hide quoted text - - Show quoted text - -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Platonia
On Mar 3, 2:07 am, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 03 Mar 2011, at 02:54, Pzomby wrote: On Mar 2, 6:03 am, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 02 Mar 2011, at 05:48, Pzomby wrote: That is why I limit myself for the TOE to natural numbers and their addition and multiplication. The reason is that it is enough, by comp, and nobody (except perhaps some philosophers) have any problem with that. Yes. A couple of questions from a philosophical point of view: Language gives meaning to the numbers as in their operations; functions, units of measurements (kilo, meter, ounce, kelvin etc.). I am not sure language gives meaning. Language have meaning, but I think meaning, sense, and reference are more primary. With the mechanist assumption, meaning sense and references will be 'explained' by what the numbers 'thinks' about that, in the manner of computer science (which can be seen as a branch of number theory). Not sure what you mean by “what the numbers ‘thinks’ ”. Are you stating that numbers have or represent some type of dispositional property? Yes. Not intrinsically. So you cannot say the number 456000109332897 likes the smell of coffee, but it makes sense to say that relatively to the universal numbers u1, u2, u3, ... the number 456000109332897 likes the smell of coffee. A bit like you could say, relatively to fortran, the number x computes this or that function. A key point is that if a number feels something, it does not know which number 'he' is, and strictly speaking we are confronted to many vocabulary problems, which I simplifies for not being too much long and boring. I shoudl say that a number like 456000109332897 might play the local role of a body of a person which likes the smell of coffee. But, locally, I identify person and their bodies, knowing that in fine, the 'real physical body will comes from a competition among all universal numbers, or among all the corresponding computational histories. What of the opinion that ‘numbers’ themselves (without human consciousness to perform operations and functions) only represent instances of matter and forces with their dispositional properties? Once you have addition and multiplication, you don't need humans to do the interpretation. Indeed with addition and multiplication, you have a natural encoding of all interpretation by all universal numbers. The idea that matter and forces have dispositional properties is locally true, but we have to extract matter and forces from the more primitive relation between numbers if we take the comp hypothesis seriously enough (that is what I argue for, at least, cf UDA, MGA, AUDA). If “once you have addition and multiplication, you don't need humans to do the interpretation” and “the idea that matter and forces have dispositional properties is locally true, but we have to extract matter and forces from the more primitive relation between numbers”: Then, in what describable realm does that ultimately put numbers under the ‘comp hypothesis’? At the ultimate ontological bottom, you need a infinite collection of abstract primary objects, having primary elementary relations so that they constitute a universal system (in the sense of Post, Church, Turing, Kleene ...). My two favorite examples (among an infinity possible) are 1) the numbers (0, s(0), s(s(0)), ...) together with addition and multiplication. This is taught in high school, albeit their Turing universality is not easy at all to demonstrate. In that case, the numbers are put at the bottom. 2) the combinators (K, S, (K K), (K S), (S K), (S S), (K (K K)), (K (S K), ) Combinators are either K or S or any (X Y) with X and Y being combinators. The basic basic elementary operation are the rule of Elimination and Duplication: ((K x) y) = x (((S x) y) z) = ((x z)(y z)) It can be shown that with the numbers you can define the combinators, and with the combinators you can define the numbers. If you choose the combinators at the ontological bottom, you get the numbers by theorems, and vice versa. Both the numbers and the combinators are Turing universal, and that makes them enough to emulate the Löbian machines histories, and explain why from their points of view the physical realm is apparent, and sensible. We could start with a quantum universal system, but then we will lose a criteria for distinguishing the quanta from the qualia (it is not just 'treachery' with respect to the (mind) body problem). Bruno I believe, I somewhat follow (in general) what you are stating, but the question remains as to the realm that the primitive or fundamental numbers exist in, if, in fact, they are at an ontological bottom. If numbers are not a part of matter, forces and human consciousness where do they exist? Perhaps it could be considered that quanta and qualia
Re: Platonia
On Mar 2, 6:03 am, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 02 Mar 2011, at 05:48, Pzomby wrote: That is why I limit myself for the TOE to natural numbers and their addition and multiplication. The reason is that it is enough, by comp, and nobody (except perhaps some philosophers) have any problem with that. Yes. A couple of questions from a philosophical point of view: Language gives meaning to the numbers as in their operations; functions, units of measurements (kilo, meter, ounce, kelvin etc.). I am not sure language gives meaning. Language have meaning, but I think meaning, sense, and reference are more primary. With the mechanist assumption, meaning sense and references will be 'explained' by what the numbers 'thinks' about that, in the manner of computer science (which can be seen as a branch of number theory). Not sure what you mean by “what the numbers ‘thinks’ ”. Are you stating that numbers have or represent some type of dispositional property? Yes. Not intrinsically. So you cannot say the number 456000109332897 likes the smell of coffee, but it makes sense to say that relatively to the universal numbers u1, u2, u3, ... the number 456000109332897 likes the smell of coffee. A bit like you could say, relatively to fortran, the number x computes this or that function. A key point is that if a number feels something, it does not know which number 'he' is, and strictly speaking we are confronted to many vocabulary problems, which I simplifies for not being too much long and boring. I shoudl say that a number like 456000109332897 might play the local role of a body of a person which likes the smell of coffee. But, locally, I identify person and their bodies, knowing that in fine, the 'real physical body will comes from a competition among all universal numbers, or among all the corresponding computational histories. What of the opinion that ‘numbers’ themselves (without human consciousness to perform operations and functions) only represent instances of matter and forces with their dispositional properties? Once you have addition and multiplication, you don't need humans to do the interpretation. Indeed with addition and multiplication, you have a natural encoding of all interpretation by all universal numbers. The idea that matter and forces have dispositional properties is locally true, but we have to extract matter and forces from the more primitive relation between numbers if we take the comp hypothesis seriously enough (that is what I argue for, at least, cf UDA, MGA, AUDA). If “once you have addition and multiplication, you don't need humans to do the interpretation” and “the idea that matter and forces have dispositional properties is locally true, but we have to extract matter and forces from the more primitive relation between numbers”: Then, in what describable realm does that ultimately put numbers under the ‘comp hypothesis’? Numbers alone may symbolize some fundamental describable matter and forces but a complete and coherent TOE should include elevated human consciousness beyond the primitive which in itself requires a relatively sophisticated language to give meaning to the numbers and their operations. Hmm... You can use numbers to symbolize things, by coding, addresses, etc. But numbers constitutes a reality per se, more or less captured (incompletely) by some theories (language, axioms, proof technics, ...). In this context, that might be important. Thanks You are welcome, Bruno -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Platonia
That is why I limit myself for the TOE to natural numbers and their addition and multiplication. The reason is that it is enough, by comp, and nobody (except perhaps some philosophers) have any problem with that. Yes. A couple of questions from a philosophical point of view: Language gives meaning to the numbers as in their operations; functions, units of measurements (kilo, meter, ounce, kelvin etc.). I am not sure language gives meaning. Language have meaning, but I think meaning, sense, and reference are more primary. With the mechanist assumption, meaning sense and references will be 'explained' by what the numbers 'thinks' about that, in the manner of computer science (which can be seen as a branch of number theory). Not sure what you mean by “what the numbers ‘thinks’ ”. Are you stating that numbers have or represent some type of dispositional property? What of the opinion that ‘numbers’ themselves (without human consciousness to perform operations and functions) only represent instances of matter and forces with their dispositional properties? Numbers alone may symbolize some fundamental describable matter and forces but a complete and coherent TOE should include elevated human consciousness beyond the primitive which in itself requires a relatively sophisticated language to give meaning to the numbers and their operations. Hmm... You can use numbers to symbolize things, by coding, addresses, etc. But numbers constitutes a reality per se, more or less captured (incompletely) by some theories (language, axioms, proof technics, ...). In this context, that might be important. Then, you are inferring, that ‘numbers’ can be and perhaps are ‘nouns’? If so, then numbers would be human mental objects that have properties of both functions and relations. Thanks Would not any TOE describing the universe appears to require human sophisticated language using referent nouns, (and conjunctions, adjectives and verbs etc.) to give meaning to the numbers and their functions and operations? With the mechanist assumption, humans and their language will be described by machine operations, which will corresponds to a collection of numbers relations (definable with addition and multiplication). This is not obvious and relies in great part of the progress of mathematical logic. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/- Hide quoted text - - Show quoted text - -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Platonia
On Feb 21, 9:11 am, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 21 Feb 2011, at 13:26, benjayk wrote: Bruno Marchal wrote: On 20 Feb 2011, at 00:39, benjayk wrote: Bruno Marchal wrote: Isn't it enough to say everything that we *could* describe in mathematics exists in platonia? The problem is that we can describe much more things than the one we are able to show consistent, so if you allow what we could describe you take too much. If you define Platonia by all consistent things, you get something inconsistent due to paradox similar to Russell paradox or St-Thomas paradox with omniscience and omnipotence. Why can inconsistent descriptions not refer to an existing object? The easy way is to assume inconsistent descriptions are merely an arbitrary combination of symbols that fail to describe something in particular and thus have only the content that every utterance has by virtue of being uttered: There exists ... (something). So they don't add anything to platonia because they merely assert the existence of existence, which leaves platonia as described by consistent theories. I think the paradox is a linguistic paradox and it poses really no problem. Ultimately all descriptions refer to an existing object, but some are too broad or explosive or vague to be of any (formal) use. I may describe a system that is equal to standard arithmetics but also has 1=2 as an axiom. This makes it useless practically (or so I guess...) but it may still be interpreted in a way that it makes sense. 1=2 may mean that there is 1 object that is 2 two objects, so it simply asserts the existence of the one number two. But what is two if 2 = 1. I can no more have clue of what you mean. Two is the successor of one. You obviously now what that means. So keep this meaning and reconcile it with 2=1. You might get the meaning two is the one (number) that is the succesor of one. Or one (number) is the successor of two. In essence it expresses 2*...=1*... or 2*X=1*Y. And it might mean the succesor of one number is the succesor of the succesor of one number. or 2+...=1+... or 2+X=1+Y. The reason that it is not a good idea to define 2=1 is because it doesn't express something that can't be expressed in standard arithmetic, but it makes everything much more confusing and redundant. In mathematics we want to be precise as possible so it's good rule to always have to specifiy which quantity we talk about, so that we avoid talking about something - that is one thing - that is something - that is two things - but rather talk about one thing and two things directly; because it is already clear that two things are a thing. OK. Bruno Marchal wrote: Now, just recall that Platonia is based on classical logic where the falsity f, or 0 = 1, entails all proposition. So if you insist to say that 0 = 1, I will soon prove that you owe to me A billions of dollars, and that you should prepare the check. You could prove that, but what is really meant by that is another question. It may simply mean I want to play a joke on you. All statements are open to interpretation, I don't think we can avoid that entirely. We are ususally more interested in the statements that are less vague, but vague or crazy statements are still valid on some level (even though often on an very boring, because trivial, level; like saying S afs fdsLfs, which is just expressing that something exists). We formalize things, or make them as formal as possible, when we search where we disagree, or when we want to find a mistake. The idea of making things formal, like in first order logic, is to be able to follow a derivation or an argument in a way which does not depend on any interpretation, other than the procedural inference rule. Bruno Marchal wrote: 3=7 may mean that there are 3 objects that are 7 objects which might be interpreted as aserting the existence of (for example) 7*1, 7*2 and 7*3. Logicians and mathematicians are more simple minded than that, and it does not always help to be understood. If you allow circles with edges, and triangles with four sides in Platonia, we will loose any hope of understanding each other. I don't think we have disallow circles with edges, and triangles with four sides; it is enough if we keep in mind that it is useful to use words in a sense that is commonly understood. That is why I limit myself for the TOE to natural numbers and their addition and multiplication. The reason is that it is enough, by comp, and nobody (except perhaps some philosophers) have any problem with that. Yes. A couple of questions from a philosophical point of view: Language gives meaning to the numbers as in their operations; functions, units of measurements (kilo, meter, ounce, kelvin etc.). Numbers
Re: Against Mechanism
On Nov 30, 10:10 am, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 30 Nov 2010, at 16:51, Pzomby wrote On Nov 29, 7:25 am, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 28 Nov 2010, at 21:18, Pzomby wrote: On Nov 27, 10:49 am, Rex Allen rexallen31...@gmail.com wrote: On Thu, Nov 25, 2010 at 7:40 PM, Jason Resch jasonre...@gmail.com wrote: On Thu, Nov 25, 2010 at 3:38 PM, Rex Allen rexallen31...@gmail.com wrote: The same goes for more abstract substrates, like bits of information. Rex Assuming that by using the term ‘abstract’ it means ‘non-physical’, But abstract does not mean non physical. F = ma is physical yet abstract. It is a true (say) abstract relation that we infer from many observation, and which can be instantiated in some concrete relationship between bodies, for example. Would not the context of this discussion, referring to ‘abstract substrates’, as opposed to physical substrates (quarks and electrons) indicate that ‘abstract’ (in this case) is not of the physical? Some of the contents of human consciousness are non physical (not of the five senses). ‘Curiosity’ for example is a non physical trait. http://www.chompchomp.com/terms/abstractnoun.htm Not bad :) But as you might guess, such a difference between abstract and concrete can be theory dependent. Is time, or even a moment, an abstract or a concrete: I cannot see it, I cannot hear it, I cannot smell it, I cannot taste it, and I cannot touch it ... unless there is particle of time (chronon, that exists ... in some theories!). What if we discover 'curiositon' :) If a ‘curiousaton’ and a beliefiton are ever discovered a biological TOEton may not be far behind. : ) is it possible for information or anything to be ‘more’ or even ‘less’ abstract. Are not the physical and abstract realms pure unto themselves with no possibility of being more or less abstract or physical? In other words ‘abstract substrates” could be incongruous. This is theory dependent. Natural numbers are usually considered by number theorists as being very concrete (yet immaterial) objects. Relations between numbers are more abstract, and relations between those relations are still more abstract. In math, algebra is considered as more abstract than arithmetic. category theory is known as very abstract. Lambda calculus contains a concrete abstraction operator (indeed lambda) capable of constructing more and more abstract objects. It replace concrete/token immaterial object like numbers (or strings) by variable one. Bruno Yes, ‘theory dependent’ human constructs. No doubt number theorists have agreed upon terminology and understandings that describe the functions and results. Are what they are really referring to, is that which is ‘finite’ (having natural boundaries or limitations) rather than concrete? The basic objects of number theorist are the numbers, but they are interested in functions, properties, relations, which are always infinite objects. Are not category theory, algebra, etc. representing things that have ‘finite’ rather than ‘concrete’ properties? No their objects are usually infinite. The category of sets is so big that it is not even a set. It is bigger than all the Cantiorian infinties. That *very* big. If a mathematician or scientist presumes the brain is the mind That is a direct category error. I can see, smell touch, ... a brain. Not so for a mind. yet a mind can be said concrete like whenh I talk about my mind, or some precise people mind in some situation. as in physicalism, materialism etc., They do association. identity theses are not all category errors. he of course, will have little choice but to describe everything (including human consciousness) as concrete. That is the reason to make distinct the duality abstract/concrete from immaterial/material. My mind is concrete, moments are concrete, numbers can be considered as concrete, more generally the object of the structure are concrete, as opposed to their possible relations. My (human) consciousness is concrete, (even if it is immaterial and different from my brain). Human conciousness in general is an abstract notion. Notions are abstract, dispositions are abstract, and concreteness will depends on theories, current paradigm, ontological choice or reality, etc. Brunohttp://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/- Hide quoted text - Your response raises a few more questions but I will state only a couple. I believe I follow your comments but am having trouble with the description of human consciousness (in general) as a ‘notion’. The word means vague or unclear and an antonym of ‘notion’ could only be described as a precise description or understanding of human consciousness (even a concrete reality). As this is more a discussion of semantics. What would be the antonym of notion? Abstract / Concrete, Immaterial
Re: Against Mechanism
On Nov 29, 7:25 am, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 28 Nov 2010, at 21:18, Pzomby wrote: On Nov 27, 10:49 am, Rex Allen rexallen31...@gmail.com wrote: On Thu, Nov 25, 2010 at 7:40 PM, Jason Resch jasonre...@gmail.com wrote: On Thu, Nov 25, 2010 at 3:38 PM, Rex Allen rexallen31...@gmail.com wrote: The same goes for more abstract substrates, like bits of information. Rex Assuming that by using the term ‘abstract’ it means ‘non-physical’, But abstract does not mean non physical. F = ma is physical yet abstract. It is a true (say) abstract relation that we infer from many observation, and which can be instantiated in some concrete relationship between bodies, for example. Would not the context of this discussion, referring to ‘abstract substrates’, as opposed to physical substrates (quarks and electrons) indicate that ‘abstract’ (in this case) is not of the physical? Some of the contents of human consciousness are non physical (not of the five senses). ‘Curiosity’ for example is a non physical trait. http://www.chompchomp.com/terms/abstractnoun.htm is it possible for information or anything to be ‘more’ or even ‘less’ abstract. Are not the physical and abstract realms pure unto themselves with no possibility of being more or less abstract or physical? In other words ‘abstract substrates” could be incongruous. This is theory dependent. Natural numbers are usually considered by number theorists as being very concrete (yet immaterial) objects. Relations between numbers are more abstract, and relations between those relations are still more abstract. In math, algebra is considered as more abstract than arithmetic. category theory is known as very abstract. Lambda calculus contains a concrete abstraction operator (indeed lambda) capable of constructing more and more abstract objects. It replace concrete/token immaterial object like numbers (or strings) by variable one. Bruno Yes, ‘theory dependent’ human constructs. No doubt number theorists have agreed upon terminology and understandings that describe the functions and results. Are what they are really referring to, is that which is ‘finite’ (having natural boundaries or limitations) rather than concrete? Are not category theory, algebra, etc. representing things that have ‘finite’ rather than ‘concrete’ properties? If a mathematician or scientist presumes the brain is the mind as in physicalism, materialism etc., he of course, will have little choice but to describe everything (including human consciousness) as concrete. Any clarification or examples on this issue would be helpful. Thanks -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com . For more options, visit this group athttp://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en . http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Against Mechanism
On Nov 27, 10:49 am, Rex Allen rexallen31...@gmail.com wrote: On Thu, Nov 25, 2010 at 7:40 PM, Jason Resch jasonre...@gmail.com wrote: On Thu, Nov 25, 2010 at 3:38 PM, Rex Allen rexallen31...@gmail.com wrote: The same goes for more abstract substrates, like bits of information. Rex Assuming that by using the term ‘abstract’ it means ‘non-physical’, is it possible for information or anything to be ‘more’ or even ‘less’ abstract. Are not the physical and abstract realms pure unto themselves with no possibility of being more or less abstract or physical? In other words ‘abstract substrates” could be incongruous. Any clarification or examples on this issue would be helpful. Thanks -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
