Re: Frege, Wittgenstein on linguistical truth

[Philip Thrift]

On Friday, December 6, 2019 at 6:57:54 PM UTC-6, Lawrence Crowell wrote:
>
> On Friday, December 6, 2019 at 5:21:25 PM UTC-6, Philip Thrift wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Friday, December 6, 2019 at 3:48:25 PM UTC-6, Brent wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On 12/6/2019 4:05 AM, Philip Thrift wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Friday, December 6, 2019 at 5:42:13 AM UTC-6, Lawrence Crowell wrote: 

 On Friday, December 6, 2019 at 12:59:15 AM UTC-6, Philip Thrift wrote: 
>
>
>
>
> https://philosophynow.org/issues/106/Wittgenstein_Frege_and_The_Context_Principle
>  
>
>
> Frege was equally concerned to reject one kind of account of 
> mathematical objectivity – the view that mathematical statements are made 
> true by reference to abstract mathematical objects that are in some way 
> real, even though we can’t see, touch or feel them. 
>
> According to the Context Principle, the basic unit of sense is the 
> proposition, or sentence. The sentence is the smallest unit of language 
> which can be used to say anything at all. The meaningfulness of names and 
> predicates is a matter of the place they occupy in the sentence, and also 
> whether the sentence is true. Whether or not a name refers to an object, 
> then, is a matter of the contribution the name makes to the truth of the 
> whole sentence.
>
> @philipthrift
>

 This leads me to appreciate on some level why Feynman called this 
 philosofuzzy.

 LC 

>>>
>>>
>>> Which is why Feyerabend (who I think was together with Feynman when he 
>>> came to some conferences in Berkeley) said 
>>>
>>> The withdrawal of philosophy into a "professional" shell of its own has 
>>> had disastrous consequences. The younger generation of physicists, the 
>>> *Feynman*s , the 
>>> Schwingers , etc., may 
>>> be very bright; they may be more intelligent than their predecessors, than 
>>> Bohr , Einstein 
>>> , Schrödinger 
>>> , Boltzmann 
>>> , Mach 
>>>  and so on. *But they are 
>>> uncivilized savages: they lack in philosophical depth.*
>>>
>>> So true.
>>>
>>>
>>> Depth is no virtue when you're just muddying the water.
>>>
>>>
>>> @philipthrift
>>>
>>>
>>> Each philosopher knows a lot but, as a whole, philosophers don't know 
>>> anything. If they did, they would be scientists.
>>>   --- Ludwig Krippahl
>>>
>>> "The point of philosophy is to start with something so simple as not to 
>>> seem worth stating, and to end with something so paradoxical that no one 
>>> will believe it."
>>>--- Bertrand Russell
>>>
>>> Philosophie ist der systematische Missbrauch einer eigens zu
>>> diesem Zweck entwickelten Terminologie."
>>>  ---Wolfgang Pauli
>>>
>>> "The philosophy of science is just about as useful to scientists
>>> as ornithology is to birds."
>>>   --- Steven Weinberg
>>>
>>> So is Feyerabend so sure his depth is more profound than theirs?
>>>
>>> Brent
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>> What some scientist calls "philosofuzzy" (Frege, Wittgenstein, Quine) 
>> perhaps is to hide their own fuzzy philosophy. (I can't find a reference 
>> for Feynman ever using that term though).
>>
>> *Physicists Are Philosophers, Too*
>> Victor J. Stenger
>>
>> https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/physicists-are-philosophers-too/ 
>> 
>>
>> What we are seeing here is not a recent phenomenon. In his 1992 book 
>> Dreams of a Final Theory, Nobel laureate *Steven Weinberg* has a whole 
>> chapter entitled “Against Philosophy.” Referring to the famous observation 
>> of Nobel laureate physicist Eugene Wigner about “the unreasonable 
>> effectiveness of mathematics,” Weinberg puzzles about “the unreasonable 
>> ineffectiveness of philosophy.”
>>
>> Weinberg does not dismiss all of philosophy, just the philosophy of 
>> science, noting that its arcane discussions interest few scientists. He 
>> points out the problems with the philosophy of positivism, although he 
>> agrees that it played a role in the early development of both relativity 
>> and quantum mechanics. He argues that positivism did more harm than good, 
>> however, writing, “The positivist concentration on observables like 
>> particle positions and momenta has stood in the way of a ‘realist’ 
>> interpretation of quantum mechanics, in which the wave function is the 
>> representative of physical reality.”
>>
>> Weinberg and [others], in fact, are expressing a platonic view of reality 
>> commonly held by many theoretical physicists and ma

Re: Frege, Wittgenstein on linguistical truth

[Lawrence Crowell]

On Friday, December 6, 2019 at 5:21:25 PM UTC-6, Philip Thrift wrote:
>
>
>
> On Friday, December 6, 2019 at 3:48:25 PM UTC-6, Brent wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On 12/6/2019 4:05 AM, Philip Thrift wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Friday, December 6, 2019 at 5:42:13 AM UTC-6, Lawrence Crowell wrote: 
>>>
>>> On Friday, December 6, 2019 at 12:59:15 AM UTC-6, Philip Thrift wrote: 




 https://philosophynow.org/issues/106/Wittgenstein_Frege_and_The_Context_Principle
  


 Frege was equally concerned to reject one kind of account of 
 mathematical objectivity – the view that mathematical statements are made 
 true by reference to abstract mathematical objects that are in some way 
 real, even though we can’t see, touch or feel them. 

 According to the Context Principle, the basic unit of sense is the 
 proposition, or sentence. The sentence is the smallest unit of language 
 which can be used to say anything at all. The meaningfulness of names and 
 predicates is a matter of the place they occupy in the sentence, and also 
 whether the sentence is true. Whether or not a name refers to an object, 
 then, is a matter of the contribution the name makes to the truth of the 
 whole sentence.

 @philipthrift

>>>
>>> This leads me to appreciate on some level why Feynman called this 
>>> philosofuzzy.
>>>
>>> LC 
>>>
>>
>>
>> Which is why Feyerabend (who I think was together with Feynman when he 
>> came to some conferences in Berkeley) said 
>>
>> The withdrawal of philosophy into a "professional" shell of its own has 
>> had disastrous consequences. The younger generation of physicists, the 
>> *Feynman*s , the 
>> Schwingers , etc., may 
>> be very bright; they may be more intelligent than their predecessors, than 
>> Bohr , Einstein 
>> , Schrödinger 
>> , Boltzmann 
>> , Mach 
>>  and so on. *But they are 
>> uncivilized savages: they lack in philosophical depth.*
>>
>> So true.
>>
>>
>> Depth is no virtue when you're just muddying the water.
>>
>>
>> @philipthrift
>>
>>
>> Each philosopher knows a lot but, as a whole, philosophers don't know 
>> anything. If they did, they would be scientists.
>>   --- Ludwig Krippahl
>>
>> "The point of philosophy is to start with something so simple as not to 
>> seem worth stating, and to end with something so paradoxical that no one 
>> will believe it."
>>--- Bertrand Russell
>>
>> Philosophie ist der systematische Missbrauch einer eigens zu
>> diesem Zweck entwickelten Terminologie."
>>  ---Wolfgang Pauli
>>
>> "The philosophy of science is just about as useful to scientists
>> as ornithology is to birds."
>>   --- Steven Weinberg
>>
>> So is Feyerabend so sure his depth is more profound than theirs?
>>
>> Brent
>>
>>
>>
>>
> What some scientist calls "philosofuzzy" (Frege, Wittgenstein, Quine) 
> perhaps is to hide their own fuzzy philosophy. (I can't find a reference 
> for Feynman ever using that term though).
>
> *Physicists Are Philosophers, Too*
> Victor J. Stenger
> https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/physicists-are-philosophers-too/
>
> What we are seeing here is not a recent phenomenon. In his 1992 book 
> Dreams of a Final Theory, Nobel laureate *Steven Weinberg* has a whole 
> chapter entitled “Against Philosophy.” Referring to the famous observation 
> of Nobel laureate physicist Eugene Wigner about “the unreasonable 
> effectiveness of mathematics,” Weinberg puzzles about “the unreasonable 
> ineffectiveness of philosophy.”
>
> Weinberg does not dismiss all of philosophy, just the philosophy of 
> science, noting that its arcane discussions interest few scientists. He 
> points out the problems with the philosophy of positivism, although he 
> agrees that it played a role in the early development of both relativity 
> and quantum mechanics. He argues that positivism did more harm than good, 
> however, writing, “The positivist concentration on observables like 
> particle positions and momenta has stood in the way of a ‘realist’ 
> interpretation of quantum mechanics, in which the wave function is the 
> representative of physical reality.”
>
> Weinberg and [others], in fact, are expressing a platonic view of reality 
> commonly held by many theoretical physicists and mathematicians. They are 
> taking their equations and model as existing on one-to-one correspondence 
> with the ultimate nature of reality.
>
> @philipthrift
>

It is not that, and few physicists think their equations are 1 to 1 with 
nature all the way. The point is to calculate things according to scheme 
that gives answers to questions. Spending lots of time concerned wi

Re: Frege, Wittgenstein on linguistical truth

[Philip Thrift]

On Friday, December 6, 2019 at 3:48:25 PM UTC-6, Brent wrote:
>
>
>
> On 12/6/2019 4:05 AM, Philip Thrift wrote:
>
>
>
> On Friday, December 6, 2019 at 5:42:13 AM UTC-6, Lawrence Crowell wrote: 
>>
>> On Friday, December 6, 2019 at 12:59:15 AM UTC-6, Philip Thrift wrote: 
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> https://philosophynow.org/issues/106/Wittgenstein_Frege_and_The_Context_Principle
>>>  
>>>
>>>
>>> Frege was equally concerned to reject one kind of account of 
>>> mathematical objectivity – the view that mathematical statements are made 
>>> true by reference to abstract mathematical objects that are in some way 
>>> real, even though we can’t see, touch or feel them. 
>>>
>>> According to the Context Principle, the basic unit of sense is the 
>>> proposition, or sentence. The sentence is the smallest unit of language 
>>> which can be used to say anything at all. The meaningfulness of names and 
>>> predicates is a matter of the place they occupy in the sentence, and also 
>>> whether the sentence is true. Whether or not a name refers to an object, 
>>> then, is a matter of the contribution the name makes to the truth of the 
>>> whole sentence.
>>>
>>> @philipthrift
>>>
>>
>> This leads me to appreciate on some level why Feynman called this 
>> philosofuzzy.
>>
>> LC 
>>
>
>
> Which is why Feyerabend (who I think was together with Feynman when he 
> came to some conferences in Berkeley) said 
>
> The withdrawal of philosophy into a "professional" shell of its own has 
> had disastrous consequences. The younger generation of physicists, the 
> *Feynman*s , the Schwingers 
> , etc., may be very 
> bright; they may be more intelligent than their predecessors, than Bohr 
> , Einstein 
> , Schrödinger 
> , Boltzmann 
> , Mach 
>  and so on. *But they are 
> uncivilized savages: they lack in philosophical depth.*
>
> So true.
>
>
> Depth is no virtue when you're just muddying the water.
>
>
> @philipthrift
>
>
> Each philosopher knows a lot but, as a whole, philosophers don't know 
> anything. If they did, they would be scientists.
>   --- Ludwig Krippahl
>
> "The point of philosophy is to start with something so simple as not to 
> seem worth stating, and to end with something so paradoxical that no one 
> will believe it."
>--- Bertrand Russell
>
> Philosophie ist der systematische Missbrauch einer eigens zu
> diesem Zweck entwickelten Terminologie."
>  ---Wolfgang Pauli
>
> "The philosophy of science is just about as useful to scientists
> as ornithology is to birds."
>   --- Steven Weinberg
>
> So is Feyerabend so sure his depth is more profound than theirs?
>
> Brent
>
>
>
>
What some scientist calls "philosofuzzy" (Frege, Wittgenstein, Quine) 
perhaps is to hide their own fuzzy philosophy. (I can't find a reference 
for Feynman ever using that term though).

*Physicists Are Philosophers, Too*
Victor J. Stenger
https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/physicists-are-philosophers-too/

What we are seeing here is not a recent phenomenon. In his 1992 book Dreams 
of a Final Theory, Nobel laureate *Steven Weinberg* has a whole chapter 
entitled “Against Philosophy.” Referring to the famous observation of Nobel 
laureate physicist Eugene Wigner about “the unreasonable effectiveness of 
mathematics,” Weinberg puzzles about “the unreasonable ineffectiveness of 
philosophy.”

Weinberg does not dismiss all of philosophy, just the philosophy of 
science, noting that its arcane discussions interest few scientists. He 
points out the problems with the philosophy of positivism, although he 
agrees that it played a role in the early development of both relativity 
and quantum mechanics. He argues that positivism did more harm than good, 
however, writing, “The positivist concentration on observables like 
particle positions and momenta has stood in the way of a ‘realist’ 
interpretation of quantum mechanics, in which the wave function is the 
representative of physical reality.”

Weinberg and [others], in fact, are expressing a platonic view of reality 
commonly held by many theoretical physicists and mathematicians. They are 
taking their equations and model as existing on one-to-one correspondence 
with the ultimate nature of reality.

@philipthrift

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Re: Frege, Wittgenstein on linguistical truth

['Brent Meeker' via Everything List]

On 12/6/2019 4:05 AM, Philip Thrift wrote:



On Friday, December 6, 2019 at 5:42:13 AM UTC-6, Lawrence Crowell wrote:

On Friday, December 6, 2019 at 12:59:15 AM UTC-6, Philip Thrift
wrote:




https://philosophynow.org/issues/106/Wittgenstein_Frege_and_The_Context_Principle





Frege was equally concerned to reject one kind of account of
mathematical objectivity – the view that mathematical
statements are made true by reference to abstract mathematical
objects that are in some way real, even though we can’t see,
touch or feel them.

According to the Context Principle, the basic unit of sense is
the proposition, or sentence. The sentence is the smallest
unit of language which can be used to say anything at all. The
meaningfulness of names and predicates is a matter of the
place they occupy in the sentence, and also whether the
sentence is true. Whether or not a name refers to an object,
then, is a matter of the contribution the name makes to the
truth of the whole sentence.

@philipthrift


This leads me to appreciate on some level why Feynman called this
philosofuzzy.

LC



Which is why Feyerabend (who I think was together with Feynman when he 
came to some conferences in Berkeley) said


The withdrawal of philosophy into a "professional" shell of its own 
has had disastrous consequences. The younger generation of physicists, 
the***Feynman*s , the 
Schwingers , etc., may 
be very bright; they may be more intelligent than their predecessors, 
than Bohr , Einstein 
, Schrödinger 
, Boltzmann 
, Mach 
 and so on. *But they are 
uncivilized savages: they lack in philosophical depth.*


So true.


Depth is no virtue when you're just muddying the water.



@philipthrift


Each philosopher knows a lot but, as a whole, philosophers don't know 
anything. If they did, they would be scientists.

  --- Ludwig Krippahl

"The point of philosophy is to start with something so simple as not to 
seem worth stating, and to end with something so paradoxical that no one 
will believe it."

   --- Bertrand Russell

Philosophie ist der systematische Missbrauch einer eigens zu
diesem Zweck entwickelten Terminologie."
 ---Wolfgang Pauli

"The philosophy of science is just about as useful to scientists
as ornithology is to birds."
  --- Steven Weinberg

So is Feyerabend so sure his depth is more profound than theirs?

Brent



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Re: Frege, Wittgenstein on linguistical truth

[Philip Thrift]

On Friday, December 6, 2019 at 5:42:13 AM UTC-6, Lawrence Crowell wrote:
>
> On Friday, December 6, 2019 at 12:59:15 AM UTC-6, Philip Thrift wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> https://philosophynow.org/issues/106/Wittgenstein_Frege_and_The_Context_Principle
>>
>>
>> Frege was equally concerned to reject one kind of account of mathematical 
>> objectivity – the view that mathematical statements are made true by 
>> reference to abstract mathematical objects that are in some way real, even 
>> though we can’t see, touch or feel them. 
>>
>> According to the Context Principle, the basic unit of sense is the 
>> proposition, or sentence. The sentence is the smallest unit of language 
>> which can be used to say anything at all. The meaningfulness of names and 
>> predicates is a matter of the place they occupy in the sentence, and also 
>> whether the sentence is true. Whether or not a name refers to an object, 
>> then, is a matter of the contribution the name makes to the truth of the 
>> whole sentence.
>>
>> @philipthrift
>>
>
> This leads me to appreciate on some level why Feynman called this 
> philosofuzzy.
>
> LC 
>


Which is why Feyerabend (who I think was together with Feynman when he came 
to some conferences in Berkeley) said 

The withdrawal of philosophy into a "professional" shell of its own has had 
disastrous consequences. The younger generation of physicists, the *Feynman*
s , the Schwingers 
, etc., may be very bright; 
they may be more intelligent than their predecessors, than Bohr 
, Einstein 
, Schrödinger 
, Boltzmann 
, Mach 
 and so on. *But they are 
uncivilized savages: they lack in philosophical depth.*

So true.

@philipthrift

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Re: Frege, Wittgenstein on linguistical truth

[Lawrence Crowell]

On Friday, December 6, 2019 at 12:59:15 AM UTC-6, Philip Thrift wrote:
>
>
>
>
> https://philosophynow.org/issues/106/Wittgenstein_Frege_and_The_Context_Principle
>
>
> Frege was equally concerned to reject one kind of account of mathematical 
> objectivity – the view that mathematical statements are made true by 
> reference to abstract mathematical objects that are in some way real, even 
> though we can’t see, touch or feel them. 
>
> According to the Context Principle, the basic unit of sense is the 
> proposition, or sentence. The sentence is the smallest unit of language 
> which can be used to say anything at all. The meaningfulness of names and 
> predicates is a matter of the place they occupy in the sentence, and also 
> whether the sentence is true. Whether or not a name refers to an object, 
> then, is a matter of the contribution the name makes to the truth of the 
> whole sentence.
>
> @philipthrift
>

This leads me to appreciate on some level why Feynman called this 
philosofuzzy.

LC 

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Re: Frege, Wittgenstein on linguistical truth

[Philip Thrift]

On Friday, December 6, 2019 at 1:46:13 AM UTC-6, Brent wrote:
>
>
>
> On 12/5/2019 10:59 PM, Philip Thrift wrote:
>
>
>
>
> https://philosophynow.org/issues/106/Wittgenstein_Frege_and_The_Context_Principle
>  
>
>
> Frege was equally concerned to reject one kind of account of mathematical 
> objectivity – the view that mathematical statements are made true by 
> reference to abstract mathematical objects that are in some way real, even 
> though we can’t see, touch or feel them. 
>
> According to the Context Principle, the basic unit of sense is the 
> proposition, or sentence. The sentence is the smallest unit of language 
> which can be used to say anything at all. The meaningfulness of names and 
> predicates is a matter of the place they occupy in the sentence, and also 
> whether the sentence is true. Whether or not a name refers to an object, 
> then, is a matter of the contribution the name makes to the truth of the 
> whole sentence.
>
>
> Is that true?  Doesn't the sentence have different truth values depending 
> on what object a name refers to?  not just whether it refers or not?  A 
> name can refer and be meaningful even when the sentence is false.
>
> Brent
>



[ via https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Context_principle ]

In the philosophy of language 
, the *context 
principle* is a form of semantic holism 
 holding that a philosopher 
should "never ... ask for the meaning of a word in isolation, but only in 
the context of a proposition" (Frege).

If semantic holism is interpreted as the thesis that any linguistic 
expression *E* (a word, a phrase or sentence) of some natural language *L* 
cannot 
be understood in isolation and that there are inevitably many ties between 
the expressions of *L*, it follows that to understand *E* one must 
understand a set *K* of expressions to which *E* is related. If, in 
addition, no limits are placed on the size of *K* (as in the cases of 
Davidson, Quine and, perhaps, Wittgenstein), then *K* coincides with the 
"whole" of *L*.


For Quine then (although Fodor and Lepore have maintained the contrary), 
and for many of his followers, confirmation holism 
 and semantic holism are 
inextricably linked.

As Quine states it:


All of our so-called knowledge or convictions, from questions of geography 
and history to the most profound laws of atomic physics or even mathematics 
and logic, are an edifice made by man that touches experience only at the 
margins. Or, to change images, science in its globality is like a force 
field whose limit points are experiences...a particular experience is never 
tied to any proposition inside the field except indirectly, for the needs 
of equilibrium which affect the field in its globality.


@philipthrift 

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Re: Frege, Wittgenstein on linguistical truth

['Brent Meeker' via Everything List]

On 12/5/2019 10:59 PM, Philip Thrift wrote:



https://philosophynow.org/issues/106/Wittgenstein_Frege_and_The_Context_Principle 




Frege was equally concerned to reject one kind of account of 
mathematical objectivity – the view that mathematical statements are 
made true by reference to abstract mathematical objects that are in 
some way real, even though we can’t see, touch or feel them.


According to the Context Principle, the basic unit of sense is the 
proposition, or sentence. The sentence is the smallest unit of 
language which can be used to say anything at all. The meaningfulness 
of names and predicates is a matter of the place they occupy in the 
sentence, and also whether the sentence is true. Whether or not a name 
refers to an object, then, is a matter of the contribution the name 
makes to the truth of the whole sentence.


Is that true?  Doesn't the sentence have different truth values 
depending on what object a name refers to?  not just whether it refers 
or not?  A name can refer and be meaningful even when the sentence is false.


Brent

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Frege, Wittgenstein on linguistical truth

[Philip Thrift]

https://philosophynow.org/issues/106/Wittgenstein_Frege_and_The_Context_Principle


Frege was equally concerned to reject one kind of account of mathematical 
objectivity – the view that mathematical statements are made true by 
reference to abstract mathematical objects that are in some way real, even 
though we can’t see, touch or feel them. 

According to the Context Principle, the basic unit of sense is the 
proposition, or sentence. The sentence is the smallest unit of language 
which can be used to say anything at all. The meaningfulness of names and 
predicates is a matter of the place they occupy in the sentence, and also 
whether the sentence is true. Whether or not a name refers to an object, 
then, is a matter of the contribution the name makes to the truth of the 
whole sentence.

@philipthrift

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