Re: A philosopher making the Duplication argument
On 20 Mar 2013, at 21:08, Stephen P. King wrote: On 3/20/2013 6:43 AM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: On Wed, Mar 20, 2013 at 9:24 AM, Stephen P. King > wrote: http://www.closertotruth.com/video-profile/What-is-the-Nature-of-Personal-Identity-Peter-van-Inwagen-/176 He starts off with a straightforward, materialist position. Then he reveals he is a Christian, believes in the resurrection of the body. How is this to be accomplished? Not by reproducing the dead person, since then there could be multiple copies, which he finds unacceptable. So God must do it using some occult method neither science nor philosophy can fathom. Dear Stathis, I agree with your critisms of what Peter van Inwagen is saying. This is mostly because I find the concept of an entity, "God', that has the capacities (attributed by implication) in the discussion to be inconsistent, for example it is not possible for an entity that does not have a continuous extension of itself in a realm to have any causal efficacy (power to cause a change in the state of affairs) on that realm. My motivation of posting a link to this video is that I believe that Prof. van Inwagen's argument is qualitatively identical to Bruno's discussion of Platonic Numbers. Not at all. Come one ... I hope you will read carefully my reply on FOAR. If Bruno's argument is coherent (not self-contradictory) then there must be some finite physical way to implement it, for example: Does comp explain how computer programs and physical stuff, such as the laptop of desktop computer that you are using to read this post and compose a reply and sent it out, etc., are related such that actions 'in the software' and actions of the physical stuff are correlated with each other? I believe that comp should be capable of explaining this relation. That's the object of AUDA. UDA shows that physics is a infinite sum on computations (which is an arithmetical notion, not a physical one). UDA already shows the big shape of the possible physics. AUDA is the beginning of the derivation. I have been trying to explain how Pratt's theory should that the relation between the two (software and hardware) is one of mutual constraint between dual aspects, but I have not stated such explicitly. I wanted to see if the members of this list could see the implication for themselves without my having to point this out... I see this as a test of Pratt's idea. So far I have failed. That is still an Aristotelian picture, with mind and matter being basically the same thing (or the dual thing). This is comparable to Craig. But with comp UDA shows that mind and matter are not dual, nor isomorphic. Their relation is more like a volume and its border. See my post to FOAR, and reply there, please, as we have already talk about this here. If you want defend Craig theory, then follow Craig in abandoning comp. Simply. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: A philosopher making the Duplication argument
On 3/20/2013 6:43 AM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: > On Wed, Mar 20, 2013 at 9:24 AM, Stephen P. King > wrote: >> http://www.closertotruth.com/video-profile/What-is-the-Nature-of-Personal-Identity-Peter-van-Inwagen-/176 > He starts off with a straightforward, materialist position. Then he > reveals he is a Christian, believes in the resurrection of the body. > How is this to be accomplished? Not by reproducing the dead person, > since then there could be multiple copies, which he finds > unacceptable. So God must do it using some occult method neither > science nor philosophy can fathom. > > Dear Stathis, I agree with your critisms of what Peter van Inwagen is saying. This is mostly because I find the concept of an entity, "God', that has the capacities (attributed by implication) in the discussion to be inconsistent, for example it is not possible for an entity that does not have a continuous extension of itself in a realm to have any causal efficacy (power to cause a change in the state of affairs) on that realm. My motivation of posting a link to this video is that I believe that Prof. van Inwagen's argument is qualitatively identical to Bruno's discussion of Platonic Numbers. If Bruno's argument is coherent (not self-contradictory) then there must be some finite physical way to implement it, for example: Does comp explain how computer programs and physical stuff, such as the laptop of desktop computer that you are using to read this post and compose a reply and sent it out, etc., are related such that actions 'in the software' and actions of the physical stuff are correlated with each other? I believe that comp should be capable of explaining this relation. I have been trying to explain how Pratt's theory should that the relation between the two (software and hardware) is one of mutual constraint between dual aspects, but I have not stated such explicitly. I wanted to see if the members of this list could see the implication for themselves without my having to point this out... I see this as a test of Pratt's idea. So far I have failed. -- Onward! Stephen -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: A philosopher making the Duplication argument
On 20 Mar 2013, at 11:43, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: On Wed, Mar 20, 2013 at 9:24 AM, Stephen P. King > wrote: http://www.closertotruth.com/video-profile/What-is-the-Nature-of-Personal-Identity-Peter-van-Inwagen-/176 He starts off with a straightforward, materialist position. Then he reveals he is a Christian, believes in the resurrection of the body. How is this to be accomplished? Not by reproducing the dead person, since then there could be multiple copies, which he finds unacceptable. So God must do it using some occult method neither science nor philosophy can fathom. Of course the Christians have an easy way to answer this: '---God's way are not human conceivable'. This of course leads to arbitrariness in the argument. That might be true, but still cannot be used in an argument. It reminds me the book by Ford(*), a priest who argued that the soul is not duplicable (which in comp can be said correct from the soul's point of view, and false from the third person point of view). From this he inferred that God will not endow something duplicable with a soul, and so he concluded ... that a woman can abort her pregnancy during the first three weeks of the embryogenesis, as during that time there are case of embryo duplications. That book is well written, and is good philosophy (with disputable premises, though). Bruno (*) FORD N. M., 1988, When did I begin?, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. -- Stathis Papaioannou -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en . For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: A philosopher making the Duplication argument
On Wed, Mar 20, 2013 at 9:24 AM, Stephen P. King wrote: > http://www.closertotruth.com/video-profile/What-is-the-Nature-of-Personal-Identity-Peter-van-Inwagen-/176 He starts off with a straightforward, materialist position. Then he reveals he is a Christian, believes in the resurrection of the body. How is this to be accomplished? Not by reproducing the dead person, since then there could be multiple copies, which he finds unacceptable. So God must do it using some occult method neither science nor philosophy can fathom. -- Stathis Papaioannou -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
A philosopher making the Duplication argument
http://www.closertotruth.com/video-profile/What-is-the-Nature-of-Personal-Identity-Peter-van-Inwagen-/176 -- Onward! Stephen -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
