subject:"Re\: Maudlin \& How many times does COMP have to be false before its false\?"



On Feb 17, 10:38 pm, benjayk  wrote:
> Brent Meeker-2 wrote:
>
> > On 2/17/2011 12:27 PM, benjayk wrote:
>
> >> Brent Meeker-2 wrote:
>
> >>> On 2/17/2011 10:14 AM, benjayk wrote:
>
>  1Z wrote:
>
> > On Feb 17, 3:10 pm, benjayk   wrote:
>
> >> 1Z wrote:
>
> >> Comp will imply that such a primary matter cannnot interfer at
> >> all
> >> with your consciousness, so that IF comp is correct physics has
> >> to
>
> >> be
>
> >> reduced to number theory, and such a primary matter is an
> >> invisible
> >> epiphenomena.
>
> > Physics cannot be eliminated in favour of non existent numbers.
> > Numbers
> > have to exist for the conclusion to follow
>
>  Physics is not eliminated, on the contrary, physics is explained
>  from
>
>  something non physical.
>
> >>> The anti realist position is not that numbers are some existing non-
> >>> physical
> >>> thing: it is that they are not existent at all.
>
> >> If numbers don't exist at all, what does a statement that seems very
> >> much
> >> like a non-fictional and true statement, like "I have two hands"
> >> mean?
>
> > It's asserting the existence of hands, not numbers.
>
>  You can't have one without the other.
>
> > Sure you can.  You can have an apple and an orange.  Whether they
> > constitute two of something depends on you thinking of them as fruits.
>
> I don't think you can conceive of "an apple and and orange" without them
> constituting two things.

That doesn't mean "two" is a third thing with a separate exisence.

>The "and" already implies there are two things
> (usually).
>
> But even if we grant that an apple and an orange are not necessarily two
> things

THat is not what is at dispute. Two fruit are two fruit, not two fruit
and
one number.

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Re: Maudlin & How many times does COMP have to be false before its false?



On Feb 17, 10:25 pm, Jason Resch  wrote:
> On Thu, Feb 17, 2011 at 9:06 AM, 1Z  wrote:
>
> > On Feb 16, 10:58 pm, Jason Resch  wrote:
> > > On Wed, Feb 16, 2011 at 11:41 AM, 1Z  wrote:
>
> > > > On Feb 16, 3:40 pm, Jason Resch  wrote:
> > > > > On Wed, Feb 16, 2011 at 9:04 AM, 1Z  wrote:
>
> > > > > > On Feb 16, 8:27 am, Jason Resch  wrote:
> > > > > > > On Tue, Feb 15, 2011 at 4:19 PM, 1Z 
> > wrote:
>
> > > > > > > > On Feb 15, 10:12 pm, Brent Meeker 
> > wrote:
> > > > > > > > > On 2/15/2011 1:48 PM, 1Z wrote:
>
> > > > > > > > > I agree.  Although it's interesting that some people with
> > > > synasthesia
> > > > > > > > > apparently perceive numbers as having various perceptual
> > > > properties.
>
> > > > > > > > Some people "perceive" pink elephants too. However, other
> > people
> > > > don't
> > > > > > > > "perceive" them , leading cynics to suppose that they are not
> > > > > > > > really being perceived at all.
>
> > > > > > > The guy who reported seeing the digits of pi like a vast
> > landscape
> > > > also
> > > > > > > receited over 20,000 digits from memory.  That should lend a
> > little
> > > > more
> > > > > > > credence to his claims.
>
> > > > > > Which are what? I don't think *he* is claiming numbers objectively
> > > > > > exist. And isn't the fact that all synaesthetes visualise them
> > > > > > differently
> > > > > > somehat contrary to *that* claim.
>
> > > > > >  > Sure. Horses are real and unicorns aren't. Didn't you know that?
>
> > > > > > > Unless you've visited every time period in every corner of
> > reality
> > > > how
> > > > > > can
> > > > > > > you assert unicrons don't exist?
>
> > > > > > The same way I assert everything: the evidence I have is good
> > enough.
>
> > > > > > >The fossile record might suggest they have
> > > > > > > never lived on this planet but that hardly rules out their
> > existence
> > > > > > > everywhere.
>
> > > > > > > "Does XYZ exist?"
> > > > > > > "Let me look around...  I can't see it right now, it must not
> > exist!"
>
> > > > > > > Instead we should take a more humble approach:
>
> > > > > > > "I've looked around and cannot see it here, it probably doesn't
> > exist
> > > > > > here,
> > > > > > > however I have no idea whether or not it exists in places I
> > cannot
> > > > see or
> > > > > > > have not looked."
>
> > > > > > > I think Bayesian inference:
>
> >http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bayesian_inference#Evidence_and_changing.
> > > > ..
> > > > > > > Is particularly useful in answering questions relating to
> > existence.
> > > >  The
> > > > > > > question is, what prior probability would you set to a
> > proposition
> > > > such
> > > > > > as
> > > > > > > "Other universes not visible to us exist".  1Z and Brent would
> > seem
> > > > to
> > > > > > > assign a rather low probability, but that just means a higher
> > > > threshold
> > > > > > of
> > > > > > > evidence will be required to convince them.  Lacking any evidence
> > at
> > > > all,
> > > > > > > the least biased prior probability to begin with is 0.5.  If some
> > > > > > evidence,
> > > > > > > for fine tuning for example, accumulates then you should adjust
> > your
> > > > > > assumed
> > > > > > > probability that the proposition "Other universes not visible to
> > us
> > > > > > exist"
> > > > > > > is true.
>
> > > > > > > Are you aware of a better or more fair way of addressing such a
> > > > question?
>
> > > > > > I am a fallibilist. You are preaching to the converted.
>
> > > > > Okay it seems we have a common foundation we agree on.  Can you
> > explain
> > > > why
> > > > > you have confidence in the unreality of other possible universes
> > rather
> > > > than
> > > > > uncertainty?  What evidence have you seen for or against that
> > > > proposition?
>
> > > Peter,
>
> > > Thank you for your very detailed and thoughtful response.
>
> > > > The  mathematical multiverse suffers from a double wammy: it is
> > > > predicts
> > > > too much (white rabbits) and explains too little (time and
> > > > consciousness are
> > > > not explained). Physical multiverses are a bit more of a nuanced
> > > > issue. Many worlds
> > > > is not my favourite interpretation of QM, but at the end of the day
> > > > there could be
> > > > empirical evidence one way or the other.
>
> > > If universes are mathematical objects, they follows well-defined
> > equations.
>
> > Physical universes will. Mathematical universes need not. Platonia
> > will include all the discontinous and non-differentiable functions.
> > You
> > have to take the rough with the smooth.
>
> Why couldn't a physical universe be discontinuous?

The more discontinuity you have, the less predictability you
have.

> > >  A few, more rare, universe may have an additional law, at time X, in
> > > location Y, a white rabbit will pop into existence, but the description
> > for
> > > such a universe is much longer.
>
> > Platonia includes eveything that is not seld contradictory, and
> > there is no contradiction

Re: Maudlin & How many times does COMP have to be false before its false?



Brent Meeker-2 wrote:
> 
> On 2/17/2011 12:27 PM, benjayk wrote:
>>
>> Brent Meeker-2 wrote:
>>
>>> On 2/17/2011 10:14 AM, benjayk wrote:
>>>  
 1Z wrote:


>
> On Feb 17, 3:10 pm, benjayk   wrote:
>
>  
>> 1Z wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> Comp will imply that such a primary matter cannnot interfer at
>> all
>> with your consciousness, so that IF comp is correct physics has
>> to
>>
>>
>> be
>>
>>
>> reduced to number theory, and such a primary matter is an
>> invisible
>> epiphenomena.
>>
>>
>>
>>
> Physics cannot be eliminated in favour of non existent numbers.
> Numbers
> have to exist for the conclusion to follow
>
>  
>>
>>
 Physics is not eliminated, on the contrary, physics is explained
 from


>>
>>
 something non physical.


>>
>>
>>> The anti realist position is not that numbers are some existing non-
>>> physical
>>> thing: it is that they are not existent at all.
>>>
>>>  
>> If numbers don't exist at all, what does a statement that seems very
>> much
>> like a non-fictional and true statement, like "I have two hands"
>> mean?
>>
>>
> It's asserting the existence of hands, not numbers.
>
>  
 You can't have one without the other.

> 
> Sure you can.  You can have an apple and an orange.  Whether they 
> constitute two of something depends on you thinking of them as fruits.

I don't think you can conceive of "an apple and and orange" without them
constituting two things. The "and" already implies there are two things
(usually).

But even if we grant that an apple and an orange are not necessarily two
things it is harder to deny that we need the number one in order to have one
apple/orange/hand.


Brent Meeker-2 wrote:
> 
 The statement "2 hands exists" requires that "2 of something" (the
 number
 2)
 exists.


>>> It requires that two of something exist, but not that the number itself
>>> 2 exist.
>>>  
>> What is the difference between two of something and two?
>>
> 
> Two of something exists if the somethings exist.

Why can "two" not just mean  "two of something existing"?


Brent Meeker-2 wrote:
> 
>> Numbers always express quantity of something, even if this something is
>> just
>> numbers.
>>
>> It's like writing "2x" and "2". It may be formally different, but I don't
>> see a difference in the concept that is expressed. "2" is just shorter
>> than
>> "2x" or "2*1" or "1+1".
>> (I am aware that 2x is of course different than 2 when they are both used
>> in
>> a common context like in 2x+2=8; but not when all numbers are written
>> with
>> an x behind them)
>>
>>
>> Brent Meeker-2 wrote:
>>
>>>In symbolic logic it and be expressed as Ex Ey (Hand(x) + Hand
>>> (y) + (x=/=y)), no mention of the number 2.
>>>  
>> You are aware that you just written down TWO "Hand"s?
>> You don't need to write "two" to express that 2 is meant. You can write
>> "II"
>> or "1 plus 1" or "the number of my hands" or "pi/pi + pi/pi" or whatever.
>>
> 
> Writing x x is writing two x's, but it's not writing a number.
Then you treat a number as a symbol. I would rather call that numeral but
OK.

I'm refering to the concept of a quantity of two. And "x x" clearly
represents a quantity of two.


Brent Meeker-2 wrote:
> 
>  Actually 
> I have no objection to supposing the number two exists - so long as  its 
> "existence" is qualified as existing in some completely different sense 
> than hands exist.
I think few would claim that numbers do not exist in a different way then
hands.
That's hard to argue with. A hand is much more specific than a number, it is
material, it is concrete...

But that does not mean that numbers exist in a "lesser" way.


Brent Meeker-2 wrote:
> 
>>
>> Brent Meeker-2 wrote:
>>
>>>  
 1Z wrote:


>
>  
>> If you have two hands, two does exists, otherwise you couldn't have
>> two
>> of
>> something, right?
>>
>>
> And if you have none of something, none exists.
>
>  
 Well, so zero exists, I have no problem with that.


>>> What if you have no zero?  :-)
>>>  
>> Uhm, then I get one out of platonia. I heard they are free there, maybe
>> you
>> should get some. They are very useful. ;)
>>
>>
>> Brent Meeker-2 wrote:
>>
>>>  
 1Z wrote:


>
>  
>> Or is it a fictional statement?
>>
>>
>>
> Nope. You seem to t

Re: Maudlin & How many times does COMP have to be false before its false?

2011-02-17 Thread Jason Resch

On Thu, Feb 17, 2011 at 9:06 AM, 1Z  wrote:

>
>
> On Feb 16, 10:58 pm, Jason Resch  wrote:
> > On Wed, Feb 16, 2011 at 11:41 AM, 1Z  wrote:
> >
> > > On Feb 16, 3:40 pm, Jason Resch  wrote:
> > > > On Wed, Feb 16, 2011 at 9:04 AM, 1Z  wrote:
> >
> > > > > On Feb 16, 8:27 am, Jason Resch  wrote:
> > > > > > On Tue, Feb 15, 2011 at 4:19 PM, 1Z 
> wrote:
> >
> > > > > > > On Feb 15, 10:12 pm, Brent Meeker 
> wrote:
> > > > > > > > On 2/15/2011 1:48 PM, 1Z wrote:
> >
> > > > > > > > I agree.  Although it's interesting that some people with
> > > synasthesia
> > > > > > > > apparently perceive numbers as having various perceptual
> > > properties.
> >
> > > > > > > Some people "perceive" pink elephants too. However, other
> people
> > > don't
> > > > > > > "perceive" them , leading cynics to suppose that they are not
> > > > > > > really being perceived at all.
> >
> > > > > > The guy who reported seeing the digits of pi like a vast
> landscape
> > > also
> > > > > > receited over 20,000 digits from memory.  That should lend a
> little
> > > more
> > > > > > credence to his claims.
> >
> > > > > Which are what? I don't think *he* is claiming numbers objectively
> > > > > exist. And isn't the fact that all synaesthetes visualise them
> > > > > differently
> > > > > somehat contrary to *that* claim.
> >
> > > > >  > Sure. Horses are real and unicorns aren't. Didn't you know that?
> >
> > > > > > Unless you've visited every time period in every corner of
> reality
> > > how
> > > > > can
> > > > > > you assert unicrons don't exist?
> >
> > > > > The same way I assert everything: the evidence I have is good
> enough.
> >
> > > > > >The fossile record might suggest they have
> > > > > > never lived on this planet but that hardly rules out their
> existence
> > > > > > everywhere.
> >
> > > > > > "Does XYZ exist?"
> > > > > > "Let me look around...  I can't see it right now, it must not
> exist!"
> >
> > > > > > Instead we should take a more humble approach:
> >
> > > > > > "I've looked around and cannot see it here, it probably doesn't
> exist
> > > > > here,
> > > > > > however I have no idea whether or not it exists in places I
> cannot
> > > see or
> > > > > > have not looked."
> >
> > > > > > I think Bayesian inference:
> > > > >
> http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bayesian_inference#Evidence_and_changing.
> > > ..
> > > > > > Is particularly useful in answering questions relating to
> existence.
> > >  The
> > > > > > question is, what prior probability would you set to a
> proposition
> > > such
> > > > > as
> > > > > > "Other universes not visible to us exist".  1Z and Brent would
> seem
> > > to
> > > > > > assign a rather low probability, but that just means a higher
> > > threshold
> > > > > of
> > > > > > evidence will be required to convince them.  Lacking any evidence
> at
> > > all,
> > > > > > the least biased prior probability to begin with is 0.5.  If some
> > > > > evidence,
> > > > > > for fine tuning for example, accumulates then you should adjust
> your
> > > > > assumed
> > > > > > probability that the proposition "Other universes not visible to
> us
> > > > > exist"
> > > > > > is true.
> >
> > > > > > Are you aware of a better or more fair way of addressing such a
> > > question?
> >
> > > > > I am a fallibilist. You are preaching to the converted.
> >
> > > > Okay it seems we have a common foundation we agree on.  Can you
> explain
> > > why
> > > > you have confidence in the unreality of other possible universes
> rather
> > > than
> > > > uncertainty?  What evidence have you seen for or against that
> > > proposition?
> >
> > Peter,
> >
> > Thank you for your very detailed and thoughtful response.
> >
> > > The  mathematical multiverse suffers from a double wammy: it is
> > > predicts
> > > too much (white rabbits) and explains too little (time and
> > > consciousness are
> > > not explained). Physical multiverses are a bit more of a nuanced
> > > issue. Many worlds
> > > is not my favourite interpretation of QM, but at the end of the day
> > > there could be
> > > empirical evidence one way or the other.
> >
> > If universes are mathematical objects, they follows well-defined
> equations.
>
> Physical universes will. Mathematical universes need not. Platonia
> will include all the discontinous and non-differentiable functions.
> You
> have to take the rough with the smooth.
>

Why couldn't a physical universe be discontinuous?


>
> >  A few, more rare, universe may have an additional law, at time X, in
> > location Y, a white rabbit will pop into existence, but the description
> for
> > such a universe is much longer.
>
> Platonia includes eveything that is not seld contradictory, and
> there is no contradiction in randomness and chaos. Moreoever
> there must be many disordered sets for every ordered set.
>

Chaotic mathematical structures may exist, but life seems to require the
right balance between complexity and simplicity.  Too complex and there is
not enough time to adapt to changing r

Re: Maudlin & How many times does COMP have to be false before its false?

2011-02-17 Thread Brent Meeker


On 2/17/2011 12:27 PM, benjayk wrote:


Brent Meeker-2 wrote:
   

On 2/17/2011 10:14 AM, benjayk wrote:
 

1Z wrote:

   


On Feb 17, 3:10 pm, benjayk   wrote:

 

1Z wrote:


   

Comp will imply that such a primary matter cannnot interfer at all
with your consciousness, so that IF comp is correct physics has to

   

be

   

reduced to number theory, and such a primary matter is an invisible
epiphenomena.

   


   

Physics cannot be eliminated in favour of non existent numbers.
Numbers
have to exist for the conclusion to follow

 


   

Physics is not eliminated, on the contrary, physics is explained from

   


   

something non physical.

   


   

The anti realist position is not that numbers are some existing non-
physical
thing: it is that they are not existent at all.

 

If numbers don't exist at all, what does a statement that seems very
much
like a non-fictional and true statement, like "I have two hands" mean?

   

It's asserting the existence of hands, not numbers.

 

You can't have one without the other.
   


Sure you can.  You can have an apple and an orange.  Whether they 
constitute two of something depends on you thinking of them as fruits.



The statement "2 hands exists" requires that "2 of something" (the number
2)
exists.

   

It requires that two of something exist, but not that the number itself
2 exist.
 

What is the difference between two of something and two?
   


Two of something exists if the somethings exist.


Numbers always express quantity of something, even if this something is just
numbers.

It's like writing "2x" and "2". It may be formally different, but I don't
see a difference in the concept that is expressed. "2" is just shorter than
"2x" or "2*1" or "1+1".
(I am aware that 2x is of course different than 2 when they are both used in
a common context like in 2x+2=8; but not when all numbers are written with
an x behind them)


Brent Meeker-2 wrote:
   

   In symbolic logic it and be expressed as Ex Ey (Hand(x) + Hand
(y) + (x=/=y)), no mention of the number 2.
 

You are aware that you just written down TWO "Hand"s?
You don't need to write "two" to express that 2 is meant. You can write "II"
or "1 plus 1" or "the number of my hands" or "pi/pi + pi/pi" or whatever.
   


Writing x x is writing two x's, but it's not writing a number. Actually 
I have no objection to supposing the number two exists - so long as  its 
"existence" is qualified as existing in some completely different sense 
than hands exist.


Brent




Brent Meeker-2 wrote:
   
 

1Z wrote:

   


 

If you have two hands, two does exists, otherwise you couldn't have two
of
something, right?

   

And if you have none of something, none exists.

 

Well, so zero exists, I have no problem with that.

   

What if you have no zero?  :-)
 

Uhm, then I get one out of platonia. I heard they are free there, maybe you
should get some. They are very useful. ;)


Brent Meeker-2 wrote:
   
 

1Z wrote:

   


 

Or is it a fictional statement?


   

Nope. You seem to think every word in a true sentence must
have a separate referent. However, "and", "or", "is", "not" etc
do not have separate referents. A true sentence must refer *as a
whole*
to some state of affairs. That is the only requirement.

 

Not every word must have an object as referent, but every word implies
the
existence of an object that is connected to the word.

   

You seem to not understand what "referent" means.  The above sentence is
self contradictory.
 

I thought referent is that thing which a word refers to.
If you allow just objects as referents, then some words have no direct
referent.

Like "and".
One could argue it doesn't directly refer to an object. But nevertheless
there are objects that reflect what the word means, like "conjunction".
   


You could say "and" is conjuction and exists in the land of 
connectives.  But this sort of extension of "exists" threatens to blur 
the use of the word in meaninglessness.  Russell's theory of types tried 
to reconstruct mathematics that way.


Brent

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Re: Maudlin & How many times does COMP have to be false before its false?



1Z wrote:
> 
> 
> On Feb 17, 6:14 pm, benjayk  wrote:
>> 1Z wrote:
>>
>> > On Feb 17, 3:10 pm, benjayk  wrote:
>> >> 1Z wrote:
>>
>> >> >> >> Comp will imply that such a primary matter cannnot interfer at
>> all
>> >> >> >> with your consciousness, so that IF comp is correct physics has
>> to
>> >> be
>> >> >> >> reduced to number theory, and such a primary matter is an
>> invisible
>> >> >> >> epiphenomena.
>>
>> >> >> > Physics cannot be eliminated in favour of non existent numbers.
>> >> >> > Numbers
>> >> >> > have to exist for the conclusion to follow
>>
>> >> >> Physics is not eliminated, on the contrary, physics is explained
>> from
>> >>  
>> >> >> something non physical.
>>
>> >> > The anti realist position is not that numbers are some existing non-
>> >> > physical
>> >> > thing: it is that they are not existent at all.
>>
>> >> If numbers don't exist at all, what does a statement that seems very
>> much
>> >> like a non-fictional and true statement, like "I have two hands" mean?
>>
>> > It's asserting the existence of hands, not numbers.
>>
>> You can't have one without the other.
>> The statement "2 hands exists" requires that "2 of something" (the number
>> 2)
>> exists.
> 
> The idea that "2 hands exist" implies that 2 exists implies that 3
> things exist (the left hand, the  right hand and "two")
Right. You just made an argument that ALL numbers do exist. Do you have a
problem with that?


1Z wrote:
> 
>> 1Z wrote:
>>
>> >> If you have two hands, two does exists, otherwise you couldn't have
>> two
>> >> of
>> >> something, right?
>>
>> > And if you have none of something, none exists.
>>
>> Well, so zero exists, I have no problem with that.
>>
>> 1Z wrote:
>>
>> >> Or is it a fictional statement?
>>
>> > Nope. You seem to think every word in a true sentence must
>> > have a separate referent. However, "and", "or", "is", "not" etc
>> > do not have separate referents. A true sentence must refer *as a
>> > whole*
>> > to some state of affairs. That is the only requirement.
>>
>> Not every word must have an object as referent, but every word implies
>> the
>> existence of an object that is connected to the word.
> 
> That's a straight contradiction.
I expressed myself badly here...

I wanted to express that some words don't seem to have a direct referent in
the sense of an object, but that it is possible to objectify them and then
they do have a referent.

Probably I should just say that every word has a referent.


1Z wrote:
> 
>> If it is meaningful to use the word "and", "something and something" or a
>> conjunction exists, if it is meaningful to use the word "or", "something
>> or
>> something" or a disjunction exists, if it is meaningful to use the word
>> "is",
> 
> To  say "there is an existing statue of liberty" says nothing more
> that "there is a statue of liberty"
That depends how you interpret the sentence. In general I agree, but "there
is an existing statue of liberty" might be used with "existing" in the sense
of existing in the stable consensus reality.

So you could say "there is an existing statue of liberty" (that exists in
the consensus reality) in contrast to "there is a 'non-existant' statue of
serfdom" (that is absent in the consensus reality; but it does exists in my
imagination).

Your comment is probably meant to imply there is something wrong with what I
wrote, but I don't get what it is.


1Z wrote:
> 
>>"something existing" or simply existence exists, if it is meaningful
>> to use the word "not", "something that does not exist" or absence exist
>> (existing in the absolute sense and not existing relative to something
>> else)
>> and if if it is meaningful to use the word "two", "two of something" or
>> the
>> number 2 exists.
> 
> Nope. To say that two of something exist is not to say two exists.
> 
OK; I don't really get that, but let's say this is so.

Then you get the functionally same structure as the numbers, but you don't
call them "one, two, three,..." but "one of something, two of something,
three of something,...".
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Re: Maudlin & How many times does COMP have to be false before its false?



Brent Meeker-2 wrote:
> 
> On 2/17/2011 10:14 AM, benjayk wrote:
>>
>> 1Z wrote:
>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Feb 17, 3:10 pm, benjayk  wrote:
>>>  
 1Z wrote:


 Comp will imply that such a primary matter cannnot interfer at all
 with your consciousness, so that IF comp is correct physics has to

 be

 reduced to number theory, and such a primary matter is an invisible
 epiphenomena.


>>> Physics cannot be eliminated in favour of non existent numbers.
>>> Numbers
>>> have to exist for the conclusion to follow
>>>  

>> Physics is not eliminated, on the contrary, physics is explained from
>>


>> something non physical.
>>

> The anti realist position is not that numbers are some existing non-
> physical
> thing: it is that they are not existent at all.
>  
 If numbers don't exist at all, what does a statement that seems very
 much
 like a non-fictional and true statement, like "I have two hands" mean?

>>> It's asserting the existence of hands, not numbers.
>>>  
>> You can't have one without the other.
>> The statement "2 hands exists" requires that "2 of something" (the number
>> 2)
>> exists.
>>
> 
> It requires that two of something exist, but not that the number itself 
> 2 exist.
What is the difference between two of something and two?
Numbers always express quantity of something, even if this something is just
numbers.

It's like writing "2x" and "2". It may be formally different, but I don't
see a difference in the concept that is expressed. "2" is just shorter than
"2x" or "2*1" or "1+1".
(I am aware that 2x is of course different than 2 when they are both used in
a common context like in 2x+2=8; but not when all numbers are written with
an x behind them)


Brent Meeker-2 wrote:
> 
>   In symbolic logic it and be expressed as Ex Ey (Hand(x) + Hand 
> (y) + (x=/=y)), no mention of the number 2.
You are aware that you just written down TWO "Hand"s?
You don't need to write "two" to express that 2 is meant. You can write "II"
or "1 plus 1" or "the number of my hands" or "pi/pi + pi/pi" or whatever.


Brent Meeker-2 wrote:
> 
>>
>> 1Z wrote:
>>
>>>  
 If you have two hands, two does exists, otherwise you couldn't have two
 of
 something, right?

>>> And if you have none of something, none exists.
>>>  
>> Well, so zero exists, I have no problem with that.
>>
> 
> What if you have no zero?  :-)
Uhm, then I get one out of platonia. I heard they are free there, maybe you
should get some. They are very useful. ;)


Brent Meeker-2 wrote:
> 
>>
>> 1Z wrote:
>>
>>>  
 Or is it a fictional statement?


>>> Nope. You seem to think every word in a true sentence must
>>> have a separate referent. However, "and", "or", "is", "not" etc
>>> do not have separate referents. A true sentence must refer *as a
>>> whole*
>>> to some state of affairs. That is the only requirement.
>>>  
>> Not every word must have an object as referent, but every word implies
>> the
>> existence of an object that is connected to the word.
>>
> 
> You seem to not understand what "referent" means.  The above sentence is 
> self contradictory.
I thought referent is that thing which a word refers to.
If you allow just objects as referents, then some words have no direct
referent.

Like "and".
One could argue it doesn't directly refer to an object. But nevertheless
there are objects that reflect what the word means, like "conjunction".
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Re: Maudlin & How many times does COMP have to be false before its false?



On Feb 17, 6:14 pm, benjayk  wrote:
> 1Z wrote:
>
> > On Feb 17, 3:10 pm, benjayk  wrote:
> >> 1Z wrote:
>
> >> >> >> Comp will imply that such a primary matter cannnot interfer at all
> >> >> >> with your consciousness, so that IF comp is correct physics has to
> >> be
> >> >> >> reduced to number theory, and such a primary matter is an invisible
> >> >> >> epiphenomena.
>
> >> >> > Physics cannot be eliminated in favour of non existent numbers.
> >> >> > Numbers
> >> >> > have to exist for the conclusion to follow
>
> >> >> Physics is not eliminated, on the contrary, physics is explained from
> >>  
> >> >> something non physical.
>
> >> > The anti realist position is not that numbers are some existing non-
> >> > physical
> >> > thing: it is that they are not existent at all.
>
> >> If numbers don't exist at all, what does a statement that seems very much
> >> like a non-fictional and true statement, like "I have two hands" mean?
>
> > It's asserting the existence of hands, not numbers.
>
> You can't have one without the other.
> The statement "2 hands exists" requires that "2 of something" (the number 2)
> exists.

The idea that "2 hands exist" implies that 2 exists implies that 3
things exist (the left hand, the  right hand and "two")

> 1Z wrote:
>
> >> If you have two hands, two does exists, otherwise you couldn't have two
> >> of
> >> something, right?
>
> > And if you have none of something, none exists.
>
> Well, so zero exists, I have no problem with that.
>
> 1Z wrote:
>
> >> Or is it a fictional statement?
>
> > Nope. You seem to think every word in a true sentence must
> > have a separate referent. However, "and", "or", "is", "not" etc
> > do not have separate referents. A true sentence must refer *as a
> > whole*
> > to some state of affairs. That is the only requirement.
>
> Not every word must have an object as referent, but every word implies the
> existence of an object that is connected to the word.

That's a straight contradiction.

> If it is meaningful to use the word "and", "something and something" or a
> conjunction exists, if it is meaningful to use the word "or", "something or
> something" or a disjunction exists, if it is meaningful to use the word
> "is",

To  say "there is an existing statue of liberty" says nothing more
that "there is a statue of liberty"

>"something existing" or simply existence exists, if it is meaningful
> to use the word "not", "something that does not exist" or absence exist
> (existing in the absolute sense and not existing relative to something else)
> and if if it is meaningful to use the word "two", "two of something" or the
> number 2 exists.

Nope. To say that two of something exist is not to say two exists.

> View this message in 
> context:http://old.nabble.com/Maudlin---How-many-times-does-COMP-have-to-be-f...
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Re: Maudlin & How many times does COMP have to be false before its false?

2011-02-17 Thread Brent Meeker


On 2/17/2011 10:14 AM, benjayk wrote:


1Z wrote:
   



On Feb 17, 3:10 pm, benjayk  wrote:
 

1Z wrote:

   

Comp will imply that such a primary matter cannnot interfer at all
with your consciousness, so that IF comp is correct physics has to
   

be
   

reduced to number theory, and such a primary matter is an invisible
epiphenomena.
   
   

Physics cannot be eliminated in favour of non existent numbers.
Numbers
have to exist for the conclusion to follow
 
   

Physics is not eliminated, on the contrary, physics is explained from
   


   

something non physical.
   
   

The anti realist position is not that numbers are some existing non-
physical
thing: it is that they are not existent at all.
 

If numbers don't exist at all, what does a statement that seems very much
like a non-fictional and true statement, like "I have two hands" mean?
   

It's asserting the existence of hands, not numbers.
 

You can't have one without the other.
The statement "2 hands exists" requires that "2 of something" (the number 2)
exists.
   


It requires that two of something exist, but not that the number itself 
2 exist.  In symbolic logic it and be expressed as Ex Ey (Hand(x) + Hand 
(y) + (x=/=y)), no mention of the number 2.




1Z wrote:
   
 

If you have two hands, two does exists, otherwise you couldn't have two
of
something, right?
   

And if you have none of something, none exists.
 

Well, so zero exists, I have no problem with that.
   


What if you have no zero?  :-)




1Z wrote:
   
 

Or is it a fictional statement?

   

Nope. You seem to think every word in a true sentence must
have a separate referent. However, "and", "or", "is", "not" etc
do not have separate referents. A true sentence must refer *as a
whole*
to some state of affairs. That is the only requirement.
 

Not every word must have an object as referent, but every word implies the
existence of an object that is connected to the word.
   


You seem to not understand what "referent" means.  The above sentence is 
self contradictory.


Brent


If it is meaningful to use the word "and", "something and something" or a
conjunction exists, if it is meaningful to use the word "or", "something or
something" or a disjunction exists, if it is meaningful to use the word
"is", "something existing" or simply existence exists, if it is meaningful
to use the word "not", "something that does not exist" or absence exist
(existing in the absolute sense and not existing relative to something else)
and if if it is meaningful to use the word "two", "two of something" or the
number 2 exists.
   


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Re: Maudlin & How many times does COMP have to be false before its false?



1Z wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On Feb 17, 3:10 pm, benjayk  wrote:
>> 1Z wrote:
>>
>> >> >> Comp will imply that such a primary matter cannnot interfer at all
>> >> >> with your consciousness, so that IF comp is correct physics has to
>> be
>> >> >> reduced to number theory, and such a primary matter is an invisible
>> >> >> epiphenomena.
>>
>> >> > Physics cannot be eliminated in favour of non existent numbers.
>> >> > Numbers
>> >> > have to exist for the conclusion to follow
>>
>> >> Physics is not eliminated, on the contrary, physics is explained from
>>  
>> >> something non physical.
>>
>> > The anti realist position is not that numbers are some existing non-
>> > physical
>> > thing: it is that they are not existent at all.
>>
>> If numbers don't exist at all, what does a statement that seems very much
>> like a non-fictional and true statement, like "I have two hands" mean?
> 
> It's asserting the existence of hands, not numbers.

You can't have one without the other.
The statement "2 hands exists" requires that "2 of something" (the number 2)
exists.


1Z wrote:
> 
>> If you have two hands, two does exists, otherwise you couldn't have two
>> of
>> something, right?
> 
> And if you have none of something, none exists.
Well, so zero exists, I have no problem with that.


1Z wrote:
> 
>> Or is it a fictional statement?
>>
> Nope. You seem to think every word in a true sentence must
> have a separate referent. However, "and", "or", "is", "not" etc
> do not have separate referents. A true sentence must refer *as a
> whole*
> to some state of affairs. That is the only requirement.
Not every word must have an object as referent, but every word implies the
existence of an object that is connected to the word.

If it is meaningful to use the word "and", "something and something" or a
conjunction exists, if it is meaningful to use the word "or", "something or
something" or a disjunction exists, if it is meaningful to use the word
"is", "something existing" or simply existence exists, if it is meaningful
to use the word "not", "something that does not exist" or absence exist
(existing in the absolute sense and not existing relative to something else)
and if if it is meaningful to use the word "two", "two of something" or the
number 2 exists.
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Re: Maudlin & How many times does COMP have to be false before its false?



On Feb 17, 3:10 pm, benjayk  wrote:
> 1Z wrote:
>
> >> >> Comp will imply that such a primary matter cannnot interfer at all
> >> >> with your consciousness, so that IF comp is correct physics has to be
> >> >> reduced to number theory, and such a primary matter is an invisible
> >> >> epiphenomena.
>
> >> > Physics cannot be eliminated in favour of non existent numbers.
> >> > Numbers
> >> > have to exist for the conclusion to follow
>
> >> Physics is not eliminated, on the contrary, physics is explained from  
> >> something non physical.
>
> > The anti realist position is not that numbers are some existing non-
> > physical
> > thing: it is that they are not existent at all.
>
> If numbers don't exist at all, what does a statement that seems very much
> like a non-fictional and true statement, like "I have two hands" mean?

It's asserting the existence of hands, not numbers.

> If you have two hands, two does exists, otherwise you couldn't have two of
> something, right?

And if you have none of something, none exists.

> Or is it a fictional statement?
>
Nope. You seem to think every word in a true sentence must
have a separate referent. However, "and", "or", "is", "not" etc
do not have separate referents. A true sentence must refer *as a
whole*
to some state of affairs. That is the only requirement.

> But this is obviously absurd! - Except if you accept that fictional things
> are, too, real in a sense, but this would mean that "fictional"
> numbers/computation can indeed be what determines the appearance of the
> physical.
>
> Or numbers are material things and numbers give rise to (in this case) the
> rest of material things. In this case your sense of material is quite
> akward, though.
>
> --
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> context:http://old.nabble.com/Maudlin---How-many-times-does-COMP-have-to-be-f...
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Re: Maudlin & How many times does COMP have to be false before its false?



1Z wrote:
> 
>> >> Comp will imply that such a primary matter cannnot interfer at all
>> >> with your consciousness, so that IF comp is correct physics has to be
>> >> reduced to number theory, and such a primary matter is an invisible
>> >> epiphenomena.
>>
>> > Physics cannot be eliminated in favour of non existent numbers.
>> > Numbers
>> > have to exist for the conclusion to follow
>>
>> Physics is not eliminated, on the contrary, physics is explained from  
>> something non physical.
> 
> The anti realist position is not that numbers are some existing non-
> physical
> thing: it is that they are not existent at all.
> 
If numbers don't exist at all, what does a statement that seems very much
like a non-fictional and true statement, like "I have two hands" mean?
If you have two hands, two does exists, otherwise you couldn't have two of
something, right?

Or is it a fictional statement?

But this is obviously absurd! - Except if you accept that fictional things
are, too, real in a sense, but this would mean that "fictional"
numbers/computation can indeed be what determines the appearance of the
physical.

Or numbers are material things and numbers give rise to (in this case) the
rest of material things. In this case your sense of material is quite
akward, though.

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Re: Maudlin & How many times does COMP have to be false before its false?



On Feb 16, 10:58 pm, Jason Resch  wrote:
> On Wed, Feb 16, 2011 at 11:41 AM, 1Z  wrote:
>
> > On Feb 16, 3:40 pm, Jason Resch  wrote:
> > > On Wed, Feb 16, 2011 at 9:04 AM, 1Z  wrote:
>
> > > > On Feb 16, 8:27 am, Jason Resch  wrote:
> > > > > On Tue, Feb 15, 2011 at 4:19 PM, 1Z  wrote:
>
> > > > > > On Feb 15, 10:12 pm, Brent Meeker  wrote:
> > > > > > > On 2/15/2011 1:48 PM, 1Z wrote:
>
> > > > > > > I agree.  Although it's interesting that some people with
> > synasthesia
> > > > > > > apparently perceive numbers as having various perceptual
> > properties.
>
> > > > > > Some people "perceive" pink elephants too. However, other people
> > don't
> > > > > > "perceive" them , leading cynics to suppose that they are not
> > > > > > really being perceived at all.
>
> > > > > The guy who reported seeing the digits of pi like a vast landscape
> > also
> > > > > receited over 20,000 digits from memory.  That should lend a little
> > more
> > > > > credence to his claims.
>
> > > > Which are what? I don't think *he* is claiming numbers objectively
> > > > exist. And isn't the fact that all synaesthetes visualise them
> > > > differently
> > > > somehat contrary to *that* claim.
>
> > > >  > Sure. Horses are real and unicorns aren't. Didn't you know that?
>
> > > > > Unless you've visited every time period in every corner of reality
> > how
> > > > can
> > > > > you assert unicrons don't exist?
>
> > > > The same way I assert everything: the evidence I have is good enough.
>
> > > > >The fossile record might suggest they have
> > > > > never lived on this planet but that hardly rules out their existence
> > > > > everywhere.
>
> > > > > "Does XYZ exist?"
> > > > > "Let me look around...  I can't see it right now, it must not exist!"
>
> > > > > Instead we should take a more humble approach:
>
> > > > > "I've looked around and cannot see it here, it probably doesn't exist
> > > > here,
> > > > > however I have no idea whether or not it exists in places I cannot
> > see or
> > > > > have not looked."
>
> > > > > I think Bayesian inference:
> > > >http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bayesian_inference#Evidence_and_changing.
> > ..
> > > > > Is particularly useful in answering questions relating to existence.
> >  The
> > > > > question is, what prior probability would you set to a proposition
> > such
> > > > as
> > > > > "Other universes not visible to us exist".  1Z and Brent would seem
> > to
> > > > > assign a rather low probability, but that just means a higher
> > threshold
> > > > of
> > > > > evidence will be required to convince them.  Lacking any evidence at
> > all,
> > > > > the least biased prior probability to begin with is 0.5.  If some
> > > > evidence,
> > > > > for fine tuning for example, accumulates then you should adjust your
> > > > assumed
> > > > > probability that the proposition "Other universes not visible to us
> > > > exist"
> > > > > is true.
>
> > > > > Are you aware of a better or more fair way of addressing such a
> > question?
>
> > > > I am a fallibilist. You are preaching to the converted.
>
> > > Okay it seems we have a common foundation we agree on.  Can you explain
> > why
> > > you have confidence in the unreality of other possible universes rather
> > than
> > > uncertainty?  What evidence have you seen for or against that
> > proposition?
>
> Peter,
>
> Thank you for your very detailed and thoughtful response.
>
> > The  mathematical multiverse suffers from a double wammy: it is
> > predicts
> > too much (white rabbits) and explains too little (time and
> > consciousness are
> > not explained). Physical multiverses are a bit more of a nuanced
> > issue. Many worlds
> > is not my favourite interpretation of QM, but at the end of the day
> > there could be
> > empirical evidence one way or the other.
>
> If universes are mathematical objects, they follows well-defined equations.

Physical universes will. Mathematical universes need not. Platonia
will include all the discontinous and non-differentiable functions.
You
have to take the rough with the smooth.

>  A few, more rare, universe may have an additional law, at time X, in
> location Y, a white rabbit will pop into existence, but the description for
> such a universe is much longer.

Platonia includes eveything that is not seld contradictory, and
there is no contradiction in randomness and chaos. Moreoever
there must be many disordered sets for every ordered set.

> In self-similar mathematical structures,
> such as the programs generated by the UDA, the simpler structures recur much
> more frequently, and so the measure for a particular instantiation of an
> observer would have a higher measure in universes with shorter
> descriptions/definitions.

That applies if the UDA is the only primary structure. However,
if your argument for a UDA is that it necessarily exists in Platonia,
it has to be an island of order in a sea of chaos.

> Further, life cannot evolve in a universe with
> unpredictable laws or with laws which constan

Re: Maudlin & How many times does COMP have to be false before its false?

2011-02-17 Thread Bruno Marchal



On 16 Feb 2011, at 22:36, Brent Meeker wrote:


On 2/16/2011 12:33 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

hat matter adds to a bundle of properties is existence. A non-
existent bundle of properties is a mere concept, a mere possibility.
Thus the concept of matter is very much tied to the idea of
contingency or "somethingism" -- the idea that only certain possible
things exist.


Only certain possible number relations exist. And relatively to a  
number there is the provable relations, the consistent relations,  
the true relation, and then the combination of those.


I don't understand that?  A relation might imply a contradiction and  
therefore be impossible.


Yes.




But I would suppose that all possible relations would exist in  
Platonia.


Yes. I was perhaps unclear. "Only certain possible relation" =  
"possible relation". It was an insistence type of use of "certain".  
But "possible" in this context is "consistent for this or that machine  
number". Possibility (consistency) applies to theories or machine or  
number.





What non-contraditory relations would not exist?


I am glad you accept they all exist.
Sorry for having been unclear.
But even contradictory relation exists relatively to number/theory.  
(PA is inconsistent) is consistent with PA, and "(PA + (PA is  
inconsistent)" is true, that is, it belongs to arithmetical truth. and  
"If PA is consistent then PA + provable('0=1') is consistent" is true  
and provable by PA, etc.


Bruno


http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



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Re: Maudlin & How many times does COMP have to be false before its false?

2011-02-16 Thread Brent Meeker


On 2/14/2011 4:12 PM, Jason Resch wrote:



On Mon, Feb 14, 2011 at 11:23 AM, Brent Meeker 
mailto:meeke...@dslextreme.com>> wrote:


On 2/13/2011 11:24 PM, Jason Resch wrote:



On Mon, Feb 14, 2011 at 12:52 AM, Brent Meeker
mailto:meeke...@dslextreme.com>> wrote:

On 2/13/2011 10:13 PM, Jason Resch wrote:



On Sun, Feb 13, 2011 at 10:46 AM, Brent Meeker
mailto:meeke...@dslextreme.com>>
wrote:

On 2/13/2011 5:21 AM, 1Z wrote:


On Feb 12, 3:18 am, Brent
Meekermailto:meeke...@dslextreme.com>>  wrote:


What do you think the chances are
that any random object in
Plato's heaven, or any random Turing
machine will support intelligent life?
1 in 10, 1 in 1000, 1 in a billion?

Zero.

Does that allow us to argue:

1) A universe selected from an uncountably infinite
number of
possibilities has measure
0
2) Our universe exists so it has measure>0
3) Our universe is not selected from uncountably
infinite
possibilities
4) MUH indicates any universe must be selected from
uncountable
infinite possibilities (since all
of maths includes the real line, etc)
5) MUH is false.


Hmmm.  I think we argue that objects in Plato's heaven
and Turing machines are not the right kind of things to
support life.



I am very puzzled by this statement.  You could help me
understand by answering the following questions:

Why couldn't there be an accurate simulation of life on a
Turing machine?


Because a Turing machine is an abstraction.  If you mean a
realization of a Turing machine, then I suppose there could
be a simulation of life on it.




How can entities within a universe that exists in Plato's
heaven distinguish it from a universe that does not?


I doubt that Plato's heaven exists.  So no universes would
exist in it.

Brent



Exists is a funny word.  It seems to embody knowledge and opinion
from one observer's viewpoint based on their own limited
experiences and interactions within their local portion of reality.


Indeed.  I'm not sure it's unqualified use is meaningful.



If Plato's heaven is such a thing that contains all possible
structures, does the fact that it contains all possible
structures hold true whether or not it exists?


All possible brick structures?  Please explain as precisely as
possible what Platonia is.



If there are universes existing abstractly inside Plato's heaven,
and some of those universes contain conscious observers, does
ascribing the property of non-existence to Plato's heaven or to
those universes make those observers not conscious, or is the
abstraction enough?


What does "abstractly existing" mean.?  How is it different from
just exsiting?



What properties can something which is non-existent have?

It seems there are two choices: 1. Things which are non-existent
can have other properties besides non-existence.


Sure.  Sherlock Holmes is non-existent and has the property of
being a detective.



E.g., a non-existent universe has atoms, stars, worlds, and
people on some of those worlds.  Or 2. Non-existent things cannot
have any other properties besides non-existence.  It sounds like
you belong to this second camp.

However, this seems to lead immediately to mathematical realism. 
As there are objects with definite objectively explorable

properties in math.  7's primality and parity are properties of
7.  But how can 7 have properties if it does not exist?  If
non-existent things can have properties, why can't consciousness
be one of those properties?  What is the difference between a
non-existent brain experiencing a sunset and an existent brain
experiencing a sunset?


Only one of them exists.



Please explain as precisely as possible what it means for
something to not exist.


If I can kick it and it kicks back it exists.

Brent



What do you think about this passage from Fabric of Reality, where 
David Deutsch argues numbers do "kick back":


"/Do/ abstract, non-physical entities exist? Are they part of the 
fabric of reality? I am not interested here in issues of mere word 
usage. It is obvious that numbers, the laws of physics, and so on do 
‘exist’ in some senses and not in others. The substantive question is 
this: how are we to understand such entities? Which of them are merely 
convenient forms of words, referr

Re: Maudlin & How many times does COMP have to be false before its false?

2011-02-16 Thread Jason Resch

On Wed, Feb 16, 2011 at 11:41 AM, 1Z  wrote:

>
>
> On Feb 16, 3:40 pm, Jason Resch  wrote:
> > On Wed, Feb 16, 2011 at 9:04 AM, 1Z  wrote:
> >
> > > On Feb 16, 8:27 am, Jason Resch  wrote:
> > > > On Tue, Feb 15, 2011 at 4:19 PM, 1Z  wrote:
> >
> > > > > On Feb 15, 10:12 pm, Brent Meeker  wrote:
> > > > > > On 2/15/2011 1:48 PM, 1Z wrote:
> >
> > > > > > I agree.  Although it's interesting that some people with
> synasthesia
> > > > > > apparently perceive numbers as having various perceptual
> properties.
> >
> > > > > Some people "perceive" pink elephants too. However, other people
> don't
> > > > > "perceive" them , leading cynics to suppose that they are not
> > > > > really being perceived at all.
> >
> > > > The guy who reported seeing the digits of pi like a vast landscape
> also
> > > > receited over 20,000 digits from memory.  That should lend a little
> more
> > > > credence to his claims.
> >
> > > Which are what? I don't think *he* is claiming numbers objectively
> > > exist. And isn't the fact that all synaesthetes visualise them
> > > differently
> > > somehat contrary to *that* claim.
> >
> > >  > Sure. Horses are real and unicorns aren't. Didn't you know that?
> >
> > > > Unless you've visited every time period in every corner of reality
> how
> > > can
> > > > you assert unicrons don't exist?
> >
> > > The same way I assert everything: the evidence I have is good enough.
> >
> > > >The fossile record might suggest they have
> > > > never lived on this planet but that hardly rules out their existence
> > > > everywhere.
> >
> > > > "Does XYZ exist?"
> > > > "Let me look around...  I can't see it right now, it must not exist!"
> >
> > > > Instead we should take a more humble approach:
> >
> > > > "I've looked around and cannot see it here, it probably doesn't exist
> > > here,
> > > > however I have no idea whether or not it exists in places I cannot
> see or
> > > > have not looked."
> >
> > > > I think Bayesian inference:
> > >http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bayesian_inference#Evidence_and_changing.
> ..
> > > > Is particularly useful in answering questions relating to existence.
>  The
> > > > question is, what prior probability would you set to a proposition
> such
> > > as
> > > > "Other universes not visible to us exist".  1Z and Brent would seem
> to
> > > > assign a rather low probability, but that just means a higher
> threshold
> > > of
> > > > evidence will be required to convince them.  Lacking any evidence at
> all,
> > > > the least biased prior probability to begin with is 0.5.  If some
> > > evidence,
> > > > for fine tuning for example, accumulates then you should adjust your
> > > assumed
> > > > probability that the proposition "Other universes not visible to us
> > > exist"
> > > > is true.
> >
> > > > Are you aware of a better or more fair way of addressing such a
> question?
> >
> > > I am a fallibilist. You are preaching to the converted.
> >
> > Okay it seems we have a common foundation we agree on.  Can you explain
> why
> > you have confidence in the unreality of other possible universes rather
> than
> > uncertainty?  What evidence have you seen for or against that
> proposition?
>
>
>
Peter,

Thank you for your very detailed and thoughtful response.


> The  mathematical multiverse suffers from a double wammy: it is
> predicts
> too much (white rabbits) and explains too little (time and
> consciousness are
> not explained). Physical multiverses are a bit more of a nuanced
> issue. Many worlds
> is not my favourite interpretation of QM, but at the end of the day
> there could be
> empirical evidence one way or the other.
>


If universes are mathematical objects, they follows well-defined equations.
 A few, more rare, universe may have an additional law, at time X, in
location Y, a white rabbit will pop into existence, but the description for
such a universe is much longer.  In self-similar mathematical structures,
such as the programs generated by the UDA, the simpler structures recur much
more frequently, and so the measure for a particular instantiation of an
observer would have a higher measure in universes with shorter
descriptions/definitions.  Further, life cannot evolve in a universe with
unpredictable laws or with laws which constantly change.  If evolution is
the most common path to observers, then again the measure will be higher for
observers located in orderly predictable universes.

Where randomness and unpredictability come from results from observers
lacking sufficient knowledge to locate in which universe they exist, or in
which universe their next consciousness moment may be.  Consider this simple
experiment:

You will be anesthetized on Friday and awoken on Monday morning.  Once you
awake you will be asked what day it is.  Your answer is clear in this case:
It will be Monday.
But then consider this twist: After giving your answer you will be given a
memory formation blocking drug, and anesthetized again until Tuesday
morning.  Where upon you will b

Re: Maudlin & How many times does COMP have to be false before its false?

2011-02-16 Thread Brent Meeker


On 2/16/2011 12:33 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

hat matter adds to a bundle of properties is existence. A non-
existent bundle of properties is a mere concept, a mere possibility.
Thus the concept of matter is very much tied to the idea of
contingency or "somethingism" -- the idea that only certain possible
things exist.


Only certain possible number relations exist. And relatively to a 
number there is the provable relations, the consistent relations, the 
true relation, and then the combination of those.


I don't understand that?  A relation might imply a contradiction and 
therefore be impossible.  But I would suppose that all possible 
relations would exist in Platonia.  What non-contraditory relations 
would not exist?


Brent

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Re: Maudlin & How many times does COMP have to be false before its false?



On 16 Feb 2011, at 18:41, 1Z wrote:




On Feb 16, 3:40 pm, Jason Resch  wrote:

On Wed, Feb 16, 2011 at 9:04 AM, 1Z  wrote:


On Feb 16, 8:27 am, Jason Resch  wrote:

On Tue, Feb 15, 2011 at 4:19 PM, 1Z  wrote:



On Feb 15, 10:12 pm, Brent Meeker  wrote:

On 2/15/2011 1:48 PM, 1Z wrote:


I agree.  Although it's interesting that some people with  
synasthesia
apparently perceive numbers as having various perceptual  
properties.


Some people "perceive" pink elephants too. However, other people  
don't

"perceive" them , leading cynics to suppose that they are not
really being perceived at all.


The guy who reported seeing the digits of pi like a vast  
landscape also
receited over 20,000 digits from memory.  That should lend a  
little more

credence to his claims.



Which are what? I don't think *he* is claiming numbers objectively
exist. And isn't the fact that all synaesthetes visualise them
differently
somehat contrary to *that* claim.



 > Sure. Horses are real and unicorns aren't. Didn't you know that?


Unless you've visited every time period in every corner of  
reality how

can

you assert unicrons don't exist?


The same way I assert everything: the evidence I have is good  
enough.



The fossile record might suggest they have
never lived on this planet but that hardly rules out their  
existence

everywhere.



"Does XYZ exist?"
"Let me look around...  I can't see it right now, it must not  
exist!"



Instead we should take a more humble approach:


"I've looked around and cannot see it here, it probably doesn't  
exist

here,
however I have no idea whether or not it exists in places I  
cannot see or

have not looked."



I think Bayesian inference:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bayesian_inference#Evidence_and_changing 
...
Is particularly useful in answering questions relating to  
existence.  The
question is, what prior probability would you set to a  
proposition such

as
"Other universes not visible to us exist".  1Z and Brent would  
seem to
assign a rather low probability, but that just means a higher  
threshold

of
evidence will be required to convince them.  Lacking any evidence  
at all,

the least biased prior probability to begin with is 0.5.  If some

evidence,
for fine tuning for example, accumulates then you should adjust  
your

assumed

probability that the proposition "Other universes not visible to us

exist"

is true.


Are you aware of a better or more fair way of addressing such a  
question?



I am a fallibilist. You are preaching to the converted.


Okay it seems we have a common foundation we agree on.  Can you  
explain why
you have confidence in the unreality of other possible universes  
rather than
uncertainty?  What evidence have you seen for or against that  
proposition?



The  mathematical multiverse suffers from a double wammy: it is
predicts
too much (white rabbits) and explains too little (time and
consciousness are
not explained). Physical multiverses are a bit more of a nuanced
issue. Many worlds
is not my favourite interpretation of QM, but at the end of the day
there could be
empirical evidence one way or the other.

Mathematical monism is both too broad and too narrow.

Too broad: If I am just a mathematical structure, I should have a much
wider range of experience than I do. There is a mathemtical structure
corresponding to myself with all my experiences up to time T. There is
a vast array of mathematical structures corresponding to other
versions of me with having a huge range of experiences -- ordinary
ones, like continuing to type, extraordinary ones like seeing my
computer sudenly turn into bowl of petunias. All these versions of me
share the memories of the "me" who is writing this, so they all
identify themselves as me. Remember, that for mathematical monism it
is only necessary that a possible experience has a mathematical
description. This is known as the White Rabbit problem. If we think in
terms of multiverse theories, we would say that there is one "me" in
this universe and other "me's" in other universes,a nd they are kept
out of contact with each other. The question is whether a purely
mathematical scheme has enough resources to impose isolation or
otherwise remove the White Rabbit problem.

Too narrow: there are a number of prima-facie phenomena which a purely
mathematical approach struggles to deal with.

   * space
   * time
   * consciousness
   * causality
   * necessity/contingency

Why space ? It is tempting to think that if a number of, or some other
mathematical entity, occurs in a set with other numbers, that is, as
it were, a "space" which is disconnected from other sets, so that a
set forms a natural model of an *isolated* universe withing a
multiverse, a universe which does not suffer from the White Rabbit
problem. However, maths per se does not work that way. The number "2"
that appears in the set of even numbers is exactly the same number "2"
that appears in the list of numbers less than 10. It does not acquire
any

Re: Maudlin & How many times does COMP have to be false before its false?



On Feb 16, 5:10 pm, Bruno Marchal  wrote:
> On 16 Feb 2011, at 16:17, 1Z wrote:
>
>
>
>
>
> > On Feb 16, 8:46 am, Bruno Marchal  wrote:
> >> On 15 Feb 2011, at 20:22, 1Z wrote:
>
> >>> I want to say "number aren't real, so I'm not really a number"
>
> >> All your talk about numbers which are not real seems to me
> >> nonsensical. Also you seems to know what is real and what is not
> >> real,
>
> > Sure. Horses are real and unicorns aren't. Didn't you know that?
>
>  I meant "in general".
>
> >>> I don't need anything more than
> >>> 1) I am real
> >>> 2) Unreal things don't generate real things
>
> >>> I think both of those are hard to dispute.
>
> >> But nobody believes that numbers are unreal.
>
> > I do. Hartry Field does. Etc.
>
> Fair enough. Nobody except nominalist philosophers.

Is that supposed to mean that the intuitions of working mathematicians
override the mere arguments of philosophers

> >> They believe that numbers
> >> are not material but that is different.
> >> You beg the question by identifying real with material, and by
> >> assuming a primitive materiality.
>
> > You beg the question by assuming Platonism
>
> I assume that arithmetical truth (actually the tiny effective part) is
> true independently of observers. It is a common assumption, and I am
> not saying it is true, just part of what is needed to make sense of
> the term  'digital' in digital mechanism. All we nedd is that it makes
> sense to say that ExP(x) or that ~ExP(x), with P decidable, so that we
> can say that the (mathematica) run of a (mathematical) program stop,
> or does not stop, and proceed to the consequences of Church thesis.

Without Platonism you cannot eliminate matter

>
>
> >> This is obstructive of thought,
> >> only. Your critics of science reminds me on the critics on Einstein's
> >> relativity by Bergson. I do appreciate Bergson, but his dialog with
> >> Einstein was a dialog of deaf. A bit like Goethe critics of Newton.
> >> Pseudo-philosophy, like pseudo-religion, are authoritative argument
> >> in
> >> disguise.
>
> > You cannot come to conclusions about my existence
> > with a merely formal statement of bivalence
>
>  I use bivalence but also "yes doctor".
>
> >>> But YD doesn't get anywhere if I am only agreeing
> >>> to a physical substitution
>
> >> The whole point of the UDA+MGA is to show that YD (defined by a
> >> physical substitution) does lead to the abandon of the physical as
> >> primary.
>
> > The physical cant be abandoned unless there is something to
> > take its place. Hence you need Platonism
>
> The physical is not abandoned.

It is abandoned as primary. In your own words.

> Just that if comp is correct it has to
> be retrieved from self-reference logic.



> >> So you are just confirming that you are using the notion of
> >> primary matter as a reason for not studying an argument. You should
> >> better search an error in it.
>
>  Then after concluding, we can
>  take as theory of everything just elementary arithmetic, and it is
>  explained in all detail how to recover formally physics (among
>  other
>  things) from that.
>
>  Use AR formally. The theological conclusion will be provided by
>  the
>  fact that you might be able to imagine surviving a digital
>  graft.
>
> >>> I might well imagine being reincarnated in some other physical
> >>> medium. I won't imagine being reincarnated as a number
>
> >> It is not so difficult to imagine. If you can imagine being
> >> reincarneted in a virtual reality, like in a dream, you can
> >> uderstand
> >> that the feeling of "matter" is a construct of your mind. Then it
> >> is
> >> just a matter of study to understand that arithmetical truth
> >> contains
> >> all the emulation of all programs,
>
> > As it is purely hypothetical it doesn't contain a ny actual
> > running programmes.
>
>  Actual is an indexical, and can be relative to numbers'
>  configurations.
>
> >>> If a multiverse is not actual, no-one within it can make
> >>> and indexical judgement of actuality.
>
> >> Sure. But that's begging the question again and again.
>
> > The converse is also question begging.
>
> I don't see this. The ontology and the epistemology are clear enough.
> Primary matter is not needed,

Given the assumption of Platonism. And vice versa

> unless there are too much WR, but that
> is the point: the mind body problem is reduced into a problem of WRs.
>
>
>
>
>
> >> You contradict your self,
>
> > No I don't. How many times have I explained that
> > mathematical existence claims are true in a fictive
> > sense that doesn't imply real existence
>
>  Then please use that fictive sense in the reasoning. Then yes
>  doctor +
>  occam gives the ontological conclusion.
>
> >>> No, if it has a fictive premise, it has a fictive conclusion.
>
> >> That

Re: Maudlin & How many times does COMP have to be false before its false?

On Feb 16, 3:40 pm, Jason Resch  wrote:
> On Wed, Feb 16, 2011 at 9:04 AM, 1Z  wrote:
>
> > On Feb 16, 8:27 am, Jason Resch  wrote:
> > > On Tue, Feb 15, 2011 at 4:19 PM, 1Z  wrote:
>
> > > > On Feb 15, 10:12 pm, Brent Meeker  wrote:
> > > > > On 2/15/2011 1:48 PM, 1Z wrote:
>
> > > > > I agree.  Although it's interesting that some people with synasthesia
> > > > > apparently perceive numbers as having various perceptual properties.
>
> > > > Some people "perceive" pink elephants too. However, other people don't
> > > > "perceive" them , leading cynics to suppose that they are not
> > > > really being perceived at all.
>
> > > The guy who reported seeing the digits of pi like a vast landscape also
> > > receited over 20,000 digits from memory.  That should lend a little more
> > > credence to his claims.
>
> > Which are what? I don't think *he* is claiming numbers objectively
> > exist. And isn't the fact that all synaesthetes visualise them
> > differently
> > somehat contrary to *that* claim.
>
> >  > Sure. Horses are real and unicorns aren't. Didn't you know that?
>
> > > Unless you've visited every time period in every corner of reality how
> > can
> > > you assert unicrons don't exist?
>
> > The same way I assert everything: the evidence I have is good enough.
>
> > >The fossile record might suggest they have
> > > never lived on this planet but that hardly rules out their existence
> > > everywhere.
>
> > > "Does XYZ exist?"
> > > "Let me look around...  I can't see it right now, it must not exist!"
>
> > > Instead we should take a more humble approach:
>
> > > "I've looked around and cannot see it here, it probably doesn't exist
> > here,
> > > however I have no idea whether or not it exists in places I cannot see or
> > > have not looked."
>
> > > I think Bayesian inference:
> >http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bayesian_inference#Evidence_and_changing...
> > > Is particularly useful in answering questions relating to existence.  The
> > > question is, what prior probability would you set to a proposition such
> > as
> > > "Other universes not visible to us exist".  1Z and Brent would seem to
> > > assign a rather low probability, but that just means a higher threshold
> > of
> > > evidence will be required to convince them.  Lacking any evidence at all,
> > > the least biased prior probability to begin with is 0.5.  If some
> > evidence,
> > > for fine tuning for example, accumulates then you should adjust your
> > assumed
> > > probability that the proposition "Other universes not visible to us
> > exist"
> > > is true.
>
> > > Are you aware of a better or more fair way of addressing such a question?
>
> > I am a fallibilist. You are preaching to the converted.
>
> Okay it seems we have a common foundation we agree on.  Can you explain why
> you have confidence in the unreality of other possible universes rather than
> uncertainty?  What evidence have you seen for or against that proposition?

The  mathematical multiverse suffers from a double wammy: it is
predicts
too much (white rabbits) and explains too little (time and
consciousness are
not explained). Physical multiverses are a bit more of a nuanced
issue. Many worlds
is not my favourite interpretation of QM, but at the end of the day
there could be
empirical evidence one way or the other.

Mathematical monism is both too broad and too narrow.

Too broad: If I am just a mathematical structure, I should have a much
wider range of experience than I do. There is a mathemtical structure
corresponding to myself with all my experiences up to time T. There is
a vast array of mathematical structures corresponding to other
versions of me with having a huge range of experiences -- ordinary
ones, like continuing to type, extraordinary ones like seeing my
computer sudenly turn into bowl of petunias. All these versions of me
share the memories of the "me" who is writing this, so they all
identify themselves as me. Remember, that for mathematical monism it
is only necessary that a possible experience has a mathematical
description. This is known as the White Rabbit problem. If we think in
terms of multiverse theories, we would say that there is one "me" in
this universe and other "me's" in other universes,a nd they are kept
out of contact with each other. The question is whether a purely
mathematical scheme has enough resources to impose isolation or
otherwise remove the White Rabbit problem.

Too narrow: there are a number of prima-facie phenomena which a purely
mathematical approach struggles to deal with.

* space
* time
* consciousness
* causality
* necessity/contingency

Why space ? It is tempting to think that if a number of, or some other
mathematical entity, occurs in a set with other numbers, that is, as
it were, a "space" which is disconnected from other sets, so that a
set forms a natural model of an *isolated* universe withing a
multiverse, a universe which does not suffer from the White Rabbit
problem. However, maths per se d

Re: Maudlin & How many times does COMP have to be false before its false?



On 16 Feb 2011, at 16:17, 1Z wrote:




On Feb 16, 8:46 am, Bruno Marchal  wrote:

On 15 Feb 2011, at 20:22, 1Z wrote:






I want to say "number aren't real, so I'm not really a number"



All your talk about numbers which are not real seems to me
nonsensical. Also you seems to know what is real and what is not
real,



Sure. Horses are real and unicorns aren't. Didn't you know that?



I meant "in general".



I don't need anything more than
1) I am real
2) Unreal things don't generate real things



I think both of those are hard to dispute.


But nobody believes that numbers are unreal.


I do. Hartry Field does. Etc.


Fair enough. Nobody except nominalist philosophers.





They believe that numbers
are not material but that is different.
You beg the question by identifying real with material, and by
assuming a primitive materiality.


You beg the question by assuming Platonism


I assume that arithmetical truth (actually the tiny effective part) is  
true independently of observers. It is a common assumption, and I am  
not saying it is true, just part of what is needed to make sense of  
the term  'digital' in digital mechanism. All we nedd is that it makes  
sense to say that ExP(x) or that ~ExP(x), with P decidable, so that we  
can say that the (mathematica) run of a (mathematical) program stop,  
or does not stop, and proceed to the consequences of Church thesis.






This is obstructive of thought,
only. Your critics of science reminds me on the critics on Einstein's
relativity by Bergson. I do appreciate Bergson, but his dialog with
Einstein was a dialog of deaf. A bit like Goethe critics of Newton.
Pseudo-philosophy, like pseudo-religion, are authoritative argument  
in

disguise.




You cannot come to conclusions about my existence
with a merely formal statement of bivalence



I use bivalence but also "yes doctor".



But YD doesn't get anywhere if I am only agreeing
to a physical substitution


The whole point of the UDA+MGA is to show that YD (defined by a
physical substitution) does lead to the abandon of the physical as
primary.


The physical cant be abandoned unless there is something to
take its place. Hence you need Platonism


The physical is not abandoned. Just that if comp is correct it has to  
be retrieved from self-reference logic.







So you are just confirming that you are using the notion of
primary matter as a reason for not studying an argument. You should
better search an error in it.






Then after concluding, we can
take as theory of everything just elementary arithmetic, and it is
explained in all detail how to recover formally physics (among  
other

things) from that.



Use AR formally. The theological conclusion will be provided by
the
fact that you might be able to imagine surviving a digital  
graft.



I might well imagine being reincarnated in some other physical
medium. I won't imagine being reincarnated as a number



It is not so difficult to imagine. If you can imagine being
reincarneted in a virtual reality, like in a dream, you can
uderstand
that the feeling of "matter" is a construct of your mind. Then it
is
just a matter of study to understand that arithmetical truth
contains
all the emulation of all programs,



As it is purely hypothetical it doesn't contain a ny actual
running programmes.



Actual is an indexical, and can be relative to numbers'
configurations.



If a multiverse is not actual, no-one within it can make
and indexical judgement of actuality.


Sure. But that's begging the question again and again.



The converse is also question begging.



I don't see this. The ontology and the epistemology are clear enough.
Primary matter is not needed, unless there are too much WR, but that  
is the point: the mind body problem is reduced into a problem of WRs.






You contradict your self,



No I don't. How many times have I explained that
mathematical existence claims are true in a fictive
sense that doesn't imply real existence



Then please use that fictive sense in the reasoning. Then yes
doctor +
occam gives the ontological conclusion.



No, if it has a fictive premise, it has a fictive conclusion.



That is your idiosyncracy. You can add as many "fictive" terms as
you
want, it will not change the validity of the reasoning, and the
testability of comp (+ the classical theory of knowledge).



If it is testable, it is false.



Why?



Not enough WR's.


Intuitively you are right, but you have to take into account computer
science which shows that intuition here is of no use. It might be
possible that in fine mechanism leads to too much White Rabbits, but
that has not been proved yet. Again, that would not change the
reasoning, just the conclusion.


WRs follow from any straightforward approach to measure.


It is nice that you have at least understood this. It is the main  
contribution. But I doubt anyone can take you seriously with the idea  
that the measure problem admit a straightforward approach, and AUDA  
shows tha

Re: Maudlin & How many times does COMP have to be false before its false?

2011-02-16 Thread Jason Resch

On Wed, Feb 16, 2011 at 9:04 AM, 1Z  wrote:

>
>
> On Feb 16, 8:27 am, Jason Resch  wrote:
> > On Tue, Feb 15, 2011 at 4:19 PM, 1Z  wrote:
> >
> > > On Feb 15, 10:12 pm, Brent Meeker  wrote:
> > > > On 2/15/2011 1:48 PM, 1Z wrote:
> >
> > > > I agree.  Although it's interesting that some people with synasthesia
> > > > apparently perceive numbers as having various perceptual properties.
> >
> > > Some people "perceive" pink elephants too. However, other people don't
> > > "perceive" them , leading cynics to suppose that they are not
> > > really being perceived at all.
> >
> > The guy who reported seeing the digits of pi like a vast landscape also
> > receited over 20,000 digits from memory.  That should lend a little more
> > credence to his claims.
>
> Which are what? I don't think *he* is claiming numbers objectively
> exist. And isn't the fact that all synaesthetes visualise them
> differently
> somehat contrary to *that* claim.
>
>  > Sure. Horses are real and unicorns aren't. Didn't you know that?
> >
> > Unless you've visited every time period in every corner of reality how
> can
> > you assert unicrons don't exist?
>
> The same way I assert everything: the evidence I have is good enough.
>
> >The fossile record might suggest they have
> > never lived on this planet but that hardly rules out their existence
> > everywhere.
> >
> > "Does XYZ exist?"
> > "Let me look around...  I can't see it right now, it must not exist!"
> >
> > Instead we should take a more humble approach:
> >
> > "I've looked around and cannot see it here, it probably doesn't exist
> here,
> > however I have no idea whether or not it exists in places I cannot see or
> > have not looked."
> >
> > I think Bayesian inference:
> http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bayesian_inference#Evidence_and_changing...
> > Is particularly useful in answering questions relating to existence.  The
> > question is, what prior probability would you set to a proposition such
> as
> > "Other universes not visible to us exist".  1Z and Brent would seem to
> > assign a rather low probability, but that just means a higher threshold
> of
> > evidence will be required to convince them.  Lacking any evidence at all,
> > the least biased prior probability to begin with is 0.5.  If some
> evidence,
> > for fine tuning for example, accumulates then you should adjust your
> assumed
> > probability that the proposition "Other universes not visible to us
> exist"
> > is true.
> >
> > Are you aware of a better or more fair way of addressing such a question?
> >
>
> I am a fallibilist. You are preaching to the converted.
>
>
Okay it seems we have a common foundation we agree on.  Can you explain why
you have confidence in the unreality of other possible universes rather than
uncertainty?  What evidence have you seen for or against that proposition?

If more evidence accumulated for Fine-Tuning, would that be sufficient for
you to believe it is probably true that universes ruled by other laws exist
also?

Do you think the prior probability that "other physical universes exist"
should be greater than the prior probability that "mathematical objects
exist"?  If so, why and to what degree?

Finally, do you see any difference between "all possible (self-consistent)
universes exist" vs. "all logically possible objects in math exist"?

Jason

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Re: Maudlin & How many times does COMP have to be false before its false?



On Feb 16, 8:46 am, Bruno Marchal  wrote:
> On 15 Feb 2011, at 20:22, 1Z wrote:
>
>
>
>
>
> > I want to say "number aren't real, so I'm not really a number"
>
>  All your talk about numbers which are not real seems to me
>  nonsensical. Also you seems to know what is real and what is not
>  real,
>
> >>> Sure. Horses are real and unicorns aren't. Didn't you know that?
>
> >> I meant "in general".
>
> > I don't need anything more than
> > 1) I am real
> > 2) Unreal things don't generate real things
>
> > I think both of those are hard to dispute.
>
> But nobody believes that numbers are unreal.

I do. Hartry Field does. Etc.

> They believe that numbers  
> are not material but that is different.
> You beg the question by identifying real with material, and by  
> assuming a primitive materiality.

You beg the question by assuming Platonism

>This is obstructive of thought,  
> only. Your critics of science reminds me on the critics on Einstein's  
> relativity by Bergson. I do appreciate Bergson, but his dialog with  
> Einstein was a dialog of deaf. A bit like Goethe critics of Newton.  
> Pseudo-philosophy, like pseudo-religion, are authoritative argument in  
> disguise.
>
>
>
> >>> You cannot come to conclusions about my existence
> >>> with a merely formal statement of bivalence
>
> >> I use bivalence but also "yes doctor".
>
> > But YD doesn't get anywhere if I am only agreeing
> > to a physical substitution
>
> The whole point of the UDA+MGA is to show that YD (defined by a  
> physical substitution) does lead to the abandon of the physical as  
> primary.

The physical cant be abandoned unless there is something to
take its place. Hence you need Platonism

> So you are just confirming that you are using the notion of  
> primary matter as a reason for not studying an argument. You should  
> better search an error in it.
>
>
>
>
>
> >> Then after concluding, we can
> >> take as theory of everything just elementary arithmetic, and it is
> >> explained in all detail how to recover formally physics (among other
> >> things) from that.
>
> >> Use AR formally. The theological conclusion will be provided by  
> >> the
> >> fact that you might be able to imagine surviving a digital graft.
>
> > I might well imagine being reincarnated in some other physical
> > medium. I won't imagine being reincarnated as a number
>
>  It is not so difficult to imagine. If you can imagine being
>  reincarneted in a virtual reality, like in a dream, you can  
>  uderstand
>  that the feeling of "matter" is a construct of your mind. Then it  
>  is
>  just a matter of study to understand that arithmetical truth  
>  contains
>  all the emulation of all programs,
>
> >>> As it is purely hypothetical it doesn't contain a ny actual
> >>> running programmes.
>
> >> Actual is an indexical, and can be relative to numbers'  
> >> configurations.
>
> > If a multiverse is not actual, no-one within it can make
> > and indexical judgement of actuality.
>
> Sure. But that's begging the question again and again.


The converse is also question begging.

>  You contradict your self,
>
> >>> No I don't. How many times have I explained that
> >>> mathematical existence claims are true in a fictive
> >>> sense that doesn't imply real existence
>
> >> Then please use that fictive sense in the reasoning. Then yes
> >> doctor +
> >> occam gives the ontological conclusion.
>
> > No, if it has a fictive premise, it has a fictive conclusion.
>
>  That is your idiosyncracy. You can add as many "fictive" terms as  
>  you
>  want, it will not change the validity of the reasoning, and the
>  testability of comp (+ the classical theory of knowledge).
>
> >>> If it is testable, it is false.
>
> >> Why?
>
> > Not enough WR's.
>
> Intuitively you are right, but you have to take into account computer  
> science which shows that intuition here is of no use. It might be  
> possible that in fine mechanism leads to too much White Rabbits, but  
> that has not been proved yet. Again, that would not change the  
> reasoning, just the conclusion.

WRs follow from any straightforward approach to measure.
The burden is on the multiversalists to avoid the objection.

> >>> What does "comp nothing exists" mean?
>
> >> Sorry. I meant "In which case comp implies nothing exists."
>
> > Comp implies that the midn is a computer. All known
> > computers are phsycial, so comp implies that the mind is physical.
>
>  You will not find any book in physics, except by Zristotle which  
>  use
>  the notion of primary matter.
>
> >>> They all do. Physicists think matter/energy exists.
>
> >> Some does not. John A. Wheeler is open to the idea that physics  
> >> emerge
> >> from something non physical (cf It from Bit).
>
> > And everyone else doesn't.
>
> New paradigm takes time to be swallowed.

That is quite a climb-down from y

Re: Maudlin & How many times does COMP have to be false before its false?



On Feb 16, 8:27 am, Jason Resch  wrote:
> On Tue, Feb 15, 2011 at 4:19 PM, 1Z  wrote:
>
> > On Feb 15, 10:12 pm, Brent Meeker  wrote:
> > > On 2/15/2011 1:48 PM, 1Z wrote:
>
> > > I agree.  Although it's interesting that some people with synasthesia
> > > apparently perceive numbers as having various perceptual properties.
>
> > Some people "perceive" pink elephants too. However, other people don't
> > "perceive" them , leading cynics to suppose that they are not
> > really being perceived at all.
>
> The guy who reported seeing the digits of pi like a vast landscape also
> receited over 20,000 digits from memory.  That should lend a little more
> credence to his claims.

Which are what? I don't think *he* is claiming numbers objectively
exist. And isn't the fact that all synaesthetes visualise them
differently
somehat contrary to *that* claim.

 > Sure. Horses are real and unicorns aren't. Didn't you know that?
>
> Unless you've visited every time period in every corner of reality how can
> you assert unicrons don't exist?  

The same way I assert everything: the evidence I have is good enough.

>The fossile record might suggest they have
> never lived on this planet but that hardly rules out their existence
> everywhere.
>
> "Does XYZ exist?"
> "Let me look around...  I can't see it right now, it must not exist!"
>
> Instead we should take a more humble approach:
>
> "I've looked around and cannot see it here, it probably doesn't exist here,
> however I have no idea whether or not it exists in places I cannot see or
> have not looked."
>
> I think Bayesian 
> inference:http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bayesian_inference#Evidence_and_changing...
> Is particularly useful in answering questions relating to existence.  The
> question is, what prior probability would you set to a proposition such as
> "Other universes not visible to us exist".  1Z and Brent would seem to
> assign a rather low probability, but that just means a higher threshold of
> evidence will be required to convince them.  Lacking any evidence at all,
> the least biased prior probability to begin with is 0.5.  If some evidence,
> for fine tuning for example, accumulates then you should adjust your assumed
> probability that the proposition "Other universes not visible to us exist"
> is true.
>
> Are you aware of a better or more fair way of addressing such a question?
>

I am a fallibilist. You are preaching to the converted.

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Re: Maudlin & How many times does COMP have to be false before its false?



On 15 Feb 2011, at 20:25, 1Z wrote:




On Feb 15, 6:13 pm, Bruno Marchal  wrote:

On 15 Feb 2011, at 18:16, 1Z wrote:




In science we never know if our premisses and conclusions are
true or
not.



I can still resist the conclusion by *believing* Platonism
to be false, while believing comp to be true.



"platonism" is ambiguous.



I mean and have always meant mathematical Platonism


But you talk on a paper with a different terminology.


What paper? The Klein paper doesn't mention it.



We were talking on the UDA+MGA argument of sane04, albeit MGA refers  
to the presentation that I have presented on this list, well, about   
two years ago.






You are
confusing people.




Any way, you can resist any conclusion in
science with some ad-hoc philosophy.



There is nothing unscientific in the attitude
the immaterial things don't exist.


Right, but irrelevant.




So you are not saying something
informative here.
Ad without a minimal amount of arithmetical realism you cannot
endorse
Church thesis,



A formalist can endorses anything with no ontological
realism whatsoever. All that is left without any ontological
realism is a formal axiom of bivalence


... which added to the theological bet "yes doctor" entails that
materialism, to explain matter,  is not better than vitalism to
explain life.


Materialism can solve WR just fine


Not in a way compatible with CT+YD (that's the point). Or there is  
something wrong in UDA+MGA. Up to now, your move consists in saying  
that seven is unreal and that mathematics is fiction. If mathematics  
is fiction, Church thesis is senseless, and CT is part of making sense  
of "digital" in "digital mechanism".


Bruno

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



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Re: Maudlin & How many times does COMP have to be false before its false?



On 15 Feb 2011, at 20:22, 1Z wrote:



I want to say "number aren't real, so I'm not really a number"



All your talk about numbers which are not real seems to me
nonsensical. Also you seems to know what is real and what is not
real,



Sure. Horses are real and unicorns aren't. Didn't you know that?


I meant "in general".



I don't need anything more than
1) I am real
2) Unreal things don't generate real things

I think both of those are hard to dispute.


But nobody believes that numbers are unreal. They believe that numbers  
are not material but that is different.
You beg the question by identifying real with material, and by  
assuming a primitive materiality. This is obstructive of thought,  
only. Your critics of science reminds me on the critics on Einstein's  
relativity by Bergson. I do appreciate Bergson, but his dialog with  
Einstein was a dialog of deaf. A bit like Goethe critics of Newton.  
Pseudo-philosophy, like pseudo-religion, are authoritative argument in  
disguise.








You cannot come to conclusions about my existence
with a merely formal statement of bivalence


I use bivalence but also "yes doctor".


But YD doesn't get anywhere if I am only agreeing
to a physical substitution


The whole point of the UDA+MGA is to show that YD (defined by a  
physical substitution) does lead to the abandon of the physical as  
primary. So you are just confirming that you are using the notion of  
primary matter as a reason for not studying an argument. You should  
better search an error in it.







Then after concluding, we can
take as theory of everything just elementary arithmetic, and it is
explained in all detail how to recover formally physics (among other
things) from that.


Use AR formally. The theological conclusion will be provided by  
the

fact that you might be able to imagine surviving a digital graft.



I might well imagine being reincarnated in some other physical
medium. I won't imagine being reincarnated as a number



It is not so difficult to imagine. If you can imagine being
reincarneted in a virtual reality, like in a dream, you can  
uderstand
that the feeling of "matter" is a construct of your mind. Then it  
is
just a matter of study to understand that arithmetical truth  
contains

all the emulation of all programs,



As it is purely hypothetical it doesn't contain a ny actual
running programmes.


Actual is an indexical, and can be relative to numbers'  
configurations.



If a multiverse is not actual, no-one within it can make
and indexical judgement of actuality.


Sure. But that's begging the question again and again.







You contradict your self,



No I don't. How many times have I explained that
mathematical existence claims are true in a fictive
sense that doesn't imply real existence



Then please use that fictive sense in the reasoning. Then yes
doctor +
occam gives the ontological conclusion.



No, if it has a fictive premise, it has a fictive conclusion.


That is your idiosyncracy. You can add as many "fictive" terms as  
you

want, it will not change the validity of the reasoning, and the
testability of comp (+ the classical theory of knowledge).



If it is testable, it is false.


Why?


Not enough WR's.


Intuitively you are right, but you have to take into account computer  
science which shows that intuition here is of no use. It might be  
possible that in fine mechanism leads to too much White Rabbits, but  
that has not been proved yet. Again, that would not change the  
reasoning, just the conclusion.







What does "comp nothing exists" mean?



Sorry. I meant "In which case comp implies nothing exists."



Comp implies that the midn is a computer. All known
computers are phsycial, so comp implies that the mind is physical.


You will not find any book in physics, except by Zristotle which  
use

the notion of primary matter.



They all do. Physicists think matter/energy exists.


Some does not. John A. Wheeler is open to the idea that physics  
emerge

from something non physical (cf It from Bit).


And everyone else doesn't.


New paradigm takes time to be swallowed.





Anyway, to refer to a what people think is not an argument.


Then why is it refer to books?


Because (good) books contain (good) arguments.






You will not find any book on computers which mention the notion of
matter.



They don't mention pixie dust either. One cannot
conclude from that that anyone has a background
assumption that computers are made of pixie dust.


The point is that the notion of computer used in the proof is the
traditional mathematical notion.


There is  no mathematical notion such that you can run a  programme on
it.


(Sigma_1) arithmetical reality do run all programs, in the  
mathematical (non material, but real) sense. To make primitive matter  
to instantiate consciousness, you will have to make consciousness and  
matter non Turing emulable, and this is in a very special way. With  
mechanism, neither consciousness nor ma

Re: Maudlin & How many times does COMP have to be false before its false?

2011-02-16 Thread Jason Resch

On Tue, Feb 15, 2011 at 4:19 PM, 1Z  wrote:

>
>
> On Feb 15, 10:12 pm, Brent Meeker  wrote:
> > On 2/15/2011 1:48 PM, 1Z wrote:
> >
> >
> >
> > I agree.  Although it's interesting that some people with synasthesia
> > apparently perceive numbers as having various perceptual properties.
>
> Some people "perceive" pink elephants too. However, other people don't
> "perceive" them , leading cynics to suppose that they are not
> really being perceived at all.
>
>
>
The guy who reported seeing the digits of pi like a vast landscape also
receited over 20,000 digits from memory.  That should lend a little more
credence to his claims.

> Sure. Horses are real and unicorns aren't. Didn't you know that?

Unless you've visited every time period in every corner of reality how can
you assert unicrons don't exist?  The fossile record might suggest they have
never lived on this planet but that hardly rules out their existence
everywhere.

"Does XYZ exist?"
"Let me look around...  I can't see it right now, it must not exist!"

Instead we should take a more humble approach:

"I've looked around and cannot see it here, it probably doesn't exist here,
however I have no idea whether or not it exists in places I cannot see or
have not looked."

I think Bayesian inference:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bayesian_inference#Evidence_and_changing_beliefs
Is particularly useful in answering questions relating to existence.  The
question is, what prior probability would you set to a proposition such as
"Other universes not visible to us exist".  1Z and Brent would seem to
assign a rather low probability, but that just means a higher threshold of
evidence will be required to convince them.  Lacking any evidence at all,
the least biased prior probability to begin with is 0.5.  If some evidence,
for fine tuning for example, accumulates then you should adjust your assumed
probability that the proposition "Other universes not visible to us exist"
is true.

Are you aware of a better or more fair way of addressing such a question?

Jason

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Re: Maudlin & How many times does COMP have to be false before its false?



On Feb 15, 10:12 pm, Brent Meeker  wrote:
> On 2/15/2011 1:48 PM, 1Z wrote:
>
>
>
>
>
> > On Feb 15, 9:22 pm, Brent Meeker  wrote:
>
> >     Whatever question you can
>
> >> ask about a number has a factual answer, although you may not know it or
> >> how to find it...numbers are wholly defined by a set of axioms, it seems 
> >> that
> >> they are more real than fictional characters.
>
> > But being able to answer question is essentially epistemic. It doesn't
> > imply any ontology in itself. The epistemic fact that we can , in
> > principle, answer
> > questions about real people may be explained by the existence and
> > perceptual accessibility
> > of real people:
>
> So the epistemic facts have an ontological implication.  If I describe a
> man who lives at 10 Baker Street, smokes dope, and works as a detective
> you won't know whether he's real or not.  But if I tell you there is no
> fact of the matter about whether he has a mole on his arm, then you'll
> know he's a fiction.

If I can figure out information I haven't been given
from information I have been given, I don't need to suppose
that I didn't figure it out and instead perceived it  by by some
sixth sense.

> > but our ability to answer questions about mathematical
> > objects
> > is explained by the existence of clear definitions and rules doesn't
> > need to posit
> > of existing immaterial numbers (plus some mode of quasi-perceptual
> > access
> > to them).
>
> I agree.  Although it's interesting that some people with synasthesia
> apparently perceive numbers as having various perceptual properties.

Some people "perceive" pink elephants too. However, other people don't
"perceive" them , leading cynics to suppose that they are not
really being perceived at all.

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Re: Maudlin & How many times does COMP have to be false before its false?


On 2/15/2011 1:48 PM, 1Z wrote:


On Feb 15, 9:22 pm, Brent Meeker  wrote:
   
 

Whatever question you can
   

ask about a number has a factual answer, although you may not know it or
how to find it...numbers are wholly defined by a set of axioms, it seems that
they are more real than fictional characters.
 

But being able to answer question is essentially epistemic. It doesn't
imply any ontology in itself. The epistemic fact that we can , in
principle, answer
questions about real people may be explained by the existence and
perceptual accessibility
of real people:


So the epistemic facts have an ontological implication.  If I describe a 
man who lives at 10 Baker Street, smokes dope, and works as a detective 
you won't know whether he's real or not.  But if I tell you there is no 
fact of the matter about whether he has a mole on his arm, then you'll 
know he's a fiction.



but our ability to answer questions about mathematical
objects
is explained by the existence of clear definitions and rules doesn't
need to posit
of existing immaterial numbers (plus some mode of quasi-perceptual
access
to them).
   


I agree.  Although it's interesting that some people with synasthesia 
apparently perceive numbers as having various perceptual properties.


Brent


But when you consider arithmetic as a whole this no
   

longer holds.  There may be questions that aren't decidable and whose
answer could be added as an axiom; the way a writer could add a mole to
Sherlock Holmes' arm.

Brent
 
   


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Re: Maudlin & How many times does COMP have to be false before its false?

On Feb 15, 9:22 pm, Brent Meeker  wrote:
>
  Whatever question you can
> ask about a number has a factual answer, although you may not know it or
> how to find it...numbers are wholly defined by a set of axioms, it seems that
> they are more real than fictional characters.

But being able to answer question is essentially epistemic. It doesn't
imply any ontology in itself. The epistemic fact that we can , in
principle, answer
questions about real people may be explained by the existence and
perceptual accessibility
of real people: but our ability to answer questions about mathematical
objects
is explained by the existence of clear definitions and rules doesn't
need to posit
of existing immaterial numbers (plus some mode of quasi-perceptual
access
to them).

  But when you consider arithmetic as a whole this no
> longer holds.  There may be questions that aren't decidable and whose
> answer could be added as an axiom; the way a writer could add a mole to
> Sherlock Holmes' arm.
>
> Brent

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Re: Maudlin & How many times does COMP have to be false before its false?

On 2/15/2011 1:01 PM, 1Z wrote:

The difference is I can choose what are/who are/the behavior of...
>  >  Sherlock  holmes/pink unicorn/whatever... not the numbers once an
>  >  axiomatic system is chosen.

>
>  No, it's only a difference of degree.  You can't choose Sherlock Holmes
>  to be an American or a bus driver.  He "exists" in a looser axiomatic
>  system than integers, but he is still defined by being consistent with
>  the character in the stories by Conan Doyle.  Similarly, you can't
>  imagine a pink unicorn that is blue and has two horns.
>
>  Brent

The ontology of fiction can be true of mathematics even if the
methodology isn't.

It seems that fictional characters exist in a different domain than 
Platonia.  One of the attributes of fictional characters that 
distinguishes them from real people is that there questions about them 
that would have factual answers if they were real but which don't 
because they are fictional.  For example, did Sherlock Holmes have a 
mole on his left arm?  If I asked that of say, Conan Doyle, we wouldn't 
know the answer but we would suppose there is a definite fact of the 
matter.

Because numbers are wholly defined by a set of axioms, it seems that 
they are more real than fictional characters.  Whatever question you can 
ask about a number has a factual answer, although you may not know it or 
how to find it.  But when you consider arithmetic as a whole this no 
longer holds.  There may be questions that aren't decidable and whose 
answer could be added as an axiom; the way a writer could add a mole to 
Sherlock Holmes' arm.

Brent

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Re: Maudlin & How many times does COMP have to be false before its false?



On Feb 15, 7:28 pm, Quentin Anciaux  wrote:
> 2011/2/15 1Z 
>
>
>
>
>
> > On Feb 15, 6:13 pm, Bruno Marchal  wrote:
> > > On 15 Feb 2011, at 18:16, 1Z wrote:
>
> > > > On Feb 15, 4:51 pm, Bruno Marchal  wrote:
> > > >> On 15 Feb 2011, at 16:23, 1Z wrote:
>
> > > >>> On Feb 15, 1:27 pm, Bruno Marchal  wrote:
> > >  On 14 Feb 2011, at 20:05, 1Z wrote:
>
> > > > On Feb 14, 2:52 pm, Bruno Marchal  wrote:
> > > >> On 14 Feb 2011, at 13:35, 1Z wrote:
>
> > > >>> On Feb 14, 8:47 am, Bruno Marchal  wrote:
> > >  Do you believe that Goldbach conjecture is either true or
> > >  false? If
> > >  you agree with this, then you accept arithmetical realism,
> > >  which is
> > >  enough for the comp consequences.,
>
> > > >>> Nope. Bivalence can be accepted as a formal rule and therefore
> > > >>> not as a claim that some set of objects either exist or don't.
>
> > > >> That's my point.
>
> > > > Such a formal claim cannot support the conclusion that
> > > > I am an immaterial dreaming machine.
>
> > >  It entails it formally. Then you interpret it like you want, with
> > >  the
> > >  philosophy you want.
>
> > > >>> I want to say "number aren't real, so I'm not really a number"
>
> > > >> All your talk about numbers which are not real seems to me
> > > >> nonsensical. Also you seems to know what is real and what is not
> > > >> real,
>
> > > > Sure. Horses are real and unicorns aren't. Didn't you know that?
>
> > > I meant "in general".
>
> > I don't need anything more than
> > 1) I am real
> > 2) Unreal things don't generate real things
>
> > I think both of those are hard to dispute.
>
> You arbitrarily choose the unreal things... without any argument that prove
> that they are unreal (or real or whatever).

It's the inverse of Bruno's argument: immateriality is an unnecessary
posit
given materiality.

> The principle is sound, the
> choice is not without arguments. You say numbers don't exist... but as I
> said before, I can think about them in my mind

You can think about fictional entities too. Why would
something have to exist outside your head in order for you
to think about it?

>... I exist, hence they
> transitively exist through my mind at the least.

But Bruno claims *they* are generating *you*.

> I do not chose if a number
> is prime or not hence

Certain things follow inevitably when you are
following rules. That does not need to be explained
by positing anything beyond the rules themselves.

> I'm not inventing them

Well, someone told you the rules. You didn't invent
chess either

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Re: Maudlin & How many times does COMP have to be false before its false?



On Feb 15, 8:39 pm, Brent Meeker  wrote:
> On 2/15/2011 12:28 PM, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
>
>
>
>
>
> > 2011/2/15 Brent Meeker  > >
>
> >     On 2/15/2011 11:28 AM, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
>
> >>     2011/2/15 1Z mailto:peterdjo...@yahoo.com>>
>
> >>         On Feb 15, 6:13 pm, Bruno Marchal  >>         > wrote:
> >>         > On 15 Feb 2011, at 18:16, 1Z wrote:
>
> >>         > > On Feb 15, 4:51 pm, Bruno Marchal  >>         > wrote:
> >>         > >> On 15 Feb 2011, at 16:23, 1Z wrote:
>
> >>         > >>> On Feb 15, 1:27 pm, Bruno Marchal  >>         > wrote:
> >>         >  On 14 Feb 2011, at 20:05, 1Z wrote:
>
> >>         > > On Feb 14, 2:52 pm, Bruno Marchal  >>         > wrote:
> >>         > >> On 14 Feb 2011, at 13:35, 1Z wrote:
>
> >>         > >>> On Feb 14, 8:47 am, Bruno Marchal
> >>         mailto:marc...@ulb.ac.be>> wrote:
> >>         >  Do you believe that Goldbach conjecture is either
> >>         true or
> >>         >  false? If
> >>         >  you agree with this, then you accept arithmetical
> >>         realism,
> >>         >  which is
> >>         >  enough for the comp consequences.,
>
> >>         > >>> Nope. Bivalence can be accepted as a formal rule
> >>         and therefore
> >>         > >>> not as a claim that some set of objects either
> >>         exist or don't.
>
> >>         > >> That's my point.
>
> >>         > > Such a formal claim cannot support the conclusion that
> >>         > > I am an immaterial dreaming machine.
>
> >>         >  It entails it formally. Then you interpret it like you
> >>         want, with
> >>         >  the
> >>         >  philosophy you want.
>
> >>         > >>> I want to say "number aren't real, so I'm not really a
> >>         number"
>
> >>         > >> All your talk about numbers which are not real seems to me
> >>         > >> nonsensical. Also you seems to know what is real and
> >>         what is not
> >>         > >> real,
>
> >>         > > Sure. Horses are real and unicorns aren't. Didn't you
> >>         know that?
>
> >>         > I meant "in general".
>
> >>         I don't need anything more than
> >>         1) I am real
> >>         2) Unreal things don't generate real things
>
> >>         I think both of those are hard to dispute.
>
> >>     You arbitrarily choose the unreal things... without any argument
> >>     that prove that they are unreal (or real or whatever). The
> >>     principle is sound, the choice is not without arguments. You say
> >>     numbers don't exist... but as I said before, I can think about
> >>     them in my mind...
>
> >     Actually I don't think you can.  You can think of the symbol "7"
> >     and the word "seven" and you can probably think of seven things,
> >     xxx,  but I doubt you can think of the number seven.  I'm
> >     pretty sure you can't think of the set of all sets with seven
> >     members.  And I'm quite sure you can't think of all the integers
> >     or all arithmetic.
>
> >>     I exist, hence they transitively exist through my mind at the
> >>     least. I do not chose if a number is prime or not hence I'm not
> >>     inventing them as I'm not inventing the world around me.
>
> >     Can you think of Sherlock Holmes?  a pink unicorn?   Can you think
> >     of a number that is one bigger than the biggest number you can
> >     think of (which per Peano must exist)?
>
> >     Brent
>
> > The difference is I can choose what are/who are/the behavior of...
> > Sherlock  holmes/pink unicorn/whatever... not the numbers once an
> > axiomatic system is chosen.
>
> No, it's only a difference of degree.  You can't choose Sherlock Holmes
> to be an American or a bus driver.  He "exists" in a looser axiomatic
> system than integers, but he is still defined by being consistent with
> the character in the stories by Conan Doyle.  Similarly, you can't
> imagine a pink unicorn that is blue and has two horns.
>
> Brent

The ontology of fiction can be true of mathematics even if the
methodology isn't.

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Re: Maudlin & How many times does COMP have to be false before its false?

On 2/15/2011 12:28 PM, Quentin Anciaux wrote:

2011/2/15 Brent Meeker >

On 2/15/2011 11:28 AM, Quentin Anciaux wrote:

2011/2/15 1Z mailto:peterdjo...@yahoo.com>>

On Feb 15, 6:13 pm, Bruno Marchal mailto:marc...@ulb.ac.be>> wrote:
> On 15 Feb 2011, at 18:16, 1Z wrote:
>
>
>
>
>
> > On Feb 15, 4:51 pm, Bruno Marchal mailto:marc...@ulb.ac.be>> wrote:
> >> On 15 Feb 2011, at 16:23, 1Z wrote:
>
> >>> On Feb 15, 1:27 pm, Bruno Marchal mailto:marc...@ulb.ac.be>> wrote:
>  On 14 Feb 2011, at 20:05, 1Z wrote:
>
> > On Feb 14, 2:52 pm, Bruno Marchal mailto:marc...@ulb.ac.be>> wrote:
> >> On 14 Feb 2011, at 13:35, 1Z wrote:
>
> >>> On Feb 14, 8:47 am, Bruno Marchal
mailto:marc...@ulb.ac.be>> wrote:
>  Do you believe that Goldbach conjecture is either
true or
>  false? If
>  you agree with this, then you accept arithmetical
realism,
>  which is
>  enough for the comp consequences.,
>
> >>> Nope. Bivalence can be accepted as a formal rule
and therefore
> >>> not as a claim that some set of objects either
exist or don't.
>
> >> That's my point.
>
> > Such a formal claim cannot support the conclusion that
> > I am an immaterial dreaming machine.
>
>  It entails it formally. Then you interpret it like you
want, with
>  the
>  philosophy you want.
>
> >>> I want to say "number aren't real, so I'm not really a
number"
>
> >> All your talk about numbers which are not real seems to me
> >> nonsensical. Also you seems to know what is real and
what is not
> >> real,
>
> > Sure. Horses are real and unicorns aren't. Didn't you
know that?
>
> I meant "in general".

I don't need anything more than
1) I am real
2) Unreal things don't generate real things

I think both of those are hard to dispute.

You arbitrarily choose the unreal things... without any argument
that prove that they are unreal (or real or whatever). The
principle is sound, the choice is not without arguments. You say
numbers don't exist... but as I said before, I can think about
them in my mind...

Actually I don't think you can.  You can think of the symbol "7"
and the word "seven" and you can probably think of seven things,
xxx,  but I doubt you can think of the number seven.  I'm
pretty sure you can't think of the set of all sets with seven
members.  And I'm quite sure you can't think of all the integers
or all arithmetic.

I exist, hence they transitively exist through my mind at the
least. I do not chose if a number is prime or not hence I'm not
inventing them as I'm not inventing the world around me.

Can you think of Sherlock Holmes?  a pink unicorn?   Can you think
of a number that is one bigger than the biggest number you can
think of (which per Peano must exist)?

Brent

The difference is I can choose what are/who are/the behavior of... 
Sherlock  holmes/pink unicorn/whatever... not the numbers once an 
axiomatic system is chosen.

No, it's only a difference of degree.  You can't choose Sherlock Holmes 
to be an American or a bus driver.  He "exists" in a looser axiomatic 
system than integers, but he is still defined by being consistent with 
the character in the stories by Conan Doyle.  Similarly, you can't 
imagine a pink unicorn that is blue and has two horns.

Brent

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Re: Maudlin & How many times does COMP have to be false before its false?

2011-02-15 Thread Quentin Anciaux

2011/2/15 Brent Meeker 

>  On 2/15/2011 11:28 AM, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
>
>
>
> 2011/2/15 1Z 
>
>>
>>
>> On Feb 15, 6:13 pm, Bruno Marchal  wrote:
>> > On 15 Feb 2011, at 18:16, 1Z wrote:
>> >
>> >
>> >
>> >
>> >
>> > > On Feb 15, 4:51 pm, Bruno Marchal  wrote:
>> > >> On 15 Feb 2011, at 16:23, 1Z wrote:
>> >
>> > >>> On Feb 15, 1:27 pm, Bruno Marchal  wrote:
>> >  On 14 Feb 2011, at 20:05, 1Z wrote:
>> >
>> > > On Feb 14, 2:52 pm, Bruno Marchal  wrote:
>> > >> On 14 Feb 2011, at 13:35, 1Z wrote:
>> >
>> > >>> On Feb 14, 8:47 am, Bruno Marchal  wrote:
>> >  Do you believe that Goldbach conjecture is either true or
>> >  false? If
>> >  you agree with this, then you accept arithmetical realism,
>> >  which is
>> >  enough for the comp consequences.,
>> >
>> > >>> Nope. Bivalence can be accepted as a formal rule and therefore
>> > >>> not as a claim that some set of objects either exist or don't.
>> >
>> > >> That's my point.
>> >
>> > > Such a formal claim cannot support the conclusion that
>> > > I am an immaterial dreaming machine.
>> >
>> >  It entails it formally. Then you interpret it like you want, with
>> >  the
>> >  philosophy you want.
>> >
>> > >>> I want to say "number aren't real, so I'm not really a number"
>> >
>> > >> All your talk about numbers which are not real seems to me
>> > >> nonsensical. Also you seems to know what is real and what is not
>> > >> real,
>> >
>> > > Sure. Horses are real and unicorns aren't. Didn't you know that?
>> >
>> > I meant "in general".
>>
>>
>>  I don't need anything more than
>> 1) I am real
>> 2) Unreal things don't generate real things
>>
>> I think both of those are hard to dispute.
>>
>
>  You arbitrarily choose the unreal things... without any argument that
> prove that they are unreal (or real or whatever). The principle is sound,
> the choice is not without arguments. You say numbers don't exist... but as I
> said before, I can think about them in my mind...
>
>
> Actually I don't think you can.  You can think of the symbol "7" and the
> word "seven" and you can probably think of seven things, xxx,  but I
> doubt you can think of the number seven.  I'm pretty sure you can't think of
> the set of all sets with seven members.  And I'm quite sure you can't think
> of all the integers or all arithmetic.
>
>
>  I exist, hence they transitively exist through my mind at the least. I do
> not chose if a number is prime or not hence I'm not inventing them as I'm
> not inventing the world around me.
>
>
> Can you think of Sherlock Holmes?  a pink unicorn?   Can you think of a
> number that is one bigger than the biggest number you can think of (which
> per Peano must exist)?
>
> Brent
>

The difference is I can choose what are/who are/the behavior of... Sherlock
 holmes/pink unicorn/whatever... not the numbers once an axiomatic system is
chosen.

Quentin


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Re: Maudlin & How many times does COMP have to be false before its false?

On 2/15/2011 11:28 AM, Quentin Anciaux wrote:

2011/2/15 1Z mailto:peterdjo...@yahoo.com>>

On Feb 15, 6:13 pm, Bruno Marchal mailto:marc...@ulb.ac.be>> wrote:
> On 15 Feb 2011, at 18:16, 1Z wrote:
>
>
>
>
>
> > On Feb 15, 4:51 pm, Bruno Marchal mailto:marc...@ulb.ac.be>> wrote:
> >> On 15 Feb 2011, at 16:23, 1Z wrote:
>
> >>> On Feb 15, 1:27 pm, Bruno Marchal mailto:marc...@ulb.ac.be>> wrote:
>  On 14 Feb 2011, at 20:05, 1Z wrote:
>
> > On Feb 14, 2:52 pm, Bruno Marchal mailto:marc...@ulb.ac.be>> wrote:
> >> On 14 Feb 2011, at 13:35, 1Z wrote:
>
> >>> On Feb 14, 8:47 am, Bruno Marchal mailto:marc...@ulb.ac.be>> wrote:
>  Do you believe that Goldbach conjecture is either true or
>  false? If
>  you agree with this, then you accept arithmetical realism,
>  which is
>  enough for the comp consequences.,
>
> >>> Nope. Bivalence can be accepted as a formal rule and
therefore
> >>> not as a claim that some set of objects either exist or
don't.
>
> >> That's my point.
>
> > Such a formal claim cannot support the conclusion that
> > I am an immaterial dreaming machine.
>
>  It entails it formally. Then you interpret it like you
want, with
>  the
>  philosophy you want.
>
> >>> I want to say "number aren't real, so I'm not really a number"
>
> >> All your talk about numbers which are not real seems to me
> >> nonsensical. Also you seems to know what is real and what is not
> >> real,
>
> > Sure. Horses are real and unicorns aren't. Didn't you know that?
>
> I meant "in general".

I don't need anything more than
1) I am real
2) Unreal things don't generate real things

I think both of those are hard to dispute.

You arbitrarily choose the unreal things... without any argument that 
prove that they are unreal (or real or whatever). The principle is 
sound, the choice is not without arguments. You say numbers don't 
exist... but as I said before, I can think about them in my mind...

Actually I don't think you can.  You can think of the symbol "7" and the 
word "seven" and you can probably think of seven things, xxx,  but I 
doubt you can think of the number seven.  I'm pretty sure you can't 
think of the set of all sets with seven members.  And I'm quite sure you 
can't think of all the integers or all arithmetic.

I exist, hence they transitively exist through my mind at the least. I 
do not chose if a number is prime or not hence I'm not inventing them 
as I'm not inventing the world around me.

Can you think of Sherlock Holmes?  a pink unicorn?   Can you think of a 
number that is one bigger than the biggest number you can think of 
(which per Peano must exist)?

Brent

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Re: Maudlin & How many times does COMP have to be false before its false?



On Feb 15, 6:13 pm, Bruno Marchal  wrote:
> On 15 Feb 2011, at 18:16, 1Z wrote:
>
>
>
>
>
> > On Feb 15, 4:51 pm, Bruno Marchal  wrote:
> >> On 15 Feb 2011, at 16:23, 1Z wrote:
>
> >>> On Feb 15, 1:27 pm, Bruno Marchal  wrote:
>  On 14 Feb 2011, at 20:05, 1Z wrote:
>
> > On Feb 14, 2:52 pm, Bruno Marchal  wrote:
> >> On 14 Feb 2011, at 13:35, 1Z wrote:
>
> >>> On Feb 14, 8:47 am, Bruno Marchal  wrote:
>  Do you believe that Goldbach conjecture is either true or
>  false? If
>  you agree with this, then you accept arithmetical realism,
>  which is
>  enough for the comp consequences.,
>
> >>> Nope. Bivalence can be accepted as a formal rule and therefore
> >>> not as a claim that some set of objects either exist or don't.
>
> >> That's my point.
>
> > Such a formal claim cannot support the conclusion that
> > I am an immaterial dreaming machine.
>
>  It entails it formally. Then you interpret it like you want, with  
>  the
>  philosophy you want.
>
> >>> I want to say "number aren't real, so I'm not really a number"
>
> >> All your talk about numbers which are not real seems to me
> >> nonsensical. Also you seems to know what is real and what is not  
> >> real,
>
> > Sure. Horses are real and unicorns aren't. Didn't you know that?
>
> I meant "in general".


I don't need anything more than
1) I am real
2) Unreal things don't generate real things

I think both of those are hard to dispute.

> >> which is a bit absurd at the start.
> >> Could you define what you mean by "real"?
>
> > i can point to my own reality.
>
> To your own consciousness. I grant that. But nothing else. Wake up!



> >>> That doesn't tell me anything about what I am.
>
> >> Right. But then Comp is CT + "yes doctor", where "yes doctor" is a
> >> memo for "it exists a level of description of my generalized body  
> >> such
> >> that  " (see the paper).
>
> > I am not a description. I for descriptions.
>
> I am not a description too. Neither from the first nor the third  
> person view.
> The difficulty of logic consists in the understanding of the  
> difference between a fact which might be true, like 1+1=2, and a  
> description of that fact, like "1+1=2". Modern tools makes it possible  
> to handle that difference in purely formal ways.
> The difficulty in MGA consists in understanding the difference between  
> a computation (be it immaterial or material) and a description of a  
> computation (be it immaterial or material).
 existence
>
> >> I don't use that platonism, and given that I come up with a  
> >> conclusion
> >> related to the theological Platonism, I prefer to keep the
> >> "arithmetical realism" vocabulary. It means that A v ~A for A
> >> arithmetical. Sometimes I say that it means that (A v ~A) is true
> >> independently of me, you, etc.
>
> > You cannot come to conclusions about my existence
> > with a merely formal statement of bivalence
>
> I use bivalence but also "yes doctor".

But YD doesn't get anywhere if I am only agreeing
to a physical substitution

> Then after concluding, we can  
> take as theory of everything just elementary arithmetic, and it is  
> explained in all detail how to recover formally physics (among other  
> things) from that.

>  Use AR formally. The theological conclusion will be provided by the
>  fact that you might be able to imagine surviving a digital graft.
>
> >>> I might well imagine being reincarnated in some other physical
> >>> medium. I won't imagine being reincarnated as a number
>
> >> It is not so difficult to imagine. If you can imagine being
> >> reincarneted in a virtual reality, like in a dream, you can uderstand
> >> that the feeling of "matter" is a construct of your mind. Then it is
> >> just a matter of study to understand that arithmetical truth contains
> >> all the emulation of all programs,
>
> > As it is purely hypothetical it doesn't contain a ny actual
> > running programmes.
>
> Actual is an indexical, and can be relative to numbers' configurations.


If a multiverse is not actual, no-one within it can make
and indexical judgement of actuality.


> >> You contradict your self,
>
> > No I don't. How many times have I explained that
> > mathematical existence claims are true in a fictive
> > sense that doesn't imply real existence
>
>  Then please use that fictive sense in the reasoning. Then yes
>  doctor +
>  occam gives the ontological conclusion.
>
> >>> No, if it has a fictive premise, it has a fictive conclusion.
>
> >> That is your idiosyncracy. You can add as many "fictive" terms as you
> >> want, it will not change the validity of the reasoning, and the
> >> testability of comp (+ the classical theory of knowledge).
>
> > If it is testable, it is false.
>
> Why?

Not enough WR's.

> > What does "comp nothing exists" mean?
>
>  Sorry. I meant "In which case comp implies nothing exists."
>
> >>> Comp implies that the

Re: Maudlin & How many times does COMP have to be false before its false?

2011-02-15 Thread Quentin Anciaux

2011/2/15 1Z 

>
>
> On Feb 15, 6:13 pm, Bruno Marchal  wrote:
> > On 15 Feb 2011, at 18:16, 1Z wrote:
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> > > On Feb 15, 4:51 pm, Bruno Marchal  wrote:
> > >> On 15 Feb 2011, at 16:23, 1Z wrote:
> >
> > >>> On Feb 15, 1:27 pm, Bruno Marchal  wrote:
> >  On 14 Feb 2011, at 20:05, 1Z wrote:
> >
> > > On Feb 14, 2:52 pm, Bruno Marchal  wrote:
> > >> On 14 Feb 2011, at 13:35, 1Z wrote:
> >
> > >>> On Feb 14, 8:47 am, Bruno Marchal  wrote:
> >  Do you believe that Goldbach conjecture is either true or
> >  false? If
> >  you agree with this, then you accept arithmetical realism,
> >  which is
> >  enough for the comp consequences.,
> >
> > >>> Nope. Bivalence can be accepted as a formal rule and therefore
> > >>> not as a claim that some set of objects either exist or don't.
> >
> > >> That's my point.
> >
> > > Such a formal claim cannot support the conclusion that
> > > I am an immaterial dreaming machine.
> >
> >  It entails it formally. Then you interpret it like you want, with
> >  the
> >  philosophy you want.
> >
> > >>> I want to say "number aren't real, so I'm not really a number"
> >
> > >> All your talk about numbers which are not real seems to me
> > >> nonsensical. Also you seems to know what is real and what is not
> > >> real,
> >
> > > Sure. Horses are real and unicorns aren't. Didn't you know that?
> >
> > I meant "in general".
>
>
> I don't need anything more than
> 1) I am real
> 2) Unreal things don't generate real things
>
> I think both of those are hard to dispute.
>

You arbitrarily choose the unreal things... without any argument that prove
that they are unreal (or real or whatever). The principle is sound, the
choice is not without arguments. You say numbers don't exist... but as I
said before, I can think about them in my mind... I exist, hence they
transitively exist through my mind at the least. I do not chose if a number
is prime or not hence I'm not inventing them as I'm not inventing the world
around me.


>
> > >> which is a bit absurd at the start.
> > >> Could you define what you mean by "real"?
> >
> > > i can point to my own reality.
> >
> > To your own consciousness. I grant that. But nothing else. Wake up!
>
>
>
> > >>> That doesn't tell me anything about what I am.
> >
> > >> Right. But then Comp is CT + "yes doctor", where "yes doctor" is a
> > >> memo for "it exists a level of description of my generalized body
> > >> such
> > >> that  " (see the paper).
> >
> > > I am not a description. I for descriptions.
> >
> > I am not a description too. Neither from the first nor the third
> > person view.
> > The difficulty of logic consists in the understanding of the
> > difference between a fact which might be true, like 1+1=2, and a
> > description of that fact, like "1+1=2". Modern tools makes it possible
> > to handle that difference in purely formal ways.
> > The difficulty in MGA consists in understanding the difference between
> > a computation (be it immaterial or material) and a description of a
> > computation (be it immaterial or material).
>  existence
> >
> > >> I don't use that platonism, and given that I come up with a
> > >> conclusion
> > >> related to the theological Platonism, I prefer to keep the
> > >> "arithmetical realism" vocabulary. It means that A v ~A for A
> > >> arithmetical. Sometimes I say that it means that (A v ~A) is true
> > >> independently of me, you, etc.
> >
> > > You cannot come to conclusions about my existence
> > > with a merely formal statement of bivalence
> >
> > I use bivalence but also "yes doctor".
>
> But YD doesn't get anywhere if I am only agreeing
> to a physical substitution
>
> > Then after concluding, we can
> > take as theory of everything just elementary arithmetic, and it is
> > explained in all detail how to recover formally physics (among other
> > things) from that.
>
> >  Use AR formally. The theological conclusion will be provided by the
> >  fact that you might be able to imagine surviving a digital graft.
> >
> > >>> I might well imagine being reincarnated in some other physical
> > >>> medium. I won't imagine being reincarnated as a number
> >
> > >> It is not so difficult to imagine. If you can imagine being
> > >> reincarneted in a virtual reality, like in a dream, you can uderstand
> > >> that the feeling of "matter" is a construct of your mind. Then it is
> > >> just a matter of study to understand that arithmetical truth contains
> > >> all the emulation of all programs,
> >
> > > As it is purely hypothetical it doesn't contain a ny actual
> > > running programmes.
> >
> > Actual is an indexical, and can be relative to numbers' configurations.
>
>
> If a multiverse is not actual, no-one within it can make
> and indexical judgement of actuality.
>
>
> > >> You contradict your self,
> >
> > > No I don't. How many times have I explained that
> > > mathematical existence claims are

Re: Maudlin & How many times does COMP have to be false before its false?



On Feb 15, 6:13 pm, Bruno Marchal  wrote:
> On 15 Feb 2011, at 18:16, 1Z wrote:
>

>  In science we never know if our premisses and conclusions are  
>  true or
>  not.
>
> >>> I can still resist the conclusion by *believing* Platonism
> >>> to be false, while believing comp to be true.
>
> >> "platonism" is ambiguous.
>
> > I mean and have always meant mathematical Platonism
>
> But you talk on a paper with a different terminology.

What paper? The Klein paper doesn't mention it.

> You are  
> confusing people.
>
>
>
> >> Any way, you can resist any conclusion in
> >> science with some ad-hoc philosophy.
>
> > There is nothing unscientific in the attitude
> > the immaterial things don't exist.
>
> Right, but irrelevant.
>
>
>
> >> So you are not saying something
> >> informative here.
> >> Ad without a minimal amount of arithmetical realism you cannot  
> >> endorse
> >> Church thesis,
>
> > A formalist can endorses anything with no ontological
> > realism whatsoever. All that is left without any ontological
> > realism is a formal axiom of bivalence
>
> ... which added to the theological bet "yes doctor" entails that  
> materialism, to explain matter,  is not better than vitalism to  
> explain life.

Materialism can solve WR just fine

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Re: Maudlin & How many times does COMP have to be false before its false?



On 15 Feb 2011, at 18:16, 1Z wrote:




On Feb 15, 4:51 pm, Bruno Marchal  wrote:

On 15 Feb 2011, at 16:23, 1Z wrote:






On Feb 15, 1:27 pm, Bruno Marchal  wrote:

On 14 Feb 2011, at 20:05, 1Z wrote:



On Feb 14, 2:52 pm, Bruno Marchal  wrote:

On 14 Feb 2011, at 13:35, 1Z wrote:



On Feb 14, 8:47 am, Bruno Marchal  wrote:

Do you believe that Goldbach conjecture is either true or
false? If
you agree with this, then you accept arithmetical realism,
which is
enough for the comp consequences.,



Nope. Bivalence can be accepted as a formal rule and therefore
not as a claim that some set of objects either exist or don't.



That's my point.



Such a formal claim cannot support the conclusion that
I am an immaterial dreaming machine.


It entails it formally. Then you interpret it like you want, with  
the

philosophy you want.



I want to say "number aren't real, so I'm not really a number"


All your talk about numbers which are not real seems to me
nonsensical. Also you seems to know what is real and what is not  
real,


Sure. Horses are real and unicorns aren't. Didn't you know that?


I meant "in general".






which is a bit absurd at the start.
Could you define what you mean by "real"?


i can point to my own reality.


To your own consciousness. I grant that. But nothing else. Wake up!






Just be careful in case you do say "yes" to a
physically real doctor.


Do you believe that Church thesis makes sense? That is enough  
to

say
that you believe in the 'arithmetical platonia'



Not at all.



OK. This means that you are using "arithmetical platonia" in a
sense
which is not relevant for the reasoning.
If you accept CT, there should be no problem with the reasoning  
at

all.



I accept CT and reject Platonism,
and thus the reasoning does not go
through.


To provide sense to CT, you need to be able to say that any  
program P
on any input x will stop or will not stop. So you have to accept  
the

use of classical logic on numbers definable properties. That is
what I
called Arithmetical realism.



That doesn't tell me anything about what I am.


Right. But then Comp is CT + "yes doctor", where "yes doctor" is a
memo for "it exists a level of description of my generalized body  
such

that  " (see the paper).


I am not a description. I for descriptions.


I am not a description too. Neither from the first nor the third  
person view.
The difficulty of logic consists in the understanding of the  
difference between a fact which might be true, like 1+1=2, and a  
description of that fact, like "1+1=2". Modern tools makes it possible  
to handle that difference in purely formal ways.
The difficulty in MGA consists in understanding the difference between  
a computation (be it immaterial or material) and a description of a  
computation (be it immaterial or material).





I prefer to use Platonism for theology. Platonism is the theology  
in

which the physical reality is the shadow, or the border, or the
projection of something else.



In the context of phiosophy of mathematics, Platonism
is the claim that numbers have immaterial, non spatio temporal
existence


I don't use that platonism, and given that I come up with a  
conclusion

related to the theological Platonism, I prefer to keep the
"arithmetical realism" vocabulary. It means that A v ~A for A
arithmetical. Sometimes I say that it means that (A v ~A) is true
independently of me, you, etc.


You cannot come to conclusions about my existence
with a merely formal statement of bivalence


I use bivalence but also "yes doctor". Then after concluding, we can  
take as theory of everything just elementary arithmetic, and it is  
explained in all detail how to recover formally physics (among other  
things) from that.










That use of Platonism come up in the
conclusion of the reasoning and is not assumed at the start.



. People needs to be
ultrafinitist to reject the arithmetical platonia.



No, they just need to be anti realist.



Same remark.



Nope. Finitists think 7 exists., anti realists think it doesn't.



Use AR formally. The theological conclusion will be provided by the
fact that you might be able to imagine surviving a digital graft.



I might well imagine being reincarnated in some other physical
medium. I won't imagine being reincarnated as a number


It is not so difficult to imagine. If you can imagine being
reincarneted in a virtual reality, like in a dream, you can uderstand
that the feeling of "matter" is a construct of your mind. Then it is
just a matter of study to understand that arithmetical truth contains
all the emulation of all programs,


As it is purely hypothetical it doesn't contain a ny actual
running programmes.


Actual is an indexical, and can be relative to numbers' configurations.






and this in relative proportion. AT
contains a natural "matrix", and we can test it because it has a non
trivial precise mathematical structure, related to the self-
referential points of view availabl

Re: Maudlin & How many times does COMP have to be false before its false?



On Feb 15, 4:51 pm, Bruno Marchal  wrote:
> On 15 Feb 2011, at 16:23, 1Z wrote:
>
>
>
>
>
> > On Feb 15, 1:27 pm, Bruno Marchal  wrote:
> >> On 14 Feb 2011, at 20:05, 1Z wrote:
>
> >>> On Feb 14, 2:52 pm, Bruno Marchal  wrote:
>  On 14 Feb 2011, at 13:35, 1Z wrote:
>
> > On Feb 14, 8:47 am, Bruno Marchal  wrote:
> >> Do you believe that Goldbach conjecture is either true or  
> >> false? If
> >> you agree with this, then you accept arithmetical realism,  
> >> which is
> >> enough for the comp consequences.,
>
> > Nope. Bivalence can be accepted as a formal rule and therefore
> > not as a claim that some set of objects either exist or don't.
>
>  That's my point.
>
> >>> Such a formal claim cannot support the conclusion that
> >>> I am an immaterial dreaming machine.
>
> >> It entails it formally. Then you interpret it like you want, with the
> >> philosophy you want.
>
> > I want to say "number aren't real, so I'm not really a number"
>
> All your talk about numbers which are not real seems to me  
> nonsensical. Also you seems to know what is real and what is not real,  

Sure. Horses are real and unicorns aren't. Didn't you know that?

> which is a bit absurd at the start.
> Could you define what you mean by "real"?

i can point to my own reality.

> >> Just be careful in case you do say "yes" to a
> >> physically real doctor.
>
> >> Do you believe that Church thesis makes sense? That is enough to
> >> say
> >> that you believe in the 'arithmetical platonia'
>
> > Not at all.
>
>  OK. This means that you are using "arithmetical platonia" in a  
>  sense
>  which is not relevant for the reasoning.
>  If you accept CT, there should be no problem with the reasoning at
>  all.
>
> >>> I accept CT and reject Platonism,
> >>> and thus the reasoning does not go
> >>> through.
>
> >> To provide sense to CT, you need to be able to say that any program P
> >> on any input x will stop or will not stop. So you have to accept the
> >> use of classical logic on numbers definable properties. That is  
> >> what I
> >> called Arithmetical realism.
>
> > That doesn't tell me anything about what I am.
>
> Right. But then Comp is CT + "yes doctor", where "yes doctor" is a  
> memo for "it exists a level of description of my generalized body such  
> that  " (see the paper).

I am not a description. I for descriptions.

> >> I prefer to use Platonism for theology. Platonism is the theology in
> >> which the physical reality is the shadow, or the border, or the
> >> projection of something else.
>
> > In the context of phiosophy of mathematics, Platonism
> > is the claim that numbers have immaterial, non spatio temporal
> > existence
>
> I don't use that platonism, and given that I come up with a conclusion  
> related to the theological Platonism, I prefer to keep the  
> "arithmetical realism" vocabulary. It means that A v ~A for A  
> arithmetical. Sometimes I say that it means that (A v ~A) is true  
> independently of me, you, etc.

You cannot come to conclusions about my existence
with a merely formal statement of bivalence

>
> >> That use of Platonism come up in the
> >> conclusion of the reasoning and is not assumed at the start.
>
> >> . People needs to be
> >> ultrafinitist to reject the arithmetical platonia.
>
> > No, they just need to be anti realist.
>
>  Same remark.
>
> >>> Nope. Finitists think 7 exists., anti realists think it doesn't.
>
> >> Use AR formally. The theological conclusion will be provided by the
> >> fact that you might be able to imagine surviving a digital graft.
>
> > I might well imagine being reincarnated in some other physical
> > medium. I won't imagine being reincarnated as a number
>
> It is not so difficult to imagine. If you can imagine being  
> reincarneted in a virtual reality, like in a dream, you can uderstand  
> that the feeling of "matter" is a construct of your mind. Then it is  
> just a matter of study to understand that arithmetical truth contains  
> all the emulation of all programs,

As it is purely hypothetical it doesn't contain a ny actual
running programmes.

>and this in relative proportion. AT  
> contains a natural "matrix", and we can test it because it has a non  
> trivial precise mathematical structure, related to the self-
> referential points of view available to the universal numbers.
>
>
>
>
>
> >> Personnaly I am a bit skeptical on set realism, because it is
> >> hard to
> >> define it, but for the numbers I have never met people who are  
> >> not
> >> realist about them.
>
> > Oh come on. How can you say that after I just told
> > you 7 doesn't exist.
>
>  You contradict your self,
>
> >>> No I don't. How many times have I explained that
> >>> mathematical existence claims are true in a fictive
> >>> sense that doesn't imply real existence
>
> >> Then please use that fictive sense in the reasoning. Then yes  
> >> doctor

Re: Maudlin & How many times does COMP have to be false before its false?



On 15 Feb 2011, at 16:23, 1Z wrote:




On Feb 15, 1:27 pm, Bruno Marchal  wrote:

On 14 Feb 2011, at 20:05, 1Z wrote:






On Feb 14, 2:52 pm, Bruno Marchal  wrote:

On 14 Feb 2011, at 13:35, 1Z wrote:



On Feb 14, 8:47 am, Bruno Marchal  wrote:
Do you believe that Goldbach conjecture is either true or  
false? If
you agree with this, then you accept arithmetical realism,  
which is

enough for the comp consequences.,



Nope. Bivalence can be accepted as a formal rule and therefore
not as a claim that some set of objects either exist or don't.



That's my point.



Such a formal claim cannot support the conclusion that
I am an immaterial dreaming machine.


It entails it formally. Then you interpret it like you want, with the
philosophy you want.


I want to say "number aren't real, so I'm not really a number"


All your talk about numbers which are not real seems to me  
nonsensical. Also you seems to know what is real and what is not real,  
which is a bit absurd at the start.

Could you define what you mean by "real"?






Just be careful in case you do say "yes" to a
physically real doctor.






Do you believe that Church thesis makes sense? That is enough to
say
that you believe in the 'arithmetical platonia'



Not at all.


OK. This means that you are using "arithmetical platonia" in a  
sense

which is not relevant for the reasoning.
If you accept CT, there should be no problem with the reasoning at
all.



I accept CT and reject Platonism,
and thus the reasoning does not go
through.


To provide sense to CT, you need to be able to say that any program P
on any input x will stop or will not stop. So you have to accept the
use of classical logic on numbers definable properties. That is  
what I

called Arithmetical realism.


That doesn't tell me anything about what I am.


Right. But then Comp is CT + "yes doctor", where "yes doctor" is a  
memo for "it exists a level of description of my generalized body such  
that  " (see the paper).







I prefer to use Platonism for theology. Platonism is the theology in
which the physical reality is the shadow, or the border, or the
projection of something else.


In the context of phiosophy of mathematics, Platonism
is the claim that numbers have immaterial, non spatio temporal
existence


I don't use that platonism, and given that I come up with a conclusion  
related to the theological Platonism, I prefer to keep the  
"arithmetical realism" vocabulary. It means that A v ~A for A  
arithmetical. Sometimes I say that it means that (A v ~A) is true  
independently of me, you, etc.








That use of Platonism come up in the
conclusion of the reasoning and is not assumed at the start.




. People needs to be
ultrafinitist to reject the arithmetical platonia.



No, they just need to be anti realist.



Same remark.



Nope. Finitists think 7 exists., anti realists think it doesn't.


Use AR formally. The theological conclusion will be provided by the
fact that you might be able to imagine surviving a digital graft.


I might well imagine being reincarnated in some other physical
medium. I won't imagine being reincarnated as a number


It is not so difficult to imagine. If you can imagine being  
reincarneted in a virtual reality, like in a dream, you can uderstand  
that the feeling of "matter" is a construct of your mind. Then it is  
just a matter of study to understand that arithmetical truth contains  
all the emulation of all programs, and this in relative proportion. AT  
contains a natural "matrix", and we can test it because it has a non  
trivial precise mathematical structure, related to the self- 
referential points of view available to the universal numbers.








Personnaly I am a bit skeptical on set realism, because it is
hard to
define it, but for the numbers I have never met people who are  
not

realist about them.



Oh come on. How can you say that after I just told
you 7 doesn't exist.



You contradict your self,



No I don't. How many times have I explained that
mathematical existence claims are true in a fictive
sense that doesn't imply real existence


Then please use that fictive sense in the reasoning. Then yes  
doctor +

occam gives the ontological conclusion.


No, if it has a fictive premise, it has a fictive conclusion.


That is your idiosyncracy. You can add as many "fictive" terms as you  
want, it will not change the validity of the reasoning, and the  
testability of comp (+ the classical theory of knowledge).








unless you mean that seven is not made of
matter. In which case comp nothing exists.



What does "comp nothing exists" mean?


Sorry. I meant "In which case comp implies nothing exists."


Comp implies that the midn is a computer. All known
computers are phsycial, so comp implies that the mind is physical.


You will not find any book in physics, except by Zristotle which use  
the notion of primary matter.
You will not find any book on computers which mention the notion of  
matter. Exce

Re: Maudlin & How many times does COMP have to be false before its false?



On 15 Feb 2011, at 16:09, 1Z wrote:




On Feb 15, 1:16 pm, Bruno Marchal  wrote:

On 14 Feb 2011, at 19:53, 1Z wrote:


CT needs arithmetical platonism/realism.


No it doesn't. It may need bivalence, which is not the same thing  
(me,

passim)


Reread the definition of AR. I define AR by bivalence.


Fine. Then it isn't an ontological premiss, and the ontological
conclusion
that I am an Immaterial Dreaming Machine doesn't follow.



But comp is not just CT. Comp is also "yes" doctor, which uses some  
ontological commitment, notably is physical reality (albeit not  
necessarily a primitive one), and bet on self-consciousness. And the  
conclusion is not ontological per se. The reasoning does not show that  
primary matter does not exist, only that it cannot be used to select  
my consciousness evolution.







If you believe the contrary,

could you give me a form of CT which does not presuppose  it?



"Every effectively calculable function is a computable function"


What is an effectively computable function?


Something a human can work out given instruction


No. That is a computable function.




What is a computable
function.


Something a computer can do given a programme


No. You need CT to define a computer as anything computing what a  
universal machine (an immaterial mathematical concept) computes.







Function computable form what to what?



I answer for you: from N to N. N is the set of natural numbers.






See my papers.



That is just what I am criticising. You need the ontological
premise that mathematical entities have real existence,
and it is a separate premise from comp. That is my
response to your writings.


The only ontology is my conciousness, and some amount of  
consensual

reality (doctor, brain, etc.).



If I agree only to the existence of doctors, brains and silicon
computers,
the conclusion that I am an immaterial dreaming machine cannot
follow


Then you have to present a refutation of UDA+MGA, without begging  
the

question.



No, I can just present a refutation of Platonism. The conlcusion
does't follo
without it.


Platonism in your sense is not used at all in the reasoning.


The the conclusion doesn't follow.



?





It does not assume that physical things
"really" or primitively exists, nor does it assume that numbers
really
exist in any sense. Just that they exist in the mathematical  
sense.



There is no generally agreed mathematical sense. If mathematical
anti-realists are right, they don't exist at all and I am  
therefore

not one.



Mathematicians don't care about the nature of the existence of
natural
numbers.



Fine. Such an ontologically non-commital idea of AR cannot support
your conclusion


Why?


Because the conclusions of ontolgocial arguments either
follow from ontological premisses, or don't follow at all.



Yes. I have already acquiesce ten times on this. And then?







They all agree with statement like "there exist prime
number", etc.


Yes, they tend to agree on a set of true existence statements, and  
to

disagree on
what existence means.


Only during the pause café. It does not change their mind on the
issues in their papers.


Why would it, since they are not doing *philosophy* of maths.



So why would I?






Read a book on logic and computability.



Read a book on philosophy, on the limitations of
apriori reasoning, on the contentious nature of mathematical
ontology.


You are the one opposing a paper in applied logic in the  
cognitive

and
physical science. I suggest you look at books to better see what
i am
taking about.



You are the one who is doing ontology without realising it.



On consciousness. Not on numbers,



You're saying *my* consciousness *is* a number!


Where? Consciousness, like truth, is not even definable in  
arithmetic.

I keep insisting on that all the time.


Fine. Then consc. doesn't emerge from aritmetic, and physics does't
emerge
from consc.


You are quick here. I don't see argument. Just assertions.






which I use in the usual
mathematical or theoretical computer sense. The reasoning is  
agonstic

on God, primary universe, mind, etc. at the start.
The only ontology used in the reasoning is the ontology of my
consciousness, and some amount of consensual reality (existence of
universe, brains, doctors, ...). Of course I do not assume either
that
such things are primitoively material, except at step 8 for the
reductio ad absurdo. Up to step seven you can still believe in a
primitively material reality.



You cannot eliminate the existence of matter in favour of the
existence
of numbers without assuming the existence of numbers


I assume no more than the axiom of Robinson Arithmetic.


You obviously don't adopt those axioms in the sense that
an anti realist would. Why keep arguing against anti realism?



I don't argue against anti-realism. I argue against the relevance of  
anti-realism, and philosophy for showing the validity or non validity  
of a reasoning.







Physicists

Re: Maudlin & How many times does COMP have to be false before its false?

On 15 Feb 2011, at 01:42, Brent Meeker wrote:

On 2/14/2011 11:36 AM, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
Programs are not written with physical instantiation in mind...
even if eventually you run it.

Really? Did people write programs before computers were invented?

If you abstract from Babbage quasi-computer, then yes. Combinators,
lambda expressions, including universal one, have been written before
computers have been builded.

What is important is the computation which doesn't care about the
physical instantiation as such.

A program could be written to care about it's instantiation, but
usually it's the programmer who cares.

We care about higher level instantiation. Theoretically and
empirically we know that our lowest level instantiation is given by a
sum on many histories.

Bruno

When I stop executing a program does it cease to exist ? And come
back to existence the instant I run it ?

A program may be written on paper, punched on cards, or encoded in
neurons.

Brent

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Re: Maudlin & How many times does COMP have to be false before its false?



On Feb 15, 1:54 pm, David Nyman  wrote:
> On 15 February 2011 13:27, Bruno Marchal  wrote:
>
> >> I am  not a realist about maths. You must be because you exist
> >> and you think you are a  number
>
> > I start from the assumption that I can survive through a digital backup. So
> > locally "I am a number", in that sense. But this concerns only my third
> > person I (body), and I show that the first person naturally associated (by
> > its memories, or by the classical theory of knowledge) is not a number.
>
> I hesitate (really!) to but into one of these delightful to-ings and
> fro-ings, but it strikes me that a focus on Peter's claim, and Bruno's
> rebuttal, above might be fruitful for the overall discussion.  Peter's
> objection seems to be summed up by "you think you are a number".  But
> Bruno's reply is that "the first person naturally associated (by its
> memories, or by the classical theory of knowledge) is not a number."

He thinks he's an immaterial something or other. I am not particularly
bothered about whether that is an immaterial number, immaterial
machine,
etc.

> He has said elsewhere that comp can be considered a form of
> (objective) idealism, and hence its ontological basis - i.e. what is
> RITSIAR - is the "ideal", or equivalently, "consciousness" in some
> primary or undifferentiated sense.  From this perspective, the number
> realm is conceived not as an independent ontology in itself, but
> rather as the effective means of differentiating the epistemology of
> persons and their "physical" environments, whose ontology is inherited
> from the whole.
>
> Does this help?
>
> David

No. I don't thinkBM is assuming the primacy of consciousness, and I
can make  no sense of it.

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Re: Maudlin & How many times does COMP have to be false before its false?



On Feb 15, 1:27 pm, Bruno Marchal  wrote:
> On 14 Feb 2011, at 20:05, 1Z wrote:
>
>
>
>
>
> > On Feb 14, 2:52 pm, Bruno Marchal  wrote:
> >> On 14 Feb 2011, at 13:35, 1Z wrote:
>
> >>> On Feb 14, 8:47 am, Bruno Marchal  wrote:
>  Do you believe that Goldbach conjecture is either true or false? If
>  you agree with this, then you accept arithmetical realism, which is
>  enough for the comp consequences.,
>
> >>> Nope. Bivalence can be accepted as a formal rule and therefore
> >>> not as a claim that some set of objects either exist or don't.
>
> >> That's my point.
>
> > Such a formal claim cannot support the conclusion that
> > I am an immaterial dreaming machine.
>
> It entails it formally. Then you interpret it like you want, with the  
> philosophy you want.

I want to say "number aren't real, so I'm not really a number"

>Just be careful in case you do say "yes" to a  
> physically real doctor.
>
>
>
>
>
>  Do you believe that Church thesis makes sense? That is enough to  
>  say
>  that you believe in the 'arithmetical platonia'
>
> >>> Not at all.
>
> >> OK. This means that you are using "arithmetical platonia" in a sense
> >> which is not relevant for the reasoning.
> >> If you accept CT, there should be no problem with the reasoning at  
> >> all.
>
> > I accept CT and reject Platonism,
> > and thus the reasoning does not go
> > through.
>
> To provide sense to CT, you need to be able to say that any program P  
> on any input x will stop or will not stop. So you have to accept the  
> use of classical logic on numbers definable properties. That is what I  
> called Arithmetical realism.

That doesn't tell me anything about what I am.

> I prefer to use Platonism for theology. Platonism is the theology in  
> which the physical reality is the shadow, or the border, or the  
> projection of something else.

In the context of phiosophy of mathematics, Platonism
is the claim that numbers have immaterial, non spatio temporal
existence

>That use of Platonism come up in the  
> conclusion of the reasoning and is not assumed at the start.
>
>
>
>  . People needs to be
>  ultrafinitist to reject the arithmetical platonia.
>
> >>> No, they just need to be anti realist.
>
> >> Same remark.
>
> > Nope. Finitists think 7 exists., anti realists think it doesn't.
>
> Use AR formally. The theological conclusion will be provided by the  
> fact that you might be able to imagine surviving a digital graft.

I might well imagine being reincarnated in some other physical
medium. I won't imagine being reincarnated as a number

>  Personnaly I am a bit skeptical on set realism, because it is  
>  hard to
>  define it, but for the numbers I have never met people who are not
>  realist about them.
>
> >>> Oh come on. How can you say that after I just told
> >>> you 7 doesn't exist.
>
> >> You contradict your self,
>
> > No I don't. How many times have I explained that
> > mathematical existence claims are true in a fictive
> > sense that doesn't imply real existence
>
> Then please use that fictive sense in the reasoning. Then yes doctor +  
> occam gives the ontological conclusion.

No, if it has a fictive premise, it has a fictive conclusion.

>
> >> unless you mean that seven is not made of
> >> matter. In which case comp nothing exists.
>
> > What does "comp nothing exists" mean?
>
> Sorry. I meant "In which case comp implies nothing exists."

Comp implies that the midn is a computer. All known
computers are phsycial, so comp implies that the mind is physical.

>  Even to say "I am not arithmetical realist" is
>  enough to be an arithmetical realist
>
> >>> Nonsense.
>
> >> Probable, given your rather inappropriate sense of metaphysical
> >> realism in mathematics.
>
> > I am  not a realist about maths. You must be because you exist
> > and you think you are a  number
>
> I start from the assumption that I can survive through a digital  
> backup. So locally "I am a number", in that sense.

That's misleading. There is a difference between being tied
to no particular physical instance and being tied to no instance at
all.

>But this concerns  
> only my third person I (body), and I show that the first person  
> naturally associated (by its memories, or by the classical theory of  
> knowledge) is not a number.
>
>
>
>  . A real anti-ariothmetical
>  realist cannot even spaeak about arithmetical realism. You need  
>  to be
>  an arithmetical realist to make sense of denying it.
>
> >>> Like the old canard that to deny God is to accept God? Naah. Meaning
> >>> is not
> >>> just reference.
>
> >> A reasoning is valid, or not valid.
>
> > A true conclusion requires soundness as well as validity
>
> In science we never know if our premisses and conclusions are true or  
> not.

I can still resist the conclusion by *believing* Platonism
to be false, while believing comp to be true.

>We judge validity only.
>
> Bruno
>
> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~mar

Re: Maudlin & How many times does COMP have to be false before its false?



On Feb 15, 1:16 pm, Bruno Marchal  wrote:
> On 14 Feb 2011, at 19:53, 1Z wrote:
>
> >> CT needs arithmetical platonism/realism.
>
> > No it doesn't. It may need bivalence, which is not the same thing (me,
> > passim)
>
> Reread the definition of AR. I define AR by bivalence.

Fine. Then it isn't an ontological premiss, and the ontological
conclusion
that I am an Immaterial Dreaming Machine doesn't follow.

 >> If you believe the contrary,
> >> could you give me a form of CT which does not presuppose  it?
>
> > "Every effectively calculable function is a computable function"
>
> What is an effectively computable function?

Something a human can work out given instruction

> What is a computable  
> function.

Something a computer can do given a programme

> Function computable form what to what?


> >> See my papers.
>
> > That is just what I am criticising. You need the ontological
> > premise that mathematical entities have real existence,
> > and it is a separate premise from comp. That is my
> > response to your writings.
>
>  The only ontology is my conciousness, and some amount of consensual
>  reality (doctor, brain, etc.).
>
> >>> If I agree only to the existence of doctors, brains and silicon
> >>> computers,
> >>> the conclusion that I am an immaterial dreaming machine cannot  
> >>> follow
>
> >> Then you have to present a refutation of UDA+MGA, without begging the
> >> question.
>
> > No, I can just present a refutation of Platonism. The conlcusion
> > does't follo
> > without it.
>
> Platonism in your sense is not used at all in the reasoning.

The the conclusion doesn't follow.

>  It does not assume that physical things
>  "really" or primitively exists, nor does it assume that numbers
>  really
>  exist in any sense. Just that they exist in the mathematical sense.
>
> >>> There is no generally agreed mathematical sense. If mathematical
> >>> anti-realists are right, they don't exist at all and I am therefore
> >>> not one.
>
> >> Mathematicians don't care about the nature of the existence of  
> >> natural
> >> numbers.
>
> > Fine. Such an ontologically non-commital idea of AR cannot support
> > your conclusion
>
> Why?

Because the conclusions of ontolgocial arguments either
follow from ontological premisses, or don't follow at all.

> >> They all agree with statement like "there exist prime
> >> number", etc.
>
> > Yes, they tend to agree on a set of true existence statements, and to
> > disagree on
> > what existence means.
>
> Only during the pause café. It does not change their mind on the  
> issues in their papers.

Why would it, since they are not doing *philosophy* of maths.

> >> Read a book on logic and computability.
>
> > Read a book on philosophy, on the limitations of
> > apriori reasoning, on the contentious nature of mathematical
> > ontology.
>
>  You are the one opposing a paper in applied logic in the cognitive
>  and
>  physical science. I suggest you look at books to better see what  
>  i am
>  taking about.
>
> >>> You are the one who is doing ontology without realising it.
>
> >> On consciousness. Not on numbers,
>
> > You're saying *my* consciousness *is* a number!
>
> Where? Consciousness, like truth, is not even definable in arithmetic.  
> I keep insisting on that all the time.

Fine. Then consc. doesn't emerge from aritmetic, and physics does't
emerge
from consc.

> >> which I use in the usual
> >> mathematical or theoretical computer sense. The reasoning is agonstic
> >> on God, primary universe, mind, etc. at the start.
> >> The only ontology used in the reasoning is the ontology of my
> >> consciousness, and some amount of consensual reality (existence of
> >> universe, brains, doctors, ...). Of course I do not assume either  
> >> that
> >> such things are primitoively material, except at step 8 for the
> >> reductio ad absurdo. Up to step seven you can still believe in a
> >> primitively material reality.
>
> > You cannot eliminate the existence of matter in favour of the
> > existence
> > of numbers without assuming the existence of numbers
>
> I assume no more than the axiom of Robinson Arithmetic.

You obviously don't adopt those axioms in the sense that
an anti realist would. Why keep arguing against anti realism?

>Physicists  
> assumes them too, albeit not explicitly.



> >> Boolos and
> >> Jeffrey, or Mendelson, or the Dover book by Martin Davis are
> >> excellent.
> >> It is a traditional exercise to define those machine in  
> >> arithmetic.
>
> > I have no doubt, but you don't get real minds and universes
> > out of hypothetical machines.
>
>  You mean mathematical machine. They are not hypothetical. Unless  
>  you
>  believe that the number seven is hypothetical,
>
> >>> I do. Haven't you got that yet?
>
> >> I did understand that seven is immaterial.
>
> > Not just immaterial. Non existent.
>
> Ex(x = s(s(s(s(s(s(s(0))

Re: Maudlin & How many times does COMP have to be false before its false?



On Feb 15, 12:56 pm, David Nyman  wrote:
> On 15 February 2011 00:42, 1Z  wrote:
>
> >> I've tried to argue before that the "causal closure of physics" is a
> >> very strong claim that is also very restrictive if applied
> >> consistently.  Trouble is, in my view, it very rarely is so applied.
> >> The Hard Problem, and the corresponding zombie intuition, is a sort of
> >> reductio of the strongest version of this claim - i.e. that what
> >> "exists" is reducible to a micro-physical substrate that is fully
> >> constitutive of all phenomena of whatever type. If this proposition
> >> were ever to be taken at face value, then further theorising would
> >> perforce just stop right there; indeed there can be no "theories" in
> >> such a scenario, just the sub-atomic events that might have been said
> >> (but by whom?) to underlie them.
>
> > No, that wouldn't follow because REDUCTION IS NOT ELIMINATION!!!
>
> Yes, so you keep saying, or in this case, shouting ;-)  And of course
> I agree with you.  To claim that reality consisted solely of
> "disconnected events" would of course be nonsensical.  Any such
> proposition leads directly to a reductio ad absurdum; observation
> informs us that reality is manifestly integrated at multiple levels.
> But this is the point: all such observation is a posteriori; it isn't
> a priori deducible from the theory of a fundamental substrate of
> micro-physical entities and their relations.

Asserted without evidence argument.

AFAICS, any *correct* theory must, as an analytical truth, recover
*all* appearances
including appearances of integration...that is what a "correct theory"
means.

> Moreover, such a theory
> does not, a priori, legitimise or require the postulation of complex
> higher-order entities

*irreducible* higher order entities. Houses still exist, but they
are made of bricks which are made of

> in order to account for the state of affairs at
> its own level.  But this state of affairs, ex hypothesi, exhausts what
> is real.  Therefore if we properly reduce - or restrict - our account
> to this level, and hence eliminate any appeal to higher-level concepts
> or states, nothing real should be left out.  But this does not accord
> with observation.

What  observation? That there are higher order entities? But
reductionism *says* there are. It just says they are reducible.

> Consequently, higher-level states must also be, in
> some ineliminable sense "real",

So what? The claim of reductionism is that they are
reducible, not that they are eliminable! You
are arguing from your incorrect premise.

>or to put it another way, both
> differentiation and integration must play a role in an adequate
> account of reality.

But didn't you just agree that integration isn't absent from
scientific accounts? If we want to explain how ice, liquid water and
steam
are made of the same components, we must also explain how
those components are "integrated" in each case--how they are
bound together or not as the case may be-- so that we can save
appearances, and explain
the differences between them.

> Remember I'm just doing accounting, not peddling solutions.  My point,
> on this accounting, is that the elusive HP and its zombie spawn seem
> to be the consequence of an incomplete tally of what is "real", and
> that this in turn is consequent on intuiting the "completeness" of
> micro-physical theory in the wrong spirit.
>

Still unclear. Are you saying that reductionism can't solve the HP
because it can't integrate anything (although I have just explained
how it can and must)?

Or just making the more standard argument that the HP is an
exceptional problem?

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Re: Maudlin & How many times does COMP have to be false before its false?

2011-02-15 Thread David Nyman

On 15 February 2011 13:27, Bruno Marchal  wrote:

>> I am  not a realist about maths. You must be because you exist
>> and you think you are a  number
>
> I start from the assumption that I can survive through a digital backup. So
> locally "I am a number", in that sense. But this concerns only my third
> person I (body), and I show that the first person naturally associated (by
> its memories, or by the classical theory of knowledge) is not a number.

I hesitate (really!) to but into one of these delightful to-ings and
fro-ings, but it strikes me that a focus on Peter's claim, and Bruno's
rebuttal, above might be fruitful for the overall discussion.  Peter's
objection seems to be summed up by "you think you are a number".  But
Bruno's reply is that "the first person naturally associated (by its
memories, or by the classical theory of knowledge) is not a number."
He has said elsewhere that comp can be considered a form of
(objective) idealism, and hence its ontological basis - i.e. what is
RITSIAR - is the "ideal", or equivalently, "consciousness" in some
primary or undifferentiated sense.  From this perspective, the number
realm is conceived not as an independent ontology in itself, but
rather as the effective means of differentiating the epistemology of
persons and their "physical" environments, whose ontology is inherited
from the whole.

Does this help?

David


>
> On 14 Feb 2011, at 20:05, 1Z wrote:
>
>>
>>
>> On Feb 14, 2:52 pm, Bruno Marchal  wrote:
>>>
>>> On 14 Feb 2011, at 13:35, 1Z wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>
 On Feb 14, 8:47 am, Bruno Marchal  wrote:
>
> Do you believe that Goldbach conjecture is either true or false? If
> you agree with this, then you accept arithmetical realism, which is
> enough for the comp consequences.,
>>>
 Nope. Bivalence can be accepted as a formal rule and therefore
 not as a claim that some set of objects either exist or don't.
>>>
>>> That's my point.
>>
>> Such a formal claim cannot support the conclusion that
>> I am an immaterial dreaming machine.
>
> It entails it formally. Then you interpret it like you want, with the
> philosophy you want. Just be careful in case you do say "yes" to a
> physically real doctor.
>
>
>
>>
>>>
> Do you believe that Church thesis makes sense? That is enough to say
> that you believe in the 'arithmetical platonia'
>>>
 Not at all.
>>>
>>> OK. This means that you are using "arithmetical platonia" in a sense
>>> which is not relevant for the reasoning.
>>> If you accept CT, there should be no problem with the reasoning at all.
>>
>> I accept CT and reject Platonism,
>> and thus the reasoning does not go
>> through.
>
> To provide sense to CT, you need to be able to say that any program P on any
> input x will stop or will not stop. So you have to accept the use of
> classical logic on numbers definable properties. That is what I called
> Arithmetical realism.
> I prefer to use Platonism for theology. Platonism is the theology in which
> the physical reality is the shadow, or the border, or the projection of
> something else. That use of Platonism come up in the conclusion of the
> reasoning and is not assumed at the start.
>
>
>
>>
> . People needs to be
> ultrafinitist to reject the arithmetical platonia.
>>>
 No, they just need to be anti realist.
>>>
>>> Same remark.
>>
>> Nope. Finitists think 7 exists., anti realists think it doesn't.
>
> Use AR formally. The theological conclusion will be provided by the fact
> that you might be able to imagine surviving a digital graft.
>
>
>
>
>>
> Personnaly I am a bit skeptical on set realism, because it is hard to
> define it, but for the numbers I have never met people who are not
> realist about them.
>>>
 Oh come on. How can you say that after I just told
 you 7 doesn't exist.
>>>
>>> You contradict your self,
>>
>> No I don't. How many times have I explained that
>> mathematical existence claims are true in a fictive
>> sense that doesn't imply real existence
>
> Then please use that fictive sense in the reasoning. Then yes doctor + occam
> gives the ontological conclusion.
>
>
>
>>
>>> unless you mean that seven is not made of
>>> matter. In which case comp nothing exists.
>>
>> What does "comp nothing exists" mean?
>
> Sorry. I meant "In which case comp implies nothing exists."
>
>
>>
> Even to say "I am not arithmetical realist" is
> enough to be an arithmetical realist
>>>
 Nonsense.
>>>
>>> Probable, given your rather inappropriate sense of metaphysical
>>> realism in mathematics.
>>
>> I am  not a realist about maths. You must be because you exist
>> and you think you are a  number
>
> I start from the assumption that I can survive through a digital backup. So
> locally "I am a number", in that sense. But this concerns only my third
> person I (body), and I show that the first person naturally associated (by
> its memories, or by the classical theory of knowledge) is not a number.
>
>
>
>
>>
> . A real

Re: Maudlin & How many times does COMP have to be false before its false?



On 14 Feb 2011, at 20:05, 1Z wrote:




On Feb 14, 2:52 pm, Bruno Marchal  wrote:

On 14 Feb 2011, at 13:35, 1Z wrote:




On Feb 14, 8:47 am, Bruno Marchal  wrote:

Do you believe that Goldbach conjecture is either true or false? If
you agree with this, then you accept arithmetical realism, which is
enough for the comp consequences.,



Nope. Bivalence can be accepted as a formal rule and therefore
not as a claim that some set of objects either exist or don't.


That's my point.


Such a formal claim cannot support the conclusion that
I am an immaterial dreaming machine.


It entails it formally. Then you interpret it like you want, with the  
philosophy you want. Just be careful in case you do say "yes" to a  
physically real doctor.








Do you believe that Church thesis makes sense? That is enough to  
say

that you believe in the 'arithmetical platonia'



Not at all.


OK. This means that you are using "arithmetical platonia" in a sense
which is not relevant for the reasoning.
If you accept CT, there should be no problem with the reasoning at  
all.


I accept CT and reject Platonism,
and thus the reasoning does not go
through.


To provide sense to CT, you need to be able to say that any program P  
on any input x will stop or will not stop. So you have to accept the  
use of classical logic on numbers definable properties. That is what I  
called Arithmetical realism.
I prefer to use Platonism for theology. Platonism is the theology in  
which the physical reality is the shadow, or the border, or the  
projection of something else. That use of Platonism come up in the  
conclusion of the reasoning and is not assumed at the start.







. People needs to be
ultrafinitist to reject the arithmetical platonia.



No, they just need to be anti realist.


Same remark.


Nope. Finitists think 7 exists., anti realists think it doesn't.


Use AR formally. The theological conclusion will be provided by the  
fact that you might be able to imagine surviving a digital graft.







Personnaly I am a bit skeptical on set realism, because it is  
hard to

define it, but for the numbers I have never met people who are not
realist about them.



Oh come on. How can you say that after I just told
you 7 doesn't exist.


You contradict your self,


No I don't. How many times have I explained that
mathematical existence claims are true in a fictive
sense that doesn't imply real existence


Then please use that fictive sense in the reasoning. Then yes doctor +  
occam gives the ontological conclusion.







unless you mean that seven is not made of
matter. In which case comp nothing exists.


What does "comp nothing exists" mean?


Sorry. I meant "In which case comp implies nothing exists."





Even to say "I am not arithmetical realist" is
enough to be an arithmetical realist



Nonsense.


Probable, given your rather inappropriate sense of metaphysical
realism in mathematics.


I am  not a realist about maths. You must be because you exist
and you think you are a  number


I start from the assumption that I can survive through a digital  
backup. So locally "I am a number", in that sense. But this concerns  
only my third person I (body), and I show that the first person  
naturally associated (by its memories, or by the classical theory of  
knowledge) is not a number.








. A real anti-ariothmetical
realist cannot even spaeak about arithmetical realism. You need  
to be

an arithmetical realist to make sense of denying it.



Like the old canard that to deny God is to accept God? Naah. Meaning
is not
just reference.


A reasoning is valid, or not valid.


A true conclusion requires soundness as well as validity


In science we never know if our premisses and conclusions are true or  
not. We judge validity only.


Bruno


http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



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Re: Maudlin & How many times does COMP have to be false before its false?



On 14 Feb 2011, at 19:53, 1Z wrote:


CT needs arithmetical platonism/realism.


No it doesn't. It may need bivalence, which is not the same thing (me,
passim)


Reread the definition of AR. I define AR by bivalence.





If you believe the contrary,
could you give me a form of CT which does not presuppose  it?


"Every effectively calculable function is a computable function"


What is an effectively computable function? What is a computable  
function. Function computable form what to what?







See my papers.



That is just what I am criticising. You need the ontological
premise that mathematical entities have real existence,
and it is a separate premise from comp. That is my
response to your writings.



The only ontology is my conciousness, and some amount of consensual
reality (doctor, brain, etc.).



If I agree only to the existence of doctors, brains and silicon
computers,
the conclusion that I am an immaterial dreaming machine cannot  
follow


Then you have to present a refutation of UDA+MGA, without begging the
question.


No, I can just present a refutation of Platonism. The conlcusion
does't follo
without it.


Platonism in your sense is not used at all in the reasoning.






It does not assume that physical things
"really" or primitively exists, nor does it assume that numbers
really
exist in any sense. Just that they exist in the mathematical sense.



There is no generally agreed mathematical sense. If mathematical
anti-realists are right, they don't exist at all and I am therefore
not one.


Mathematicians don't care about the nature of the existence of  
natural

numbers.


Fine. Such an ontologically non-commital idea of AR cannot support
your conclusion



Why?






They all agree with statement like "there exist prime
number", etc.


Yes, they tend to agree on a set of true existence statements, and to
disagree on
what existence means.


Only during the pause café. It does not change their mind on the  
issues in their papers.








Read a book on logic and computability.



Read a book on philosophy, on the limitations of
apriori reasoning, on the contentious nature of mathematical
ontology.



You are the one opposing a paper in applied logic in the cognitive
and
physical science. I suggest you look at books to better see what  
i am

taking about.



You are the one who is doing ontology without realising it.


On consciousness. Not on numbers,


You're saying *my* consciousness *is* a number!


Where? Consciousness, like truth, is not even definable in arithmetic.  
I keep insisting on that all the time.







which I use in the usual
mathematical or theoretical computer sense. The reasoning is agonstic
on God, primary universe, mind, etc. at the start.
The only ontology used in the reasoning is the ontology of my
consciousness, and some amount of consensual reality (existence of
universe, brains, doctors, ...). Of course I do not assume either  
that

such things are primitoively material, except at step 8 for the
reductio ad absurdo. Up to step seven you can still believe in a
primitively material reality.


You cannot eliminate the existence of matter in favour of the
existence
of numbers without assuming the existence of numbers


I assume no more than the axiom of Robinson Arithmetic. Physicists  
assumes them too, albeit not explicitly.







Boolos and
Jeffrey, or Mendelson, or the Dover book by Martin Davis are
excellent.
It is a traditional exercise to define those machine in  
arithmetic.



I have no doubt, but you don't get real minds and universes
out of hypothetical machines.


You mean mathematical machine. They are not hypothetical. Unless  
you

believe that the number seven is hypothetical,



I do. Haven't you got that yet?


I did understand that seven is immaterial.


Not just immaterial. Non existent.


Ex(x = s(s(s(s(s(s(s(0)) is provable in Robinson Arithmetic.
And you tell me that your are formalist, so be it.







But I am OK with seven
being hypothetical. It changes nothing in the reasoning.


I am not running on some immaterial TM that exists only in your head


How do you know that?









in which case I get
hypothetical minds and hypothetical universes.



I am not generated by a hypothesis: I generate hypotheses.


Confusion level. If you suppose a TOE you are supposed to be  
explained

by that TOE.


Explained by, not caused by. Things fell before Newton explained
gravity


That was my point.






In that sense you are generated by an hypothesis,


I am not generated by a hypothesis, even a true one, any more
than my house is built on a map, even an accurate one.


That's why I put 'in that (uninteresting) sense'.






Comp will imply that such a primary matter cannnot interfer at all
with your consciousness, so that IF comp is correct physics has to be
reduced to number theory, and such a primary matter is an invisible
epiphenomena.


Physics cannot be eliminated in favour of non existent numbers.
Numbers
have to exist for th

Re: Maudlin & How many times does COMP have to be false before its false?

2011-02-15 Thread David Nyman

On 15 February 2011 00:42, 1Z  wrote:

>> I've tried to argue before that the "causal closure of physics" is a
>> very strong claim that is also very restrictive if applied
>> consistently.  Trouble is, in my view, it very rarely is so applied.
>> The Hard Problem, and the corresponding zombie intuition, is a sort of
>> reductio of the strongest version of this claim - i.e. that what
>> "exists" is reducible to a micro-physical substrate that is fully
>> constitutive of all phenomena of whatever type. If this proposition
>> were ever to be taken at face value, then further theorising would
>> perforce just stop right there; indeed there can be no "theories" in
>> such a scenario, just the sub-atomic events that might have been said
>> (but by whom?) to underlie them.
>
> No, that wouldn't follow because REDUCTION IS NOT ELIMINATION!!!

Yes, so you keep saying, or in this case, shouting ;-)  And of course
I agree with you.  To claim that reality consisted solely of
"disconnected events" would of course be nonsensical.  Any such
proposition leads directly to a reductio ad absurdum; observation
informs us that reality is manifestly integrated at multiple levels.
But this is the point: all such observation is a posteriori; it isn't
a priori deducible from the theory of a fundamental substrate of
micro-physical entities and their relations.  Moreover, such a theory
does not, a priori, legitimise or require the postulation of complex
higher-order entities in order to account for the state of affairs at
its own level.  But this state of affairs, ex hypothesi, exhausts what
is real.  Therefore if we properly reduce - or restrict - our account
to this level, and hence eliminate any appeal to higher-level concepts
or states, nothing real should be left out.  But this does not accord
with observation. Consequently, higher-level states must also be, in
some ineliminable sense "real", or to put it another way, both
differentiation and integration must play a role in an adequate
account of reality.

Remember I'm just doing accounting, not peddling solutions.  My point,
on this accounting, is that the elusive HP and its zombie spawn seem
to be the consequence of an incomplete tally of what is "real", and
that this in turn is consequent on intuiting the "completeness" of
micro-physical theory in the wrong spirit.

David

>
>
> On Feb 14, 11:08 pm, David Nyman  wrote:
>> On 14 February 2011 20:46, John Mikes  wrote:
>>
>> > I asked several times: "what are numbers?" without getting a reasonable
>> > reply.
>> > Sometimes I really like 1Z's twists.
>>
>> That may be, but I would also like to see if we can get things
>> untwisted.  I'm not peddling any theory of my own here, I'm just
>> trying to do some simple accounting.  For example according to some
>> theory "X doesn't exist" and then somewhere else in the same theory
>> something supposedly depends on "assuming X".  This doesn't add up.
>> Part of the problem - most of it, perhaps - is
>> psychological-linguistic.  Being dead wrong about some theory of the
>> mind (fortunately) doesn't stop our minds from functioning.  But that
>> very same fact can blind us to circular reasoning.
>>
>> I've tried to argue before that the "causal closure of physics" is a
>> very strong claim that is also very restrictive if applied
>> consistently.  Trouble is, in my view, it very rarely is so applied.
>> The Hard Problem, and the corresponding zombie intuition, is a sort of
>> reductio of the strongest version of this claim - i.e. that what
>> "exists" is reducible to a micro-physical substrate that is fully
>> constitutive of all phenomena of whatever type. If this proposition
>> were ever to be taken at face value, then further theorising would
>> perforce just stop right there; indeed there can be no "theories" in
>> such a scenario, just the sub-atomic events that might have been said
>> (but by whom?) to underlie them.
>
> No, that wouldn't follow because REDUCTION IS NOT ELIMINATION!!!
>
>>  Of course this hardly reflects our
>> experience (how could it?).  We do not discover ourselves to be in
>> some maximally fragmented state (what could it be "like"?) but rather
>> in some integrated state of an altogether higher order;
>
> Do you think reduction means reduction to *disconnected* bits and
> pieces.
>
>> but such
>> quotidian reality apparently impresses us so little that we are quite
>> capable of theorising it cheerfully out of existence (e.g. eliminative
>> materialism).  Well, as Groucho Marx once innocently enquired "who you
>> gonna believe - me or your own eyes?".
>>
>> David
>>
>> > David,
>>
>> > I was laughing all the way from the computer that '7 does not exist'. And
>> > yes, it does not.
>> > Do qualia exist without the substrate they serve for as qualia?
>> > It goes into our deeper thought to identify 'existing' -
>> > I am willing to go as far as "if our mind handles it, 'it' DOES exist"
>> > so the quale like; 7(?) [i.e. the monitor for the eggs in your fridg

Re: Maudlin & How many times does COMP have to be false before its false?



On 14 Feb 2011, at 18:46, Brent Meeker wrote:


On 2/14/2011 1:00 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:



On 14 Feb 2011, at 07:13, Jason Resch wrote:




On Sun, Feb 13, 2011 at 10:46 AM, Brent Meeker > wrote:

On 2/13/2011 5:21 AM, 1Z wrote:

On Feb 12, 3:18 am, Brent Meeker  wrote:


What do you think the chances are that any random object in
Plato's heaven, or any random Turing machine will support  
intelligent life?

1 in 10, 1 in 1000, 1 in a billion?

Zero.

Does that allow us to argue:

1) A universe selected from an uncountably infinite number of
possibilities has measure
0
2) Our universe exists so it has measure>0
3) Our universe is not selected from uncountably infinite
possibilities
4) MUH indicates any universe must be selected from uncountable
infinite possibilities (since all
of maths includes the real line, etc)
5) MUH is false.


Hmmm.  I think we argue that objects in Plato's heaven and Turing  
machines are not the right kind of things to support life.



I am very puzzled by this statement.  You could help me understand  
by answering the following questions:


Why couldn't there be an accurate simulation of life on a Turing  
machine?


How can entities within a universe that exists in Plato's heaven  
distinguish it from a universe that does not?


That is a good argument which convinces many people, who actually  
ask "what is the MGA for?"


Here I can imagine what 1Z could answer to "How can entities within  
a universe that exists in Plato's heaven distinguish it from a  
universe that does not?".
He assumes the existence of primary matter or of a primitively real  
physical universe,


It's equivocation to speak of entities existing in a domain that  
doesn't exist.


I agree.



If something like arithmetical universe exists, it exists in a very  
different sense of the word than material objects exist.


Arithmetical universe (model of arithmetic theories) already exist in  
a different sense than the existence of natural number. For the  
existence of natural numbers you don't need to postulate sets or  
'universes'. In the comp physics, both person and matter exists in a  
quite different sense than numbers. All the different type of  
existence can be explained intuitively with the notion of persons  
views, or technically by the use of the modalities. "ExP(x)" means  
usually that there exist a number n such that it is the case that  
P(n), but the existence of matter will be described by a "quantized  
formula" of the type BD(ExBD(P(n)), or something like that. The  
intensional difference makes all the difference of the notion of  
"existence" rather transparent. All existence are build from the  
number existence, but none are equivalent to number existence which  
can be taken as the most primitive form of existence.




If there are entities in that universe that are aware of it  
(whatever that may mean) then they a perforce aware in a different  
sense.


Not necessarily. If their awareness is emulated by a computation, then  
such an awareness will not feel any difference if the computation is  
done by this or that type of reality, but the content of their  
consciousness, and the stability of the experience may depend on it in  
the long term. The indeterminacy of their first person experience  
depends on the set of all continuations available in the maximal  
"everything" structure. That is why we can test the mechanist  
hypothesis.








and will, by decision, attribute consciousness, only to the  
creature made off that primary matter,


No, there is no need to assume primary matter.  One need only  
recognize that there is *this* universe which we are aware of and  
exist in and it is not the same as some other universe which may or  
may not exist in some different sense or another.


OK.





even if the consciousness relies in the computation implemented in  
that matter. So 1Z accepts the idea that arithmetical truth is full  
of zombies, like the "1Z" described in arithmetic through the  
arithmetical emulation of our galaxy (say).
But that moves is made impossible by the MGA. To attach  
consciousness to matter, you have to introduce something non Turing  
emulable in that consciousness, or, like Jack Mallah did, attribute  
a physical activity to a piece of matter having no physical  
activity at all relevant with the computation.


But the idea of multiple worlds started with Everett whose  
interpretation of QM implies that there are no pieces of matter with  
no activity.  The universe is defined by a wave function in a  
Hilbert space and pieces of matter are just certain projections.


OK. I don't see why this change anything in the paragraph you quoted.





But this prevent to say "yes" to the doctor *qua computatio*.


No it doesn't.  Whatever the doctor uses to replace neurons in your  
head is also matter and also part of the universal wave function.


OK.







Do you (the reader of the list, not Jason) agree with the 323  
principle? If the phy

Re: Maudlin & How many times does COMP have to be false before its false?



On Feb 15, 12:12 am, Jason Resch  wrote:
> On Mon, Feb 14, 2011 at 11:23 AM, Brent Meeker wrote:
>
>
>
> >  On 2/13/2011 11:24 PM, Jason Resch wrote:
>
> > On Mon, Feb 14, 2011 at 12:52 AM, Brent Meeker 
> > wrote:
>
> >>  On 2/13/2011 10:13 PM, Jason Resch wrote:
>
> >> On Sun, Feb 13, 2011 at 10:46 AM, Brent Meeker 
> >> wrote:
>
> >>> On 2/13/2011 5:21 AM, 1Z wrote:
>
>  On Feb 12, 3:18 am, Brent Meeker  wrote:
>
> >  What do you think the chances are that any random object in
>  Plato's heaven, or any random Turing machine will support
>  intelligent life?
>  1 in 10, 1 in 1000, 1 in a billion?
>
> >>>  Zero.
>
>  Does that allow us to argue:
>
>  1) A universe selected from an uncountably infinite number of
>  possibilities has measure
>  0
>  2) Our universe exists so it has measure>0
>  3) Our universe is not selected from uncountably infinite
>  possibilities
>  4) MUH indicates any universe must be selected from uncountable
>  infinite possibilities (since all
>  of maths includes the real line, etc)
>  5) MUH is false.
>
> >>>  Hmmm.  I think we argue that objects in Plato's heaven and Turing
> >>> machines are not the right kind of things to support life.
>
> >> I am very puzzled by this statement.  You could help me understand by
> >> answering the following questions:
>
> >> Why couldn't there be an accurate simulation of life on a Turing machine?
>
> >>  Because a Turing machine is an abstraction.  If you mean a realization
> >> of a Turing machine, then I suppose there could be a simulation of life on
> >> it.
>
> >> How can entities within a universe that exists in Plato's heaven
> >> distinguish it from a universe that does not?
>
> >>  I doubt that Plato's heaven exists.  So no universes would exist in it.
>
> >> Brent
>
> > Exists is a funny word.  It seems to embody knowledge and opinion from one
> > observer's viewpoint based on their own limited experiences and interactions
> > within their local portion of reality.
>
> > Indeed.  I'm not sure it's unqualified use is meaningful.
>
> >  If Plato's heaven is such a thing that contains all possible structures,
> > does the fact that it contains all possible structures hold true whether or
> > not it exists?
>
> > All possible brick structures?  Please explain as precisely as possible
> > what Platonia is.
>
> >  If there are universes existing abstractly inside Plato's heaven, and
> > some of those universes contain conscious observers, does ascribing the
> > property of non-existence to Plato's heaven or to those universes make those
> > observers not conscious, or is the abstraction enough?
>
> > What does "abstractly existing" mean.?  How is it different from just
> > exsiting?
>
> >   What properties can something which is non-existent have?
>
> > It seems there are two choices: 1. Things which are non-existent can have
> > other properties besides non-existence.
>
> > Sure.  Sherlock Holmes is non-existent and has the property of being a
> > detective.
>
> >  E.g., a non-existent universe has atoms, stars, worlds, and people on
> > some of those worlds.  Or 2. Non-existent things cannot have any other
> > properties besides non-existence.  It sounds like you belong to this second
> > camp.
>
> > However, this seems to lead immediately to mathematical realism.  As there
> > are objects with definite objectively explorable properties in math.  7's
> > primality and parity are properties of 7.  But how can 7 have properties if
> > it does not exist?  If non-existent things can have properties, why can't
> > consciousness be one of those properties?  What is the difference between a
> > non-existent brain experiencing a sunset and an existent brain experiencing
> > a sunset?
>
> > Only one of them exists.
>
> >  Please explain as precisely as possible what it means for something to
> > not exist.
>
> > If I can kick it and it kicks back it exists.
>
> > Brent
>
> What do you think about this passage from Fabric of Reality, where David
> Deutsch argues numbers do "kick back":
>
> "*Do* abstract, non-physical entities exist? Are they part of the fabric of
> reality? I am not interested here in issues of mere word usage. It is
> obvious that numbers, the laws of physics, and so on do ‘exist’ in some
> senses and not in others. The substantive question is this: how are we to
> understand such entities? Which of them are merely convenient forms of
> words, referring ultimately only to ordinary, physical reality? Which are
> merely ephemeral features of our culture? Which are arbitrary, like the
> rules of a trivial game that we need only look up? And which, if any, can be
> explained only in a way that attributes an independent existence to them?
> Things of this last type *must* be part of the fabric of reality as
> {222} defined in this book, because one would have to understand them
> in order to
> understand everything that is understood.
>
> This suggests

Re: Maudlin & How many times does COMP have to be false before its false?

2011-02-14 Thread Brent Meeker


On 2/14/2011 11:36 AM, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
Programs are not written with physical instantiation in mind... even 
if eventually you run it.


Really?  Did people write programs before computers were invented?

What is important is the computation which doesn't care about the 
physical instantiation as such.


A program could be written to care about it's instantiation, but usually 
it's the programmer who cares.




When I stop executing a program does it cease to exist ? And come back 
to existence the instant I run it ?


A program may be written on paper, punched on cards, or encoded in neurons.

Brent


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Re: Maudlin & How many times does COMP have to be false before its false?



On Feb 14, 11:08 pm, David Nyman  wrote:
> On 14 February 2011 20:46, John Mikes  wrote:
>
> > I asked several times: "what are numbers?" without getting a reasonable
> > reply.
> > Sometimes I really like 1Z's twists.
>
> That may be, but I would also like to see if we can get things
> untwisted.  I'm not peddling any theory of my own here, I'm just
> trying to do some simple accounting.  For example according to some
> theory "X doesn't exist" and then somewhere else in the same theory
> something supposedly depends on "assuming X".  This doesn't add up.
> Part of the problem - most of it, perhaps - is
> psychological-linguistic.  Being dead wrong about some theory of the
> mind (fortunately) doesn't stop our minds from functioning.  But that
> very same fact can blind us to circular reasoning.
>
> I've tried to argue before that the "causal closure of physics" is a
> very strong claim that is also very restrictive if applied
> consistently.  Trouble is, in my view, it very rarely is so applied.
> The Hard Problem, and the corresponding zombie intuition, is a sort of
> reductio of the strongest version of this claim - i.e. that what
> "exists" is reducible to a micro-physical substrate that is fully
> constitutive of all phenomena of whatever type. If this proposition
> were ever to be taken at face value, then further theorising would
> perforce just stop right there; indeed there can be no "theories" in
> such a scenario, just the sub-atomic events that might have been said
> (but by whom?) to underlie them.

No, that wouldn't follow because REDUCTION IS NOT ELIMINATION!!!

>  Of course this hardly reflects our
> experience (how could it?).  We do not discover ourselves to be in
> some maximally fragmented state (what could it be "like"?) but rather
> in some integrated state of an altogether higher order;

Do you think reduction means reduction to *disconnected* bits and
pieces.

> but such
> quotidian reality apparently impresses us so little that we are quite
> capable of theorising it cheerfully out of existence (e.g. eliminative
> materialism).  Well, as Groucho Marx once innocently enquired "who you
> gonna believe - me or your own eyes?".
>
> David
>
> > David,
>
> > I was laughing all the way from the computer that '7 does not exist'. And
> > yes, it does not.
> > Do qualia exist without the substrate they serve for as qualia?
> > It goes into our deeper thought to identify 'existing' -
> > I am willing to go as far as "if our mind handles it, 'it' DOES exist"
> > so the quale like; 7(?) [i.e. the monitor for the eggs in your fridge] is
> > existing. Not answering the question 'what it is?" - but principally I am
> > also against ontology in a worldview of change, where "being" makes only
> > sense as "transitionally becoming" and transition substitutes for stagnancy.
> > Panta Rhei also boggles my mind, especially when I cut out conventional
> > time.
>
> > I asked several times: "what are numbers?" without getting a reasonable
> > reply.
> > Sometimes I really like 1Z's twists.
>
> > On Mon, Feb 14, 2011 at 2:32 PM, 1Z  wrote:
>
> >> On Feb 14, 6:21 pm, David Nyman  wrote:
> >> > On 14 February 2011 12:35, 1Z  wrote:
>
> >> > > Oh come on. How can you say that after I just told
> >> > > you 7 doesn't exist.
>
> >> > Wouldn't this then imply that computation also doesn't exist, in an
> >> > analogous sense?
>
> >> I can still have seven eggs in my fridge, and I can still
> >> have a computation running on a physical computer.
>
> >> >  And that consequently any computational
> >> > characterisation of the mental is in itself a mere fiction, reducing
> >> > to whatever physical behaviour is picked out under the rules of a
> >> > formal "game"?
>
> >> If computation is multiply realisable, it never reduces to
> >> any particular physical behaviour, even if it always instantiated a
> >> such
>
> >> >  I recall that you aren't committed to CTM per se, but
> >> > if what you say about mathematics is true, and only the physical is
> >> > real, wouldn't it follow a priori that CTM just eliminates the mind?
>
> >> No. Every running programme is physical. Only programmes
> >> with nothing to run on are eliminated
>
> >> > I know you've said before that reduction isn't elimination, but I'm
> >> > not clear what is supposed to have any claim to "reality" here, other
> >> > than the physical tokens instantiating the "computation".
>
> >> > David
>
> >> If you have a physical token running a computation, you have
> >> a computation. What is eliminated?
>
> >> --
> >> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
> >> "Everything List" group.
> >> To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
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>
> > --
> > You received this message because you are subscri

Re: Maudlin & How many times does COMP have to be false before its false?



On Feb 14, 8:07 pm, David Nyman  wrote:
> On 14 February 2011 19:32, 1Z  wrote:
>
>
>
> > "If you have a physical token running a computation, you have
> > a computation. What is eliminated?
>
> But such talk is all a posteriori and hence merely circular.

That the aposteriori is uniformly circular is new to me. Proof?

> A
> priori, if you claim that reality can be reduced to (i.e. actually
> consists exclusively of) physical tokens doing whatever they are
> doing, then that's all you have to play with, and moreover all you
> appear to need to get the job done.  If you want to further claim that
> "computation" also exists

Once more with feeling: reductions are identification, not
eliminations.
To say that there is nothing more to a computation than physical
behaviour is not
to say there is no computation.

>in some sense capable of accounting for all
> the a posteriori appearances (including all this talk of computation
> and mind) you need to get a bigger boat.

Why?

> Or else you've just
> eliminated both the computation and the mind (after all, who needs
> 'em? - not the physical tokens, apparently).  The distinction between
> "reduction" and "elimination"

is what I have said it is.

>
is mere absent-mindedness: you just have
> to forget to remember that you can't eat your cake and still have it.
>
> David
>
>
>
> > On Feb 14, 6:21 pm, David Nyman  wrote:
> >> On 14 February 2011 12:35, 1Z  wrote:
>
> >> > Oh come on. How can you say that after I just told
> >> > you 7 doesn't exist.
>
> >> Wouldn't this then imply that computation also doesn't exist, in an
> >> analogous sense?
>
> > I can still have seven eggs in my fridge, and I can still
> > have a computation running on a physical computer.
>
> >>  And that consequently any computational
> >> characterisation of the mental is in itself a mere fiction, reducing
> >> to whatever physical behaviour is picked out under the rules of a
> >> formal "game"?
>
> > If computation is multiply realisable, it never reduces to
> > any particular physical behaviour, even if it always instantiated a
> > such
>
> >>  I recall that you aren't committed to CTM per se, but
> >> if what you say about mathematics is true, and only the physical is
> >> real, wouldn't it follow a priori that CTM just eliminates the mind?
>
> > No. Every running programme is physical. Only programmes
> > with nothing to run on are eliminated
>
> >> I know you've said before that reduction isn't elimination, but I'm
> >> not clear what is supposed to have any claim to "reality" here, other
> >> than the physical tokens instantiating the "computation".
>
> >> David
>
> > If you have a physical token running a computation, you have
> > a computation. What is eliminated?
>
> > --
> > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
> > "Everything List" group.
> > To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
> > To unsubscribe from this group, send email to 
> > everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
> > For more options, visit this group 
> > athttp://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.

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Re: Maudlin & How many times does COMP have to be false before its false?

2011-02-14 Thread Jason Resch

On Mon, Feb 14, 2011 at 11:23 AM, Brent Meeker wrote:

>  On 2/13/2011 11:24 PM, Jason Resch wrote:
>
>
>
> On Mon, Feb 14, 2011 at 12:52 AM, Brent Meeker wrote:
>
>>  On 2/13/2011 10:13 PM, Jason Resch wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Sun, Feb 13, 2011 at 10:46 AM, Brent Meeker 
>> wrote:
>>
>>> On 2/13/2011 5:21 AM, 1Z wrote:
>>>

 On Feb 12, 3:18 am, Brent Meeker  wrote:

>  What do you think the chances are that any random object in
 Plato's heaven, or any random Turing machine will support
 intelligent life?
 1 in 10, 1 in 1000, 1 in a billion?

>>>  Zero.
>
>
 Does that allow us to argue:

 1) A universe selected from an uncountably infinite number of
 possibilities has measure
 0
 2) Our universe exists so it has measure>0
 3) Our universe is not selected from uncountably infinite
 possibilities
 4) MUH indicates any universe must be selected from uncountable
 infinite possibilities (since all
 of maths includes the real line, etc)
 5) MUH is false.

>>>
>>>  Hmmm.  I think we argue that objects in Plato's heaven and Turing
>>> machines are not the right kind of things to support life.
>>
>>
>>
>> I am very puzzled by this statement.  You could help me understand by
>> answering the following questions:
>>
>> Why couldn't there be an accurate simulation of life on a Turing machine?
>>
>>
>>  Because a Turing machine is an abstraction.  If you mean a realization
>> of a Turing machine, then I suppose there could be a simulation of life on
>> it.
>>
>>
>>
>> How can entities within a universe that exists in Plato's heaven
>> distinguish it from a universe that does not?
>>
>>
>>  I doubt that Plato's heaven exists.  So no universes would exist in it.
>>
>> Brent
>>
>>
>
> Exists is a funny word.  It seems to embody knowledge and opinion from one
> observer's viewpoint based on their own limited experiences and interactions
> within their local portion of reality.
>
>
> Indeed.  I'm not sure it's unqualified use is meaningful.
>
>
>  If Plato's heaven is such a thing that contains all possible structures,
> does the fact that it contains all possible structures hold true whether or
> not it exists?
>
>
> All possible brick structures?  Please explain as precisely as possible
> what Platonia is.
>
>
>  If there are universes existing abstractly inside Plato's heaven, and
> some of those universes contain conscious observers, does ascribing the
> property of non-existence to Plato's heaven or to those universes make those
> observers not conscious, or is the abstraction enough?
>
>
> What does "abstractly existing" mean.?  How is it different from just
> exsiting?
>
>
>   What properties can something which is non-existent have?
>
> It seems there are two choices: 1. Things which are non-existent can have
> other properties besides non-existence.
>
>
> Sure.  Sherlock Holmes is non-existent and has the property of being a
> detective.
>
>
>  E.g., a non-existent universe has atoms, stars, worlds, and people on
> some of those worlds.  Or 2. Non-existent things cannot have any other
> properties besides non-existence.  It sounds like you belong to this second
> camp.
>
> However, this seems to lead immediately to mathematical realism.  As there
> are objects with definite objectively explorable properties in math.  7's
> primality and parity are properties of 7.  But how can 7 have properties if
> it does not exist?  If non-existent things can have properties, why can't
> consciousness be one of those properties?  What is the difference between a
> non-existent brain experiencing a sunset and an existent brain experiencing
> a sunset?
>
>
> Only one of them exists.
>
>
>  Please explain as precisely as possible what it means for something to
> not exist.
>
>
> If I can kick it and it kicks back it exists.
>
> Brent
>

What do you think about this passage from Fabric of Reality, where David
Deutsch argues numbers do "kick back":

"*Do* abstract, non-physical entities exist? Are they part of the fabric of
reality? I am not interested here in issues of mere word usage. It is
obvious that numbers, the laws of physics, and so on do ‘exist’ in some
senses and not in others. The substantive question is this: how are we to
understand such entities? Which of them are merely convenient forms of
words, referring ultimately only to ordinary, physical reality? Which are
merely ephemeral features of our culture? Which are arbitrary, like the
rules of a trivial game that we need only look up? And which, if any, can be
explained only in a way that attributes an independent existence to them?
Things of this last type *must* be part of the fabric of reality as
{222} defined in this book, because one would have to understand them
in order to
understand everything that is understood.

This suggests that we ought to apply Dr Johnson's criterion again. If we
want to know whether a given abstraction real

Re: Maudlin & How many times does COMP have to be false before its false?

2011-02-14 Thread David Nyman

On 14 February 2011 20:46, John Mikes  wrote:

> I asked several times: "what are numbers?" without getting a reasonable
> reply.
> Sometimes I really like 1Z's twists.

That may be, but I would also like to see if we can get things
untwisted.  I'm not peddling any theory of my own here, I'm just
trying to do some simple accounting.  For example according to some
theory "X doesn't exist" and then somewhere else in the same theory
something supposedly depends on "assuming X".  This doesn't add up.
Part of the problem - most of it, perhaps - is
psychological-linguistic.  Being dead wrong about some theory of the
mind (fortunately) doesn't stop our minds from functioning.  But that
very same fact can blind us to circular reasoning.

I've tried to argue before that the "causal closure of physics" is a
very strong claim that is also very restrictive if applied
consistently.  Trouble is, in my view, it very rarely is so applied.
The Hard Problem, and the corresponding zombie intuition, is a sort of
reductio of the strongest version of this claim - i.e. that what
"exists" is reducible to a micro-physical substrate that is fully
constitutive of all phenomena of whatever type. If this proposition
were ever to be taken at face value, then further theorising would
perforce just stop right there; indeed there can be no "theories" in
such a scenario, just the sub-atomic events that might have been said
(but by whom?) to underlie them.   Of course this hardly reflects our
experience (how could it?).  We do not discover ourselves to be in
some maximally fragmented state (what could it be "like"?) but rather
in some integrated state of an altogether higher order; but such
quotidian reality apparently impresses us so little that we are quite
capable of theorising it cheerfully out of existence (e.g. eliminative
materialism).  Well, as Groucho Marx once innocently enquired "who you
gonna believe - me or your own eyes?".

David

> David,
>
> I was laughing all the way from the computer that '7 does not exist'. And
> yes, it does not.
> Do qualia exist without the substrate they serve for as qualia?
> It goes into our deeper thought to identify 'existing' -
> I am willing to go as far as "if our mind handles it, 'it' DOES exist"
> so the quale like; 7(?) [i.e. the monitor for the eggs in your fridge] is
> existing. Not answering the question 'what it is?" - but principally I am
> also against ontology in a worldview of change, where "being" makes only
> sense as "transitionally becoming" and transition substitutes for stagnancy.
> Panta Rhei also boggles my mind, especially when I cut out conventional
> time.
>
> I asked several times: "what are numbers?" without getting a reasonable
> reply.
> Sometimes I really like 1Z's twists.
>
> On Mon, Feb 14, 2011 at 2:32 PM, 1Z  wrote:
>>
>>
>> On Feb 14, 6:21 pm, David Nyman  wrote:
>> > On 14 February 2011 12:35, 1Z  wrote:
>> >
>> > > Oh come on. How can you say that after I just told
>> > > you 7 doesn't exist.
>> >
>> > Wouldn't this then imply that computation also doesn't exist, in an
>> > analogous sense?
>>
>> I can still have seven eggs in my fridge, and I can still
>> have a computation running on a physical computer.
>>
>> >  And that consequently any computational
>> > characterisation of the mental is in itself a mere fiction, reducing
>> > to whatever physical behaviour is picked out under the rules of a
>> > formal "game"?
>>
>> If computation is multiply realisable, it never reduces to
>> any particular physical behaviour, even if it always instantiated a
>> such
>>
>> >  I recall that you aren't committed to CTM per se, but
>> > if what you say about mathematics is true, and only the physical is
>> > real, wouldn't it follow a priori that CTM just eliminates the mind?
>>
>> No. Every running programme is physical. Only programmes
>> with nothing to run on are eliminated
>>
>> > I know you've said before that reduction isn't elimination, but I'm
>> > not clear what is supposed to have any claim to "reality" here, other
>> > than the physical tokens instantiating the "computation".
>> >
>> > David
>>
>>
>> If you have a physical token running a computation, you have
>> a computation. What is eliminated?
>>
>> --
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Re: Maudlin & How many times does COMP have to be false before its false?

2011-02-14 Thread John Mikes

David,

I was laughing all the way from the computer that '7 does not exist'. And
yes, it does not.
Do qualia exist without the substrate they serve for as qualia?
It goes into our deeper thought to identify 'existing' -
I am willing to go as far as "if our mind handles it, 'it' DOES exist"
so the quale like; 7(?) [i.e. the monitor for the eggs in your fridge] is
existing. Not answering the question 'what it is?" - but principally I am
also against ontology in a worldview of change, where "being" makes only
sense as "transitionally becoming" and transition substitutes for stagnancy.
Panta Rhei also boggles my mind, especially when I cut out conventional
time.

I asked several times: "what are numbers?" without getting a reasonable
reply.
Sometimes I really like 1Z's twists.

On Mon, Feb 14, 2011 at 2:32 PM, 1Z  wrote:

>
>
> On Feb 14, 6:21 pm, David Nyman  wrote:
> > On 14 February 2011 12:35, 1Z  wrote:
> >
> > > Oh come on. How can you say that after I just told
> > > you 7 doesn't exist.
> >
> > Wouldn't this then imply that computation also doesn't exist, in an
> > analogous sense?
>
> I can still have seven eggs in my fridge, and I can still
> have a computation running on a physical computer.
>
> >  And that consequently any computational
> > characterisation of the mental is in itself a mere fiction, reducing
> > to whatever physical behaviour is picked out under the rules of a
> > formal "game"?
>
> If computation is multiply realisable, it never reduces to
> any particular physical behaviour, even if it always instantiated a
> such
>
> >  I recall that you aren't committed to CTM per se, but
> > if what you say about mathematics is true, and only the physical is
> > real, wouldn't it follow a priori that CTM just eliminates the mind?
>
> No. Every running programme is physical. Only programmes
> with nothing to run on are eliminated
>
> > I know you've said before that reduction isn't elimination, but I'm
> > not clear what is supposed to have any claim to "reality" here, other
> > than the physical tokens instantiating the "computation".
> >
> > David
>
>
> If you have a physical token running a computation, you have
> a computation. What is eliminated?
>
> --
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Re: Maudlin & How many times does COMP have to be false before its false?

2011-02-14 Thread David Nyman

On 14 February 2011 19:32, 1Z  wrote:

>
> "If you have a physical token running a computation, you have
> a computation. What is eliminated?

But such talk is all a posteriori and hence merely circular.  A
priori, if you claim that reality can be reduced to (i.e. actually
consists exclusively of) physical tokens doing whatever they are
doing, then that's all you have to play with, and moreover all you
appear to need to get the job done.  If you want to further claim that
"computation" also exists in some sense capable of accounting for all
the a posteriori appearances (including all this talk of computation
and mind) you need to get a bigger boat.  Or else you've just
eliminated both the computation and the mind (after all, who needs
'em? - not the physical tokens, apparently).  The distinction between
"reduction" and "elimination is mere absent-mindedness: you just have
to forget to remember that you can't eat your cake and still have it.

David


>
>
> On Feb 14, 6:21 pm, David Nyman  wrote:
>> On 14 February 2011 12:35, 1Z  wrote:
>>
>> > Oh come on. How can you say that after I just told
>> > you 7 doesn't exist.
>>
>> Wouldn't this then imply that computation also doesn't exist, in an
>> analogous sense?
>
> I can still have seven eggs in my fridge, and I can still
> have a computation running on a physical computer.
>
>>  And that consequently any computational
>> characterisation of the mental is in itself a mere fiction, reducing
>> to whatever physical behaviour is picked out under the rules of a
>> formal "game"?
>
> If computation is multiply realisable, it never reduces to
> any particular physical behaviour, even if it always instantiated a
> such
>
>>  I recall that you aren't committed to CTM per se, but
>> if what you say about mathematics is true, and only the physical is
>> real, wouldn't it follow a priori that CTM just eliminates the mind?
>
> No. Every running programme is physical. Only programmes
> with nothing to run on are eliminated
>
>> I know you've said before that reduction isn't elimination, but I'm
>> not clear what is supposed to have any claim to "reality" here, other
>> than the physical tokens instantiating the "computation".
>>
>> David
>
>
> If you have a physical token running a computation, you have
> a computation. What is eliminated?
>
> --
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Re: Maudlin & How many times does COMP have to be false before its false?

2011-02-14 Thread Quentin Anciaux

2011/2/14 1Z 

>
>
> On Feb 14, 6:21 pm, David Nyman  wrote:
> > On 14 February 2011 12:35, 1Z  wrote:
> >
> > > Oh come on. How can you say that after I just told
> > > you 7 doesn't exist.
> >
> > Wouldn't this then imply that computation also doesn't exist, in an
> > analogous sense?
>
> I can still have seven eggs in my fridge, and I can still
> have a computation running on a physical computer.
>
> >  And that consequently any computational
> > characterisation of the mental is in itself a mere fiction, reducing
> > to whatever physical behaviour is picked out under the rules of a
> > formal "game"?
>
> If computation is multiply realisable, it never reduces to
> any particular physical behaviour, even if it always instantiated a
> such
>
> >  I recall that you aren't committed to CTM per se, but
> > if what you say about mathematics is true, and only the physical is
> > real, wouldn't it follow a priori that CTM just eliminates the mind?
>
> No. Every running programme is physical. Only programmes
> with nothing to run on are eliminated
>
>
Programs are not written with physical instantiation in mind... even if
eventually you run it. What is important is the computation which doesn't
care about the physical instantiation as such.

When I stop executing a program does it cease to exist ? And come back to
existence the instant I run it ?


>  > I know you've said before that reduction isn't elimination, but I'm
> > not clear what is supposed to have any claim to "reality" here, other
> > than the physical tokens instantiating the "computation".
> >
> > David
>
>
> If you have a physical token running a computation, you have
> a computation. What is eliminated?
>
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Re: Maudlin & How many times does COMP have to be false before its false?



On Feb 14, 6:21 pm, David Nyman  wrote:
> On 14 February 2011 12:35, 1Z  wrote:
>
> > Oh come on. How can you say that after I just told
> > you 7 doesn't exist.
>
> Wouldn't this then imply that computation also doesn't exist, in an
> analogous sense?

I can still have seven eggs in my fridge, and I can still
have a computation running on a physical computer.

>  And that consequently any computational
> characterisation of the mental is in itself a mere fiction, reducing
> to whatever physical behaviour is picked out under the rules of a
> formal "game"?

If computation is multiply realisable, it never reduces to
any particular physical behaviour, even if it always instantiated a
such

>  I recall that you aren't committed to CTM per se, but
> if what you say about mathematics is true, and only the physical is
> real, wouldn't it follow a priori that CTM just eliminates the mind?

No. Every running programme is physical. Only programmes
with nothing to run on are eliminated

> I know you've said before that reduction isn't elimination, but I'm
> not clear what is supposed to have any claim to "reality" here, other
> than the physical tokens instantiating the "computation".
>
> David


If you have a physical token running a computation, you have
a computation. What is eliminated?

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Re: Maudlin & How many times does COMP have to be false before its false?

2011-02-14 Thread Quentin Anciaux

2011/2/14 1Z 

>
>
> On Feb 14, 2:52 pm, Bruno Marchal  wrote:
> > On 14 Feb 2011, at 13:35, 1Z wrote:
> >
> >
> >
> > > On Feb 14, 8:47 am, Bruno Marchal  wrote:
> > >> Do you believe that Goldbach conjecture is either true or false? If
> > >> you agree with this, then you accept arithmetical realism, which is
> > >> enough for the comp consequences.,
> >
> > > Nope. Bivalence can be accepted as a formal rule and therefore
> > > not as a claim that some set of objects either exist or don't.
> >
> > That's my point.
>
> Such a formal claim cannot support the conclusion that
> I am an immaterial dreaming machine.
>
> >
> > >> Do you believe that Church thesis makes sense? That is enough to say
> > >> that you believe in the 'arithmetical platonia'
> >
> > > Not at all.
> >
> > OK. This means that you are using "arithmetical platonia" in a sense
> > which is not relevant for the reasoning.
> > If you accept CT, there should be no problem with the reasoning at all.
>
> I accept CT and reject Platonism, and thus the reasoning does not go
> through.
>
> > >> . People needs to be
> > >> ultrafinitist to reject the arithmetical platonia.
> >
> > > No, they just need to be anti realist.
> >
> > Same remark.
>
> Nope. Finitists think 7 exists., anti realists think it doesn't.
>
> > >> Personnaly I am a bit skeptical on set realism, because it is hard to
> > >> define it, but for the numbers I have never met people who are not
> > >> realist about them.
> >
> > > Oh come on. How can you say that after I just told
> > > you 7 doesn't exist.
> >
> > You contradict your self,
>
> No I don't. How many times have I explained that
> mathematical existence claims are true in a fictive
> sense that doesn't imply real existence
>

You still did not define what is real existence... that it kicks back is not
an acceptable definition.

When you're dead you don't exist ? If yes what does it means to exist at all
?

>
> >unless you mean that seven is not made of
> > matter. In which case comp nothing exists.
>
> What does "comp nothing exists" mean?
>
> > >> Even to say "I am not arithmetical realist" is
> > >> enough to be an arithmetical realist
> >
> > > Nonsense.
> >
> > Probable, given your rather inappropriate sense of metaphysical
> > realism in mathematics.
>
> I am  not a realist about maths. You must be because you exist
> and you think you are a  number
>
> > >> . A real anti-ariothmetical
> > >> realist cannot even spaeak about arithmetical realism. You need to be
> > >> an arithmetical realist to make sense of denying it.
> >
> > > Like the old canard that to deny God is to accept God? Naah. Meaning
> > > is not
> > > just reference.
> >
> > A reasoning is valid, or not valid.
>
> A true conclusion requires soundness as well as validity
>
> --
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Re: Maudlin & How many times does COMP have to be false before its false?



On Feb 14, 2:56 pm, Bruno Marchal  wrote:
> On 14 Feb 2011, at 12:13, 1Z wrote:
>
>
>
> > Thing that aren't real can't have  real properties, but
> > hypothetical things have hypothetical properties
>
> You talk like if you knew what is real.

I only have to know what real means.

>Do you agree that the  
> existence of primary matter can only be an hypothesis?

Only in the sense that everything is. It is beside the point
anyway. Talk of properties does not imply that they are real
or that what has them is real. Such talk is really about definitions.

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Re: Maudlin & How many times does COMP have to be false before its false?



On Feb 14, 2:52 pm, Bruno Marchal  wrote:
> On 14 Feb 2011, at 13:35, 1Z wrote:
>
>
>
> > On Feb 14, 8:47 am, Bruno Marchal  wrote:
> >> Do you believe that Goldbach conjecture is either true or false? If
> >> you agree with this, then you accept arithmetical realism, which is
> >> enough for the comp consequences.,
>
> > Nope. Bivalence can be accepted as a formal rule and therefore
> > not as a claim that some set of objects either exist or don't.
>
> That's my point.

Such a formal claim cannot support the conclusion that
I am an immaterial dreaming machine.

>
> >> Do you believe that Church thesis makes sense? That is enough to say
> >> that you believe in the 'arithmetical platonia'
>
> > Not at all.
>
> OK. This means that you are using "arithmetical platonia" in a sense  
> which is not relevant for the reasoning.
> If you accept CT, there should be no problem with the reasoning at all.

I accept CT and reject Platonism, and thus the reasoning does not go
through.

> >> . People needs to be
> >> ultrafinitist to reject the arithmetical platonia.
>
> > No, they just need to be anti realist.
>
> Same remark.

Nope. Finitists think 7 exists., anti realists think it doesn't.

> >> Personnaly I am a bit skeptical on set realism, because it is hard to
> >> define it, but for the numbers I have never met people who are not
> >> realist about them.
>
> > Oh come on. How can you say that after I just told
> > you 7 doesn't exist.
>
> You contradict your self,

No I don't. How many times have I explained that
mathematical existence claims are true in a fictive
sense that doesn't imply real existence

>unless you mean that seven is not made of  
> matter. In which case comp nothing exists.

What does "comp nothing exists" mean?

> >> Even to say "I am not arithmetical realist" is
> >> enough to be an arithmetical realist
>
> > Nonsense.
>
> Probable, given your rather inappropriate sense of metaphysical  
> realism in mathematics.

I am  not a realist about maths. You must be because you exist
and you think you are a  number

> >> . A real anti-ariothmetical
> >> realist cannot even spaeak about arithmetical realism. You need to be
> >> an arithmetical realist to make sense of denying it.
>
> > Like the old canard that to deny God is to accept God? Naah. Meaning
> > is not
> > just reference.
>
> A reasoning is valid, or not valid.

A true conclusion requires soundness as well as validity

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Re: Maudlin & How many times does COMP have to be false before its false?



On Feb 14, 10:16 am, Bruno Marchal  wrote:
> On 11 Feb 2011, at 19:10, 1Z wrote:
>
>
>
>
>
> > On Feb 10, 1:24 pm, Bruno Marchal  wrote:
> >> On 09 Feb 2011, at 16:49, 1Z wrote:
>
> >>> On Feb 8, 6:17 pm, Bruno Marchal  wrote:
>  On 07 Feb 2011, at 23:58, 1Z wrote:
>
> > On Feb 7, 6:29 pm, Bruno Marchal  wrote:
> >> Peter,
>
> >> Everything is fine. You should understand the reasoning by using
> >> only
> >> the formal definition of "arithmetical realism",
>
> > You reasoning *cannot* be both valid and ontologically
> > neutral because it has ontological conclusions.
>
>  Wrong.
>
> >>> Wrong about what?
>
> >> You were wrong on the idea that an argument cannot be valid and
> >> ontological. It is enough that the premises have ontological clauses.
>
> > So which is the ontological premise? You don't say
> > that Platonism is an explicit premise. But it isn't
> > a corollary of CT either.
>
> CT needs arithmetical platonism/realism.

No it doesn't. It may need bivalence, which is not the same thing (me,
passim)

> If you believe the contrary,  
> could you give me a form of CT which does not presuppose  it?

"Every effectively calculable function is a computable function"

>  See my papers.
>
> >>> That is just what I am criticising. You need the ontological
> >>> premise that mathematical entities have real existence,
> >>> and it is a separate premise from comp. That is my
> >>> response to your writings.
>
> >> The only ontology is my conciousness, and some amount of consensual
> >> reality (doctor, brain, etc.).
>
> > If I agree only to the existence of doctors, brains and silicon
> > computers,
> > the conclusion that I am an immaterial dreaming machine cannot follow
>
> Then you have to present a refutation of UDA+MGA, without begging the  
> question.

No, I can just present a refutation of Platonism. The conlcusion
does't follo
without it.

> >> It does not assume that physical things
> >> "really" or primitively exists, nor does it assume that numbers  
> >> really
> >> exist in any sense. Just that they exist in the mathematical sense.
>
> > There is no generally agreed mathematical sense. If mathematical
> > anti-realists are right, they don't exist at all and I am therefore
> > not one.
>
> Mathematicians don't care about the nature of the existence of natural  
> numbers.

Fine. Such an ontologically non-commital idea of AR cannot support
your conclusion

>They all agree with statement like "there exist prime  
> number", etc.

Yes, they tend to agree on a set of true existence statements, and to
disagree on
what existence means.

>  Read a book on logic and computability.
>
> >>> Read a book on philosophy, on the limitations of
> >>> apriori reasoning, on the contentious nature of mathematical  
> >>> ontology.
>
> >> You are the one opposing a paper in applied logic in the cognitive  
> >> and
> >> physical science. I suggest you look at books to better see what i am
> >> taking about.
>
> > You are the one who is doing ontology without realising it.
>
> On consciousness. Not on numbers,

You're saying *my* consciousness *is* a number!

>which I use in the usual  
> mathematical or theoretical computer sense. The reasoning is agonstic  
> on God, primary universe, mind, etc. at the start.
> The only ontology used in the reasoning is the ontology of my  
> consciousness, and some amount of consensual reality (existence of  
> universe, brains, doctors, ...). Of course I do not assume either that  
> such things are primitoively material, except at step 8 for the  
> reductio ad absurdo. Up to step seven you can still believe in a  
> primitively material reality.

You cannot eliminate the existence of matter in favour of the
existence
of numbers without assuming the existence of numbers

>  Boolos and
>  Jeffrey, or Mendelson, or the Dover book by Martin Davis are
>  excellent.
>  It is a traditional exercise to define those machine in arithmetic.
>
> >>> I have no doubt, but you don't get real minds and universes
> >>> out of hypothetical machines.
>
> >> You mean mathematical machine. They are not hypothetical. Unless you
> >> believe that the number seven is hypothetical,
>
> > I do. Haven't you got that yet?
>
> I did understand that seven is immaterial.

Not just immaterial. Non existent.

> But I am OK with seven  
> being hypothetical. It changes nothing in the reasoning.

I am not running on some immaterial TM that exists only in your head

>

> >> in which case I get
> >> hypothetical minds and hypothetical universes.
>
> > I am not generated by a hypothesis: I generate hypotheses.
>
> Confusion level. If you suppose a TOE you are supposed to be explained  
> by that TOE.

Explained by, not caused by. Things fell before Newton explained
gravity

> In that sense you are generated by an hypothesis,

I am not generated by a hypothesis, even a true one, any more
than my house is built on a map, even an accurate one.

>even if

Re: Maudlin & How many times does COMP have to be false before its false?

2011-02-14 Thread David Nyman

On 14 February 2011 12:35, 1Z  wrote:

> Oh come on. How can you say that after I just told
> you 7 doesn't exist.

Wouldn't this then imply that computation also doesn't exist, in an
analogous sense?  And that consequently any computational
characterisation of the mental is in itself a mere fiction, reducing
to whatever physical behaviour is picked out under the rules of a
formal "game"?  I recall that you aren't committed to CTM per se, but
if what you say about mathematics is true, and only the physical is
real, wouldn't it follow a priori that CTM just eliminates the mind?
I know you've said before that reduction isn't elimination, but I'm
not clear what is supposed to have any claim to "reality" here, other
than the physical tokens instantiating the "computation".

David

>
>
> On Feb 14, 8:47 am, Bruno Marchal  wrote:
>> Do you believe that Goldbach conjecture is either true or false? If
>> you agree with this, then you accept arithmetical realism, which is
>> enough for the comp consequences.,
>
> Nope. Bivalence can be accepted as a formal rule and therefore
> not as a claim that some set of objects either exist or don't.
>
>> Do you believe that Church thesis makes sense? That is enough to say
>> that you believe in the 'arithmetical platonia'
>
> Not at all.
>
>>. People needs to be
>> ultrafinitist to reject the arithmetical platonia.
>
> No, they just need to be anti realist.
>
>> Personnaly I am a bit skeptical on set realism, because it is hard to
>> define it, but for the numbers I have never met people who are not
>> realist about them.
>
> Oh come on. How can you say that after I just told
> you 7 doesn't exist.
>
>> Even to say "I am not arithmetical realist" is
>> enough to be an arithmetical realist
>
> Nonsense.
>
>>. A real anti-ariothmetical
>> realist cannot even spaeak about arithmetical realism. You need to be
>> an arithmetical realist to make sense of denying it.
>>
>
> Like the old canard that to deny God is to accept God? Naah. Meaning
> is not
> just reference.
>
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Re: Maudlin & How many times does COMP have to be false before its false?

2011-02-14 Thread Brent Meeker


On 2/14/2011 1:00 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 14 Feb 2011, at 07:13, Jason Resch wrote:




On Sun, Feb 13, 2011 at 10:46 AM, Brent Meeker 
mailto:meeke...@dslextreme.com>> wrote:


On 2/13/2011 5:21 AM, 1Z wrote:


On Feb 12, 3:18 am, Brent Meekermailto:meeke...@dslextreme.com>>  wrote:


What do you think the chances are that any
random object in
Plato's heaven, or any random Turing machine
will support intelligent life?
1 in 10, 1 in 1000, 1 in a billion?

Zero.

Does that allow us to argue:

1) A universe selected from an uncountably infinite number of
possibilities has measure
0
2) Our universe exists so it has measure>0
3) Our universe is not selected from uncountably infinite
possibilities
4) MUH indicates any universe must be selected from uncountable
infinite possibilities (since all
of maths includes the real line, etc)
5) MUH is false.


Hmmm.  I think we argue that objects in Plato's heaven and Turing
machines are not the right kind of things to support life.



I am very puzzled by this statement.  You could help me understand by 
answering the following questions:


Why couldn't there be an accurate simulation of life on a Turing machine?

How can entities within a universe that exists in Plato's heaven 
distinguish it from a universe that does not?


That is a good argument which convinces many people, who actually ask 
"what is the MGA for?"


Here I can imagine what 1Z could answer to "How can entities within a 
universe that exists in Plato's heaven distinguish it from a universe 
that does not?".
He assumes the existence of primary matter or of a primitively real 
physical universe,


It's equivocation to speak of entities existing in a domain that doesn't 
exist.  If something like arithmetical universe exists, it exists in a 
very different sense of the word than material objects exist.  If there 
are entities in that universe that are aware of it (whatever that may 
mean) then they a perforce aware in a different sense.


and will, by decision, attribute consciousness, only to the creature 
made off that primary matter,


No, there is no need to assume primary matter.  One need only recognize 
that there is *this* universe which we are aware of and exist in and it 
is not the same as some other universe which may or may not exist in 
some different sense or another.


even if the consciousness relies in the computation implemented in 
that matter. So 1Z accepts the idea that arithmetical truth is full of 
zombies, like the "1Z" described in arithmetic through the 
arithmetical emulation of our galaxy (say).
But that moves is made impossible by the MGA. To attach consciousness 
to matter, you have to introduce something non Turing emulable in that 
consciousness, or, like Jack Mallah did, attribute a physical activity 
to a piece of matter having no physical activity at all relevant with 
the computation.


But the idea of multiple worlds started with Everett whose 
interpretation of QM implies that there are no pieces of matter with no 
activity.  The universe is defined by a wave function in a Hilbert space 
and pieces of matter are just certain projections.



But this prevent to say "yes" to the doctor *qua computatio*.


No it doesn't.  Whatever the doctor uses to replace neurons in your head 
is also matter and also part of the universal wave function.




Do you (the reader of the list, not Jason) agree with the 323 
principle? If the physical running of a computer entails some 
consciousness, and if that running does not use the register 323, does 
the same running of that computer with the "323 register" deleted, run 
the same consciousness, or not?


I'd say that's an empirical question.  But in terms of answering the 
doctor we can say that leaving out register 323 very likely makes it a 
different computer.


Brent



Bruno


http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ 



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Re: Maudlin & How many times does COMP have to be false before its false?

2011-02-14 Thread Brent Meeker


On 2/13/2011 11:24 PM, Jason Resch wrote:



On Mon, Feb 14, 2011 at 12:52 AM, Brent Meeker 
mailto:meeke...@dslextreme.com>> wrote:


On 2/13/2011 10:13 PM, Jason Resch wrote:



On Sun, Feb 13, 2011 at 10:46 AM, Brent Meeker
mailto:meeke...@dslextreme.com>> wrote:

On 2/13/2011 5:21 AM, 1Z wrote:


On Feb 12, 3:18 am, Brent Meekermailto:meeke...@dslextreme.com>>  wrote:


What do you think the chances are that
any random object in
Plato's heaven, or any random Turing
machine will support intelligent life?
1 in 10, 1 in 1000, 1 in a billion?

Zero.

Does that allow us to argue:

1) A universe selected from an uncountably infinite number of
possibilities has measure
0
2) Our universe exists so it has measure>0
3) Our universe is not selected from uncountably infinite
possibilities
4) MUH indicates any universe must be selected from
uncountable
infinite possibilities (since all
of maths includes the real line, etc)
5) MUH is false.


Hmmm.  I think we argue that objects in Plato's heaven and
Turing machines are not the right kind of things to support life.



I am very puzzled by this statement.  You could help me
understand by answering the following questions:

Why couldn't there be an accurate simulation of life on a Turing
machine?


Because a Turing machine is an abstraction.  If you mean a
realization of a Turing machine, then I suppose there could be a
simulation of life on it.




How can entities within a universe that exists in Plato's heaven
distinguish it from a universe that does not?


I doubt that Plato's heaven exists.  So no universes would exist
in it.

Brent



Exists is a funny word.  It seems to embody knowledge and opinion from 
one observer's viewpoint based on their own limited experiences and 
interactions within their local portion of reality.


Indeed.  I'm not sure it's unqualified use is meaningful.

If Plato's heaven is such a thing that contains all possible 
structures, does the fact that it contains all possible structures 
hold true whether or not it exists?


All possible brick structures?  Please explain as precisely as possible 
what Platonia is.


If there are universes existing abstractly inside Plato's heaven, and 
some of those universes contain conscious observers, does ascribing 
the property of non-existence to Plato's heaven or to those universes 
make those observers not conscious, or is the abstraction enough?


What does "abstractly existing" mean.?  How is it different from just 
exsiting?



What properties can something which is non-existent have?

It seems there are two choices: 1. Things which are non-existent can 
have other properties besides non-existence.


Sure.  Sherlock Holmes is non-existent and has the property of being a 
detective.


E.g., a non-existent universe has atoms, stars, worlds, and people on 
some of those worlds.  Or 2. Non-existent things cannot have any other 
properties besides non-existence.  It sounds like you belong to this 
second camp.


However, this seems to lead immediately to mathematical realism.  As 
there are objects with definite objectively explorable properties in 
math.  7's primality and parity are properties of 7.  But how can 7 
have properties if it does not exist?  If non-existent things can have 
properties, why can't consciousness be one of those properties?  What 
is the difference between a non-existent brain experiencing a sunset 
and an existent brain experiencing a sunset?


Only one of them exists.

Please explain as precisely as possible what it means for something to 
not exist.


If I can kick it and it kicks back it exists.

Brent



Jason

No facts about it if it is non existent?
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Re: Maudlin & How many times does COMP have to be false before its false?



On 14 Feb 2011, at 12:13, 1Z wrote:


Thing that aren't real can't have  real properties, but
hypothetical things have hypothetical properties


You talk like if you knew what is real. Do you agree that the  
existence of primary matter can only be an hypothesis? A useful  
simplifying assumption perhaps?


Bruno Marchal


http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



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Re: Maudlin & How many times does COMP have to be false before its false?



On 14 Feb 2011, at 13:35, 1Z wrote:




On Feb 14, 8:47 am, Bruno Marchal  wrote:

Do you believe that Goldbach conjecture is either true or false? If
you agree with this, then you accept arithmetical realism, which is
enough for the comp consequences.,


Nope. Bivalence can be accepted as a formal rule and therefore
not as a claim that some set of objects either exist or don't.


That's my point.





Do you believe that Church thesis makes sense? That is enough to say
that you believe in the 'arithmetical platonia'


Not at all.


OK. This means that you are using "arithmetical platonia" in a sense  
which is not relevant for the reasoning.

If you accept CT, there should be no problem with the reasoning at all.






. People needs to be
ultrafinitist to reject the arithmetical platonia.


No, they just need to be anti realist.


Same remark.





Personnaly I am a bit skeptical on set realism, because it is hard to
define it, but for the numbers I have never met people who are not
realist about them.


Oh come on. How can you say that after I just told
you 7 doesn't exist.


You contradict your self, unless you mean that seven is not made of  
matter. In which case comp nothing exists.







Even to say "I am not arithmetical realist" is
enough to be an arithmetical realist


Nonsense.



Probable, given your rather inappropriate sense of metaphysical  
realism in mathematics.






. A real anti-ariothmetical
realist cannot even spaeak about arithmetical realism. You need to be
an arithmetical realist to make sense of denying it.



Like the old canard that to deny God is to accept God? Naah. Meaning
is not
just reference.


A reasoning is valid, or not valid. Playing with words will not help  
you to understand it.


Bruno Marchal

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



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Re: Maudlin & How many times does COMP have to be false before its false?



On Feb 14, 8:47 am, Bruno Marchal  wrote:
> Do you believe that Goldbach conjecture is either true or false? If
> you agree with this, then you accept arithmetical realism, which is
> enough for the comp consequences.,

Nope. Bivalence can be accepted as a formal rule and therefore
not as a claim that some set of objects either exist or don't.

> Do you believe that Church thesis makes sense? That is enough to say
> that you believe in the 'arithmetical platonia'

Not at all.

>. People needs to be
> ultrafinitist to reject the arithmetical platonia.

No, they just need to be anti realist.

> Personnaly I am a bit skeptical on set realism, because it is hard to
> define it, but for the numbers I have never met people who are not
> realist about them.

Oh come on. How can you say that after I just told
you 7 doesn't exist.

> Even to say "I am not arithmetical realist" is
> enough to be an arithmetical realist

Nonsense.

>. A real anti-ariothmetical
> realist cannot even spaeak about arithmetical realism. You need to be
> an arithmetical realist to make sense of denying it.
>

Like the old canard that to deny God is to accept God? Naah. Meaning
is not
just reference.

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Re: Maudlin & How many times does COMP have to be false before its false?



On Feb 14, 7:24 am, Jason Resch  wrote:
> On Mon, Feb 14, 2011 at 12:52 AM, Brent Meeker wrote:
>
>
>
> >  On 2/13/2011 10:13 PM, Jason Resch wrote:
>
> > On Sun, Feb 13, 2011 at 10:46 AM, Brent Meeker 
> > wrote:
>
> >> On 2/13/2011 5:21 AM, 1Z wrote:
>
> >>> On Feb 12, 3:18 am, Brent Meeker  wrote:
>
>   What do you think the chances are that any random object in
> >>> Plato's heaven, or any random Turing machine will support intelligent
> >>> life?
> >>> 1 in 10, 1 in 1000, 1 in a billion?
>
> >>  Zero.
>
> >>> Does that allow us to argue:
>
> >>> 1) A universe selected from an uncountably infinite number of
> >>> possibilities has measure
> >>> 0
> >>> 2) Our universe exists so it has measure>0
> >>> 3) Our universe is not selected from uncountably infinite
> >>> possibilities
> >>> 4) MUH indicates any universe must be selected from uncountable
> >>> infinite possibilities (since all
> >>> of maths includes the real line, etc)
> >>> 5) MUH is false.
>
> >>  Hmmm.  I think we argue that objects in Plato's heaven and Turing
> >> machines are not the right kind of things to support life.
>
> > I am very puzzled by this statement.  You could help me understand by
> > answering the following questions:
>
> > Why couldn't there be an accurate simulation of life on a Turing machine?
>
> > Because a Turing machine is an abstraction.  If you mean a realization of a
> > Turing machine, then I suppose there could be a simulation of life on it.
>
> > How can entities within a universe that exists in Plato's heaven
> > distinguish it from a universe that does not?
>
> > I doubt that Plato's heaven exists.  So no universes would exist in it.
>
> > Brent
>
> Exists is a funny word.  It seems to embody knowledge and opinion from one
> observer's viewpoint based on their own limited experiences and interactions
> within their local portion of reality.  If Plato's heaven is such a thing
> that contains all possible structures, does the fact that it contains all
> possible structures hold true whether or not it exists?

It's a correct definition whether or not it exists.

>  If there are
> universes existing abstractly inside Plato's heaven, and some of those
> universes contain conscious observers, does ascribing the property of
> non-existence to Plato's heaven or to those universes make those observers
> not conscious, or is the abstraction enough?

Thing that aren't real can't have  real properties, but
hypothetical things have hypothetical properties

> What properties can something
> which is non-existent have?
>
> It seems there are two choices: 1. Things which are non-existent can have
> other properties besides non-existence.  E.g., a non-existent universe has
> atoms, stars, worlds, and people on some of those worlds.  Or 2.
> Non-existent things cannot have any other properties besides non-existence.
> It sounds like you belong to this second camp.

3. Hypothetical things have hypothetical properties.

> However, this seems to lead immediately to mathematical realism.  As there
> are objects with definite objectively explorable properties in math.

Hypothetical properties can be reasoned about. If I said you
had 3 stakes and 5 phials of holy water, you could tell me
how many vampires you could kill. But vampires don't exist.
Defnitiness is epistemological and descriptive, not ontological.

> 7's
> primality and parity are properties of 7.  But how can 7 have properties if
> it does not exist?

In the way that vampires have the property of not liking garlic.

> If non-existent things can have properties, why can't
> consciousness be one of those properties?  

The consciousness of a hypothetical conscious being is only
a hypothetical consciousness.

>What is the difference between a
> non-existent brain experiencing a sunset and an existent brain experiencing
> a sunset?  Please explain as precisely as possible what it means for
> something to not exist.

That's not what needs explaining. What needs explaining is
that people tend to use the word "property" interchangably
for a) a characteristic predicated of something as a matter of theory
or definition b) a characteristic of something that is a discoverable
part of the fabric of the world.

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Re: Maudlin & How many times does COMP have to be false before its false?

On Feb 14, 6:50 am, Jason Resch  wrote:
>  Perhaps humans are merely
> severely disabled when it comes to seeing and feeling the mathematical
> reality and our deficit in seeing this reality is much the same as an ant's
> poor vision prevents it from making out a mountain vista.  

If mathematicians share this deficit, then they are doing maths
successfully without being able to peep into Plato's heaven, so
they Plato's heaven does not explain their abilities. There is no
need to posit its existence to explain anything.

>Nevertheless, a
> creature with such a capability is not inconceivable, and arguably some
> synesthetes have experienced this.
>
> http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Daniel_Tammet#Synesthesia

Or synaesthetes are just co-opting their visual processing
to solve maths problems, as graphics co-processors
can also be used for number crunching.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Graphics_processing_unit#Stream_Processing_and_General_Purpose_GPUs_.28GPGPU.29

BYW, Tammet is no good at "advanced maths" which tends not to be
visualisable.

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Re: Maudlin & How many times does COMP have to be false before its false?



On 11 Feb 2011, at 19:10, 1Z wrote:




On Feb 10, 1:24 pm, Bruno Marchal  wrote:

On 09 Feb 2011, at 16:49, 1Z wrote:






On Feb 8, 6:17 pm, Bruno Marchal  wrote:

On 07 Feb 2011, at 23:58, 1Z wrote:



On Feb 7, 6:29 pm, Bruno Marchal  wrote:

Peter,



Everything is fine. You should understand the reasoning by using
only
the formal definition of "arithmetical realism",



You reasoning *cannot* be both valid and ontologically
neutral because it has ontological conclusions.



Wrong.



Wrong about what?


You were wrong on the idea that an argument cannot be valid and
ontological. It is enough that the premises have ontological clauses.


So which is the ontological premise? You don't say
that Platonism is an explicit premise. But it isn't
a corollary of CT either.


CT needs arithmetical platonism/realism. If you believe the contrary,  
could you give me a form of CT which does not presuppose  it?







See my papers.



That is just what I am criticising. You need the ontological
premise that mathematical entities have real existence,
and it is a separate premise from comp. That is my
response to your writings.


The only ontology is my conciousness, and some amount of consensual
reality (doctor, brain, etc.).


If I agree only to the existence of doctors, brains and silicon
computers,
the conclusion that I am an immaterial dreaming machine cannot follow


Then you have to present a refutation of UDA+MGA, without begging the  
question.







It does not assume that physical things
"really" or primitively exists, nor does it assume that numbers  
really

exist in any sense. Just that they exist in the mathematical sense.


There is no generally agreed mathematical sense. If mathematical
anti-realists are right, they don't exist at all and I am therefore
not one.


Mathematicians don't care about the nature of the existence of natural  
numbers. They all agree with statement like "there exist prime  
number", etc.







Read a book on logic and computability.



Read a book on philosophy, on the limitations of
apriori reasoning, on the contentious nature of mathematical  
ontology.


You are the one opposing a paper in applied logic in the cognitive  
and

physical science. I suggest you look at books to better see what i am
taking about.


You are the one who is doing ontology without realising it.


On consciousness. Not on numbers, which I use in the usual  
mathematical or theoretical computer sense. The reasoning is agonstic  
on God, primary universe, mind, etc. at the start.
The only ontology used in the reasoning is the ontology of my  
consciousness, and some amount of consensual reality (existence of  
universe, brains, doctors, ...). Of course I do not assume either that  
such things are primitoively material, except at step 8 for the  
reductio ad absurdo. Up to step seven you can still believe in a  
primitively material reality.






Boolos and
Jeffrey, or Mendelson, or the Dover book by Martin Davis are
excellent.
It is a traditional exercise to define those machine in arithmetic.



I have no doubt, but you don't get real minds and universes
out of hypothetical machines.


You mean mathematical machine. They are not hypothetical. Unless you
believe that the number seven is hypothetical,


I do. Haven't you got that yet?


I did understand that seven is immaterial. But I am OK with seven  
being hypothetical. It changes nothing in the reasoning.







in which case I get
hypothetical minds and hypothetical universes.


I am not generated by a hypothesis: I generate hypotheses.


Confusion level. If you suppose a TOE you are supposed to be explained  
by that TOE. In that sense you are generated by an hypothesis, even if  
your own consciousness here and now is plausibly not an hypothesis.






It is not a big deal to
accomodate the vocabulary.





Recently Brent Meeker sent an excellent reference by Calude
illustrating how PA can prove the existence of universal machine  
(or

number).



Oh good griefit can only prove the *mathematical* existence. If
mathematical "existence" is not real existence, I am not an  
immaterial

machine.


Comp can explain why mathematical machine believes that they are made
of stuff. If you have an argument that stuff is primary, then you  
have

an argument against comp.


That doesn't follow. An immaterial machine might believe it is
material,
but so might a material machine. So arguing that matter is prmiary
has no impact on comp.


Comp will imply that such a primary matter cannnot interfer at all  
with your consciousness, so that IF comp is correct physics has to be  
reduced to number theory, and such a primary matter is an invisible  
epiphenomena. Occam does the rest.








Not against the validity of the reasoning.




what is at is the side of formalism
that says maths is ontologically non-commital game playing.


That is not formalism. That is conventionalism (in math).


So you say. I have quoted a source saying they are the sa

Re: Maudlin & How many times does COMP have to be false before its false?