Re: The Nature of Time

[Saibal Mitra]

Hi Stephen,

My point is that time as a pointer that points to what exists and what not
(anymore or yet), cannot exist. You can indeed map the set of all such
pointers to the real line. I agree that relativity is inconsistent with
such an idea of time.

Saibal

> Hi Saibal
>
> Are you defining time as isomorphic to the Real number line? Could it
> be
> that all of these "proofs of the nonexistence of time" are really just
> proofs that time is *not* that but something else entirely? It seems to me
> that we are thinking of the way that we can chronometrize events in our
> past
> with real number values and concluding that this labeling scheme extends
> into the future in a unique way, the problem is that if we take General
> Relativity seriously this is a non-started of an idea. The relativity of
> simultaneity coupled with general covariance does not permit any form of
> unique labeling events. We really need to stop assuming a Newtonian
> Absolute
> chronometrization of events. Time is a local measure of change, nothing
> more.
>
> Onward!
>
> Stephen
>
> ***
>
> -Original Message-
> From: smi...@zonnet.nl
> Sent: Saturday, April 02, 2011 8:27 PM
> To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
> Subject: Re: QTI is trivially false
>
> I think we are now making hidden assumptions about the nature of time,
> namely that it "really exists", and then we are trying to argue that
> you can still have immortality (in different senses). However, it is
> far more natural to assume that time does not exist and then you get
> immortality (in the sense of my conscious states that have a finite
> memory always existing) in a far more straightforward way.
>
> That time does not exist is a quite natural assumption. To see this,
> assume that it does exist. But then, since time evolution is given by a
> unitary transform, the past still exists in a scrambled way in the
> present (when taking into account parallel universes). E.g. your past
> brain state of ten years ago can still be described in terms of the
> physical variables as they exist today. Of course such a description is
> extremely complicated involving the physical state of today's
> multiverse within a sphere of ten lightyears.
>
> Then assuming that the details of implementation does not affect
> consciousness (as long as the right program is being run), one has to
> conclude that your past state of coinsciousess exists also today. You
> could therefore just as well assume that time does not exist, as the
> two possibilities are operationally equivalent.
>
>
> Saibal
>
>
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Re: Changing the past by forgetting

[Saibal Mitra]

That's correct. It is not really irreversible. The point is that it doesn't
matter as you end up in a state where the outcome of finding out what
happened is not pre-determined.

Saibal

- Original Message - 
From: "Bruno Marchal" 
To: 
Sent: Tuesday, April 21, 2009 07:27 PM
Subject: Re: Changing the past by forgetting


>
> Accepting QM without collapse, I am not sure you can dump your memory
> in the environment in any truly irreversible way.
>
> Bruno
>
>
> On 21 Apr 2009, at 15:22, Saibal Mitra wrote:
>
> >
> > Yes, I agree, and that's then why we cannot do this in practice. The
> > verification of the MWI would have to wait untilk we have artificially
> > intelligent observers implemented by quantum computers.
> >
> > However, ass uming that the MWI is indeed correct, it doesn't matter
> > if you
> > undo the measurement. If you just dump your memory in the nvironment
> > in an
> > irreversible way, you end up in a superposition like:
> >
> > |you>[ |universe_1| + |universe_2> ]
> >
> > As far as |you> are concerned, it doesn't matter if |universe_1> and
> > |universe_2> differ by one electron state or the state of 10^23
> > particles:
> > the result of a new measurement is not pre-determined in either case.
> >
> >
> > - Original Message -
> > From: "Brent Meeker" 
> > To: 
> > Sent: Sunday, March 15, 2009 08:06 PM
> > Subject: Re: Changing the past by forgetting
> >
> >
> >>
> >> Saibal Mitra wrote:
> >>> If we consider measuring the spin of a particle, you could also
> >>> say that
> > the
> >>> two possible outcomes just exist and thatthere are two possible
> >>> future
> >>> versions of me. There is no meaningful way to associate myself with
> > either
> >>> of the two outcomes.
> >>>
> >>> But then, precisely this implies that after a measurement and
> >>> forgetting
> >>> about the result will yield a version of me who is in a similar
> >>> position
> > as
> >>> that earlier version of me who had yet to make the measurement. If
> >>> one
> > could
> >>> perform measurements in a reversible way, this would be possible to
> >>> experimentally confirm, as David Deutsch pointed out. You can
> >>> start with
> > a
> >>> spin polarized in the x direction. Then you measure the z-component.
> > There
> >>> then exists a unitary transformation which leads to the observer
> > forgetting
> >>> about the outcome of the measurement and to the spin to be
> >>> restored in
> > the
> >>> original state. The observer does remember having measured the
> > z-component
> >>> of the spin.
> >>>
> >>> Then, measuring the x-component again will yield "spin-up" with 100%
> >>> probability, confirming that both branches in which the observer
> > measured
> >>> spin up and spin down have coherently recombined. This then proves
> >>> that
> > had
> >>> the observer measured the z-component, the outcome would not be a
> >>> priori
> >>> determined, despite the observer having measured it earlier. So,
> >>> both
> >>> branches are real. But then this is true in general, also if the
> >>> quantum
> >>> state is of the form:
> >>>
> >>> |You>[|spin up>|rest of the world knows the spin is up> + |spin
> > down>|rest
> >>> of the world knows spin is down>]
> >>
> >> You're contemplating reversing three different things:
> >>
> >> 1) Your knowledge, by forgetting a measurement result.  Something
> >> that's
> > easy to do.
> >>
> >> 2) The spin state of a particle.
> >>
> >> 3) The state of what the rest of the world knows.
> >>
> >> Because of the entanglement, I don't think you can, in general,
> >> reverse
> > the spin
> >> state of the  particle without reversing what is known about it by
> >> "the
> > rest of
> >> the world".
> >> If it was a known state (to someone) the particle can easily be put
> >> back
> > in that
> >> state.  But to do so for a general, unknown state, after a
> >> measurement
> > would
> >> require invoking time-reversal invariance of the state of whole
> >

Extra explanation

[Saibal Mitra]

I just send a posting to the FOR list about my article. I did not have the
time to reply to everyone on this list previously. Reading the old
discussion again, I think that it was suggested that the exact quantum
states matter, but they don't. It was only used to illustrate the thought
experiment by Deutsch which would allow one to prove that the MWI is
correct.

This is what I sent to the FOR list:


Some time ago I wrote a small article:


http://arxiv.org/abs/0902.3825


This was recently featured in New Scientist:


http://www.newscientist.com/article/mg20227044.200-avoid-a-future-cataclysm-forget-the-past.html


The idea is that an observer can undo things that have already happened by
resetting its memory, because when you reset your memory to a previous
state, that previous state you are evolving into will be the same in a
sector of the multiverse which evolved from that previous state and then was
reset for any reason. So, if the reseting is triggered for reason A or
reason B, it would lead to the observer ending up in the same state. The
outcome of a new measuremnt to find out why the mempory was reset is then
not pre-determined.

Some details:

The word "state" here refers to the classically describable state of an
observer. In the article, I focus on machine observers. The subjective state
of the observer is then exactly specified by specifying the ones and zeroes
of the bits of the memory. So, I assume that whatever the observer can be
aware of is encoded by the classical state of the bits of the computer and
not the exact quantum state of the computer. The exact state of the computer
has to be specified using a wavefunction of the computer (in fact, the state
of the computer will be entangled with the rest of the universe).


Then, one can write down any generic quantum state of the universe
containing the observer by supplementing the (classical) information stored
in the bits by the extra information you need to fully specify the
wavefunction of the computer and everything else in the universe. One can
then consider the unitary transformations that would represent a memory
backup, memory resetting etc.


After the memory resetting, you are notified why the memory was reset. Since
the relevant things happen in the realm where classical physics applies, the
probabilities are the same as what you would find using purely classical
reasoning. The interpretation of these probablilites is, however, different
from classical physics. When the memory is reset, you evolve to some state
while the rest of the inverse will be in some superposition of states in
which the memory was reset for various reasons. Then, before finding out why
the memory was reset, the outcome of that observation is not pre-determined


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Re: Changing the past by forgetting

[Saibal Mitra]

Yes, I agree, and that's then why we cannot do this in practice. The
verification of the MWI would have to wait untilk we have artificially
intelligent observers implemented by quantum computers.

However, ass uming that the MWI is indeed correct, it doesn't matter if you
undo the measurement. If you just dump your memory in the nvironment in an
irreversible way, you end up in a superposition like:

|you>[ |universe_1| + |universe_2> ]

As far as |you> are concerned, it doesn't matter if |universe_1> and
|universe_2> differ by one electron state or the state of 10^23 particles:
the result of a new measurement is not pre-determined in either case.


- Original Message - 
From: "Brent Meeker" 
To: 
Sent: Sunday, March 15, 2009 08:06 PM
Subject: Re: Changing the past by forgetting


>
> Saibal Mitra wrote:
> > If we consider measuring the spin of a particle, you could also say that
the
> > two possible outcomes just exist and thatthere are two possible future
> > versions of me. There is no meaningful way to associate myself with
either
> > of the two outcomes.
> >
> > But then, precisely this implies that after a measurement and forgetting
> > about the result will yield a version of me who is in a similar position
as
> > that earlier version of me who had yet to make the measurement. If one
could
> > perform measurements in a reversible way, this would be possible to
> > experimentally confirm, as David Deutsch pointed out. You can start with
a
> > spin polarized in the x direction. Then you measure the z-component.
There
> > then exists a unitary transformation which leads to the observer
forgetting
> > about the outcome of the measurement and to the spin to be restored in
the
> > original state. The observer does remember having measured the
z-component
> > of the spin.
> >
> > Then, measuring the x-component again will yield "spin-up" with 100%
> > probability, confirming that both branches in which the observer
measured
> > spin up and spin down have coherently recombined. This then proves that
had
> > the observer measured the z-component, the outcome would not be a priori
> > determined, despite the observer having measured it earlier. So, both
> > branches are real. But then this is true in general, also if the quantum
> > state is of the form:
> >
> > |You>[|spin up>|rest of the world knows the spin is up> + |spin
down>|rest
> > of the world knows spin is down>]
>
> You're contemplating reversing three different things:
>
> 1) Your knowledge, by forgetting a measurement result.  Something that's
easy to do.
>
> 2) The spin state of a particle.
>
> 3) The state of what the rest of the world knows.
>
> Because of the entanglement, I don't think you can, in general, reverse
the spin
> state of the  particle without reversing what is known about it by "the
rest of
> the world".
> If it was a known state (to someone) the particle can easily be put back
in that
> state.  But to do so for a general, unknown state, after a measurement
would
> require invoking time-reversal invariance of the state of whole universe
(or at
> least all of it entangled with the particle spin via the measuring
apparatus).
>
> Brent Meeker
>
> >
> > although you cannot directly verify it here. But that means that you
cannot
> > rule out an alternative theory in which only one of the branches is real
> > when performing a measurement in this case. But if the reality of both
> > branches is accepted, then each time you make a measurement and you
don't
> > know the outcome, the outcome is not fixed (proovided, of course, there
is
> > indeed more than one branch).
> >
> >
> > - Original Message - 
> > From: "Jack Mallah" 
> > To: 
> > Sent: Thursday, March 12, 2009 03:47 AM
> > Subject: Re: Changing the past by forgetting
> >
> >
> >
> >
> > --- On Tue, 3/10/09, Saibal Mitra  wrote:
> >> http://arxiv.org/abs/0902.3825
> >>
> >> I've written up a small article about the idea that you could end up in
a
> > different sector of the multiverse by selective memory erasure. I had
> > written about that possibility a long time ago on this list, but now
I've
> > made the argument more rigorous.
> >
> > Saibal, I have to say that I disagree.  As you acknowledge, erasing
memory
> > doesn't recohere the branches.  There is no meaningful sense in which
you
> > could end up in a different branch due to memory erasure.
> >
> > You admit the 'effect' has no observable consequences.  But it has no

Re: Changing the past by forgetting

[Saibal Mitra]

If we consider measuring the spin of a particle, you could also say that the
two possible outcomes just exist and thatthere are two possible future
versions of me. There is no meaningful way to associate myself with either
of the two outcomes.

But then, precisely this implies that after a measurement and forgetting
about the result will yield a version of me who is in a similar position as
that earlier version of me who had yet to make the measurement. If one could
perform measurements in a reversible way, this would be possible to
experimentally confirm, as David Deutsch pointed out. You can start with a
spin polarized in the x direction. Then you measure the z-component. There
then exists a unitary transformation which leads to the observer forgetting
about the outcome of the measurement and to the spin to be restored in the
original state. The observer does remember having measured the z-component
of the spin.

Then, measuring the x-component again will yield "spin-up" with 100%
probability, confirming that both branches in which the observer measured
spin up and spin down have coherently recombined. This then proves that had
the observer measured the z-component, the outcome would not be a priori
determined, despite the observer having measured it earlier. So, both
branches are real. But then this is true in general, also if the quantum
state is of the form:

|You>[|spin up>|rest of the world knows the spin is up> + |spin down>|rest
of the world knows spin is down>]

although you cannot directly verify it here. But that means that you cannot
rule out an alternative theory in which only one of the branches is real
when performing a measurement in this case. But if the reality of both
branches is accepted, then each time you make a measurement and you don't
know the outcome, the outcome is not fixed (proovided, of course, there is
indeed more than one branch).


- Original Message - 
From: "Jack Mallah" 
To: 
Sent: Thursday, March 12, 2009 03:47 AM
Subject: Re: Changing the past by forgetting




--- On Tue, 3/10/09, Saibal Mitra  wrote:
> http://arxiv.org/abs/0902.3825
>
> I've written up a small article about the idea that you could end up in a
different sector of the multiverse by selective memory erasure. I had
written about that possibility a long time ago on this list, but now I've
made the argument more rigorous.

Saibal, I have to say that I disagree.  As you acknowledge, erasing memory
doesn't recohere the branches.  There is no meaningful sense in which you
could end up in a different branch due to memory erasure.

You admit the 'effect' has no observable consequences.  But it has no
unobservable meaning either.

In fact, other than what I call 'causal differentiation', which clearly will
track the already-decohered branches (so you don't get to reshuffle the
deck), there is no meaningful sense in which "you" will end up in one
particular future branch at all.  Other than causal differentiation
tracking, either 'you' are all of your future branches, or 'you' are just
here for the moment and are none of them.









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Re: Changing the past by forgetting

[Saibal Mitra]

Thanks!  This is like undoing historical events. If you forget about the
fact that dinosaurs ever lived on Earth and there is an alternative history
that led to your existence in the multiverse, and you do the memory erasure
also in sectors were dinosaurs never lived, you have some nonzero
probability of finding yourself on an Earth were the dinosaurs never lived.

- Original Message - 
From: "Bruno Marchal" 
To: 
Sent: Wednesday, March 11, 2009 06:54 PM
Subject: Re: Changing the past by forgetting


>
> Nice! I did refer often to the Saibal Mitra backtracking procedure (in
> immortality discussions). I will take a further look on your paper.
> If valid, it should work in the comp frame. Amnesia could lead you to
> the "original singularity", which could be a kind of blind spot of
> "universal consciousness", except that with comp such a singularity
> should looks like a "little Mandelbrot" set, at first sight, I mean
> something like a compact view of a universal dovetailing.
>
> Bruno
>
> On 10 Mar 2009, at 19:55, Saibal Mitra wrote:
>
> >
> > http://arxiv.org/abs/0902.3825
> >
> > I've written up a small article about the idea that you could end up
> > in a
> > different sector of the multiverse by selective memory erasure. I had
> > written about that possibility a long time ago on this list, but now
> > I've
> > made the argument more rigorous.
> >
> >
> > >
>
> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
>
>
>
>
> >


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Changing the past by forgetting

[Saibal Mitra]

http://arxiv.org/abs/0902.3825

I've written up a small article about the idea that you could end up in a
different sector of the multiverse by selective memory erasure. I had
written about that possibility a long time ago on this list, but now I've
made the argument more rigorous.


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Dreams and measure

[Saibal Mitra]

Welcome back Jack Mallah!

I have a different argument against QTI.

I had a nice dream last night, but unfortunately it suddenly ended. 
Now, this is empirical evidence against QTI because, according to the 
QTI, the life expectancy of the version of me simulated in that dream 
should have been be infinite.

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QTI ---> Expanding brains

[Saibal Mitra]

Yes, I should have mentioned ASSA and RSSA as discussed on this list in the
dark ages.

I don't buy QTI for quite a few reasons. A "model independent" objection I
have is the following. If you accept QTI, then the information you have
about your history will have to grow without limit (if not, then effectively
you have a finite lifetime as you can only store a finite amount of
information in a finite volume).

Your identity must be preserved as your brain continues to expand to make
room for all that informaton that must be stored. Now, I find it hard to
believe that a superlarge brain the size of the galaxy would still be "me".
:)



- Original Message - 
From: "Russell Standish" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
To: <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Sent: Wednesday, April 16, 2008 03:24 AM
Subject: Re: Quantum Immortality = no second law


>
> On Wed, Apr 16, 2008 at 02:22:23AM +0200, Saibal Mitra wrote:
> >
> > > First off, how is it that the MWI does not imply
> > >quantum immortality?
> >
> > MWI is just quantum mechanics without the wavefunction collapse
postulate.
> > This then implies that after a measurement your wavefuntion will be in a
> > superposition of the states corresponding to definite outcomes. But we
> > cannot just consider suicide experiments and then say that just because
> > branches of the wavefuntion exist in which I survive, I'll find myself
there
> > with 100% probability. The fact that probabilities are conserved follows
> > from unitary time evolution. If a state evolves into a linear
combination of
> > states in which I'm dead and alive then the probabilities of all these
> > states add up to 1. The probability of finding myself to be alive at all
> > after the experiment is then less than the probability of me finding
myself
> > about to perform the suicide experiment.
> >
> > The probability of me finding myself to be alive after n suicide
experiments
> > decays exponentially with n. Therefore I should not expect to find
myself
> > having survived many suicide experiments. Note that contrary to what you
> > often read in the popular accounts of the multiverse, the multiverse
does
> > not split when we make observations. The most natural state for the
entire
> > multiverse is just an eigenstate of the Hamiltonian. The energy can be
taken
> > to be zero, therefore the wavefunction of the multiverse satisfies the
> > equation:
> >
>
> One should also note that this is the ASSA position. The ASSA was
> introduced by Jacques Mallah in his argument against quantum
> immortality, and a number of participants in this list adhere to the
> ASSA position. Its counterpart if the RSSA, which does imply quantum
> immortality (provided that the no cul-de-sac conjecture holds), and
> other list participants adhere to the RSSA. To date, no argument has
> convincingly demonstrated which of the ASSA or RSSA should be
> preferred, so it has become somewhat a matter of taste. There is some
> discussion of this in my book "Theory of Nothing".
>
> Cheers
>
> -- 
>
> --
--
> A/Prof Russell Standish  Phone 0425 253119 (mobile)
> Mathematics
> UNSW SYDNEY 2052  [EMAIL PROTECTED]
> Australiahttp://www.hpcoders.com.au
> --
--
>
> >


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Re: Quantum Immortality = no second law

[Saibal Mitra]

Citeren nichomachus <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>:

>
> In the description of the quantum immortality gedanken experiment, a
> physicist rigs an automatic rifle to a geiger counter to fire into him
> upon the detection of an atomic decay event from a bit of radioactive
> material. If the many worlds hypothesis is true, the self-awareness of
> the physicist will continue to find himself alive after any length of
> time in front of his gun, since there exist parallel worlds where the
> decay does not occur.

This has never been rigorously proven. I can give you some argumetns 
why the MWI does not imply Quantum Immortality.

>
> On a microscopic scale this is analogous to the observing a reality in
> which the second law of thermodynamics does not hold. for example,
> since there is a non-zero probability that molecular interactions will
> result in a decrease in entropy in a particular sealed volume under
> observation, there exist histories in which this must be observed.
>
> This is never observed. Therefore the MWI is shown to be false.

This is also not a correct conclusion (if you replace MWI by quantum 
immortality).


> >
>



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Re: Quantum Immortality = no second law

[Saibal Mitra]

Citeren nichomachus <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>:

>
> In the description of the quantum immortality gedanken experiment, a
> physicist rigs an automatic rifle to a geiger counter to fire into him
> upon the detection of an atomic decay event from a bit of radioactive
> material. If the many worlds hypothesis is true, the self-awareness of
> the physicist will continue to find himself alive after any length of
> time in front of his gun, since there exist parallel worlds where the
> decay does not occur.

This has never been rigorously proven. I can give you some argumetns 
why the MWI does not imply Quantum Immortality.

>
> On a microscopic scale this is analogous to the observing a reality in
> which the second law of thermodynamics does not hold. for example,
> since there is a non-zero probability that molecular interactions will
> result in a decrease in entropy in a particular sealed volume under
> observation, there exist histories in which this must be observed.
>
> This is never observed. Therefore the MWI is shown to be false.

This is also not a correct conclusion (if you replace MWI by quantum 
immortality).


> >
>



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Re: Request to form 'Social Contract' with SAI

[Saibal Mitra]

The best thing you could do is to freeze your brain. I think that will
preserve the connections between the neurons, although the cells will be
destroyed.

This will make it easier for a future civilization to regenerate you
digitally


- Original Message - 
From: <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
To: "Everything List" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Sent: Monday, October 15, 2007 07:17 AM
Subject: Re: Request to form 'Social Contract' with SAI


>
>
>
> On Oct 14, 3:39 am, Bruno Marchal <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>
> >
> > Take care, trust yourself and "kill all the "SAI"" on the road, to
> > paraphrase a well known Buddhist idea. Either you are sufficiently
> > clever to understand the SAI arguments, showing you are already an SAI
> > yourself, and your message is without purpose, or you are not, in which
> > case, to keep soundness (by lobianity), you better be skeptical, (and
> > not to abide so quick imo).
> >
> > Unless you want to loose your universality, and be a slave, a tool.
> >
> > Bruno
> >
> > http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
>
> Heh.  Bruno, I continue to analyse my current (human) condition to try
> to find a way out of this mess (I'm not a happy bloke).  Still
> considering many possibilities.  Given the possibility that super-
> intelligences do already (or will in the future) exist,  there's a
> chance that a non-interference policy is being/will be pursued, but
> that there's a way to get their attention - it could be a simple
> matter of indicating that you are aware of the possibility and
> requesting to 'sign' a 'social contract'.  Get in early now! ;)
>
>
> >


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Re: how to define ASSA

[Saibal Mitra]

Of course, we all live in the same universe in the sense that we are 
all simulated by brains that exist in this universe (described 
approximately by the Standard Model and General Relativity). The 
problem is how to define the observer moments rigorously at least in 
principle. It is undeniable that we experience a the world that our 
brains are simulating and not the real world. We experience the real 
world only indirectly.

If you touch a hot object and burn your finger then you experiencing 
the pain is really an event that happens in the virtual world simulated 
by your brain. Your brain simply uses the results of the simulation to 
compute what action to take in the real world (and the simulation will 
then be updated accordingly). The burning sensation exists only in the 
simulated world, not in the real world. Of course, you can infer that 
the object must have been hot.

So, it seems to be more sensible to me to say that an observer moment 
is itself an entire universe (= program) in some state. This looks 
equivalent to specifying the exact state a brain is in, but the brain 
contains more information than is accessible to the observer. We really 
have to extract the program the brain is running from the brain and use 
that to define OMs, otherwise an OM becomes an inherently ambiguous 
concept (e.g. where does the brain end, do the nerves in my feet also 
count? etc. etc.).

One can simply define an observer as some program and look at the 
entire multiverse to seek out these programs that are in such and such 
state. Then one adds up all the absolute measures to obtain the total 
probability that the program is experiencing that state.

One would then expect that it is likely that a program defining a human 
observer is simulated by a brain in a universe described by the 
Standard Model.

citeren Brent Meeker <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>:

>
> Saibal Mitra wrote:
>> 1) looks better because there is no unambiguous definition of "next".
>> However, I don't understand the "shared by everyone" part. Different
>> persons are different programs who cannot exactly represent the
>> "observer moment" of me.
>>
>> As I see it, an observer moment is a snapshot of the universe taken by
>> my brain. The brain simulates a virtual world based on information from
>> the real world. We don't really experience the real world, we just
>> experience this simulated world. Observer moments for observers should
>> refer to the physical states of the virtual world they live in. Since
>> different observers live in different universes which have different
>> laws of physics, these physical states (= qualia) cannot be compared to
>> each other.
>
> How do you know they live in different universes?  The great 
> agreement among observers is what leads us to believe in an objective 
> world.  It appears that it is more economical (both ontologically and 
> algorithmically) to explain the agreement by supposing there is an 
> objective world as described by physics.  In which case the observer 
> moments are derivative from the objective world - that's what makes 
> it a more efficient hypothesis.
>
> Brent Meeker
>
>
> >
>



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Re: how to define ASSA (was: The ASSA leads to a unique utilitarism)

[Saibal Mitra]

1) looks better because there is no unambiguous definition of "next". 
However, I don't understand the "shared by everyone" part. Different 
persons are different programs who cannot exactly represent the 
"observer moment" of me.

As I see it, an observer moment is a snapshot of the universe taken by 
my brain. The brain simulates a virtual world based on information from 
the real world. We don't really experience the real world, we just 
experience this simulated world. Observer moments for observers should 
refer to the physical states of the virtual world they live in. Since 
different observers live in different universes which have different 
laws of physics, these physical states (= qualia) cannot be compared to 
each other.

We can only talk about an absolute measure for programs (simulated by 
other programs or not)...



Citeren Wei Dai <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>:

>
> Russell Standish wrote:
>> This is actually the SSSA, as originally defined by Bostrom. The ASSA
>> is the SSSA applied to "next observer moments".
>
> I guess there is a bit of confusing on these terms. I did some searching in
> the mailing list archives to find out how they were originally defined.
> First of all SSSA was clearly coined by Hal Finney, not Bostrom. Here's Hal
> Finney on May 18, 1999:
>
>> Perhaps we need to distinguish a "Strong Self-Sampling Assumption",
>> which is like the SSA but instead of discussing "observers", it refers to
>> "observer-instants".
>
> Followed by Bruno Marchal's reply defining RSSA/ASSA:
>
>> >Perhaps we need to distinguish a "Strong Self-Sampling Assumption",
>> >which is like the SSA but instead of discussing "observers", it refers to
>> >"observer-instants".
>>
>> Useful distinction, indeed.
>>
>> Nevertheless I do think we should also distinguish between
>> a relative strong SSA and a absolute strong SSA.
>> The idea is that we can only quantify the first-person
>> indeterminism on the set of consistent observer-instants
>> extensions. I mean : consistent with the observers memory of its own
>> (first person) past.
>
> Actually now I'm not sure what Bruno really meant. I had assumed that ASSA
> was the same thing as SSSA, only with the clarification that it's not
> relative. But if Bruno had really meant to define ASSA as "SSSA applied to
> the next observer moment" then I have been using the term "ASSA"
> incorrectly.
>
> So to sum up, there are two possible meanings for ASSA currently. Does
> anyone else have an opinion on the matter? Here are the competing
> definitions:
>
> 1. You should reason as if your current observer-moment was randomly
> selected from a distribution that is shared by everyone and independent of
> your current observations (hence "absolute").
>
> 2. You should expect your next observer-moment to be randomly selected from
> a distribution that is shared by everyone and independent of your current
> observations.
>
>
>
>
> >
>



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Re: How would a computer know if it were conscious?

[Saibal Mitra]

If it feels bafflement and confusion, then surely it is conscious :)

An AI that takes information from books might experience similar qualia we
can experience. The AI will be programmed to do certain tasks and it must
thus have a notion of what it is doing is ok., not ok, or completely wrong.

If things are going wrong and it has to revert what it has just done, it may
feel some sort of pain. Just like what happens to us if we pick up something
that is very hot.

So, I think that there will be a mismatch between the qualia the AI
experiences and what "it reads about that we experience". The AI won't read
the information like we read it. I think it will directly experience it as
some qualia, just like we experience information coming in via our senses
into our brain.

The meaning we associate with the text would not be accessible to the AI,
because ultimately that is linked to the qualia we experience.

Perhaps what the AI experiences when it is processing information is similar
to an animal that is moving in some landscape. Maybe when it reads something
then that manifests itself like some object it sees. If  it processes
information then that could be like picking up that object putting it next
to a similar looking object.

But if  that object represents a text about consciousness then there is no
way for the AI to know that.

Saibal


- Original Message - 
From: ""Hal Finney"" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
To: <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Sent: Sunday, June 03, 2007 09:52 PM
Subject: Re: How would a computer know if it were conscious?


>
> Part of what I wanted to get at in my thought experiment is the
> bafflement and confusion an AI should feel when exposed to human ideas
> about consciousness.  Various people here have proffered their own
> ideas, and we might assume that the AI would read these suggestions,
> along with many other ideas that contradict the ones offered here.
> It seems hard to escape the conclusion that the only logical response
> is for the AI to figuratively throw up its hands and say that it is
> impossible to know if it is conscious, because even humans cannot agree
> on what consciousness is.
>
> In particular I don't think an AI could be expected to claim that it
> knows that it is conscious, that consciousness is a deep and intrinsic
> part of itself, that whatever else it might be mistaken about it could
> not be mistaken about being conscious.  I don't see any logical way it
> could reach this conclusion by studying the corpus of writings on the
> topic.  If anyone disagrees, I'd like to hear how it could happen.
>
> And the corollary to this is that perhaps humans also cannot legitimately
> make such claims, since logically their position is not so different
> from that of the AI.  In that case the seemingly axiomatic question of
> whether we are conscious may after all be something that we could be
> mistaken about.
>
> Hal
>
> >


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Re: Believing in Divine Destiny

[Saibal Mitra]

The only connection I can think of is as follows. For any given religious
text there should exist a universe which "best fits" those text.


Saibal


- Original Message - 
From: "Wei Dai" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
To: 
Sent: Tuesday, February 27, 2007 11:55 PM
Subject: Re: Believing in Divine Destiny


>
> > A year ago or so Wei Dai put an end to religious discussions on the
list.
>
> I don't remember if I did that a year ago or not, but I certainly think
the
> current discussion is off-topic. This mailing list is based on the premise
> that all possible universes exist. Unless someone can think of a
connection
> to this idea, can we please drop this thread?
>
> I have also noticed that all of [EMAIL PROTECTED]'s posts are
> copy-and-pastes from online sources:
>
> http://www.islamanswers.net/destiny/recorded.htm
> http://www.islamanswers.net/unity/understand.htm
> http://sg.answers.yahoo.com/question/index?qid=20070226110342AAy6SG5
> http://www.themodernreligion.com/basic/quran/quran_proof_preservation.htm
>
> Copying other people's writings without attribution is plagiarism, which I
> certainly do not approve of.
>
> And aside from that, if anyone wants to reference large amounts of online
> material, please post a link instead of copying the text.
>
> P.S., I find that I am not always able to keep up with all of the
> discussions on the list. Putting my name in a post is a good way to get my
> attention, and please always feel free to email me directly with any
> administrative issues related to the list.
>
>
>
> >


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Re: testing

[Saibal Mitra]

The listserver was experiencing a lot of "computer pain" recently and 
that prevented it from function normally :)


John Mikes <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>:


This is the 3rd time I send a 'test' to myself. I receive list-post on this
gmail address, but my mail does not show up, neither here nor on the
YAHOO-mail address I unsubscribed from.
Am I still on the "No e-mail" exclusion?
Or does the listserve not recognise my mailing?

John Mikes





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Re: Zuse Symposium: Is the universe a computer? Berlin Nov 6-7

[Saibal Mitra]

uncompoutable numbers, non countable sets etc. don't exist in first 
order logic, see here:

http://www.earlham.edu/~peters/courses/logsys/low-skol.htm


"[EMAIL PROTECTED]" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>:

>
> Ah the famous Juergen Schmidhuber! :)
>
> Is the universe a computer.  Well, if you define 'universe' to mean
> 'everything which exists' and you're a mathematical platonist and grant
> reality to infinite sets and uncomputables, the answer must be NO,
> since if uncomputable numbers are objectively real (strong platonism)
> they are 'things' and therefore 'part of the universe' which are by
> definition not computable.
>
> But if by 'universe' you just mean 'physical reality' or 'discrete
> mathematics' or you refuse to grant platonic reality to uncomputables
> or infinite sets (anti-platonism or weaker platonism) then the answer
> could be YES, the universe is a computer.
>
> Cheers!
>
>
> >
>



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Re: Proof that QTI is false

[Saibal Mitra]

Yes, I agree that you could still have some form of QTI if there are only a
finite number of states. I just don't believe in it, because I don't think
the use of the relative measure is justified in case the observer isn't
conserved. In all other case the absolute measure and the relative measure
lead to the same predictions.



>
> Actually, in standard quantum mechanics, there is an infinity of
> observer moments, 2^{\aleph_0} of them in fact.
>
> What you are talking about are various quantum gravity theories, such
> as string theory, which appear to have a finite number of observer
> moments.
>
> However, even if as observers we are locked into a Nietschian cycle at
> some point in time due to finiteness of the number of possible states,
> the number will be so large that the practical effects of QTI will
> still need to be considered.
>
> Cheers
>

- Original Message - 
From: "Russell Standish" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
To: 
Sent: Wednesday, September 13, 2006 4:31 AM
Subject: Re: Proof that QTI is false

> On Tue, Sep 12, 2006 at 11:58:14PM +0200, Saibal Mitra wrote:
> >
> > QTI in the way defined in this list contradicts quantum mechanics. The
> > observable part of the universe can only be in a finite number of
quantum
> > states. So, it can only harbor a finite number of observer moments or
> > experiences a  person can have, see here for details:
> >
> > http://arxiv.org/abs/gr-qc/0102010
> >
> > If there can only be a finite number of observer moments you can only
> > experience a finite amount of time.
> >
> > QED.
> >
> >
> >
> -- 
> *PS: A number of people ask me about the attachment to my email, which
> is of type "application/pgp-signature". Don't worry, it is not a
> virus. It is an electronic signature, that may be used to verify this
> email came from me if you have PGP or GPG installed. Otherwise, you
> may safely ignore this attachment.
>
> --
--
> A/Prof Russell Standish  Phone 0425 253119 (mobile)
> Mathematics
> UNSW SYDNEY 2052  [EMAIL PROTECTED]
> Australia
http://parallel.hpc.unsw.edu.au/rks
> International prefix  +612, Interstate prefix 02
> --
--
>
>
> --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~
Saibal


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Re: Proof that QTI is false

[Saibal Mitra]

- Original Message - 
From: "Brent Meeker" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
To: 
Sent: Wednesday, September 13, 2006 5:47 AM
Subject: Re: Proof that QTI is false


>
> Saibal Mitra wrote:
> > QTI in the way defined in this list contradicts quantum mechanics. The
> > observable part of the universe can only be in a finite number of
quantum
> > states. So, it can only harbor a finite number of observer moments or
> > experiences a  person can have, see here for details:
> >
> > http://arxiv.org/abs/gr-qc/0102010
> >
> > If there can only be a finite number of observer moments you can only
> > experience a finite amount of time.
> >
> > QED.
>
> So that would imply that when predicting states at some fixed finite time
in the
> future there is a smallest, non-zero probability that is realizable.  So
if our
> prediction, using continuum variables as an approximation, indicates a
probability
> lower than this value we should set it to zero??
>
> Brent Meeker

Yes, but you don't have to set anything to zero by hand. What happens is
that if there are only a finite number of quantum states there is one which
has the smallest non zero probability.

Saibal


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Proof that QTI is false

[Saibal Mitra]

QTI in the way defined in this list contradicts quantum mechanics. The
observable part of the universe can only be in a finite number of quantum
states. So, it can only harbor a finite number of observer moments or
experiences a  person can have, see here for details:

http://arxiv.org/abs/gr-qc/0102010

If there can only be a finite number of observer moments you can only
experience a finite amount of time.

QED.


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Re: Russell's book

[Saibal Mitra]

I think I can prove that QTI as intepreted in this list is false, I'll post
the proof in a new thread.

The only version of QTI that makes sense to me is this:
All possible states exist "out there" in the multiverse. The observer
moments are timeless objects so, in a certain sense, QTI is true. But then
you must consider surviving with memory loss.

E.g., if I'm diagnosed with a terminal illness, then there is still a branch
in which I haven't  been diagnosed with that illness. If I'm 100 years old,
then I still have copies that are only 20 years old etc. etc.

Saibal

- Original Message - 
From: "Johnathan Corgan" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
To: 
Sent: Tuesday, September 12, 2006 7:43 PM
Subject: Re: Russell's book


>
> David Nyman wrote:
>
> [re: QTI]
> > This has obvious
> > implications for retirement planning in general and avoidance of the
> > more egregious cul-de-sac situations. On the other hand, short of
> > outright lunacy vis-a-vis personal safety, it also seems to imply that
> > from the 1st-person pov we are likely to come through (albeit possibly
> > in less-than-perfect shape) even apparently minimally survivable
> > situations. This struck me particularly forcibly while watching the
> > 9/11 re-runs on TV last night.
>
> It's the cul-de-sac situations that interest me.  Are there truly any?
> Are there moments of consciousness which have no logically possible
> continuation (while remaining conscious?)
>
> It seems the canonical example is surviving a nearby nuclear detonation.
>  One logical possibility is that all your constituent particles
> quantum-tunnel away from the blast in time.
>
> This would be of extremely low measure in absolute terms, but what about
> the proportion of continuations that contain you as a conscious entity?
>
> This also touches on a recent thread about "how being of low measure
> feels." If QTI is true, and I'm subject to a nuclear detonation, does it
> matter if my possible continuations are of such a low relative measure?
> Once I'm "in" them, would I feel any different and should I care?
>
> These questions may reduce to something like, "Is there a lower limit to
> the amplitude of the SWE?"
>
> If measure is infinitely divisible, then is there any natural scale to
> its absolute value?
>
> I raised a similar question on the list a few months ago when Tookie
> Wiliams was in the headlines and was eventually executed by the State of
> California.  What possible continuations exist in this situation?
>
> > In effect, we are being presented with a kind of 'yes doctor' in
> > everyday life. Do you find that these considerations affect your own
> > behaviour in any way?
>
> A very interesting question.
>
> If my expectation is that QTI is true and I'll be living for a very long
> time, I may adjust my financial planning accordingly.  But QTI only
> applies to my own first-person view; I'll be constantly "shedding"
> branches where I did indeed die.  If I have any financial dependents, do
> I provide for their welfare, even if they'll only exist forever outside
> my ability to interact with?
>
> -Johnathan
>
> >


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Re: Interested in thoughts on this excerpt from Martin Rees

[Saibal Mitra]

- Original Message - 
From: ""Hal Finney"" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
To: 
Sent: Wednesday, July 26, 2006 08:28 AM
Subject: Re: Interested in thoughts on this excerpt from Martin Rees



> The real problem is not just that it is a philosophical speculation,
> it is that it does not lead to any testable physical predictions.
> The string theory landscape, even if finite, is far too large for
> systematic exploration.  Our ideas, with an infinite number of possible
> universes, are even worse.  Physicists see acceptance of anthropic
> explanations as the end of physics because there is no way to make
> quantitative predictions when there are so many degrees of freedom.
>

I'm not so sure that our ideas are worse. If you read some recent articles,
e.g.:

http://arxiv.org/abs/astro-ph/0607227

you see that they haven't really formulated rigorous theories about measure,
probabilities etc. of the multiverse. It's still very much in the
"handwaving" stage.

Saibal


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Re: A calculus of personal identity

[Saibal Mitra]

- Original Message - 
From: "Stathis Papaioannou" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
To: 
Sent: Friday, June 30, 2006 09:23 AM
Subject: Re: A calculus of personal identity


Brent Meeker writes:

> > I think it is one of the most profound things about consciousness > >
that observer moments don't *need* anything to connect them other than > >
their content. They are linked like the novels in a series, not like the > >
carriages of a train. It is not necessary that the individual novels be > >
lined up specially on a shelf: as long as they have each been written > >
and exist somewhere in the world, the series exists. > > But the series
exists, as a series, by virtue of the information in them.  They are like
Barbour's > time-capsules; each contains enough references and characters
from the others to allow them to be > put into order.  It's not clear to me
what duration "obserever moments" have - but I don't think > they are novel
length.  I imagine them more like sentences (a complete thought as my
English teacher > used to say), and sentences *don't* have enough
information to allow them to be reconstructed into > the novel they came
from.
A book is the analogy that came to mind, but there is an important
difference between this and conscious experience. Books, sentences, words
may not need to be physically collected together to make a coherent larger
structure, but they do need to be somehow sorted in the mind of an observer;
otherwise, we could say that a dictionary contains every book ever written
or yet to be written. Moments of consciousness, on the other hand, by their
nature contain their own observer.
> That's why I suggest that OMs are not an adequate ontological basis for a
world model.  On the other > hand, if we include brain processes, or more
abstractly, subconscious thoughts, then we would have > enough information
to string them together.
I know some people on this list have attempted world-building with OMs, but
my starting point is the less ambitious idea that consciousness can in
principle extend across time and space without being specially linked. If a
person's stream of consciousness were chopped up into seconds, minutes, days
or whatever, using whatever vehicle it takes to run a human mind, and these
moments of consciousness randomly dispersed throughout the multiverse, they
would all connect up by virtue of their information content. Do you disagree
that it would in principle be possible?


You can take time evolution as an example. In both classical physics and
quantum mechanics, information is preserved. All the information about us
was already present in the early universe


Saibal







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Re: Teleportation thought experiment and UD+ASSA

[Saibal Mitra]

Hal, thanks for explaining!

I think that your approach makes a lot of sense. Applying this to copying
experiments, the probability of finding yourself to be the digital copy is:

m1/[m1 + m2]

where m1 is the measure of the mental experience corresponding to knowing
that you are the digital copy and m2 the measure of the mental experience
corresponding to knowing that you are still in biological form. I think that
for practical implementations m1 = m2 because the digital implementation
will just simulate the brain, so the complexity of the translation program
would be practically the same.

Saibal



- Original Message - 
From: ""Hal Finney"" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
To: 
Sent: Wednesday, June 21, 2006 08:49 AM
Subject: Re: Teleportation thought experiment and UD+ASSA


>
> "Saibal Mitra" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> writes:
> > I don't understand why you consider the measures of the programs that do
the
> > simulations. The ''real'' measure should be derived from the algorithmic
> > complexity of the laws of physics that describe how the computers/brains
> > work. If you know for certain that a computation will be performed in
this
> > universe, then it doesn't matter how it is performed.
>
> I think what you're saying here is that if a mental state is instantiated
> by a given universe, the contribution to its measure should just be
> the measure of the universe that instantiates it.  And that universe's
> measure is based on the complexity of its laws of physics.
>
> I used to hold this view, but I eventually abandoned it because of a
> number of problems.  I need to go back and collect the old messages
> and discussions that we have had and put them into some kind of order.
> But I can mention a couple of issues.
>
> One problem is the one I just wrote about in my reply to Russell, the
> fuzziness of the concept of implementation.  In at least some universes
> we may face a gray area in deciding whether a particular computation,
> or more specifically a particular mental state, is being instantiated.
> Philosophers like Hans Moravec apparently really believe that every
> system instantiates virtually every mental state!  If you look at the
> right subset of the atomic vibrations inside a chunk of rock, you can
> come up with a pattern that is identical to the pattern of firing of
> neurons in your own brain.  Now, most philosophers reject this, they come
> up with various technical criteria that implementations have to satisfy,
> but as I wrote to Russell I don't think any of these work.
>
> The other problem arises from fuzziness in what counts as a "universe".
> The problem is that you can write very simple programs which will
> create your mental state.  For example, the Universal Dovetailer does
> just that.  But the UD program is much smaller than what our universe's
> physical laws probably would be.  Does the measure of the UD "count" as a
> contribution to every mind it creates?  If so, then it will dominate over
> the contributions from more conventional universes; and further, since
> the UD generates all minds, it means that all minds have equal measure.
> To reject the UD as a cheating non-universe means that we will need a
> bunch of ad hoc rules about what counts as a universe and what does not,
> which are fundamentally arbitrary and unconvincing.
>
> Then there are all those bothersome disputes which arise in this model,
> such as whether multiple instantiations should add more measure than
> just one; or whether a given brain in a small universe should get more
> measure than the same brain in a big universe (since it uses a higher
> proportion of the universe's resources in the first case).  All these
> issues, as well as the ones above, are addressed and answered in my
> current framework, which is far simpler (the measure of a mental state
> is just its Kolmogorov measure - end of story).
>
>
> > The algorithmic complexity of the program needed to simulate a brain
refers
> > to a ''personal universe''. You can think of the brain as a machine that
is
> > simulating a virtual world in which the qualia we experience exist. That
> > world also exists independent of our brain in a universe of its own.
This
> > world has a very small measure defined by the very large algorithmic
> > complexity of the program needed to specify the brain.
>
> I agree with this, I think.  The program needed to specify a mental state
> a priori would be far larger than the program needed to specify the laws
> of physics which could cause that mental state to evolve "naturally".
> Both programs make a contribution to the measure of the mental state

Re: Teleportation thought experiment and UD+ASSA

[Saibal Mitra]

I don't understand why you consider the measures of the programs that do the
simulations. The ''real'' measure should be derived from the algorithmic
complexity of the laws of physics that describe how the computers/brains
work. If you know for certain that a computation will be performed in this
universe, then it doesn't matter how it is performed.

The algorithmic complexity of the program needed to simulate a brain refers
to a ''personal universe''. You can think of the brain as a machine that is
simulating a virtual world in which the qualia we experience exist. That
world also exists independent of our brain in a universe of its own. This
world has a very small measure defined by the very large algorithmic
complexity of the program needed to specify the brain.


Saibal



From: ""Hal Finney"" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
To: 
Sent: Tuesday, June 20, 2006 06:35 PM
Subject: Re: Teleportation thought experiment and UD+ASSA


>
> Bruno writes:
> > Hal,
> >
> > It seems to me that you are introducing a notion of physical
universe,=20
> > and then use it to reintroduce a notion of first person death, so
that=20
> > you can bet you will be the one "annihilated" in Brussels.
>
> I should first mention that I did not anticipate the conclusion that
> I reached when I did that analysis.  I did not expect to conclude that
> teleportation like this would probably not work (speaking figurately).
> This was not the starting point of the analysis, but the conclusion.
>
> The starting point was the framework I have described previously, which
> can be stated very simply as that the measure of an information pattern
> comes from the universal distribution of Kolmogorov.  I then applied this
> analysis to specific information patterns which represent subjective,
> first person lifetime experiences.  I concluded that the truncated version
> which ends when the teleportation occurs would probably have higher
> measure than the ones which proceed through and beyond the teleportation.
>
> Although I worked in terms of a specific physical universe, that is
> a short-cut for simplicity of exposition.  The general case is to simply
> ask for the K measure of each possible first-person subjective life
> experience - what is the shortest program that produces each one.  I
> assume that the shortest program will in fact have two parts, one which
> creates a universe and the second which takes that universe as input
> and produces the first-person experience record as output.
>
> This leads to a Schmidhuber-like ensemble where we would consider
> all possible universes and estimate the contribution of each one to
> the measure of a particular first-person experience.  It is important
> though to keep in mind that in practice the only universe which adds
> non-negligible measure would be the one we are discussing.  In other
> words, consider the first person experience of being born, living your
> life, travelling to Brussels and stepping into a teleportation machine.
> A random, chaotic universe would add negligibly to the measure of this
> first-person life experience.  Likewise for a universe which only evolves
> six-legged aliens on some other planet.  So in practice it makes sense
> to restrict our attention to the (approximately) one universe which has
> third-person objective events that do add significant measure to the
> instantiation of these abstract first-person experiences.
>
>
> > You agree that this is just equivalent of negating the comp
hypothesis.=20
> > You would not use (classical) teleportation, nor accept a digital=20
> > artificial brain, all right? Do I miss something?
>
> It is perhaps best to say that I would not do these things
> *axiomatically*.  Whether a particular teleportation technology would
> be acceptable would depend on considerations such as I described in my
> previous message.  It's possible that the theoretical loss of measure for
> some teleportation technology would be small enough that I would do it.
>
> As far as using an artificial brain, again I would look to this kind of
> analysis.  I have argued previously that a brain which is much smaller
> or faster than the biological one should have much smaller measure, so
> that would not be an appealing transformation.  OTOH an artificial brain
> could be designed to have larger measure, such as by being physically
> larger or perhaps by having more accurate and complete memory storage.
> Then that would be appealing.
>
> I think that one of the fundamental principles of your COMP hypothesis
> is the functionalist notion, that it does not matter what kind of system
> instantiates a computation.  However I think this founders on the familiar
> paradoxes over what counts as an instantiation.  In principle we can
> come up with a continuous range of devices which span the alternatives
> from non-instantiation to full instantiation of a given computation.
> Without some way to distinguish these, there is no meaning to the question
> of when a computatio

Re: Reasons and Persons

[Saibal Mitra]

John, actually I don't want to do that per se. I think that ultimately we live 
in a 
universe described by the very complex ''laws of physics'' that describe the 
qualia we 
experience. Perhaps it is better to say that we are such complex universes. We 
are 
simulated in a universe described by simple laws of physics. Our brains are 
simulating 
us. We shouldn't confuse the hardware with the software


Saibal


Quoting "[EMAIL PROTECTED]" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>:

> 
> And why do you want to restrict a 'person' to a cut view of its neurons
> only?
> Isn't a person (as anything) part of his ambience - in a wider view: of
> the
> totality, with interction back and forth with all the changes that go on?
> Are you really interested only in the dance of those silly neurons?
> 
> John M
> - Original Message -
> From: "Saibal Mitra" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
> To: 
> Sent: Monday, May 29, 2000 9:07 PM
> Subject: Re: Reasons and Persons
> 
> 
> >
> > There must exist a ''high level'' program that specifies a person in
> terms
> > of qualia. These qualia are ultimately defined by the way neurons are
> > connected, but you could also think of persons in terms of the
> high-level
> > algorithm, instead of the ''machine language'' level algorithm specified
> by
> > the neural network.
> >
> > The interpolation between two persons is more easily done in the high
> level
> > language. Then you do obtain a continuous path from one person to the
> other.
> > For each intermediary person, you can then try to ''compile'' the
> program
> to
> > the corresponding neural network.
> >
> > - Original Message -
> > From: "Jesse Mazer" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
> > To: 
> > Sent: Tuesday, May 30, 2006 02:29 AM
> > Subject: Re: Reasons and Persons
> >
> >
> > >
> > > Russell Standish wrote:
> > > >
> > > >
> > > >On Mon, May 29, 2006 at 07:15:33PM +1000, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> > > > >
> > > > > I don't see why you are so sure about the necessity of passing
> through
> > > > > non-functional brain structures going from you to Napoleon. After
> all,
> > > > > there is a continuous sequence of intermediates between you and a
> > > > > fertilized ovum, and on the face of it you have much more in
> common
> > > > > mentally and physically with Napoleon than with a fertilized ovum.
> > > > > However, technical feasibility is not the point. The point is that
> > *if*
> > > > > (let's say magically) your mind were gradually transformed, so
> that
> > your
> > > >
> > > >We need to be a bit more precise than "magically". In Parfit's book
> he
> > > >talks about swapping out my neurons for the equivalent neurons in
> > > >Napoleon's brain. Sure this is not exactly technically feasible at
> > > >present, but for thought experiment purposes it is adequate, and
> > > >suffices for doing the teleporting experiment.
> > > >
> > > >The trouble I have is that Napoleon's brain will be wired completely
> > > >differently to my own. Substituting enough of his neurons and
> > > >connections will eventually just disrupt the functioning of my brain.
> > >
> > > I agree that Parfit's simple method would probably create a
> nonfunctional
> > > state in between, or at least the intermediate phase would involve a
> sort
> > of
> > > split personality disorder with two entirely separate minds coexisting
> in
> > > the same brain, without access to each other's thoughts and feelings.
> But
> > > this is probably not a fatal flaw in whatever larger argument he was
> > making,
> > > because you could modify the thought experiment to say something like
> > "let's
> > > assume that in the phase space of all possibe arrangements of neurons
> and
> > > synapses, there is some continuous path between my brain and
> Napoleon's
> > > brain such that every intermediate state would have a single
> integrated
> > > consciousness". There's no way of knowing whether such a path exists
> (and
> > of
> > > course I don't have a precise definition of 'single integrated
> > > consciousness'), but it seems at least somewhat plausible.
> > >
> > > Jesse
> > >
> > >
> > >
> > > >
> >
> >
> > >
> >
> >
> > --
> > No virus found in this incoming message.
> > Checked by AVG Free Edition.
> > Version: 7.1.394 / Virus Database: 268.8.0/353 - Release Date: 05/31/06
> >
> >
> 
> 
> > 
> 




-- 
_
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http://www.tele2.nl


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Re: Reasons and Persons

[Saibal Mitra]

There must exist a ''high level'' program that specifies a person in terms
of qualia. These qualia are ultimately defined by the way neurons are
connected, but you could also think of persons in terms of the high-level
algorithm, instead of the ''machine language'' level algorithm specified by
the neural network.

The interpolation between two persons is more easily done in the high level
language. Then you do obtain a continuous path from one person to the other.
For each intermediary person, you can then try to ''compile'' the program to
the corresponding neural network.

- Original Message - 
From: "Jesse Mazer" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
To: 
Sent: Tuesday, May 30, 2006 02:29 AM
Subject: Re: Reasons and Persons


>
> Russell Standish wrote:
> >
> >
> >On Mon, May 29, 2006 at 07:15:33PM +1000, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> > >
> > > I don't see why you are so sure about the necessity of passing through
> > > non-functional brain structures going from you to Napoleon. After all,
> > > there is a continuous sequence of intermediates between you and a
> > > fertilized ovum, and on the face of it you have much more in common
> > > mentally and physically with Napoleon than with a fertilized ovum.
> > > However, technical feasibility is not the point. The point is that
*if*
> > > (let's say magically) your mind were gradually transformed, so that
your
> >
> >We need to be a bit more precise than "magically". In Parfit's book he
> >talks about swapping out my neurons for the equivalent neurons in
> >Napoleon's brain. Sure this is not exactly technically feasible at
> >present, but for thought experiment purposes it is adequate, and
> >suffices for doing the teleporting experiment.
> >
> >The trouble I have is that Napoleon's brain will be wired completely
> >differently to my own. Substituting enough of his neurons and
> >connections will eventually just disrupt the functioning of my brain.
>
> I agree that Parfit's simple method would probably create a nonfunctional
> state in between, or at least the intermediate phase would involve a sort
of
> split personality disorder with two entirely separate minds coexisting in
> the same brain, without access to each other's thoughts and feelings. But
> this is probably not a fatal flaw in whatever larger argument he was
making,
> because you could modify the thought experiment to say something like
"let's
> assume that in the phase space of all possibe arrangements of neurons and
> synapses, there is some continuous path between my brain and Napoleon's
> brain such that every intermediate state would have a single integrated
> consciousness". There's no way of knowing whether such a path exists (and
of
> course I don't have a precise definition of 'single integrated
> consciousness'), but it seems at least somewhat plausible.
>
> Jesse
>
>
>
> >


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Re: Smullyan Shmullyan, give me a real example

[Saibal Mitra]

From: "Patrick Leahy" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
To: 
Sent: Friday, May 12, 2006 12:56 PM
Subject: Re: Smullyan Shmullyan, give me a real example


>
>
> On Fri, 12 May 2006, Saibal Mitra wrote:
>
> >
> > Einstein seems to have believed in ''immortal observer moments''.
> >
> > In a BBC documentary about time it was mentioned that Einstein consoled
a
> > friend whose son had died in a tragic accident by saying that relativity
> > suggests that the past and the future are as real as the present.
> >
>
> I'm sure Einstein would turn in his grave at your quoted expression. An
> immortal moment is a contradiction in terms, unless it implies a "second
> time" which passes as we contemplate "first time" embedded in 4-D
> space-time.  Unfortunately a lot of popular discussion of space-time
> implicitly invokes this spurious second time, because it is hard to
> decouple the language of existence from the language of existence *in
> time*. To believe, with Einstein, that all points in space-time are
> equally real (because the relativity of simultaneity means that there is
> no unique "now") is quite the opposite of the nutty idea that all events
> exist "now" --- not even wrong, from Einstein's point of view.
>
> Einstein actually expressed this view in a letter of condolence to the
> widow of his old friend Michele Besso. His words are worth quoting
> accurately:
>
> "In quitting this strange world he has once again preceded me by just a
> little. That doesn't mean anything. For we convinced physicists the
> distinction between past, present, and future is only an illusion, however
> persistent."
>
> Later physicists, in particular John Bell, have pointed out that
> relativity doesn't *prove* that now is an illusion, it just makes it
> impossible to identify any objective "now".
>
> Not that any of this has anything to do with the sort of immortality
> contemplated by Everett, which is not at all enticing: like the Sibyl in
> classical myth, his immortality would not be accompanied by eternal
> youth... a rather horrible fate.
>

Thanks for the correction and the exact quote. I only vaguely remembered
what was said in the program. Of course, ''immortal observer moment'' is
indeed contradictory. The point is, of course, that ''now'' implies a
localization in time just like ''here'' implies localization in space. Just
like things that don't exist here but do exist elsewhere are ''real'' so
should things that don't exist now anymore but did exist at some time in the
past.

Saibal


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Re: Smullyan Shmullyan, give me a real example

[Saibal Mitra]

Einstein seems to have believed in ''immortal observer moments''.

In a BBC documentary about time it was mentioned that Einstein consoled a
friend whose son had died in a tragic accident by saying that relativity
suggests that the past and the future are as real as the present.

Saibal





From: "Russell Standish" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
To: 
Sent: Thursday, May 11, 2006 01:07 AM
Subject: Re: Smullyan Shmullyan, give me a real example


>
> On Wed, May 10, 2006 at 11:13:27PM +0100, Patrick Leahy wrote:
> >
> >
> > On who invented quantum suicide, the following is from the biography of
> > Hugh Everett by Eugene B. Shikhovtsev and Kenneth W. Ford, at
> > http://space.mit.edu/home/tegmark/everett/
> >
> > "Atheist or not, Everett firmly believed that his many-worlds theory
> > guaranteed him immortality: His consciousness, he argued, is bound at
each
> > branching to follow whatever path does not lead to death --- and so on
ad
> > infinitum. (Sadly, Everett's daughter Liz, in her later suicide note,
said
> > she was going to a parallel universe to be with her father...)"
>
> Sadly, because this is based on a total misunderstanding of QTI, I guess.
>
> >
> > The reference is to Everett's views in 1979-80, but there is no reason
to
> > suppose that Everett had only just thought of it at the time. On a
> > personal note, some time in the '80s I met one of Everett's co-workers
who
> > told me that Everett used to justify his very unhealthy lifestyle on
> > exactly these grounds. In our world, Everett died of a heart attack aged
> > 52.
> >
> > I have always assumed that John Bell was thinking along these lines when
> > he commented on Everett's theory:
> >
> > "But if such a theory was taken seriously it would hardly be possible to
> > take anything else seriously." (1981, reprinted in _Speakable &
> > Unspeakable in Quantum Mechanics).
> >
>
> These dates all mesh with Don Page's anecdote about Ed Teller :
> immortality consequences widely known, but rarely talked about by the
> early '80s.
>
> > For that matter, this idea is implicit in Borges' story "The Garden of
> > Forking Paths" (written before 1941), which provides the epigraph to the
> > DeWitt & Graham anthology on The Many Worlds Interpretation.
> >
> > ==
> > Dr J. P. Leahy, University of Manchester,
> > Jodrell Bank Observatory, School of Physics & Astronomy,
> > Macclesfield, Cheshire SK11 9DL, UK
> > Tel - +44 1477 572636, Fax - +44 1477 571618
>
> Very interesting. Its a shame my manuscript is already at the
> printers, I would have loved this for my background info on QTI.
>
> -- 
> --
--
> A/Prof Russell Standish  Phone 8308 3119 (mobile)
> Mathematics0425 253119 (")
> UNSW SYDNEY 2052  [EMAIL PROTECTED]
> Australia
http://parallel.hpc.unsw.edu.au/rks
> International prefix  +612, Interstate prefix 02
> --
--
>
> >


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Re: why can't we erase information?

[Saibal Mitra]

This thread is still alive! It seems that information can't be erased in
this thread either :)

I think that information can't be erased because of the way time is (or
should be) defined. If you take the observer moment approach to the
multiverse, then you have to define a notion of time. That definition will
then imply conservation of information.




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Re: why can't we erase information?

[Saibal Mitra]

- Original Message - 
From: "Wei Dai" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
To: 
Sent: Tuesday, April 11, 2006 01:46 AM
Subject: Re: why can't we erase information?


>
> Saibal Mitra wrote:
> > How would an observer know he is living in a universe in which
information
> > is lost? Information loss means that time evolution can map two
different
> > initial states to the same final state. The observer in the final state
> > thus
> > cannot know that information really has been lost.
>
> If the universe allows two different states to evolve into the same final
> state, the second law of thermodynamics wouldn't hold, and we would be
able
> to (in principle) contruct perpetual motion machines.
>
> I don't know why you say this can't be detected by an observer. In theory
> all we have to do is prepare two systems in two different states, and then
> observe that they have evolved into the same final state. Of course in
> practice the problem is "which two different states?" And as I suggest
> earlier, it may be that for anthropic reasons one or both of these states
is
> very difficult to access.
>

Yes, in principle you could observe such a thing. But it may be that generic
models exhibiting information loss look like model that don't have
information loss to internal observers. 't Hooft's deterministic models are
an example of this.

I'm also skeptical about observers being able to make more efficient
machines. The problem with that, as I see it (I haven't read Lloyd's book
yet) is as follows.

Consider first a model without information loss, like our own universe. What
is preventing us from converting heat into work with 100% efficiency is lack
of information. If we had access to all the information that is present then
you could make an effective Maxwell's Daemon.

Lacking such information, Maxwell's Deamon has to make measurements, which
it has to act on. But eventually it has to clear it's memory, and that makes
it ineffective.

To get rid of this problem Maxwell's Daemon would have to be able to reset
its memory without changing the state of the rest of the universe. This
could possibly be done in an universe with information loss, but that could
only work if the Daemon has control over the information loss process. If
information loss interferes with the actions of the Daemon, then it isn't
much use.

You could also think of the possiblity of some ''physical process'' which
would be sort of a ''passive Maxwell's Deamon'' that could reduce the
entropy in such universe. Using that you could create a temperature
difference between two objects. To extract work you now need to let heat
flow between the two objects. So, at that stage you need an entropy to
increase again.

So, to me this doesn't seem to be a generic world in which you have
information loss, rather a world in which it is preserved but where it can
be overruled at will. The benefits come from that magical power.


Saibal


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Re: why can't we erase information?

[Saibal Mitra]

Yes, I agree. But it could be that information loss is a bit ambiguous. E.g.
't Hooft has shown that you can start with a deterministic model exhibiting
information loss and end up with quantum mechanics.

Saibal

- Original Message - 
From: "Jesse Mazer" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
To: 
Sent: Monday, April 10, 2006 03:22 AM
Subject: Re: why can't we erase information?


>
> Saibal Mitra wrote:
>
> >
> >
> >How would an observer know he is living in a universe in which
information
> >is lost? Information loss means that time evolution can map two different
> >initial states to the same final state. The observer in the final state
> >thus
> >cannot know that information really has been lost.
>
> If he is able to figure out the fundamental laws of physics of his
universe,
> then he could see whether or not they have this property of it being
> possible to deduce past states from present ones (I think the name for
this
> property might be 'reversible', although I can't remember the difference
> between 'reversible' and 'invertible' laws). For example, the rules of
> Conway's "Game of Life" cellular automaton are not reversible, but if it
> were possible for such a world to support intelligent beings I don't see
why
> it wouldn't be in principle possible for them to deduce the underlying
> rules.
>
> As for the question of why we live in a universe that apparently has this
> property, I don't think there's an anthropic explanation for it, I'd see
it
> as part of the larger question of why we live in a universe whose
> fundamental laws seem to be so elegant and posess so many symmetries, one
of
> which is time-symmetry (or to be more accurate, CPT-symmetry, which means
> the laws of physics are unchanged if you switch particles with
antiparticles
> and flip the 'parity' along with reversing which direction of time is
> labeled 'the future' and which is labeled 'the past'). Some TOEs that have
> been bandied about here say that we should expect to live in a universe
> whose laws are very compressible, so maybe this would be one possible way
of
> answering the question.
>
> Jesse
>
>
>
> >

-
Defeat Spammers by launching DDoS attacks on Spam-Websites:
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Re: why can't we erase information?

[Saibal Mitra]

How would an observer know he is living in a universe in which information
is lost? Information loss means that time evolution can map two different
initial states to the same final state. The observer in the final state thus
cannot know that information really has been lost.



- Original Message - 
From: "Wei Dai" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
To: 
Sent: Sunday, April 09, 2006 09:11 AM
Subject: why can't we erase information?


>
> If we consider our observable universe as a computation, it's rather
> atypical in that it doesn't seem to make use of the erase operation (or
> other any operation that irreversibly erases information). The second law
of
> thermodynamics is a consequence of this. In order to forget anything
> (decrease entropy), we have to put the information somewhere else
(increase
> entropy of the environment), instead of just making it disappear. If this
> doesn't make sense to you, see Seth Lloyd's new book "Programming the
> Universe : A Quantum Computer Scientist Takes On the Cosmos" for a good
> explanation of the relationship between entropy, computation, and
> information.
>
> Has anyone thought about why this is the case? One possible answer is that
> if it were possible to erase information, life organisms would be able to
> construct internal perpetual motion machines to power their metabolism,
> instead of competing with each other for sources of negentropy, and
perhaps
> intelligence would not be able to evolve in this kind of environment. If
> this is the case, perhaps there is reason to hope that our universe does
> contain mechanisms to erase information, but they are not easily
accessible
> to life before the evolution of intelligence. It may be a good idea to
look
> out for such mechanisms, for example in high energy particle reactions.
>
> However I'm not sure this answer is correct because there would still be
> competition for raw material (matter and energy) where intelligence can
> still be an advantage. Anyone have other ideas?
>
>
>
> >


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Re: Multiverse concepts in string theory

[Saibal Mitra]

Hi Stephen,
 
Yes I agree. But once you have many scientists 
believing in a certain paradigm, it takes radical new discoveries to overturn 
it. The lack of confirmation is usually not enough.
 
Saibal
 
 
 
 
- Original Message - 

  From: 
  Stephen 
  Paul King 
  To: everything-list@eskimo.com 
  Sent: Wednesday, February 15, 2006 1:45 
  AM
  Subject: Re: Multiverse concepts in 
  string theory
  
  Hi Saibal,
   
      Does this not lead one to suspect that 
  they secretly believe SUSY to be "not even wrong" and yet seek to save face? 
  My problem is that any scientific theory must be highly falsifiable, otherwise 
  we are just going back to the days of Scholastic debates...
   
  http://clublet.com/why?AngelsOnTheHeadsOfPins
   
  Onward!
   
  Stephen
   
  
- Original Message - 
From: 
    Saibal Mitra 

To: Stephen Paul King ; everything-list@eskimo.com 

Sent: Tuesday, February 14, 2006 6:20 
PM
Subject: Re: Multiverse concepts in 
string theory

Stephen,
 
Theorists are always a bit ahead and they have 
already found ways to save SUSY from negative results from the LHC. 

 
Saibal
 
 
- Original Message - 

  From: 
  Stephen 
  Paul King 
  To: everything-list@eskimo.com 
  
  Sent: Tuesday, February 14, 2006 1:04 
  PM
  Subject: Re: Multiverse concepts in 
  string theory
  
  Hi Norman,
   
      It will be a wonderful thing to get a 
  confirmation by next year but I am afraid that the usual behavior of 
  theorist will occur: the theory will be re-tinkered so that the particle 
  masses are too massive to be created by humans. It has been happening 
  already in astrophysics...
   
      Btw, have you any familiarity with 
  modeling the dynamics of scalar fields in relativistic situations? I need 
  some help. ;-)
   
  Onward!
   
  Stephen
   
   
  - Original Message - 
  
From: 
Norman 
Samish 
To: Everything-list 
Sent: Tuesday, February 14, 2006 
1:36 AM
Subject: Re: Multiverse concepts in 
string theory

Stephen,
 
As you say, the version of string theory with an 
infinity of universes is an elegant concept.  However, when 
you say ". . . its most fundamental assumption, the existence 
of a supersymmerty relation between bosons and fermions, has never even 
come close to matching experimental observation," one could infer 
that there is little likelihood that SUSY will ever be shown to 
be a good theory.
 
This may change soon.  Wikipedia says 
"Experimentalists have not yet found any superpartners for known 
particles, either because they are too massive to be created in our 
current particle accelerators, or because they may not exist at 
all.   By the year 2007, the Large Hadron Collider at CERN 
should be ready for use, producing collisions at sufficiently high 
energies to detect the superpartners many theorists hope to 
see."
 
So maybe, in a couple of years, there WILL be 
experimental observation supporting SUSY.
 
I agree that the posts by Hal Finney and Wei Dai are 
well said and inspirational.  Thanks,
 
Norman

Re: Multiverse concepts in string theory

[Saibal Mitra]

Stephen,
 
Theorists are always a bit ahead and they have 
already found ways to save SUSY from negative results from the LHC. 

 
Saibal
 
 
- Original Message - 

  From: 
  Stephen 
  Paul King 
  To: everything-list@eskimo.com 
  Sent: Tuesday, February 14, 2006 1:04 
  PM
  Subject: Re: Multiverse concepts in 
  string theory
  
  Hi Norman,
   
      It will be a wonderful thing to get a 
  confirmation by next year but I am afraid that the usual behavior of theorist 
  will occur: the theory will be re-tinkered so that the particle masses are too 
  massive to be created by humans. It has been happening already in 
  astrophysics...
   
      Btw, have you any familiarity with 
  modeling the dynamics of scalar fields in relativistic situations? I need some 
  help. ;-)
   
  Onward!
   
  Stephen
   
   
  - Original Message - 
  
From: 
Norman 
Samish 
To: Everything-list 
Sent: Tuesday, February 14, 2006 1:36 
AM
Subject: Re: Multiverse concepts in 
string theory

Stephen,
 
As you say, the version of string theory with an 
infinity of universes is an elegant concept.  However, when you 
say ". . . its most fundamental assumption, the existence of a 
supersymmerty relation between bosons and fermions, has never even come 
close to matching experimental observation," one could infer that there 
is little likelihood that SUSY will ever be shown to be a good 
theory.
 
This may change soon.  Wikipedia says 
"Experimentalists have not yet found any superpartners for known particles, 
either because they are too massive to be created in our current particle 
accelerators, or because they may not exist at all.   By the year 
2007, the Large Hadron Collider at CERN should be ready for use, producing 
collisions at sufficiently high energies to detect the superpartners many 
theorists hope to see."
 
So maybe, in a couple of years, there WILL be experimental 
observation supporting SUSY.
 
I agree that the posts by Hal Finney and Wei Dai are well 
said and inspirational.  Thanks,
 
Norman

Re: Quantum Immortality and Information Flow

[Saibal Mitra]

Hi Bruno,

Well, even if you can derive the laws of physics as we know them (in some
approximation), you still can't do an experiment to prove that quantum
suicide works. It can only be proven to the experimentor himself. This means
that the absolute measure cannot be ruled out experimentally.


- Original Message - 
From: "Bruno Marchal" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
To: "Saibal Mitra" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Cc: 
Sent: Thursday, December 15, 2005 01:25 PM
Subject: Re: Quantum Immortality and Information Flow


>
> Le 15-déc.-05, à 03:04, Saibal Mitra a écrit :
>
>
> >
> > To me it seems that the notion of ''successor'' has to break down at
> > cases
> > where the observer can die. The Tookies that are the most similar to
> > the
> > Tookie who got executed are the ones who got clemency. There is no
> > objective
> > reason why these Tookies should be excluded as ''successors''. They
> > miss the
> > part of their memories about things that happened after clemency was
> > denied.
> > Instead of those memories they have other memories. We forget things
> > all the
> > time. Sometimes we remember things that didn't really happen. So, we
> > allow
> > for information loss anyway. My point is then that we should forget
> > about
> > all of the information contained in the OM and just sample from the
> > entire
> > set of OMs.
> >
> > The notion of a ''successor'' is not a fundamental notion at all. You
> > can
> > define it any way you like.
>
>
> ?
>
>
>
> > It will not lead to any conflict with any
> > experiments you can think of.
> >
> >
>
>
> ?
>
> Counterexamples will appear if I succeed to explain more of the
> conversation with the lobian machines.
>
> But just with the Kripke semantics we have a base to doubt what you are
> saying here. Indeed, it is the relation of accessibility between OMs
> which determine completely the invariant laws pertaining in all OMs.
> For example, if the multiverse is reflexive the Bp -> p is true in all
> OMs (that is, Bp -> p is invariant for any walk in the multiverse). If
> the mutliverse is "terminal" of "papaioannou-like) then Dt -> ~BDt  is
> a law. In Kripke structure the accessibility relation determined the
> invariant laws.
> later, the modal logic is given by the machine interview, and from
> that, we will determine the structure of the multiverse, including the
> "observable" one.
>
> Bruno
>
>
>
>
> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
>
>

Re: Quantum Immortality and Information Flow

[Saibal Mitra]

- Original Message - 
From: "Johnathan Corgan" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
To: "Stathis Papaioannou" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Cc: 
Sent: Wednesday, December 14, 2005 10:39 AM
Subject: Re: Quantum Immortality and Information Flow


> Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>
> > In the multiverse, only other people end up in dead ends.
>
> Kind of makes you wonder what Tookie is doing right now.  To us, he died
> as a result of lethal injection.
>
> What sort of successor observer-moments can follow a thing like that?
>
> Better question--what is the most likely type of 1st-person
> observer-moment that would follow experiencing lethal injection?
>
> Sure, there is an infinitesimal probability that all his constituent
> particles quantum-tunneled to a Pacific island paradise and right now
> somewhere in the multiverse he's enjoying a drink with an umbrella in
> it, thanking the fine State of California for his new life.
>
> More likely, but still infinitesimally small, is the probability that
> only the molecules of toxin in the injection syringe quantum-tunneled
> away and right now there are execution officials puzzling over whether
> to pardon him after this "act-of-God" miraculous reprieve from death.
>
> But seriously, when the overwhelmingly vast majority of successor
> moments to an instant in time are all 3rd-person dead-ends, what would
> would be an example of a high-expectation 1st-person successor
> observer-moment from the tiny sliver of physically possible (but
> extremely unlikely) ones left?
>
> Is there in fact always one left, no matter how unlikely?
>
>

To me it seems that the notion of ''successor'' has to break down at cases
where the observer can die. The Tookies that are the most similar to the
Tookie who got executed are the ones who got clemency. There is no objective
reason why these Tookies should be excluded as ''successors''. They miss the
part of their memories about things that happened after clemency was denied.
Instead of those memories they have other memories. We forget things all the
time. Sometimes we remember things that didn't really happen. So, we allow
for information loss anyway. My point is then that we should forget about
all of the information contained in the OM and just sample from the entire
set of OMs.

The notion of a ''successor'' is not a fundamental notion at all. You can
define it any way you like. It will not lead to any conflict with any
experiments you can think of.

A New Kind of Science Conference

[Saibal Mitra]

http://www.wolframscience.com/conference/2006/outline.html

Re: Quantum Immortality and Information Flow

[Saibal Mitra]

I still think that if you double everything and then annihilate only the
doubled person, the probability will be 1. This is simply a consequence of
using the absolute measure. The idea is that the future is ''already out
there''. So, the correct picture is not that suddenly the plenitude is made
larger because a copy of the person plus (part of) his universe is appended
to the plenitude. The plenitude itself is a timeless entity, containing all
possible states. If someone wants to carry out a duplication experiment then
the results of that are ''already'' present in the plenitude.

When death can be ignored then the apparent time evolution can be described
by a relative measure which is given as the ratio of absolute measures taken
before and after an experiment (as pointed out by George Levy in a previous
reply). Note that the locality of the laws of physics imply that you can
never directly experience the past. So, if you measure the z-component of a
spin polarized in the x-direction, you will find yourself in a state where
you have measured, say, spin up, while you have a memory of how you
prepaired the spin of the particle, some time before you made the
measurement. One thus has to distinguish between the three states:

S1: the experimenter prepaires the spin of the particle

S2: the experimenter finds spin up while having the memory of being in S1

S3: the experimenter finds spin down while having the memory of being in S1

These three states are ''timeless'' elements of the plenitude. They have
their own intrinsic measures. I challenge people on this list to explain why
this is not the case. If you have a plenitude you have everything. So, S1,
S2 and S3 are just ''out there''. The measure of S2  and S3 are half that of
S1. The probability of being in either S2 or S3 is thus the same as being in
S1. But if measuring spin down leads to instant death, then the probability
of being alive after the experiment is half that of being alive before the
experiment.




- Original Message - 
From: "Stathis Papaioannou" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
To: <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>; 
Cc: <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>; <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Sent: Sunday, December 04, 2005 05:32 AM
Subject: Re: Quantum Immortality and Information Flow


>
> There is, of course, a difference between being duplicated so that there
are
> multiple copies of you in the one Universe, as in teleportation, and being
> duplicated along with the rest of the Universe as a result of MWI
branching.
> In the former case your relative measure increases and problems will arise
> when it comes to deciding who will get the spouse, house, bank account
etc.
> In the latter case your relative measure stays the same because everything
> else is duplicated along with you and nothing will seem to have changed.
You
> agree that in the teleportation example if your duplicate is
instantaneously
> annihilated the moment he comes into being, you will continue living with
> probability 1, as if the duplication had not taken place. On the other
hand,
> in the MWI branching example, you would argue that if your duplicate in
one
> of the branches is annihilated, then your subjective probability of
survival
> is 1/2.
>
> Now, suppose that instead of just you the entire Earth, or Galaxy, or
> Universe is duplicated along with you, while as before your duplicate (and
> only he) is annihilated the moment he comes into being on the new Earth
(or
> Galaxy, or Universe). It could be argued that your measure relative to the
> rest of the Universe (or that part of it which is duplicated) has now
> decreased. Is your expectation of survival in this case more like the
> original teleportation example, or more like the MWI branching example?
>
> Stathis Papaioannou
>
>
>
> Saibal Mitra writes:
>
> >This doubling of the absolute measure is important. In another posting
you
> >wrote about being teleported to many places and then being annihilated
> >everywhere except at the original place. This won't affect the
probability
> >of being alive at the original place. But in a QC experiment where you
have
> >many outcomes, all leading to death except one, the probability of
> >experiencing that branch is very small.
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >- Original Message -
> >From: "Stathis Papaioannou" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
> >To: <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>; 
> >Sent: Saturday, December 03, 2005 11:38 AM
> >Subject: Re: Quantum Immortality and Information Flow
> >
> >
> > > Well, I did actually intend my example to be analogous to the Tegmark
QS
> > > experiment. Are you saying that if there is only one world and
magically
> >an
> > &g

Does God play dice?

[Saibal Mitra]

http://physicsweb.org/articles/world/18/12/2/1

Re: Quantum Immortality and Information Flow

[Saibal Mitra]

- Original Message - 
From: "Brent Meeker" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
To: "Saibal Mitra" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Sent: Saturday, December 03, 2005 03:06 AM
Subject: Re: Quantum Immortality and Information Flow


> Saibal Mitra wrote:
> > - Original Message - 
> > From: "Brent Meeker" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
> > To: 
> > Cc: 
> > Sent: Sunday, November 27, 2005 07:41 PM
> > Subject: Re: Quantum Immortality and Information Flow
> >
> >
> >
> >>Saibal Mitra wrote:
> >>
> >>>- Original Message - 
> >>>From: "Jonathan Colvin" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
> >>>To: 
> >>>Sent: Sunday, November 27, 2005 05:49 AM
> >>>Subject: RE: Quantum Immortality and Information Flow
> >>>
> >>>
> >>>
> >>>
> >>>>Saibal wrote:
> >>>>
> >>>>
> >>>>>The answer must be a) because (and here I disagree with
> >>>>>Jesse), all that exists is an ensemble of isolated observer
> >>>>>moments. The future, the past, alternative histories, etc.
> >>>>>they all exist in a symmetrical way. It don't see how some
> >>>>>states can be more ''real'' than other states. Of course, the
> >>>>>universe we experience seems to be real to us while
> >>>>>alternative universes, or past or future states of this
> >>>>>universe are not being experienced by us.
> >>>>>
> >>>>>
> >>>>>So, you must think of yourself at any time as being  randomly
> >>>>>sampled from the set of all possible observer moments.
> >>>>
> >>>>
> >>>>
> >>>>I'm not sure how this works. Suppose I consider my state now at time

> >>>
> >>>as
> >>>
> >>>
> >>>>a random sample of all observer moments. Now, after having typed this
> >>>>sentence, I consider my state at time . Is this also a
> >>>
> >>>random
> >>>
> >>>
> >>>>sample on all observer moments?  I can do the same at now , and
> >>>
> >>>so-on.
> >>>
> >>>
> >>>>It seems very unlikely that 3 random samples would coincide so
closely.
> >
> > So
> >
> >>>>in what sense are these states randomly sampled?
> >>>
> >>>
> >>>It's a bit like symmetry breaking. You have an ensemble of all possible
> >>>observer moment, but each observer moment can only experience its own
> >
> > state.
> >
> >>>So, the OM samples itself.
> >>>
> >>>There exists an observer moment representing you at N seconds, at N + 4
> >>>seconds and at all possible other states. They all ''just exist'' in
the
> >>>plenitude, as Stathis wrote. The OM  representing you at N + 4 has the
> >>>memory of being the OM at N.
> >>
> >>This I find confusing.  How is there memory associated with an obserever
> >
> > moment?
> >
> >>  Is it equivocation on "memory"?  As an experience, remembering
something
> >
> > takes
> >
> >>much longer than what I would call "a moment".  It may involve a
sequence
> >>images, words, and emotions.  Of course in a materialist model of the
> >
> > world the
> >
> >>memories are coded in the physical configuration of your brain, even
when
> >
> > not
> >
> >>being experienced; but an analysis that takes OM's as fundamental can't
> >
> > refer to
> >
> >>that kind of memories.
> >
> >
> >
> > Well, what really matters is that the laws of physics define a
probability
> > distribution over OMs. So, there is no problem thinking of yourself as
being
> > sampled randomly from that probability distribution. The length of an OM
> > can be taken to be zero. Even if recalling something takes time, at any
time
> > you are at a certain point in that process. There exists an OM that
recalls
> > going through that sequence, but that is also at a specific moment in
time.
>
> But you're assuming laws of physics and a physical basis for
consciousness.  I
> thought the idea was to take conscious moments as basic.  I'm fine with
taking
> physics as basic - but then what's the point of talking about observer
moments;
> conscious observations are then some kind of emergent phenomena and
they're
> connected by physical causation.
>


Yes, but it's a fact that there exists laws of physics. I am of the opinion
that what really exists is an ensemble of algorithms and that the laws of
physics is a consequence of this. Whatever your starting point, you'll end
up with an absolute measure over the set of all OMs.

Re: Quantum Immortality and Information Flow

[Saibal Mitra]

This doubling of the absolute measure is important. In another posting you
wrote about being teleported to many places and then being annihilated
everywhere except at the original place. This won't affect the probability
of being alive at the original place. But in a QC experiment where you have
many outcomes, all leading to death except one, the probability of
experiencing that branch is very small.






- Original Message - 
From: "Stathis Papaioannou" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
To: <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>; 
Sent: Saturday, December 03, 2005 11:38 AM
Subject: Re: Quantum Immortality and Information Flow


> Well, I did actually intend my example to be analogous to the Tegmark QS
> experiment. Are you saying that if there is only one world and magically
an
> identical, separate world comes into being this is fundamentally different
> to what happens in quantum branch splitting? It seems to me that in both
> cases the relative measure of everything in the world stays the same, even
> though in absolute terms there is double of everything.
>
> Stathis Papaioannou
>
>
> Saibal Mitra writes:
>
> >Correction, I seem to have misunderstood Statis'  set up. If you really
> >create a new world and then create and kill the person there then the
> >probability of survival is 1. This is different from quantum mechanical
> >branch splitting.
> >
> >To see this, consider first what would have happened had the person not
> >been
> >killed. Then his measure would have doubled. But because he is killed in
> >one
> >of the two copies of Earth, his measure stays the same. In a quantum
> >suicide
> >experiment his measure would be reduced by a factor two.
>
> > > If on the basis of a coin toss the world splits, and in one branch I
am
> > > instantaneously killed while in the other I continue living, there are
> > > several possible ways this might be interpreted from the 1st person
> > > viewpoint:
> > >
> > > (a) Pr(I live) = Pr(I die) = 0.5
> > >
> > > (b) Pr(I live) = 1, Pr(I die) = 0
> > >
> > > (c) Pr(I live) = 0, Pr(I die) = 1
>
> _
> Buy now @ Tradingpost.com.au
>
http://a.ninemsn.com.au/b.aspx?URL=http%3A%2F%2Fad%2Eau%2Edoubleclick%2Enet%2Fclk%3B23850242%3B12217581%3Bw%3Fhttp%3A%2F%2Fwww%2Etradingpost%2Ecom%2Eau%2F%3Freferrer%3DnmsnHMetag&_t=11482&_r=emaildec05&_m=EXT
>

Re: Quantum Immortality and Information Flow

[Saibal Mitra]

Correction, I seem to have misunderstood Statis'  set up. If you really
create a new world and then create and kill the person there then the
probability of survival is 1. This is different from quantum mechanical
branch splitting.

To see this, consider first what would have happened had the person not been
killed. Then his measure would have doubled. But because he is killed in one
of the two copies of Earth, his measure stays the same. In a quantum suicide
experiment his measure would be reduced by a factor two.


- Original Message - 
From: "Saibal Mitra" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
To: "Stathis Papaioannou" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>;
<[EMAIL PROTECTED]>; "Jesse Mazer" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Cc: 
Sent: Sunday, November 27, 2005 02:25 AM
Subject: Re: Quantum Immortality and Information Flow


> The answer must be a) because (and here I disagree with Jesse), all that
> exists is an ensemble of isolated observer moments. The future, the past,
> alternative histories, etc.  they all exist in a symmetrical way. It don't
> see how some states can be more ''real'' than other states. Of course, the
> universe we experience seems to be real to us while alternative universes,
> or past or future states of this universe are not being experienced by us.
>
>
> So, you must think of yourself at any time as being  randomly sampled from
> the set of all possible observer moments. To get to answer b) you have to
> redefine your identity so that experiencing having done the experiment
> becomes a necessary part of your identity. But this is cheating because
you
> wouldn't say that if ''death'' were replaced by a partial memory erasure
> such that the experience of having done the experiment were wiped out form
> your memory.
>
>
>
>
>
> - Original Message - 
> From: "Stathis Papaioannou" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
> To: <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
> Cc: 
> Sent: Saturday, November 26, 2005 11:51 AM
> Subject: Re: Quantum Immortality and Information Flow
>
>
> >
> > Stathis Papaioannou writes:
> > If on the basis of a coin toss the world splits, and in one branch I am
> > instantaneously killed while in the other I continue living, there are
> > several possible ways this might be interpreted from the 1st person
> > viewpoint:
> >
> > (a) Pr(I live) = Pr(I die) = 0.5
> >
> > (b) Pr(I live) = 1, Pr(I die) = 0
> >
> > (c) Pr(I live) = 0, Pr(I die) = 1
> >
> > Even on this list, there are people who might say (a) above is the case
> > rather than (b) or (c).
> >
> > Bruno Marchal replies:
> > Are you sure?
> >
> > I was thinking of people who accept some ensemble theory such as MWI,
but
> > don't believe in QTI. I must admit, I find it difficult to understand
how
> > even a dualist might justify (a) as being correct. Would anyone care to
> > help?
> >
> > Stathis
> >
> > _
> > Start something musical - 15 free ninemsn Music downloads!
> >
>
http://ninemsn.com.au/share/redir/adTrack.asp?mode=click&clientID=667&referral=HotmailTaglineNov&URL=http://www.ninemsn.com.au/startsomething
> >
>

Re: Quantum Immortality and Information Flow

[Saibal Mitra]

- Original Message - 
From: "Bruno Marchal" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
To: "Saibal Mitra" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Cc: "Jesse Mazer" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>; "Stathis Papaioannou"
<[EMAIL PROTECTED]>; 
Sent: Monday, November 28, 2005 04:47 PM
Subject: Re: Quantum Immortality and Information Flow


>
> Le 27-nov.-05, à 02:25, Saibal Mitra a écrit :
>
> > The answer must be a) because (and here I disagree with Jesse), all
> > that
> > exists is an ensemble of isolated observer moments. The future, the
> > past,
> > alternative histories, etc.  they all exist in a symmetrical way. It
> > don't
> > see how some states can be more ''real'' than other states.
>
> But then how could we ever explain why some states seem to be more
> *near*, or more probable than others from our point of view?

Well, even if you assume ''ordinary'' laws of physics, you can have this
view. Einstein tried to console a friend whose son had died, by saying that
although he isn't alive now, he is ''still'' alive in the past. Relativity
theory threats space and time in more or less symmetrical ways.It doesn't
make any difference if you assume that you are sampled from a probability
distribution (to be calculated from physics) over your experiences.


>
> Is the choice between Papaioannou's  "a", "b" reflecting(*) the ASSA
> and RSSA difference?
>
> Recall: ASSA = absolute self-sampling assumption. RSSA = relative
> self-sampling assumption.
>
> (*) Stathis Papaioannou writes:
> > If on the basis of a coin toss the world splits, and in one branch I am
> > instantaneously killed while in the other I continue living, there are
> > several possible ways this might be interpreted from the 1st person
> > viewpoint:
> >
> > (a) Pr(I live) = Pr(I die) = 0.5
> >
> > (b) Pr(I live) = 1, Pr(I die) = 0
> >
> > (c) Pr(I live) = 0, Pr(I die) = 1
> >
> > Even on this list, there are people who might say (a) above is the case
> > rather than (b) or (c).
>
>
> Saibal:
>
> > So, you must think of yourself at any time as being  randomly sampled
> > from
> > the set of all possible observer moments.
>
>
> This could make sense in a pure third person perspective, but then it
> is no more a perspective. And, indeed, to predict the result of
> anything I decide to test, I need to take into account relations
> between observer-moments. Let me throw a dice. Are you saying to us
> that to predict the result I need to take into account all
> observer-moments and sample on them in some "uniform" way. Why should
> people buy lotto-tickets? They could make the big win by their OM being
> sampled on all OMs.
> I'm not saying you are false, but your absolute sample does not
> correspond tour first person experience (including physics) which we
> want to explain. It seems to me.

Well, the probability distribution has to be consistent with physics. In
case of throwing a dice, one should consider the set of OMs that are
experiencing the outcome of the throw.
>
>
>
> > To get to answer b) you have to
> > redefine your identity so that experiencing having done the experiment
> > becomes a necessary part of your identity.
>
> Not some absolute identity, but memories are part of our relative,
> mundane, identity.
>
>
>
> > But this is cheating because you
> > wouldn't say that if ''death'' were replaced by a partial memory
> > erasure
> > such that the experience of having done the experiment were wiped out
> > form
> > your memory.
>
> OK, but that is why the experiment is proposed with (absolute) death
> (if that exists) and not with memory erasure. This could change the
> probabilities a lot, and this can admit many different protocol for
> verifying the probability distributions. It is another experiment.
> Perhaps I miss your point.


Yes, that was my point. The probabilities become sensitive to the details of
the set up in a way that I find unphysical. If we just do conventional
quantum measurement of z-component of a spin polarized in the x-direction.
Then, in the MWI, you would say that there exists a world in which an
observer sees spin up and a world in which spin down is experienced.
Strictly speaking the two observers are not identical. Let's now modify the
experiment so that in case of spin down the observer is annihilated and
replaced by some arbitrary person. Then if we choose this person to be
''close'' to the original person then the probabilities are 1/2, but if I
move sufficiently ''far away'' from the person then it should somehow jump
to 1 for the original person.

Re: Quantum Immortality and Information Flow

[Saibal Mitra]

- Original Message - 
From: "Jonathan Colvin" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
To: 
Sent: Sunday, November 27, 2005 10:02 PM
Subject: RE: Quantum Immortality and Information Flow


>
> Saibal wrote:
> > > > The answer must be a) because (and here I disagree with
> > > > Jesse), all that exists is an ensemble of isolated observer
> > > > moments. The future, the past, alternative histories, etc.
> > > > they all exist in a symmetrical way. It don't see how some
> > > > states can be more ''real'' than other states. Of course, the
> > > > universe we experience seems to be real to us while
> > > > alternative universes, or past or future states of this
> > > > universe are not being experienced by us.
> > > >
> > > >
> > > > So, you must think of yourself at any time as being  randomly
> > > > sampled from the set of all possible observer moments.
> > >
> > > 
> > >
> > > I'm not sure how this works. Suppose I consider my state
> > now at time 
> > as
> > > a random sample of all observer moments. Now, after having
> > typed this
> > > sentence, I consider my state at time . Is
> > this also a
> > random
> > > sample on all observer moments?  I can do the same at now
> > , and
> > so-on.
> > > It seems very unlikely that 3 random samples would coincide
> > so closely. So
> > > in what sense are these states randomly sampled?
> >
> > It's a bit like symmetry breaking. You have an ensemble of
> > all possible
> > observer moment, but each observer moment can only experience
> > its own state.
> > So, the OM samples itself.
> >
> > There exists an observer moment representing you at N
> > seconds, at N + 4
> > seconds and at all possible other states. They all ''just
> > exist'' in the
> > plenitude, as Stathis wrote. The OM  representing you at N + 4 has the
> > memory of being the OM at N. Subjectively the OMs experience
> > time evolution,
> > even though the plenitude itself doesn't have a time evolution at the
> > fundamental level.
>
> I understand all that, but I still don't see in what sense these OM's are
> randomly sampled.
>
> Here's a related question. The DDA insists that we must all consider
> ourselves random observers on our reference class, whatever it is (class
of
> all observers is standard). Now, if I am a random observer, and you
(Saibal)
> are a random observer, what are the odds that two observers selected
> randomly from the class of all observers would be discoursing on the same
> mailing list? We can only conclude that one of us can not be random, but
> must have been selected by the other. But did I select you, or did you
> select me? If we select each other, the randomness issue is not resolved.
>
> Another possibility is, I suppose, to simply *define* randomness as
observer
> self-selection. Perhaps observer self-selection is the only truly random
> phenomenon in the universe (everything else appearing random is merely
> unpredictable). But it is then a purely a first-person phenomenon, and I
can
> not consider anything else in the universe (including *your* observer
> moments) as random.
>


Yes, I meant ''random'' in the sense of observer self selection. But note
that the laws of physics define, in principle, a probability distribution
over the set over all possible states you can be in. One element of that set
corresponds to you reading this sentence. The probability of this is given
by an integral of the probability of states of the universe that are
consistent with you experiencing this OM. So, you ''integrate out''
everything that is not part of the OM and you are left with the probability
of the OM.

Re: Quantum Immortality and Information Flow

[Saibal Mitra]

- Original Message - 
From: "Brent Meeker" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
To: 
Cc: 
Sent: Sunday, November 27, 2005 07:41 PM
Subject: Re: Quantum Immortality and Information Flow


> Saibal Mitra wrote:
> > - Original Message - 
> > From: "Jonathan Colvin" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
> > To: 
> > Sent: Sunday, November 27, 2005 05:49 AM
> > Subject: RE: Quantum Immortality and Information Flow
> >
> >
> >
> >>Saibal wrote:
> >>
> >>>The answer must be a) because (and here I disagree with
> >>>Jesse), all that exists is an ensemble of isolated observer
> >>>moments. The future, the past, alternative histories, etc.
> >>>they all exist in a symmetrical way. It don't see how some
> >>>states can be more ''real'' than other states. Of course, the
> >>>universe we experience seems to be real to us while
> >>>alternative universes, or past or future states of this
> >>>universe are not being experienced by us.
> >>>
> >>>
> >>>So, you must think of yourself at any time as being  randomly
> >>>sampled from the set of all possible observer moments.
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >>I'm not sure how this works. Suppose I consider my state now at time 
> >
> > as
> >
> >>a random sample of all observer moments. Now, after having typed this
> >>sentence, I consider my state at time . Is this also a
> >
> > random
> >
> >>sample on all observer moments?  I can do the same at now , and
> >
> > so-on.
> >
> >>It seems very unlikely that 3 random samples would coincide so closely.
So
> >>in what sense are these states randomly sampled?
> >
> >
> > It's a bit like symmetry breaking. You have an ensemble of all possible
> > observer moment, but each observer moment can only experience its own
state.
> > So, the OM samples itself.
> >
> > There exists an observer moment representing you at N seconds, at N + 4
> > seconds and at all possible other states. They all ''just exist'' in the
> > plenitude, as Stathis wrote. The OM  representing you at N + 4 has the
> > memory of being the OM at N.
>
> This I find confusing.  How is there memory associated with an obserever
moment?
>   Is it equivocation on "memory"?  As an experience, remembering something
takes
> much longer than what I would call "a moment".  It may involve a sequence
> images, words, and emotions.  Of course in a materialist model of the
world the
> memories are coded in the physical configuration of your brain, even when
not
> being experienced; but an analysis that takes OM's as fundamental can't
refer to
> that kind of memories.


Well, what really matters is that the laws of physics define a probability
distribution over OMs. So, there is no problem thinking of yourself as being
sampled randomly from that probability distribution. The length of an OM
can be taken to be zero. Even if recalling something takes time, at any time
you are at a certain point in that process. There exists an OM that recalls
going through that sequence, but that is also at a specific moment in time.

Re: Quantum Immortality and Information Flow

[Saibal Mitra]

- Original Message - 
From: "Jonathan Colvin" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
To: 
Sent: Sunday, November 27, 2005 05:49 AM
Subject: RE: Quantum Immortality and Information Flow


> Saibal wrote:
> > The answer must be a) because (and here I disagree with
> > Jesse), all that exists is an ensemble of isolated observer
> > moments. The future, the past, alternative histories, etc.
> > they all exist in a symmetrical way. It don't see how some
> > states can be more ''real'' than other states. Of course, the
> > universe we experience seems to be real to us while
> > alternative universes, or past or future states of this
> > universe are not being experienced by us.
> >
> >
> > So, you must think of yourself at any time as being  randomly
> > sampled from the set of all possible observer moments.
>
> 
>
> I'm not sure how this works. Suppose I consider my state now at time 
as
> a random sample of all observer moments. Now, after having typed this
> sentence, I consider my state at time . Is this also a
random
> sample on all observer moments?  I can do the same at now , and
so-on.
> It seems very unlikely that 3 random samples would coincide so closely. So
> in what sense are these states randomly sampled?

It's a bit like symmetry breaking. You have an ensemble of all possible
observer moment, but each observer moment can only experience its own state.
So, the OM samples itself.

There exists an observer moment representing you at N seconds, at N + 4
seconds and at all possible other states. They all ''just exist'' in the
plenitude, as Stathis wrote. The OM  representing you at N + 4 has the
memory of being the OM at N. Subjectively the OMs experience time evolution,
even though the plenitude itself doesn't have a time evolution at the
fundamental level.


Although it is a bit strange to think about time evolution in this way, it
is necessary to resolve paradoxes you get when contemplating doubling and
suicide experiments. It is precisely in these cases that our naive notion of
time evolution breaks down.


Saibal

Re: Quantum Immortality and Information Flow

[Saibal Mitra]

The answer must be a) because (and here I disagree with Jesse), all that
exists is an ensemble of isolated observer moments. The future, the past,
alternative histories, etc.  they all exist in a symmetrical way. It don't
see how some states can be more ''real'' than other states. Of course, the
universe we experience seems to be real to us while alternative universes,
or past or future states of this universe are not being experienced by us.


So, you must think of yourself at any time as being  randomly sampled from
the set of all possible observer moments. To get to answer b) you have to
redefine your identity so that experiencing having done the experiment
becomes a necessary part of your identity. But this is cheating because you
wouldn't say that if ''death'' were replaced by a partial memory erasure
such that the experience of having done the experiment were wiped out form
your memory.





- Original Message - 
From: "Stathis Papaioannou" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
To: <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Cc: 
Sent: Saturday, November 26, 2005 11:51 AM
Subject: Re: Quantum Immortality and Information Flow


>
> Stathis Papaioannou writes:
> If on the basis of a coin toss the world splits, and in one branch I am
> instantaneously killed while in the other I continue living, there are
> several possible ways this might be interpreted from the 1st person
> viewpoint:
>
> (a) Pr(I live) = Pr(I die) = 0.5
>
> (b) Pr(I live) = 1, Pr(I die) = 0
>
> (c) Pr(I live) = 0, Pr(I die) = 1
>
> Even on this list, there are people who might say (a) above is the case
> rather than (b) or (c).
>
> Bruno Marchal replies:
> Are you sure?
>
> I was thinking of people who accept some ensemble theory such as MWI, but
> don't believe in QTI. I must admit, I find it difficult to understand how
> even a dualist might justify (a) as being correct. Would anyone care to
> help?
>
> Stathis
>
> _
> Start something musical - 15 free ninemsn Music downloads!
>
http://ninemsn.com.au/share/redir/adTrack.asp?mode=click&clientID=667&referral=HotmailTaglineNov&URL=http://www.ninemsn.com.au/startsomething
>

Re: ROSS MODEL OF THE UNIVERSE - The Simplest Yet Theory of Everything

[Saibal Mitra]

You clearly forgot to read this:
http://insti.physics.sunysb.edu/~siegel/quack.html


John Ross:

''General Relativity and String Theory

[0005] Einstein's special theory did not deal with acceleration and gravity
but his General Theory of Relativity did. His general theory, attempting to
explain gravity further complicated physics proposing for example that
gravity produces a curvature of space. Various String Theories also attempt
to explain how the universe functions. Relatively very few people understand
Einstein's General Theory of Relativity or these string theories. I am one
of the many who do not. Most people are reluctant to say these prior art
theories are wrong. Not me.''

If you don't understand these theories, how can you claim they are wrong?


''Light Speed

[0014] Photons in a light beam slow down when passing through a Coulombic
reference frame (such as a laboratory where light speed is being made)
moving opposite the beam. And they speed up when the reference frame is
moving in the same direction of the beam. Based on this preferred model,
time does not slow down when you go fast and things do not get shorter.
Simultaneous events are simultaneous in all reference frames. Time is
absolute. When an astronaut returns to earth he and his twin brother can
have their next birthday party together at the same time.''

There are journals devoted to quacky theories (e.g. physics essays), but I
think that even these journals will reject your work.





- Original Message - 
From: "John Ross" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
To: "'Bruno Marchal'" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Cc: "'Hal Ruhl'" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>; "'Russell Standish'"
<[EMAIL PROTECTED]>; 
Sent: Thursday, October 13, 2005 07:34 PM
Subject: RE: ROSS MODEL OF THE UNIVERSE - The Simplest Yet Theory of
Everything


> Have you read my patent application?  It has plenty of details (17 pages
> of fine print).  Take a look at it on www.uspto.gov search under patent
> applications for Pub No. 20050182607 or Application Serial No.
> 11/108,938.
>
> -Original Message-
> From: Bruno Marchal [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]
> Sent: Thursday, October 13, 2005 6:45 AM
> To: John Ross
> Cc: 'Hal Ruhl'; 'Russell Standish'; everything-list@eskimo.com
> Subject: Re: ROSS MODEL OF THE UNIVERSE - The Simplest Yet Theory of
> Everything
>
>
>
> Le 11-oct.-05, à 01:46, John Ross a écrit :
>
> > Because there is only one particle (and its  anti-particle) and one
> > force from which the entire universe is built.  How could there be
> > anything simpler?
>
>
> 0 particles and 0 forces, no time nor spaces but a web a overlapping
> turing machines' dreams emerging from addition and multiplication ...
>
> John, if you want your theory being a TOE, don't forget to address the
> mind body problem, and to be clear on all your assumptions (ontology,
> epistemology).
>
> Now to be honest I have no idea how neutrinos could be photons. If you
> thrust your idea try (at least) to write a paper with some details.
>
> Bruno
>
>
> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/=
>
>

Re: Quantum theory of measurement

[Saibal Mitra]

Well, as you can see here:

http://cabtep5.cnea.gov.ar/particulas/daniel/curri/curreng.html

He isn't very experienced yet. I know of some experienced  professors of
have made worse mistakes :)

So, what goes wrong? Well, you don't get an interference pattern at one end
even if you don't detect the photon at the other end. To see this, just
write down the two particle state and add the phase shifts. If the detectors
on the other sides are off, then the two contributions corresponding to the
photon being detected at some position z consist of two orthogonal terms;
one term correpsonds to the other photon in pipe 1 and the other for that
photon in pipe 2

 Suppose that you add a plate to detect the photon on that side as well.
Then the probability that the photon at one end is detected at position z1
and the other is detected at z2 does contain an interference term of the
form:

Cos[delta1(z1) + delta2(z2)]

If you don't detect where photon 2 is absorbed you have to integrate over z2
and the interference term vanishes. To see an interference term you must
keep  z2 fixed. This means that you must consider only those photons for
which the entangled partners were detected at at some fixed z2. But this
means that this value must be communicated by the observer there.

- Original Message - 
From: ""Hal Finney"" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
To: 
Sent: Thursday, October 13, 2005 03:59 AM
Subject: RE: Quantum theory of measurement


> Now that you are experts on this, try your hand on this FTL
> signalling device, .
> The author, Daniel Badagnani, is apparently a genuine physicist,
> .
>
> Hal Finney
>

Re: Quantum theory of measurement

[Saibal Mitra]

Hal gives the correct explanation of what's going on. In general,  all you
have to do to analyze the problem is to consider all contributions to a
particular state and add up the amplitudes. The absolute value squared of
the amplitude gives the probability, which may or may not contain an
interference term.

A simple minded formal description can be given as follows:

If you pass a photon through two slits then close to the screen its state
would be of the form:

Integral over z of [1 + Exp(i delta(z))] |s,z>

Here z denotes the postion on the screen, s is just a label for the photon
and Exp(i delta(z)) is the phase shift between the two paths which gives
rise to the interference term. Delta(z) will be zero exactly inbetween the
two slits and will be nonzero elsewhere. The probability of having the
photon at z is obtained (up to normalization) by taking the absolute value
squared of the prefactor of |s,z>, which is 2 + 2 cos(delta(z)).

Let's do the same for the two entagled photons. The entangled photon pair
can be denoted as:

 |p_x,s_y> + |p_y,s_x>

here x and y denote the polarization states.

If you pass s through the two slits then the state becomes:

 [1 + Exp(i delta(z))] |p_x,s_y,z> +  [1 + Exp(i delta(z))] ||p_y,s_x,z>

This has to be integrated over z, but let's focus only at the contribution
at some fixed position z. The prefactors of both state vectors |p_x,s_y,z>
and |p_y,s_x,z> are of the same form as in the single photon case and thus
you get an interference term Cos(delta(z) as above. If you put the quarter
wave plate in then instead of

 [1 + Exp(i delta(z))] |p_x,s_y,z> you get:

 |p_x,s_r,z> +  Exp(i delta(z))  |p_x,s_l,z>

And the complete state vector becomes:

|p_x,s_r,z> +  Exp(i delta(z))  |p_x,s_l,z>+

|p_y,s_l,z> +  Exp(i delta(z))  |p_y,s_r,z>


All the four state vectors are orthogonal. The probability that you detect
the photon s at z is just the sum of the absolute value squared of the four
terms, which is constant and doesn't contain an interference term.

Now let's pass photon p through the polarizer (45 degrees w.r.t. x). This
amounts to measuring the polarization state of photon p in the basis |p_x> +
p_y> and |p_x> - p_y>. If you don't discard one of these two states and keep
them both then, as Hal rightly points out, nothing changes. If you
substitute:

|p_x> = |a> + |b>;

|p_y> = |a> - |b>

in the state vector above you get:



|a,s_r,z> +  Exp(i delta(z))  |a,s_l,z>+

|a,s_l,z> +  Exp(i delta(z))  |a,s_r,z>+


|b,s_r,z> +  Exp(i delta(z))  |b,s_l,z>+

- |b,s_l,z> -  Exp(i delta(z))  |b,s_r,z> = (collecting the prefactors of
like state vectors)

=

[1 + Exp(i delta(z))]|a,s_r,z> + [1 + Exp(i delta(z))]|a,s_l,z> +

[1 - Exp(i delta(z))]|b,s_r,z> - [1 -  Exp(i delta(z))] |b,s_l,z>

The absolute value squared of the terms with the p photons in the |a> state
contains the term 2 Cos (delta(z)), but for the b terms this is - 2
Cos(delta(z). If you don't observe the polarization of the p photon, the
interference terms would thus cancel. This is obvious since all we have done
is to write down the same state in a different basis. But if you do observe
the polarization of the p photon, then can measure the probability of
detecting s at position z and p in polarization state |a> then you have to
add up the absolute value squared of |a,s_r,z> and |a,s_l,z>. Then you do
get the Cos(delta(z) interference term.




- Original Message - 
From: ""Hal Finney"" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
To: <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>; 
Sent: Wednesday, October 12, 2005 08:16 PM
Subject: Re: Quantum theory of measurement


> Ben Goertzel writes about:
> > http://grad.physics.sunysb.edu/~amarch/
> >
> > The questions I have regard the replacement of the Coincidence Counter
(from
> > here on: CC) in the  above experiment with a more complicated apparatus.
> >
> > What if we replace the CC with one of the following:
> >
> > 1) a carefully sealed, exquisitely well insulated box with a printer
inside
> > it.  The printer is  hooked up so that it prints, on paper, an exact
record
> > of everything that comes into the CC.  Then,  to "erase" the printed
record,
> > the whole box is melted, or annihilated using nuclear explosives, or
> > whatever.
>
> The CC is not what is "erased".  Rather, the so-called erasure happens
> to the photons while they are flying through the apparatus.  Nothing in
> the experiment proposes erasing data in the CC.  So I don't really see
> what you are getting at.
>
> > What will the outcome be in these experiments?
>
> It won't make any difference, because the CC is not used in the way you
> imagine.  It doesn't have to produce a record and it doesn't have to erase
> any records.
>
> Let me tell you what really happens in the experiment above.  It is
> actually not so mystical as people try to make it sound.
>
> We start off with the s photon going through a 2 slit experiment and
> getting interference.  That is standard.
>
> Now we put two different polarization rotations in front of the t

Tegmark's prediction of neutrino masses

[Saibal Mitra]

Since we are discussing neutrinos, I thought it is fun to mention antropic
constraints on neutrino masses derived by Tegmark, see here:

http://arxiv.org/abs/astro-ph/0304536


Anthropic predictions for neutrino masses
Authors: Max Tegmark (MIT), Alexander Vilenkin (Tufts), Levon Pogosian
(Tufts)
Categories: astro-ph
Comments: Revised to match accepted PRD version. Added references,
discussion of very heavy neutrinos, analytic growth factor fit. 9 pages, 4
figs. Color figs and links at this http URL
Journal-ref: Phys.Rev. D71 (2005) 103523

It is argued that small values of the neutrino masses may be due to
anthropic selection effects. If this is the case, then the combined mass of
the three neutrino species is expected to be ~1eV, neutrinos causing a
non-negligible suppression of galaxy formation.


http://arxiv.org/abs/astro-ph/0404497

Anthropic predictions for vacuum energy and neutrino masses
Authors: Levon Pogosian, Alexander Vilenkin, Max Tegmark
Categories: astro-ph gr-qc hep-th
Comments: 9 pages, 4 figures
Journal-ref: JCAP 0407 (2004) 005

It is argued that the observed vacuum energy density and the small values of
the neutrino masses could be due to anthropic selection effects. Until now,
these two quantities have been treated separately from each other and, in
particular, anthropic predictions for the vacuum energy were made under the
assumption of zero neutrino masses. Here we consider two cases. In the
first, we calculate predictions for the vacuum energy for a fixed (generally
non-zero) value of the neutrino mass. In the second we allow both quantities
to vary from one part of the universe to another. We find that the anthropic
predictions for the vacuum energy density are in a better agreement with
observations when one allows for non-zero neutrino masses. We also find that
the individual distributions for the vacuum energy and the neutrino masses
are reasonably robust and do not change drastically when one adds the other
variable.



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Re: Neutrino shield idea

[Saibal Mitra]

Faster than light effects lead to violations of causality. There are very
stringent experimental constraints against such effects.

- Original Message - 
From: "John Ross" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
To: "'Russell Standish'" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Cc: "'Stephen Paul King'" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>;

Sent: Tuesday, October 11, 2005 01:43 AM
Subject: RE: Neutrino shield idea


> I say any massless particle that has a charge supporting a Coulomb force
> must travel at the speed of light or faster because the Coulomb force
> travels at the speed of light and a charged massless particle will be
> repelled by its own Coulomb force.
>
> -Original Message-
> From: Russell Standish [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]
> Sent: Monday, October 10, 2005 3:04 PM
> To: John Ross
> Cc: 'Stephen Paul King'; everything-list@eskimo.com
> Subject: Re: Neutrino shield idea
>
>
> On Mon, Oct 10, 2005 at 09:11:04AM -0700, John Ross wrote:
> > * Only photons travel at the speed of light.  (Except my tronnies that
>
> > usually go faster than the speed of light.)
>
> Who says? Any massless particle will travel at the speed of light.
>
> -- 
> *PS: A number of people ask me about the attachment to my email, which
> is of type "application/pgp-signature". Don't worry, it is not a virus.
> It is an electronic signature, that may be used to verify this email
> came from me if you have PGP or GPG installed. Otherwise, you may safely
> ignore this attachment.
>
> 
> 
> A/Prof Russell Standish  Phone 8308 3119 (mobile)
> Mathematics0425 253119 (")
> UNSW SYDNEY 2052  [EMAIL PROTECTED]
>
> Australia
> http://parallel.hpc.unsw.edu.au/rks
> International prefix  +612, Interstate prefix 02
> 
> 
>

Re: Neutrino shield idea

[Saibal Mitra]

I'm sure you saw something else :-)

- Original Message - 
From: "John Ross" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
To: "'Russell Standish'" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Cc: "'Hal Ruhl'" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>; 
Sent: Tuesday, October 11, 2005 01:40 AM
Subject: RE: Neutrino shield idea


> I say a neutrino does not have a rest mass.  It is a photon, like a very
> high energy gamma ray photon.  I have seen photos of a neutrino
> collision in a neutrino trap.  From the look of all the resulting
> ionization tracks, it must have had a lot more energy than 40 ev.  I say
> the energy of neutrinos is in the range of 300 mev!
> 
> -Original Message-
> From: Russell Standish [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] 
> Sent: Monday, October 10, 2005 3:00 PM
> To: John Ross
> Cc: 'Hal Ruhl'; everything-list@eskimo.com
> Subject: Re: Neutrino shield idea
> 
> 
> According to special relativity, anything with a positive rest mass
> travels slower than the speed of light. Neutrinos have been measured
> with a positive rest mass, of around 40ev for the electron neutrino
> IIRC, and higher values for the muon and tauon neutrinos.
> 
> I have never heard of either tardyon or luxon before either, but have
> heard of tachyon, or faster than light particle. Clearly tardyon is
> therefore slower than light, and luxon is at light speed.
> 
> Luxons therefore have zero rest mass, and tachyons have imaginary (ie
> proportional to sqrt(-1)) rest mass.
> 
> Cheers
> 
> On Mon, Oct 10, 2005 at 03:06:55PM -0700, John Ross wrote:
> > Where is the proof that a neutrino is not a photon.  I believe people 
> > are only guessing that a neutrino is a tardyon, whatever in the hell a
> 
> > tardyon is.  Tardyons are not in my dictionary.
> > 
> > -Original Message-
> > From: Hal Ruhl [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]
> > Sent: Monday, October 10, 2005 2:50 PM
> > To: everything-list@eskimo.com
> > Subject: RE: Neutrino shield idea
> > 
> > 
> > As I understand it a photon is a luxon as is a gluon and a neutrino
> > is a tardyon.
> > 
> > Hal Ruhl
> > 
> > 
> > At 04:49 PM 10/10/2005, you wrote:
> > >I think the beta decay model is wrong where it predicts neutrinos are
> > >basically different from photons.  I understand neutrinos travel at
> the
> > 
> > >speed of light.  Only photons travel at the speed of light.
> > >
> > >-Original Message-
> > >From: Saibal Mitra [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]
> > >Sent: Friday, October 07, 2005 4:30 PM
> > >To: John Ross; everything-list@eskimo.com
> > >Subject: Re: Neutrino shield idea
> > >
> > >
> > >This means that beta decay proves your model wrong.
> > >
> > >- Original Message -
> > >From: "John Ross" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
> > >To: "'Stephen Paul King'" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>;
> > >
> > >Sent: Saturday, October 08, 2005 12:35 AM
> > >Subject: RE: Neutrino shield idea
> > >
> > >
> > > > Thanks for the paper relating to detection of "low energy"
> > > > neutrinos. However, according to my model, neutrinos are very,
> very 
> > > > high energy photons (off everybody's chart, except mine).
> > > >
> > > > Therefore, if my model is correct, then low energy neutrinos would
> > > > merely be the photons we are familiar with and would be very easy
> to
> > 
> > > > detect.
> > > >
> > > > -Original Message-
> > > > From: Stephen Paul King [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]
> > > > Sent: Friday, October 07, 2005 12:54 PM
> > > > To: everything-list@eskimo.com
> > > > Subject: Neutrino shield idea
> > > >
> > > >
> > > > Howdy!
> > > >
> > > > I friend of mine has worked on a related idea that might help
> > > > this
> > >
> > > > inverstigation. Please see:
> > > >
> > > > http://davidwoolsey.com/physics/ideas/neutrinoscope/index.html
> > > >
> > > > Kindest regards,
> > > >
> > > > Stephen
> > > >
> > > > - Original Message -
> > > > From: "John Ross" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
> > > > To: <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
> > > > Cc: 
> > > > Sent: Friday, October 07, 2005 11:57 AM
> > > > Subject: RE: ROSS MODEL OF THE UNIVERSE - The Simplest Yet Theory 
> > > > of
> > 
> > > > Everything
> > > >
> > > >
> > > > > Yes.  But building a neutrino shield would be difficult.
> > > >
> 
> -- 
> *PS: A number of people ask me about the attachment to my email, which
> is of type "application/pgp-signature". Don't worry, it is not a virus.
> It is an electronic signature, that may be used to verify this email
> came from me if you have PGP or GPG installed. Otherwise, you may safely
> ignore this attachment.
> 
> 
> 
> A/Prof Russell Standish  Phone 8308 3119 (mobile)
> Mathematics0425 253119 (")
> UNSW SYDNEY 2052  [EMAIL PROTECTED]
> 
> Australia
> http://parallel.hpc.unsw.edu.au/rks
> International prefix  +612, Interstate prefix 02
> 
> 
> 

Re: Neutrino shield idea

[Saibal Mitra]

There are a lot of experiments that have detected neutrinos and verified
their properties (which are completely different from photons).



- Original Message - 
From: "John Ross" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
To: "'Saibal Mitra'" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>; 
Sent: Monday, October 10, 2005 10:49 PM
Subject: RE: Neutrino shield idea


> I think the beta decay model is wrong where it predicts neutrinos are
> basically different from photons.  I understand neutrinos travel at the
> speed of light.  Only photons travel at the speed of light.
>
> -Original Message-
> From: Saibal Mitra [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]
> Sent: Friday, October 07, 2005 4:30 PM
> To: John Ross; everything-list@eskimo.com
> Subject: Re: Neutrino shield idea
>
>
> This means that beta decay proves your model wrong.
>
> - Original Message - 
> From: "John Ross" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
> To: "'Stephen Paul King'" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>;
> 
> Sent: Saturday, October 08, 2005 12:35 AM
> Subject: RE: Neutrino shield idea
>
>
> > Thanks for the paper relating to detection of "low energy" neutrinos.
> > However, according to my model, neutrinos are very, very high energy
> > photons (off everybody's chart, except mine).
> >
> > Therefore, if my model is correct, then low energy neutrinos would
> > merely be the photons we are familiar with and would be very easy to
> > detect.
> >
> > -Original Message-
> > From: Stephen Paul King [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]
> > Sent: Friday, October 07, 2005 12:54 PM
> > To: everything-list@eskimo.com
> > Subject: Neutrino shield idea
> >
> >
> > Howdy!
> >
> > I friend of mine has worked on a related idea that might help this
>
> > inverstigation. Please see:
> >
> > http://davidwoolsey.com/physics/ideas/neutrinoscope/index.html
> >
> > Kindest regards,
> >
> > Stephen
> >
> > - Original Message -
> > From: "John Ross" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
> > To: <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
> > Cc: 
> > Sent: Friday, October 07, 2005 11:57 AM
> > Subject: RE: ROSS MODEL OF THE UNIVERSE - The Simplest Yet Theory of
> > Everything
> >
> >
> > > Yes.  But building a neutrino shield would be difficult.
> >
>

Re: Neutrino shield idea

[Saibal Mitra]

This means that beta decay proves your model wrong.

- Original Message - 
From: "John Ross" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
To: "'Stephen Paul King'" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>;

Sent: Saturday, October 08, 2005 12:35 AM
Subject: RE: Neutrino shield idea


> Thanks for the paper relating to detection of "low energy" neutrinos.
> However, according to my model, neutrinos are very, very high energy
> photons (off everybody's chart, except mine).
>
> Therefore, if my model is correct, then low energy neutrinos would
> merely be the photons we are familiar with and would be very easy to
> detect.
>
> -Original Message-
> From: Stephen Paul King [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]
> Sent: Friday, October 07, 2005 12:54 PM
> To: everything-list@eskimo.com
> Subject: Neutrino shield idea
>
>
> Howdy!
>
> I friend of mine has worked on a related idea that might help this
> inverstigation. Please see:
>
> http://davidwoolsey.com/physics/ideas/neutrinoscope/index.html
>
> Kindest regards,
>
> Stephen
>
> - Original Message - 
> From: "John Ross" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
> To: <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
> Cc: 
> Sent: Friday, October 07, 2005 11:57 AM
> Subject: RE: ROSS MODEL OF THE UNIVERSE - The Simplest Yet Theory of
> Everything
>
>
> > Yes.  But building a neutrino shield would be difficult.
>

Re: What Computationalism is and what it is *not*

[Saibal Mitra]

Hi Norman,


> At last, I may be getting a glimmering of understanding of your point of
> view (which doesn't mean that I agree with you).  Thanks for your
patience.
>
> You seem to be saying that it is irrelevant if a Turing Machine, even one
> that operates at the speed of light, takes a billion years to simulate one
> second of a cubic meter of space.  The fact that it CAN simulate the cubic
> meter for one second, irrespective of the time it takes to do so, means
that
> the computationalist hypothesis is true.
>
> But, as you point out, this isn't a ''bona fide'' simulation because it's
> not in "real time."
>
> My problem is that if it's not bona fide then it's imaginary - a Harry
> Potter universe - and I don't understand how this imaginary happening can
be
> a proof of the computationalist hypothesis, or of anything else in the
real
> universe.

The observer living in the simulated universe perceives his universe in the
same way as we perceive our uiverse. He experiences the simulated time, not
our time. Because we are simulating our laws of physics, the simulated
observer won't be able to detect any deviations in the laws of physics in
any experiment. Only some boundary condistions, such as the size of the
observable part of his universe could be different because of the
fundamental limitations on simulations.


Saibal

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Re: What Computationalism is and what it is *not*

[Saibal Mitra]

Hi Norman,

Only when you demand that the computations be done in real time there is a
problem. My point is that this problem is not relevant.

Any TM that you can build will have limitations because of the laws of
physics. Suppose that  simulating the time evolution of 1 isolated cubic
meter of space containing matter for 1 second takes at least 1 billion years
for a computer the size of our solar system.

Then I would say that I can simulate a few seconds of your consciousness
because you only experience simulated time. You may say that because your
simulated brain can't interact with the rest of the (real) universe this
doesn't qualify as a ''bona fide'' simulation.

Saibal



- Original Message - 
From: "Norman Samish" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
To: "Saibal Mitra" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Sent: Tuesday, September 06, 2005 05:48 AM
Subject: Re: What Computationalism is and what it is *not*


> Hi Saibal,
>
> Thanks for your reply.  But semantics once again rears its ugly head!
> Norman
>
> - Original Message - 
> From: "Saibal Mitra" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
> To: "Norman Samish" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>; 
> Sent: Monday, September 05, 2005 3:08 PM
> Subject: Re: What Computationalism is and what it is *not*
>
>
> Hi Norman,
>
> (SM) A TM in our universe can simulate you living in a virtual universe.
If
> your universe is described by the same laws of physics as ours, then most
> physicists believe that the TM would have to work in a nonlocal way from
> your perspective.
>
> (NS) What do you mean by "nonlocal"?  Wikipedia says "Nonlocality in
quantum
> mechanics, refers to the property of entangled quantum states in which
both
> the entangled states "collapse" simultaneously upon measurement of one of
> their entangled components, regardless of the spatial separation of the
two
> states."   I don't understand what that has to do with the TM.
>
> (SM) Is this a problem? I don't think so, because the TM doesn't exist in
> your universe, it exists in our universe and it doesn't violate locality
> here.  The TM generates your universe in which locality cannot be
violated.
> So, I don't see the problem.
>
> (NS) Are you saying that the universe that the Turing Machine simulates is
> different from the one that I'm in, and in this simulated universe the
speed
> limits on the speed of the TM don't apply?  No - that can't be it.  I'm
> sorry - I guess I don't know what you mean.  The "problem" that I posed is
> that I don't understand how a finite-speed Turing Machine can simulate a
> universe, contrary to the assertions of the Church Thesis.  Whether or not
> I'm in the universe to be simulated seem irrelevant.  The computation in
> such a simulation is so immense that it must take a faster-than-light TM,
> which is not possible.  Therefore, it seems to me, computationalism must
be
> false.
>

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Re: What Computationalism is and what it is *not*

[Saibal Mitra]

Hi Norman,

A TM in our universe can simulate you living in a virtual universe. If your
universe is described by the same laws of physics as ours, then most
physicists believe that the TM would have to work in a nonlocal way from
your perspective.

Is this a problem? I don't think so, because the TM doesn't exist in your
universe, it exists in our universe and it doesn't violate locality here.
The TM generates your universe in which locality cannot be violated. So, I
don't see the problem.

Saibal

- Original Message - 
From: "Norman Samish" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
To: 
Sent: Monday, September 05, 2005 08:44 PM
Subject: Re: What Computationalism is and what it is *not*


> Hal Finney,
>
> You say, ". . . the Church Thesis, which I would paraphrase as saying that
> there are no physical processes more computationally powerful than a
Turing
> machine, or in other words that the universe could in principle be
simulated
> on a TM.  I wouldn't be surprised if most people who believe that minds
can
> be simulated on TMs also believe that everything can be simulated on a
TM."
>
> I'm out of my depth here, but this doesn't make sense to me.  My
> understanding is that the Turing Machine is a hypothetical device.  If one
> could be built that operated at faster-than-light or infinite speed, maybe
> it could, in principle, simulate the universe.  However, this isn't
> possible.  Does this mean that the Church Thesis, hence computationalism,
> is, in reality, false?
>
> Norman Samish
>

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Re: subjective reality

[Saibal Mitra]

Hi Norman,

I agree that you can assume that one multiverse exists and that that implies
that everything describable exists. But If physical existence is not the
same as mathematical existence then there is nothing we can do to verify
this. So, this like postulating that a powerless God exists.

Saibal



- Original Message - 
From: "Norman Samish" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
To: 
Sent: Saturday, September 03, 2005 09:33 PM
Subject: Re: subjective reality


> Hi Saibal,
> While my simple mind believes that "mathematical existence = physical
> existence," I do not assume that "we owe our existence to the mere
existence
> of the algorithm, not a machine that executes it."
> To me, the reason that mathematical existence means physical existence
> is that "in infinite space and time, everything that can exist must
exist."
> If it's describable mathematically, then it "can" exist, somewhere in the
> multiverse - therefore it "must" exist.  Tegmark claims, for example, that
> in his Level I multiverse, there is "an identical copy of (me) about
> 10^10^29 meters away."   (arXiv:astro-ph/0302131 v1  7 Feb 2003)
>
> Norman
> ~~
>
> - Original Message - 
> From: "Saibal Mitra" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
> To: <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>; <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
> Cc: 
> Sent: Saturday, September 03, 2005 7:10 AM
> Subject: Re: subjective reality
>
>
> Hi Godfrey,
>
> It is not clear to me why one would impose constraints such as locality
etc.
> here. Ignoring the exact details of what Bruno (and others) are doing, it
> all all boils down to this:
>
> Does there exists an algorithm that when run on some computer would
generate
> an observer who would subjectively perceive his virtual world to be
similar
> to the world we live in (which is well described by the standard model and
> GR).
>
> The quantum fields are represented in some way by the states of the
> transistors of the computer. The way the computer evolves from one state
to
> the next, of course, doesn't violate ''our laws of physics''. It may be
the
> case that the way the transistors are manipulated by the computer when
> interpreted in terms of the quantum fields in the ''virtual world'' would
> violate the laws of physics of that world. But this is irrelevant, because
> the observer cannot violate the laws of physics in his world. Also, if you
> believe that ''mathematical existence= physical existence'', then you
assume
> that we owe our existence to the mere existence of the algorithm, not a
> machine that executes it.
>
>
> Saibal
>

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Re: subjective reality

[Saibal Mitra]

Hi Godfrey,

It is not clear to me why one would impose constraints such as locality etc.
here. Ignoring the exact details of what Bruno (and others) are doing, it
all all boils down to this:

Does there exists an algorithm that when run on some computer would generate
an observer who would subjectively perceive his virtual world to be similar
to the world we live in (which is well described by the standard model and
GR).

The quantum fields are represented in some way by the states of the
transistors of the computer. The way the computer evolves from one state to
the next, of course, doesn't violate ''our laws of physics''. It may be the
case that the way the transistors are manipulated by the computer when
interpreted in terms of the quantum fields in the ''virtual world'' would
violate the laws of physics of that world. But this is irrelevant, because
the observer cannot violate the laws of physics in his world. Also, if you
believe that ''mathematical existence= physical existence'', then you assume
that we owe our existence to the mere existence of the algorithm, not a
machine that executes it.


Saibal


From: <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
To: <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Cc: 
Sent: Friday, September 02, 2005 09:34 PM
Subject: Re: subjective reality


> Hi Bruno,
>
>  From the bottom
>
>  [BM]
>  About the links: I know them. Thanks anyway.
>
>  [GK]
>   Maye you know the links but you surely have not read what they point
> to otherwise
>   you would not go on claiming that there are no NON-computable
> processes in the
>   physical world! You probably also have heard of books such of that by
> Pour-El and
>   Richards which catalogue a good number of them from both classical and
> quantum
>   physics but declined to read them as they don't agree with your
> proclivities...
>
>   The case of the general NON-computability of the results of individual
> measurements
>   is somewhat more grievious than all of these because, not only QM does
> not in general
>   compute them (but computes their statistical distributions quite
> generally) but because we
>   know that NO other conceivable local theory does compute them and
> furthermore,
>   no other such theory computes their distribution as well as QM! In
> fact the only
>   other "mechanistic" (non-local) theories that can claim to compute
> anything like the QM distibutions
>   must contain "faster-than-light" propagations and other features that
> violate other
>   well supported physical theories! This later result was proved by
> George Svetlichny
>  but I am sure you know the link so I need not include it.
>
>   I wrote "compute" above where I would normaly write "predict" because
> physical theories
>   are really analogue algorithms for computing predictions. Turing
> machines are very general
>   (but very slow and ineficient) ways of discretizing and encoding such
> algorithms and
>   implementing them in special physical systems called digital computers
> to generate
>   approximate predictions. This means that no UTM, no UD or UDA or any
> model of
>   digital computation (or any physical, calssical or quantum computer by
> that matter)
>  that is CT equivalent to them, can compute what QM cannot!
>
>  So if your UDA produces a "huge amount of non-locality" (whatever that
>   means) I can only understand that as meaning that it computes
> (predicts) a whole lot less
>  than QM and so, why should I care for it anyway?
>
>  I know this sounds "didatic" but so do you when you run out
>  of arguments and send people to your papers...
>
>  Godfrey Kurtz
>  (New Brunswick, NJ)
>
>
>
>  -Original Message-
>  From: Bruno Marchal <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
>  To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
>  Cc: everything-List List 
>  Sent: Fri, 2 Sep 2005 12:10:17 +0200
>  Subject: Re: subjective reality
>
>  [BM]
>  Hi Godfrey,
>
>   I answer some relevant (imo) comments in one post (for avoiding
> mailbox abuse).
>   For your others paragraphs, I can only suggest you study the UDA
> theorem
>
>
>  On 01 Sep 2005, at 16:20, [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
>
>
>  [RussellStandish]
>  > How does this affect Bruno's UDA? As far as I can tell, steps 1-6 go
>  through as before, but after that the conclusions are not so clear.
>
>
>  [Godfrey]
>  > But isn't step 1 the YD?
>
>
>  Good remark! (And Russell's answer does not really answers).
>   Glad to see you are going from step 0 (YD hypothesis mainly) to step 1
> (classical teleportation). What about step 2?
>  CF: http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/publications/SANE2004Slide.pdf
>   Explanation here:
> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/publications/SANE2004MARCHAL.htm
>
>
>  [GK]
>   Tsk, tsk Bruno! Now you are getting petty and condescending. I take it
> as a sign that this exchange as lasted longer
>  than it should...
>
>
>   > I would leave the "soul" out of my statements. The soul-body problem
> was solved long time ago.
>
>  [BM]
>  ? What is the solution?
>
>  [GK]
>  The body perishes, the soul (and the damnation) is eternal! What else?
>

Re: How did it all begin?

[Saibal Mitra]

I agree, but Tegmark does mention the idea that mathematical existence =
physical existence, which is basically the same thing (the universe
considered as a purely mathematical entity is ''eternal'').

The point is that the Universe appears to have a beginning from the point of
view of observers


Saibal


- Original Message - 
From: "Stephen Paul King" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
To: 
Sent: Thursday, September 01, 2005 12:40 AM
Subject: Re: How did it all begin?


> Dear Friends,
>
> Does it truly make sense to assume that Existence can have a
Beginning?
> We are not talking here, I AFAIK, about the beginning of our observed
> universe as we can wind our way back in history to a Big Bang Event
Horizon,
> but this event itself must have some form of antecedent that Exists.
> Remember, existence, per say, does not depend on anything, except for
maybe
> self-consistency, and thus it follows that Existence itself can not have a
> "beginning". It follows that it is Eternal, without beginning or end.
>
> IMHO, Tegmark's paper, like the rest of his papers, is not worth
reading
> if only because they misdirect thoughts more than they inform thoughts.
>
> Onward!
>
> Stephen
>
>
> - Original Message - 
> From: "Norman Samish" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
> To: 
> Sent: Wednesday, August 31, 2005 5:19 PM
> Subject: Re: How did it all begin?
>
>
> > Hi Godfrey,
> >Thanks for the ID.  Now I know that "Godfrey" is one of the
> > mind-stretchers on this list.
> >I hope that Saibal will eventually tell us the reason(s) for
> > "Dishonorable Mention."
> >I read Tegmark's paper too, where he seems to attribute the beginning
> > of
> > "It" to Inflation.  But he didn't appear to address how, or why,
Inflation
> > got started.  I guess his definition of "It" ends with our Big Bang.
> >Thinking of Big Bangs, or anything else, as a logical process that
> > occurs without causality isn't something I'm able to do.  But I'll keep
> > reading!
> > Norman
> > ~~
>

Re: How did it all begin?

[Saibal Mitra]

Hi Norman,

I have no idea why it received a dishonorable mention. It could be because
some physicists/cosmologists don't like anthropic reasoning.




- Original Message - 
From: "Norman Samish" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
To: "Saibal Mitra" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Cc: 
Sent: Wednesday, August 31, 2005 12:57 AM
Subject: Re: How did it all begin?


> This is a teaser.  Why did Tegmark's paper receive Dishonorable Mention?
> Who is Godfrey?
>
> - Original Message - 
> From: "Saibal Mitra" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
> To: "everything" 
> Sent: Tuesday, August 30, 2005 6:14 AM
> Subject: How did it all begin?
>
>
> http://arxiv.org/abs/astro-ph/0508429
>
>
> Tegmark's essay was not well received (perhaps Godfrey didn't like it?
:-) )
>
>
> How did it all begin?
> Authors: Max Tegmark
> Comments: 6 pages, 6 figs, essay for 2005 Young Scholars Competition in
> honor of Charles Townes; received Dishonorable Mention
>
> How did it all begin? Although this question has undoubtedly lingered for
as
> long as humans have walked the Earth, the answer still eludes us. Yet
since
> my grandparents were born, scientists have been able to refine this
question
> to a degree I find truly remarkable. In this brief essay, I describe some
of
> my own past and ongoing work on this topic, centering on cosmological
> inflation. I focus on
> (1) observationally testing whether this picture is correct and
> (2) working out implications for the nature of physical reality (e.g., the
> global structure of spacetime, dark energy and our cosmic future, parallel
> universes and fundamental versus environmental physical laws).
> (2) clearly requires (1) to determine whether to believe the conclusions.
I
> argue that (1) also requires (2), since it affects the probability
> calculations for inflation's observational predictions.
>

How did it all begin?

[Saibal Mitra]

http://arxiv.org/abs/astro-ph/0508429


Tegmark's essay was not well received (perhaps Godfrey didn't like it? :-) )


How did it all begin?
Authors: Max Tegmark
Comments: 6 pages, 6 figs, essay for 2005 Young Scholars Competition in
honor of Charles Townes; received Dishonorable Mention

How did it all begin? Although this question has undoubtedly lingered for as
long as humans have walked the Earth, the answer still eludes us. Yet since
my grandparents were born, scientists have been able to refine this question
to a degree I find truly remarkable. In this brief essay, I describe some of
my own past and ongoing work on this topic, centering on cosmological
inflation. I focus on
(1) observationally testing whether this picture is correct and
(2) working out implications for the nature of physical reality (e.g., the
global structure of spacetime, dark energy and our cosmic future, parallel
universes and fundamental versus environmental physical laws).
(2) clearly requires (1) to determine whether to believe the conclusions. I
argue that (1) also requires (2), since it affects the probability
calculations for inflation's observational predictions.

Re: subjective reality

[Saibal Mitra]

Hi Godfrey,

As you wrote in reply to others, local deterministic models seem to be ruled
out. The class of all formally describable models is much larger than that
of only the local deterministic models. So, although 't Hooft may  be proved
wrong (if loopholes like pre-determinism don't save him), non-local models
can reproduce QM.


Saibal




- Original Message - 
From: <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
To: <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>; <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Cc: 
Sent: Sunday, August 14, 2005 06:07 PM
Subject: Re: subjective reality


> Hi Saibal,
>
>   Yes, trans-Plankian physics is likely to be quite different from our
> cis-plankian
>   one. However I think the main reason 't Hooft claims the no-go
> theorems of
>   quantum physics are "in small print" is because his "reading glasses"
> are no
>   longer current :-), I am afraid. His arguments for the prevalence of
> simple
>   deterministic models at this scaled have varied over the years (as his
> little
>  examples) and some of these are quite clever, I'll agree.
>
>   However, as you very well point out, any transplankian theory worth
> looking
>   into has to reproduce a recognizable picture of the cisplankian world
> we know
>  and that means: quantum mechanics (non-locality and all) in some
>   discernible limit (and General Relativity too in some other limit) and
> all
>   indications is that this cannot be done from deterministic models
> alone.
>  't Hooft has been working around this for the last 10 years or so and
>  he doesn't have much to show for it. Considering that it took him less
>   than 2 years to come up with a renormalization prescription for
> non-abelian gauge
>   theories in his youth I suspect "god's dice" are loaded against him
> this time.
>
>  However he is always fascinating to read and hear. I saw him at Harvard
>   this winter for the Colemanfest and he had the most fabulous
> animations...
>
>  Godfrey Kurtz
>  (New Brunswick, NJ)
>
>  -Original Message-
>  From: Saibal Mitra <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
>  To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]; [EMAIL PROTECTED]
>  Cc: everything-list@eskimo.com
>  Sent: Sat, 13 Aug 2005 01:34:19 +0200
>  Subject: Re: subjective reality
>
>  Hi Godfrey,
>
>  't Hooft's work is motivated by problems one encounters in Planck scale
>  physics. 't Hooft has argued that the no go theorems precluding
>   deterministic models come with some ''small print''. Physicists
> working on
>   ''conventional ways'' to unite gravity with QM are forced to make such
> bold
>  assumptions that one should now also question this ''small print''.
>
>   As you wrote, 't Hooft has only looked at some limited type of models.
> It
>   seems to me that much more is possible. I have never tried to do any
> serious
>   work in this area myself (I'm too busy with other things). I would say
> that
>   anything goes as long as you can explain the macroscopic world. One
> could
>   imagine that a stochastic treatment of some deterministic theory could
> yield
>  the standard model, but now with the status of the quantum fields as
>   fictitional ghosts. If photons and electrons etc. don't really exists,
> then
>  you can say that this is consistent with ''no local hidden variables''.
>
>  Saibal
>
>
>
>  > Hi Saibal,
>  >
>  > You are correct that Gerard 't Hooft is one of the world exponents in
>  > QFTh.
>   > But Quantum Field Theory is but one small piece of QM and one in
> which
>   > non-local effects do not play a direct role (as of yet).
> Understandably
>  > 't Hooft's forays into Quantum Mechanics have not, however, been
>  > very insightful as he himself confesses (you can check his humorous
>  > slides in the Kavli Institute symposium of last year on the Future of
>  > Physics).
>  >
>  > So far he has supplied mostly some interesting simple CA models from
>  > which one
>   > can indeed extract something akin to superpositions but that in no
> way
>  > bypasses
>  > the basic facts of entanglement and non-local correlations.
>  >
>   > He may very well be the very last hold out for a deterministic (an
> thus
>  > classically mechanistic) point-of-view but I would not count him out
>  > just yet. If any one around has the brain to deal with this its him!
>  > That much I will grant you...
>  >
>  > (Now I have met 't Hooft! 't Hooft was a neighbor of mine and I tell
>  > you: Bruno is no 't Hooft! ;- )
>  >
>  > Best regar

Re: subjective reality

[Saibal Mitra]

Hi Godfrey,

't Hooft's work is motivated by problems one encounters in Planck scale
physics. 't Hooft has argued that the no go theorems precluding
deterministic models come with some ''small print''. Physicists working on
''conventional ways'' to unite gravity with QM are forced to make such bold
assumptions that one should now also question this ''small print''.

As you wrote, 't Hooft has only looked at some limited type of models. It
seems to me that much more is possible. I have never tried to do any serious
work in this area myself (I'm too busy with other things). I would say that
anything goes as long as you can explain the macroscopic world. One could
imagine that a stochastic treatment of some deterministic theory could yield
the standard model, but now with the status of the quantum fields as
fictitional ghosts. If photons and electrons etc. don't really exists, then
you can say that this is consistent with ''no local hidden variables''.

Saibal



> Hi Saibal,
>
>   You are correct that Gerard 't Hooft is one of the world exponents in
> QFTh.
>  But Quantum Field Theory is but one small piece of QM and one in which
>  non-local effects do not play a direct role (as of yet). Understandably
>  't Hooft's forays into Quantum Mechanics have not, however, been
>  very insightful as he himself confesses (you can check his humorous
>   slides in the Kavli Institute symposium of last year on the Future of
> Physics).
>
>   So far he has supplied mostly some interesting simple CA models from
> which one
>   can indeed extract something akin to superpositions but that in no way
> bypasses
>  the basic facts of entanglement and non-local correlations.
>
>  He may very well be the very last hold out for a deterministic (an thus
>  classically mechanistic) point-of-view but I would not count him out
>  just yet. If any one around has the brain to deal with this its him!
>  That much I will grant you...
>
>  (Now I have met 't Hooft! 't Hooft was a neighbor of mine and I tell
>  you: Bruno is no 't Hooft! ;- )
>
>  Best regards
>
>  Godfrey Kurtz
>  (New Brunswick, NJ)
>
>  -Original Message-
>  From: Saibal Mitra <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
>  To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]; [EMAIL PROTECTED]
>  Cc: everything-list@eskimo.com
>  Sent: Fri, 12 Aug 2005 21:11:30 +0200
>  Subject: Re: subjective reality
>
>  Godfrey Kurtz wrote
>
>   > More specifically: I believe QM puts a big kabosh into any
> non-quantum
>  > mechanistic view of the physical world. If you
>   > don't get that, than maybe you don't get a lot of other things,
> Bruno.
>  > Sorry if this sounds contemptuous. It is meant
>  > to be.
>
>
>   There aren't many people with a better understanding of QFT than 't
> Hooft.
>
>
>
>  http://arxiv.org/abs/quant-ph/0409021
>
>
>  http://arxiv.org/abs/gr-qc/9903084
>
>
>  http://arxiv.org/abs/quant-ph/0212095
>
>
>  http://arxiv.org/abs/hep-th/0105105
>
>
>  http://arxiv.org/abs/hep-th/0104219
>
>
>  http://arxiv.org/abs/hep-th/0104080
>
>
>
>
>  Saibal
>
>
>
>
> 
> Check Out the new free AIM(R) Mail -- 2 GB of storage and
> industry-leading spam and email virus protection.
>

Re: subjective reality

[Saibal Mitra]

Godfrey Kurtz wrote

>   More specifically: I believe QM puts a big kabosh into any non-quantum 
> mechanistic view of the physical world. If you
>   don't get that, than maybe you don't get a lot of other things, Bruno. 
> Sorry if this sounds contemptuous. It is meant
>  to be.


There aren't many people with a better understanding of QFT than 't Hooft.



http://arxiv.org/abs/quant-ph/0409021


http://arxiv.org/abs/gr-qc/9903084


http://arxiv.org/abs/quant-ph/0212095


http://arxiv.org/abs/hep-th/0105105


http://arxiv.org/abs/hep-th/0104219


http://arxiv.org/abs/hep-th/0104080




Saibal

OMs are events

[Saibal Mitra]

I agree with the notion of OMs as events in some suitably chosen space.
Observers are defined by the programs that generate them. If we identify
universes with programs then observers are just embedded universes. An
observer moment is just a qualia experienced by the observer, which is just
an event in the observer's universe.


I don't think that Hal's idea of identifying brain patterns with OMs will be
successful. The brain is just the hardware that runs a program (the
observer). If I run a simulation of our solar system on a computer, then the
relevant events are e.g. that Jupiter is in such and such a position. This
is associated with the state of the transistors of the computer running the
program. But that same pattern could arise in a completely different
calculation. You would have to extract exactly what program is running on
the machine to be able to define OMs like that. To do that you need to feed
the program with different kinds of input and study the output, otherwise
you'll fall prey to the famous ''clock paradox'' (you can map the time
evolution of a clock to that of any object, including brains).


Saibal


- Original Message - 
From: "Aditya Varun Chadha" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
To: "Lee Corbin" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>; 
Sent: Sunday, July 31, 2005 08:46 AM
Subject: Re: What We Can Know About the World


> [RS]
> On 7/31/05, Russell Standish <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> > On Sat, Jul 30, 2005 at 12:25:48PM -0700, Lee Corbin wrote:
> > >
> > > This is not to say that progress is impossible. Consider an idea
> > > like Aditya has:  what is the real difference between an event
> > > and an observer-moment?  In trying to answer that question, many
> > > of us may learn something (at least for our own purposes).
> > >
> >
> > Err, an event is a particular set of coordinates (t,x,y,z) in 4D
> > spacetime. This is how it is used in GR, anyway.
> >
> > An observer moment is a set of constraints, or equivalently
> > information known about the world (obviously at a moment of time). It
> > corresponds the the "state" vector \psi of quantum mechanics.
> >
> > Perhaps you have different definitions of these terms, but it seems
> > like chalk and cheese to me.
> >
>
> Lets not constrain an "event" to mean something only in 4-space. Take
> any N-Space and you can define it in terms of a set of N-dim. events.
> Ofcourse I agree with your definition, am just making it scale over
> dimensions.
>
> Now consider an "observer moment" to be exactly what you are defining
> it to be: information KNOWN about the world at a moment of time. The
> "coming to know" of any information corresponds to an "event". Thus an
> "observer moment" is well-defined if and only if "event" is defined.
> In other words, an Observer-Moment exists iff it's corresponding
> "coming to know" event exists for "some" observer. In terms of light
> cones, OMs are the Events at and "after" the crossing over of light
> cones.
>
> I think the distinction is not a qualitative one between the two, only
> those events which interfere with the set of events "observable" by
> "us" (who are also just sets of events) correspond to
> "observer-moments" in "our universe". So the set of OMs is simply a
> subset of the set of all events.
>
> refer to my previous mail about the multiverse as a partition with
> equivalence classes which are maximal sets of connected "observer
> moments", in other words, maximal sets of "mutually interfering
> events". visualize this as connected components of a graph.
>
> Defining entities in more than one different sets of words does not
> rule out their qualitative identity. Every Observer-Moment is an
> event. Every event is an Observer-Moment in some universe.
>
> -- 
> Aditya Varun Chadha
> adichad AT gmail.com
> http://www.adichad.com
>

Re: Measure, Doomsday argument

[Saibal Mitra]

- Original Message - 
From: "Quentin Anciaux" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
To: 
Sent: Monday, June 20, 2005 11:37 PM
Subject: Measure, Doomsday argument


> Hi everyone,
>
> I have some questions about measure...
>
> As I understand the DA, it is based on conditionnal probabilities. To
somehow
> calculate the "chance" on doom soon or doom late. An observer should
reason
> as if he is a random observer from the "class" of observer.
>
> The conditionnal probabilities come from the fact, that the observer find
that
> he is the sixty billions and something observer to be "born". Discover
this
> fact, this increase the probability of doom soon. The probability is
> increased because if doom late is the case, the probability to find myself
in
> a universe where billions of billions of observer are present is greater
but
> I know that I'm the sixty billions and something observer.


This is a false argument see here:

http://arxiv.org/abs/gr-qc/0009081


To calculate the conditional probability given the birthrank you have you
must use Bayes' theorem. You then have to take into account the a priori
probability for a given birthrank. If you could have been anyone of all the
people that will ever live, then you must include this informaton in the
a-priori probability, and as a result of that the Doomsday Paradox is
canceled.



>
> Now I come to the measure of observer moment :
> It has been said on this list, to justify we are living in "this" reality
and
> not in an Harry Potter like world that somehow "our" reality is simpler,
has
> higher measure than Whitte rabbit universe. But if I correlate this
> assumption with the DA, I also should assume that it is more probable to
be
> in a universe with billions of billions of observer instead of this one.
>
> How are these two cases different ?
>

Olum also stumbles on this point in his article. I also agree with Hall's
earlier reply that (artificially) increasing the number of universes will
lead to a decrease in intrinsic measure. One way to see this is as follows
(this argument was also given by Hall a few years ago, if I remember
correctly):

According to the Self Sampling Asumption you have to include an
''anthropic'' factor in the measure. The more observers there are the more
likely the universe is, but you do have to multiply the number of observers
by the intrinsic measure. For any given universe U you can consider an
universe U(n) that runs U n times, So, the anthropic factor of U(n) is n
times that of U. This means that the intrinsic measure of U(n)  should go to
zero faster than 1/n, or else you wouldn't be able to normalize
probabilities for observers. U(n) contains
 Log(n)/Log(2) bits more than U (you need to specify the number n). So,
assuming that the intrinsic measure only depends on program size, it should
decay faster than 2^(-program length).


Saibal



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Defeat Spammers by launching DDoS attacks on Spam-Websites:
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Re: Reference class (was dualism and the DA)

[Saibal Mitra]

- Original Message - 
From: "Jonathan Colvin" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
To: "'Russell Standish'" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Cc: "'EverythingList'" 
Sent: Monday, June 20, 2005 09:52 PM
Subject: Reference class (was dualism and the DA)


> Russell Standish wrote:
> > > > >(JC) If you want to insist that "What would it be like
> > to be a bat"
> > > > >is  equivalent to the question "What would the universe be like
> > > > if I had
> > > > > been a bat rather than me?", it is very hard to see what the
> > > > > answer could be. Suppose you
> > > > > *had* been a bat rather than you (Russell Standish).
> > How would the
> > > > > universe be any different than it is now? If you can
> > answer that
> > > > > question, (which is the key question, to my mind), then
> > I'll grant
> > > > > that the question is meaningful.
> > >
> > > >
> > > > No different in the 3rd person, very obviously different
> > in the 1st
> > > > person
> > >
> > > I don't really know what that means. The only way I can
> > make sense of
> > > the question is something like, "If I was a bat instead of me
> > > (Jonathan Colvin), then the universe would consist of a bat
> > asking the
> > > question I'm asking now." That's a counterfactual, a way in
> > which the
> > > universe would be objectively different.
> >
> > It wouldn't be counterfactual, because by assumption bats ask
> > this question of themselves anyway. Hence there is no
> > difference in the 3rd person. The 1st person experience is
> > very different though. There are only 1st person counterfactuals.
>
> That's quite an assumption. *Do* all conscious things ask this question of
> themselves? Babies don't. Senile old people don't. I'm not sure that
> medieval peasants ever thought to ask this question, or pre-literate
> cavemen.
>
>
> >
> > I definitely acknowledge the distinction between 1st and 3rd
> > person. This is not the same as duality, which posits a 3rd
> > person entity (the immaterial soul).
> >
> > >
> > > This is, I think, the crux of the reference class issue
> > with the DA.
> > > My (and
> > > your) reference class can not be merely "conscious
> > observers" or "all
> > > humans", but must be something much closer to "someone (or thing)
> > > discussing or aware of the DA).
> >
> > I don't think this is a meaningful reference class. I can
> > still ask the question "why am I me, and not someone else"
> > without being aware of the DA. All it takes is self-awareness IMHO.
>
> You *could* certainly. Perhaps it is important as to whether you actually
> *do* ask that question (and perhaps it should be in the context of the
DA).
>
>
> > > I note that this reference class is certainly appropriate
> > for you and
> > > me, and likely for anyone else reading this. This reference class
> > > certainly also invalidates the DA (although immaterial souls would
> > > rescue it).
> > >
> > > But at this point, I am, like Nick Bostrom, tempted to
> > throw my hands
> > > up and declare the reference class issue pretty much intractable.
> > >
> > > Jonathan Colvin
> >
> > Incidently, I think I may have an answer to my "Why am I not Chinese"
> > criticism, and the corresponding correction to "Why am I not an ant"
> > seems to give the same answer as I originally proposed.
>
> I'd be interested to hear it. Here's something else you could look
> at...calculate the median annual income for all humans alive today (I
> believe it is around $4,000 /year), compare it to your own, and see if you
> are anyway near the median. I predict that the answer for you (and for
> anyone else reading this), is far from the median. This result is
obviously
> related to the "why you are not Chinese" criticism, and is, I believe, the
> reason the DA goes astray.
>
> Jonathan Colvin


I don't think so, because most people on Earth are not Chinese. The correct
refutation of the Doomsday Paradox was given by D. Dieks and involves the
Self Indicating Axiom. The definition of the reference class defines the set
of observers that you consider to be you. The DA involves applying Bayes's
theorem and to do that correctly you have then to use the correct a priori
probability which is also fixed by the choice of the reference class. The
two effects cancel and there is no Doomsday Problem. This is all explained
here:


http://arxiv.org/abs/gr-qc/0009081



Saibal


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>

Re: copy method important?

[Saibal Mitra]

You ca still create two identical systems starting from another system. E.g.
in stimulated emission two photons are created in the same state. Another
example is a Bose Einstein condensate, in which all the atoms are in the
same state.


Note that you can still teleport an unknown quantum state despite
Heisenberg's uncertainty principle (you do this without measuring the
state). It can be shown that you can't copy an unknown quantum state,
because that would violate the Schrodinger equation.


Saibal
-
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- Original Message - 
From: "Norman Samish" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
To: 
Sent: Saturday, June 18, 2005 08:36 PM
Subject: Re: copy method important?


> I'm no physicist, but doesn't Heisenberg's Uncertainty Principle forbid
> making exact quantum-level measurements, hence exact copies?  If so, then
> all this talk of making exact copies is fantasy.
> Norman Samish
> ~
> - Original Message - 
> From: "rmiller" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
> To: "Stathis Papaioannou" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>;
> <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>; 
> Sent: Saturday, June 18, 2005 10:05 AM
> Subject: copy method important?
>
>
> All,
> Though we're not discussing entanglement per se, some of these examples
> surely meet the criteria.  So, my thought question for the day: is the
> method of copying important?
>  Example #1: we start with a single marble, A.  Then, we magically
> create a copy, marble B--perfectly like marble B in every way. . .that is,
> the atoms are configured similarly, the interaction environment is the
> same--and they are indistinguishable from one another.
>  Example #2: we start with a single marble A.  Then, instead of
> magically creating a copy, we search the universe, Tegmarkian-style, and
> locate a second marble, B that is perfectly equivalent to our original
> marble A.  All tests both magically avoid QM decoherence problems and show
> that our newfound marble is, in fact, indistinguishable in every way from
> our original.
>  Here's the question:  Are the properties of the *relationship*
> between Marbles A and B in Example #1 perfectly equivalent to those in
> Example #2?
>  If the criteria involves simply analysis of configurations at a
> precise point in time, it would seem the answer must be "yes."  On the
> other hand, if the method by which the marbles were created is crucial to
> the present configuration, then the answer would be "no."
>
> R. Miller
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
> -- 
> No virus found in this incoming message.
> Checked by AVG Anti-Virus.
> Version: 7.0.323 / Virus Database: 267.7.8/22 - Release Date: 6/17/2005
>
>

Re: more torture

[Saibal Mitra]

- Original Message - 
From: "Stathis Papaioannou" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
To: <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>; 
Sent: Tuesday, June 14, 2005 05:26 PM
Subject: Re: more torture


>
> > > Saibal Mitra writes:
> > >
> > > >Because no such thing as free will exists one has to consider three
> > > >different universes in which the three different choices are made.
The
> > > >three
> > > >universes will have comparable measures. The antropic factor of
10^100
> >will
> > > >then dominate and will cause the observer to find himself having made
> > > >choice
> > > >b) as one of the 10^100 copies in the minute without torture.
> > >
> > > But what will happen to the observer when the minute is up?
> > >
> > > --Stathis
> >
> >
> >Pretending that these three universes are all that exists, what will
happen
> >is that the OM will find himself being another one of the 10^100 copies.
> >The
> >copy survives with memory loss.
> >
> >
> >Saibal
>
> In what sense can the copy (or anything) become another copy with memory
> loss? It is almost as if you are postulating a soul, which flies from one
> body to another, and somehow contains the original person's identity so
that
> it survives memory loss. What is required for an observer moment OM_1 at
> time t1 to "become" the next observer moment at time t2 is that at least
one
> successor OM exist with time stamp t2, a belief that he is the same person
> as OM_1, and memories of OM_1 up to time t2. If several such OM's exist
> {OM_2.1, OM_2.2, OM_2.3...} then either one may be the successor, with
> probability determined by the measure of OM_2.n relative to the measure of
> the whole set. Amazingly, being completely swamped with other OM's of
> various types and vintages, more or less closely related to OM_1, makes
> absolutely no difference to the process, because the OM's don't need to
> "find" each other and lock arms, all they need to do is *exist*, anywhere
in
> the multiverse, related in the way I have described. This is somewhat
> analogous to the fact that the integer 56 is always followed by the
integer
> 57, even though there are lots and lots of other integers everywhere
amongst
> which these two could get lost.
>
> --Stathsi Papaioannou


I'm certainly not postulating a soul. All I'm saying is that all OMs are
real and there is no preference for one over another. Each OM will feel that
he is the successor of a previous one. If an OM checks if he is a typical
creature in the universe, he will find with large probability that this is
indeed the case.

Your proposal about time evolution ignores memory loss. How to assign
probabilities to OM_2.1, OM_2.2, etc. if they don't remember everything
about OM_1? Real people's memories are not perfect. So, you would have to
admit memory loss to make your proposal work in practice. And unless you
believe that QTI makes you immune from Alzheimer's you would have to admit
an arbitrary large amount of memory loss.


So, to me the notion of a successor doesn't make sense in general. You can
always define a set of successors of OM_1 irrespective of measure by saying
that members of that set remember being OM_1. But then there also exists
successors of me with perfect memory but with very small measures. I could
e.g. arise accidentally in a simulation performed by aliens and that
simulation could be a more perfect continuation (memory wise) of my present
OM.



These considerations have led me to believe that one should abandon any
fundamental idea of successors altogether. OMs just exist and each OM has a
memory of ''previous'' experiences. So, each OM remembers being another OM.
There exists a probability distribution over the set of all OMs which is
fixed by the laws of physics. OMs thus ''always'' exist and this is a form
of immortality. In your example of 10^100 copies almost all OMs are one of
these copies. What happens to such an OM when the minute is up? Nothing
really happens. All the OMs are ''static'' mathematical entities.


Saibal

Re: more torture

[Saibal Mitra]

- Original Message - 
From: "Stathis Papaioannou" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
To: <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>; 
Sent: Tuesday, June 14, 2005 08:06 AM
Subject: Re: more torture


> Saibal Mitra writes:
>
> >Because no such thing as free will exists one has to consider three
> >different universes in which the three different choices are made. The
> >three
> >universes will have comparable measures. The antropic factor of 10^100
will
> >then dominate and will cause the observer to find himself having made
> >choice
> >b) as one of the 10^100 copies in the minute without torture.
>
> But what will happen to the observer when the minute is up?
>
> --Stathis


Pretending that these three universes are all that exists, what will happen
is that the OM will find himself being another one of the 10^100 copies. The
copy survives with memory loss.


Saibal

Re: more torture

[Saibal Mitra]

Because no such thing as free will exists one has to consider three
different universes in which the three different choices are made. The three
universes will have comparable measures. The antropic factor of 10^100 will
then dominate and will cause the observer to find himself having made choice
b) as one of the 10^100 copies in the minute without torture.


Saibal








-
Defeat Spammers by launching DDoS attacks on Spam-Websites:
http://www.hillscapital.com/antispam/
- Original Message - 
From: "Stathis Papaioannou" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
To: 
Sent: Monday, June 13, 2005 01:00 PM
Subject: more torture


> I have been arguing in recent posts that the absolute measure of an
observer
> moment (or observer, if you prefer) makes no possible difference at the
> first person level. A counterargument has been that, even if an observer
> cannot know how many instantiations of him are being run, it is still
> important in principle to take the absolute measure into account, for
> example when considering the total amount of suffering in the world. The
> following thought experiment shows how, counterintuitively, sticking to
this
> principle may actually be doing the victims a disservice:
>
> You are one of 10 copies who are being tortured. The copies are all being
> run in lockstep with each other, as would occur if 10 identical computers
> were running 10 identical sentient programs. Assume that the torture is so
> bad that death is preferable, and so bad that escaping it with your life
is
> only marginally preferable to escaping it by dying (eg., given the option
of
> a 50% chance of dying or a 49% chance of escaping the torture and living,
> you would take the 50%). The torture will continue for a year, but you are
> allowed one of 3 choices as to how things will proceed:
>
> (a) 9 of the 10 copies will be chosen at random and painlessly killed,
while
> the remaining copy will continue to be tortured.
>
> (b) For one minute, the torture will cease and the number of copies will
> increase to 10^100. Once the minute is up, the number of copies will be
> reduced to 10 again and the torture will resume as before.
>
> (c) the torture will be stopped for 8 randomly chosen copies, and continue
> for the other 2.
>
> Which would you choose? To me, it seems clear that there is an 80% chance
of
> escaping the torture if you pick (c), while with (a) it is certain that
the
> torture will continue, and with (b) it is certain that the torture will
> continue with only one minute of respite.
>
> Are there other ways to look at the choices? It might be argued that in
(a)
> there is a 90% chance that you will be one of the copies who is killed,
and
> thus a 90% chance that you will escape the torture, better than your
chances
> in (c). However, even if you are one of the ones killed, this does not
help
> you at all. If there is a successor observer moment at the moment of
death,
> subjectively, your consciousness will continue. The successor OM in this
> case comes from the one remaining copy who is being tortured, hence
> guaranteeing that you will continue to suffer.
>
> What about looking at it from an altruistic rather than selfish viewpoint:
> isn't it is better to decrease the total suffering in the world by 90% as
in
> (a) rather than by 80% as in (c)? Before making plans to decrease
suffering,
> ask the victims. All 10 copies will plead with you to choose (c).
>
> What about (b)? ASSA enthusiasts might argue that with this choice, an OM
> sampled randomly from the set of all possible OM's will almost certainly
be
> from the one minute torture-free interval. What would this mean for the
> victims? If you interview each of the 10 copies before the minute starts,
> they will tell you that they are currently being tortured and they expect
> that they will get one minute respite, then start suffering again, so they
> wish the choice had been (c). Next, if you interview each of the 10^100
> copies they will tell you that the torture has stopped for exactly one
> minute by the torture chambre's clock, but they know that it is going to
> start again and they wish you had chosen (c). Finally, if you interview
each
> of the 10 copies for whom the torture has recommenced, they will report
that
> they remember the minute of respite, but that's no good to them now, and
> they wish you had chosen (c).
>
> --Stathis Papaioannou
>
> _
> Express yourself instantly with MSN Messenger! Download today - it's FREE!
> http://messenger.msn.click-url.com/go/onm00200471ave/direct/01/
>

RE: Observer-Moment Measure from Universe Measure

[Saibal Mitra]

- Original Message - 
From: "Brent Meeker" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
To: "Saibal Mitra" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Sent: Friday, June 10, 2005 06:41 PM
Subject: RE: Observer-Moment Measure from Universe Measure


>
>
> >-Original Message-
> >From: Saibal Mitra [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]
> >Sent: Friday, June 10, 2005 11:39 PM
> >To: Brent Meeker; everything
> >Subject: Re: Observer-Moment Measure from Universe Measure
> >
> >
> >
> >- Original Message -
> >From: "Brent Meeker" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
> >To: "Saibal Mitra" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
> >Sent: Wednesday, June 08, 2005 02:23 PM
> >Subject: RE: Observer-Moment Measure from Universe Measure
> >
> >
> >>
> >>
> >> >-Original Message-
> >> >From: Saibal Mitra [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]
> >> >Sent: Wednesday, June 08, 2005 1:16 PM
> >> >To: Patrick Leahy; Hal Finney; [EMAIL PROTECTED]; [EMAIL PROTECTED]
> >> >Cc: everything-list@eskimo.com
> >> >Subject: Re: Observer-Moment Measure from Universe Measure
> >> >
> >> >
> >> >I think one should define an observer moment as the instantaneous
> >> >description of the human brain. I.e. the minimum amount of information
> >you
> >> >need to simulate the brain of a observer. This description changes
over
> >time
> >> >due to interactions with the environment. Even if there were no
> >interactions
> >> >with the environment the description would change, but this change is
> >fixed
> >> >by the original description.
> >>
> >> That means that, supposing the brain is a classical, the "moment"
cannot
> >be
> >> defined by a description of values, omitting rates; just as the path of
a
> >> ballistic projectile cannot be specified by it location, omitting its
> >velocity.
> >> But to include rates means an implicit introduction of time and
continuity
> >of
> >> OMs.  This implies that OMs form causal chains and it makes no sense to
> >talk
> >> about the same OM being in two different chains.
> >
> >
> >That's true in an isolated personal universe that is not interacting with
an
> >'outside world'. I could, e.g. take your brain and simulate that on a
> >computer. The evolution equations for your brain are deterministic, so
the
> >simulation will describe a unique chain of causal links provided you fix
the
> >boundary conditions.
> >
> >If the personal universe is embedded in another universe (like in our
case),
> >then the evolution equations will be constantly perturbed.
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >>
> >> But a lot of the motivation for OMs comes from the brain *not* being
> >classical;
> >> from the idea that the brain gets "copied" into Everett's multiple
> >relative
> >> states or MWIs.  Decoherence in the brain is very much faster than the
> >> neurochemical processes - that's why it's approximately classical.  So
> >what is
> >> going on when QM predicts different OMs?  From Everett's point of view
the
> >> brain must be treated as part of the QM system and it gets "copied" -
but
> >not
> >> by itself.  Its description must include its entanglement with the
quantum
> >> systems observed.  So it seems that in either case, classical or
quantum,
> >an OM
> >> as a description of a brain state, has links outside itself.  In the
> >classical
> >> case it has casual links in time.  In the QM case it has Hilbert space
> >links to
> >> what has been observed.
> >
> >
> >I agree. But the entangled state of a brain with the rest of the universe
in
> >the MWI corresponds to an ensemble of different worlds such that in each
> >member of the ensemble the brain is in some definite state.
> >
> >
> >>
> >> >So, I see no problem with Hal's way of thinking about OMs
> >> >
> >> >
> >> >Observers are can be thought of as their own descriptions and thus
> >universes
> >> >in their own right. Observer moments are observers in particular
states
> >i.e.
> >> >their ''personal'' universe being in a certain state. The causal
relation
> >> >between successive states is already defined when we specify which
> >observer
> >> >we are talking about. i.e., we have already specified the laws of
physics
>

Re: Observer-Moment Measure from Universe Measure

[Saibal Mitra]

- Original Message - 
From: "Brent Meeker" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
To: "Saibal Mitra" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Sent: Sunday, June 12, 2005 02:43 AM
Subject: RE: Observer-Moment Measure from Universe Measure


>
>
> >-Original Message-
> >From: Saibal Mitra [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]
> >Sent: Sunday, June 11, 2000 4:01 PM
> >To: Brent Meeker; ":everything-list"@eskimo.com
> >Subject: Re: Observer-Moment Measure from Universe Measure
> >
> >
> >
> >- Original Message -
> >From: "Brent Meeker" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
> >To: "Saibal Mitra" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
> >Sent: Friday, June 10, 2005 06:41 PM
> >Subject: RE: Observer-Moment Measure from Universe Measure
> >
> >
> >>
> >>
> >> >-Original Message-
> >> >From: Saibal Mitra [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]
> >> >Sent: Friday, June 10, 2005 11:39 PM
> >> >To: Brent Meeker; everything
> >> >Subject: Re: Observer-Moment Measure from Universe Measure
> >> >
> >> >
> >> >
> >> >- Original Message -
> >> >From: "Brent Meeker" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
> >> >To: "Saibal Mitra" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
> >> >Sent: Wednesday, June 08, 2005 02:23 PM
> >> >Subject: RE: Observer-Moment Measure from Universe Measure
> >> >
> >> >
> >> >>
> >> >>
> >> >> >-Original Message-
> >> >> >From: Saibal Mitra [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]
> >> >> >Sent: Wednesday, June 08, 2005 1:16 PM
> >> >> >To: Patrick Leahy; Hal Finney; [EMAIL PROTECTED]; [EMAIL PROTECTED]
> >> >> >Cc: everything-list@eskimo.com
> >> >> >Subject: Re: Observer-Moment Measure from Universe Measure
> >> >> >
> >> >> >
> >> >> >I think one should define an observer moment as the instantaneous
> >> >> >description of the human brain. I.e. the minimum amount of
information
> >> >you
> >> >> >need to simulate the brain of a observer. This description changes
> >over
> >> >time
> >> >> >due to interactions with the environment. Even if there were no
> >> >interactions
> >> >> >with the environment the description would change, but this change
is
> >> >fixed
> >> >> >by the original description.
> >> >>
> >> >> That means that, supposing the brain is a classical, the "moment"
> >cannot
> >> >be
> >> >> defined by a description of values, omitting rates; just as the path
of
> >a
> >> >> ballistic projectile cannot be specified by it location, omitting
its
> >> >velocity.
> >> >> But to include rates means an implicit introduction of time and
> >continuity
> >> >of
> >> >> OMs.  This implies that OMs form causal chains and it makes no sense
to
> >> >talk
> >> >> about the same OM being in two different chains.
> >> >
> >> >
> >> >That's true in an isolated personal universe that is not interacting
with
> >an
> >> >'outside world'. I could, e.g. take your brain and simulate that on a
> >> >computer. The evolution equations for your brain are deterministic, so
> >the
> >> >simulation will describe a unique chain of causal links provided you
fix
> >the
> >> >boundary conditions.
> >> >
> >> >If the personal universe is embedded in another universe (like in our
> >case),
> >> >then the evolution equations will be constantly perturbed.
> >> >
> >> >
> >> >
> >> >
> >> >>
> >> >> But a lot of the motivation for OMs comes from the brain *not* being
> >> >classical;
> >> >> from the idea that the brain gets "copied" into Everett's multiple
> >> >relative
> >> >> states or MWIs.  Decoherence in the brain is very much faster than
the
> >> >> neurochemical processes - that's why it's approximately classical.
So
> >> >what is
> >> >> going on when QM predicts different OMs?  From Everett's point of
view
> >the
> >> >> brain must be treated as part of the QM system and it gets
"copied" -
> >but
> >> >not
>

RE: Observer-Moment Measure from Universe Measure

[Saibal Mitra]

- Original Message - 
From: "Brent Meeker" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
To: "Saibal Mitra" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Sent: Wednesday, June 08, 2005 02:23 PM
Subject: RE: Observer-Moment Measure from Universe Measure


>
>
> >-Original Message-
> >From: Saibal Mitra [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]
> >Sent: Wednesday, June 08, 2005 1:16 PM
> >To: Patrick Leahy; Hal Finney; [EMAIL PROTECTED]; [EMAIL PROTECTED]
> >Cc: everything-list@eskimo.com
> >Subject: Re: Observer-Moment Measure from Universe Measure
> >
> >
> >I think one should define an observer moment as the instantaneous
> >description of the human brain. I.e. the minimum amount of information
you
> >need to simulate the brain of a observer. This description changes over
time
> >due to interactions with the environment. Even if there were no
interactions
> >with the environment the description would change, but this change is
fixed
> >by the original description.
>
> That means that, supposing the brain is a classical, the "moment" cannot
be
> defined by a description of values, omitting rates; just as the path of a
> ballistic projectile cannot be specified by it location, omitting its
velocity.
> But to include rates means an implicit introduction of time and continuity
of
> OMs.  This implies that OMs form causal chains and it makes no sense to
talk
> about the same OM being in two different chains.


That's true in an isolated personal universe that is not interacting with an
'outside world'. I could, e.g. take your brain and simulate that on a
computer. The evolution equations for your brain are deterministic, so the
simulation will describe a unique chain of causal links provided you fix the
boundary conditions.

If the personal universe is embedded in another universe (like in our case),
then the evolution equations will be constantly perturbed.




>
> But a lot of the motivation for OMs comes from the brain *not* being
classical;
> from the idea that the brain gets "copied" into Everett's multiple
relative
> states or MWIs.  Decoherence in the brain is very much faster than the
> neurochemical processes - that's why it's approximately classical.  So
what is
> going on when QM predicts different OMs?  From Everett's point of view the
> brain must be treated as part of the QM system and it gets "copied" - but
not
> by itself.  Its description must include its entanglement with the quantum
> systems observed.  So it seems that in either case, classical or quantum,
an OM
> as a description of a brain state, has links outside itself.  In the
classical
> case it has casual links in time.  In the QM case it has Hilbert space
links to
> what has been observed.


I agree. But the entangled state of a brain with the rest of the universe in
the MWI corresponds to an ensemble of different worlds such that in each
member of the ensemble the brain is in some definite state.


>
> >So, I see no problem with Hal's way of thinking about OMs
> >
> >
> >Observers are can be thought of as their own descriptions and thus
universes
> >in their own right. Observer moments are observers in particular states
i.e.
> >their ''personal'' universe being in a certain state. The causal relation
> >between successive states is already defined when we specify which
observer
> >we are talking about. i.e., we have already specified the laws of physics
> >for the personal universe of an observer which defines the observer.
> >Specifying the initial state of the personal universes thus suffices.
>
> That would hold for a classical brain in a classical universe.  But does
it in
> a QM universe?  I see a tension between the idea of "personal universe"
and
> quantum entanglement.

I don't see problems here. If you assume that our universe is described by
some fundamental laws of physics then those laws of physics also describe
our brains. The way a particular brain works is thus fixed. This then
defines the personal universe. Entanglement of the brain with another system
can only happen if there are interactions with the outside. Even in the
classic case these intercations make the evolution of the personal universe
nondeterministic.



Saibal

-
Defeat Spammers by launching DDoS attacks on Spam-Websites:
http://www.hillscapital.com/antispam/

Re: Observer-Moment Measure from Universe Measure

[Saibal Mitra]

- Original Message - 
From: "Brent Meeker" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
To: "Saibal Mitra" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Sent: Wednesday, June 08, 2005 02:23 PM
Subject: RE: Observer-Moment Measure from Universe Measure


>
>
> >-Original Message-
> >From: Saibal Mitra [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]
> >Sent: Wednesday, June 08, 2005 1:16 PM
> >To: Patrick Leahy; Hal Finney; [EMAIL PROTECTED]; [EMAIL PROTECTED]
> >Cc: everything-list@eskimo.com
> >Subject: Re: Observer-Moment Measure from Universe Measure
> >
> >
> >I think one should define an observer moment as the instantaneous
> >description of the human brain. I.e. the minimum amount of information
you
> >need to simulate the brain of a observer. This description changes over
time
> >due to interactions with the environment. Even if there were no
interactions
> >with the environment the description would change, but this change is
fixed
> >by the original description.
>
> That means that, supposing the brain is a classical, the "moment" cannot
be
> defined by a description of values, omitting rates; just as the path of a
> ballistic projectile cannot be specified by it location, omitting its
velocity.
> But to include rates means an implicit introduction of time and continuity
of
> OMs.  This implies that OMs form causal chains and it makes no sense to
talk
> about the same OM being in two different chains.


That's true in an isolated personal universe that is not interacting with an
'outside world'. I could, e.g. take your brain and simulate that on a
computer. The evolution equations for your brain are deterministic, so the
simulation will describe a unique chain of causal links provided you fix the
boundary conditions.

If the personal universe is embedded in another universe (like in our case),
then the evolution equations will be constantly perturbed.




>
> But a lot of the motivation for OMs comes from the brain *not* being
classical;
> from the idea that the brain gets "copied" into Everett's multiple
relative
> states or MWIs.  Decoherence in the brain is very much faster than the
> neurochemical processes - that's why it's approximately classical.  So
what is
> going on when QM predicts different OMs?  From Everett's point of view the
> brain must be treated as part of the QM system and it gets "copied" - but
not
> by itself.  Its description must include its entanglement with the quantum
> systems observed.  So it seems that in either case, classical or quantum,
an OM
> as a description of a brain state, has links outside itself.  In the
classical
> case it has casual links in time.  In the QM case it has Hilbert space
links to
> what has been observed.


I agree. But the entangled state of a brain with the rest of the universe in
the MWI corresponds to an ensemble of different worlds such that in each
member of the ensemble the brain is in some definite state.


>
> >So, I see no problem with Hal's way of thinking about OMs
> >
> >
> >Observers are can be thought of as their own descriptions and thus
universes
> >in their own right. Observer moments are observers in particular states
i.e.
> >their ''personal'' universe being in a certain state. The causal relation
> >between successive states is already defined when we specify which
observer
> >we are talking about. i.e., we have already specified the laws of physics
> >for the personal universe of an observer which defines the observer.
> >Specifying the initial state of the personal universes thus suffices.
>
> That would hold for a classical brain in a classical universe.  But does
it in
> a QM universe?  I see a tension between the idea of "personal universe"
and
> quantum entanglement.

I don't see problems here. If you assume that our universe is described by
some fundamental laws of physics then those laws of physics also describe
our brains. The way a particular brain works is thus fixed. This then
defines the personal universe. Entanglement of the brain with another system
can only happen if there are interactions with the outside. Even in the
classic case these intercations make the evolution of the personal universe
nondeterministic.



Saibal

Re: Observer-Moment Measure from Universe Measure

[Saibal Mitra]

I think one should define an observer moment as the instantaneous
description of the human brain. I.e. the minimum amount of information you
need to simulate the brain of a observer. This description changes over time
due to interactions with the environment. Even if there were no interactions
with the environment the description would change, but this change is fixed
by the original description.



So, I see no problem with Hal's way of thinking about OMs


Observers are can be thought of as their own descriptions and thus universes
in their own right. Observer moments are observers in particular states i.e.
their ''personal'' universe being in a certain state. The causal relation
between successive states is already defined when we specify which observer
we are talking about. i.e., we have already specified the laws of physics
for the personal universe of an observer which defines the observer.
Specifying the initial state of the personal universes thus suffices.



Saibal


- Original Message - 
From: "Patrick Leahy" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
To: "Hal Finney" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Cc: 
Sent: Wednesday, June 08, 2005 01:04 PM
Subject: RE: Observer-Moment Measure from Universe Measure


>
> On Tue, 7 Jun 2005, Hal Finney wrote:
>
> > Jonathan Colvin writes:
> >> There's a question begging to be asked, which is (predictably I
suppose, for
> >> a qualia-denyer such as myself), what makes you think there is such a
thing
> >> as an "essence of an experience"? I'd suggest there is no such "thing"
as an
> >> observer-moment. I'm happy with using the concept as a tag of sorts
when
> >> discussing observer selection issues, but I think reifying it is likely
a
> >> mistake, and goes considerably beyond Strong AI into a full Cartesian
> >> dualism. Is it generally accepted here on this list that a
> >> substrate-independent thing called an "observer moment" exists?
> >
> > Here's how I attempted to define observer moment a few years ago:
> >
> > Observer - A subsystem of the multiverse with qualities sufficiently
> > similar to those which are common among human beings that we consider
> > it meaningful that we might have been or might be that subsystem.
> > These qualities include consciousness, perception of a flow of time,
> > and continuity of identity.
> >
> > Observer-moment - An instant of perception by an observer.  An
observer's
> > sense of the flow of time allows its experience to be divided into
> > units so small that no perceptible change in consciousness is possible
> > in those intervals.  Each such unit of time for a particular observer
> > is an observer-moment.
> >
> >
> > So if you don't believe in observer-moments, do you also not believe
> > in observers?  Or is it the -moment that causes problems?
> >
>
> Obviously, its the -moment. I'm pleased to see that Jonathan and Brent
> have the same problem with the concept that I do.
>
> Being an observer is a process. Slicing it into moments is OK
> mathematically, where a "moment" corresponds to a calculus dt (and hence
> is neither a particular length of time nor an instant). But to regard the
> "observer-state" at a particular moment as an isolated entity which is
> self-aware makes as much sense as regarding individual horizontal slices
> through a brain as being self-aware. It is the causal relation between
> successive brain states (incorporating incoming sense data) which
> constitutes intelligence, and self-awareness is just an epiphenomenon on
> top of intelligence, i.e. I would not agree that anything can be
> self-aware but have no intelligence.
>
> Paddy Leahy
>

Re: where did the Big Bang come from?

[Saibal Mitra]

- Original Message - 
From: "Jesse Mazer" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
To: <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>; 
Sent: Monday, June 06, 2005 07:53 PM
Subject: RE: where did the Big Bang come from?


> Norman Samish wrote:
> >
> >
> > > Norman Samish wrote:
> > >> And where did this mysterious Big Bang come from?  A "quantum
> > >> fluctuation of virtual particles" I'm told.
> > >
> >On Mon, 6 Jun 2005, Jesse Mazer wrote:
> > > Whoever told you that was passing off speculation as fact--in fact
there
> > > is no agreed-upon answer to the question of what, if anything, came
> >before
> > > the Big Bang or "caused" it.
> > >
> >
> >Patrick Leahy wrote:
> >Maybe Norman is confusing the rather more legit idea that the
> >"fluctuations"
> >in the Big Bang, that explain why the universe is not completely uniform,
> >come from quantum fluctuations amplified by inflation.  This is currently
> >the leading theory for the origin of structure, in that it has quite a
lot
> >of successful predictions to its credit.
> >
> >Norman Samish writes:
> >Perhaps I didn't express myself well.  What I was referring to is at
> >http://www.astronomycafe.net/cosm/planck.html, where Sten Odenwald
> >hypothesizes that random fluctuations in "nothing at all" led to the Big
> >Bang.  "This process has been described by the physicist Frank Wilczyk at
> >the University of California, Santa Barbara by saying, 'The reason that
> >there is something instead of nothing is that nothing is unstable.'  ". .
.
> >"Physicist Edward Tryon expresses this best by saying that 'Our universe
is
> >simply one of those things that happens from time to time.' "
> >
>
> But as I said, this idea is pure speculation, there isn't any evidence for
> it and we'd probably need a fully worked-out theory of quantum gravity to
> see if the idea even makes sense.
>
> Jesse

This is one of the motivations for believing in a purely mathematical
universe. A physical universe can never arise from 'nothing'. If you believe
in mathematical reality then there is no mystery. The mathematical model
that describes the big bang is eternal.


Saibal

Re: Observer-Moment Measure from Universe Measure

[Saibal Mitra]

- Original Message - 
From: ""Hal Finney"" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
To: 
Sent: Friday, June 03, 2005 08:10 PM
Subject: Observer-Moment Measure from Universe Measure


> To apply Wei's method, first we need to get serious about what is an OM.
> We need a formal model and description of a particular OM.  Consider, for
> example, someone's brain when he is having a particular experience.  He is
> eating chocolate ice cream while listening to Beethoven's 5th symphony,
> on his 30th birthday.  Imagine that we could scan his brain with advanced
> technology and record his neural activity.  Imagine further that with the
> aid of an advanced brain model we are able to prune out the unnecessary
> information and distill this to the essence of the experience.  We come
> up with a pattern that represents that observer moment.  Any system which
> instantiates that pattern genuinely creates an experience of that observer
> moment.  This pattern is something that can be specified, recorded and
> written down in some form.  It probably involves a huge volume of data.
>
> So, now that we have a handle on what a particular OM is, we can more
> reasonably ask whether a universe instantiates it.


Wouldn't it be better to think of OMs as programs just like we think of
universes? If you only look at patterns then you get the problem which you
later mention like crystals that can represent an OM of a person etc. The
patterns one is looking for should be capable of doing computations


If I define OMs as a programs (in a particular computational state), then
that is the same as saying that OMs are universes in particular states. One
can then argue that these universes are very complex and have high measures
and are thus likely to be found embedded in simple, low measure, universes.
Then one can also address the problem of what qualia actually are. They are
'events' that occur in an OM's universe.


In case of persons one can think of the neural network formed by the brain.
The events that take place in the universe defined by the neural network are
the qualia we experience. So, I think that Wei's interpretation program has
to do more than just spot certain patterns localized in time.



Similarly if I simulate the solar system on a pc, then this defines a
universe in which an event could be that jupiter is at a certain position at
a certain time. To 'see' this in terms of the electrons moving through the
transistors one has to first 'see' the program. Seeing the program requires
one to study the way the object interacts with its environment which means
that you have to take it out of the universe and study how it behaves when
you expose it to alternative inputs.



Saibal

Re: Many Pasts? Not according to QM...

[Saibal Mitra]

- Original Message - 
From: ""Hal Finney"" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
To: 
Sent: Friday, June 03, 2005 05:00 AM
Subject: Re: Many Pasts? Not according to QM...


> Stephen Paul King writes:
> > I really do not want to be a stick-in-the-mud here, but what do we
base
> > the idea that "copies" could exist upon? What if "I", or any one else's
1st
> > person aspect, can not be copied? If the operation of copying is
impossible,
> > what is the status of all of these thought experiments?
> > If, and this is a HUGE if, there is some thing irreducibly quantum
> > mechanical to this "1st person aspect" then it follows from QM that
copying
> > is not allowed. Neither a quantum state nor a "qubit" can be copied
without
> > destroying the "original".
>
> According to the Bekenstein bound, which is a result from quantum gravity,
> any finite sized system can only hold a finite amount of information.
> That means that it can only be in a finite number of states.  If you
> made a large enough number of systems in every possible state, you would
> be guaranteed to have one that matched the state of your target system.
> However you could not in general know which one matched it.
>
> Nevertheless this shows that even if consciousness is a quantum
> phenomenon, it is possible to have copies of it, at the expense of
> some waste.


This is actualy another argument against QTI. There are only a finite number
of different versions of observers. Suppose a 'subjective' time evolution on
the set of all possible observers exists that is always well defined.
Suppose we start with observer O1, and under time evolution it evolves to
O2, which then evolves to O3 etc. Eventually an On will be mapped back to O1
(if this never happened that would contradict the fact that there are only a
finite number of O's). But mapping back to the initial state doesn't
conserve memory. You can thus only subjectively experience yourself evolving
for a finite amount of time.


Saibal

Re: objections to QTI

[Saibal Mitra]

Hi Bruno,

Patric has already explained Barbour's position (I didn't read his book).
Separating space from time is not very natural...


Perhaps one can use a similar method as presented here:

http://arxiv.org/abs/math-ph/0008018

to derive the notion of space-time as a first person phenomena.


Saibal


- Original Message - 
From: "Bruno Marchal" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
To: "Saibal Mitra" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Cc: "Norman Samish" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>; 
Sent: Wednesday, June 01, 2005 03:24 PM
Subject: Re: objections to QTI



Le 01-juin-05, à 15:00, Saibal Mitra a écrit :

> Hi Norman,
>
> I entirely agree with Julian Barbour. A fundamental notion of time
> would act as a pointer indicating what is real (things that are
> happening now) and what was real and what will be real. Most of us
> here on the everything list believe that in a certain sense
> 'everything exists', so the notion of a fundamental time would be
> contrary to this idea. I think that that most here on the list would
> consider time as a first person phenomena


Indeed. (SGrz pour those who knows). I would like to know if Norman and
Saibal and others agree that there is nothing special with time. Why
does not Julian Barbour talk about space-time capsule?  (Or does he?)
I think space is also a first person phenomena. OK?

Bruno

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/

Re: objections to QTI

[Saibal Mitra]

Hi Norman,
 
I entirely agree with Julian Barbour. A fundamental notion of 
time would act as a pointer indicating what is real (things that are happening 
now) and what was real and what will be real. Most of us here on the everything 
list believe that in a certain sense 'everything exists', so the notion of a 
fundamental time would be contrary to this idea. I think that that most here on 
the list would consider time as a first person phenomena.
 
 
Saibal
 
 
 
-Defeat Spammers by 
launching DDoS attacks on Spam-Websites: http://www.hillscapital.com/antispam/

  - Oorspronkelijk bericht - 
  Van: 
  Norman Samish 
  
  Aan: everything-list@eskimo.com 
  Verzonden: Monday, May 30, 2005 06:04 
  PM
  Onderwerp: Re: objections to QTI
  
  Hi Saibal and Stathis,
      This scenario that you are 
  discussing reminds me of this interview with Julian Barbour where he proposes 
  that "time" is an illusion.  If you agree or disagree with 
  Barbour, I'd like to hear why.
  http://www.science-spirit.org/article_detail.php?article_id=183
   
  Norman Samish
  - Original 
  Message - From: "Saibal Mitra" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>To: 
  "Stathis Papaioannou" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>; 
  Sent: Monday, May 30, 2005 8:28 
  AMSubject: Re: objections to QTIHi Stathis,I think that your 
  example below was helpful to clarify the disagreement.  You say that 
  randomly sampling from all the files is not 'how real life works'.  
  However, if you did randomly sample from all the files the result would not be 
  different from the selective time ordered sampling you suggest, as long as the 
  effect of dying (reducing the absolute measure) can be ignored.  If I'm 
  sampled by the computer, I'll have the recollection of having been a continuum 
  of previous states, even though these states may not have been sampled for 
  quite some while. I'll subjectively experience a linear time evolution. The 
  order in which the computer chooses to generate me at various instances 
  doesn't matter.  There are a few reasons why I believe in the ''random 
  sampling''. First of all, random sampling seems to be necessary to avoid the 
  Doomsday Paradox.  See this article written by Ken Olum:
  http://arxiv.org/abs/gr-qc/0009081He 
  explains here why you need the Self Indicating Assumption. The self indicating 
  assumption amounts to adopting an absolute measure that is proportional to the 
  number of observers.  Another reason has to do with the notion of time. I 
  don't believe that events that have happened or will happen are not real while 
  events that are happening now are real. They have to be treated in the same 
  way. The fact that I experience time evolution is a first person 
  phenomena.  Finally, QTI (which more or less follows if you adopt the 
  time ordered picture), implies that for the most part of your life you should 
  find yourself in an a-typical state (e.g. very old while almost everyone else 
  is very young).    
  -Saibal-- 
  Oorspronkelijk bericht - Van: "Stathis Papaioannou" 
  <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>Aan: 
  Verzonden: Monday, May 30, 2005 04:02 
  PMOnderwerp: objections to QTI> I thought the following analogy 
  might clarify the point I was trying to make in recent posts to the "Many 
  Pasts? Not according to QM" thread, addressing one objection to 
  QTI.  You are a player in the computer game called the Files of 
  Life. In this game the computer  generates consecutively numbered 
  folders which each contain multiple text files, representing  the 
  multiple potential histories of the player at that time point. Each 
  folder F_i contains N_i files. The first folder, F_0,  contains N_0 
  files each describing possible events soon after your birth. You choose 
  one of the  files in this folder at random, and from this the 
  computer generates the next folder, F_1, and places in it N 
  files representing N possible continuations of the story. If you die 
  going from F_0 to F_1, that  file in F_1 corresponding to this event 
  is blank, and blank files are deleted; so for the first  folder 
  N_0=N, but for the next one N_1<=N, allowing for deaths. The game then 
  continues: you  choose a file at random from F_1, from this file the 
  computer generates the next folder F_2  containing N_2 files, then 
  you choose a file at random from F_2, and so on.  It should be 
  obvious that if the game is realistic, N_i should decrease 
  with increasing i, due  to death from accidents (fairly constant) + 
  death from age related disease. The earlier folders  will therefore 
  on average contain many more files than the later folders. Now, it is 
  argued that  QTI is impossible because a randomly sampled obse

Re: objections to QTI

[Saibal Mitra]

Hi Stathis,

I think that your example below was helpful to clarify the disagreement.
You say that randomly sampling from all the files is not 'how real life
works'.  However, if you did randomly sample from all the files the result
would not be different from the selective time ordered sampling you suggest,
as long as the effect of dying (reducing the absolute measure) can be
ignored.


If I'm sampled by the computer, I'll have the recollection of having been a
continuum of previous states, even though these states may not have been
sampled for quite some while. I'll subjectively experience a linear time
evolution. The order in which the computer chooses to generate me at various
instances doesn't matter.


There are a few reasons why I believe in the ''random sampling''. First of
all, random sampling seems to be necessary to avoid the Doomsday Paradox.
See this article written by Ken Olum:

http://arxiv.org/abs/gr-qc/0009081


He explains here why you need the Self Indicating Assumption. The self
indicating assumption amounts to adopting an absolute measure that is
proportional to the number of observers.


Another reason has to do with the notion of time. I don't believe that
events that have happened or will happen are not real while events that are
happening now are real. They have to be treated in the same way. The fact
that I experience time evolution is a first person phenomena.


Finally, QTI (which more or less follows if you adopt the time ordered
picture), implies that for the most part of your life you should find
yourself in an a-typical state (e.g. very old while almost everyone else is
very young).



Saibal


-
Defeat Spammers by launching DDoS attacks on Spam-Websites:
http://www.hillscapital.com/antispam/
- Oorspronkelijk bericht - 
Van: "Stathis Papaioannou" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Aan: 
Verzonden: Monday, May 30, 2005 04:02 PM
Onderwerp: objections to QTI


> I thought the following analogy might clarify the point I was trying to
make
> in recent posts to the "Many Pasts? Not according to QM" thread,
addressing
> one objection to QTI.
>
> You are a player in the computer game called the Files of Life. In this
game
> the computer  generates consecutively numbered folders which each contain
> multiple text files, representing  the multiple potential histories of the
> player at that time point. Each folder F_i contains N_i files. The first
> folder, F_0,  contains N_0 files each describing possible events soon
after
> your birth. You choose one of the  files in this folder at random, and
from
> this the computer generates the next folder, F_1, and places in it N
files
> representing N possible continuations of the story. If you die going from
> F_0 to F_1, that  file in F_1 corresponding to this event is blank, and
> blank files are deleted; so for the first  folder N_0=N, but for the next
> one N_1<=N, allowing for deaths. The game then continues: you  choose a
file
> at random from F_1, from this file the computer generates the next folder
> F_2  containing N_2 files, then you choose a file at random from F_2, and
so
> on.
>
> It should be obvious that if the game is realistic, N_i should decrease
with
> increasing i, due  to death from accidents (fairly constant) + death from
> age related disease. The earlier folders  will therefore on average
contain
> many more files than the later folders. Now, it is argued that  QTI is
> impossible because a randomly sampled observer moment from your life is
very
> unlikely to  be from a version of you who is 1000 years old, which has
very
> low measure compared with a  younger version. The equivalent argument for
> the Files of Life would be that since the earlier  files are much more
> numerous than the later files, a randomly sampled file from your life (as
> created by playing the game) is very unlikely to represent a 1000 year old
> version of you, as  compared with a younger version. This reasoning would
be
> sound if the "random sampling" were  done by mixing up all the files, or
all
> the OM's, and pulling one out at random. But this is not  how the game
works
> and it is not how real life works. From the first person viewpoint, it
> doesn't matter how many files are in the folder because you only choose
one
> at each step, spend  the same time at each step, and are no more likely to
> find yourself at one step rather than  another. As long as there is at
least
> *one* file in the next folder, it is guaranteed that you  will continue
> living. Similarly, as long as there is at least *one* OM in your future
> which  represents a continuation from your present OM, you will continue
> living.
>
> --Stathis Papaioannou
>
> _
> Meet 1000s of Aussie singles today at Lavalife!
> http://lavalife9.ninemsn.com.au/
>

Re: Many Pasts? Not according to QM...

[Saibal Mitra]

- Oorspronkelijk bericht - 
Van: "Stathis Papaioannou" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Aan: <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
CC: 
Verzonden: Saturday, May 28, 2005 07:26 AM
Onderwerp: Re: Many Pasts? Not according to QM...


> Saibal Mitra wrote:
>
> >You have to consider the huge number of alternative states you could be
in.
> >
> >1) Consider an observer moment that has experienced a lot of things.
These
> >experiences are encoded by n bits. Suppose that these experiences were
more
> >or less random. Then we can conclude that there are 2^n OMs that all have
a
> >probability proportional to 2^(-n). The probability that you are one of
> >these OMs isn't small at all!
> >
> >2) Considering perforing n suicide experiments, each with 50%  survival
> >probability. The n bits have registered the fact that you have survived
the
> >n suicide experiments. The probability of experiencing that is 2^(-n).
The
> >2^(n) -1 alternate states are all unconscious.
> >
> >
> >So, even though each of the states in 1 is as likely as the single state
in
> >2, the probability that you'll find yourself alive in 1 is vastly more
> >likely than in 2. This is actually similar to why you never see a mixture
> >of
> >two gases spontaneously unmix. Even though all states are equally likely,
> >there are far fewer unmixed states than mixed ones.
>
> I understand your point, but I think you are making an invalid assumption
> about the relationship between a random sampling of all the OM's available
> to an individual and that individual's experience of living his life.
> Suppose a trillion trillion copies of my mind are made today on a computer
> and run in lockstep with my biologically implemented mind for the next six
> months, at which point the computer is shut down. This means that most of
my
> measure is now in the latter half of 2005, in the sense that if you pick
an
> observer moment at random out of all the observer moments which identify
> themselves as being me, it is much more likely to be one of the copies on
> the computer. But what does this mean for my experience of life? Does it
> mean that I am unlikely to experience 2006, being somehow suspended in
2005?

I would say so. You would find yoursef to be suspended in 2005, just like
you are now suspended between 1900 and 2100. But this would require the
simulations of your mind in 2005 to dominate over all other versions of you.
Now unless experiencing 2006 would require a miracle this can't be the case.
The reason is that all possible versions of you 'already' exist in the
multiverse. Your measure in 2005 is what it is. This includes the effects of
others simulating your mind experiencing 2005 (the simulation can be done at
any time, of course).

So, you can say that your measure for experiencing time t is:

m(t) =  m_{biol}(t) + m_{sim}(t)


m_{biol} being the 'biological' contribution of your measure and m_{sim} the
digital contribution. Both terms are fixed by the laws of physics. If indeed
m_{sim}(2005) is trillions of times larger than m_{biol}(2005) and zero at
other times, you would be suspended in 2005. But this cannot be the case
unless there is some reason why m_{sim}(t) is so strongly peaked around
2005. If there are branches in which someone is simulating you in 2005 for
no good reason, then that decision is taken at random. That means that in
some other branch you are simulated in some other time. So, the measure
isn't strongly peaked around 2005 at all!




>
> More generally, if a person has N OM's available to him at time t1 and kN
at
> time t2, does this mean he is k times as likely to find himself
experiencing
> t2 as t1? I suggest that this is not the right way to look at it. A person
> only experiences one OM at a time, so if he has "passed through" t1 and t2
> it will appear to him that he has spent just as much time in either
interval
> (assuming t1 and t2 are the same length). The only significance of the
fact
> that there are "more" OM's at t2 is that the person can expect a greater
> variety of possible experiences at t2 if the OM's are all distinct.


The same is true here. It must follow from the laws of physics (which
include the effects of simmulations) that there are indeed many more copies
of you at t2.


Saibal

Re: Many Pasts? Not according to QM...

[Saibal Mitra]

Hi Bruno

- Oorspronkelijk bericht - 
Van: "Bruno Marchal" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Aan: "Saibal Mitra" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
CC: "Stathis Papaioannou" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>;

Verzonden: Friday, May 27, 2005 04:08 PM
Onderwerp: Re: Many Pasts? Not according to QM...


> Hi Saibal,
>
> Le 27-mai-05, à 14:29, Saibal Mitra a écrit :
>
> > - Oorspronkelijk bericht -
> > Van: "Stathis Papaioannou" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
> > Aan: <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
> > CC: <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>; 
> > Verzonden: Friday, May 27, 2005 01:44 AM
> > Onderwerp: Re: Many Pasts? Not according to QM...
> >
> >
> >> Saibal Mitra wrote:
> >>
> >>> Quoting Stathis Papaioannou <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>:
> >>>
> >>>> On 25th May 2005 Saibal Mitra wrote:
> >>>>
> >>>>> One of the arguments in favor of the observer moment picture is
> >>>>> that
> > it
> >>>>> solves Tegmark's quantum suicide paradox. If you start with a set
> >>>>> of
> >>> all
> >>>>> possible observer moments on which a measure is defined (which can
> >>>>> be
> >>>>> calculated in principle using the laws of physics), then the
> >>>>> paradox
> >>>> never
> >>>>> arises. At any moment you can think of yourself as being randomly
> > drawn
> >>>>> from
> >>>>> the set of all possible observer moments. The observer moment who
> >>>>> has
> >>>>> survived the suicide experiment time after time after time has a
> >>>>> very
> >>>> very
> >>>>> very low measure.
> >>>>
> >>>> I'm not sure what you mean by "the paradox never arises" here. You
> > have
> >>>> said
> >>>> in the past that although you initially believed in QTI, you later
> >>> realised
> >>>>
> >>>> that it could not possibly be true (sorry if I am misquoting you,
> >>>> this
> >>> is
> >>>> from memory). Or are you distinguishing between QTI and QS?
> >>>>
> >>> That's correct. In both QTI and QS one assumes conditional
> >>> probabilities.
> >>> You just
> >>> throw away the branches in which you don't survive and then you
> >>> conclude
> >>> that you
> >>> continue to survive into the infinitely far future (or after
> >>> performing
> > an
> >>> arbitrary
> >>> large number of suicide experiments) with probability 1.
> >>>
> >>> But if you use the a priori probability distribution then you see
> >>> that
> > you
> >>> the measure
> >>> of versions of you that survive into the far future is almost zero.
> >>
> >> What does "the measure of versions of you that survive into the far
> >> future
> >> is almost zero" actually mean? The measure of this particular version
> >> of
> > me
> >> typing this email is practically zero, considering all the other
> >> versions
> > of
> >> me and all the other objects in the multiverse. Another way of
> >> looking at
> > it
> >> is that I am dead in a lot more places and times than I am alive. And
> >> yet
> >> undeniably, here I am! Reality trumps probability every time.
> >
> >
> > You have to consider the huge number of alternative states you could
> > be in.
> >
> > 1) Consider an observer moment that has experienced a lot of things.
> > These
> > experiences are encoded by n bits. Suppose that these experiences were
> > more
> > or less random. Then we can conclude that there are 2^n OMs that all
> > have a
> > probability proportional to 2^(-n). The probability that you are one of
> > these OMs isn't small at all!
> >
> > 2) Considering perforing n suicide experiments, each with 50%  survival
> > probability. The n bits have registered the fact that you have
> > survived the
> > n suicide experiments. The probability of experiencing that is 2^(-n).
> > The
> > 2^(n) -1 alternate states are all unconscious.
> >
> >
> > So, even though each of the states in 1 is as likely as the single
> > state in
> > 2, the probability that you'll find yourself alive in 1 is vastly more
> &

Re: Many Pasts? Not according to QM...

[Saibal Mitra]

- Oorspronkelijk bericht - 
Van: "Stathis Papaioannou" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Aan: <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
CC: <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>; 
Verzonden: Friday, May 27, 2005 01:44 AM
Onderwerp: Re: Many Pasts? Not according to QM...


> Saibal Mitra wrote:
>
> >Quoting Stathis Papaioannou <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>:
> >
> > > On 25th May 2005 Saibal Mitra wrote:
> > >
> > > >One of the arguments in favor of the observer moment picture is that
it
> > > >solves Tegmark's quantum suicide paradox. If you start with a set of
> >all
> > > >possible observer moments on which a measure is defined (which can be
> > > >calculated in principle using the laws of physics), then the paradox
> > > never
> > > >arises. At any moment you can think of yourself as being randomly
drawn
> > > >from
> > > >the set of all possible observer moments. The observer moment who has
> > > >survived the suicide experiment time after time after time has a very
> > > very
> > > >very low measure.
> > >
> > > I'm not sure what you mean by "the paradox never arises" here. You
have
> > > said
> > > in the past that although you initially believed in QTI, you later
> >realised
> > >
> > > that it could not possibly be true (sorry if I am misquoting you, this
> >is
> > > from memory). Or are you distinguishing between QTI and QS?
> > >
> >That's correct. In both QTI and QS one assumes conditional probabilities.
> >You just
> >throw away the branches in which you don't survive and then you conclude
> >that you
> >continue to survive into the infinitely far future (or after performing
an
> >arbitrary
> >large number of suicide experiments) with probability 1.
> >
> >But if you use the a priori probability distribution then you see that
you
> >the measure
> >of versions of you that survive into the far future is almost zero.
>
> What does "the measure of versions of you that survive into the far future
> is almost zero" actually mean? The measure of this particular version of
me
> typing this email is practically zero, considering all the other versions
of
> me and all the other objects in the multiverse. Another way of looking at
it
> is that I am dead in a lot more places and times than I am alive. And yet
> undeniably, here I am! Reality trumps probability every time.


You have to consider the huge number of alternative states you could be in.

1) Consider an observer moment that has experienced a lot of things. These
experiences are encoded by n bits. Suppose that these experiences were more
or less random. Then we can conclude that there are 2^n OMs that all have a
probability proportional to 2^(-n). The probability that you are one of
these OMs isn't small at all!

2) Considering perforing n suicide experiments, each with 50%  survival
probability. The n bits have registered the fact that you have survived the
n suicide experiments. The probability of experiencing that is 2^(-n). The
2^(n) -1 alternate states are all unconscious.


So, even though each of the states in 1 is as likely as the single state in
2, the probability that you'll find yourself alive in 1 is vastly more
likely than in 2. This is actually similar to why you never see a mixture of
two gases spontaneously unmix. Even though all states are equally likely,
there are far fewer unmixed states than mixed ones.

Saibal

Re: Many Pasts? Not according to QM...

[Saibal Mitra]

The original posting about this dates back from the beginning of this list. I 
just 
invoked this in this thread to argue why one should consider observer moments 
(identical ones considered as the same) as fundamental concepts.

The suicide paradox I was referring to is just Tegmark's thought experiment 
where the 
experimenter measures the spin of a particle. If it is down he is instantly 
killed, he 
survives if it is up. Then he argues that according to the MWI the experimenter 
should 
always measure that the spin is up, because that's the only branch in which he 
survives.

Saibal 

Quoting "aet.radal ssg" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>:

> For some reason I didn't get the original post about the suicide paradox,
> so if someone could resend it, sans any "everything" computer lingo, I
> would appreciate it.
> The subject of the thread - "Many Pasts? - Not according to QM"  taken on
> its face seems false, at least from the standard MWI model. If you have
> parallel worlds you have parallel pasts. In fact, that's why MWI is
> supposed to be the solution to time travel paradoxes. Take an arbitrary
> moment, when a measurement, or any other trigger, causes a decoherence,
> move forward in time from that moment and look back - you have parallel
> pasts that begin from the point of decoherence. 
> 
> 
> - Original Message - 
> From: "Saibal Mitra" 
> To: everything-list@eskimo.com 
> Subject: Re: Many Pasts? Not according to QM... 
> Date: Wed, 25 May 2005 01:24:23 +0200 
> 
> > 
> > 
> > 
> > 
> > - Oorspronkelijk bericht - 
> > Van: "Patrick Leahy" 
> > Aan: 
> > Verzonden: Wednesday, May 18, 2005 05:57 PM 
> > Onderwerp: Many Pasts? Not according to QM... 
> > 
> > 
> > > Of course, many of you (maybe all) may be defining pasts from an 
> > > information-theoretic point of view, i.e. by identifying all 
> > > observer-moments in the multiverse which are equivalent as perceived by
> 
> > > the observer; in which case the above point is quite irrelevant. (But
> you 
> > > still have to distinguish the different branches to find the total
> measure 
> > > for each OM). 
> > 
> > This is indeed my position. I prefer to define an observer moment as the 
> > information needed to generate an observer. According to the
> ''everything'' 
> > hypothesis (I've just seen that you don't subscibe this) an observer
> moment 
> > defines its own universe. But this universe is very complex and therefore
> 
> > must have a very low measure. It is thus far more likely that the
> observer 
> > finds himself embedded in a low complexity universe. 
> > 
> > 
> > One of the arguments in favor of the observer moment picture is that it 
> > solves Tegmark's quantum suicide paradox. If you start with a set of all 
> > possible observer moments on which a measure is defined (which can be 
> > calculated in principle using the laws of physics), then the paradox
> never 
> > arises. At any moment you can think of yourself as being randomly drawn
> from 
> > the set of all possible observer moments. The observer moment who has 
> > survived the suicide experiment time after time after time has a very
> very 
> > very low measure. 
> > 
> > 
> > Even if one assumes only a single universe described by the MWI, one has
> to 
> > consider simulations of other universes. Virtual observers living in such
> a 
> > simulated universe will perceive their world as real. The measure of such
> 
> > embedded universes will probably decay exponentialy with complexity 
> > 
> > 
> > Saibal 
> 
> 
> 
> -- 
> ___
> Sign-up for Ads Free at Mail.com
> 
> http://www.mail.com/?sr=signup
> 
> 
> 
> 




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Re: Plaga

[Saibal Mitra]

Bruno was quoting another Aet from a parallel world :)



Quoting Eugen Leitl <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>:

> 
> If you expect to be quoted correctly, stop posting HTML-only.
> 
> On Thu, May 26, 2005 at 08:45:34AM -0500, aet.radal ssg wrote:
> > HEY! BRUNO - I, (aet) didn't say that. Someone else did. I was
> quoting them. If you're going to quote somebody, I suggest you get it
> right.- Original Message - From: "Bruno Marchal"
> <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>To: "aet.radal ssg"
> <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>Subject: Re: Plaga Date: Wed, 25 May 2005
> 20:40:21 +0200 > > > Le 25-mai-05, à 17:59,
> aet.radal ssg a écrit : > > > From the initial page from
> the included link to the archive: "I'm > > no physicist so I
> don't know for sure that these implications > > would >
> > follow, but I am very doubtful that interworld communication is
> consistent > > with the basics of quantum mechanics.  The
> fact that this paper has not > > been published in peer reviewed
> journals in 7 years indicates that it > > probably doesn't work."
> > > Ooh... you should not make inferences like that. I
> could give > you 10,000 reasons for not publishing. But I have not
> the time > because I have a deadline today! > > I red
> Plaga's paper. It is extremely interesting. It belongs to the >
> family of Weinberg's result. Some hoped that a slight >
> delinearisation of QM would "explain the collapse". Reasoning a-la >
> Weinberg Plaga shows that it is the contrary which happens. Not >
> only we keep the MW but they became more "real" in some sense. It >
> shows the MWI is stable for slight "variation of the SWE". this >
> confirms MWI in a deeper way. It shows quantum non linearity >
> contradicts thermodynamics! This is a powerful argument in favor of
> > both pure linear QM and MWI. > > (Good for me, it
> shows nature confirms the lobian machine's > inability to observe
> kestrels and starlings when they look enough > closely to
> themselves) > > Bruno > >
> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ 
> > 
> > -- 
> > ___Sign-up
> for Ads Free at Mail.com
> >  href="http://mail01.mail.com/scripts/payment/adtracking.cgi?bannercode=adsfreejump01";
> target="_blank">http://www.mail.com/?sr=signup
> > 
> -- 
> Eugen* Leitl http://leitl.org";>leitl
> __
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> 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A  7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE
> 




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Re: Many Pasts? Not according to QM...

[Saibal Mitra]

Quoting Stathis Papaioannou <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>:

> On 25th May 2005 Saibal Mitra wrote:
> 
> >One of the arguments in favor of the observer moment picture is that it
> >solves Tegmark's quantum suicide paradox. If you start with a set of all
> >possible observer moments on which a measure is defined (which can be
> >calculated in principle using the laws of physics), then the paradox
> never
> >arises. At any moment you can think of yourself as being randomly drawn 
> >from
> >the set of all possible observer moments. The observer moment who has
> >survived the suicide experiment time after time after time has a very
> very
> >very low measure.
> 
> I'm not sure what you mean by "the paradox never arises" here. You have
> said 
> in the past that although you initially believed in QTI, you later realised
> 
> that it could not possibly be true (sorry if I am misquoting you, this is 
> from memory). Or are you distinguishing between QTI and QS?
> 
That's correct. In both QTI and QS one assumes conditional probabilities. You 
just 
throw away the branches in which you don't survive and then you conclude that 
you 
continue to survive into the infinitely far future (or after performing an 
arbitrary 
large number of suicide experiments) with probability 1.

But if you use the a priori probability distribution then you see that you the 
measure 
of versions of you that survive into the far future is almost zero.


Saibal

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Re: Plaga

[Saibal Mitra]

Plaga's paper has been published:
 
''Proposal for an experimental test of the 
many-worlds interpretation of quantum mechanics''
 
Found.Phys. 27 (1997) 559
 
arXiv: quant-ph/9510007
 
 
 
 
-Defeat Spammers by 
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  - Oorspronkelijk bericht - 
  Van: 
  aet.radal 
  ssg 
  Aan: everything-list@eskimo.com 
  Verzonden: Wednesday, May 25, 2005 05:59 
  PM
  Onderwerp: Re: Plaga
  
  From the initial page from the included link to the archive: "I'm no 
  physicist so I don't know for sure that these implications wouldfollow, 
  but I am very doubtful that interworld communication is consistentwith the 
  basics of quantum mechanics.  The fact that this paper has notbeen 
  published in peer reviewed journals in 7 years indicates that itprobably 
  doesn't work."
  Back when I wasn't long in the field of video production I was well aware 
  of the insistance and belief of TV engineers that a single tube industrial 
  color video camera was not broadcast quality. Working in cable, where they 
  were used for cablecast, I had plenty of opportunity to look at picture 
  quality, etc. and came to the conclusion that it shouldn't be a problem. 2 
  years later I got the chance to prove it when a local news station sent a crew 
  out to cover something that I was shooting. In the end I gave them 
  the editied sequence I had shot (now down two generations), and they 
  took it and edited it into their story, which would have taken it down a 
  third. Then they broadcasted it over the air. I taped it off-air and the 
  results were conclusive - I was right, all the nay-sayer engineers were 
  wrong. A $40,000 Ikegami  vs a $1,500 Panasonic and it was a tie 
  except for one slight red bleed from a costume due to the Saticon tube bias 
  toward red in the camera I used, which could have been color corrected with a 
  time base corrector, but whoever dubbed the tape left the red level a little 
  too hot. 
  My point being that that was the first in a long line of "you can'ts" that 
  I've faced which I eventually proved, "you can". Thus I have a dim view of 
  such positions when they aren't backed up with experiments that prove so 
  *conclusively*. As long as the possibility exists, I keep an open mind. 
  Besides, if unbriddled skepticism was right all the time, we wouldn't be using 
  computers, flying, or even have phones of any kind, just to name a few 
  things.- Original Message - From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] 
  To: everything-list@eskimo.com Subject: Re: Plaga Date: Tue, 24 
  May 2005 17:51:13 -0700 (PDT) > > We discussed Plaga's paper 
  back in June, 2002. I reported some skeptical > analysis of the paper 
  by John Baez of sci.physics fame, at > 
  http://www.escribe.com/science/theory/m3686.html . I also gave some > 
  reasons of my own why arbitrary inter-universe quantum communication > 
  should be impossible. > > Hal Finney -- 
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Re: Many Pasts? Not according to QM...

[Saibal Mitra]

- Oorspronkelijk bericht - 
Van: "Patrick Leahy" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Aan: 
Verzonden: Wednesday, May 18, 2005 05:57 PM
Onderwerp: Many Pasts? Not according to QM...


> Of course, many of you (maybe all) may be defining pasts from an
> information-theoretic point of view, i.e. by identifying all
> observer-moments in the multiverse which are equivalent as perceived by
> the observer; in which case the above point is quite irrelevant. (But you
> still have to distinguish the different branches to find the total measure
> for each OM).

This is indeed my position. I prefer to define an observer moment as the
information needed to generate an observer. According to the ''everything''
hypothesis (I've just seen that you don't subscibe this) an observer moment
defines its own universe. But this universe is very complex and therefore
must have a very low measure. It is thus far more likely that the observer
finds himself embedded in a low complexity universe.


One of the arguments in favor of the observer moment picture is that it
solves Tegmark's quantum suicide paradox. If you start with a set of all
possible observer moments on which a measure is defined (which can be
calculated in principle using the laws of physics), then the paradox never
arises. At any moment you can think of yourself as being randomly drawn from
the set of all possible observer moments. The observer moment who has
survived the suicide experiment time after time after time has a very very
very low measure.


Even if one assumes only a single universe described by the MWI, one has to
consider simulations of other universes. Virtual observers living in such a
simulated universe will perceive their world as real. The measure of such
embedded universes will probably decay exponentialy with complexity


Saibal

Re: Hamel Basis

[Saibal Mitra]

Hi Patrick,
Welcome to the list!

When I was a student a friend told me about transfinite induction. While
ordinary induction allows you to generalize from n to n + 1 and thus to a
countable set, transfinite induction enables you to explore the continuum.

He didn't explain how it was done, though. I learned later while following a
functional analyses class.


Saibal


>
> I know this one!
>
> I had a friend who published a magazine called "Zorn" printed on pale
> yellow paper... ;)
>
> Paddy Leahy
>

Hamel Basis

[Saibal Mitra]

A Hamel basis is a set H such that every element of the vector space is a
*unique* *finite* linear combination of  elements in H.

This can be proven using Zorn's lemma, which is a direct consequence of the
Axiom of Choice. The idea of the proof is as follows. If you start with an H
that is too small in the sense that some elements of the vector space cannot
be written as a finite linear combination of members of H, then you make H a
bit larger by including that element. Now H has to satisfy the constraint
that any finite linear combination of its elements be unique. Adding the
element that could not be written as a linear combination will not make the
larger H violate this constraint.

You can imagine adding more and more elements until you reach some maximal H
that cannot be made larger. The existence of this maximal H is guaranteed by
Zorn's lemma. If you now consider the union of H with any element of the
vector space not contained in H, then the condition that any finite linear
combination be unique must fail (otherwise the maximality of H would be
contradicted). From this you can conclude that the element you added to H
(which was arbitrary) can be written as a unique linear combination of
elements from H.


Saibal




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- Oorspronkelijk bericht - 
Van: ""Hal Finney"" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Aan: 
Verzonden: Tuesday, May 24, 2005 06:07 PM
Onderwerp: RE: White Rabbit vs. Tegmark


> Lee Corbin writes:
> > Russell writes
> > > You've got me digging out my copy of Kreyszig "Intro to Functional
> > > Analysis". It turns out that the set of continuous functions on an
> > > interval C[a,b] form a vector space. By application of Zorn's lemma
> > > (or equivalently the axiom of choice), every vector space has what is
> > > called a Hamel basis, namely a linearly independent countable set B
> > > such that every element in the vector space can be expressed as a
> > > finite linear combination of elements drawn from the Hamel basis
> >
> > I can't follow your math, but are you saying the following
> > in effect?
> >
> > Any continuous function on R or C, as we know, can be
> > specified by countably many reals R1, R2, R3, ... But
> > by a certain mapping trick, I think that I can see how
> > this could be reduced to *one* real.  It depends for its
> > functioning---as I think your result above depends---
> > on the fact that each real encodes infinite information.
>
> I don't think that is exactly how the result Russell describes works, but
> certainly Lee's construction makes his result somewhat less paradoxical.
> Indeed, a real number can include the information from any countable
> set of reals.
>
> Nevertheless I'd be curious to see an example of this Hamel basis
> construction.  Let's consider a simple Euclidean space.  A two dimensional
> space is just the Euclidean plane, where every point corresponds to
> a pair of real numbers (x, y).
>
> We can generalize this to any number of dimensions, including a countably
> infinite number of dimensions.  In that form each point can be expressed
> as (x0, x1, x2, x3, ...).  The standard orthonormal basis for this vector
> space is b0=(1,0,0,0...), b1=(0,1,0,0...), b2=(0,0,1,0...), 
>
> With such a basis the point I showed can be expressed as x0*b0+x1*b1+
> I gather from Russell's result that we can create a different, countable
> basis such that an arbitrary point can be expressed as only a finite
> number of terms.  That is pretty surprising.
>
> I have searched online for such a construction without any luck.
> The Wikipedia article, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hamel_basis has an
> example of using a Fourier basis to span functions, which requires an
> infinite combination of basis vectors and is therefore not a Hamel basis.
> They then remark, "Every Hamel basis of this space is much bigger than
> this merely countably infinite set of functions."  That would seem to
> imply, contrary to what Russell writes above, that the Hamel basis is
> uncountably infinite in size.
>
> In that case the Hamel basis for the infinite dimensional Euclidean space
> can simply be the set of all points in the space, so then each point
> can be represented as 1 * the appropriate basis vector.  That would be
> a disappointingly trivial result.  And it would not shed light on the
> original question of proving that an arbitrary continuous function can
> be represented by a countably infinite number of bits.
>
> Hal
>

Re: Many worlds theory of immortality

[Saibal Mitra]

One could say that the brain of some 
schizophrenic persons simulate otherpersons. I don't know if some of you 
have seen the film 'A Beautiful mind'about the life of mathematician Nash. 
In the film Nash was closelyacquainted to persons that didn't realy exist. 
Only much later when he wastreated for his condition did he realize that 
some of his close friendsdidn't really exist.One could argue that 
the persons that Nash was seeing in fact did exist (inour universe), 
precisely because Nash's brain was simulating 
them.SaibalVan: "Stathis Papaioannou" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>Aan: 
<[EMAIL PROTECTED]>; <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>CC: Verzonden: 
Thursday, May 12, 2005 03:25 PMOnderwerp: Re: Many worlds theory of 
immortality> The obvious and sensible-sounding response to 
Jeanne's question whether it> may be possible to access other universes 
through dreams or hallucinations> is that it is not really any more 
credible than speculation that peoplecan> contact the dead, or have 
been kidnapped by aliens, or any other of the> millions of weird things 
that so many seem to believe despite the totallack> of supporting 
evidence. However, this response is completely wrong if MWIis> 
correct. If I dream tonight that a big green monster has eaten the 
Sydney> Opera House, then definitely, in some branch of the MW, a big 
greenmonster> will eat the Sydney Opera House. Of course, this 
unfortunate event will> occur even if I *don't* dream it, but I'm not 
saying that my dream caused> it, only that I saw it happening. It might 
also be argued that I didn't> really "receive" this information from 
another branch, but that it wasjust> a coincidence that my dream 
matched the reality in the other branch. But> seers don't see things by 
putting two and two together; they just, well,> *see* them. And if I 
really could, godlike, enter at random another branch> of the MW and 
return to this branch to report what I saw, how would the> information 
provided be any different from my dream? The only difference I> can think 
of is that with the direct method I would be more likely tovisit> a 
branch with greater measure, but I can probably achieve the same 
thingby> trying not to think about green monsters when I go to sleep 
tonight.>> --Stathis Papaioannou>> >I once read 
an article in, I believe, Time Magazine, about the relatively> >new 
field of "neurotheology" which investigates what goes on in the brain> 
>during ecstatic states, etc.  One suggestion that intrigued me was 
thatit> >may be possible that in such a state, and I believe that 
schizophrenics> >were> >also mentioned, that the brain is 
malfunctioning in such a way as toallow> >it to perceive states of 
reality other than that which the normal brain> >would perceive.  
In other words, the "antenna" (brain) is picking-up> >signals> 
>that are usually beyond the scope of the normal brain.  I wondered 
if> >anyone> >could comment on this, and if there was any 
reason to even entertain the> >thought that perhaps some people have 
passed through a crack in the> >division> >between our 
universe or dimension, into perhaps another?  I read this> 
>several years ago and wish that I could recall the details of 
thearticle,> >but I don't have it anymore.> >> 
>Jeanne>> 
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Many worlds theory of immortality

[Saibal Mitra]

> Russell Standish 
wrote:>>> With my TIME postulate, I say that a conscious 
observer necessarily> experiences a sequence of related observer moments 
(or even a> continuum of them). To argue that observer moments are 
independent of> each other is to argue the negation of TIME. With TIME, 
the measure of> each observer moment is relative to the predecessor 
state, or the RSSA> is the appropriate principle to use. With not-TIME, 
each observer> moment has an absolute measure, the 
ASSA>> That's an interesting idea, although I do have 
some problems with it. Ifone completely specifies the state of an 
observer at a given time, then this already contains a notion of time 
as experienced by the observer. So, I would say that the notion of an 
abserver moment is more like that of a tangent space in General 
Relativity than that of a single space-time 
point. Saibal
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Fw: Many worlds theory of immortality

[Saibal Mitra]

 I think we agree on the observer moment. One should formulate questions in
 terms of observer moments and then there are no problems (in principle).


 Saibal
>
>
>
> - Oorspronkelijk bericht - 
> Van: "Stathis Papaioannou" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
> Aan: <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>; 
> Verzonden: Tuesday, May 03, 2005 03:47 PM
> Onderwerp: Re: Many worlds theory of immortality
>
>
> > 2 weeks ago Saibal Mitra wrote:
> >
> > >  I don't think that the MW immortality is correct at all! In a certain
> > >sense
> > >we are
> > >  immortal, because the enseble of all possible worlds is a fixed
static
> > >entity. So,
> > >  you ''always'' find yourselve alive in one state or another. However,
> you
> > >won't
> > >  experience youself evolving in the infinite far future.
> > >
> > >
> > >  If you encounter a ''branching'' in which one of the possibilities is
> > >death, that
> > >  branch cannot be said to be nonexistent relative to you. Quantum
> > >mechanics
> > >doesn't
> > >  imply that you can never become unconscious, otherwise you could
never
> > >fall
> > >asleep!
> > >
> > >
> > >  Of course, you can never experience being unconscious. So, what to do
> > >with
> > >the branch
> > >  leading to (almost) certain death? The more information your brain
> > >contains, the smaller the set of branches is in which you are alive
(and
> > >consistent with your experiences stored in your brain). The set of all
> > >branches in which you could be alive doesn't contain any information at
> > >all.
> > >Since death involves complete
> > >  memory loss, the branch leading to death should be replaced by the
> > >complete
> > >set of all possibilities.
> >
> > ...and despite reading the last paragraph several times slowly, I'm
afraid
> I
> > don't understand it. Are you saying there may never be a "next moment"
at
> > the point where you are facing near-certain death? It seems to me that
all
> > that is required is an observer moment in which (a) you believe that you
> are
> > you, however this may be defined (it's problematic even in "normal" life
> > what constitutes continuity of identity), and (b) you remember facing
the
> > said episode of near-certain death (ncd), and it will seem to you that
you
> > have miraculously escaped, even if there is no actual physical
connection
> > between the pre-ncd and the post-ncd observer moment. Or, another way to
> > escape is as you have suggested in a more recent post, that there is an
> > observer moment somewhere in the multiverse in which the ncd episode has
> > been somehow deleted from your memory. Perhaps the latter is more
likely,
> in
> > which case you can look forward to never, or extremely rarely, facing
ncd
> in
> > your life.
> >
> > It all gets very muddled. If we try to ruthlessly dispense with every
> > derivative, ill-defined, superfluous concept and assumption in an effort
> to
> > simplify the discussion, the one thing we are left with is the
individual
> > observer-moments. We then try to sort these observer-moments into sets
> which
> > constitute lives, identities, birth, death, amnesia, mind duplication,
> mind
> > melding, multiple world branchings, and essentially every possible
> variation
> > on these and other themes. No wonder it's confusing! And who is to judge
> > where a particular individual's identity/life/body/memory begins and
ends
> > when even the most detailed, passed by committee of philosophers set of
> > rules fails, as it inevitably will?
> >
> > The radical solution is to accept that only the observer-moments are
real,
> > and how we sort them then is seen for what it is: essentially arbitrary,
a
> > matter of convention. You can dismiss the question of immortality,
quantum
> > or otherwise, by observing that the only non-problematic definition of
an
> > individual is identification with a single observer-moment, so that no
> > individual can ever "really" live for longer than a moment. Certainly,
> this
> > goes against intuition, because I feel that I was alive a few minutes
ago
> as
> > well as ten years ago, but *of course* I feel that; this is simply
> reporting
> > on my current thought processes, like saying I feel hungry or tired, and
> > beyond this cannot be taken as a falsifiable statement about the state
of
&g

Many worlds theory of immortality

[Saibal Mitra]

I would have to read about these theories, but I think that it 
doesn't matter if you work with complex measures.
 
 
Saibal
 
 

  - Oorspronkelijk bericht - 
  Van: 
  Ben Goertzel 
  
  Aan: Bruno Marchal ; Saibal Mitra 
  
  CC: everything-list@eskimo.com 
  Verzonden: Tuesday, May 03, 2005 02:11 
  PM
  Onderwerp: RE: Many worlds theory of 
  immortality
  
  
  Saibal,
   
  Does 
  your conclusion about conditional probability also apply to complex-valued 
  probabilities a la Youssef?
   
  http://physics.bu.edu/~youssef/quantum/quantum_refs.html
   
  http://www.goertzel.org/papers/ChaoQM.htm
   
  -- 
  Ben Goertzel
  
-Original Message-From: Bruno Marchal 
[mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]Sent: Tuesday, May 03, 2005 4:20 
AMTo: Saibal MitraCc: 
everything-list@eskimo.comSubject: Re: Many worlds theory of 
immortalityLe 16-avr.-05, à 02:45, Saibal Mitra a 
écrit :
Both the suicide and copying thought experiments have 
  convinced me that thenotion of a conditional probability is 
  fundamentally flawed. It can bedefined under ''normal'' circumstances 
  but it will break down precisely whenconsidering copying or 
  suicide.This is a quite remarkable remark. I can 
related it to the COMBINATORS thread.In a nutshell: in the *empirical* 
FOREST there are no kestrels (no eliminators at all),nor Mockingbird, 
warblers or any duplicators. Quantum information behaveslike 
incompressible fluid. Universes differentiate, they never multiplies. 
Deutsch is right on that point. I use Hardegree (ref in my thesis(*)) He 
did show thatquantum logic can be seen as a conditional probability 
logic. We will come back on this (it's necessarily a little bit 
technical). I am finishing atechnical paper on that. The COMBINATORS can 
help to simplify considerablythe mathematical conjectures of my 
thesis.Bruno(*) Hardegree, G. M. (1976). 
The Conditional in Quantum Logic. In Suppes, P., editor, Logic and 
Probability in Quantum Mechanics, volume 78 of Synthese 
Library, pages 55-72. D. Reidel Publishing Company, Dordrecht-Holland.