RE: More on qualia of consciousness and occam's razor
; you might even be able to read the brain, scanning for neuronal activity and deducing correctly that the subject sees a red flash. However, it is impossible to know what it feels like to see a red flash unless you have the actual experience yourself. So I maintain that there is this extra bit of information -subjective experience or qualia - that you do not automatically have even if you know everything about the brain to an arbitrary level of precision. In what sense is a quale information? formalizing this might help me to understand your hypothesis better ben
Re: More on qualia of consciousness and occam's razor
Pete Carlton [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: [snip] Earlier there were posts about whether SAS-like patterns in a cellular automaton would really be conscious or not. It seems like this question is asking, I can see how the thing behaves, but what I want to know is, are the lights 'turned on inside' or not?. But we already know that there are no lights -- so what is the question really asking? You take the box/brain analogy to literally. If I rephrase the question as I can see how the thing behaves, but what I want to know is 'is there consciousness there?' . Would you still say But we already know that there are no consciousness -- so what the question is really asking?. Well my remark adds nothing in the sense that Eric Cavalcanti succeeds apparently to pinpoint the contradiction in Pete's post (through the use of Frank Jackson's colorblind Mary experiment). Nice piece of dialog. Actually I do think that the box/brain analogy is not so bad, once we agree to choose another topology for the information space, but for this I need the modal theory of knowledge S4 ... Well, the box/brain analogy *does* lead to wrong statements, and indeed it occurs again in Eric Cavalcanti and Stathis Papaioannou later reply in that thread! Look: Stathis Papaioannou wrote (and Eric Cavalcanti did assess it) Actually, you probably _could_ drive your brain into seeing red if you knew exactly what physical processes occur in the brain in response to a red stimulus, and if you had appropriate neural interface equipment. Such capabilities do not currently exist - not even close - but the idea is the basis of many SF stories (eg. William Gibson, Greg Egan). The same sort of thing frequently occurs naturally: the definition of a hallucination is a perception without the stimulus that would normally give rise to that perception. The point is, even if you knew in perfect detail what happens in your brain when you see red, you would not actually know/feel/experience the qualia unless you ran the software on your own hardware. Of course I mainly agree with Stathis here, and with Eric's assessment, but Stathis formulates it in just the way which makes people abusing the box analogy. Indeed, the only way to actually know/feel/experience the qualia is to run the right software, which really *defines* the owner. The choice of hardware makes no difference. The owner of the hardware makes no difference. This is because the owner is really defined by the (running) software. To be even more exact, there is eventually no need for running the software, because eventually the box itself is a construction of the mind, and is defined by the (possible) software/owner. That illustrates also that you cannot see blue as someone else sees blue by running the [someone else's software] on your hardware, because if you run [someone else's software] on your hardware, you will just duplicate that someone-else, and your hardware will become [someone else's hardware!] And *you* will just disappear (locally). Bruno
Re: More on qualia of consciousness and occam's razor
Hi Bruno, - Original Message - From: Bruno Marchal [EMAIL PROTECTED] You take the box/brain analogy to literally. If I rephrase the question as I can see how the thing behaves, but what I want to know is 'is there consciousness there?' . Would you still say But we already know that there are no consciousness -- so what the question is really asking?. Well my remark adds nothing in the sense that Eric Cavalcanti succeeds apparently to pinpoint the contradiction in Pete's post (through the use of Frank Jackson's colorblind Mary experiment). Nice piece of dialog. Actually I do think that the box/brain analogy is not so bad, once we agree to choose another topology for the information space, but for this I need the modal theory of knowledge S4 ... I would love to read more about that. Where can I find a good reference? Of course I mainly agree with Stathis here, and with Eric's assessment, but Stathis formulates it in just the way which makes people abusing the box analogy. Indeed, the only way to actually know/feel/experience the qualia is to run the right software, which really *defines* the owner. The choice of hardware makes no difference. The owner of the hardware makes no difference. This is because the owner is really defined by the (running) software. To be even more exact, there is eventually no need for running the software, because eventually the box itself is a construction of the mind, and is defined by the (possible) software/owner. That illustrates also that you cannot see blue as someone else sees blue by running the [someone else's software] on your hardware, because if you run [someone else's software] on your hardware, you will just duplicate that someone-else, and your hardware will become [someone else's hardware!] And *you* will just disappear (locally). Well, that's just where I guess we come to disagree... :) I am still not sure I believe comp, so I am not yet sure I agree that the hardware doesn't matter at all... Or at least not in that strong sense that one can expect to experience a copy of oneself elsewhere. I am not even sure what 'one' means here... So many doubts... :) -Eric.
Re: More on qualia of consciousness and occam's razor
Bruno Marchal wrote on 17 Feb 04: QUOTE- Stathis Papaioannou wrote (and Eric Cavalcanti did assess it) Actually, you probably _could_ drive your brain into seeing red if you knew exactly what physical processes occur in the brain in response to a red stimulus, and if you had appropriate neural interface equipment. Such capabilities do not currently exist - not even close - but the idea is the basis of many SF stories (eg. William Gibson, Greg Egan). The same sort of thing frequently occurs naturally: the definition of a hallucination is a perception without the stimulus that would normally give rise to that perception. The point is, even if you knew in perfect detail what happens in your brain when you see red, you would not actually know/feel/experience the qualia unless you ran the software on your own hardware. Of course I mainly agree with Stathis here, and with Eric's assessment, but Stathis formulates it in just the way which makes people abusing the box analogy. Indeed, the only way to actually know/feel/experience the qualia is to run the right software, which really *defines* the owner. The choice of hardware makes no difference. The owner of the hardware makes no difference. This is because the owner is really defined by the (running) software. To be even more exact, there is eventually no need for running the software, because eventually the box itself is a construction of the mind, and is defined by the (possible) software/owner. That illustrates also that you cannot see blue as someone else sees blue by running the [someone else's software] on your hardware, because if you run [someone else's software] on your hardware, you will just duplicate that someone-else, and your hardware will become [someone else's hardware!] And *you* will just disappear (locally). Bruno -ENDQUOTE Well yes, the mind IS the software. I am reminded of a frequent discussion I have with schizophrenic patients who have improved on medication and then think they no longer need it. I warn them that on other occasions when they have done this their delusions have returned and they have ended up in hospital, to be restabilised on antipsychotic medication. That will never happen again, they confidently say, because I now know those thoughts were crazy, and if they recur, I will be able to think rationally and hence dismiss them. Now, a psychotic delusion occurs(due to complex and poorly understood neurochemical pathology) precisely because the mind/brain dysfunction causes the patient to think IRrationally; so what are they going to use to talk their ailing mind into seeing sense again? We may have an extra kidney and lung for backup, but we only have one brain! Yet this is how many people (not just the mentally ill) seem to see it: that they have this magical I which can stand back and assess things no matter what is actually going on inside their heads - as if they don't really believe they think with their brain at all. Stathis Papaioannou Melbourne, Australia _ Hot chart ringtones and polyphonics. Go to http://ninemsn.com.au/mobilemania/default.asp
Re: More on qualia of consciousness and occam's razor
At 09:21 17/02/04 -0300, Eric Cavalcanti wrote: snip (through the use of Frank Jackson's colorblind Mary experiment). Nice piece of dialog. Actually I do think that the box/brain analogy is not so bad, once we agree to choose another topology for the information space, but for this I need the modal theory of knowledge S4 ... I would love to read more about that. Where can I find a good reference? I will think about it. There is the B.F. CHELLAS 1980 book introducing modal logic which is very good as a textbook without much motivations. The new edition of Hugues and Creswell is simpler and provides more explanation. Van Benthem's guide on intensional logics gives more philosophical motivation, but not so much proof. Boolos 79 is rather good for modal logic, but only with the Godelian motivation. Mmmmh... Of course I mainly agree with Stathis here, and with Eric's assessment, but Stathis formulates it in just the way which makes people abusing the box analogy. Indeed, the only way to actually know/feel/experience the qualia is to run the right software, which really *defines* the owner. The choice of hardware makes no difference. The owner of the hardware makes no difference. This is because the owner is really defined by the (running) software. To be even more exact, there is eventually no need for running the software, because eventually the box itself is a construction of the mind, and is defined by the (possible) software/owner. That illustrates also that you cannot see blue as someone else sees blue by running the [someone else's software] on your hardware, because if you run [someone else's software] on your hardware, you will just duplicate that someone-else, and your hardware will become [someone else's hardware!] And *you* will just disappear (locally). Well, that's just where I guess we come to disagree... :) I am still not sure I believe comp, Good! Comp is really unbelievable, especially by sound machines ... (of course this should be nuanced especially because here believe is very informal). But nobody should believe that I believe in comp, I believe that comp is fascinating, no more. Well if my work is correct then we can also believe that comp is refutable. so I am not yet sure I agree that the hardware doesn't matter at all... Or at least not in that strong sense that one can expect to experience a copy of oneself elsewhere. I am not even sure what 'one' means here... So many doubts... :) Just in case you find the time, it could help me to better understand your position if you tell me where in the UDA reasoning you would disagree: for example in the conversation with Joel Dobrzelewski: UDA step 1 http://www.escribe.com/science/theory/m2971.html UDA step 2-6 http://www.escribe.com/science/theory/m2978.html UDA step 7 8 http://www.escribe.com/science/theory/m2992.html UDA step 9 10 http://www.escribe.com/science/theory/m2998.html UDA last question http://www.escribe.com/science/theory/m3005.html Joel 1-2-3 http://www.escribe.com/science/theory/m3013.html Re: UDA... http://www.escribe.com/science/theory/m3019.html George'sigh http://www.escribe.com/science/theory/m3026.html Re:UDA... http://www.escribe.com/science/theory/m3035.html Joel's nagging question http://www.escribe.com/science/theory/m3038.html Re:UDA... http://www.escribe.com/science/theory/m3042.html I say this because an _expression_ like the hardware matters is rather ambiguous It could help you to understand why you don't believe in comp :) Or why you have many doubts. With comp doubts can only grow ... Bruno
Re: More on qualia of consciousness and occam's razor
Pete, I hope you don't mind my replying to the list. - Original Message - From: Pete Carlton [EMAIL PROTECTED] But even this goes way out in front of what we can possibly know. You say we have no idea what these feelings are like to experience--but why should we assume we even are entitled to ask this question? And why assume that we are not? I prefer not to have my right to ask waived. If I cannot ask it, then I should understand why not, and that would be an answer in a way. At first it seems like a normal question to ask, because we have a way of talking about our experiences that takes them to be simple entities, and why not ask what it is like for other beings? But you're asking the question in the same manner (using the same logical form) as when one asks what's inside a box, and expecting the same kind of answer. But the two cases are conceptually distinct. We are well acquainted with boxes and their contents, and thus have every right to ask what's inside when we see a box. But we have no such acquaintance with minds. I have only followed the analogy. But of course I am aware that the analogy is loose and that we cannot ask about qualia in the same manner as about the contents of a box. I may have overstated a bit -- of course anyone has the right to ask any question they want! =) But when we explore the consequences of consciousness in a multiverse, as this list often does, we shouldn't overlook the fact that there are many views of consciousness and some may lead to fewer problems than others. Earlier there were posts about whether SAS-like patterns in a cellular automaton would really be conscious or not. It seems like this question is asking, I can see how the thing behaves, but what I want to know is, are the lights 'turned on inside' or not?. But we already know that there are no lights -- so what is the question really asking? Maybe we can get away with ignoring questions like this, and have a better universe model as a result. I don't agree that we already know that there are no lights. The thing is that we know what it feels like to be conscious. We know what is the difference between red and blue, and we know we cannot communicate that to someone who cannot see. It is not as if we were unconscious beings asking if there was something like 'qualia' (which we would have no idea about) in the cellular automata. We are not merely inventing concepts which have no correspondence in the real world. Each of us knows exactly what it means, and talk about these things using the assumption that other similar beings have experiences similar to our own. The fact that we try to ask this question in the first place implies that there is something there to be explained, at least. snip know what is inside it. Now what is the logical conclusion here: a) There may or may not be something in the box. b) There's definitely something in the box, and I have absolutely no idea what it is. What on earth could possibly make someone conclude (b) here? It's not logical at all. Yet this is what people conclude when they bend over backwards talking about qualia and how ineffable they are. And you seem to conclude a (c) hypothesis: there is definitely nothing inside the box. I stay with (a). And to try to find out if there is something there or not, we need to talk about it, and qualia is the word for the hypothetical contents of the box. That would be correct if the analogy between boxes and minds were sound, but I don't think it is, and that's the point of bringing it up. About the only thing you can conclude is that something strange is going on because these people insist you can't know what's inside a box. You're right, though, I don't exactly embrace (a), I question the entire setup. Neither do I think the analogy is sound, as I said above. Suppose a blind man did understand all the chain of events that lead from the light reaching the eyes to the retina, then to the brain and finally to the qualia of red. Would he see the red? Why not? Where is the path from the brain to the qualia of red? You're saying that the blind man is aware of trillions of neural changes occurring over time, and that at some point he can say, Now, here's where things leave the brain and start to become qualia... Is this before or after the neural changes that modify behavior, i.e., to cause someone to say, I'm seeing red now? I have no idea. I don't claim to understand how qualia arises. In any case, I grant that the blind man's experience would be quite different from someone who's actually looking at the color red. This is just because the functional states of someone who is seeing red are different than those of someone who just understands what it's like-- you can't stimulate your optic nerve just by will alone. It isn't clear that someone could drive
Re: More on qualia of consciousness and occam's razor
Eric Cavalcanti wrote: BEGINQUOTE- Pete Carlton wrote: In any case, I grant that the blind man's experience would be quite different from someone who's actually looking at the color red. This is just because the functional states of someone who is seeing red are different than those of someone who just understands what it's like-- you can't stimulate your optic nerve just by will alone. It isn't clear that someone could drive their brain into the state of someone who had seen red merely by understanding everything about the process of seeing red. This is also how I respond to Frank Jackson's colorblind Mary experiment.. So you agree that you cannot drive someone's brain into the state of someone who had seen red merely by understanding everything about the process of seeing red.. That is, you agree that you cannot see red unless you do physically see red. Isn't that somehow in contradiction with your claim below, i.e., that there is nothing else to know beyond the explanation of the physiological response? One thing you seem to agree: you cannot know how red looks like unless you see red. A blind man cannot possibly know that. Now I am aware that know may not be the correct term. Maybe experience would be better. -ENDQUOTE Actually, you probably _could_ drive your brain into seeing red if you knew exactly what physical processes occur in the brain in response to a red stimulus, and if you had appropriate neural interface equipment. Such capabilities do not currently exist - not even close - but the idea is the basis of many SF stories (eg. William Gibson, Greg Egan). The same sort of thing frequently occurs naturally: the definition of a hallucination is a perception without the stimulus that would normally give rise to that perception. The point is, even if you knew in perfect detail what happens in your brain when you see red, you would not actually know/feel/experience the qualia unless you ran the software on your own hardware. Stathis. _ Protect your inbox from harmful viruses with new ninemsn Premium. Click here http://ninemsn.com.au/premium/landing.asp
Re: More on qualia of consciousness and occam's razor
- Original Message - From: Stathis Papaioannou [EMAIL PROTECTED] Pete Carlton wrote: In any case, I grant that the blind man's experience would be quite different from someone who's actually looking at the color red. This is just because the functional states of someone who is seeing red are different than those of someone who just understands what it's like-- you can't stimulate your optic nerve just by will alone. It isn't clear that someone could drive their brain into the state of someone who had seen red merely by understanding everything about the process of seeing red. This is also how I respond to Frank Jackson's colorblind Mary experiment.. So you agree that you cannot drive someone's brain into the state of someone who had seen red merely by understanding everything about the process of seeing red.. That is, you agree that you cannot see red unless you do physically see red. Isn't that somehow in contradiction with your claim below, i.e., that there is nothing else to know beyond the explanation of the physiological response? One thing you seem to agree: you cannot know how red looks like unless you see red. A blind man cannot possibly know that. Now I am aware that know may not be the correct term. Maybe experience would be better. -ENDQUOTE Actually, you probably _could_ drive your brain into seeing red if you knew exactly what physical processes occur in the brain in response to a red stimulus, and if you had appropriate neural interface equipment. Such capabilities do not currently exist - not even close - but the idea is the basis of many SF stories (eg. William Gibson, Greg Egan). The same sort of thing frequently occurs naturally: the definition of a hallucination is a perception without the stimulus that would normally give rise to that perception. The point is, even if you knew in perfect detail what happens in your brain when you see red, you would not actually know/feel/experience the qualia unless you ran the software on your own hardware. You are right. You could in principle (and it indeed happens in hallucination) experience red without the normal physical stimulus. But the argument holds in that you cannot experience red merely by understanding the process. As you say, you have to run it in your own hardware. -Eric.
Re: More on qualia of consciousness and occam's razor
On Tue, Feb 03, 2004 at 02:55:53PM -0800, Pete Carlton wrote: But even this goes way out in front of what we can possibly know. You say we have no idea what these feelings are like to experience--but why should we assume we even are entitled to ask this question? Here's my basic philosophy: we're entitled to ask any question whose answer is relevant to making a decision. As far as qualia is concerned, consider this thought experiment: Two subjects labeled A and B and placed in separate rooms. They're each given a button and told to choose between pushing it and not pushing it. If subject A pushes the button, he is rewarded. If subject B doesn't push the button, he is rewarded. While they consider their choices, they're both given a real-time high-resolution brain scan of subject A. So if they can answer the question is the person being scanned having the same subjective experiences that I am having? then they can both obtain the rewards for sure, otherwise they can only choose blindly. Does this convince you that it makes sense to ask what other people experience?
Re: More on qualia of consciousness and occam's razor
Wei Dai asks: Does this convince you that it makes sense to ask what other people experience? Nobody KNOWS what other people experience. We can KNOW only what other people communicate about their experience. Just as: our experience is a first person secret, even we ourselves don't 'know' it, only in an 'adjusted' (interpreted) format of our mindwork, which we may communicate(?) to others. Such communication can be quite straightforward, or adjusted to our communicational purposes, as the case may be. My answer to your question (to Pete): Yes, it makes sense to ask, prepared for a thorough re-thinking for such (multiple?) transmutations. So the reasonable question may be: to ask what other people may communicate about their experience. That stands also for computersG. Regards John Mikes - Original Message - From: Wei Dai [EMAIL PROTECTED] To: Pete Carlton [EMAIL PROTECTED] Cc: Stathis Papaioannou [EMAIL PROTECTED]; [EMAIL PROTECTED]; [EMAIL PROTECTED] Sent: Friday, February 06, 2004 9:57 AM Subject: Re: More on qualia of consciousness and occam's razor On Tue, Feb 03, 2004 at 02:55:53PM -0800, Pete Carlton wrote: But even this goes way out in front of what we can possibly know. You say we have no idea what these feelings are like to experience--but why should we assume we even are entitled to ask this question? Here's my basic philosophy: we're entitled to ask any question whose answer is relevant to making a decision. As far as qualia is concerned, consider this thought experiment: Two subjects labeled A and B and placed in separate rooms. They're each given a button and told to choose between pushing it and not pushing it. If subject A pushes the button, he is rewarded. If subject B doesn't push the button, he is rewarded. While they consider their choices, they're both given a real-time high-resolution brain scan of subject A. So if they can answer the question is the person being scanned having the same subjective experiences that I am having? then they can both obtain the rewards for sure, otherwise they can only choose blindly. Does this convince you that it makes sense to ask what other people experience?
Re: More on qualia of consciousness and occam's razor
Entering the discussion here... - Original Message - From: Pete Carlton [EMAIL PROTECTED] But even this goes way out in front of what we can possibly know. You say we have no idea what these feelings are like to experience--but why should we assume we even are entitled to ask this question? And why assume that we are not? I prefer not to have my right to ask waived. If I cannot ask it, then I should understand why not, and that would be an answer in a way. To borrow a bit from Wittgenstein -- imagine you have completely translated these aliens' language, and they tell you that each of them has a box with something inside it. Although they talk a lot in rather vague terms about what's in their box, they insist you can't really know what is inside it. Now what is the logical conclusion here: a) There may or may not be something in the box. b) There's definitely something in the box, and I have absolutely no idea what it is. What on earth could possibly make someone conclude (b) here? It's not logical at all. Yet this is what people conclude when they bend over backwards talking about qualia and how ineffable they are. And you seem to conclude a (c) hypothesis: there is definitely nothing inside the box. I stay with (a). And to try to find out if there is something there or not, we need to talk about it, and qualia is the word for the hypothetical contents of the box. So, in addition to the empirical data, there is this extra bit of information, neither contained in the data nor able to be derived from it using the laws of physics: what it actually feels like to be the one experiencing the subjective sensation. If someone can think of a better way to describe it than extra bit of information or can come up with a way to formalise it, I would be happy to hear about it. A better way to describe what, exactly? What it actually feels like? But why do you first commit yourself to the view that this question makes any sense? Suppose a blind man did understand all the chain of events that lead from the light reaching the eyes to the retina, then to the brain and finally to the qualia of red. Would he see the red? Why not? I can imagine that I have my vision scrambled in such a way that red is exchanged with blue. Red is the color that I associate with an apple, and blue to the sky. I can imagine that the sky appeared to have the color of an apple and an apple appeared to have the sky's color. But if that happened, from then on, I could change the names of the colors in such a way that I still called the apple 'red' and the sky 'blue'. If there is no such a thing as 'qualia', then nothing really happened. But I could tell that things are different. In what sense could they be different? I suppose there will still be some who insist that if you know all about the physiology etc. behind the alien response to gamma rays, then you know all there is to know. I think this response is analogous to the shut up and calculate attitude to the interpretation of quantum mechanics. Yes, I am one of these people. You say if you know all about, and you must be taken seriously here: you would really have to know all about it. But if you did, you would be able to entirely trace the causal pathway from the receipt of the gamma rays, to whatever internal responses go on inside the alien's body, to the subsequent report of I feel that pleasant, odd-multiple feeling. Let's say you had that entire explanation written out. And subjective experience doesn't appear anywhere on this list. So what reason on earth do you have to assert that it exists? When the alien says I feel that pleasant feeling, he is just saying that he knows that chain of events is happening in his body right now. Suppose you are watching him with equipments that let you know that same thing. Could you also say I feel that pleasant feeling too? Why not, if there is nothing beyond the chain of events? What could make the alien's knowledge different from yours? One obvious answer is that he is the organism where those events are happening. But this means that each organism is entitled to feel something about himself , an experience that is inaccesible to others, no matter how comprehensive their knowledge is. But that is something that you are claiming that does not exist. How can we explain this without something as qualia? Sorry for making so many questions. I don't intend to be pedantic, but I really don't know the answers. Of course subjective experience exists in a way -- but it's just a way of talking about things. It isn't a primitive. When I see red, I have a subjective experience of red, sure -- but all this means is just that my brain has responded to a certain stimulus in the way it normally does. And maybe it is not all that this means... Eric.
Re: More on qualia of consciousness and occam's razor
At 10:25 04/02/04 -0200, Eric Cavalcanti wrote: EC: Entering the discussion here... - Original Message - From: Pete Carlton [EMAIL PROTECTED] PT: But even this goes way out in front of what we can possibly know. You say we have no idea what these feelings are like to experience--but why should we assume we even are entitled to ask this question? EC: And why assume that we are not? I prefer not to have my right to ask waived. If I cannot ask it, then I should understand why not, and that would be an answer in a way. BM: Yes. Somehow it would be an answer at a higher level, or even a meta-level. Now later I will perhaps try to explain that consciousness will be linked (among other things) with some collapse between a level and a meta-level, so it's good to keep in mind those levels, and it is good to expect that if some question lacks an answer, we will perhaps be able to justify that very fact, by a level shifting indeed. To borrow a bit from Wittgenstein -- imagine you have completely translated these aliens' language, and they tell you that each of them has a box with something inside it. Although they talk a lot in rather vague terms about what's in their box, they insist you can't really know what is inside it. Now what is the logical conclusion here: a) There may or may not be something in the box. b) There's definitely something in the box, and I have absolutely no idea what it is. What on earth could possibly make someone conclude (b) here? It's not logical at all. Yet this is what people conclude when they bend over backwards talking about qualia and how ineffable they are. And you seem to conclude a (c) hypothesis: there is definitely nothing inside the box. I stay with (a). And to try to find out if there is something there or not, we need to talk about it, and qualia is the word for the hypothetical contents of the box. OK. Although I assume you are using the word content with the meaning of meaning, qualia being an interpretation of a state of the brain by the owner of the brain, grosso modo. Saying that qualia are ineffable is very interesting, and Carlton's mention of Wittgenstein is quite relevant (imo...), and indeed, shifting from the level of what consciousness can be I propose to try to capture it by the possible self-referential discourse, and ineffability is the key point for, at first, a very large sense of consciousness (including all Protogoras Virtue, conscience, sensation, self-identity, cleverness, honesty,...) So here is a first proponent for an axiom of those virtues: AX 1 It is ineffable or uncommunicable I call it Wittgenstein principle (in my Brussel's thesis), and we can abbreviate it by 'existential) formula (equation) AX 1 Not Communicable x, and even translate it in modal logic language as -[]x. Note that Wittgenstein is in trouble here, because when he says in the tractatus we cannot talk on those things he is really talking about, and we are entitled to ask him what does he really talk about. In the same way we will need to find models, or mathematical structures to classify our valid forms of reasoning with those sentences (but then that's all what logic is about). A trivial solution for a honest machine (or being, I am not using comp here) would be F (your favorite falsity, like 1 = 0, ...) But Wittgenstein was hardly giving a moral statement like you will not communicate the false ( -[]F ) nor can we suppose Wittgenstein was saying you will not be wrong, or you will not be mad, etc... So F is perhaps a little bit too trivial, but note that this solution will remains stable for a very vast amount of semantics for the box. But Godel and the logicians found many other solutions... Actually for self-referentially correct (SRC) machine, the Wittgenstein principle is itself a solution of the Wittgenstein principle: -[] (-[]F) Actually, a SRC machine can even prove that, that is, that if she would be honest (consistent, ...) then she would not been able to prove that she is honest: -[]F - -[] (-[]F) That is just Godel's second incompleteness theorem. It gives an arithmetical model for most of what we can be derived, informally or not, from the ineffability assumption. So, in addition to the empirical data, there is this extra bit of information, neither contained in the data nor able to be derived from it using the laws of physics: what it actually feels like to be the one experiencing the subjective sensation. If someone can think of a better way to describe it than extra bit of information or can come up with a way to formalise it, I would be happy to hear about it. A better way to describe what, exactly? What it actually feels like? But why do you first commit yourself to the view that this question makes any sense? Suppose a blind man did understand all the chain of events that lead from
RE: More on qualia of consciousness and occam's razor
I am using terms like information loosely when discussing subjective experience precisely because I cannot think of a way to formalise it. Perhaps its defining characteristic is that it cannot be formalised. One can imagine that if we made contact with an extraterrestrial civilization, however alien it is, we could eventually exchange information about the natural sciences, mathematics, history, anything objective. It would effectively involve finding an algorithm to convert from one formal system to another, or one natural language to another. But although the aliens may be able to explain how their physiology has evolved so that gamma rays which are an odd multiple of a certain wavelength cause them to feel a pleasant sensation while even multiple rays cause them to feel a completely different, unpleasant sensation, we as humans would have absolutely no idea what these sensations are like to experience. So, in addition to the empirical data, there is this extra bit of information, neither contained in the data nor able to be derived from it using the laws of physics: what it actually feels like to be the one experiencing the subjective sensation. If someone can think of a better way to describe it than extra bit of information or can come up with a way to formalise it, I would be happy to hear about it. I suppose there will still be some who insist that if you know all about the physiology etc. behind the alien response to gamma rays, then you know all there is to know. I think this response is analogous to the shut up and calculate attitude to the interpretation of quantum mechanics. Stathis Papaioannou From: Ben Goertzel [EMAIL PROTECTED] To: Stathis Papaioannou [EMAIL PROTECTED], [EMAIL PROTECTED] CC: [EMAIL PROTECTED] Subject: RE: More on qualia of consciousness and occam's razor Date: Mon, 2 Feb 2004 11:34:22 -0500 ; you might even be able to read the brain, scanning for neuronal activity and deducing correctly that the subject sees a red flash. However, it is impossible to know what it feels like to see a red flash unless you have the actual experience yourself. So I maintain that there is this extra bit of information -subjective experience or qualia - that you do not automatically have even if you know everything about the brain to an arbitrary level of precision. In what sense is a quale information? formalizing this might help me to understand your hypothesis better ben _ Hot chart ringtones and polyphonics. Go to http://ninemsn.com.au/mobilemania/default.asp
Re: More on qualia of consciousness and occam's razor
On Feb 3, 2004, at 3:19 AM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: I am using terms like information loosely when discussing subjective experience precisely because I cannot think of a way to formalise it. Perhaps its defining characteristic is that it cannot be formalised. One can imagine that if we made contact with an extraterrestrial civilization, however alien it is, we could eventually exchange information about the natural sciences, mathematics, history, anything objective. It would effectively involve finding an algorithm to convert from one formal system to another, or one natural language to another. But although the aliens may be able to explain how their physiology has evolved so that gamma rays which are an odd multiple of a certain wavelength cause them to feel a pleasant sensation while even multiple rays cause them to feel a completely different, unpleasant sensation, we as humans would have absolutely no idea what these sensations are like to experience. But even this goes way out in front of what we can possibly know. You say we have no idea what these feelings are like to experience--but why should we assume we even are entitled to ask this question? To borrow a bit from Wittgenstein -- imagine you have completely translated these aliens' language, and they tell you that each of them has a box with something inside it. Although they talk a lot in rather vague terms about what's in their box, they insist you can't really know what is inside it. Now what is the logical conclusion here: a) There may or may not be something in the box. b) There's definitely something in the box, and I have absolutely no idea what it is. What on earth could possibly make someone conclude (b) here? It's not logical at all. Yet this is what people conclude when they bend over backwards talking about qualia and how ineffable they are. Earlier you say: I'll grant you that the subjective experience of red etc cannot be derived from a theory of physics. But this statement just assumes one philosophical position about mind, and there are many out there. So, in addition to the empirical data, there is this extra bit of information, neither contained in the data nor able to be derived from it using the laws of physics: what it actually feels like to be the one experiencing the subjective sensation. If someone can think of a better way to describe it than extra bit of information or can come up with a way to formalise it, I would be happy to hear about it. A better way to describe what, exactly? What it actually feels like? But why do you first commit yourself to the view that this question makes any sense? I suppose there will still be some who insist that if you know all about the physiology etc. behind the alien response to gamma rays, then you know all there is to know. I think this response is analogous to the shut up and calculate attitude to the interpretation of quantum mechanics. Yes, I am one of these people. You say if you know all about, and you must be taken seriously here: you would really have to know >all about it. But if you did, you would be able to entirely trace the causal pathway from the receipt of the gamma rays, to whatever internal responses go on inside the alien's body, to the subsequent report of I feel that pleasant, odd-multiple feeling. Let's say you had that entire explanation written out. And subjective experience doesn't appear anywhere on this list. So what reason on earth do you have to assert that it exists? Of course subjective experience exists in a way -- but it's just a way of talking about things. It isn't a primitive. When I see red, I have a subjective experience of red, sure -- but all this means is just that my brain has responded to a certain stimulus in the way it normally does. Stathis Papaioannou
Re: More on qualia of consciousness and occam's razor
Eric Hawthorne writes: quote Stathis Papaioannou wrote: ; you might even be able to read the brain, scanning for neuronal activity and deducing correctly that the subject sees a red flash. However, it is impossible to know what it feels like to see a red flash unless you have the actual experience yourself. So I maintain that there is this extra bit of information -subjective experience or qualia - that you do not automatically have even if you know everything about the brain to an arbitrary level of precision. Moreover, it cannot be derived even in theory from the laws of physics - even though, of course, it is totally dependent on the laws of physics, like everything else in the Universe. I'll grant you that the subjective experience of red etc cannot be derived from a theory of physics. However, by Occam's Razor we can say that the qualia that other people experience are the same as those that we experience. The reasoning is as follows: The theorem that the qualia are the same is justifiable on the simple theory that near-identical physical brain structure and function (amongst humans) leads to near-identical perception of the qualia of consciousness. What simple theory which is consistent with the rest of our scientific knowledge would justify that the qualia are significantly different? Right now, in the absence of such a qualia-difference-explaining theory, and with a plausible and simple and non-revolutionary and reasonable theory of qualia-sameness, a scientific-thinking default assumption should be qualia-sameness. endquote I never meant to suggest that other people's subjective experiences are different to our own (although it is certainly logically possible, in the same way that solipsism is logically possible). What I am saying is that there is this extra piece of information needed - the nature of the subjective experience - if we are to claim complete understanding of the brain and mind. Furthermore, this extra piece of information differs from all the other kinds of empirical data scientists collect and analyse in that it cannot be understood unless the person trying to understand it has experienced something like it himself. Thus, a man blind from birth may be a world expert on the neurophysiology of human vision but know nothing about what it feels like to see. If you are correct and there is nothing to know beyond the neurophysiology, you would have to say that there is either no such thing as what it feels like to see, or that he doesn't understand it yet because he doesn't yet know enough neurophysiology! Stathis _ E-mail just got a whole lot better. New ninemsn Premium. Click here http://ninemsn.com.au/premium/landing.asp
Re: More on qualia of consciousness and occam's razor
Stathis Papaioannou wrote: Eric Hawthorne writes: I'll grant you that the subjective experience of "red" etc cannot be derived from a theory of physics. However, by Occam's Razor we can say that the qualia that other people experience are the same as those that we experience. The reasoning is as follows: The theorem that the qualia are the same is justifiable on the simple theory that near-identical physical brain structure and function (amongst humans) leads to near-identical perception of the qualia of consciousness. Function is the key term. This theorem agrees with the substitution principle (in COMP) that says if you replace any brain component by a functionally equivalent device using any arbitrary technology (wetware, hardware, DNA, silicon, germanium, organic semiconductors, etc...) then the feeling you get about any experience should be identical. It seems that it is not the underlying substrate that is important but the arrangement of that substrate as a functional entity. Substrate (hardware), and arrangement of substrate (software) belong to two different "levels." Experience and software belong to the same level. Experience and hardware belong to different levels. Looking at the implementation levels, it seems that for an experience to feel identical for two observers, their software have to be identical. Different softwares produce different experience. A Frenchman and an Englishman have different experiences eating escargots. George
Re: More on qualia of consciousness and occam's razor
Stathis Papaioannou wrote: ; you might even be able to read the brain, scanning for neuronal activity and deducing correctly that the subject sees a red flash. However, it is impossible to know what it feels like to see a red flash unless you have the actual experience yourself. So I maintain that there is this extra bit of information -subjective experience or qualia - that you do not automatically have even if you know everything about the brain to an arbitrary level of precision. Moreover, it cannot be derived even in theory from the laws of physics - even though, of course, it is totally dependent on the laws of physics, like everything else in the Universe. I'll grant you that the subjective experience of red etc cannot be derived from a theory of physics. However, by Occam's Razor we can say that the qualia that other people experience are the same as those that we experience. The reasoning is as follows: The theorem that the qualia are the same is justifiable on the simple theory that near-identical physical brain structure and function (amongst humans) leads to near-identical perception of the qualia of consciousness. What simple theory which is consistent with the rest of our scientific knowledge would justify that the qualia are significantly different? Right now, in the absence of such a qualia-difference-explaining theory, and with a plausible and simple and non-revolutionary and reasonable theory of qualia-sameness, a scientific-thinking default assumption should be qualia-sameness. Long aside: Parallel example: A similar Occam's Razor argument can explain why the scientific-thinking default assumption should be in the non-existence of God, except for the undeniable existence of God as a human abstract concept, like the concept of Nation-State. There is a simple and reasonable theory of intelligent co-operating agent behaviour which runs something like that 1. We do a lot of reasoning about how agents, and in particular animal agents and intelligent human agents, affect the outcomes in the world. 2. We do a lot of reasoning about how to influence these agents to act on the world as we would wish. 3. An unknown-agent proxy is an easy-to-understand extension to such an agent-behaviour and effects theory. 4. We can extend the same attitudes of obeisance and desire to please to the unknown-agent-proxy as we would to any powerful animal agent or powerful human (king, warlord) agent. If we do (we would reason), we may obtain the unknown-agent-proxy's favour and the outcome of unknown-agency events might come out in our favor. Aside: Note that the fundamental fallacy in the ancients' God-theory here is the ascription of unknown-cause events as being the effects of intelligent agency. This is an example of a theory that is elegant, simple, and wrong. Physical science and mathematics has by now provided alternative explanations (which have the advantage of being consistent with each other and with observation i.e. of being logical and scientific) for the vast majority of the types of events (cosmic and planetary origin, and life and human origin, weather, illness, love (reflection and elaboration of mating instincts into stories at conscious-level of brain, in an information-processing model of brain/mind), crop-failure, failure or success of various forms of psychological make-up and group-organizational behavior (reasons that kings might be successful or not) etc., 5. Humans with intellect and other leadership qualities would also see how to harness the power implicit in the populace's fear of and desire to be obeisant to the unknown-agent-proxy (i.e. the god). By proclaiming that they have special access to the god, knowledge of its intentions, ability to influence it etc. they can harness the psychologically based power that the god has over the believers' actions, and turn it into power that they themselves (the priesthood, the god-kings or just kings-by-divine-right) have over the populace. Convenient. Too convenient not to result in a whole entrenched societal structure of rules and hierarchical authority connected ultimately to the authority of the god itself. 6. Such an organised religion structure, or god-empowered government structure, if it succeeds in organizing people for an extended period of time, as it seems they did, would naturally tend to take on a life of its own, a self-reinforcing aspect, an autopoietic function as one of its functions. This self-preservation subfunction of the god-empowered governance organization would take the form of religious education about the great history of beneficial acts and mercies and wisdoms conferred on the people over their glorious history by the god via the god-henchmen. In my view, the governance aspect; that is the societal cohesion and organization aspect of always was the genuine essence of organized religions, and also of divine-right governments. The god-basis was just a
Re: More on qualia of consciousness and occam's razor - tiny addendum
Eric Hawthorne wrote: 6. Such an organised religion structure, or god-empowered government structure, if it succeeds in organizing people for an extended period of time, as it seems they did, would naturally tend to take on a life of its own, a self-reinforcing aspect, an autopoietic function as one of its functions. This self-preservation subfunction of the god-empowered governance organization would take the form of religious education about the great history of beneficial acts and mercies and wisdoms conferred on the people over their glorious history by the god via the god-henchmen. I should add that the other half of the autopoietic (self-preservative) subfunction of the god-fear-and-god-obeisance-empowered organization is of course the enforcement branch: Mechanisms would develop for enforcement-of-membership, rule-adherence, and enforcement that members conform to (express) the orthodox forms (orthodox in that particular organization of course) of belief in the deity. Thus we have religious intolerance, we have shunning, outcasting, excommunication, we have dehumanization as worthless infidels and enemies of adherents to other (incorrect and defiant) religious orthodoxies, and also, of course, stigmatization and de-valuing (not to mention torture and execution as an example) of those who profess not to believe in the god (or any god) at all. If I were living in the time (or a present-day place) of overwhelming and brutal dominance of god-empowered governance organizations (e.g. everywhere before the beginning of the last century, and in a number of fundamentalist-Islamic states (and southern US states? today,) I would have to profess belief in God to survive, and just hope that no-one heard the quotation-marks in my statement which indicate belief in the power of the god-myth concept in human psychology and thus in human society.
