Re: Max Tegmark: The Mathematical Universe

2007-09-21 Thread Russell Standish

I haven't read Max's latest epistle yet, but I feel the need to
respond to your points here.

On Fri, Sep 21, 2007 at 05:50:12AM -, [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
> 
> It appears to me that to attempt to reduce everything to pure math
> runs the risk of a lapse into pure Idealism, the idea that reality is
> 'mind created'.  Since math is all about knowledge, a successful
> attempt to derive physics from math would appear to mean that there's
> nothing external to 'mind' itself.  As I said, there seems to be a
> slippery slipe into solipsism/idealism here."
> 

The Anthropic Principle prevents the slide into solipsism of an
idealist theory. The argument is a little subtle, but I'll try to
recap. Basically observed reality cannot be completely arbitrary, as
it must be consistent with the observer being embedded in the observed
reality. Quite why this should be so in an idealist setting is a
little mysterious, but is presumably a requirement of consciousness.

> ---
> 
> Another major problem is this idea of pure 'baggage free' description
> that Max talks about (the removal of all references to obervables ,
> leaving only abstract relations).  The problem with this , is that, by
> definition, it cannot possibly explain any observables we actually
> see.  Notions of space and agency (fundamental to our empirical
> descriptions), cannot be derived from pure mathematics, since these
> notions involve attaching additional 'non-mathematical' notions to the
> pure mathematics.  As I pointed out in another recent thread on this
> thread, the distinctions required for physical and teleological
> explanations of the world appear to be incommensurable with
> mathematical notions.  We cannot possibly explain anything about the
> empirical reality we actually observe without attaching additional
> *non-mathematical* notions to the mathematics.
> 

I suspect this comes from limitations in one's imagination of
mathematical structures. For me, maths is all about compression,
detecting regularities in systems. I think this leads onto your point below
about considering OO systems to be mathematical.

> 
> ---
> 
> There are yet more problems with Max's ideas.  For instance, he says
> in the New Scientist article that: 'mathematical relations, are by
> definition eternal and outside space and time'.  Certainly, there have
> to be *some* mathematical notions that are indeed eternal and platonic
> (if one believes in arthematical realism), but it also makes sense to
> talk about some kinds of mathematical objects that exist *inside*
> space-time and are not static.  As I pointed out in another thread
> here, implemented algoithms (instantiated computations) are equivalent
> to *dynamic* mathematical objects which exist *inside* space-time:
> 

Indeed, how the "inside view" of a mathematical structure relates to
the external view of the structure is unclear. There is a bit of the
same problem with Bruno's AUDA too. But there must be such a relationship...

> "Let us now apply a unique new perspective on mathematics - we shall
> now attempt to view mathematics through the lens of the object
> oriented framework.  That is to say, consider mathematics as we would
> try to model it using object oriented programming - what the classes,
> methods and objects of math?  This is a rather un-usual way of
> looking
> at math.  Mathematical entities, if they are considered in this way
> at
> all, are not regarded as 'Objects' (things with state, identity and
> behaviours) but merely as static class properties.  For instance the
> math classes in the Java libraries consist of static (class)
> variables
> and class methods.
> 

See above..


...
-- 


A/Prof Russell Standish  Phone 0425 253119 (mobile)
Mathematics  
UNSW SYDNEY 2052 [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Australiahttp://www.hpcoders.com.au


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Re: Max Tegmark: The Mathematical Universe

2007-09-20 Thread marc . geddes

Max himself posted about this on the everything-list here:
http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list/browse_thread/thread/7da9934267f64acf/690ccf0715150a36#690ccf0715150a36

A popular article  was also the feature in last week's 'New
Scientist':
http://www.newscientist.com/channel/fundamentals/mg19526210.500-mathematical-cosmos-reality-by-numbers.html

---

Now is a good time for me to summarize my objections once again.

As I said recently to Bruno, here's the problem with the idea that
everything is mathematics:

"I think we need to draw a careful distinction between the *process*
of
reasoning itself, and the external entities that reasoning is *about*
*(ie what it is that our theories are externally referencing).  When
you carefully examine what mathematics is all about, it seems that it
is all about *knowledge* (justified belief).  This is because math
appears to be the study of patterns and when meaning is ascribed to
be
these patterns, the result is knowledge.  So:
so Math <> Meaningful Patterns <> Knowledge.

Since math appears to be equivalent to knowledge itself, it is no
surprise that all explanations with real explanatory power must use
(or indirectly reference) mathematics.  That is to say, I think it's
true that the *process* of reasoning redcues to pure mathematics.
However, it does not follow that all the entities being *referenced*
(refered to) by mathematical theories, are themselves mathematical.


It appears to me that to attempt to reduce everything to pure math
runs the risk of a lapse into pure Idealism, the idea that reality is
'mind created'.  Since math is all about knowledge, a successful
attempt to derive physics from math would appear to mean that there's
nothing external to 'mind' itself.  As I said, there seems to be a
slippery slipe into solipsism/idealism here."

---

Another major problem is this idea of pure 'baggage free' description
that Max talks about (the removal of all references to obervables ,
leaving only abstract relations).  The problem with this , is that, by
definition, it cannot possibly explain any observables we actually
see.  Notions of space and agency (fundamental to our empirical
descriptions), cannot be derived from pure mathematics, since these
notions involve attaching additional 'non-mathematical' notions to the
pure mathematics.  As I pointed out in another recent thread on this
thread, the distinctions required for physical and teleological
explanations of the world appear to be incommensurable with
mathematical notions.  We cannot possibly explain anything about the
empirical reality we actually observe without attaching additional
*non-mathematical* notions to the mathematics.

"I've talked often about 'the three types of properties' (for my
property dualism) : Mathematical, Teleological and Physical.  These
three properties are based on three different kinds of distinction:


Mathematics:  The distinction is *model/reality* (or mind-body,
information, concept).
Teleology: The distinction is *observer/observerd* (self-
other
or 1st person/3rd person, intention)
Physics: The distinction is  *here/there* (space, geometry).


These are simply three  incommensurable types of distinction.  You
(believers in comp) can try to derieve the observer/observed and
here/
there distinctions from the model/reality distinction all you want,
you just won't succeed."



---

There are yet more problems with Max's ideas.  For instance, he says
in the New Scientist article that: 'mathematical relations, are by
definition eternal and outside space and time'.  Certainly, there have
to be *some* mathematical notions that are indeed eternal and platonic
(if one believes in arthematical realism), but it also makes sense to
talk about some kinds of mathematical objects that exist *inside*
space-time and are not static.  As I pointed out in another thread
here, implemented algoithms (instantiated computations) are equivalent
to *dynamic* mathematical objects which exist *inside* space-time:

"Let us now apply a unique new perspective on mathematics - we shall
now attempt to view mathematics through the lens of the object
oriented framework.  That is to say, consider mathematics as we would
try to model it using object oriented programming - what the classes,
methods and objects of math?  This is a rather un-usual way of
looking
at math.  Mathematical entities, if they are considered in this way
at
all, are not regarded as 'Objects' (things with state, identity and
behaviours) but merely as static class properties.  For instance the
math classes in the Java libraries consist of static (class)
variables
and class methods.

But consider instead that there could be mathematical 'objects' (in
the sense of entites with states, identities and behaviours).  What
could these mathematical 'objects' look like?  if there are
mathematical objects they have to be dynamic.  This conflicts with
standard platonic pictures of math as entities which are ete

Max Tegmark: The Mathematical Universe

2007-09-12 Thread Russell Standish

This arXiv paper should be of interest here.

- Forwarded message from "Yonatan Fishman, Ph.D." <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> -


Thought this would be of interest:
The Mathematical Universe
Authors: Max Tegmark

(Submitted on 5 Apr 2007)

Abstract: I explore physics implications of the External Reality Hypothesis 
(ERH) that there exists an external physical reality completely independent 
of us humans. I argue that with a sufficiently broad definition of 
mathematics, it implies the Mathematical Universe Hypothesis (MUH) that our 
physical world is an abstract mathematical structure. I discuss various 
implications of the ERH and MUH, ranging from standard physics topics like 
symmetries, irreducible representations, units, free parameters and initial 
conditions to broader issues like consciousness, parallel universes and 
Godel incompleteness. I hypothesize that only computable and decidable (in 
Godel's sense) structures exist, which alleviates the cosmological measure 
problem and help explain why our physical laws appear so simple. I also 
comment on the intimate relation between mathematical structures, 
computations, simulations and physical systems.

http://arxiv.org/abs/0704.0646

Yon

- End forwarded message -

-- 


A/Prof Russell Standish  Phone 0425 253119 (mobile)
Mathematics  
UNSW SYDNEY 2052 [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Australiahttp://www.hpcoders.com.au


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