Re: The anti-roadmap - an alternative 'Theology'
John, Interesting, but from the point of view of the interview, this would be cheating. If such sophisticated form of comp is justified, then by the UDA reasoning, it has to be justified by the lobian machine. If it is the case that such move is proposed by the lobian machine, I will let you know. Bruno Le 25-août-06, à 17:07, [EMAIL PROTECTED] a écrit : Thanks Bruno, for accepting my position about atheists. You just did not add that 'this is why I don't call myself an atheist'. Theology is well thought of in your explanation, however IMO it carries too much historical baggage (garbage?) since ~500AD to renew peoples' thinking about the meaning of the term. * One question to the math-teach(er): you pressed the 'integers' as the basis of your number-world. How about if we consider from the excellent explanation I read recently on this list about 'string theory origins': to consider the inside the circle equivalents of the 'points' (numbers) outside the circle, - which are the integers - AS THE INTEGERS??? (and call the reciprocals 'inside the circle' as our integers?) would that change the status of the world? Encased in the circle? (That would be a definitely human-manipulated image). You could freely apply all your theories on that, too. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
RE: The anti-roadmap - an alternative 'Theology'
Peter Jones writes: And there's no way to prove we aren't computer-simulated... Right! So if you claimed we were living in a computer simulation because you liked the sound of it, that would be a metaphysical position. It would still be a metaphsyical claim if I had a very good arguemnt. It is metaphysical either way because of its content, not because of the way it is argued. If Democritus came up with the idea that everything was made of atoms because he liked the sound of it that would have been a metaphysical position, even if happened to be true, because it would only have been true *by luck*, not because there was some good reason to believe it was true. If Democritus had come up with a good reason for his atomic theory, that would then have been science, not metaphysics. Empiricism is still metaphysical. We have different working definitions of metaphysical. Stathis Papaioannou _ Be one of the first to try Windows Live Mail. http://ideas.live.com/programpage.aspx?versionId=5d21c51a-b161-4314-9b0e-4911fb2b2e6d --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
RE: The anti-roadmap - an alternative 'Theology'
John Mikes writes: Stathis: would you condone to include in your (appreciated) post below the words at the * I plant into your text? The words: in the (scientific?) belief system we have TODAY about our interpretation of whatever epistemically we so far learned about the 'world'. OK, I could accept the inclusion of that clause. That would underline your subsequent sentence - if you kindly stop denigrating the term 'metaphysics' - a pejoration of the same 'carried away' physicists. I guess those physicists and philosophers in the Empiricist tradition have poisoned my mind against theology and metaphysics. Sorry, can't help it. The word 'prediction' also sends the chill alongside my spine: how can a model based on a model predict events subject to impact from 'beyond model' changes? The many results of science-technology should not lead us into a generalized acceptance of the model-based thinking. This list is a good example. Prediction in science is not like prediction by oracles and prophets. If you take your umbrella with you when you see that the sky is cloudy, you are implicitly making a scientific prediction based on a meteorological model. Science is really just common sense writ large. Stathis Papaioannou John Mikes - Original Message - From: Stathis Papaioannou [EMAIL PROTECTED] To: everything-list@googlegroups.com Sent: Wednesday, August 23, 2006 8:54 PM Subject: RE: The anti-roadmap - an alternative 'Theology' As Brent Meeker has pointed out, physical theories are just models to make predictions about how the world works*. If physists get carried away and say this is the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth then they are talking metaphysics, not physics. Stathis Papaioannou _ Be one of the first to try Windows Live Mail. http://ideas.live.com/programpage.aspx?versionId=5d21c51a-b161-4314-9b0e-4911fb2b2e6d --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
RE: The anti-roadmap - an alternative 'Theology'
You can use meta in that way if you like, but metaphysics is about as deeply ingrained in the language as any philosophical term can be. I think it was Hume rather than Kant who started the anti-metaphysics movement: If we take in our hand any volume of divinity or school metaphysics, for instance, let us ask, Does it contain any abstract reasoning concerning quantity or number? No. Does it contain any experimental reasoning concerning matter of fact and existence? No. Commit it then to the flames, for it can contain nothing but sophistry and illusion. (An Inquiry Concerning Human Understanding) Perhaps he went too far with the book-burning, since even the logical positivists allowed that works of art may have validity for their aesthetic qualities - but only for their aesthetic qualities. Stathis Papaioannou As Brent Meeker has pointed out, physical theories are just models to make predictions about how the world works*. If physists get carried away and say this is the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth then they are talking metaphysics, not physics. Stathis Papaioannou The archaic usage of the word metaphysics, which became a pejorative somewhere around the time of Kant, is no longer viable or productive. The modern usage of the term Meta = about... far more productive. meta-chemistry example...table of elements meta-data ... computer science term meta-mathematics ... 'about' a mathematics I'd like to eliminate the older usage of the term. It doesn't work as a descriptor, especially in physics! You're right about the physicists, though... they are the most 'model-bound' in all science. Their beliefs about what they do...in effect a theology of mathematical models... is worst in cosmology. To continue to believe in the intractability of any formulation of an underlying reality in spite of glaring evidence to the contrary...and that it is deserved of a pejorative label is. .. theology A much better pejorative! cheers, Colin Hales _ Be one of the first to try Windows Live Mail. http://ideas.live.com/programpage.aspx?versionId=5d21c51a-b161-4314-9b0e-4911fb2b2e6d --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
RE: The anti-roadmap - an alternative 'Theology'
Peter jones writes: Stathis Papaioannou wrote: Peter Jones writes: All physical theories are theories of matter (mass/energy). True, but they are not theories of what matter *actually is*. Hence the need for a metaphysical account of matter-as-Bare-Substance to complement the physicst's account of matter-as-behaviour. That would be like theology. Theology uses the vocabulary of traditional metaphysics, but not all traditional metaphysics is theology Theology is a subset of metaphysics. Metaphysics does not deal with purely logical and/or empirical facts. This means you could come up with any metaphysical theory consistent with the logical and empirical facts, no matter how silly, and no-one would be able to rebutt it. For example, I could say that friction is the result of tiny, undetectable demons who try to grab my finger as I slide it against an object. Sure, there's no way to prove these demons do or don't exist, but I'm going to believe in them anyway as a metaphysical theory. Stathis Papaioannou _ Be one of the first to try Windows Live Mail. http://ideas.live.com/programpage.aspx?versionId=5d21c51a-b161-4314-9b0e-4911fb2b2e6d --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: The anti-roadmap - an alternative 'Theology'
Le 24-août-06, à 22:46, Colin Geoffrey Hales wrote: .. theology A much better pejorative! I can understand, but I *strongly* disagree on this. theology has been studied by the so called rational mystics, which are also the greek philosopher/scientist (but also by Chinese and Indian logicians) during more than one millennia. It is just a sad and contingent fact that theology has been appropriated by politician since about 500 A.D. Abandoning the term theology is the product of a confusion between the field theology and the contingent christian theology. Well, apparently, thanks to St-Augustin (french writing) 2/3 of the main Christian Theology could be Plotinian, and so is closer to comp than, for example the Atheist position, and comp (I mean together with its immaterialist consequences) seems to be much harder to be accepted by atheists than by christians (I got many empirical confirmation of this). I agree with John Mikes: an atheist need to believe in something for not believing in it. Actually they are doubly dogmatic, in the sense they cannot doubt about the existence of a physical-stuffy universe, and very often, atheist denies they are dogmatic (unlike typical believer). I try to avoid completely the term metaphysics, mainly because I use metamathematics in comp, and this could be confusing. I agree with Peter, here, the two meta are unrelated. (Actually a case could be made that Everett made metaphysics in the sense of the meta in metamathematics: but I avoid insisting on that: the term metaphysics is too much emotionally charged). Now we have already developed an entire thread on this vocabulary problem, and I refer those interested to consult them. Other opportunity will appear probably when I will give more explanations on the arithmetical interpretation of Plotinus' hypostases. See the recent ROADMAP (SHORT) for a preview. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: The anti-roadmap - an alternative 'Theology'
Stathis Papaioannou wrote: Peter jones writes: Stathis Papaioannou wrote: Peter Jones writes: All physical theories are theories of matter (mass/energy). True, but they are not theories of what matter *actually is*. Hence the need for a metaphysical account of matter-as-Bare-Substance to complement the physicst's account of matter-as-behaviour. That would be like theology. Theology uses the vocabulary of traditional metaphysics, but not all traditional metaphysics is theology Theology is a subset of metaphysics. Metaphysics does not deal with purely logical and/or empirical facts. T Metaphysics can. It depends on who is doing it. his means you could come up with any metaphysical theory consistent with the logical and empirical facts, no matter how silly, and no-one would be able to rebutt it. Of course not, that is utterly wrong. Meaphysicians often invoke Occam's razor, for instance. In cany case, people who seriously think we are all living in Plato's heaven are already dealing in metaphysics of the most baroque kind. For example, I could say that friction is the result of tiny, undetectable demons who try to grab my finger as I slide it against an object. Sure, there's no way to prove these demons do or don't exist, but I'm going to believe in them anyway as a metaphysical theory. And there's no way to prove we aren't computer-simulated... Stathis Papaioannou _ Be one of the first to try Windows Live Mail. http://ideas.live.com/programpage.aspx?versionId=5d21c51a-b161-4314-9b0e-4911fb2b2e6d --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: The anti-roadmap - an alternative 'Theology'
Thanks Bruno, for accepting my position about atheists. You just did not add that 'this is why I don't call myself an atheist'. Theology is well thought of in your explanation, however IMO it carries too much historical baggage (garbage?) since ~500AD to renew peoples' thinking about the meaning of the term. * One question to the math-teach(er): you pressed the 'integers' as the basis of your number-world. How about if we consider from the excellent explanation I read recently on this list about 'string theory origins': to consider the inside the circle equivalents of the 'points' (numbers) outside the circle, - which are the integers - AS THE INTEGERS??? (and call the reciprocals 'inside the circle' as our integers?) would that change the status of the world? Encased in the circle? (That would be a definitely human-manipulated image). You could freely apply all your theories on that, too. John - Original Message - From: Bruno Marchal [EMAIL PROTECTED] To: everything-list@googlegroups.com Sent: Friday, August 25, 2006 9:06 AM Subject: Re: The anti-roadmap - an alternative 'Theology' Le 24-août-06, à 22:46, Colin Geoffrey Hales wrote: .. theology A much better pejorative! I can understand, but I *strongly* disagree on this. theology has been studied by the so called rational mystics, which are also the greek philosopher/scientist (but also by Chinese and Indian logicians) during more than one millennia. It is just a sad and contingent fact that theology has been appropriated by politician since about 500 A.D. Abandoning the term theology is the product of a confusion between the field theology and the contingent christian theology. Well, apparently, thanks to St-Augustin (french writing) 2/3 of the main Christian Theology could be Plotinian, and so is closer to comp than, for example the Atheist position, and comp (I mean together with its immaterialist consequences) seems to be much harder to be accepted by atheists than by christians (I got many empirical confirmation of this). I agree with John Mikes: an atheist need to believe in something for not believing in it. Actually they are doubly dogmatic, in the sense they cannot doubt about the existence of a physical-stuffy universe, and very often, atheist denies they are dogmatic (unlike typical believer). I try to avoid completely the term metaphysics, mainly because I use metamathematics in comp, and this could be confusing. I agree with Peter, here, the two meta are unrelated. (Actually a case could be made that Everett made metaphysics in the sense of the meta in metamathematics: but I avoid insisting on that: the term metaphysics is too much emotionally charged). Now we have already developed an entire thread on this vocabulary problem, and I refer those interested to consult them. Other opportunity will appear probably when I will give more explanations on the arithmetical interpretation of Plotinus' hypostases. See the recent ROADMAP (SHORT) for a preview. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- No virus found in this incoming message. Checked by AVG Free Edition. Version: 7.1.405 / Virus Database: 268.11.6/427 - Release Date: 08/24/06 --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: The anti-roadmap - an alternative 'Theology'
Brent wrote: If you know the domain of your model there won't be any impact from beyond. Of course the domain is uncertain at the edges - but just because there is Grey doesn't mean there is no black and white. Our views (I did not press: definition) of a model' differs. Since I consider the totality as interrelated and interactive and the 'model' a topical cut as the object of our observation (c.f.: sciences) those boundaries we surround our (my) models are 'cutting off' the rest of the world. With all the influence it may have on events BENEATH those (selected) boundaries. I am not talking about a grey area. * Should we then resort mystical thinking or armchair philosophizing or theological revelation? I do not call your wording an argumentation (style?) ad hominem, if you know no better variant, you can refer to any one that comes to your mind. Finally: Can you do some other kind of thinking? The answer is: YES, for one there are things to which I respond I dunno but try to think in new ways which does not mean that I also completed it. To know about something that is not perfect does not imply the obligation to 'perfect it' at the same time. It takes lots of work. Without necessarily resorting to mystics or (religious) theology. John - Original Message - From: Brent Meeker [EMAIL PROTECTED] To: everything-list@googlegroups.com Sent: Thursday, August 24, 2006 8:00 PM Subject: Re: The anti-roadmap - an alternative 'Theology' [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: Stathis: would you condone to include in your (appreciated) post below the words at the * I plant into your text? The words: in the (scientific?) belief system we have TODAY about our interpretation of whatever epistemically we so far learned about the 'world'. That would underline your subsequent sentence - if you kindly stop denigrating the term 'metaphysics' - a pejoration of the same 'carried away' physicists. The word 'prediction' also sends the chill alongside my spine: how can a model based on a model predict events subject to impact from 'beyond model' changes? If you know the domain of your model there won't be any impact from beyond. Of course the domain is uncertain at the edges - but just because there is grey doesn't mean there is no black and white. The many results of science-technology should not lead us into a generalized acceptance of the model-based thinking. Should we then resort mystical thinking or armchair philosophizing or theological revelation? This list is a good example. Can you do some other kind of thinking? Brent Meeker -- No virus found in this incoming message. Checked by AVG Free Edition. Version: 7.1.405 / Virus Database: 268.11.6/427 - Release Date: 08/24/06 --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: The anti-roadmap - an alternative 'Theology'
[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: Brent wrote: If you know the domain of your model there won't be any impact from beyond. Of course the domain is uncertain at the edges - but just because there is Grey doesn't mean there is no black and white. Our views (I did not press: definition) of a model' differs. Since I consider the totality as interrelated and interactive and the 'model' a topical cut as the object of our observation (c.f.: sciences) those boundaries we surround our (my) models are 'cutting off' the rest of the world. With all the influence it may have on events BENEATH those (selected) boundaries. I am not talking about a grey area. * Should we then resort mystical thinking or armchair philosophizing or theological revelation? I do not call your wording an argumentation (style?) ad hominem, if you know no better variant, you can refer to any one that comes to your mind. Finally: Can you do some other kind of thinking? The answer is: YES, for one there are things to which I respond I dunno but try to think in new ways which does not mean that I also completed it. But is this different than trying to think of new models? To know about something that is not perfect does not imply the obligation to 'perfect it' at the same time. I'm not asking that you perfect anything. You ask that we not be led into acceptance of model based thinking. I'm not sure there is another way to think about the world - my poor brain is not up to thinking the world in it's entirety; hence I resort to models. So I'm asking for an example or even a description of how you think we should think about the world, while avoiding models. Brent Meeker --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: The anti-roadmap - an alternative 'Theology'
Brent, you ask the tuppence (or million $) questions. --- Brent Meeker [EMAIL PROTECTED] asked: 1: But is this different than trying to think of new models? Somebody suggested (on another list) that MY model is the unlimited universe. I could not argue, yet it is a limited model, since our presentG knowledge is limited to the up-to-date epistemic cognitive inventory. This is why I feel comfortable to plead to be ignorant. (Irrespective of the 'truth' that I am). ---and--- 2:...- my poor brain is not up to thinking the world in it's entirety; hence I resort to models. So I'm asking for an example or even a description of how you think we should think about the world, while avoiding models. My poor brain is also reductionistic in my thinking, I cannot encompass the totality either. So I think in models, but always keep that in mind: avoid drawing conclusions upon the wholeness from results extracted from a limited model view. (Or so I think). If I make some general deductions, I use cautious grammar, allowing for diverse opinions to come up. This is not the scientific way to get a title, tenure, grants, or even the smallest Nobel prize, but it is satisfactory for me. I do not persuade others to apply it. It's my way. If there is any merit in my ideas for others, be my guest -that's the reason why I proclaim them. AND: to get the counter-ideas for my perusal. John M [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: Brent wrote: If you know the domain of your model there won't be any impact from beyond. Of course the domain is uncertain at the edges - but just because there is Grey doesn't mean there is no black and white. Our views (I did not press: definition) of a model' differs. Since I consider the totality as interrelated and interactive and the 'model' a topical cut as the object of our observation (c.f.: sciences) those boundaries we surround our (my) models are 'cutting off' the rest of the world. With all the influence it may have on events BENEATH those (selected) boundaries. I am not talking about a grey area. * Should we then resort mystical thinking or armchair philosophizing or theological revelation? I do not call your wording an argumentation (style?) ad hominem, if you know no better variant, you can refer to any one that comes to your mind. Finally: Can you do some other kind of thinking? The answer is: YES, for one there are things to which I respond I dunno but try to think in new ways which does not mean that I also completed it. But is this different than trying to think of new models? To know about something that is not perfect does not imply the obligation to 'perfect it' at the same time. I'm not asking that you perfect anything. You ask that we not be led into acceptance of model based thinking. I'm not sure there is another way to think about the world - my poor brain is not up to thinking the world in it's entirety; hence I resort to models. So I'm asking for an example or even a description of how you think we should think about the world, while avoiding models. Brent Meeker --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
RE: The anti-roadmap - an alternative 'Theology'
Peter Jones: Theology is a subset of metaphysics. Metaphysics does not deal with purely logical and/or empirical facts. T Metaphysics can. It depends on who is doing it. his means you could come up with any metaphysical theory consistent with the logical and empirical facts, no matter how silly, and no-one would be able to rebutt it. Of course not, that is utterly wrong. Meaphysicians often invoke Occam's razor, for instance. In cany case, people who seriously think we are all living in Plato's heaven are already dealing in metaphysics of the most baroque kind. For example, I could say that friction is the result of tiny, undetectable demons who try to grab my finger as I slide it against an object. Sure, there's no way to prove these demons do or don't exist, but I'm going to believe in them anyway as a metaphysical theory. And there's no way to prove we aren't computer-simulated... Right! So if you claimed we were living in a computer simulation because you liked the sound of it, that would be a metaphysical position. If Democritus came up with the idea that everything was made of atoms because he liked the sound of it that would have been a metaphysical position, even if happened to be true, because it would only have been true *by luck*, not because there was some good reason to believe it was true. If Democritus had come up with a good reason for his atomic theory, that would then have been science, not metaphysics. Stathis Papaioannou _ Be one of the first to try Windows Live Mail. http://ideas.live.com/programpage.aspx?versionId=5d21c51a-b161-4314-9b0e-4911fb2b2e6d --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: The anti-roadmap - an alternative 'Theology'
Le 23-août-06, à 13:32, 1Z (Peter D. Jones) wrote (in different posts) : There are many interpretations of the box and diamond. Incompleteness introduces ideas if necessity and possibility based on provability (or provability within a system). But there are, and always were, ideas of necessity based on truth rather than provability. I agree (so what?) Since the failure of logicism, by Godel's theorem, we can argue that numbers does not necessarily exist. Numbers does not come from logic alone. If you want them, to exist you have to do a ontological commitment. ..and if you want to play with them as a formal system, you don't. I am not sure I follow you (terminological) nuance between wanting something and wanting something to exist. The move toward formalism does not work for any theory of formal system. This is a consequence of Godel's incompleteness. I don't believe the formalistic philosophical position can even make sense of notion like yes doctor. Still less about arithmetical truth, unless you formalize all this in second order arithmetic or in set theory, but then you need to rely on informal intuition at that level. Hence the need for a metaphysical account of matter-as-Bare-Substance to complement the physicst's account of matter-as-behaviour. I have not the slightest idea of what could be matter-as-bare-substance. Does matter-as-bare-substance possess a mass? Does matter-as-bare substance violate Bell's inequality? Does such questions make sense, when you add that such bare matter has no property of its own? Especially when you put some consciousness in it. It seems to me that you are trying to use a metaphysical notion just to put in there all remaining unsolved fundamental questions. For a formalist, there is nothing to numbers except definitions (axoms, etc),. The numbers themselves do not have to exist. So there is still no necessary ontological commitment in CT. OK. In that sense comp does not make any ontological commitment at all. as if will always be enough, even for the comp-electrons and protons. Are you formalist? Could you develop your notion of bare matter in a formalistic theory of physics? What about the interpretation of such a theory. Note that formalist have no problem with the lobian interview, which can indeed be seen as the formal counterpart of the UDA reasoning, but I am not sure any mind/body questions addressed in that enterprise could make sense to a formalist philosopher. I agree with Girard (french logician, discoverer of linear logic) that formalism in logic is just bureaucracy: it is more harmful than useless, imo. I said something along such line some times ago. I can provide a (short) explanation. The reason is the Hilbert-Polya conjecture according to which the non trivial zero of the complex Riemann Zeta function could perhaps be shown to stay on the complex line 1/2 + gt, if it was the case that those zero describe the spectrum of some quantum operator. The *spectrum* of a quantum operator is not observer-dependent. What is observer-dependent, according to some, is the particular value on the spectrum that is actually observed. Sorry I was (much too much short). We can come back latter on this difficult subject. It is a bit out of topics for now. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: The anti-roadmap - an alternative 'Theology'
Stathis: would you condone to include in your (appreciated) post below the words at the * I plant into your text? The words: in the (scientific?) belief system we have TODAY about our interpretation of whatever epistemically we so far learned about the 'world'. That would underline your subsequent sentence - if you kindly stop denigrating the term 'metaphysics' - a pejoration of the same 'carried away' physicists. The word 'prediction' also sends the chill alongside my spine: how can a model based on a model predict events subject to impact from 'beyond model' changes? The many results of science-technology should not lead us into a generalized acceptance of the model-based thinking. This list is a good example. John Mikes - Original Message - From: Stathis Papaioannou [EMAIL PROTECTED] To: everything-list@googlegroups.com Sent: Wednesday, August 23, 2006 8:54 PM Subject: RE: The anti-roadmap - an alternative 'Theology' As Brent Meeker has pointed out, physical theories are just models to make predictions about how the world works*. If physists get carried away and say this is the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth then they are talking metaphysics, not physics. Stathis Papaioannou From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] To: everything-list@googlegroups.com Subject: Re: The anti-roadmap - an alternative 'Theology' Date: Wed, 23 Aug 2006 11:51:07 -0400 Stathis, you touched the 'truth' (a word I put into - because I don't believe it). Matter cannot be an is - actually or virtually. Rutherford's empty atom shows the dichotomy between 'effects' ('affects'?) and 'explanation' (more than just words). The figment 'matter' is a product of 'mental evolution' in this universe, to catch imputes we cannot handle. 'We' is here the mental evolution of the universe. It was not man, or the old ape who decided let there be matter in our thinking - it was a zillion-stepwise development to cope with 'affects' we experienced without better explanation. So we (humans and animals) nowadays (~1b years?) accept the notion that 'there IS matter' and we can interact with it. Physics is a product in this development of reductionist efforts to 'organize' our world for ourselves. And then came the other sciences as well, in the same reductionism. We better do not chase a figment, as long as we are living IN IT - accept its use and the uncertainty of whatever we talk about. It looks like a basic tenet in our percept of reality - the what we see is what we live with from which I TRY to get to a better understanding (not yet achieved, of course). All our life, the base knowledge, the technology, the mental construct, is a product of this figment. Yes, matter is not matterly, just believed so. Energy is a cop-out - a 'name' for something we cannot put our finger on (mentally). And so are numbers. The theories you decry, or promote, all of them, are in the same circle. Regards John Mikes - Original Message - From: Stathis Papaioannou [EMAIL PROTECTED] To: 1Z everything-list@googlegroups.com Sent: Wednesday, August 23, 2006 5:11 AM Subject: RE: The anti-roadmap - an alternative 'Theology' Peter Jones writes: Bruno Marchal wrote: I can agree. No physicist posit matter in a fundamental theory. All physical theories are theories of matter (mass/energy). True, but they are not theories of what matter *actually is*. At the turn of last century Rutherford showed that atoms were mostly empty space. Tables and chairs did not suddenly become less solid as a result, but it became clear that their apparent solidity was not actually evidence that atoms are solid all the way through. In a similar fashion, the apparent solidity of matter is not actually evidence that it isn't just fluff all the way down, or part of a computer simulation. Our physical theories describe the behaviour of matter without formally addressing this question at all, despite what prejudices and working assumptions physicists may have about the true basis of physical reality. Stathis Papaioannou _ Be one of the first to try Windows Live Mail. http://ideas.live.com/programpage.aspx?versionId=5d21c51a-b161-4314-9b0e-491 1fb2b2e6d -- No virus found in this incoming message. Checked by AVG Free Edition. Version: 7.1.405 / Virus Database: 268.11.5/425 - Release Date: 08/22/06 _ Be one of the first to try Windows Live Mail. http://ideas.live.com/programpage.aspx?versionId=5d21c51a-b161-4314-9b0e-491 1fb2b2e6d -- No virus found in this incoming message. Checked by AVG Free Edition. Version: 7.1.405 / Virus Database: 268.11.5/425 - Release Date: 08/22/06 --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List
Re: The anti-roadmap - an alternative 'Theology'
Le 24-août-06, à 08:51, Tom Caylor a écrit : I agree with the importance of recursion theory. By the way I got the book by Cutland. Nice. It is a very good book. I recommend it heartily to all those who want to dig a bit the math behind the comp. hyp. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: The anti-roadmap - an alternative 'Theology'
As Brent Meeker has pointed out, physical theories are just models to make predictions about how the world works*. If physists get carried away and say this is the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth then they are talking metaphysics, not physics. Stathis Papaioannou The archaic usage of the word metaphysics, which became a pejorative somewhere around the time of Kant, is no longer viable or productive. The modern usage of the term Meta = about... far more productive. meta-chemistry example...table of elements meta-data ... computer science term meta-mathematics ... 'about' a mathematics I'd like to eliminate the older usage of the term. It doesn't work as a descriptor, especially in physics! You're right about the physicists, though... they are the most 'model-bound' in all science. Their beliefs about what they do...in effect a theology of mathematical models... is worst in cosmology. To continue to believe in the intractability of any formulation of an underlying reality in spite of glaring evidence to the contrary...and that it is deserved of a pejorative label is. .. theology A much better pejorative! cheers, Colin Hales --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: The anti-roadmap - an alternative 'Theology'
Stathis Papaioannou wrote: Peter Jones writes: All physical theories are theories of matter (mass/energy). True, but they are not theories of what matter *actually is*. Hence the need for a metaphysical account of matter-as-Bare-Substance to complement the physicst's account of matter-as-behaviour. That would be like theology. Theology uses the vocabulary of traditional metaphysics, but not all traditional metaphysics is theology --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: The anti-roadmap - an alternative 'Theology'
Stathis Papaioannou wrote: As Brent Meeker has pointed out, physical theories are just models to make predictions about how the world works. If physists get carried away and say this is the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth then they are talking metaphysics, not physics. Yes. That is the problem. (Apart from the nothing exists approach...) --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: The anti-roadmap - an alternative 'Theology'
[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: Stathis: would you condone to include in your (appreciated) post below the words at the * I plant into your text? The words: in the (scientific?) belief system we have TODAY about our interpretation of whatever epistemically we so far learned about the 'world'. That would underline your subsequent sentence - if you kindly stop denigrating the term 'metaphysics' - a pejoration of the same 'carried away' physicists. The word 'prediction' also sends the chill alongside my spine: how can a model based on a model predict events subject to impact from 'beyond model' changes? If you know the domain of your model there won't be any impact from beyond. Of course the domain is uncertain at the edges - but just because there is grey doesn't mean there is no black and white. The many results of science-technology should not lead us into a generalized acceptance of the model-based thinking. Should we then resort mystical thinking or armchair philosophizing or theological revelation? This list is a good example. Can you do some other kind of thinking? Brent Meeker --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: The anti-roadmap - an alternative 'Theology'
Bruno Marchal wrote: Le 23-août-06, à 13:32, 1Z (Peter D. Jones) wrote (in different posts) : There are many interpretations of the box and diamond. Incompleteness introduces ideas if necessity and possibility based on provability (or provability within a system). But there are, and always were, ideas of necessity based on truth rather than provability. I agree (so what?) So all mathematical staments are still necesary-qua-proof even if they are possible-qua-provability. So contingent truths -- like matter doesn't exist -- don't belong in Platonia. Since the failure of logicism, by Godel's theorem, we can argue that numbers does not necessarily exist. Numbers does not come from logic alone. If you want them, to exist you have to do a ontological commitment. ..and if you want to play with them as a formal system, you don't. I am not sure I follow you (terminological) nuance between wanting something and wanting something to exist. All you have to assume or adopt in order to *do* arithmetic -- beyond logic -- is additional axioms. The move toward formalism does not work for any theory of formal system. This is a consequence of Godel's incompleteness. GIT means there are theorems which cannot be proven within *a* formal system. It does not mean there are theorems which cannot be proven with *any* formal systems. Every mathmetical proof procedes from axioms and rulesof inference. A claim to have peeked into Plato's heaven doesn not count as proof. I don't believe the formalistic philosophical position can even make sense of notion like yes doctor. That depends on what you mean by yes doctor. As far as most people are concerned , yes Doctor is about the ability of silicon to emulate organic matter. Most people woul not assent to being killed here, in the sublunar wolrd, on the basis that they would still survive in Plato's heaven. Still less about arithmetical truth, unless you formalize all this in second order arithmetic or in set theory, but then you need to rely on informal intuition at that level. Informal intuition still doens't require Platonic objects. There are several non-Platonic theoires, formalism is not the only one. Hence the need for a metaphysical account of matter-as-Bare-Substance to complement the physicst's account of matter-as-behaviour. I have not the slightest idea of what could be matter-as-bare-substance. Does matter-as-bare-substance possess a mass? Not necessarily. Does matter-as-bare substance violate Bell's inequality? Not necessarily. Does such questions make sense, when you add that such bare matter has no property of its own? Especially when you put some consciousness in it. If I put consciounsess on it, it is no longer bare. However, there is no *contradiction* in the idea -- and hence no *hard* problem. It seems to me that you are trying to use a metaphysical notion just to put in there all remaining unsolved fundamental questions. So are you: the difference is that I know I am, and I know I must. No amount of mathematics will dodge the metaphyiscal question. If I am in Plato's heaven, then Plato's heaven must exist in the same way that I exist , whatever that is. That is the metaphysical quesiton which has not been addressed. For a formalist, there is nothing to numbers except definitions (axoms, etc),. The numbers themselves do not have to exist. So there is still no necessary ontological commitment in CT. OK. In that sense comp does not make any ontological commitment at all. That is what I have been saying all along! as if will always be enough, even for the comp-electrons and protons. Are you formalist? Could you develop your notion of bare matter in a formalistic theory of physics? If I am formalist about mathematics, that doesn not mean I have to be formalist about physics. Prima-facie, there is a difference between maths and physics. In physics, you have to *look* -- in maths, you don't. What about the interpretation of such a theory. Note that formalist have no problem with the lobian interview, which can indeed be seen as the formal counterpart of the UDA reasoning, but I am not sure any mind/body questions addressed in that enterprise could make sense to a formalist philosopher. I agree with Girard (french logician, discoverer of linear logic) that formalism in logic is just bureaucracy: it is more harmful than useless, imo. I am nor exaclty a formalist. I am using formalism as an example of a non-Platonic approach . There are others. The important point is that nothing is ontologically guaranteed by comp or CT or AR -- but, for your conclusions, something needs to be. I said something along such line some times ago. I can provide a (short) explanation. The reason is the Hilbert-Polya conjecture according to which the non trivial zero of the complex Riemann Zeta function could perhaps be shown to stay on the complex line 1/2 + gt, if it
Re: The anti-roadmap - an alternative 'Theology'
Colin Geoffrey Hales wrote: As Brent Meeker has pointed out, physical theories are just models to make predictions about how the world works*. If physists get carried away and say this is the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth then they are talking metaphysics, not physics. Stathis Papaioannou The archaic usage of the word metaphysics, which became a pejorative somewhere around the time of Kant, is no longer viable or productive. The modern usage of the term Meta = about... far more productive. meta-chemistry example...table of elements meta-data ... computer science term meta-mathematics ... 'about' a mathematics I agree, let's write it meta-physics. I'd like to eliminate the older usage of the term. It doesn't work as a descriptor, especially in physics! You're right about the physicists, though... they are the most 'model-bound' in all science. Their beliefs about what they do...in effect a theology of mathematical models... is worst in cosmology. To continue to believe in the intractability of any formulation of an underlying reality in spite of glaring evidence to the contrary...and that it is deserved of a pejorative label is. You have a formulation of an underlying reality which is not only tractable, but for which you have glaring evidence of its tractability? Is it also correct? I'd like to see it. Brent Meeker --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
RE: The anti-roadmap - an alternative 'Theology'
Peter Jones writes: Bruno Marchal wrote: I can agree. No physicist posit matter in a fundamental theory. All physical theories are theories of matter (mass/energy). True, but they are not theories of what matter *actually is*. At the turn of last century Rutherford showed that atoms were mostly empty space. Tables and chairs did not suddenly become less solid as a result, but it became clear that their apparent solidity was not actually evidence that atoms are solid all the way through. In a similar fashion, the apparent solidity of matter is not actually evidence that it isn't just fluff all the way down, or part of a computer simulation. Our physical theories describe the behaviour of matter without formally addressing this question at all, despite what prejudices and working assumptions physicists may have about the true basis of physical reality. Stathis Papaioannou _ Be one of the first to try Windows Live Mail. http://ideas.live.com/programpage.aspx?versionId=5d21c51a-b161-4314-9b0e-4911fb2b2e6d --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: The anti-roadmap - an alternative 'Theology'
Le 21-août-06, à 17:42, 1Z a écrit : The point I was trying to make was that I don't have to define exactly what my existence is. (Bruno's rationalism makes him think no question can can be settled unless it can be exactly defined; my empiricism makes me believe there are Brute Facts which are true even if we don't understand their nature). And then we can at least propose theory to figure out where those non definable things come from. Note that I show that the notion of first person is necessarily not definable by any first person. precisely: a lobian machine can define it for a much simpler lobian machine. No lobian machine can defined its own notion of first person. It is necessarily fuzzy, from her point of view. This requires some notion in mathematical logic. See the roadmap posts. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: The anti-roadmap - an alternative 'Theology'
Le 21-août-06, à 18:55, David Nyman a écrit : I don't think Bruno and Stathis are arguing that numbers are neceesarily the only things that exist (although a standard Platonist might argue that that they are the only things that exist necessarily..) But aren't they claiming that numbers are the only things necessary (together with the operations required for CT+YD, whatever they might be) to account for *our* existence? If not, what else is required? Since the failure of logicism, by Godel's theorem, we can argue that numbers does not necessarily exist. Numbers does not come from logic alone. If you want them, you have to do a ontological commitment. To believe, like all mathematicians, in the structure (N,+,*,0,1) is enough for that (actually to believe in (N,+,*,0,1) is too much, but I don't want to enter in the technical details before it is really necessary). Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: The anti-roadmap - an alternative 'Theology'
Le 21-août-06, à 21:12, 1Z a écrit : If Everythingism is the combination of rationalsim (all truths are necessary apriori truths) and Mathematical Monism (mathematical objects exist, and are all that exist), it may be self-defeating , in that the second claim, ie Mathematical Monism, is not a necessary truth. Because somewhere you say I am a rationalist (which I appreciate), I must say that I do not believe all truth are necessary apriori truth at all. Indeed, everything intelligible, sensible, observable, are build from modal logics of necessity and possibility, themselves build from incompleteness in arithmetic (which entails that notion of possibility makes sense in the world of numbers and machines). Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: The anti-roadmap - an alternative 'Theology'
Bruno Marchal wrote: Le 21-août-06, à 21:12, 1Z a écrit : If Everythingism is the combination of rationalsim (all truths are necessary apriori truths) and Mathematical Monism (mathematical objects exist, and are all that exist), it may be self-defeating , in that the second claim, ie Mathematical Monism, is not a necessary truth. Because somewhere you say I am a rationalist (which I appreciate), I must say that I do not believe all truth are necessary apriori truth at all. Indeed, everything intelligible, sensible, observable, are build from modal logics of necessity and possibility, themselves build from incompleteness in arithmetic (which entails that notion of possibility makes sense in the world of numbers and machines). There are many interpretations of the box and diamond. Incompleteness introduces ideas if necessity and possibility based on provability (or provability within a system). But there are, and always were, ideas of necessity based on truth rather than provability. --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: The anti-roadmap - an alternative 'Theology'
Bruno Marchal wrote: Le 21-août-06, à 18:55, David Nyman a écrit : I don't think Bruno and Stathis are arguing that numbers are neceesarily the only things that exist (although a standard Platonist might argue that that they are the only things that exist necessarily..) But aren't they claiming that numbers are the only things necessary (together with the operations required for CT+YD, whatever they might be) to account for *our* existence? If not, what else is required? Since the failure of logicism, by Godel's theorem, we can argue that numbers does not necessarily exist. Numbers does not come from logic alone. If you want them, to exist you have to do a ontological commitment. ..and if you want to play with them as a formal system, you don't. To believe, like all mathematicians, in the structure (N,+,*,0,1) is enough for that (actually to believe in (N,+,*,0,1) is too much, but I don't want to enter in the technical details before it is really necessary). Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: The anti-roadmap - an alternative 'Theology'
Stathis Papaioannou wrote: Peter Jones writes: Bruno Marchal wrote: I can agree. No physicist posit matter in a fundamental theory. All physical theories are theories of matter (mass/energy). True, but they are not theories of what matter *actually is*. Hence the need for a metaphysical account of matter-as-Bare-Substance to complement the physicst's account of matter-as-behaviour. --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: The anti-roadmap - an alternative 'Theology'
Le 22-août-06, à 12:37, 1Z a écrit : Tom Caylor wrote: I'd say a candidate for making AR false is the behavior of the prime numbers, as has been discussed regarding your Riemann zeta function TOE. As I suggested on that thread, it could be that the behavior of the Riemann zeta function follows a collapse that is dependent on the observer. That's the strangest thign I've read ina long I said something along such line some times ago. I can provide a (short) explanation. The reason is the Hilbert-Polya conjecture according to which the non trivial zero of the complex Riemann Zeta function could perhaps be shown to stay on the complex line 1/2 + gt, if it was the case that those zero describe the spectrum of some quantum operator. This has not been proved, but this has been confirmed experimentally on many zeroes thanks to Odlyzko, Montgommery etc. But instead of finding something like the universal wave function, the spectrum seems to describe quantum chaos. but as every schoolboy knows there is no quantum chaos. Quantum chaos can only appears in a branch of the universal quantum wave. It requires measurement. Now the zeroes controls and are controlled by the distribution of the prime numbers (Riemann). So it looks like the prime number describes a reduced universal wave function, like if a collapse did occur. I can understand Tom Caylor wanting then that the prime numbers themselves (or the zeta description) result from some abstract collapse. One day I will send a post on many Pythagorean TOE like that. (They all miss the quanta/qualia distinction, unlike the lobian interview). To infer from the Riemann Zeta TOE, that there is a problem for Arithmetical Realism (AR) is a bit quick, though. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: The anti-roadmap - an alternative 'Theology'
Bruno Marchal wrote: Le 22-août-06, à 08:36, Tom Caylor a écrit : I believe that we are finite, but as I said in the computationalsim and supervenience thread, it doesn't seem that this is a strong enough statement to be useful in a TOE. It seems that you cannot have YD without CT, but if true I would leave Bruno to explain exactly why. I am not sure I have said that YD needs CT. CT is needed to use the informal digital instead of the turing, java python seemingly restriction. For someone not believing in CT, digital could have a wider meaning than turing emulable. Now CT needs AR. CT is equivalent with the statement that all universal digital machine can emulate each other. i.e If a Universal Digital macine exists, it can emulate another one. No ontological commitment there. To make this precise (or just to define universal machine/number) you need to believe in numbers. To make something precise you need a precise *definition*. For a formalist, there is nothing to numbers except definitions (axoms, etc),. The numbers themselves do not have to exist. So there is still no necessary ontological commitment in CT. (But just in the usual sense of any number theorist). Which will depend on whether the individual number theorist is a Platonist, Formalist, or whatever. --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: The anti-roadmap - an alternative 'Theology'
Le 22-août-06, à 18:36, 1Z a écrit : Bruno Marchal wrote: I can agree. No physicist posit matter in a fundamental theory. All physical theories are theories of matter (mass/energy). I believe so. This does not entail per se that matter is primitive. Also I prefer to define physics by the science of the observables. It is more neutral and misleading than by using the notion of matter, which is so different when considered along Plato line or Aristotle one. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: The anti-roadmap - an alternative 'Theology'
Le 22-août-06, à 23:03, David Nyman a écrit : But this suggests to me that comp, in the 'instantiation-free' AR+CT+YD sense, *cannot* be correct, precisely because it makes 'existential' claims for the 'axiomatisation of indexical existence in a 3rd-person way'. The key issue here is surely the distinction between 'existence' and 'truth' as Peter specifies in his post to me. Comp makes only the assumption that there are numbers (although technically it is just about the number 0, and its successor). The 'axiomatisation of indexical existence in a 3rd person way' is derived from that. This is a key point. I think my discussion with Pete is terminological. When I say numbers exist, Pete seems to think I believe in some magical realm were numbers exist in I don't know which sense. But when I say number exist, I just mean that the proposition numbers exists is true independently of myself. I know since a long time that the word platonist is slightly ambiguous when used by modern mathematician, and that is why I prefer to say realism instead of Platonism. My ontic theory is really no more than Robinson Arithmetic (Q). Well to be sure I have more cute ontic theories, like the SK-combinators, or like a unique equation for an universal diophantine polynomials, etc. Some are more useful than others in some context, but they are all equivalent with respect to the derivation of physics from numbers. Your post is long, and I would like to comment Russell still today. Will read the rest of your post tomorrow. perhaps we should try to write shorter post on very specific points. It would help, if only the mail boxes :) Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: The anti-roadmap - an alternative 'Theology'
Bruno Marchal wrote: Le 22-août-06, à 18:36, 1Z a écrit : Bruno Marchal wrote: I can agree. No physicist posit matter in a fundamental theory. All physical theories are theories of matter (mass/energy). I believe so. This does not entail per se that matter is primitive. A philosophical notion of pimitive matter is both constent and useful. Also I prefer to define physics by the science of the observables. It isn't, de facto. Machian physics is a side-issue or minority interest, like intuitionism in maths. It is more neutral and misleading than by using the notion of matter, which is so different when considered along Plato line or Aristotle one. People have come up with different theories about the same thing ?! Next, you'll be telling me there is more than one philosophy-of-maths...so obviously maths must be dicarded wholesale , to avoid confusion. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: The anti-roadmap - an alternative 'Theology'
Bruno Marchal wrote: Le 22-août-06, à 12:37, 1Z a écrit : Tom Caylor wrote: I'd say a candidate for making AR false is the behavior of the prime numbers, as has been discussed regarding your Riemann zeta function TOE. As I suggested on that thread, it could be that the behavior of the Riemann zeta function follows a collapse that is dependent on the observer. That's the strangest thign I've read ina long I said something along such line some times ago. I can provide a (short) explanation. The reason is the Hilbert-Polya conjecture according to which the non trivial zero of the complex Riemann Zeta function could perhaps be shown to stay on the complex line 1/2 + gt, if it was the case that those zero describe the spectrum of some quantum operator. The *spectrum* of a quantum operator is not observer-dependent. What is observer-dependent, according to some, is the particular value on the spectrum that is actually observed. --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: The anti-roadmap - an alternative 'Theology'
Bruno Marchal wrote: I think my discussion with Pete is terminological. When I say numbers exist, Pete seems to think I believe in some magical realm were numbers exist in I don't know which sense. But when I say number exist, I just mean that the proposition numbers exists is true independently of myself. I know since a long time that the word platonist is slightly ambiguous when used by modern mathematician, and that is why I prefer to say realism instead of Platonism. This is the heart of the disagreement. Of course I agree that 'numbers exist' is true independent of myself, but for me this just means that I believe that such 'mathematical objects' - abstracted from other putative features of what-exists - are instantiated in what-exists independently of any instantiation of myself. That's all. And I challenge you to show that this is insufficient for any actual mathematics that is, has been, or could be practised. I also prefer to say 'realism', in this case in place of 'Aristotelianism'. And this is the parting of the ways. If we choose to be 'realist' about numbers, we also choose not to explain them further. If our 'realism' relates to observables - e.g. my primitive 'figure/ ground reflexivity' - then we have OR (observable arithmetic) derived from its instantiation in a posited differentiable what-exists. I've chosen the latter because my intuition favours starting from what is reflexively manifested. This is clearly not mandatory. But choose we must, and what is then 'explicable' follows ineluctably from this. perhaps we should try to write shorter post on very specific points. It would help, if only the mail boxes :) I'm trying! David Le 22-août-06, à 23:03, David Nyman a écrit : But this suggests to me that comp, in the 'instantiation-free' AR+CT+YD sense, *cannot* be correct, precisely because it makes 'existential' claims for the 'axiomatisation of indexical existence in a 3rd-person way'. The key issue here is surely the distinction between 'existence' and 'truth' as Peter specifies in his post to me. Comp makes only the assumption that there are numbers (although technically it is just about the number 0, and its successor). The 'axiomatisation of indexical existence in a 3rd person way' is derived from that. This is a key point. I think my discussion with Pete is terminological. When I say numbers exist, Pete seems to think I believe in some magical realm were numbers exist in I don't know which sense. But when I say number exist, I just mean that the proposition numbers exists is true independently of myself. I know since a long time that the word platonist is slightly ambiguous when used by modern mathematician, and that is why I prefer to say realism instead of Platonism. My ontic theory is really no more than Robinson Arithmetic (Q). Well to be sure I have more cute ontic theories, like the SK-combinators, or like a unique equation for an universal diophantine polynomials, etc. Some are more useful than others in some context, but they are all equivalent with respect to the derivation of physics from numbers. Your post is long, and I would like to comment Russell still today. Will read the rest of your post tomorrow. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: The anti-roadmap - an alternative 'Theology'
Stathis, you touched the 'truth' (a word I put into - because I don't believe it). Matter cannot be an is - actually or virtually. Rutherford's empty atom shows the dichotomy between 'effects' ('affects'?) and 'explanation' (more than just words). The figment 'matter' is a product of 'mental evolution' in this universe, to catch imputes we cannot handle. 'We' is here the mental evolution of the universe. It was not man, or the old ape who decided let there be matter in our thinking - it was a zillion-stepwise development to cope with 'affects' we experienced without better explanation. So we (humans and animals) nowadays (~1b years?) accept the notion that 'there IS matter' and we can interact with it. Physics is a product in this development of reductionist efforts to 'organize' our world for ourselves. And then came the other sciences as well, in the same reductionism. We better do not chase a figment, as long as we are living IN IT - accept its use and the uncertainty of whatever we talk about. It looks like a basic tenet in our percept of reality - the what we see is what we live with from which I TRY to get to a better understanding (not yet achieved, of course). All our life, the base knowledge, the technology, the mental construct, is a product of this figment. Yes, matter is not matterly, just believed so. Energy is a cop-out - a 'name' for something we cannot put our finger on (mentally). And so are numbers. The theories you decry, or promote, all of them, are in the same circle. Regards John Mikes - Original Message - From: Stathis Papaioannou [EMAIL PROTECTED] To: 1Z everything-list@googlegroups.com Sent: Wednesday, August 23, 2006 5:11 AM Subject: RE: The anti-roadmap - an alternative 'Theology' Peter Jones writes: Bruno Marchal wrote: I can agree. No physicist posit matter in a fundamental theory. All physical theories are theories of matter (mass/energy). True, but they are not theories of what matter *actually is*. At the turn of last century Rutherford showed that atoms were mostly empty space. Tables and chairs did not suddenly become less solid as a result, but it became clear that their apparent solidity was not actually evidence that atoms are solid all the way through. In a similar fashion, the apparent solidity of matter is not actually evidence that it isn't just fluff all the way down, or part of a computer simulation. Our physical theories describe the behaviour of matter without formally addressing this question at all, despite what prejudices and working assumptions physicists may have about the true basis of physical reality. Stathis Papaioannou _ Be one of the first to try Windows Live Mail. http://ideas.live.com/programpage.aspx?versionId=5d21c51a-b161-4314-9b0e-491 1fb2b2e6d -- No virus found in this incoming message. Checked by AVG Free Edition. Version: 7.1.405 / Virus Database: 268.11.5/425 - Release Date: 08/22/06 --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: The anti-roadmap - an alternative 'Theology'
Stathis Papaioannou wrote: Peter Jones writes: Bruno Marchal wrote: I can agree. No physicist posit matter in a fundamental theory. All physical theories are theories of matter (mass/energy). True, but they are not theories of what matter *actually is*. Hence the need for a metaphysical account of matter-as-Bare-Substance to complement the physicst's account of matter-as-behaviour. If that is done isn't what you call metaphysics the 'actual physics' and the physicist's account of 'matter-as-behaviour' the metaphysics? Just a rhetorical terminological gripe. Also, if the universe is treated as a mathematics ( of matter-as-bare-substance ), isn't the scientist its metamathematics, built of it? (With all the Godellian implications..) i.e. Scientists are what could be called the 'metamathematics of the noumenon'? andTo be an instance of this metamathematics.. is to be a scientist and have qualia. The scientist and the qualia would both be natural expressions of the same noumenon. The existence of qualia _at all_ is logical proof that the choice of which 'matter-as-Bare-Substance' (to make a universe with scientists in it) is limited to be only that class which are capable of expressing what might be termed qualia. Hence this is a scientific proposition. It might not predict to a comfortable level of specificity (as to what this matter-as-bare-substance is) , but it certainly is a scientific (empirically supportable) constraint. Qualia thus become an empirical key to a door to the noumenon. Colin Hales --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: The anti-roadmap - an alternative 'Theology'
Colin Geoffrey Hales wrote: Stathis Papaioannou wrote: Peter Jones writes: Bruno Marchal wrote: I can agree. No physicist posit matter in a fundamental theory. All physical theories are theories of matter (mass/energy). True, but they are not theories of what matter *actually is*. Hence the need for a metaphysical account of matter-as-Bare-Substance to complement the physicst's account of matter-as-behaviour. If that is done isn't what you call metaphysics the 'actual physics' and the physicist's account of 'matter-as-behaviour' the metaphysics? Just a rhetorical terminological gripe. The meta in metaphysics doesn't operate like the meta in metamathematics. 'The title of the work is Τῶν μετὰ τὰ φύσικα (literally, of the things after physics). This is generally supposed to mean that this is just a collection of works that later editors placed after Aristotle's treatises on physics, but it may well mean that the budding philosopher should study these subjects after studying physical matters such as motion, time, and animal life.' Also, if the universe is treated as a mathematics ( of matter-as-bare-substance ), isn't the scientist its metamathematics, built of it? (With all the Godellian implications..) i.e. Scientists are what could be called the 'metamathematics of the noumenon'? --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
RE: The anti-roadmap - an alternative 'Theology'
Peter Jones writes: All physical theories are theories of matter (mass/energy). True, but they are not theories of what matter *actually is*. Hence the need for a metaphysical account of matter-as-Bare-Substance to complement the physicst's account of matter-as-behaviour. That would be like theology. Stathis Papaioannou _ Be one of the first to try Windows Live Mail. http://ideas.live.com/programpage.aspx?versionId=5d21c51a-b161-4314-9b0e-4911fb2b2e6d --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
RE: The anti-roadmap - an alternative 'Theology'
As Brent Meeker has pointed out, physical theories are just models to make predictions about how the world works. If physists get carried away and say this is the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth then they are talking metaphysics, not physics. Stathis Papaioannou From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] To: everything-list@googlegroups.com Subject: Re: The anti-roadmap - an alternative 'Theology' Date: Wed, 23 Aug 2006 11:51:07 -0400 Stathis, you touched the 'truth' (a word I put into - because I don't believe it). Matter cannot be an is - actually or virtually. Rutherford's empty atom shows the dichotomy between 'effects' ('affects'?) and 'explanation' (more than just words). The figment 'matter' is a product of 'mental evolution' in this universe, to catch imputes we cannot handle. 'We' is here the mental evolution of the universe. It was not man, or the old ape who decided let there be matter in our thinking - it was a zillion-stepwise development to cope with 'affects' we experienced without better explanation. So we (humans and animals) nowadays (~1b years?) accept the notion that 'there IS matter' and we can interact with it. Physics is a product in this development of reductionist efforts to 'organize' our world for ourselves. And then came the other sciences as well, in the same reductionism. We better do not chase a figment, as long as we are living IN IT - accept its use and the uncertainty of whatever we talk about. It looks like a basic tenet in our percept of reality - the what we see is what we live with from which I TRY to get to a better understanding (not yet achieved, of course). All our life, the base knowledge, the technology, the mental construct, is a product of this figment. Yes, matter is not matterly, just believed so. Energy is a cop-out - a 'name' for something we cannot put our finger on (mentally). And so are numbers. The theories you decry, or promote, all of them, are in the same circle. Regards John Mikes - Original Message - From: Stathis Papaioannou [EMAIL PROTECTED] To: 1Z everything-list@googlegroups.com Sent: Wednesday, August 23, 2006 5:11 AM Subject: RE: The anti-roadmap - an alternative 'Theology' Peter Jones writes: Bruno Marchal wrote: I can agree. No physicist posit matter in a fundamental theory. All physical theories are theories of matter (mass/energy). True, but they are not theories of what matter *actually is*. At the turn of last century Rutherford showed that atoms were mostly empty space. Tables and chairs did not suddenly become less solid as a result, but it became clear that their apparent solidity was not actually evidence that atoms are solid all the way through. In a similar fashion, the apparent solidity of matter is not actually evidence that it isn't just fluff all the way down, or part of a computer simulation. Our physical theories describe the behaviour of matter without formally addressing this question at all, despite what prejudices and working assumptions physicists may have about the true basis of physical reality. Stathis Papaioannou _ Be one of the first to try Windows Live Mail. http://ideas.live.com/programpage.aspx?versionId=5d21c51a-b161-4314-9b0e-491 1fb2b2e6d -- No virus found in this incoming message. Checked by AVG Free Edition. Version: 7.1.405 / Virus Database: 268.11.5/425 - Release Date: 08/22/06 _ Be one of the first to try Windows Live Mail. http://ideas.live.com/programpage.aspx?versionId=5d21c51a-b161-4314-9b0e-4911fb2b2e6d --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: The anti-roadmap - an alternative 'Theology'
Bruno Marchal wrote: Hi David, Le 18-août-06, à 02:16, David Nyman wrote (answering John): [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: John Thanks for taking the trouble to express your thoughts at such length. I won't say too much now, as I have to leave shortly to meet a long lost relative - from Hungary! However, I just want to make sure it's clear, both for you and the list, that: Comp is false. Let's see where *that* leads. isn't intended as a definitive claim that comp *is* false. To be honest I have not yet seen where you postulates comp wrong in your long anti-roadmap post. Recall that I take comp as YD + CT + AR (Yes Doctor + Church Thesis + Arithmetical Realism). So, strictly speaking comp can be false in seven ways: YD CT AR 1 1 1comp is true 1 1 0comp is false 1 1 0 1 2 1 0 0 3 0 1 1 4 0 1 0 5 0 0 1 6 0 0 0 7 1. AR is false, but CT is true, and YD is true. This would mean there is a program which stops or does not stop according to my knowledge of it. It is beyond my imagination, even if, as a logician I know that I have to postulate AR. Of course the UD would loose all its purpose. 2. CT is false. This would mean there exist a way to explain in a finite time how to compute a function from N to N, such that no computer can be programmed to compute it. Possible but unlikely. 3) YD is true, but CT is false and AR is false. This means the doctor is helped by Gods or Goddesses. 4) YD is false (and CT and AR are true). This means I am an actual infinite object. 5) 6) 7): combination of above. Rather, *if* it is false, in what ways specifically, and what are the alternatives? Can they be stated as clearly and explicitly as Bruno is trying to do for his approach ('to see where it leads')? Hence the 'anti-roadmap', or perhaps better - 'another roadmap', or some ideas for one. It is certainly interesting. But comp is a very weak statement, so non-comp is very strong. It needs some actual infinite to be implemented. Judson Webb range comp in the finitist doctrines (but not in the ultra-finitist doctrine). I believe that we are finite, but as I said in the computationalsim and supervenience thread, it doesn't seem that this is a strong enough statement to be useful in a TOE. It seems that you cannot have YD without CT, but if true I would leave Bruno to explain exactly why. The substitution level being a finite level is not strong enough to conclude that there is a non-zero probability that the doctor will get it right. That would be a bad bet/faith. Most of the thoughts in it were originally expressed in some earlier postings on 'The Fabric of Reality' list, which Bruno was kind enough to copy to this list. Anyway, it's intended as a point of departure (for me certainly) and I look forward to some strenuous critiques. One misgiving I have, now that I've finally grasped (I think) that the comp 'theology' entails 'faith' in the number realm, ... I prefer to reserve faith for the resurection promised but not guarantied by the (honest) doctor. I need infinitely less faith to believe that each number has a successor than to believe the sun will rise tomorrow. AR is very weak. Sometimes I regret to have been explicit on AR, because it looks like everyone believe in it, except when we write it explicitly. People put many things in it, which are not there. Not believing in AR also entails that there is a finite polynomial (on the integers) such that two different people can find different integer values when applying the polynomial on the same number, and despite those people agree on the meaning of + and * and zero and +1. ... is that by this token it seeks to provide a TOE (Bruno, am I wrong about this?) You are right. By the UDA it is not a matter of choice. That is, beginning with an assertion of 'faith' in UDA + the number realm, we seek to axiomatise and 'prove' a complete theory of our origins. Bruno is a very modest person, but I worry about the 'modesty' of the goal. Modesty is not incompatible with ambitious goal. You can decide to climb the everest Mountain, and recognize you have climb only two meters high :) Of course, it's highly probable that I just misunderstand this point. However, I'm having trouble with my faith in numbers, monseigneur. We cannot build a theory without accepting some intuitive truth, and some third person presentation of those truth. AR false means that the simple y = sin(x) real function could intersect the real axes on some non integer abscisse. Do you really believe that? Quantum mechanics relies completely on AR. If AR is false, QM is inconsistent (and almost all math). So, either you put in AR something which is
Re: The anti-roadmap - an alternative 'Theology'
Tom Caylor wrote: I'd say a candidate for making AR false is the behavior of the prime numbers, as has been discussed regarding your Riemann zeta function TOE. As I suggested on that thread, it could be that the behavior of the Riemann zeta function follows a collapse that is dependent on the observer. That's the strangest thign I've read ina long time. BTW, do you find AR umabiguous? Is it about truth or existence, in your view ? --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: The anti-roadmap - an alternative 'Theology'
Le 21-août-06, à 04:14, David Nyman a écrit : Bruno (BTW please delete any previous version of this posted in error.) I'm absolutely sincere in what I've said about approaching comp in 'as if' mode. All right. I thought so. Let us try to see if and where we differ. But at the same time I've hoped from the beginning that we could make explicit the choices that motivate our different ontic starting assumptions. Are there perhaps irreconcilable issues of style or preference, or are there fundamental logical, philosophical, or even semantic errors entailed in one or other position? Well, let me continue in the effort by trying to clarify my position on some of your recent points. So, either you put in AR something which is not there (like peter D Jones who want me doing Aristotle error on the numbers (like if I was reifying some concreteness about them), or you should have a powerful argument against AR, but then you should elaborate. To be honest I have not yet seen where you postulates comp wrong in your long anti-roadmap post. Recall that I take comp as YD + CT + AR (Yes Doctor + Church Thesis + Arithmetical Realism). OK. I've already agreed to accept AR in 'as if' mode. So that implies I'm staying on the comp road in the same 'as if' spirit to see where it leads. It's very interesting! Also I genuinely think that AR is not 'false' from any of the *logical* perspectives from which you defend it. OK. My problem - outside 'as if' mode (and this goes back to the 'primacy' issue) - is with adopting *any* essentially 'non-indexical' (or in Colin's usage 'non-situated') postulate as 'ontic ground zero'. My view - and I'm still not clear whether you think it unjustified, or that you simply *prefer* to start elsewhere - is that we go wrong the moment we fail to treat reflexive indexical necessity with maximal - *extreme* - seriousness. My most basic claim is that to make *any* non-indexical assumption primary - even one as apparently 'modest' as AR - is to try to 'sneak past' this, and thereby to fail *the* crucial test of ontic realism. Because comp makes it possible to postulate a simple theory where everything is communicable in a third person way. By making the first person primitive, you loose the ability to explain it (or to get some best possible third person explanation). I agree with Peter (1Z) when he criticize you by saying that a person is something complex, and I agree with Dennett when he says that something complex must be explained by something easier. Now comp shows the ultimate fundamental role of the first person, and that is why I appreciate your seriousness here, and in principle you still could try to formalize it in a third person way, but your last attempt led to some explosion of more complicated concepts. The same remark works when you are making indexical primitive, although indexical can be translated in purely third person way (that is exactly what Post, Turing, Godel ... Kleene have proved). The case of platonist or classical machine gives rise to the indexical but purely arithmetical provability predicate B, and this one is quasi-primitive in the sense that all others notions of persons (the hypostases) are variant of B. So yes, there is just a tiny difference between us. I just doubt you can axiomatize your first person indexical seriousness in a simple third person way. If comp is correct, you can't, I think, and eventually this gives a protection of the first person against normative theories. To sum up, the notion of first person is too complex to be be primitive, especially when you see that comp explains why the first person is correct when thinking it is primitive (but false by trying to put this in a third person discourse. And the, unlike Peter, I consider that the notion of matter is also complex, and assuming it also thhrows away any hope foir explanation, and then comp forbid that move anyway by the UDA. We could call this position maximal personal, or indexical, seriousness, but what's in a name? It frustrates me almost beyond endurance that this isn't simply 'obvious' (though error, especially one's own, is subtle). As a first person discourse, comp tells that you are correct. As a third person discourse you are on the verge of inconsistency. But it seems as though we're somehow 'tricked' out of seeing it because all 'personal' interaction (including that with the 'self') is relational, and 3rd-person is the characteristic mode of relational interaction. So all natural language just assumes it. Consequently when you say: What you say is exactly what the lobian *first person* will feel. I hope you will see this eventually. I think I do 'see' it. I understand that the lobian first person *emerging* from your non-indexical AR postulate could indeed be decribed as 'possessing' such a view. I can indeed 'see' how you can invoke a '1st-person David analog' in
Re: The anti-roadmap - an alternative 'Theology'
1Z wrote: That's the strangest thign I've read ina long time. !!! That's odd, because this's the stringest thagn I've road ina ling tome. David Tom Caylor wrote: I'd say a candidate for making AR false is the behavior of the prime numbers, as has been discussed regarding your Riemann zeta function TOE. As I suggested on that thread, it could be that the behavior of the Riemann zeta function follows a collapse that is dependent on the observer. That's the strangest thign I've read ina long time. BTW, do you find AR umabiguous? Is it about truth or existence, in your view ? --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: The anti-roadmap - an alternative 'Theology'
Bruno Marchal wrote: I can agree. No physicist posit matter in a fundamental theory. All physical theories are theories of matter (mass/energy). --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: The anti-roadmap - an alternative 'Theology'
1Z wrote: Tom Caylor wrote: I'd say a candidate for making AR false is the behavior of the prime numbers, as has been discussed regarding your Riemann zeta function TOE. As I suggested on that thread, it could be that the behavior of the Riemann zeta function follows a collapse that is dependent on the observer. That's the strangest thign I've read ina long time. Truth is stranger than fiction. Something strange may be just what is needed to break out of going around in circles. BTW, do you find AR umabiguous? Is it about truth or existence, in your view ? The way I see it, we define math in the first place as being whatever is independent of the observer (i.e. invariance). (This is why observer-dependent math seems absurd.) But then I think this search for invariance eventually brings us full circle to a self-referential paradox. Math is whatever we observe (to be true / to exist) independent of the observer. Is AR about truth or existence? Is the earth is flat about truth or existence? I believe only in a relative/local/apparent AR, but that really isn't AR. --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: The anti-roadmap - an alternative 'Theology'
Tom Caylor wrote: But then I think this search for invariance eventually brings us full circle to a self-referential paradox. Math is whatever we observe (to be true / to exist) independent of the observer. The fact that an observer can observe something doesn't make it dependent on the observer. --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: The anti-roadmap - an alternative 'Theology'
Bruno Marchal wrote: Because comp makes it possible to postulate a simple theory where everything is communicable in a third person way. By making the first person primitive, you loose the ability to explain it (or to get some best possible third person explanation). I'm still not sure I've communicated this 'primitivity' correctly, but IMO comp (in 'pure' AR+CT+YD form) achieves what you claim at the cost of coherence about 'existence' (see below). (BTW, is it simply the case that 'existence' in the sense described below is not really your concern? When you said that grandma was 'very very close indeed', what else is needed for Achilles to get abreast of the tortoise, if I may thus egregiously mix my metaphors?) So yes, there is just a tiny difference between us. I just doubt you can axiomatize your first person indexical seriousness in a simple third person way. If comp is correct, you can't, I think, and eventually this gives a protection of the first person against normative theories. But this suggests to me that comp, in the 'instantiation-free' AR+CT+YD sense, *cannot* be correct, precisely because it makes 'existential' claims for the 'axiomatisation of indexical existence in a 3rd-person way'. The key issue here is surely the distinction between 'existence' and 'truth' as Peter specifies in his post to me. Indexical seriousness is believing that whatever exists does so 'in the sense that I exist'. (The 'infinity' of this sense must be resolved within the infinity or otherwise of whatever exists.) 'Truth' is an abstraction from whatever exists, and there is no justification for hypothesising it to 'exist' in any other sense whatsoever. Truths are 'dispositions to believe' - highly organised metaphors, no more, just as 'I' am. What they are 'about' is other features of what exists, and this situation exists self-referentially solely 'in the sense that I exist'. AR, CT, etc. are functional instantiations of such metaphors within what exists. They are just one part of what exists modelling another. My view is that 'participation in what exists' exhausts what we can 'modestly' claim as 'axiomatic'. We agree, I think, that it is our unique source of knowledge of anything whatsoever. Consequently, it seems to me perverse to reject its brutely 'given' status in any schematisation of 'what exists'. I think you seek to overcome this by giving 'truth' primacy and then deriving 'what exists' from this. I know you believe that this is a 'modest' assumption, but IMO its modesty cannot compensate for its incoherence. I would challenge you to demonstrate any natural language specifiable meaning of truth that is not a mapping between putative features of 'what exists in the sense that I exist'. Mathematical truth is a special version of this, the 'putative features' here being metaphorised as highly abstracted/ highly structured 'mathematical objects'. Ditto logic. The fact that a logical or mathematical analysis can show what 3rd-person (i.e. logically) specifiable entities 'would believe' is epistemologically insightful but existentially neither here nor there, because the logic is the *model*, not the *referent*. And it's the referent that 'possesses' the belief, not the model. I agree with Peter (1Z) when he criticize you by saying that a person is something complex, and I agree with Dennett when he says that something complex must be explained by something easier. The 'sense in which I exist' is not dependent on my complexity. It's rather the *bare participation* of 'whatever-I-am' in what exists, not the specifics of this (as Peter points out, his formulation exists precisely to leave questions of detail open). Consequently, what I've been calling 'indexical' or '1st person' existence (and obviously these are bad terms because they lead to such misunderstanding) is *not* complex, and avoids Dennett's criticism, and also Peter's (because the same confusion had unfortunately arisen between us). Yes and that is normal. I reduce the mystery of here and now to the much simpler mysteries of the type: why am I in Washington and not in Moscow, or why am I in Moscow and not in Washington after a WM self-duplication experiment. Surely with comp you could figure out that those questions, although first person meaningful, are third person meaningless. NO? Yes, but I don't think these conclusions are dependent on comp. They are simply an aspect of point-of-view, or the localising effect of 'information horizons'. Identity is global, point-of-view is local. My criticism was not this, but rather against the invocation of 'global indexicality' as an artefact of 3rd person models. Metaphorically, 3rd person is 'over there', indexical necessity 'over here'. You can't make something appear 'over here', whatever you do 'over there', because what's 'over there' is just your *story* about what's going on 'over here'. So my point is that the story about 'indexicality' has to be understood as
Re: The anti-roadmap - an alternative 'Theology'
David Nyman wrote: This isn't a surprise surely, because 'matter' is defined purely relationally as behaviour. By whom ? I just can't see, except in 'as if' mode, how AR truly serves as 'ontic ground zero' in this 'maximally serious' sense. Some of us think matter does... --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: The anti-roadmap - an alternative 'Theology'
1Z wrote: This isn't a surprise surely, because 'matter' is defined purely relationally as behaviour. By whom ? Not by me! I mean that I assume that it is defined this way in the 'AR+CT+YD' version of comp. Whereas I need a 'substrate' to carry my sense of reflexive ontic 'realism' or 'seriousness'. I think our views can be reconciled (see below). I just can't see, except in 'as if' mode, how AR truly serves as 'ontic ground zero' in this 'maximally serious' sense. Some of us think matter does... And as it happens we both may be included in this 'some of us'! I've been reading with interest your exchange with Bruno re the 'existence' of numbers etc - also what you've been saying to Stathis about the significance of instantiation and the consequent difference between 'programme and process'. I've always felt that that much of our disagreement was language based, and reading these conversations has reinforced this. When you say: If numbers don't exist in the sense that I exist, then I cannot be a number. I'm perfectly happy to agree. And 'in the sense that I exist' is what I always intended by 'personal', etc. Consequently, as far as I'm concerned, we can agree on 'reflexive necessity' as ontic ground zero. IOW, we both ask that whatever is postulated as the fons et origo of existence should exist 'in the sense that I exist'. I think the difference in language is mainly that my mental picture begins with the 'situated view' and yours with the 'external view', but I think we both believe that a 'serious' view of 'existence' cannot dispense with either, and must reconcile and unify them. Hence the idea of a 'bare substrate' as indispensible to carry this basic sense of existence, within which relationally defined 'properties' and 'phenomena' can then coherently find their expression. But it seems to me that inherent in Bruno's (and Stathis') view is a desire to have relationality without the relata, and although this may lead to some unexpected epistemological insights, it leads IMO to a fatally incoherent theory of 'existence', with a concomittant trivialisation, amounting to dismissal, of the whole notion of instantiation. There is a fundamental disagreement here on the mutual dependency of 'personal existence' and 'conceptual existence'. I hold, and I think you do too, that 'I exist' must be prior to 'concepts exist', whereas AR+CT+YD holds the opposite. So its article of faith becomes: 'If I don't exist in the sense that numbers exist, then I cannot be.' Actually, your recent debates on these issues have come as close as I've seen on the list to pinning down the precise terms of disagreement between what amounts two two camps. It would be a great service to the list if we could achieve a position where the 'articles of faith' of each camp could be unambiguously defined, even if not reconciled. For a start, have you a view on the status, as empirical *evidence* for your position, of what you intend by 'the sense I exist'? I ask because both sides claim the 'sense of existence' as compatible with their views, and it would be really helpful if this could be shown to be false. David David Nyman wrote: This isn't a surprise surely, because 'matter' is defined purely relationally as behaviour. By whom ? I just can't see, except in 'as if' mode, how AR truly serves as 'ontic ground zero' in this 'maximally serious' sense. Some of us think matter does... --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: The anti-roadmap - an alternative 'Theology'
David Nyman wrote: 1Z wrote: This isn't a surprise surely, because 'matter' is defined purely relationally as behaviour. By whom ? Not by me! I mean that I assume that it is defined this way in the 'AR+CT+YD' version of comp. Whereas I need a 'substrate' to carry my sense of reflexive ontic 'realism' or 'seriousness'. I think our views can be reconciled (see below). Hmm. I think the substrate is just down to Somethingism -- some possible things exist, other don't. I just can't see, except in 'as if' mode, how AR truly serves as 'ontic ground zero' in this 'maximally serious' sense. Some of us think matter does... And as it happens we both may be included in this 'some of us'! I've been reading with interest your exchange with Bruno re the 'existence' of numbers etc - also what you've been saying to Stathis about the significance of instantiation and the consequent difference between 'programme and process'. I've always felt that that much of our disagreement was language based, and reading these conversations has reinforced this. When you say: If numbers don't exist in the sense that I exist, then I cannot be a number. I'm perfectly happy to agree. And 'in the sense that I exist' is what I always intended by 'personal', etc. Consequently, as far as I'm concerned, we can agree on 'reflexive necessity' as ontic ground zero. Actually, you have lost me there. The point I was trying to make was that I don't have to define exactly what my existence is. (Bruno's rationalism makes him think no question can can be settled unless it can be exactly defined; my empiricism makes me believe there are Brute Facts which are true even if we don't understand their nature). So: even if I don't know in which sense i exsit, I exist in some sense S, and if numbers don't exist in (at least) sense S (whatever that is) , I cannot be one. Therefore, there must be some kind of existence-claim in Bruno's thesis. IOW, we both ask that whatever is postulated as the fons et origo of existence should exist 'in the sense that I exist'. I think the difference in language is mainly that my mental picture begins with the 'situated view' and yours with the 'external view', but I think we both believe that a 'serious' view of 'existence' cannot dispense with either, and must reconcile and unify them. I am not at all sure that views equate to kinds of existstence. I just think that arguments cannot come to sound existential conclusions without making existential assumptions.. Hence the idea of a 'bare substrate' as indispensible to carry this basic sense of existence, within which relationally defined 'properties' and 'phenomena' can then coherently find their expression. The bare substrate, AFAICS, is inferred empricially, although having been inferred, it can then explain various basic facts logically (through its very bareness!) But it seems to me that inherent in Bruno's (and Stathis') view is a desire to have relationality without the relata, and although this may lead to some unexpected epistemological insights, it leads IMO to a fatally incoherent theory of 'existence', with a concomittant trivialisation, amounting to dismissal, of the whole notion of instantiation. I agree. They seem to found their arguments on an inability to understand the difference between truth and existence. There is a fundamental disagreement here on the mutual dependency of 'personal existence' and 'conceptual existence'. I hold, and I think you do too, that 'I exist' must be prior to 'concepts exist', whereas AR+CT+YD holds the opposite. I am not convinced that ther is anything special about my existence objectively, it is just a convenient starting-point (epistemologcially). It might turn out to be inessential (ontologically). So its article of faith becomes: 'If I don't exist in the sense that numbers exist, then I cannot be.' I don't think Bruno and Stathis are arguing that numbers are neceesarily the only things that exist (although a standard Platonist might argue that that they are the only things that exist necessarily..) Bruno sometimes claims that the posit of material existence is unnecessary once you have immaterial existence..and also that material existence is not merely unnecessary but impossible. Actually, your recent debates on these issues have come as close as I've seen on the list to pinning down the precise terms of disagreement between what amounts two two camps. It would be a great service to the list if we could achieve a position where the 'articles of faith' of each camp could be unambiguously defined, even if not reconciled. For a start, have you a view on the status, as empirical *evidence* for your position, of what you intend by 'the sense I exist'? The point of that particular formulation is to avoid giving an exact meaning -- although I the meaning of existence in the emprical-contingent-materialist snese can be explained. I ask
Re: The anti-roadmap - an alternative 'Theology'
1Z wrote: Hmm. I think the substrate is just down to Somethingism -- some possible things exist, other don't. Yes, but I find that to avoid slipping implicitly into 'relations without the relata', or necessarily relying on 'matter', it's conceptually helpful to have a 'figure/ ground' sort of schema, and the 'ground' is what I'm here calling the 'substrate'. Within this, some 'things' - occasions of relatedness - will exist, others won't. So: even if I don't know in which sense i exsit, I exist in some sense S, and if numbers don't exist in (at least) sense S (whatever that is) , I cannot be one. Therefore, there must be some kind of existence-claim in Bruno's thesis. Yes, sorry - language again. I meant 'reflexive' precisely in the sense that S must be the same for both - i.e. the senses must 'reflect' each other even where they're not specified in detail. So of course I agree that Bruno's view implies an existence claim (though I know he doesn't). I am not at all sure that views equate to kinds of existstence. I just think that arguments cannot come to sound existential conclusions without making existential assumptions.. OK. And the sound existential conclusion, and the assumptions on which it is based, will must be adequate to account for both of these views, yes? The bare substrate, AFAICS, is inferred empricially, although having been inferred, it can then explain various basic facts logically (through its very bareness!) When you say 'empirically' do you mean for example that there might have been no opportunity for us to infer anything, or that something quite other might have been the case to be inferred? I suppose when you appeal to 'brute facts', that necessarily implies that the facts might be brutally otherwise. But do you hold that there are any logically or conceptually prior constraints on what could be available to be brutely discovered, or is this simply an open question? I am not convinced that ther is anything special about my existence objectively, it is just a convenient starting-point (epistemologcially). It might turn out to be inessential (ontologically). Well, your factual existence may be circumstantially contingent, although necessarily potential in the overall state of affairs, given your factual existence. So, 'inessential' in what sense? I don't think Bruno and Stathis are arguing that numbers are neceesarily the only things that exist (although a standard Platonist might argue that that they are the only things that exist necessarily..) But aren't they claiming that numbers are the only things necessary (together with the operations required for CT+YD, whatever they might be) to account for *our* existence? If not, what else is required? The point of that particular formulation is to avoid giving an exact meaning -- although I the meaning of existence in the emprical-contingent-materialist snese can be explained. So in that case is empirical evidence to convince us one way or the other only to the extent that we are willing to build 'empiricism' into our presuppositions about reality? IOW, are all justifications destined to be entirely circular? David David Nyman wrote: 1Z wrote: This isn't a surprise surely, because 'matter' is defined purely relationally as behaviour. By whom ? Not by me! I mean that I assume that it is defined this way in the 'AR+CT+YD' version of comp. Whereas I need a 'substrate' to carry my sense of reflexive ontic 'realism' or 'seriousness'. I think our views can be reconciled (see below). Hmm. I think the substrate is just down to Somethingism -- some possible things exist, other don't. I just can't see, except in 'as if' mode, how AR truly serves as 'ontic ground zero' in this 'maximally serious' sense. Some of us think matter does... And as it happens we both may be included in this 'some of us'! I've been reading with interest your exchange with Bruno re the 'existence' of numbers etc - also what you've been saying to Stathis about the significance of instantiation and the consequent difference between 'programme and process'. I've always felt that that much of our disagreement was language based, and reading these conversations has reinforced this. When you say: If numbers don't exist in the sense that I exist, then I cannot be a number. I'm perfectly happy to agree. And 'in the sense that I exist' is what I always intended by 'personal', etc. Consequently, as far as I'm concerned, we can agree on 'reflexive necessity' as ontic ground zero. Actually, you have lost me there. The point I was trying to make was that I don't have to define exactly what my existence is. (Bruno's rationalism makes him think no question can can be settled unless it can be exactly defined; my empiricism makes me believe there are Brute Facts which are true even if we don't understand their nature). So: even if I don't know in
Re: The anti-roadmap - an alternative 'Theology'
David Nyman wrote: 1Z wrote: Hmm. I think the substrate is just down to Somethingism -- some possible things exist, other don't. Yes, but I find that to avoid slipping implicitly into 'relations without the relata', or necessarily relying on 'matter', it's conceptually helpful to have a 'figure/ ground' sort of schema, and the 'ground' is what I'm here calling the 'substrate'. Within this, some 'things' - occasions of relatedness - will exist, others won't. So: even if I don't know in which sense i exsit, I exist in some sense S, and if numbers don't exist in (at least) sense S (whatever that is) , I cannot be one. Therefore, there must be some kind of existence-claim in Bruno's thesis. Yes, sorry - language again. I meant 'reflexive' precisely in the sense that S must be the same for both - i.e. the senses must 'reflect' each other even where they're not specified in detail. So of course I agree that Bruno's view implies an existence claim (though I know he doesn't). I am not at all sure that views equate to kinds of existstence. I just think that arguments cannot come to sound existential conclusions without making existential assumptions.. OK. And the sound existential conclusion, and the assumptions on which it is based, will must be adequate to account for both of these views, yes? The bare substrate, AFAICS, is inferred empricially, although having been inferred, it can then explain various basic facts logically (through its very bareness!) When you say 'empirically' do you mean for example that there might have been no opportunity for us to infer anything, or that something quite other might have been the case to be inferred? I mean that historically the concept of matter emerged from observation. There are various things that can be made out of the raw-material of wood, various that can be made out of stone... maybe there is a sub-raw-material that underpins wood and stone. Taking the term in its widest sense, matter signifies that out of which anything is made or composed. Thus the original meaning of hyle (Homer) is wood, in the sense of grove or forest; and hence, derivatively, wood cut down or timber. The Latin materia, as opposed to lignum (wood used for fuel), has also the meaning of timber for building purposes. In modern languages this word (as signifying raw material) is used in a similar way. Matter is thus one of the elements of the becoming and continued being of an artificial product. The architect employs timber in the building of his house; the shoemaker fashions his shoes from leather. It will be observed that, as an intrinsic element, matter connotes composition, and is most easily studied in a consideration of the nature of change. http://www.newadvent.org/cathen/10053b.htm . I suppose when you appeal to 'brute facts', that necessarily implies that the facts might be brutally otherwise. But do you hold that there are any logically or conceptually prior constraints on what could be available to be brutely discovered, or is this simply an open question? Well, I don't think logical contradicitons are possible...beyond that the only constraint is the weak anthropic principle. I am not convinced that ther is anything special about my existence objectively, it is just a convenient starting-point (epistemologcially). It might turn out to be inessential (ontologically). Well, your factual existence may be circumstantially contingent, although necessarily potential in the overall state of affairs, given your factual existence. So, 'inessential' in what sense? In that sense: my factual existence may be circumstantially contingent.. I don't think Bruno and Stathis are arguing that numbers are neceesarily the only things that exist (although a standard Platonist might argue that that they are the only things that exist necessarily..) But aren't they claiming that numbers are the only things necessary (together with the operations required for CT+YD, whatever they might be) to account for *our* existence? If not, what else is required? Standard Platonists (e.g Plato) don't claim that. The point of that particular formulation is to avoid giving an exact meaning -- although I the meaning of existence in the emprical-contingent-materialist snese can be explained. So in that case is empirical evidence to convince us one way or the other only to the extent that we are willing to build 'empiricism' into our presuppositions about reality? IOW, are all justifications destined to be entirely circular? Empiricism vs. rationalism is the really deep question here. If Everythingism is the combination of rationalsim (all truths are necessary apriori truths) and Mathematical Monism (mathematical objects exist, and are all that exist), it may be self-defeating , in that the second claim, ie Mathematical Monism, is not a necessary truth. If that is the case,
Re: The anti-roadmap - an alternative 'Theology'
Bruno I'm absolutely sincere in what I've said about approaching comp in 'as if' mode. But at the same time I've hoped from the beginning that we could make explicit the choices that motivate our different ontic starting assumptions. Are there perhaps irreconcilable issues of style or preference, or are there fundamental logical, philosophical, or even semantic errors entailed in one or other position? Well, let me continue in the effort by trying to clarify my position on some of your recent points. So, either you put in AR something which is not there (like peter D Jones who want me doing Aristotle error on the numbers (like if I was reifying some concreteness about them), or you should have a powerful argument against AR, but then you should elaborate. To be honest I have not yet seen where you postulates comp wrong in your long anti-roadmap post. Recall that I take comp as YD + CT + AR (Yes Doctor + Church Thesis + Arithmetical Realism). OK. I've already agreed to accept AR in 'as if' mode. So that implies I'm staying on the comp road in the same 'as if' spirit to see where it leads. It's very interesting! Also I genuinely think that AR is not 'false' from any of the *logical* perspectives from which you defend it. My problem - outside 'as if' mode (and this goes back to the 'primacy' issue) - is with adopting *any* 3rd-person postulate as 'ontic ground zero'. My view - and I'm still not clear whether you think it unjustified, or that you simply *prefer* to start elsewhere - is that we go wrong the moment we fail to treat reflexive indexical necessity with maximal - *extreme* - seriousness. My most basic claim is that to make *any* 3rd-person assumption primary - even one as apparently 'modest' as AR - is to try to 'sneak past' this, and thereby to fail *the* crucial test of ontic realism. We could call this position maximal personal, or indexical, seriousness, but what's in a name? It frustrates me almost beyond endurance that this isn't simply 'obvious' (though error, especially one's own, is subtle). But it seems as though we're somehow 'tricked' out of seeing it because all 'personal' interaction (including that with the 'self') is relational, and 3rd-person is the characteristic mode of relational interaction. So all natural language just assumes it. Consequently when you say: What you say is exactly what the lobian *first person* will feel. I hope you will see this eventually. I think I 'see' it *now*. I understand that the lobian first person *emerging* from your 3rd person AR postulate *would* indeed 'possess' such a view. But my problem is with all this 3rd person language. I can indeed 'see' how you can invoke a '1st-person David analog' in this way, but I can't at all see how this causes 'indexically necessary David' - 'here and now' - to appear out of 'thin 3rd-person air'. Logic lacks this power. It seems as if only magic will do. It's like Harry Potter saying - I know I'm just imagining you, but hang on, in just a jiffy AR will make you indexically necessary. On the other hand, bare 'indexical necessity' is the sole ontic postulate I need. Is this an insufficiently 'modest' requirement? My justification is reflexively evident and incorrigible. It does no practical damage to the subsequent postulation of AR - it can't do, because this position simply *is* the situation from which I postulate it. By the same token, CT survives (if true) undamaged by being postulated from this position. In other words, I'm claiming that we have access to versions of AR and CT manifested entirely in virtue of their generalisation from relational reality, and I can't see that you or I have reason to believe anything else, except through 'Penrose direct revelation', which you reject. So what's the alternative? YD now becomes the interesting case, and the point, as I recall, where we started. My long post refers to the dependencies and assumptions, implicit in bit-stream representations, that are only made explicit by their instantiation. My argument is that any digital program is an arbitrary gloss on the behaviour of a 'substrate' (i.e. lower logical level) - I think I've seen you argue more or less the same point - and therefore relies on a notion of 'causation' (dependency, sequence, structure, behaviour, or state your preferred terminology) - that is essentially non-local at the level of such instantiation. Consequently we must choose: to believe either that *any* example of situated, indexical, experience arises from localised phenomena at the causal level of their instantiation (appropriately schematised), or that it arises from arbitrary, non-localised, aspatial, atemporal, abstractions from behaviour at this level. I can't see that these considerations don't apply to *any* digital 'substitution level' that relies on a purely syntactical expression - e.g. instantiation in a digital computer - and would consequently have to decline the doctor's offer. This is what I mean by
Re: The anti-roadmap - an alternative 'Theology'
Bruno (BTW please delete any previous version of this posted in error.) I'm absolutely sincere in what I've said about approaching comp in 'as if' mode. But at the same time I've hoped from the beginning that we could make explicit the choices that motivate our different ontic starting assumptions. Are there perhaps irreconcilable issues of style or preference, or are there fundamental logical, philosophical, or even semantic errors entailed in one or other position? Well, let me continue in the effort by trying to clarify my position on some of your recent points. So, either you put in AR something which is not there (like peter D Jones who want me doing Aristotle error on the numbers (like if I was reifying some concreteness about them), or you should have a powerful argument against AR, but then you should elaborate. To be honest I have not yet seen where you postulates comp wrong in your long anti-roadmap post. Recall that I take comp as YD + CT + AR (Yes Doctor + Church Thesis + Arithmetical Realism). OK. I've already agreed to accept AR in 'as if' mode. So that implies I'm staying on the comp road in the same 'as if' spirit to see where it leads. It's very interesting! Also I genuinely think that AR is not 'false' from any of the *logical* perspectives from which you defend it. My problem - outside 'as if' mode (and this goes back to the 'primacy' issue) - is with adopting *any* essentially 'non-indexical' (or in Colin's usage 'non-situated') postulate as 'ontic ground zero'. My view - and I'm still not clear whether you think it unjustified, or that you simply *prefer* to start elsewhere - is that we go wrong the moment we fail to treat reflexive indexical necessity with maximal - *extreme* - seriousness. My most basic claim is that to make *any* non-indexical assumption primary - even one as apparently 'modest' as AR - is to try to 'sneak past' this, and thereby to fail *the* crucial test of ontic realism. We could call this position maximal personal, or indexical, seriousness, but what's in a name? It frustrates me almost beyond endurance that this isn't simply 'obvious' (though error, especially one's own, is subtle). But it seems as though we're somehow 'tricked' out of seeing it because all 'personal' interaction (including that with the 'self') is relational, and 3rd-person is the characteristic mode of relational interaction. So all natural language just assumes it. Consequently when you say: What you say is exactly what the lobian *first person* will feel. I hope you will see this eventually. I think I do 'see' it. I understand that the lobian first person *emerging* from your non-indexical AR postulate could indeed be decribed as 'possessing' such a view. I can indeed 'see' how you can invoke a '1st-person David analog' in 3rd-person language in this way, but I can't at all see how this causes 'indexically necessary David' - 'here and now' - to appear out of 'thin 3rd-person air'. Does mere logic posess such power? It seems as if only magic will do. It's like Harry Potter saying - I know I'm just imagining you, but hang on, in just a jiffy AR will make you indexically necessary. On the other hand, bare 'indexical necessity' is the sole ontic postulate I need. Is this an insufficiently 'modest' requirement? My justification is reflexively evident and incorrigible. It does no practical damage to the subsequent postulation of AR - it can't do, because this position simply *is* the situation from which I postulate it. By the same token, CT survives (if true) undamaged by being postulated from this position. In other words, I'm claiming that we have access to versions of AR and CT manifested entirely in virtue of their generalisation from relational reality, and I can't see that you or I have reason to believe anything else, except through 'Penrose direct revelation', which you reject. So what's the alternative? YD now becomes the interesting case, and the point, as I recall, where we started. My long post refers to the dependencies and assumptions, implicit in bit-stream representations, that are only made explicit by their instantiation. My argument is that any digital program is an arbitrary gloss on the behaviour of a 'substrate' (i.e. lower logical level) - I think I've seen you argue more or less the same point - and therefore relies on a notion of 'causation' (dependency, sequence, structure, behaviour, or state your preferred terminology) - that is essentially non-local at the level of such instantiation. Consequently we must choose: to believe either that *any* example of situated, indexical, experience arises from localised phenomena at the causal level of their instantiation (appropriately schematised), or that it arises from arbitrary, non-localised, aspatial, atemporal, abstractions from behaviour at this level. I can't see that these considerations don't apply to *any* digital 'substitution level' that relies on a purely syntactical expression - e.g.
Re: The anti-roadmap - an alternative 'Theology'
Hi David, Le 18-août-06, à 02:16, David Nyman wrote (answering John): [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: John Thanks for taking the trouble to express your thoughts at such length. I won't say too much now, as I have to leave shortly to meet a long lost relative - from Hungary! However, I just want to make sure it's clear, both for you and the list, that: Comp is false. Let's see where *that* leads. isn't intended as a definitive claim that comp *is* false. To be honest I have not yet seen where you postulates comp wrong in your long anti-roadmap post. Recall that I take comp as YD + CT + AR (Yes Doctor + Church Thesis + Arithmetical Realism). So, strictly speaking comp can be false in seven ways: YD CT AR 1 1 1comp is true 1 1 0comp is false 1 1 0 1 2 1 0 0 3 0 1 1 4 0 1 0 5 0 0 1 6 0 0 0 7 1. AR is false, but CT is true, and YD is true. This would mean there is a program which stops or does not stop according to my knowledge of it. It is beyond my imagination, even if, as a logician I know that I have to postulate AR. Of course the UD would loose all its purpose. 2. CT is false. This would mean there exist a way to explain in a finite time how to compute a function from N to N, such that no computer can be programmed to compute it. Possible but unlikely. 3) YD is true, but CT is false and AR is false. This means the doctor is helped by Gods or Goddesses. 4) YD is false (and CT and AR are true). This means I am an actual infinite object. 5) 6) 7): combination of above. Rather, *if* it is false, in what ways specifically, and what are the alternatives? Can they be stated as clearly and explicitly as Bruno is trying to do for his approach ('to see where it leads')? Hence the 'anti-roadmap', or perhaps better - 'another roadmap', or some ideas for one. It is certainly interesting. But comp is a very weak statement, so non-comp is very strong. It needs some actual infinite to be implemented. Judson Webb range comp in the finitist doctrines (but not in the ultra-finitist doctrine). Most of the thoughts in it were originally expressed in some earlier postings on 'The Fabric of Reality' list, which Bruno was kind enough to copy to this list. Anyway, it's intended as a point of departure (for me certainly) and I look forward to some strenuous critiques. One misgiving I have, now that I've finally grasped (I think) that the comp 'theology' entails 'faith' in the number realm, ... I prefer to reserve faith for the resurection promised but not guarantied by the (honest) doctor. I need infinitely less faith to believe that each number has a successor than to believe the sun will rise tomorrow. AR is very weak. Sometimes I regret to have been explicit on AR, because it looks like everyone believe in it, except when we write it explicitly. People put many things in it, which are not there. Not believing in AR also entails that there is a finite polynomial (on the integers) such that two different people can find different integer values when applying the polynomial on the same number, and despite those people agree on the meaning of + and * and zero and +1. ... is that by this token it seeks to provide a TOE (Bruno, am I wrong about this?) You are right. By the UDA it is not a matter of choice. That is, beginning with an assertion of 'faith' in UDA + the number realm, we seek to axiomatise and 'prove' a complete theory of our origins. Bruno is a very modest person, but I worry about the 'modesty' of the goal. Modesty is not incompatible with ambitious goal. You can decide to climb the everest Mountain, and recognize you have climb only two meters high :) Of course, it's highly probable that I just misunderstand this point. However, I'm having trouble with my faith in numbers, monseigneur. We cannot build a theory without accepting some intuitive truth, and some third person presentation of those truth. AR false means that the simple y = sin(x) real function could intersect the real axes on some non integer abscisse. Do you really believe that? Quantum mechanics relies completely on AR. If AR is false, QM is inconsistent (and almost all math). So, either you put in AR something which is not there (like peter D Jones who want me doing Aristotle error on the numbers (like if I was reifying some concreteness about them), or you should have a powerful argument against AR, but then you should elaborate. My own intuition begins from my own indexical self-assertion, my necessity, generalised to an inclusive self-asserting necessity extending outwards indefinitely. Here I have a pedagogical, if not diplomatical, problem. What you say is exactly what the lobian *first person* will feel. I hope you will see this
Re: The anti-roadmap - an alternative 'Theology'
David, your post has wits. Yet it reminded me of 'atheism' which starts from the belief it is supposed to deny. I am not an atheist, because I do not know what to deny: what do people 'think' to call god? My question to comp was (and I think it is different from your position): Let me IN into learning about 'comp' from the outside, the 'no comp' mindset. When you say: Comp is false you accepted it and argue about IT. I ask What is comp - if I am outside the entire mindset and don't assume? Bruno is VERY logical and knowledgeable, but his 'mindset' includes numbers and mathematical thinking. I got a lot of good responses from him to my questions and all started from some in theory assumption (e.g. 'assuming comp', etc.). What if we do NOT assume it? I asked about 'numbers' stripped from counting and quantities. Otherwise they are only quantizing adjectives (6 what?). (Like the 'color green'?) Pure mathematics works differently, it even substitutes the numbers with other symbols (yes, 'symbols', if we do not think of the 'what'). I differentiate an applied math in the sciences, working with quantities identified within the limited topical models of the science. This is another subject, - I want to concentrate here on the numbers concept. Ideas 'exist' relationally (and some are translated into physical (materialistic) features). To get to 'ideas' a receiving observer is necessary with enough complexity to accept them. (Then we (our mind) interpret them into the perception of reality). In my older thinking (prone to be revised) I defined my 'information' concept as some difference 'accepted' into an observer. The difference can be e.g. an electric (so called) potential and the acceptor )observer!) even a polar(!) moelcule(!), - or at a different level: a difference, like a strange societal story is accepted by a reader of G.B.Shaw (observer). (Existence in this ontology was the difference itself, observer anything that accepts information.) When the developing human 'mind' reached the complexity to identify 'numbers' the numbers enetered the human thinking. Does it make sense to argue a homoiusion war whether they existed before they could be accepted? For 'us' they started to exist when our mind became capable to 'accept' such information. It is only semantical in our syntax to call this situation an invention. It is only semantical in our syntax to call this situation an invention. Then we started to count and think in quantities using the newly invented 'numbers'. But what are these 'numbers' without the counting and quantizing? Do they have a quantitative original meaning? Originally the 'unit' was 2, and '1' was half of it in certain cases. In my language which is older than the Indo - European ones a man with 1 eye is half-eyed and with 1 hand or foot i said to have lost his half hand or foot. Yet a man is 1, a sable is 1, not 2. Many was 5, seemingly from the fingers, and in Russian grammar they have a dual case and a big plural above 5. (Also: a 'unit' involves more than one by its meaning). David, I do not go all along your long post. These remarks came to mind - I don't write a dissertation. Your idea was an intreresting one. My original reaction (above) was a reminiscence to a 'believer's' challenge that I should 'disprove' god and my answer was: only, if you prove something to exist can I refute it. Best wishes John Mikes - Original Message - From: David Nyman [EMAIL PROTECTED] To: Everything List everything-list@googlegroups.com Sent: Thursday, August 17, 2006 9:41 AM Subject: The anti-roadmap - an alternative 'Theology' Comp is false. Let's see where *that* leads. I'm erecting this as a signpost to indicate a direction, and I would beg the list's indulgence in helping me to look in this direction, rather than confining its comments to the ramshackle construction of the signpost itself. My hope is that you will help me to expose whatever is untrue or confused about what follows (I'm sure you will!). But I hope you will also 'catch my drift'. 1) The bit-stream Comp deals with a bit-stream representation of appearance. The theorems of comp process this bit-stream in terms of a formal system, creating a framework within which 'true or 'false' theorems may be evaluated. This system is by its nature closed, or tautological. The statements that can be made, their 'truth' or 'falsehood', are inherent in the axiomatic and operational characteristics of the formal system as applied to the bit-stream. 2) The instantiation In order to implement the comp approach, an instantiation is required that will represent the bit-stream and enact the formal operations. The Turing machine is an idealised version of such an instantiation. A digital computer is a physical version of a TM. Consequently comp may be instantiated in a digital computer, and copied in innumerable media that suitably preserve its informational structure. 3) Dimensionality The bit-stream
Re: The anti-roadmap - an alternative 'Theology'
[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: John Thanks for taking the trouble to express your thoughts at such length. I won't say too much now, as I have to leave shortly to meet a long lost relative - from Hungary! However, I just want to make sure it's clear, both for you and the list, that: Comp is false. Let's see where *that* leads. isn't intended as a definitive claim that comp *is* false. Rather, *if* it is false, in what ways specifically, and what are the alternatives? Can they be stated as clearly and explicitly as Bruno is trying to do for his approach ('to see where it leads')? Hence the 'anti-roadmap', or perhaps better - 'another roadmap', or some ideas for one. Most of the thoughts in it were originally expressed in some earlier postings on 'The Fabric of Reality' list, which Bruno was kind enough to copy to this list. Anyway, it's intended as a point of departure (for me certainly) and I look forward to some strenuous critiques. One misgiving I have, now that I've finally grasped (I think) that the comp 'theology' entails 'faith' in the number realm, is that by this token it seeks to provide a TOE (Bruno, am I wrong about this?) That is, beginning with an assertion of 'faith' in UDA + the number realm, we seek to axiomatise and 'prove' a complete theory of our origins. Bruno is a very modest person, but I worry about the 'modesty' of the goal. Of course, it's highly probable that I just misunderstand this point. However, I'm having trouble with my faith in numbers, monseigneur. My own intuition begins from my own indexical self-assertion, my necessity, generalised to an inclusive self-asserting necessity extending outwards indefinitely. I don't look for a way to 'get behind' this, and to this extent I don't seek a TOE, because I can't believe that 'everything' (despite the name of this list) is theoretically assimilable. This may well be blindness more than modesty, however. Having said this, of course in a spirit of learning I'm trying to understand and adopt *as if* true the comp assumptions, and continue to put my best efforts into getting my head around Bruno's roadmap as it emerges. I have a lot of experience of changing my mind (and maybe I'll get a better one!) David David, your post has wits. Yet it reminded me of 'atheism' which starts from the belief it is supposed to deny. I am not an atheist, because I do not know what to deny: what do people 'think' to call god? My question to comp was (and I think it is different from your position): Let me IN into learning about 'comp' from the outside, the 'no comp' mindset. When you say: Comp is false you accepted it and argue about IT. I ask What is comp - if I am outside the entire mindset and don't assume? Bruno is VERY logical and knowledgeable, but his 'mindset' includes numbers and mathematical thinking. I got a lot of good responses from him to my questions and all started from some in theory assumption (e.g. 'assuming comp', etc.). What if we do NOT assume it? I asked about 'numbers' stripped from counting and quantities. Otherwise they are only quantizing adjectives (6 what?). (Like the 'color green'?) Pure mathematics works differently, it even substitutes the numbers with other symbols (yes, 'symbols', if we do not think of the 'what'). I differentiate an applied math in the sciences, working with quantities identified within the limited topical models of the science. This is another subject, - I want to concentrate here on the numbers concept. Ideas 'exist' relationally (and some are translated into physical (materialistic) features). To get to 'ideas' a receiving observer is necessary with enough complexity to accept them. (Then we (our mind) interpret them into the perception of reality). In my older thinking (prone to be revised) I defined my 'information' concept as some difference 'accepted' into an observer. The difference can be e.g. an electric (so called) potential and the acceptor )observer!) even a polar(!) moelcule(!), - or at a different level: a difference, like a strange societal story is accepted by a reader of G.B.Shaw (observer). (Existence in this ontology was the difference itself, observer anything that accepts information.) When the developing human 'mind' reached the complexity to identify 'numbers' the numbers enetered the human thinking. Does it make sense to argue a homoiusion war whether they existed before they could be accepted? For 'us' they started to exist when our mind became capable to 'accept' such information. It is only semantical in our syntax to call this situation an invention. It is only semantical in our syntax to call this situation an invention. Then we started to count and think in quantities using the newly invented 'numbers'. But what are these 'numbers' without the counting and quantizing? Do they have a quantitative original meaning? Originally the 'unit' was 2, and '1' was half of it in certain cases. In my language which is
Re: The anti-roadmap - an alternative 'Theology'
- Original Message - From: David Nyman [EMAIL PROTECTED] To: Everything List everything-list@googlegroups.com Sent: Thursday, August 17, 2006 8:16 PM Subject: Re: The anti-roadmap - an alternative 'Theology' Dave, thanks fir the friendly and decent words. It was not questionable that you did not 'attack' comp as false, I reflected principally as a discussion-technique. I like Bruno a lot and use some not-so-kind argumentation style lately to tease out from him a stronger argument. We agree in the goal of learning. You are more of a professional than I am. John [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: ... John Thanks for taking the trouble to express your thoughts at such length. I won't say too much now, as I have to leave shortly to meet a long lost relative - from Hungary! However, I just want to make sure it's clear, both for you and the list, that: Comp is false. Let's see where *that* leads. isn't intended as a definitive claim that comp *is* false. Rather, *if* it is false, in what ways specifically, and what are the alternatives? Can they be stated as clearly and explicitly as Bruno is trying to do for his approach ('to see where it leads')? Hence the 'anti-roadmap', or perhaps better - 'another roadmap', or some ideas for one. Most of the thoughts in it were originally expressed in some earlier postings on 'The Fabric of Reality' list, which Bruno was kind enough to copy to this list. Anyway, it's intended as a point of departure (for me certainly) and I look forward to some strenuous critiques. One misgiving I have, now that I've finally grasped (I think) that the comp 'theology' entails 'faith' in the number realm, is that by this token it seeks to provide a TOE (Bruno, am I wrong about this?) That is, beginning with an assertion of 'faith' in UDA + the number realm, we seek to axiomatise and 'prove' a complete theory of our origins. Bruno is a very modest person, but I worry about the 'modesty' of the goal. Of course, it's highly probable that I just misunderstand this point. However, I'm having trouble with my faith in numbers, monseigneur. My own intuition begins from my own indexical self-assertion, my necessity, generalised to an inclusive self-asserting necessity extending outwards indefinitely. I don't look for a way to 'get behind' this, and to this extent I don't seek a TOE, because I can't believe that 'everything' (despite the name of this list) is theoretically assimilable. This may well be blindness more than modesty, however. Having said this, of course in a spirit of learning I'm trying to understand and adopt *as if* true the comp assumptions, and continue to put my best efforts into getting my head around Bruno's roadmap as it emerges. I have a lot of experience of changing my mind (and maybe I'll get a better one!) David truncated --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---