Re: Functionalism and People as Programs
Le 05-juin-05, à 19:45, Lee Corbin a écrit : Bruno provides the exercise I notice that many people seek refuge in the "no-copying" theorem of QM. Exercise: 1) Show by a qualitative informal reasoning that if we are Turing emulable then a no-cloning theorem is a necessity. My best guess right now? Your challenge would be a futile exercise in word play! "no-cloning" involves quantum mechanics. I don't think QM has a copyright on the non copy theorems! I have been prudent enough to talk on "a", and not "the" Zurek-Wootters-Diecks non copy theorems. In france there is a law of non cloning of embryo. What are you saying? So far as I know, computability theory (e.g. Rogers 1967) says ABSOLUTELY NOTHING about quantum mechanics, and they are in two completely different intellectual domains. Why does the David Deutsch FOR book mention comp/turing as an important thread of the book. Everett uses comp in its derivation of the collapse. I'm glad you mention Rogers' classical introduction to computability theory, which is excellent, but is a book on pure computability theory, not on applied computability theory. Since when is it forbidden to apply one field on another. I really don't understand your remark. All what I say is that someone who understands the 8 UDA steps should easily be able to convince him/herself that whatever matter could *be*, it cannot be cloned. This can be shown in a short sentence. It is almost trivial. (once UDA is thoroughly understood: this is probably less trivial, and from your conversation with Stathis I can infer you have trouble at the step 3, in the SANE paper: http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/publications/ SANE2004MARCHALAbstract.html Let me know when the newspapers announce that you've derived QM from computability theory. I have only show that if comp is true then QM is derivable from comp theory. I do have derive a little bit of QM. Or any blasted physics equation whatsoever. (I'm sorry that I have neither the time nor the expertise to digest your technical papers.) Except the step 7 which need a passive understanding of Church's thesis, there is nothing technical in the UDA reasoning. I agree the interview of the machine on UDA is more difficult, because it presupposes some background in logic and computability theory. But it is not necessary for the understanding of the UDA (universal dovetailer argument) which gives the main result. In another thread, Bruno wrote This is the central problem from those who are deeply concerned as to *why* 1st person experiences exist. Too bad that to me, it's just obvious that they must. I literally cannot conceive of how it could be different! (Poor me, I suppose---in some ways some of us just have too little imagination, I truly guess.) The problem is not so much "why" 1-person experiences exist, but how they are related to 3-person descriptions, and which one. How do *you* explain the relation? If I were a great novelist, I might be able to convey certain 1st person experiences to you (but that is possible *only* because the two organisms Bruno and Lee are so similar). But I'm not a great novelist, and so I can't. Here you make the category error which is made by so many physicalists or materialists. I am not asking you to convey some of your first person experience (well actually with your aargh and other humbug you do succeed but that's beyond the poin :). But at least you accept the existence of those 1-experience (unlike the materialist eliminativist a-la-Churchland). My question is how do you related them to third person describable things? Therefore, we can only talk about what is in the world, from tables to trees to mountains and stars. Ah ? This is a so ambiguous statement that I cannot comment it. *People* occupy an infinitesimal portion of what's out there. The maze of internal events which make each one of them feel and think is interesting, but is a very difficult physiological problem. It is a physiological problem once you are both computationalist and physicalist, but UDA shows those two options are incompatible. Please tell me where I am wrong. If you want we can go step by step with little posts. I am afraid you take for granted, perhaps unconsciously Aristotle theory of mind and substance. It just does not work with comp. I claim that it has nothing to do with serious philosophy, You talk of serious philosophy, but are explicitly against the use of definition and postulates (axioms) in some of your posts. How could we progress. Beside I don't believe in some clear boundary between science and philosophy. Those are, imo, purely conventional construct. In France and Belgium philosophy belongs to literature. and is just a hideous distraction, possibly stemming from confusion at the semantic level and disturbed sr. Bad epistemology, in a phrase. I could agree if
RE: Functionalism and People as Programs
Bruno provides the exercise > > I notice that many people seek refuge in the "no-copying" theorem of > > QM. > > Exercise: 1) Show by a qualitative informal reasoning that if we are > Turing emulable then a no-cloning theorem is a necessity. My best guess right now? Your challenge would be a futile exercise in word play! "no-cloning" involves quantum mechanics. So far as I know, computability theory (e.g. Rogers 1967) says ABSOLUTELY NOTHING about quantum mechanics, and they are in two completely different intellectual domains. Let me know when the newspapers announce that you've derived QM from computability theory. Or any blasted physics equation whatsoever. (I'm sorry that I have neither the time nor the expertise to digest your technical papers.) In another thread, Bruno wrote > > This is the central problem from those who are deeply concerned as > > to *why* 1st person experiences exist. Too bad that to me, it's > > just obvious that they must. I literally cannot conceive of how > > it could be different! (Poor me, I suppose---in some ways some > > of us just have too little imagination, I truly guess.) > The problem is not so much "why" 1-person experiences exist, but how > they are related to 3-person descriptions, and which one. > How do *you* explain the relation? If I were a great novelist, I might be able to convey certain 1st person experiences to you (but that is possible *only* because the two organisms Bruno and Lee are so similar). But I'm not a great novelist, and so I can't. Therefore, we can only talk about what is in the world, from tables to trees to mountains and stars. *People* occupy an infinitesimal portion of what's out there. The maze of internal events which make each one of them feel and think is interesting, but is a very difficult physiological problem. I claim that it has nothing to do with serious philosophy, and is just a hideous distraction, possibly stemming from confusion at the semantic level and disturbed sr. Bad epistemology, in a phrase. THERE ISN'T A PROBLEM! (Yes, okay, to computer scientists and physiologists there is, but not to philosophers or others interested in getting their ontology and epistemology straight.) The evolved creatures all have their responses and their internal workings; and that's *all* there is to it! I am an evolved creature; and if I can't understand that that same conclusions apply just as much to me as to the creatures I study, then I'm yielding to nonsense. Lee
Re: Existence of Copies (was RE: Functionalism and People as Programs)
Le 05-juin-05, à 01:04, Lee Corbin a écrit : This is the central problem from those who are deeply concerned as to *why* 1st person experiences exist. Too bad that to me, it's just obvious that they must. I literally cannot conceive of how it could be different! (Poor me, I suppose---in some ways some of us just have too little imagination, I truly guess.) The problem is not so much "why" 1-person experience exist, but how they are related to 3-person description, and which one. How do *you* explain the relation? Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
Re: Functionalism and People as Programs
Le 03-juin-05, à 06:20, Lee Corbin a écrit : [Stephen:] What if "I", or any one else's 1st person aspect, can not be copied? If the operation of copying is impossible, what is the status of all of these thought experiments? I notice that many people seek refuge in the "no-copying" theorem of QM. Exercise: 1) Show by a qualitative informal reasoning that if we are Turing emulable then a no-cloning theorem is a necessity. Show more precisely that IF I am duplicable at some description level THEN if I observe myself below that substitution level I will discover that I am made from "object" relying on an infinity (a continuum) of information states/histories (hardly duplicable "stuff"). Hint: (re)read the UDA. Exercise 2) (For Stephen :) Show that the 1-person is not 1-duplicable, show that it is not even 1-nameable. (This can be done also by a qualitative informal reasoning, but it is also beautifully obtainable with G and G*, S4Grz, ...) Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
Existence of Copies (was RE: Functionalism and People as Programs)
Stephen writes > > Stephen writes > > > > > I really do not want to be a stick-in-the-mud here, but > > > what do we base the idea that "copies" could exist upon? Don't worry about not going along with someone's program ;-) I think that you're just being polite by calling yourself a stick-in-the-mud. Why, if I had to interpose such a disclaimer every time that I was stubborn and mule-headed, 90% of my posts would be consist of nothing but apologies!! :-) To prevent most of us from feeling inadquate, you should suppress some of your southern politeness in these discussions :-) > > It is a conjecture called "functionalism" (or one of its close variants). > > I guess the "strong AI" view is that the mind can be emulated on a > > computer. And yes, just because many people believe this---not > > surprisingly many computer scientists---does not [necessarily] > > make it true. [though I myself (Lee and his copies) believe it] > > [SPK] > > I am aware of those ideas and they seem, at least to me, to be supported > by an article of Faith and not any kind of empirical evidence. Maybe that is > why I have such an allergy to the conjecture. ;-) Well for Pete's sake! Of *course* there is some faith here---as you wryly note, you yourself are hardly exempt from indulging in a little (or a lot) of speculation. What you have written is not even an argument. Whereas what Brent Meeker wrote "I think there is considerable evidence to support the view that human level intelligence could be achieved by a (non-quantum) computer and that human intelligence and consciousness are dependent on brain processes; e.g. see the many studies of brain damaged patients. Also, I think it is well established that consciousness corresponds to only a small part of the information processing in the brain. definitely constitutes a strong argument, even if from your point of view it does not constitute evidence. (Thanks, Brent!) > >[LC] > > An aspect of this belief is that a robot could act indistinguishably > > from humans. At first glance, this seems plausible enough; certainly > > many early 20th century SF writers thought it reasonable. Even Searle > > concedes that such a robot could at least appear intelligent and > > thoughtful to Chinese speakers. > > > > I suspect that Turing also believed it: after all, he proposed that > > a program one day behave indistinguishably from humans. And why not, > > exactly? After all, the robot undertakes actions, performs calculations, > > has internal states, and should be able to execute a repertoire as fine > > as that of any human. Unless there is some devastating reason to the > > contrary. > > [SPK] > > What I seem to rest my skepticism upon is the fact that in all of these > considerations there remains, tacitly or not, the assumption that these > "internal states" have an entity "to whom" they have a particular valuation. This is the central problem from those who are deeply concerned as to *why* 1st person experiences exist. Too bad that to me, it's just obvious that they must. I literally cannot conceive of how it could be different! (Poor me, I suppose---in some ways some of us just have too little imagination, I truly guess.) > I see this expressed in the MWI, more precisely, in the "relative state" way > of thinking within an overall QM multiverse. Okay; On closer reading, I think that you are talking about the way that many people cannot stand MWI because it seems to require that they observe both outcomes of an experiment. > Additionally, we are still embroiled in debate over the > sufficiency of a Turing Test to give us reasonable certainty > to claim that we can reduce 1st person aspects from 3rd > person, Searle's Chinese Room being one example. > > >> What if "I", or any one else's 1st person aspect, can not be copied? > >> If the operation of copying is impossible, what is the status of all > >> of these thought experiments? > > > > I notice that many people seek refuge in the "no-copying" theorem of > > QM. Well, for them, I have that automobile travel also precludes > > survival. I can prove that to enter an automobile, drive it somewhere, > > and then exit the automobile invariably changes the quantum state of > > the person so reckless as to do it. > > [SPK] > > Come on, Lee, your trying to evade the argument. ;-) Am not! If the shoe doesn't fit, then don't wear it. I thought (mistakenly, it appears) that you were seeking refuge in the no-clone QM theorem. Sorry for the misattribution. What you are saying---PLEASE CORRECT ME IF I AM WRONG---is that copying just might not be possible at all. But I don't understand! Surely you admit that it is conceivable that a machine might scan your brain and body and create a duplicate. (As I say, it doesn't have to be **exact**.) But didn't you see it happen many times on Star Trek? Or were you in the other room (as I often was) vi
RE: Functionalism and People as Programs
At 12:36 PM 6/4/2005, Lee Corbin wrote: R. Miller writes > Lee Corbin wrote: > > Exposure to a nuclear detonation at 4000 yds typically kills about 1 in a > million cells. When that happens, you die. I would suggest that is a bad > metaphor. Well, my numbers, above, are *entirely* different from yours. One in a million cells is a *terrible* loss. But one atom? There are 10^14 atoms per cell. (And 10^14 cells in a typical human.) I would stick with my numbers. But in case you are somehow right, and that each cell would be wrecked by the loss of a single atom, my point can be made by relaxing the numbers: replace what I've written by "I'll be happy to teleport even if 100 trillion atoms are destroyed: a whole cell, gone". Lee, As I indicated earlier, I was out to lunch on that one-in-a-million cells/atoms deal. As I understand it, one cell killed out of a million is lethal, however. R.
RE: Functionalism and People as Programs
R. Miller writes > Lee Corbin wrote: > >Stephen writes > > > > > I really do not want to be a stick-in-the-mud here, > > > but what do we base the idea that "copies" could > > > exist upon? > > > > It is a conjecture called "functionalism" (or one of its close variants). > > "Functionalism," at least, in the social sciences refers to the proposition > that everything exists because it has a function (use). Well, that is *not* at all the meaning of the term in philosophy. To put it simply, "if it behaves like a duck in every particular, it is a duck". > I notice that many people seek refuge in the "no-copying" theorem of > QM. Well, for them, I have that automobile travel also precludes > survival. I can prove that to enter an automobile, drive it somewhere, > and then exit the automobile invariably changes the quantum state of > the person so reckless as to do it. > > >If someone can teleport me back and forth from work to home, I'll > >be happy to go along even if 1 atom in every thousand cells of mine > >doesn't get copied. > > Exposure to a nuclear detonation at 4000 yds typically kills about 1 in a > million cells. When that happens, you die. I would suggest that is a bad > metaphor. Well, my numbers, above, are *entirely* different from yours. One in a million cells is a *terrible* loss. But one atom? There are 10^14 atoms per cell. (And 10^14 cells in a typical human.) I would stick with my numbers. But in case you are somehow right, and that each cell would be wrecked by the loss of a single atom, my point can be made by relaxing the numbers: replace what I've written by "I'll be happy to teleport even if 100 trillion atoms are destroyed: a whole cell, gone". Lee P.S. Thanks for the interesting fact that death of 1/10^6 cells kills one.
Re: Functionalism and People as Programs
At 10:58 PM 6/3/2005, you wrote: R. Miller writes (quoting Lee Corbin): If someone can teleport me back and forth from work to home, I'll be happy to go along even if 1 atom in every thousand cells of mine doesn't get copied. Exposure to a nuclear detonation at 4000 yds typically kills about 1 in a million cells. When that happens, you die. I would suggest that is a bad metaphor. Losing one atom in every thousand cells is not the same as losing the cell itself. Cells are a constant work in progress. Bits fall off, transcription errors occur in the process of making proteins, radiation or noxious chemicals damage subcellular components, and so on. The machinery of the cell is constantly at work repairing all this damage. It is like a building project where the builders only just manage to keep up with the wreckers. Eventually, errors accumulate or the blueprints are corrupted and the cell dies. Taking the organism as a whole, the effect of all this activity is like the ship of Theseus: over time, even though it looks like the same organism, almost all the matter in it has been replaced. That's correct, of course. I'm finishing up a book on nuclear fallout, and most of my selves were obviously immersed in radiation issues rather than simple mathematics. Sorry. RM
Re: Functionalism and People as Programs
R. Miller writes (quoting Lee Corbin): If someone can teleport me back and forth from work to home, I'll be happy to go along even if 1 atom in every thousand cells of mine doesn't get copied. Exposure to a nuclear detonation at 4000 yds typically kills about 1 in a million cells. When that happens, you die. I would suggest that is a bad metaphor. Losing one atom in every thousand cells is not the same as losing the cell itself. Cells are a constant work in progress. Bits fall off, transcription errors occur in the process of making proteins, radiation or noxious chemicals damage subcellular components, and so on. The machinery of the cell is constantly at work repairing all this damage. It is like a building project where the builders only just manage to keep up with the wreckers. Eventually, errors accumulate or the blueprints are corrupted and the cell dies. Taking the organism as a whole, the effect of all this activity is like the ship of Theseus: over time, even though it looks like the same organism, almost all the matter in it has been replaced. --Stathis Papaioannou _ FREE pop-up blocking with the new MSN Toolbar get it now! http://toolbar.msn.click-url.com/go/onm00200415ave/direct/01/
RE: Functionalism and People as Programs
>-Original Message- >From: Stephen Paul King [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] >Sent: Friday, June 03, 2005 3:16 PM >To: everything-list@eskimo.com >Subject: Re: Functionalism and People as Programs > > >Dear Lee, > >- Original Message - >From: "Lee Corbin" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> >To: "EverythingList" >Sent: Friday, June 03, 2005 12:20 AM >Subject: Functionalism and People as Programs > > >> Stephen writes >> >>> I really do not want to be a stick-in-the-mud here, but what do we >>> base >>> the idea that "copies" could exist upon? >> >> It is a conjecture called "functionalism" (or one of its close variants). >> I guess the "strong AI" view is that the mind can be emulated on a >> computer. And yes, just because many people believe this---not >> surprisingly >> many computer scientists---does not make it true. > >[SPK] > >I am aware of those ideas and they seem, at least to me, to be supported >by an article of Faith and not any kind of empirical evidence. Maybe that is >why I have such an allergy to the conjecture. ;-) I think there is considerable evidence to support the view that human level intelligence could be achieved by a (non-quantum) computer and that human intelligence and consciousness are dependent on brain processes; e.g. see the many studies of brain damaged patients. Also, I think it is well established that consciousness corresponds to only a small part of the information processing in the brain. That's something that bother's mean about the discussion of "observer moments" with the implication that only the conscious "observation" matters. > >>[LC] >> An aspect of this belief is that a robot could act indistinguishably >> from humans. At first glance, this seems plausible enough; certainly >> many early 20th century SF writers thought it reasonable. Even Searle >> concedes that such a robot could at least appear intelligent and >> thoughtful to Chinese speakers. >> >> I suspect that Turing also believed it: after all, he proposed that >> a program one day behave indistinguishably from humans. Interestingly, Turing's actual proposal was to test whether a computer do as well posing as a woman as could a man. >And why not, >> exactly? After all, the robot undertakes actions, performs calculations, >> has internal states, and should be able to execute a repertoire as fine >> as that of any human. Unless there is some devastating reason to the >> contrary. > >[SPK] > >What I seem to rest my skepticism upon is the fact that in all of these >considerations there remains, tacitly or not, the assumption that these >"internal states" have an entity "to whom" they have a particular valuation. >I see this expressed in the MWI, more precisely, in the "relative state" way >of thinking within an overall QM multiverse. Additionally, we are still >embroiled in debate over the sufficiency of a Turing Test to give us >reasonable certainty to claim that we can reduce 1st person aspects from 3rd >person, Searle's Chinese Room being one example. > >>> What if "I", or any one else's 1st person aspect, can not be copied? >>> If the operation of copying is impossible, what is the status of all >>> of these thought experiments? I agree that for copying to be successful requires that what is copied is something classical. Tegmark makes more than an argument that brain processes are classical, he makes a calculation, quant-ph/9907009. So I don't think that's an in-principle barrier to copying. However, there might be other limits based on thermal noise etc that forbid copying finer than some crude level. >> >> I notice that many people seek refuge in the "no-copying" theorem of >> QM. Well, for them, I have that automobile travel also precludes >> survival. I can prove that to enter an automobile, drive it somewhere, >> and then exit the automobile invariably changes the quantum state of >> the person so reckless as to do it. > >[SPK] > >Come on, Lee, your trying to evade the argument. ;-) > >> [LC] >> If someone can teleport me back and forth from work to home, I'll >> be happy to go along even if 1 atom in every thousand cells of mine >> doesn't get copied. Moreover---I am not really picky about the exact >> bound state of each atom, just so long as it is able to perform the >> role approximately expected of it. (That is, go ahead and remove any >> carbon atom you like, and replace it by another carbon atom in a >> differen
Re: Functionalism and People as Programs
Dear Lee, - Original Message - From: "Lee Corbin" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> To: "EverythingList" Sent: Friday, June 03, 2005 12:20 AM Subject: Functionalism and People as Programs Stephen writes I really do not want to be a stick-in-the-mud here, but what do we base the idea that "copies" could exist upon? It is a conjecture called "functionalism" (or one of its close variants). I guess the "strong AI" view is that the mind can be emulated on a computer. And yes, just because many people believe this---not surprisingly many computer scientists---does not make it true. [SPK] I am aware of those ideas and they seem, at least to me, to be supported by an article of Faith and not any kind of empirical evidence. Maybe that is why I have such an allergy to the conjecture. ;-) [LC] An aspect of this belief is that a robot could act indistinguishably from humans. At first glance, this seems plausible enough; certainly many early 20th century SF writers thought it reasonable. Even Searle concedes that such a robot could at least appear intelligent and thoughtful to Chinese speakers. I suspect that Turing also believed it: after all, he proposed that a program one day behave indistinguishably from humans. And why not, exactly? After all, the robot undertakes actions, performs calculations, has internal states, and should be able to execute a repertoire as fine as that of any human. Unless there is some devastating reason to the contrary. [SPK] What I seem to rest my skepticism upon is the fact that in all of these considerations there remains, tacitly or not, the assumption that these "internal states" have an entity "to whom" they have a particular valuation. I see this expressed in the MWI, more precisely, in the "relative state" way of thinking within an overall QM multiverse. Additionally, we are still embroiled in debate over the sufficiency of a Turing Test to give us reasonable certainty to claim that we can reduce 1st person aspects from 3rd person, Searle's Chinese Room being one example. What if "I", or any one else's 1st person aspect, can not be copied? If the operation of copying is impossible, what is the status of all of these thought experiments? I notice that many people seek refuge in the "no-copying" theorem of QM. Well, for them, I have that automobile travel also precludes survival. I can prove that to enter an automobile, drive it somewhere, and then exit the automobile invariably changes the quantum state of the person so reckless as to do it. [SPK] Come on, Lee, your trying to evade the argument. ;-) [LC] If someone can teleport me back and forth from work to home, I'll be happy to go along even if 1 atom in every thousand cells of mine doesn't get copied. Moreover---I am not really picky about the exact bound state of each atom, just so long as it is able to perform the role approximately expected of it. (That is, go ahead and remove any carbon atom you like, and replace it by another carbon atom in a different state.) [SPK] If you care to look into teleportation, as it has been researched so far, it has been shown that the "original" - that system or state of a system - that is teleported is not copied like some Xerox of an original document. http://www.research.ibm.com/quantuminfo/teleportation/ Such can not be done because *all* of the information about the system or state must be simultaneously measured and that act itself destroys the original. If *all* of the information is not measured, then one is not copying or teleporting, one is just measurering. This is not overly complicated! If, and this is a HUGE if, there is some thing irreducibly quantum mechanical to this "1st person aspect" then it follows from QM that copying is not allowed. Neither a quantum state nor a "qubit" can be copied without destroying the "original". This is being awfully picky about permissible transformations. I have even survived mild blows to the head, which have enormously changed my quantum state. [SPK] Again, you are begging the point! The impact of air molecules change one's quantum state! Perhaps we are stuck on this because we are assuming a "still frame by still frame" kind of representation of the situation. The quantum state of a system is continuously changing, that is why there is a variable "t" in the Schroedinger eqation for a wavefunction! I am commenting about the absurdity of copying the quantum mechanical system itself, or some subset or trace of it, other that that implied by the rules of QM. falsified, by the same experiments that unassailably imply that Nature is, at its core, Quantum Mechanical and not Classical and thus one wonders: "Why do we persist in this state of denial?&qu
Re: Functionalism and People as Programs
At 11:20 PM 6/2/2005, Lee Corbin wrote: Stephen writes > I really do not want to be a stick-in-the-mud here, but what do we base > the idea that "copies" could exist upon? It is a conjecture called "functionalism" (or one of its close variants). "Functionalism," at least, in the social sciences refers to the proposition that everything exists because it has a function (use). When that notion came under attack in the 1960s, structural functionalists responded that some things have "latent functions"--uses that we have yet to divine. Functionalism follows Scholasticism which follows teleology. Not particularly good science---or at least, not *modern* science. > What if "I", or any one else's 1st person aspect, can not be copied? > If the operation of copying is impossible, what is the status of all > of these thought experiments? Still pretty robust. If you accept that a chronon has a dimension equal to about 10^-43 seconds, then you'd have to concede that we exist as a "deck" of copies through time. No big deal, but we ARE copies of the individual we were 1 x 10-^43 seconds ago. If not, where's the "glue"? I notice that many people seek refuge in the "no-copying" theorem of QM. Well, for them, I have that automobile travel also precludes survival. I can prove that to enter an automobile, drive it somewhere, and then exit the automobile invariably changes the quantum state of the person so reckless as to do it. If someone can teleport me back and forth from work to home, I'll be happy to go along even if 1 atom in every thousand cells of mine doesn't get copied. Exposure to a nuclear detonation at 4000 yds typically kills about 1 in a million cells. When that happens, you die. I would suggest that is a bad metaphor. Moreover---I am not really picky about the exact bound state of each atom, just so long as it is able to perform the role approximately expected of it. Structural functionalism. When physicists converse at a bar, they talk the language of sociology. (That is, go ahead and remove any carbon atom you like, and replace it by another carbon atom in a different state.) > If, and this is a HUGE if, there is some thing irreducibly quantum > mechanical to this "1st person aspect" then it follows from QM that copying > is not allowed. Neither a quantum state nor a "qubit" can be copied without > destroying the "original". What if there is *no* original copy? Those that are familiar with Photoshop would probably argue that each layer created is still an integral part of the image. If you accept Cramer's transactional model, then what *will* take place in the future will affect the state of the past. You don't suppose Julian Barbour is on to something? R. Miller
Functionalism and People as Programs
Stephen writes > I really do not want to be a stick-in-the-mud here, but what do we base > the idea that "copies" could exist upon? It is a conjecture called "functionalism" (or one of its close variants). I guess the "strong AI" view is that the mind can be emulated on a computer. And yes, just because many people believe this---not surprisingly many computer scientists---does not make it true. An aspect of this belief is that a robot could act indistinguishably from humans. At first glance, this seems plausible enough; certainly many early 20th century SF writers thought it reasonable. Even Searle concedes that such a robot could at least appear intelligent and thoughtful to Chinese speakers. I suspect that Turing also believed it: after all, he proposed that a program one day behave indistinguishably from humans. And why not, exactly? After all, the robot undertakes actions, performs calculations, has internal states, and should be able to execute a repertoire as fine as that of any human. Unless there is some devastating reason to the contrary. > What if "I", or any one else's 1st person aspect, can not be copied? > If the operation of copying is impossible, what is the status of all > of these thought experiments? I notice that many people seek refuge in the "no-copying" theorem of QM. Well, for them, I have that automobile travel also precludes survival. I can prove that to enter an automobile, drive it somewhere, and then exit the automobile invariably changes the quantum state of the person so reckless as to do it. If someone can teleport me back and forth from work to home, I'll be happy to go along even if 1 atom in every thousand cells of mine doesn't get copied. Moreover---I am not really picky about the exact bound state of each atom, just so long as it is able to perform the role approximately expected of it. (That is, go ahead and remove any carbon atom you like, and replace it by another carbon atom in a different state.) > If, and this is a HUGE if, there is some thing irreducibly quantum > mechanical to this "1st person aspect" then it follows from QM that copying > is not allowed. Neither a quantum state nor a "qubit" can be copied without > destroying the "original". This is being awfully picky about permissible transformations. I have even survived mild blows to the head, which have enormously changed my quantum state. > falsified, by the same experiments that unassailably imply that Nature is, > at its core, Quantum Mechanical and not Classical and thus one wonders: "Why > do we persist in this state of denial?" Probably for the same reason that some people continue to be Libertarians. It's a belief thing---the way you see the world. Lee
