Re: A sequel to my 1996 ultimate ensemble theory paper
Le 08-mai-07, à 05:13, Max a écrit : Thanks to all of you who have posted/sent interesting and helpful comments on this paper. You are welcome. I hope to respond to them once teaching finishes and I (hopefully) come up for air later this month. Take it easy. I will myself try to sum up in some non technical way what I try to convey in the list. In the mean time, I'd like to alert you to http://www.fqxi.org/community/index.php If you're interested, you'll be able to apply for research grants here next year to think about the sort of big questions discussed on this list, regardless of your nationality and whether you're in academia or not. Moreover, you're welcome to participate in the discussion forum that was just launched today at http://www.fqxi.org/community/forum.php, so please consider copying stuff you post to this list to the Ultimate Reality section there. Thanks for the info. Best, Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: A sequel to my 1996 ultimate ensemble theory paper
Thanks to all of you who have posted/sent interesting and helpful comments on this paper. I hope to respond to them once teaching finishes and I (hopefully) come up for air later this month. In the mean time, I'd like to alert you to http://www.fqxi.org/community/index.php If you're interested, you'll be able to apply for research grants here next year to think about the sort of big questions discussed on this list, regardless of your nationality and whether you're in academia or not. Moreover, you're welcome to participate in the discussion forum that was just launched today at http://www.fqxi.org/community/forum.php, so please consider copying stuff you post to this list to the Ultimate Reality section there. This has the advantage of getting your ideas out to lots of unusually open-minded scientists (see http://www.fqxi.org/members.html). Cheers, Max ;-) --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: A sequel to my 1996 ultimate ensemble theory paper
Max, You may be interested in checking out the top-level 'Class Diagram of Reality' which I just posted. It gives a graphical representation of my ideas about ontology. The Mathematical concepts are all on the right-hand side of the page and you can see from the diagram that I think there are 9 fundamental areas of mathematical knowledge. Incidentally the so-called 'Theory of Everything' pursued by main- stream physics would fit entirely into the 3 boxes at the bottom left of my diagram ;) Link: http://marc.geddes.googlepages.com/MCRT_ClassDiagram.html --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: A sequel to my 1996 ultimate ensemble theory paper
I've read the paper and still am reading the paper ... I'm writing down my first thoughts, I was surprised you used the free of baggage argument to argue that ERH == MUH, I would rather have thought of a simulation kind of argument here but nevertheless, interesting. Also, since there's no observational difference between ERH and a Copenhagen interpretation of ERH, I do not see any kind of conflict there either ? Also, one big question I have after reading your paper, what is the TOE or what would you consider to be the TOE ? I guess it would be the initial conditions and everything which influences our universe (even if we can not observe it ourselves). Because in some way, the simple statement that everything mathematical is also physical, is already a TOE as it explains everything. Finally, if anyone would have a rigorous proof that the existence of mathematics implies human existence (which I believe must be possible), I would be very interested to hear that. --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: A sequel to my 1996 ultimate ensemble theory paper
Max skrev: Hi Folks, After a decade of procrastination, I've finally finished writing up a sequel to that paper that I wrote back in 1996 (Is "the theory of everything'' merely the ultimate ensemble theory?) that's been the subject of so much interesting discussion in this group. It's entitled "The Mathematical Universe", and you'll find it at http://arxiv.org/pdf/0704.0646 and http://space.mit.edu/home/tegmark/toe.html - I'd very much appreciate any comments that you may have. I have now read your new paper more carefully, and I have then found one error in it. I the top of page 6 you write: But there is a length scale "1" of special significance in our physical space, namely the Planck length: meter. And there is a time period of special significance, namely the Planck time: . (Source: Wikipedia.) So when you look for the mathematical system that is our universe, you have to look at the mathematical systems that have a special unit length and a special unit time. -- Torgny Tholerus --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: A sequel to my 1996 ultimate ensemble theory paper
An addendum on the highly intriguing diagram with the arrows connecting three mathematical concepts: Formal Systems, Mathematical Structures and Computations. I think you're definitely on to something big with that intriguing diagram but you need to get it exactly right. I don't believe that this is a complete classification of mathematical concepts. What is missing are the concepts from probability theory: things like Probability Distributions. Also (as I pointed out in my last post), the term 'Mathematical Structures' should really be spit in two: you could distinguish between specific Algebraic structures and the most general structures from Category Theory. My own diagram has SIX of those circles. You've made some intriguing preliminary attempts to show the relationships between the various mathematical concepts but I don't think you've got them right yet. For instance (as I mentioned) I think computations are special cases of formal systems. (*not*, as you have in your diagram, special cases of mathematical structures). I would be particualrly interested to hear what Bruno has to say about that diagram and the nature of the relationship between the various mathematical concepts. --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: A sequel to my 1996 ultimate ensemble theory paper
Very interesting Max. Filled with erudite ideas and a depth of knowledge far greater than mine! Can't comment much on the technical stuff, but can talk about the ontological assumptions. The trouble with Platonism is that it's far too simplistic. *all* mathematical concepts are lumped into the same category, which are then defined to exist objectively. Of course, those who think mathematics is only a human invention (nominalists) make exactly the same mistake as the Platonists. They lump *all* mathematical concepts together, then define the lump to be a social construct. But before one starts talking about mathematical concepts, one must be careful to distinguish between *kinds* of mathematical concepts. I think that *some* mathematical concepts exist objectively, some don't. I think we need to be careful to distinguish between *Cognitive Models* (which make references to *mathematical objects* which really do objectively) and *Cognitive Tools* (which include *mathematical procedures* for reasoning about reality). So the distinction here is between *mathematical objects* and *mathematical cognitive tools*. We need to remember that if all the universe is math, intelligent observers have to *use* math to learn about math. The way observers use math *internally* to reason about mathematical things *externally* leads to the division between *mathematical cognitive tools* (subjective) and *mathematical objects* (objective). Thus if all the universe is math then I think we need to give up the idea of complete objectivity.The *mathematical objects* are objectively real, the *mathematical cognitive tools* aren't. However there is close relationship between the mathematical objects and the *mathematical cognitive tools* Let me give you an example of what I mean, because I think you were definitely on the right track when you were talking about the relationship between formal systems and computational models. Using my terminology, I think the formal systems are the objectively existing *mathematical objects*, the computational models are subjective *mathematical cognitive tools*. The computational model is not a mathematical *thing* , it's a mathematical *procedure* that observers use internally. Therefore, the computational model is not something objectively real. However, there is a close mapping between computational models and formal systems. This is hard to explain, but let me say that I think that the *formal system* is the more general concept. The computational model is a sort of *a subjective snap- shot* of the formal system. An apt analogy here might be the taking of photos - you can photograph a physical object from many different angles. In my analogy, the formal system is the externally real object being photographed, the computational model is the subjective 'photo' of the formal system. Another example might be the relationship between Algebra and Category Theory. Here I think standard Algebra is a tool-kit of (non- objective) mathematical *procedures* and therefore not objectively real. However, there is a mapping between standard Algebra and a more general theory: Category Theory. The concepts in Category Theory *are* I think objectively real (they are mathematical *objects*). For instance, the algebraic *operation* '2+2' does not correspond to anything objectively real. However the *category* - the number 4 - *is* objectively real - because it's not a procedure, it's a mathematical object. You see what I'm getting at? In general, each *mathematical object* maps to a corresponding *mathematical procedure*. The mathematical objects are objectively real general concepts, the mathematical procedures are the subjective internal snap-shots. What we need to remember, according to my suppositions, is that mathematical concepts which represent *objects* are objectively real, but mathematical concepts which represent *procedures* aren't. What all this is leading to is this punch-line: I f we believe your 2nd postulate that all the universe is math(which I do) I think we need to give up your first postulate. I do not see what is so bad about giving up the idea ofa completely objective description of reality. I do not believe that giving up the objectivity postulate would spell the end of the quest for a TOE. It would just mean that a TOE would have to *include* direct conscious experience (subjective elements) in order to be fully comprehended. This sounds highly strange, but it's not impossible. Onward! Cheers! --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: A sequel to my 1996 ultimate ensemble theory paper
Hi Max, I will first comment what you say about Gödel's theorem. You say (pp 19, 20) that Gödel's second incompleteness theorem implies that we can never be 100% sure that this (Peano Arithmetic, real numbers, ...) is consistent, and that this would leave open the possibility that a finite length proof of 0 = 1. This is a very common misconception of Godel's incompleteness, sometimes advocated by relativists. By common I mean that most good popularizations of Godel's results address correctly this misconception. I am mainly thinking about Smullyan's many books on this subject, or the more recent, quite excellent, book by Torkel Franzèn Gödel's Theorem An incomplete Guide to its Use and Abuse. I certainly recommand it to anyone interested in this list subject. Franzèn is a little weak on the *Use* of Gödel's theorem, but quite excellent on the so widespread *Misuses* and *Abuses*. It is hard for me to believe you are serious on Gödel. Even if we grant some possibility of doubting the consistency of Peano Arithmetic PA (say) I don't see how you derive from Gödel's second theorem the possibility of a finite proof of 0=1. Gödel's theorem is itself provable in PA, so your doubt would have a circular origin. Would PA proves its consistency, this could be doubtful too: after all, all inconsistent theories do proof their own consistency. Then it is easy to provide everyday informal quite convincing proof of the consistency of PA by using the fact that the axioms of PA are satisfied by the model (N, +, *), and the inference rule of PA are truth preserving). Formally, the consistency of PA can be proved in weak fragment of ZF (Zermelo Fraenkel set theory) by transfinite induction up to the little constructive ordinal epsilon zero (Gentzen theorem). Now, what is curious and amazing, is the following consequence of the second incompleteness theorem: given that PA is consistent, but cannot prove its consistency, it follows that the theory PA + [PA is inconsistent], that is PA with the addition of the axiom Bf (beweisbar false = false is provable) has to be consistent too! (why? because if you can derive a contradiction in PA from Bf, you would prove in PA that Bf - f, that is ~Bf = PA's consistency, contradicting the second incompleteness theorem. NOW, by Godel's COMPLETENESS (not INcompleteness) theorem, all first order theory is consistent if and only if the theory has a model (in the logician sense, that is a model is a mathematical structure satisfying the axioms. I think your misconception could come from this fact. Indeed the completeness theorem entails that the theory PA+Bf , being con,sistent by Godel II, has a model! So there is a mathematical structure which satisfies the axiom of PA + there is a proof of a falsity. But PA can prove (like weaker theories) that 0 is not (a godel number coding) a proof of f, and that 1 is not a proof of f, and that 2 is not a proof of f, etc. That is, for each natural number n, PA can prove that n is not the godel number of a falsity f. Thus, in the model of PA+Bf, the object corresponding to a proof of a falsity has to be different from any natural number. logician describes such object has an infinite non standard numbers, and it can't correspond to anything looking like a finite proof of f, or 0=1. By the way, this list mixes people with diploma and without, you could have asked or participate, but then this is what you are doing now, isn't it? I have a phd in logic and computer science, although my motivation has always been biology and/or theology, I mean fundamental questioning. People without diploma are often better on new or very old questions because they are less prejudiced by granting less theories. It is also why I like to interview directly universal machines. What is much more annoying in your paper, and shows that you have never really consulted this mailing list, is that you are still burying under the rug the mind body problem, or the first person/third person relation problem. Your use of the frog/bird distinction illustrates that you are using implicitly, despite your mathematicalism which I appreciate, some mind-matter-like identity theory capable of giving sense to the notion of a physical structure and of an observer belonging to it. This *can* make sense, but, especially with the computationalist hypothesis (= I am turing emulable), such a thing has to be justified. This follows from the Universal Dovetailer Argument + the Movie-graph Argument. I have already show that the computationalist hypothesis (roughly: there is a level of description where I am Turing emulable) entails the falsity of the computational universe thesis. Physicalness, with comp, is a global internal feature of arithmetical reality emerging from machine's dream gluing, to be short. Another problem, is that, although I agree with mathematicalism, I have no clue of what could be All Mathematics. But with
Re: A sequel to my 1996 ultimate ensemble theory paper
Hi Max, In line with my preoccupation and passion: consciousness. I confine my comments to that narrow scope and offer the following observations (which I did with my phenomenal consciousness! :-) Page 4 Section D. I cannot utter a 'WOOHOO!' too loud here, to finally see these kinds of words appearing. There is a long record on this forum of me trying to get people to _really_ grasp the nature of the difference between Description/Appearance(apparent causal necessity)/Phenomenon to Explanation/Actual Causal Necessity/Noumenon. In Max's work we clearly have the arrival of a scientifically valid noumenon. You may be aware that I have been raving on ad nauseum here recently about my EC, which literally is a 'MUH'. The universe literally 'is' an instantated EC, say MUHcol. We humans are literally an ongoing proof written in EC.albeit of a different nature to the one proposed, say MUHmax. The difference between MUHmax and MUHcol are not important - the fact of the clear appreciation and expression of the ontological/epistemological 'cut' (as Howard Pattee[2] puts it) and distinction is what is important. ..the words clearly distinguish 'being' from 'appearance'. They embed the origins of all knowledge as sourced subjectively from within itthrough the embedded agency of the FROG scientist's depiction of the BIRD side of the cut. More than that, the words emerge in a way that is hard to argue against without appearing (at least methodologically/virtually) to hold rather bizarre views about the ontology (underlying reality) of the universe - ...far more bizarre than any MUH.as the final para clearly shows. so YES! RE: Frogs and Birds Having said the above, I detect a possible small crack in the Bird/ Frog depiction that might open up a door for unfounded criticism from those who struggle to see the difference between a noumenon and phenomenon. What you are describing is what I have written about (rather badly!) [1]: It is a 'dual aspect science'. What I described there is the phenomenon aspect (T = FROG) and the 'noumenon' aspect (T' = BIRD). Both are completely equivalent descriptions of the same thing, the universe U(.) as T' and how that universe appears (T') when you are made of it, inside it, with observational capacities delivered by T', _not_ T. The 'helicopter/bird' view metaphor is not quite right, IMO - the MUH is a noumenon and not to be confused with an 'objective view' (there is no such thing!)...the BIRD metaphor might confuse things. The missing subtlety, which undermines all empirical support for MUHmax, is that both the FROG's view _AND_ the BIRD's view are equally supported by any and all empirical work. (with specific ref to the isomorphism sentence on P4, section D). The FROG can lay no claim to exclusive use of empirical work - for the noumenon is the thing that is actually generating the 'observation' intrinsic in ...as you say on P4, top.'processes that give rise to the familiar sensations of self awareness' ..that the FROG has... that are the single, mandated and only sources of all scientific evidence (where scientist = FROG, and everything about the MUH is a product of that perspective). Without that faculty there is no science. I hope I am making sense hereI don't think you have made enough mileage out of this brute FROG/BIRD reality as regards their place as equals in provision of DESCRIPTION/EXPLANATION resp. using the same evidence system: phenomenal consciousness. RE: Final Note There is one aspect to MUH which remains completely absent and which, IMO, is absolutely vital to any real 'TOE'. Whilst recognizing that 'it is like something' to be FROG.MUHmax provides no basis for the necessity that it be 'like something' to be FROG under the circumstances of being configured as a FROG. That 'contents of consciousness/that which is seen/observed', is the single source of all scientific evidence used in support of all FROG and BIRD MUH rule sets (=FROG/BIRD aspect science)Fine...But nowhere is the paper MUHmax explanatory of how the BIRD view/descriptions provide the phenomenal consciousness that the FROG uses to do observation in support of all propositions for either collection of rules. After all.it is not the FROGs descriptions, derived _directly using_ observation of MUH that deliver the observations.this is oxymoronic.rather it is the noumenon (The BIRD rules of MUHmax) that delivers observation (the faculty of observation, through which all FROG views are delivered). A TOE must deliver 'everything', right? Well this chunk of 'everything' is not in the paper. None of the QM or anything else in your paper does it, nor does it propose a principle upon which it may be deliveredAFAICT. Maybe I missed it or have wires crossedHaving said that, I don't believe you actually have to deliver it right nowwhat is more important is mere recognition of the need and a clear
Re: A sequel to my 1996 ultimate ensemble theory paper
Max skrev: Hi Folks, After a decade of procrastination, I've finally finished writing up a sequel to that paper that I wrote back in 1996 (Is the theory of everything'' merely the ultimate ensemble theory?) that's been the subject of so much interesting discussion in this group. It's entitled The Mathematical Universe, and you'll find it at http://arxiv.org/pdf/0704.0646 and http://space.mit.edu/home/tegmark/toe.html - I'd very much appreciate any comments that you may have. I have now read The Mathematical Universe, and I have found it very good. I agree with everything you write there. I found the CUH (Computable Universe Hypothesis) very good, and most interesting was VII G 2 (Abandoning the continuum altogether), that is exactly what I believe in. One problem I have not yet solved, is how to get all directions isomorph if you have a discrete space-time. Maybe someone on this this list can help me solve that problem? Max, a suggestion to you is to skip the concept of infinity totally. Your reasoning will be true even if you have a finite, but enough big, universe. You don't need the infinity. -- Torgny Tholerus --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: A sequel to my 1996 ultimate ensemble theory paper
Le 11-avr.-07, à 17:25, Max a écrit : Hi Folks, Hi Max, Nice you remember us. After a decade of procrastination, I've finally finished writing up a sequel to that paper that I wrote back in 1996 (Is the theory of everything'' merely the ultimate ensemble theory?) that's been the subject of so much interesting discussion in this group. Are you aware of the critics I have made about it, and about Schmidhuber approach? I am not sure you have taken those critics into account in your new paper, although on some point it is indeed clearer. Oh, I see you are mistaken about Godel's theorem (hope you don't mind the typical frankness in our discussion, mainly for reason of being short). Perhaps this will be an opportunity to have a straight discussion, and to help the go beyond the usual gap between logicians, which in my opinion have developed the right tools, and the physicists, which in general have kept the right (scientific realist) motivations. It's entitled The Mathematical Universe, and you'll find it at http://arxiv.org/pdf/0704.0646 and http://space.mit.edu/home/tegmark/toe.html - I'd very much appreciate any comments that you may have. I will. The purpose of this paper is both to clarify what I mean by the Level IV Multiverse and to further explore various implications, so it has lots of discussion of stuff like the simulation argument, the relation to Schmidhuber's ideas, Gödel incompleteness and Church-Turing incomputability. Schmidhuber leaves the list more than 5 years ago without answering questions adressed to him. I hope you will be more serious. Apparently you are not aware of my works, which I have explained more than once in this list, and has been the subject of my PhD thesis in France a long time ago (and this 20 years after having published the results). It is not entirely your fault because I have not yet send my papers to the arXiv.org or international journal. I don't submit more than one paper every 500 years (g), and you are lucky because I have just do this recently and my paper has been accepted for the cie 2007: http://www.amsta.leeds.ac.uk/~pmt6sbc/cie07.html (nice if you could come, but it is high level logic). All my other papers was ordered by kind people with serious motivation in my results or my approach (similar to ideas discussed in this list, and indeed close (but quite different) of yours. You can find most of those papers in my url below. Alas it does not contain my last two papers (for copyright reason). One of the main result is that if I am a machine then the observable universe cannot be described by a machine: the laws of physics have to emerge from the math of cognition (not of human cognition but of universal machine introspection). The other result is a direct partial extraction of the physical laws by the interview of an ideally self-referentially correct universal machine, and evidences adds up that indeed there is a quantum computer exploitable in real time in the neighborhood of almost all classical universal machines. This shows there is plausibly a mathematical justification of the qubits from the bits. So the Everett-Graham-Deutsch-Zurek qubit from bit transformation admits a reciprocal. This is going in your direction (classical platonist mathematicalism), but like with Penrose, the reasons differ. Please let me apologize in advance for the fact that Sections III, IV and the appendix of this paper are quite technical, so if you're among the 99.99% who don't have a Ph.D. in theoretical physics, perhaps skip those sections. I've added links to more accessible papers touching on some of these issues at http://space.mit.edu/home/tegmark/toe.html, and I'll try to write something less obtuse soon. Finally, if you discover a good time stretching device, please let me know! Although I'm embarrassed that I haven't found the time to follow and participate in the fascinating discussions in this group, the fact that there's such interest has inspired and motivated me to continue pursuing these ideas despite the discouragement from mainstream academia. So thanks for the encouragement! Thanks to you, Max. I appreciate very much your effort to explain Everett. I really love your paper with Wheeler. And I appreciate you have the courage you show in tackling very difficult questions which are indeed a little bit out of the mainstream fashion. I have myself got trouble after publishing the quantum suicide in 1988, like I got problem in the seventies with the more general computationist suicide. You can consider my work as a generalisation of Everett's (but see also Otto Rossler's endophysics) embedding of the subject (the physicist) in the physical world (quantum mechanics), indeed I embed the mathematician in arithmetic; or you can see it as a detailed reconstruction of Penrose's argument, with similar conclusions (although Penrose
A sequel to my 1996 ultimate ensemble theory paper
Hi Folks, After a decade of procrastination, I've finally finished writing up a sequel to that paper that I wrote back in 1996 (Is the theory of everything'' merely the ultimate ensemble theory?) that's been the subject of so much interesting discussion in this group. It's entitled The Mathematical Universe, and you'll find it at http://arxiv.org/pdf/0704.0646 and http://space.mit.edu/home/tegmark/toe.html - I'd very much appreciate any comments that you may have. The purpose of this paper is both to clarify what I mean by the Level IV Multiverse and to further explore various implications, so it has lots of discussion of stuff like the simulation argument, the relation to Schmidhuber's ideas, Gödel incompleteness and Church-Turing incomputability. Please let me apologize in advance for the fact that Sections III, IV and the appendix of this paper are quite technical, so if you're among the 99.99% who don't have a Ph.D. in theoretical physics, perhaps skip those sections. I've added links to more accessible papers touching on some of these issues at http://space.mit.edu/home/tegmark/toe.html, and I'll try to write something less obtuse soon. Finally, if you discover a good time stretching device, please let me know! Although I'm embarrassed that I haven't found the time to follow and participate in the fascinating discussions in this group, the fact that there's such interest has inspired and motivated me to continue pursuing these ideas despite the discouragement from mainstream academia. So thanks for the encouragement! Max ;-) --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
