On 24 May 2017, at 13:53, David Nyman wrote:
-- Forwarded message --
From: David Nyman
Date: 22 May 2017 at 10:32
Subject: Re: A case in point
To: meekerdb
On 22 May 2017 2:44 a.m., "Brent Meeker" wrote:
On 5/21/2017 5:49 PM, David Nyman wrote:
On 22 May 2017 at 00:59, Brent Meeker wrote:
It hardly seems like a serious proposal.
I surely agree.
If he were serious, he would have already done the experiment in
the lab with one or two people. If they could cause a deviation
from QM, THEN it would be worthwhile to do it with people far apart
to avoid inadvertant signaling.
Sure, but I'm still interested in the category confusion. I doubt
he's twigged that the very way he's formulated this implies that
brain function is somehow inconsistent with whatever he thinks he
means by consciousness. I assume he isn't suggesting that
neurocognition itself isn't itself reducible to physics.
I think that is what he's suggesting. He's supposing that
consciousness can realize FTL signaling.
As opposed to neurocognition which cannot? As I said below, it
strains credulity that he would believe that neurocognition itself
isn't part of physics. So he's making an implicit distinction
between that and consciousness, which he obviously does believe
isn't physical in some putatively distinguishable sense. Because
he's also apparently not questioning the latter's ability to
participate in the implied ontological schema, he's willing to
credit that it can somehow intercede in causal relations. Trouble
is, this view would make consciousness inconsistent with brain
function, as indeed it would have to be to accomplish what the
former could not.
Is it really? He seems to me to believe that consciousness might
reduce the wave packet. He seems just willing to believe that
Mechanism is false, and that consciousness is a non local physical
phenomenon. Of course, a Mechanist will interpret his experience as
the nth experience confirming the many-worlds (saving 3p determinacy,
3p locality, etc.) ... or disproving quantum mechanics.
As I've said, I don't believe that this kind of cognitive dissonance
could be established or maintained without a fundamental confusion
of categories between ontology and epistemology. In the view I've
put forward, both neurocognition and consciousness properly belong
to the category of a theory of knowledge, the former as an
observable and the latter as the manner of its observation.
Consequently both concepts would necessarily be inferences from a
common ontological assumption. Viewed in that way, it would
hopefully be rather more obvious that they could hardly be
inconsistent with each other.
I am OK when assuming mechanism is correct. If mechanism is false, we
can almost imagine *any* weird theory.
Bruno
David
Brent
Consequently it would presumably be subject to the same limitations
that worry him with respect to any other physical source of
randomisation. So the contention that "conscious choice" somehow
isn't thus restricted implies an inconsistency between these two
categories that on the face of it would make little sense even in a
dualist framework.
David
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
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