Re: PSYCHE Vol 16 #1 ... essay
Hi Jason,
On 14 Jun 2010, at 15:55, Jason Resch wrote:
On Mon, Jun 14, 2010 at 3:08 AM, Bruno Marchal
wrote:
You have added the UTM and its variants to the pile. Any of these
could be just as right as you think COMP is.
I have no idea about the truth status of Digital Mechanism, except
nothing in nature suggest it to be false. On the contrary, the main
startling consequence of digital mechanism (non locality, first
person indeterminacy, symmetry at the bottom, etc.) are confirmed by
the empirical study of nature. But I am open to the idea that comp
may be false. That is why I study it: to show it falsifiable and
thus scientific in Popper sense.
Bruno,
The part about symmetry at the bottom being a consequence of
mechanism intrigued me. How is symmetry at the bottom related to
mechanism?
It is rather technical. Let me give you a non rigorous overview. It is
easier to explain this on Löbian machine "talking" first order language.
In that case, Gödel's completeness theorem insures that if the machine
proves A then A will be true in all mathematical models satisfying
(making true) all the beliefs of the machine (soundness), and vice
versa (completeness).
So: M proves A iff A is true in all models of M (I identify a machine
with the set of all its beliefs/theorem/assertion).
Now let us write Bp for the machine proves p. Bp is meant for Bew('p')
and is supposed to be expressible in the language of the machine (like
Gödel's showed it to be the case for a large class of theory/machine).
A first idea to tackle the first person indeterminacy would consist to
say that the probability of a 'proposition' is one in case 'Bp' is
true, given the Gödel's soundness/completeness theorem. This would
indeed making that proposition true in all consistent extension (or
models) of the machine's beliefs. But this does not work, due to
incompleteness. Incompletness implies the existence of cul-de-sac
world/model/state in which Bf, the provability of 'false' is true.
There, Bf is trivially satisfied, 'f' is true in all extension, given
that there are no extensions! This has been the main motivation for
looking to intensional variant of 'B'.
So let us invent a new modal operator Bp, defined by Bp & p (the first
Theatetical variant), or the weaker Bp & Dp, or Bp & Dp & p. The logic
G* shows them all equivalent for any 'p' being a proposition in
arithmetic (the "ontic" propositions), but, by incompleteness the
machine cannot prove this facts. So, although those variant are
'truly' equivalent, they will not seem equivalent for the machine's
points of view.
And finally let us restrict p to the Sigma_1 sentences (that is those
with the shape ExP(x), P decidable). This is how we translate "comp"
itself in the language of the machine. A machine is universal iff it
proves all the true sigma_1 sentences, and a machine is Löbian if it
proves p->Bp, for all p sigma_1. To be sigma_1and true means also to
be accessible by the universal dovetailer.
In that case, it can be shown that the modal symmetry condition "p ->
BDp" is satisfied for all theaetetical variant of provability. It
means that any time you can fly from a world to another world, or from
a state to another state, you can come back following either the
accessibility relation (if there is one), or the neighborhood relation
(if there is one). At the "star" level (under G*, the arithmetical
"Noûs"), unfortunately, we don't have modal logics with accessibility
relations, so we have to use more complex semantics, and the symmetry
conditions is admittedly rather abstract. We have also Bp -> p, and
despite the lack of necessitation, this gives a formal quantization
for p: BDp. This gives a formal quantum logic, admitting an
arithmetical interpretation, and it provides the logic of "measure
one" statements, and it is symmetrical in the sense above.
I hope this can help to give you the idea of where that symmetry comes
from. I hope also that the bold characters don't disappear! (Tell me
if you don't see the difference between B and B).
I have explained on this list, a long time ago, why in the Kripke
semantics for modal logic, the validity of the formula Bp -> p makes
the accessibility relation reflexive, and why the validity of p -> BDp
makes the accessibility relation symmetrical. You may search in the
archive, perhaps with the older notation:
p -> [ ]<>p.
In some of my french writing I suggest (wrongly) that such a symmetry
is impossible for the first Theatetical variant of B (Bp & p), because
it is an antisymmetrical structure. So I thought the symmetry provided
by the restriction to the sigma_1 sentence would make the modal logic
collapse into the trivial theory where Bp is equivalent with p. But I
was wrong! In particular we have p -> BDp, but we don't have BDp -> p.
This may confirms the neoplatonist idea that the soul (Bp
Re: PSYCHE Vol 16 #1 ... essay
On Mon, Jun 14, 2010 at 3:08 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: > > You have added the UTM and its variants to the pile. Any of these could be > just as right as you think COMP is. > > > I have no idea about the truth status of Digital Mechanism, except nothing > in nature suggest it to be false. On the contrary, the main startling > consequence of digital mechanism (non locality, first person indeterminacy, > symmetry at the bottom, etc.) are confirmed by the empirical study of > nature. But I am open to the idea that comp may be false. That is why I > study it: to show it falsifiable and thus scientific in Popper sense. > > Bruno, The part about symmetry at the bottom being a consequence of mechanism intrigued me. How is symmetry at the bottom related to mechanism? Thanks, Jason -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: PSYCHE Vol 16 #1 ... essay
On 14 Jun 2010, at 09:09, Colin Hales wrote: Bruno Marchal wrote: Colin, I think we have always agreed on this conclusion. We may differ on the premises. It just happen that I am using a special hypothesis, which is very common, but not so well understood, and which is the digital mechanist hypothesis. I think things are more subtle than this.. I assume nothing, especially 'digital anything'. In reality there's no such thing as 'digital' (do not conflate this with 'quantisation'!). There's brains that make statements or kind (A) and (B). That's all. If I am digital, then quantization is given by the logic of BDp in Z1*. I make the realtion between digital and quantization quite explicit. When you say "there are brains", what do you mean?. Do you mean that there are primitively material or physical brain? Actually I have no idea by what you mean by "I assume nothing". We always assume a theory, implicetly or explicitly. Unfortunately, because of our conceptual divide Which conceptual divide? We may have a different theory. I study just the hypothesis that the brain is Turing emulable. I cannot give meaningful answers to any of the subsequent questions you ask - because to answer them at all means I have to agree with the starting point. I don't see why. My point is a point of logic. Unless you make explicit that we are not machine, in which case we have different theory. Your questions are of the same kind as "when did you first start beating your dog?" - the presupposition is that I beat my dog and the only undecided issue is 'when?'. Where do I presuppose that "you beat your dog"? The issues you discuss presuppose something that fundamentally violates science approaches in the same way that 'strings', 'loops', 'branes', 'froth' etc etc violate it and get sidelined. On the contrary. In theoretical science we make explicit the theory we are using. Unlike "string theory", the hypothesis I am using is the most common one among scientists. You have added the UTM and its variants to the pile. Any of these could be just as right as you think COMP is. I have no idea about the truth status of Digital Mechanism, except nothing in nature suggest it to be false. On the contrary, the main startling consequence of digital mechanism (non locality, first person indeterminacy, symmetry at the bottom, etc.) are confirmed by the empirical study of nature. But I am open to the idea that comp may be false. That is why I study it: to show it falsifiable and thus scientific in Popper sense. The (A)/(B) framework is parsimonious/empirically tractable (requires nothing extra in the Occam's razor sense) and COMP isn't because it requires invocation of a form of unseen abstract computer running rules-of-Bruno, Don't attribute to me what is just elementary theoretical computer science. You are the one postulating something concrete and material apparently (but this is too vague in your paper). none of which lead to predictions that implement/explain the observer. You seem to think that my (A)/(B) framework must address issues in Bruno/COMP terms. I need none of it. Your framework is a preemptive generalisation of (A)/(B). In the end, once (A)/(B) candidates have been found and explored, Bruno/COMP may be able to be used as an abstract generalisation of the Hales/(A)/(B) framework. When that realisation happens, we can all go down to the pub and declare "Bruno was right" and drink to your insightsHowever, this will not happen until (A)/(B) is adopted in a self-consistent manner and followed to its logical endpoint I was just mentioning that this is provided by the comp theory. How will you develop your self-consistent frame without postulating assumption? literal, verifiable neuroscience predictions of an observer (not by pointing to "what is believed corresponds to observation" within in an abstract hypostase framework on a presupposed computer)Then and only then will we understand the relationship between the natural world and formal/artificial computation of the COMP kind.so we can then make informed decisions. Yes. Why not? IMO this is the way that you can ultimately be right, Bruno. Your work is an uber-framework within which sits mine as a special case. Your assumptions are unclear. You seem just to accept that qualia and consciousness exist, I too. Then I work in the mechanist theory. You can see that as a special case. I said exactly that. It's not either/or. Sure. Between you and proof of COMP is type (B) science of claims and testing. I don't prove comp, I start from comp. I prove only that comp forces physics to be retrieved from number theory. It makes precise an intuition running through all the post in this list: the relative measure problem. I tackle the measure one. It is not a lot, yet it explains the ex
Re: PSYCHE Vol 16 #1 ... essay
Bruno Marchal wrote: Colin, I think we have always agreed on this conclusion. We may differ on the premises. It just happen that I am using a special hypothesis, which is very common, but not so well understood, and which is the digital mechanist hypothesis. I think things are more subtle than this.. I assume nothing, especially 'digital anything'. In reality there's no such thing as 'digital' (do not conflate this with 'quantisation'!). There's brains that make statements or kind (A) and (B). That's all. Unfortunately, because of our conceptual divide I cannot give meaningful answers to any of the subsequent questions you ask - because to answer them at all means I have to agree with the starting point. Your questions are of the same kind as "when did you first start beating your dog?" - the presupposition is that I beat my dog and the only undecided issue is 'when?'. The issues you discuss presuppose something that fundamentally violates science approaches in the same way that 'strings', 'loops', 'branes', 'froth' etc etc violate it and get sidelined. You have added the UTM and its variants to the pile. Any of these could be just as right as you think COMP is. The (A)/(B) framework is parsimonious/empirically tractable (requires nothing extra in the Occam's razor sense) and COMP isn't because it requires invocation of a form of unseen abstract computer running rules-of-Bruno, none of which lead to predictions that implement/explain the observer. You seem to think that my (A)/(B) framework must address issues in Bruno/COMP terms. I need none of it. Your framework is a preemptive generalisation of (A)/(B). In the end, once (A)/(B) candidates have been found and explored, Bruno/COMP may be able to be used as an abstract generalisation of the Hales/(A)/(B) framework. When that realisation happens, we can all go down to the pub and declare "Bruno was right" and drink to your insightsHowever, this will not happen until (A)/(B) is adopted in a self-consistent manner and followed to its logical endpoint /literal/, verifiable neuroscience predictions of an observer (not by pointing to "what is believed corresponds to observation" within in an abstract hypostase framework on a presupposed computer)Then and only then will we understand the relationship between the natural world and formal/artificial computation of the COMP kind.so we can then make informed decisions. IMO this is the way that you can ultimately be right, Bruno. Your work is an uber-framework within which sits mine as a special case. It's not either/or. Between you and proof of COMP is type (B) science of claims and testing. The instant that a (B) makes a verified prediction of brain material, you can then provide an abstract 'generalised theoretical neuroscience' that can, under suitable constraints, become the specific (B) that is us. At that time (A)/(B) will be able to be calibrated in terms of 'digital doctors', 'white rabibits', hypostases etc etc. In this way, Bruno/COMP can be quite right but devoid of practical utility, at least at this stage. (Right now...if I believe in COMP or I don't believe...changes nothing I still do (A)/(B), making predictive claims) Note that at the same time, the equally sidelined. 'strings', 'loops', 'branes', 'froth' etc etc will also get their validity sorted ... because all of them will be required to predict/explain the observer or go away. I can see how it must be very frustrating for you to see the overall generalisation but not how we are actually implemented as a particular version of it. At least my assessment of your position looks like that. This is how I think the COMP proposition could be viewed in the futurewe'll see, I suppose. :-) Meanwhile I have a broken, neurotic, deluded (A) science to fix. That's enough work! cheers colin -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: PSYCHE Vol 16 #1 ... essay
Colin, I think we have always agreed on this conclusion. We may differ on the premises. It just happen that I am using a special hypothesis, which is very common, but not so well understood, and which is the digital mechanist hypothesis. Then the discourse of the universal machine, which knows that she is universal, leads to quite a precision of what you are saying, it seems to me. For the "universe' X we can take arithmetical truth, and from this, doing the math, you discover that any universal machine, by being embedded in arithmetical truth indeed, will inherit, not two, but 8 modes or 'points of view', which are the main variant of the logic of self-reference. Some give the person, some gives the person bodies, some the coherent dreams, etc. (the eight hypostases). Some of those variant are not computable: the Nôus, second hypostase, is P1- complete with arithmetical truth as oracle! But, contrary to what you say, it leads to precise predictions, given that it makes the quanta a particular sort of sharable qualia, it makes physics a branch of number theory, and its math is entirely derivable from number+self-reference, making the DM hypothesis testable. The qualia themselves are made indirectly testable too. It is real concrete theory which ask us to be modest relatively to the universal Löbian machines. Would you say that your theory would prevent someone to "say yes to a digital surgeon"? Would your theory prohibit the marriage between humans and machines? Do you think machine cannot makes it possible for genuine consciousness to manifest relatively to ourselves? The confusion that you describe can appear in the discourse of the machine in the form of the modal confusion between Bp and Bp & p (or Bp and Bp & p & Dt, etc.). It makes us backtrack to the greek theologians, but today we have theoretical computer science to make things precise and testable. It is not a question of dreaming of abstract interactions, just to deduce facts in a theory. The 'yes doctor' shows it is not an 'abstract hypothesis': it is a question of life or death, really. The DM ethic is that you have the right to say 'no' to the doctor, even if this entails your 'clinical death'. You have the ability to choose your doctor also. Bruno Marchal On 12 Jun 2010, at 08:28, Colin Hales wrote: Bruno Marchal wrote: Thanks for the link Colin. I will read it after the exams period. In some trivial sense I think I, and the Lobian machine, agrees with your conclusion, but less trivially, we may disagree. We don't have to change the boundaries of science, just be more open to facts, including the consequences of different theories. Could say more later. I think that computer science offers a theory of qualia on a plate (the intensional variants of the solovay logic G*, the 'right hypostases"). It is a sort of theory which explains what escapes all theories. It makes you "first person" right, with the assumption of mechanism. But it is not knew, many did intuit such type of 'truth', and the greek intuited it together with the fact that we can reason about that. Th (old) error consists in opposing science and mysticism. The universal machine is naturally already mystical. I have explained this, but I know it is not so easy to grasp. Bruno I hope I can crack through your mindset one day! You can dream all you like about abstract interactions of numbers on a non-existent computer. It makes no difference to me. You can't build it, it predicts nothing and explains nothing. What I am trying to get people to realise is the most elementary of simple realities that we face as humans: (1) That whatever it is, we are inside it, made of it. The universe X. We acquire our faculties of observation from that circumstance. (2) That the position you intrinsically inherit from (1) as an observer intent on understanding how X works has two possible modes of description: (A) Statements capturing the essence of how X appears to us as observers in X. No matter how mathematically elaborate these statements are, you cannot deny the other mode ... (B) Statements depicting the interactions between structural- primitive elements comprising X that (i) result in an observer that (ii) sees the universe as we do (as per (A). Mutual self consistency must be confirmed at all levels except where (A) failspredictably. Neither (A) or (B) can be claimed to literally 'be' the universe. This does not mean that (B) cannot literally be the universe. It means we cannot claim it to be. Formally, we must remain forever agnostic. In practice we get the benefit of really getting to the heart of X in useful ways. Our big mistake is to conflate, endlessly and without review, (A) and (B). The conflation is twofold. We either do (B) without realising that its primary demand is the prediction of an observer or
Re: PSYCHE Vol 16 #1 ... essay
Bruno Marchal wrote: Thanks for the link Colin. I will read it after the exams period. In some trivial sense I think I, and the Lobian machine, agrees with your conclusion, but less trivially, we may disagree. We don't have to change the boundaries of science, just be more open to facts, including the consequences of different theories. Could say more later. I think that computer science offers a theory of qualia on a plate (the intensional variants of the solovay logic G*, the 'right hypostases"). It is a sort of theory which explains what escapes all theories. It makes you "first person" right, with the assumption of mechanism. But it is not knew, many did intuit such type of 'truth', and the greek intuited it together with the fact that we can reason about that. Th (old) error consists in opposing science and mysticism. The universal machine is naturally already mystical. I have explained this, but I know it is not so easy to grasp. Bruno I hope I can crack through your mindset one day! You can dream all you like about abstract interactions of numbers on a non-existent computer. It makes no difference to me. You can't build it, it predicts nothing and explains nothing. What I am trying to get people to realise is the most elementary of simple realities that we face as humans: (1) That whatever it is, we are inside it, made of it. The universe X. We acquire our faculties of observation from that circumstance. (2) That the position you intrinsically inherit from (1) as an observer intent on understanding how X works has two possible modes of description: (A) Statements capturing the essence of how X appears to us as observers in X. No matter how mathematically elaborate these statements are, you cannot deny the other mode ... (B) Statements depicting the interactions between structural-primitive elements comprising X that (i) result in an observer that (ii) sees the universe as we do (as per (A). Mutual self consistency must be confirmed at all levels except where (A) failspredictably. Neither (A) or (B) can be claimed to literally 'be' the universe. This does not mean that (B) cannot literally be the universe. It means we cannot /claim it to be/. Formally, we must remain forever agnostic. In practice we get the benefit of really getting to the heart of X in useful ways. Our big mistake is to conflate, endlessly and without review, (A) and (B). The conflation is twofold. We either do (B) without realising that its primary demand is the prediction of an observer or we arbitrarily decree (B) as impossib;le...sometimes by simply only doing A and thinking it somehow explains an observer. Observations cannot explain an observer! (an ability to observe). To believe they do is like saying that telephone conversations explain the telephone system. But we've been here before.. All I am saying is that (A) science is no less valid than (B) science, is not the same science and that it has equal rights to all empirical evidence (the contents of the consciousnes of scientists that literally constitutes scientific observation). No amount of fiddling about with abstract maths changes any of this. I hope that the essay speaks to you in a way that helps you see this. This is the position I am gradually building. I am going to go so far as to formally demand a summit on the matter. I believe things are that screwed up. 300 years of this confinement in the (A) prison is long enough. cheers colin hales -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: PSYCHE Vol 16 #1 ... essay
Thanks for the link Colin. I will read it after the exams period. In some trivial sense I think I, and the Lobian machine, agrees with your conclusion, but less trivially, we may disagree. We don't have to change the boundaries of science, just be more open to facts, including the consequences of different theories. Could say more later. I think that computer science offers a theory of qualia on a plate (the intensional variants of the solovay logic G*, the 'right hypostases"). It is a sort of theory which explains what escapes all theories. It makes you "first person" right, with the assumption of mechanism. But it is not knew, many did intuit such type of 'truth', and the greek intuited it together with the fact that we can reason about that. Th (old) error consists in opposing science and mysticism. The universal machine is naturally already mystical. I have explained this, but I know it is not so easy to grasp. Bruno On 10 Jun 2010, at 04:17, Colin Hales wrote: Recently there was a student essay contest run by the ASSC (Association for the Scientific Study of Consciousness) The five winners are published in the ASSC journal PSYCHE. One of them was mine. They have finally got around to publishing them. Hales C. 2010. The scientific evidence of qualia meets the qualia that are scientific evidence. PSYCHE 16(1):24-29. (http://www.theassc.org/journal_psyche/archive/vol_16_no_1_2010) I am trying hard to get my ideas about science into the awareness of as many folks as I can. I thought some of you may be interested.The essays are mercifully short (1500 words!) Enjoy. Colin Hales -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com . For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en . http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
PSYCHE Vol 16 #1 ... essay
Recently there was a student essay contest run by the ASSC (Association for the Scientific Study of Consciousness) The five winners are published in the ASSC journal PSYCHE. One of them was mine. They have finally got around to publishing them. Hales C. 2010. The scientific evidence of qualia meets the qualia that are scientific evidence. PSYCHE 16(1):24-29. (http://www.theassc.org/journal_psyche/archive/vol_16_no_1_2010) I am trying hard to get my ideas about science into the awareness of as many folks as I can. I thought some of you may be interested.*The essays are mercifully short (1500 words!) * Enjoy. Colin Hales -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
