Re: Kim 2.4 - 2.5

[Bruno Marchal]

On 10 Jan 2009, at 02:26, Kim Jones wrote:

>
>
> On 10/01/2009, at 5:17 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>>
>> I admire too. Kim is courageous.
>> Well, for the tenacity we will see :)
>>
>>
>
> Gee thanks Doctor! I'll try not disappoint you. At the moment I am
> devoting an egregious amount of time to searching for employment as my
> ability to sit and cogitate on Correct Machine Theology will be
> severely curtailed if I don't find a job soon.


Life is not easy. Wish you the best.


>
>
> In the meantime, is there any chance of a bus slogan campaign: "There
> Probably Is a Universal Dovetailer Computing All of Reality.

Too much technical and ambiguous imo. The danger with comp is that a  
slight misunderstanding of it can transform it into a reductionism or  
even a nihilism.




> Now, All
> Of You Theologians, Start Worrying and Start Studying Quantum Physics,
> Computationalism and Modal Logic."

Modal logic is generally considered as an invention of theologian. It  
has been a practical tool for religious metaphysics among Middle-Age  
theologians, especially in Middle East.
You could as well have said "Scientists, Start Worrying to have to  
ReStart the Study of Plato's Theology".
But I am not sure we should start worry people with a subject which  
can so easily give too much metaphysical vertigo.

Take it easy,

Bruno




http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/




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Re: Kim 2.4 - 2.5

[John Mikes]

Brent,
there are misunderstood phenomena and epistemologically underdeveloped
explanations over the past 10,000 years - plus conclusion (upon
conlusions)^n - quantizations with and without zero (14th c. AD) to develop
in our conventional scientific view the figment Bruno puts into " - " called
"The Physical World" (view). Within this there is 'physics' as a
conventional science. Never mind that beyond its 101 there are included QM
etc. considered 'less' conventional - still within the figment.
Clicking in your kind post on the *DrChinese.com* ref, you may find more
formulated trains than I care to follow, with a
---
"*Conclusion

*QM predicts an expectation value for cases [2] and [7] of -.1036, which is
less than 0 and seemingly absurd. However, this is born out by actual
experiments , in
defiance of common sense! This result means that the seemingly reasonable
assumption (the Realistic view) that we started with in *c.* above is
invalid. This is easily explained in QM because cases [2] and [7] are *not*
real, they are literally imaginary. (Note that X, Y and Z can be separately
tested anywhere in the world at any time and you still end up with the same
conclusion once you combine the results per *h.* above.)
---
you may follow the critical ways what I did not.

Many of the posts on this list are transcending limitations of the *
conventionally* *physical world* figment (although many still use elements
taken from there). Just try to roll back how many levels of concludings you
have to pass into arriving  at a 'pair of entangled photons diverted into
opposite dir.' or other conditions of 'experiments' and you will not deny
the Gedankenexperiment status of EPR with its conclusions, all experiments
with supportive (Aspect?) and criticizing (Bell? Dr.Chinese?) ideas in spite
of the success in our present technology based on such conventional science
and human ingenuity.
I read Bell and Aspect 2 decades ago and thanks for the
http://www-ece.rice.edu/~kono/ELEC565/Aspect_Nature.pdf
for a refresher.

John M





On Sat, Jan 10, 2009 at 12:42 AM, Brent Meeker wrote:

>
> John Mikes wrote:
> > Brent wrote:
> >
> > "...But the EPR experiments show that this can only hold if the
> > influence of  "the rest of the world" is non-local
> > (i.e. faster than light) and hence inconsistent with relativity..."
> >
> > EPR is a thought-experiment, constructed (designed) to make a point. How
> > can one use such artifact as 'evidence' that "shows..."?
>
> Because it has been performed in various ways and is not just a "thought
> experiment".
>
> http://www.drchinese.com/David/EPR_Bell_Aspect.htm
>
> Brent
>
> > Furthermore: relativity is a (genius) human idea, based on the figment
> > of the 'physical world' (assumption). Whether something is consistent or
> > inconsistent with it, is also no 'proof' to be considered in dubious
> > theories (like the conventional - or not so conventional - physics).
> > (Anyway this side-line was far from 'random' or 'probabiliyt'
> > the focus of my post.)
> >
> > John M
> >
> >
> > On Thu, Jan 8, 2009 at 4:14 PM, Brent Meeker   > > wrote:
> >
> >
> > John Mikes wrote:
> >  > Dear Bruno,
> >  >
> >  > I decided so many times not to reflect to the esoteric sci-fi
> >  > assumptions (thought experiments?) on this list - about situations
> >  > beyond common sense, their use as templates for consequences.
> >  > Now, however, I can't control my 'mouse' - in random and
> > probabilistics.
> >  > *
> >  > Bruno quotes in  " -- "  lines, like the starting proposition:
> >  > "It is because an event can be random or probabilistic..."
> >  > *
> >  > "...the perfect throwing of the perfect coin gives an random
> >  > experience with a probability "measure"
> >  > HEAD = 1/2, TAIL = 1/2"
> >  >
> >  > Wrong.
> >  > A "PERFECT coin PERFECTLY thrown gives ALWAYS either HEAD or TAIL.
> It
> >  > is those imperfections unobserved(?) that makes the difference in
> the
> >  > outcome to 50-50. The only difference that really counts is the
> >  > starting condition - whether it is thrown head or tail UP.
> >
> > Interestingly, the statistician Persis Diaconis can flip a coin so
> that
> > it lands heads or tails as he chooses.   Many professional magicians
> can
> > do it to.
> >  >
> >  > To your subsequent 3 questions the answer is YES - depending how
> you
> >  > identify 'probability'. (I don't).
> >  > To your evaluating paragraph "Fair Enough": fair enough.
> >  > That makes my point.
> >  > *
> >  > The "experiments with sleeping in the room with whiskey" are above
> my
> >  > head (=my common sense). The Einstein conclusions show that even
> > a big
> >  > genius like him cannot cope with epistemic enrichment c

Re: Kim 2.4 - 2.5

[Brent Meeker]

John Mikes wrote:
> Brent wrote:
>  
> "...But the EPR experiments show that this can only hold if the 
> influence of  "the rest of the world" is non-local
> (i.e. faster than light) and hence inconsistent with relativity..."
>  
> EPR is a thought-experiment, constructed (designed) to make a point. How 
> can one use such artifact as 'evidence' that "shows..."?

Because it has been performed in various ways and is not just a "thought 
experiment".

http://www.drchinese.com/David/EPR_Bell_Aspect.htm

Brent

> Furthermore: relativity is a (genius) human idea, based on the figment 
> of the 'physical world' (assumption). Whether something is consistent or 
> inconsistent with it, is also no 'proof' to be considered in dubious 
> theories (like the conventional - or not so conventional - physics).
> (Anyway this side-line was far from 'random' or 'probabiliyt'
> the focus of my post.)
>  
> John M
> 
>  
> On Thu, Jan 8, 2009 at 4:14 PM, Brent Meeker  > wrote:
> 
> 
> John Mikes wrote:
>  > Dear Bruno,
>  >
>  > I decided so many times not to reflect to the esoteric sci-fi
>  > assumptions (thought experiments?) on this list - about situations
>  > beyond common sense, their use as templates for consequences.
>  > Now, however, I can't control my 'mouse' - in random and
> probabilistics.
>  > *
>  > Bruno quotes in  " -- "  lines, like the starting proposition:
>  > "It is because an event can be random or probabilistic..."
>  > *
>  > "...the perfect throwing of the perfect coin gives an random
>  > experience with a probability "measure"
>  > HEAD = 1/2, TAIL = 1/2"
>  >
>  > Wrong.
>  > A "PERFECT coin PERFECTLY thrown gives ALWAYS either HEAD or TAIL. It
>  > is those imperfections unobserved(?) that makes the difference in the
>  > outcome to 50-50. The only difference that really counts is the
>  > starting condition - whether it is thrown head or tail UP.
> 
> Interestingly, the statistician Persis Diaconis can flip a coin so that
> it lands heads or tails as he chooses.   Many professional magicians can
> do it to.
>  >
>  > To your subsequent 3 questions the answer is YES - depending how you
>  > identify 'probability'. (I don't).
>  > To your evaluating paragraph "Fair Enough": fair enough.
>  > That makes my point.
>  > *
>  > The "experiments with sleeping in the room with whiskey" are above my
>  > head (=my common sense). The Einstein conclusions show that even
> a big
>  > genius like him cannot cope with epistemic enrichment coming
> AFTER his
>  > time.
>  > (Which extends into the contemporary novelties as well?!)
>  >
>  > "...Einstein missed comp by its "conventionalist math" blindness
>  > perhaps, togethet with the fact that he was not interested in
> computer
>  > science. ..."
>  >
>  > I admire Kim's scientific tenacity to absorb your 'explanations' to
>  > the level of asking resonable questions.
>  > I could not spend so much time to submerge myself - and - maybe I am
>  > further away from your domain to do so.
>  >
>  > Thanks for the (*) added post scriptum, I missed it so far.
>  >
>  > One word of how I feel about probability:
>  > In the conventional (scientific/math) view we consider model domains
>  > for our observation (interest). Within such domain we 'count' the
> item
>  > in question (that is statistical) irrespective of occurrences beyond
>  > the boundaries of that domain. The "next" occurrence in the future
>  > history is undecided from a knowledge of the domain's past history in
>  > our best effort: we can consider only the 'stuff' limited into our
>  > model, cannot include effects from 'the rest of the world', so we
>  > cannot tell a 'probability' of the 'next' occurrence at all.
>  > Ominscient is different. I am not.
> I think it is an open question whether there is inherent randomness in
> quantum mechanics.  In Bohmian QM the randomness comes from ignorance of
> "the rest of the world".  But the EPR experiments show that this can
> only hold if the influence of  "the rest of the world" is non-local
> (i.e. faster than light) and hence inconsistent with relativity.
> 
> Brent
> 
> 
> > 


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Re: Kim 2.4 - 2.5

[Kim Jones]

On 10/01/2009, at 5:17 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

>
> I admire too. Kim is courageous.
> Well, for the tenacity we will see :)
>
>

Gee thanks Doctor! I'll try not disappoint you. At the moment I am  
devoting an egregious amount of time to searching for employment as my  
ability to sit and cogitate on Correct Machine Theology will be  
severely curtailed if I don't find a job soon.

In the meantime, is there any chance of a bus slogan campaign: "There  
Probably Is a Universal Dovetailer Computing All of Reality. Now, All  
Of You Theologians, Start Worrying and Start Studying Quantum Physics,  
Computationalism and Modal Logic."

Perhaps we can get it down to something a bit shorter?

cheers,

Kim



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Re: Kim 2.4 - 2.5

[Günther Greindl]

John, Brent,

John said:
 > EPR is a thought-experiment, constructed (designed) to make a point. 
 >How can one use such artifact as 'evidence' that "shows..."?


Aspect Et Al tested it ages ago, see for instance here:
http://www-ece.rice.edu/~kono/ELEC565/Aspect_Nature.pdf

Brent said:
 > But the EPR experiments show that this can
 >only hold if the influence of  "the rest of the world" is non-local
 >(i.e. faster than light) and hence inconsistent with relativity.


QM lives well with special relativity (the physics community speaks of 
"peaceful coexistence") due to the fact that non-local effects can not 
be used for signalling.

QM and Relativity only clash at the level of General Relativity 
(gravity)- at Black Holes and other Singularities (Big Bang).

Cheers,
Günther

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Re: Kim 2.4 - 2.5

[John Mikes]

Brent wrote:

"...But the EPR experiments show that this can only hold if the influence of
 "the rest of the world" is non-local
(i.e. faster than light) and hence inconsistent with relativity..."

EPR is a thought-experiment, constructed (designed) to make a point. How can
one use such artifact as 'evidence' that "shows..."?
Furthermore: relativity is a (genius) human idea, based on the figment of
the 'physical world' (assumption). Whether something is consistent or
inconsistent with it, is also no 'proof' to be considered in dubious
theories (like the conventional - or not so conventional - physics).
(Anyway this side-line was far from 'random' or 'probabiliyt'
the focus of my post.)

John M


On Thu, Jan 8, 2009 at 4:14 PM, Brent Meeker wrote:

>
> John Mikes wrote:
> > Dear Bruno,
> >
> > I decided so many times not to reflect to the esoteric sci-fi
> > assumptions (thought experiments?) on this list - about situations
> > beyond common sense, their use as templates for consequences.
> > Now, however, I can't control my 'mouse' - in random and probabilistics.
> > *
> > Bruno quotes in  " -- "  lines, like the starting proposition:
> > "It is because an event can be random or probabilistic..."
> > *
> > "...the perfect throwing of the perfect coin gives an random
> > experience with a probability "measure"
> > HEAD = 1/2, TAIL = 1/2"
> >
> > Wrong.
> > A "PERFECT coin PERFECTLY thrown gives ALWAYS either HEAD or TAIL. It
> > is those imperfections unobserved(?) that makes the difference in the
> > outcome to 50-50. The only difference that really counts is the
> > starting condition - whether it is thrown head or tail UP.
>
> Interestingly, the statistician Persis Diaconis can flip a coin so that
> it lands heads or tails as he chooses.   Many professional magicians can
> do it to.
>  >
> > To your subsequent 3 questions the answer is YES - depending how you
> > identify 'probability'. (I don't).
> > To your evaluating paragraph "Fair Enough": fair enough.
> > That makes my point.
> > *
> > The "experiments with sleeping in the room with whiskey" are above my
> > head (=my common sense). The Einstein conclusions show that even a big
> > genius like him cannot cope with epistemic enrichment coming AFTER his
> > time.
> > (Which extends into the contemporary novelties as well?!)
> >
> > "...Einstein missed comp by its "conventionalist math" blindness
> > perhaps, togethet with the fact that he was not interested in computer
> > science. ..."
> >
> > I admire Kim's scientific tenacity to absorb your 'explanations' to
> > the level of asking resonable questions.
> > I could not spend so much time to submerge myself - and - maybe I am
> > further away from your domain to do so.
> >
> > Thanks for the (*) added post scriptum, I missed it so far.
> >
> > One word of how I feel about probability:
> > In the conventional (scientific/math) view we consider model domains
> > for our observation (interest). Within such domain we 'count' the item
> > in question (that is statistical) irrespective of occurrences beyond
> > the boundaries of that domain. The "next" occurrence in the future
> > history is undecided from a knowledge of the domain's past history in
> > our best effort: we can consider only the 'stuff' limited into our
> > model, cannot include effects from 'the rest of the world', so we
> > cannot tell a 'probability' of the 'next' occurrence at all.
> > Ominscient is different. I am not.
> I think it is an open question whether there is inherent randomness in
> quantum mechanics.  In Bohmian QM the randomness comes from ignorance of
> "the rest of the world".  But the EPR experiments show that this can
> only hold if the influence of  "the rest of the world" is non-local
> (i.e. faster than light) and hence inconsistent with relativity.
>
> Brent
>
> >
>

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Re: Kim 2.4 - 2.5

[Bruno Marchal]

Hi John,


> I decided so many times not to reflect to the esoteric sci-fi  
> assumptions (thought experiments?) on this list - about situations  
> beyond common sense, their use as templates for consequences.


It is as you wish, but it is my way to question the humans, through UDA.
Then the number is my way to question the machine, through AUDA.

You seem to have a problem with thought experiences and with numbers,  
which prevent you to follow both path.

Don't worry, because perhaps you have your own path and interest and I  
know we agree on some fundamental issue.

The only thing which sometimes worries me is when it looks you are  
sure that machine or number are dumb, which for me illustrates a  
common human prejudice (the feeling superior ...)




> Now, however, I can't control my 'mouse' - in random and  
> probabilistics.
> *
> Bruno quotes in  " -- "  lines, like the starting proposition:
> "It is because an event can be random or probabilistic..."
> *
> "...the perfect throwing of the perfect coin gives an random
> experience with a probability "measure"
> HEAD = 1/2, TAIL = 1/2"
>
> Wrong.
> A "PERFECT coin PERFECTLY thrown gives ALWAYS either HEAD or TAIL.  
> It is those imperfections unobserved(?) that makes the difference in  
> the outcome to 50-50. The only difference that really counts is the  
> starting condition - whether it is thrown head or tail UP.


It seems to me that I agree with you. Let me give you my precise  
definition of a perfect throw of a dice. You know, as Brent Meeker  
recall nowadays there are magician which can "cheat" on those things  
in extreme brilliant ways.
So I will accept that a thrown of coin is "perfect" (relatively to the  
Probability 1/2) if the coin is enclosed in a velvet box and the box  
is shaken during 5 days by 500 monkeys themselves taken randomly among  
10 monkeys, and this when God is not looking (to prevent God for  
being the magician accomplice, who knows ...).




>
> To your subsequent 3 questions the answer is YES - depending how you  
> identify 'probability'. (I don't).
> To your evaluating paragraph "Fair Enough": fair enough.
> That makes my point.
> *
> The "experiments with sleeping in the room with whiskey" are above  
> my head (=my common sense). The Einstein conclusions show that even  
> a big genius like him cannot cope with epistemic enrichment coming  
> AFTER his time.


Einstein was alas still a bit brainwashed by Aristotle, imo. You know  
that I think that the Platonists, and especially Plotinus, has well  
coped with the epistemic enrichment coming after him, and I believe,  
after us  (Lewis Carroll too I think, actually).

And I would so much be pleased to let you guess that the little Lobian  
machine can cope a so big epistemic enrichment too...

Theology has to come back in Academy, I think, if only we want some  
human human science ... I'm afraid that  science has been interrupted  
in 529.

The enlightnment period has only aggravated the gap between human  
science and exact science. This could explain in part the inhuman mess  
on the planet.



> (Which extends into the contemporary novelties as well?!)
>
> "...Einstein missed comp by its "conventionalist math" blindness  
> perhaps, togethet with the fact that he was not interested in  
> computer science. ..."
>
> I admire Kim's scientific tenacity to absorb your 'explanations' to  
> the level of asking resonable questions.


I admire too. Kim is courageous.
Well, for the tenacity we will see :)



> I could not spend so much time to submerge myself - and - maybe I am  
> further away from your domain to do so.


My domain is theology. scientific and thus agnostic theology.  I  
specialized my self in Machine's theology. Or Human's theology once  
assuming comp. The UDA shows (or should show) that physics is a branch  
of theology, so that the AUDA makes Machine's theology experimentally  
refutable.

Will machines go to paradise?

As a scientist I *know* nothing, but I can appreciate some theories.  
Theories are always hypotheses, waiting to be changed or reinterpreted.


>
> Thanks for the (*) added post scriptum, I missed it so far.
>
> One word of how I feel about probability:
> In the conventional (scientific/math) view we consider model domains  
> for our observation (interest). Within such domain we 'count' the  
> item in question (that is statistical) irrespective of occurrences  
> beyond the boundaries of that domain. The "next" occurrence in the  
> future history is undecided from a knowledge of the domain's past  
> history in our best effort: we can consider only the 'stuff' limited  
> into our model, cannot include effects from 'the rest of the world',  
> so we cannot tell a 'probability' of the 'next' occurrence at all.
> Ominscient is different. I am not.

I am not sure I understand, given that "probability" is a measure of  
our ignorance (from us to God, depending on the domain indeed).
In deterministic theories

Re: Kim 2.4 - 2.5

[Brent Meeker]

John Mikes wrote:
> Dear Bruno,
>  
> I decided so many times not to reflect to the esoteric sci-fi 
> assumptions (thought experiments?) on this list - about situations 
> beyond common sense, their use as templates for consequences.
> Now, however, I can't control my 'mouse' - in random and probabilistics.
> *
> Bruno quotes in  " -- "  lines, like the starting proposition:
> "It is because an event can be random or probabilistic..."
> *
> "...the perfect throwing of the perfect coin gives an random
> experience with a probability "measure"
> HEAD = 1/2, TAIL = 1/2"
>  
> Wrong.
> A "PERFECT coin PERFECTLY thrown gives ALWAYS either HEAD or TAIL. It 
> is those imperfections unobserved(?) that makes the difference in the 
> outcome to 50-50. The only difference that really counts is the 
> starting condition - whether it is thrown head or tail UP.

Interestingly, the statistician Persis Diaconis can flip a coin so that 
it lands heads or tails as he chooses.   Many professional magicians can 
do it to.
>  
> To your subsequent 3 questions the answer is YES - depending how you 
> identify 'probability'. (I don't).
> To your evaluating paragraph "Fair Enough": fair enough.
> That makes my point.
> *
> The "experiments with sleeping in the room with whiskey" are above my 
> head (=my common sense). The Einstein conclusions show that even a big 
> genius like him cannot cope with epistemic enrichment coming AFTER his 
> time.  
> (Which extends into the contemporary novelties as well?!)
>  
> "...Einstein missed comp by its "conventionalist math" blindness 
> perhaps, togethet with the fact that he was not interested in computer 
> science. ..."
>  
> I admire Kim's scientific tenacity to absorb your 'explanations' to 
> the level of asking resonable questions.
> I could not spend so much time to submerge myself - and - maybe I am 
> further away from your domain to do so.
>  
> Thanks for the (*) added post scriptum, I missed it so far.
>  
> One word of how I feel about probability:
> In the conventional (scientific/math) view we consider model domains 
> for our observation (interest). Within such domain we 'count' the item 
> in question (that is statistical) irrespective of occurrences beyond 
> the boundaries of that domain. The "next" occurrence in the future 
> history is undecided from a knowledge of the domain's past history in 
> our best effort: we can consider only the 'stuff' limited into our 
> model, cannot include effects from 'the rest of the world', so we 
> cannot tell a 'probability' of the 'next' occurrence at all.
> Ominscient is different. I am not.
I think it is an open question whether there is inherent randomness in 
quantum mechanics.  In Bohmian QM the randomness comes from ignorance of 
"the rest of the world".  But the EPR experiments show that this can 
only hold if the influence of  "the rest of the world" is non-local 
(i.e. faster than light) and hence inconsistent with relativity.

Brent

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Re: Kim 2.4 - 2.5

[John Mikes]

Dear Bruno,

I decided so many times not to reflect to the esoteric sci-fi assumptions
(thought experiments?) on this list - about situations beyond common sense,
their use as templates for consequences.
Now, however, I can't control my 'mouse' - in random and probabilistics.
*
Bruno quotes in  " -- "  lines, like the starting proposition:
"It is because an event can be random or probabilistic..."
*
"...the perfect throwing of the perfect coin gives an random
experience with a probability "measure"
HEAD = 1/2, TAIL = 1/2"

Wrong.
A "PERFECT coin PERFECTLY thrown gives ALWAYS either HEAD or TAIL. It is
those imperfections unobserved(?) that makes the difference in the outcome
to 50-50. The only difference that really counts is the starting condition -
whether it is thrown head or tail UP.

To your subsequent 3 questions the answer is YES - depending how you
identify 'probability'. (I don't).
To your evaluating paragraph "Fair Enough": fair enough.
That makes my point.
*
The "experiments with sleeping in the room with whiskey" are above my head
(=my common sense). The Einstein conclusions show that even a big genius
like him cannot cope with epistemic enrichment coming AFTER his time.
(Which extends into the contemporary novelties as well?!)

"...Einstein missed comp by its "conventionalist math" blindness perhaps,
togethet with the fact that he was not interested in computer science. ..."

I admire Kim's scientific tenacity to absorb your 'explanations' to the
level of asking resonable questions.
I could not spend so much time to submerge myself - and - maybe I am further
away from your domain to do so.

Thanks for the (*) added post scriptum, I missed it so far.

One word of how I feel about probability:
In the conventional (scientific/math) view we consider model domains for our
observation (interest). Within such domain we 'count' the item in question
(that is statistical) irrespective of occurrences beyond the boundaries of
that domain. The "next" occurrence in the future history is undecided from a
knowledge of the domain's past history in our best effort: we can consider
only the 'stuff' limited into our model, cannot include effects from 'the
rest of the world', so we cannot tell a 'probability' of the 'next'
occurrence at all.
Ominscient is different. I am not.

Thanks for an interesting reading.

John M




On Mon, Jan 5, 2009 at 1:48 PM, Bruno Marchal  wrote:

>
>
> On 03 Jan 2009, at 12:59, Kim Jones wrote:
> >
> > Bruno,
> >
> > In this step, one of me experiences (or actually does not experience)
> > the delay prior to reconstitution. In Step 2, it was proven to me that
> > I cannot know that any extra time (other than the 4 minutes necessary
> > transmission interval) has elapsed between my annihilation and
> > reconstitution on Mars. The same thing will now happen to one of "me"
> > in the duplication-plus-delay in Step 4. Essentially, Step 4 is
> > identical to Step 2 with duplication as the only added feature. We
> > cannot attribute a measure to my 1-pov in either step because the
> > outcome is truly random.
>
> It is because an event can be random or probabilistic that we have to
> put a measure on it (like a distribution of probabilities, or of
> credibilities).
>
> Example: the perfect throwing of the perfect coin gives an random
> experience with a probability "measure" HEAD = 1/2, TAIL = 1/2.
>
> I will ask you questions, if you don't mind. I prefer to ask question
> and illustrate the use of the word in place of teaching you the
> probability theory.
>
> - Do you agree that if you throw a coin, you have a probability of 1/2
> to get HEAD?
> - Do you agree that if you throw a dice, you have a probability of 1/6
> to get "six"?
> - Do you agree that if you play lottery, you will win the biggest
> price with a probability like 1/
>
> In most discrete case, we can infer equivalence of the elementary
> events on the base of symmetry (like in the old Pascal probability
> calculus).
> >
> > Here I would merely like to ask, random to whom?
>
> *Fair enough.* In all situation which will interest us: it means "random
> for the subject who performs the (first person) experience".
> You are the one throwing the dice? Then it will be random for you
> (despite it will be random for your friend too, but perhaps not for God).
>
> > Doesn't random mean  that no conscious mind (mine or >yours) can see the
> determinism behind it?
>
> I could agree, although it is not necessary to dig on such detailed
> analysis, imo.
>
> > We are tempted to say "probability 1/2" but that is only >a comp-style
> "bet".
>
> I am not sure I understand. There is just one comp bet: the "yes doctor",
> which we can be paraphrased in step 1by "I survive (or I go to Mars) with
> probability 1". (and idem in step 2)
> But in step 3, ASSUMING comp, it is hard for me to see any difference with
> the throwing of a coin, *for the subject of the experience*.
>
> Suppose I propose the following two type of experiences/experimen

Re: Kim 2.4 - 2.5

[Bruno Marchal]

On 03 Jan 2009, at 12:59, Kim Jones wrote:

>
> Bruno,
>
> In this step, one of me experiences (or actually does not experience)
> the delay prior to reconstitution. In Step 2, it was proven to me that
> I cannot know that any extra time (other than the 4 minutes necessary
> transmission interval) has elapsed between my annihilation and
> reconstitution on Mars. The same thing will now happen to one of "me"
> in the duplication-plus-delay in Step 4. Essentially, Step 4 is
> identical to Step 2 with duplication as the only added feature. We
> cannot attribute a measure to my 1-pov in either step because the
> outcome is truly random.


It is because an event can be random or probabilistic that we have to  
put a measure on it (like a distribution of probabilities, or of  
credibilities).

Example: the perfect throwing of the perfect coin gives an random  
experience with a probability "measure" HEAD = 1/2, TAIL = 1/2.

I will ask you questions, if you don't mind. I prefer to ask question  
and illustrate the use of the word in place of teaching you the  
probability theory.

- Do you agree that if you throw a coin, you have a probability of 1/2  
to get HEAD?
- Do you agree that if you throw a dice, you have a probability of 1/6  
to get "six"?
- Do you agree that if you play lottery, you will win the biggest  
price with a probability like 1/

In most discrete case, we can infer equivalence of the elementary  
events on the base of symmetry (like in the old Pascal probability  
calculus).




>
>
> Here I would merely like to ask, random to whom?


Fair enough. In all situation which will interest us: it means "random  
for the subject who performs the (first person) experience".
You are the one throwing the dice? Then it will be random for you  
(despite it will be random for your friend too, but perhaps not for  
God).




> Doesn't random mean
> that no conscious mind (mine or yours) can see the determinism behind
> it?



I could agree, although it is not necessary to dig on such detailed  
analysis, imo.







> We are tempted to say "probability 1/2" but that is only a comp-
> style "bet".


I am not sure I understand. There is just one comp bet: the "yes  
doctor", which we can be paraphrased in step 1by "I survive (or I go  
to Mars) with probability 1". (and idem in step 2)
But in step 3, ASSUMING comp, it is hard for me to see any difference  
with the throwing of a coin, *for the subject of the experience*.

Suppose I propose the following two type of experiences/experiments.  
The ROOM ZERO and the ROOM ONE are NOT distinguishable from inside  
(but are of course distinguishable from outside). In particular, to  
make things 100% clear later, i add in both room a close box with a  
bottle of whisky inside. And you know this fact about the rooms.

Type 1 experience: I make you asleep, then I throw a coin, if the  
outcome is HEAD I put you in the ROOM ZERO, if I get TAIL, I put you  
in the ROOM ONE. In the room, I wake you up, and I ask you to evaluate  
the chance of finding whisky in the box, and then the chance  
(probability) of being in room ZERO.

Type 2 experience: I make you asleep, then I scan you and annihilate  
you, and I reconstitute you in both rooms ZERO and ONE.  I wake you up  
in both room. In both rooms, you have to evaluate the chance  
(probability) of being in room ZERO or ONE,  and the chance of
finding whisky in the box.

 From the first person points of view, sequences of such experience  
will seem equivalent, except for the "Harry Potter" or "white rabbit"  
youS, which will believe in special computable sequences. OK?

Now the question can be asked BEFORE you undergo the experience. You  
can predict you will have whisky with probability 1. So you can  
predict that you will NOT know in which room you are with probability  
one. So you can predict with certainty that you *will be* uncertain of  
which room you are. So you are now not knowing in which room you will  
be. So the 1/2 can be lifted in your past. You could not have known!  
(This I sum up by the drawing: Y = II, bifurcation of "futures"  
differentiates the "pasts")


> You explained on this in Step 2:
>
>
> "We see that the MEC hypothesis, generally considered as imposing a
> strong determinacy in nature, introduces on the contrary a form of
> strong indeterminacy. Even a God, or whatever possible Omniscient
> Being, cannot predict to you, before a duplication (of you)
> experiment, where you will feel to be after. If he told you "you will
> feel to be the one in room A", the "Kim" in room A will say that such
> God was right, but the one in room B will know or believe that that
> God was wrong, and the point of MEC is that we have no reason to
> listen more to one Kim than to the other Kim. In particular the Kim of
> room A will not convince the Kim of room B, that "God" was right. No
> Kim will ever be able to convince its counterpart about any possible
> method of prediction for the particular futu