Re: The 'no miracles' argument against scientific realism
On Sat, May 15, 2010 at 6:43 PM, Brent Meeker wrote: > > I don't know what "fine tuned" means in this context. You're back to the > measurement problem. If it is observed that unsorted lists of words (for > example) sort themselves alphabetically, then one might hypothesize a "law > of physics" to explain this. And physicists seeking to test this law might > hypothesize different ways it works. One might speculate it works like > Quicksort while another hypothesizes it works like Bubblesort. This quickly > leads to an experimental test. By preparing different initial lists and > seeing how long it takes for them to be sorted the test may favor Quicksort > over Bubblesort. But of course there are infinitely many different sort > algorithms which would produce the same results. Except in this case, we're not observing the sorting process from the outside. Instead, our observations are a side-effect of the sorting process. We aren't free to develop experimental tests...instead the "underlying process" dictates our selection of which tests to perform, our execution of those tests, and our interpretation of the results. Our learning about the process would have to be hardcoded into the process from the start. Pretending otherwise is just fantasy and wishful thinking isn't it? > So one just takes the more favored, simplest one. Isn't the simplest explanation that our experiences are fundamental and uncaused? If our experiences aren't fundamental and uncaused, then the process that underlies them must be. But, that being the case, what good does it do to insert this hypothetical underlying process, except as a calculational device? If you take reality as a whole, then it makes no difference whether there is a material world (or a platonic world) that underlies the world of subjective experience or not. What difference does it make if there "really" is a layer of rule-driven particles (or numbers and logic) between our experiences and reality's foundation? Ultimately the result is the same...things just are the way they are, and there is no answer to the question "why?" >> It is inconceivable to me that I could be wrong about what I experience. >> > > It's inconceivable that "I am looking at a real book." can have any meaning > unless there are real books and real looking at them and a real "I". So you > can only have certainty at the price of losing all reference. It'd still be a bargain at twice the price! "By what argument can it be proved, that the perceptions of the mind must be caused by external objects, entirely different from them, though resembling them (if that be possible) and could not arise either from the energy of the mind itself, or from the suggestion of some invisible and unknown spirit, or from some other cause still more unknown to us?" - David Hume "As the sceptical doubt arises naturally from a profound and intense reflection on those subjects, it always increases, the farther we carry our reflections, whether in opposition or conformity to it. Carelessness and inattention alone can afford us any remedy. For this reason I rely entirely upon them.” -- David Hume "Now, while it happens, sometimes, that anti-realism drives people to skepticism, actually, it usually goes the other way. As Rorty once explained, 'people become Pragmatists for the same reason they become idealists or verificationists: they hope to frustrate the skeptic.' If we can know nothing about any mind-independent, external world, then, if we say the world is inside the mind, maybe we can know about it! So, historically, it’s been a dread of the demon that scared philosophers off the pedestrian realism of less enlightened folk." -- Quee Nelson I wonder why you have that preference? What causes you to be that way? >>> >>> The laws of physics and reality. >>> >> >> What are "the laws of physics", do you think? Are they real things, >> which we approximate with our scientific theories? Or is there really >> no necessity behind how events transpire? >> > > I think "the laws of physics" are our inventions to explain the regularities > we observe. Is there *really* some necessity in how events transpire. I > don't know how to answer questions with *really* in them. It's my best > theory that there is some necessity in how events transpire and I'm willing > to use it as a guide to thought and action. If there was a necessity, what enforces it? What makes it necessary for events to transpire according to that rule? If the answer is "nothing", then I'd say it wasn't actually a necessity...it was just a contingent pattern. If the answer is "something", then I'd ask what enforces that "something". And what enforces what enforces it. And so on. Again, the infinite chain. >> Tangentially: isn't your claim that you are only interested in theory >> to the extent that it is "useful", essentially a skeptical position? >> > > That's not my only interest in the
Re: The 'no miracles' argument against scientific realism
On 5/15/2010 1:32 PM, Rex Allen wrote:
On Fri, May 14, 2010 at 1:10 AM, Brent Meeker wrote:
On 5/13/2010 9:27 PM, Rex Allen wrote:
Either the initial conditions were fine-tuned or the physical laws
were fine-tuned to produce reliable knowledge.
What happened to "...a wide variety of initial conditions will ultimately
"converge" with the result that
conscious entities have this knowledge." That's contrary to "fine-tuning".
Okay, in the discussion that follows: the algorithm is analogous to
the laws of physics; the unsorted input list is analogous to "initial
conditions"; and producing a correctly sorted list from this input is
analogous to arriving at "reliable knowledge".
1) Fine-tuned physical laws: The Quicksort algorithm can start with
any unsorted list and it will "converge" to a sorted version of that
list.
So regardless of the initial condition of the data, the result will
always be the same: a perfectly sorted list.
This happens because the Quicksort algorithm is very finely-tuned.
Unlike most other algorithms, this one is perfectly suited to produce
sorted lists from a "wide variety of initial conditions."
2) Fine-tuned initial conditions: Alternatively, you could have an
algorithm that will only produce a sorted list when provided with a
very specific "unsorted" initial input data. Freshman Computer
Science students sometimes produce this type of "sort algorithm." It
only correctly sorts when provided with one particular starting
list...which happens to be the list they tested with before turning in
their homework assignment. If you run their (supposed) sort algorithm
on any other unsorted input data, then the output will not be a
correctly sorted list.
So in this case, arriving at the correct solution ("reliable
knowledge") is entirely a function of the initial conditions. The
initial conditions must be very fine-tuned for that algorithm to give
correct results.
Right?
I don't know what "fine tuned" means in this context. You're back to
the measurement problem. If it is observed that unsorted lists of words
(for example) sort themselves alphabetically, then one might hypothesize
a "law of physics" to explain this. And physicists seeking to test this
law might hypothesize different ways it works. One might speculate it
works like Quicksort while another hypothesizes it works like
Bubblesort. This quickly leads to an experimental test. By preparing
different initial lists and seeing how long it takes for them to be
sorted the test may favor Quicksort over Bubblesort. But of course
there are infinitely many different sort algorithms which would produce
the same results. So one just takes the more favored, simplest one.
Note that the Randomized Quicksort can even be said to be
indeterministic. And yet it still reliably and efficiently produces
correctly sorted lists from any initial conditions.
Regardless, why is this kind of "reliable knowledge" more desirable
than the reliable knowledge of ephemeral thoughts? You seem to imply
that it is "better". Why?
There is no "knowledge of ephemeral thoughts". Knowledge, by definition is
a kind of thought that refers, but emphemeral thoughts don't refer. So they
cannot be knowledge.
Even assuming physicalism, I can have thoughts that refer only to
"ephemeral" things...including other thoughts (not explicitly to the
material substrate that instantiates the thoughts).
It would seem to me that one ephemeral thought could refer to another
ephemeral thought. And ephemeral thoughts could refer to perceptions,
impressions, emotions, "ideas", whatever...the same kinds of things
that "non-ephemeral" thoughts can refer to.
Again, I don't know that I am looking at a *real* book, but I
definitely know that I am having the experience of looking at book.
Another definition of knowledge is "a true, justified belief."
So how would I justify my belief that I am looking at a real book that
exists independently of my perceptions of it?
My belief that I am having the experience of looking at a book is
undeniably true and justified, as I have direct knowledge of my
experiences.
It is inconceivable to me that I could be wrong about what I experience.
It's inconceivable that "I am looking at a real book." can have any
meaning unless there are real books and real looking at them and a real
"I". So you can only have certainty at the price of losing all reference.
So...you'd rather be a material cog in a (deterministic or
probabilistic) rule-driven physical machine than an insubstantial
entity composed entirely of ephemeral thoughts.
I'd rather be system that interacts with a universe of physical systems and
thereby form thoughts correlated with the rest of the universe. I dont'
think "physical" adds anything - it's just a word that indicates some
external reality. Why do you find it preferable to be dreamer?
The coherence, scope, and
Re: The 'no miracles' argument against scientific realism
On Fri, May 14, 2010 at 1:10 AM, Brent Meeker wrote:
> On 5/13/2010 9:27 PM, Rex Allen wrote:
>> Either the initial conditions were fine-tuned or the physical laws
>> were fine-tuned to produce reliable knowledge.
>>
>
> What happened to "...a wide variety of initial conditions will ultimately
> "converge" with the result that
> conscious entities have this knowledge." That's contrary to "fine-tuning".
Okay, in the discussion that follows: the algorithm is analogous to
the laws of physics; the unsorted input list is analogous to "initial
conditions"; and producing a correctly sorted list from this input is
analogous to arriving at "reliable knowledge".
1) Fine-tuned physical laws: The Quicksort algorithm can start with
any unsorted list and it will "converge" to a sorted version of that
list.
So regardless of the initial condition of the data, the result will
always be the same: a perfectly sorted list.
This happens because the Quicksort algorithm is very finely-tuned.
Unlike most other algorithms, this one is perfectly suited to produce
sorted lists from a "wide variety of initial conditions."
2) Fine-tuned initial conditions: Alternatively, you could have an
algorithm that will only produce a sorted list when provided with a
very specific "unsorted" initial input data. Freshman Computer
Science students sometimes produce this type of "sort algorithm." It
only correctly sorts when provided with one particular starting
list...which happens to be the list they tested with before turning in
their homework assignment. If you run their (supposed) sort algorithm
on any other unsorted input data, then the output will not be a
correctly sorted list.
So in this case, arriving at the correct solution ("reliable
knowledge") is entirely a function of the initial conditions. The
initial conditions must be very fine-tuned for that algorithm to give
correct results.
Right?
Note that the Randomized Quicksort can even be said to be
indeterministic. And yet it still reliably and efficiently produces
correctly sorted lists from any initial conditions.
>> Regardless, why is this kind of "reliable knowledge" more desirable
>> than the reliable knowledge of ephemeral thoughts? You seem to imply
>> that it is "better". Why?
>>
>
> There is no "knowledge of ephemeral thoughts". Knowledge, by definition is
> a kind of thought that refers, but emphemeral thoughts don't refer. So they
> cannot be knowledge.
Even assuming physicalism, I can have thoughts that refer only to
"ephemeral" things...including other thoughts (not explicitly to the
material substrate that instantiates the thoughts).
It would seem to me that one ephemeral thought could refer to another
ephemeral thought. And ephemeral thoughts could refer to perceptions,
impressions, emotions, "ideas", whatever...the same kinds of things
that "non-ephemeral" thoughts can refer to.
Again, I don't know that I am looking at a *real* book, but I
definitely know that I am having the experience of looking at book.
Another definition of knowledge is "a true, justified belief."
So how would I justify my belief that I am looking at a real book that
exists independently of my perceptions of it?
My belief that I am having the experience of looking at a book is
undeniably true and justified, as I have direct knowledge of my
experiences.
It is inconceivable to me that I could be wrong about what I experience.
>> So...you'd rather be a material cog in a (deterministic or
>> probabilistic) rule-driven physical machine than an insubstantial
>> entity composed entirely of ephemeral thoughts.
>>
>
> I'd rather be system that interacts with a universe of physical systems and
> thereby form thoughts correlated with the rest of the universe. I dont'
> think "physical" adds anything - it's just a word that indicates some
> external reality. Why do you find it preferable to be dreamer?
The coherence, scope, and simplicity of the idea is attractive.
And being correlated with something beyond my experiences isn't that
big an attraction.
Though, ultimately I think the two options are interchangeable in
terms of their "usefulness". I don't necessarily see that believing
one over the other would result in different decisions.
A rule-driven cog in a vast implacable machine.
OR, not even a dreamer, but rather just a dream.
In either case: Why are things this way? There is no reason. They just are.
>> I wonder why you have
>> that preference? What causes you to be that way?
>>
>
> The laws of physics and reality.
What are "the laws of physics", do you think? Are they real things,
which we approximate with our scientific theories? Or is there really
no necessity behind how events transpire?
What explains reality's consistency, predictability, and order? Does
anything explain it? Or is it just that way?
>> I don't see any significant difference in the two options.
>>
>>
> You don't see a theory can be useful?
I agree that a theory can *seem*
Re: The 'no miracles' argument against scientific realism
On 5/13/2010 9:27 PM, Rex Allen wrote: On Thu, May 13, 2010 at 1:16 AM, Brent Meeker wrote: On 5/12/2010 9:48 PM, Rex Allen wrote: I commented on Sean Carroll's position on "Cognative Instability" in "The Past Hypothesis" thread. Cognative instability is only a problem if you refuse to relinquish the starting assumption that an independently existing physical world is the cause of our experiences. But you seem to stop short of the last step. Assume physicalism: this leads to the inference that all the evidence for physicalism and for an external world is unreliable and all perception and thought that seems to refer is unreliable and so your only reliable knowledge is that of ephemeral thoughts that in all probability have no meaning. That "last step" is one of the points I try to make in my posts. BUT, I have a further point. Which is: Let's say we add two more supplemental "axiomatic" assumptions: 1) "The Physical World Hypothesis" - a physical world exists independently of us and causes our experiences. 2) "The Honest Universe Hypothesis" - our experiences tell us something true about this physical world...we're not in a "Matrix" universe. Now we can claim to have reliable knowledge about the physical world. But so what? This knowledge is purely a function of the initial conditions and physical laws of this world. Either the initial conditions were just right to allow us this knowledge, OR the physical laws are such that a wide variety of initial conditions will ultimately "converge" with the result that conscious entities have this knowledge. Either the initial conditions were fine-tuned or the physical laws were fine-tuned to produce reliable knowledge. What happened to "...a wide variety of initial conditions will ultimately "converge" with the result that conscious entities have this knowledge." That's contrary to "fine-tuning". Regardless, why is this kind of "reliable knowledge" more desirable than the reliable knowledge of ephemeral thoughts? You seem to imply that it is "better". Why? There is no "knowledge of ephemeral thoughts". Knowledge, by definition is a kind of thought that refers, but emphemeral thoughts don't refer. So they cannot be knowledge. It seems to me that both kinds of knowledge are equally meaningless. In either case, the only possible meaning is subjective. Subjective as compared to what? A meaningless physical world, or meaningless ephemeral thoughts. Take your pick. I already did. So...you'd rather be a material cog in a (deterministic or probabilistic) rule-driven physical machine than an insubstantial entity composed entirely of ephemeral thoughts. I'd rather be system that interacts with a universe of physical systems and thereby form thoughts correlated with the rest of the universe. I dont' think "physical" adds anything - it's just a word that indicates some external reality. Why do you find it preferable to be dreamer? I wonder why you have that preference? What causes you to be that way? The laws of physics and reality. I don't see any significant difference in the two options. You don't see a theory can be useful? I incline towards the later because I know that my conscious experiences exist, and I don't see how positing an inferred-but-unexplained physical world which somehow causes my experiences adds anything "useful". So are your thoughts all miracles? Tangentially: isn't your claim that you are only interested in theory to the extent that it is "useful", essentially a skeptical position? That's not my only interest in theories, but it's one. What are your other interests with respect to theories? Coherence, scope, simplicity. Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: The 'no miracles' argument against scientific realism
On Thu, May 13, 2010 at 1:16 AM, Brent Meeker wrote: > On 5/12/2010 9:48 PM, Rex Allen wrote: >> >> I commented on Sean Carroll's position on "Cognative Instability" in >> "The Past Hypothesis" thread. Cognative instability is only a problem >> if you refuse to relinquish the starting assumption that an >> independently existing physical world is the cause of our experiences. >> > > But you seem to stop short of the last step. Assume physicalism: this leads > to the inference that all the evidence for physicalism and for an external > world is unreliable and all perception and thought that seems to refer is > unreliable and so your only reliable knowledge is that of ephemeral thoughts > that in all probability have no meaning. That "last step" is one of the points I try to make in my posts. BUT, I have a further point. Which is: Let's say we add two more supplemental "axiomatic" assumptions: 1) "The Physical World Hypothesis" - a physical world exists independently of us and causes our experiences. 2) "The Honest Universe Hypothesis" - our experiences tell us something true about this physical world...we're not in a "Matrix" universe. Now we can claim to have reliable knowledge about the physical world. But so what? This knowledge is purely a function of the initial conditions and physical laws of this world. Either the initial conditions were just right to allow us this knowledge, OR the physical laws are such that a wide variety of initial conditions will ultimately "converge" with the result that conscious entities have this knowledge. Either the initial conditions were fine-tuned or the physical laws were fine-tuned to produce reliable knowledge. Regardless, why is this kind of "reliable knowledge" more desirable than the reliable knowledge of ephemeral thoughts? You seem to imply that it is "better". Why? It seems to me that both kinds of knowledge are equally meaningless. In either case, the only possible meaning is subjective. A meaningless physical world, or meaningless ephemeral thoughts. Take your pick. So...you'd rather be a material cog in a (deterministic or probabilistic) rule-driven physical machine than an insubstantial entity composed entirely of ephemeral thoughts. I wonder why you have that preference? What causes you to be that way? I don't see any significant difference in the two options. I incline towards the later because I know that my conscious experiences exist, and I don't see how positing an inferred-but-unexplained physical world which somehow causes my experiences adds anything "useful". >> Tangentially: isn't your claim that you are only interested in theory >> to the extent that it is "useful", essentially a skeptical position? >> > > That's not my only interest in theories, but it's one. What are your other interests with respect to theories? -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: The 'no miracles' argument against scientific realism
On 5/12/2010 9:48 PM, Rex Allen wrote: On Tue, May 11, 2010 at 10:29 PM, Brent Meeker wrote: I'm confused about your theory of this, Rex. You talk about "honest" vs "dishonest:" universes and how the initial conditions must determine what theories we have about the universe This point about initial conditions and causal laws "determining" what follows, including our discovery of various theories, is reasonable isn't it? IF you assume a physicalist view of reality, of course. and since there are a lot more dishonest ones than honest (a point not in evidence) we have no reason to believe our theories of the universe. So the "no miracles" part of my title is a reference to Hilary Putnam's observation: “The positive argument for realism is that it is the only philosophy that doesn't make the success of science a miracle” This is discussed here: http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/structural-realism/ As to my statement that "It seems to me that this set of deceptive universes is likely much larger than the set of honest universes", my reasoning is: 1) If we assume physicalism/materialism 2) and if we assume that a computer simulation of a brain+environment would give rise to the same conscious experience as a real brain in a real environment (i.e. multiple realizability) 3) Next, we know that there are infinitely many different Turing machines capable of running any given computer simulation. 4) We can therefore conceive of a universe containing nothing but an implementation of such a Turing machine. 5) And we can therefore conceive of infinitely many universes, each containing a different Turing machine that runs the same "brain simulation" program. 6) Therefore it's conceivable that there could be infinitely many of these deceptive universes running "Matrix"-style simulations of *any* "honest" universe. So how many honest universes can there be that will "honestly" generate our conscious experiences? I would think that the more accurate our observations become, the fewer universes there are that can honestly generate them... With maximumly accurate observations, then only 1 universe (and it's exact duplicates) could honestly generate those observations. Though maybe we get into quantum uncertainty issues here. But then you cite Schulze and Kant who contend that you have no reason to think there is a universe or causal laws or anything except your cognitions. Well, Kant contended that we had good reason to believe that a noumenal world existed...but that we couldn't know anything about it beyond the fact of it's existence. He explicitly addressed this in the "Refutation of Idealism" which he added to the second edition of A Critique of Pure Reason (1787) to avoid the charge that his Transcendental Idealism was just a variation of Berkeleyan Idealism. Schulze basically showed that Kant's arguments against Cartesian Doubt, Berkeleyan Idealism, and Humean Skepticism didn't go through. According to Schulze, Kant's arguments end up strengthening the case for these views, instead of countering them. Interestingly, one of the reviewers of Schulze's Aenesidemus was Johann Fichte (1764-1814), who came to this conclusion: "Fichte did not endorse Kant's argument for the existence of noumena, of 'things in themselves', the supra-sensible reality beyond the categories of human reason. Fichte saw the rigorous and systematic separation of 'things in themselves' (noumena) and things 'as they appear to us' (phenomena) as an invitation to skepticism. Rather than invite such skepticism, Fichte made the radical suggestion that we should throw out the notion of a noumenal world and instead accept the fact that consciousness does not have a grounding in a so-called 'real world'. In fact, Fichte achieved fame for originating the argument that consciousness is not grounded in anything outside of itself." So. There's nothing new under the sun... You can't draw any conclusions about probability from that. Before you can count up the infinite number of "Matrix" universes and Boltzmann brains, you need to suppose there is something beyond your own thoughts. So I guess in the future I need to be more clear about where I'm assuming physicalism to make arguments against it. I'm not actually arguing that "Matrix" universes and Boltzmann brains exist. I'm saying that IF we assume Physicalism, I don't see how we can rule out Matrix universes and Boltzmann brains, except by fiat. They seem to be "likely" consequences of Physicalist assumptions. As likely as the mainstream physicalist conclusions that the world really is (generally) as it appears to be. Only because you think cardinality is a measure. I commented on Sean Carroll's position on "Cognative Instability" in "The Past Hypothesis" thread. Cognative instability is only a problem if you refuse to relinquish the starting assumption that an independently existing physical world is the cause of
Re: The 'no miracles' argument against scientific realism
On Tue, May 11, 2010 at 10:29 PM, Brent Meeker wrote: > > I'm confused about your theory of this, Rex. You talk about "honest" vs > "dishonest:" universes and how the initial conditions must determine what > theories we have about the universe This point about initial conditions and causal laws "determining" what follows, including our discovery of various theories, is reasonable isn't it? IF you assume a physicalist view of reality, of course. > and since there are a lot more dishonest > ones than honest (a point not in evidence) we have no reason to believe our > theories of the universe. So the "no miracles" part of my title is a reference to Hilary Putnam's observation: “The positive argument for realism is that it is the only philosophy that doesn't make the success of science a miracle” This is discussed here: http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/structural-realism/ As to my statement that "It seems to me that this set of deceptive universes is likely much larger than the set of honest universes", my reasoning is: 1) If we assume physicalism/materialism 2) and if we assume that a computer simulation of a brain+environment would give rise to the same conscious experience as a real brain in a real environment (i.e. multiple realizability) 3) Next, we know that there are infinitely many different Turing machines capable of running any given computer simulation. 4) We can therefore conceive of a universe containing nothing but an implementation of such a Turing machine. 5) And we can therefore conceive of infinitely many universes, each containing a different Turing machine that runs the same "brain simulation" program. 6) Therefore it's conceivable that there could be infinitely many of these deceptive universes running "Matrix"-style simulations of *any* "honest" universe. So how many honest universes can there be that will "honestly" generate our conscious experiences? I would think that the more accurate our observations become, the fewer universes there are that can honestly generate them... With maximumly accurate observations, then only 1 universe (and it's exact duplicates) could honestly generate those observations. Though maybe we get into quantum uncertainty issues here. > But then you cite Schulze and Kant who contend > that you have no reason to think there is a universe or causal laws or > anything except your cognitions. Well, Kant contended that we had good reason to believe that a noumenal world existed...but that we couldn't know anything about it beyond the fact of it's existence. He explicitly addressed this in the "Refutation of Idealism" which he added to the second edition of A Critique of Pure Reason (1787) to avoid the charge that his Transcendental Idealism was just a variation of Berkeleyan Idealism. Schulze basically showed that Kant's arguments against Cartesian Doubt, Berkeleyan Idealism, and Humean Skepticism didn't go through. According to Schulze, Kant's arguments end up strengthening the case for these views, instead of countering them. Interestingly, one of the reviewers of Schulze's Aenesidemus was Johann Fichte (1764-1814), who came to this conclusion: "Fichte did not endorse Kant's argument for the existence of noumena, of 'things in themselves', the supra-sensible reality beyond the categories of human reason. Fichte saw the rigorous and systematic separation of 'things in themselves' (noumena) and things 'as they appear to us' (phenomena) as an invitation to skepticism. Rather than invite such skepticism, Fichte made the radical suggestion that we should throw out the notion of a noumenal world and instead accept the fact that consciousness does not have a grounding in a so-called 'real world'. In fact, Fichte achieved fame for originating the argument that consciousness is not grounded in anything outside of itself." So. There's nothing new under the sun... > You can't draw any conclusions about > probability from that. Before you can count up the infinite number of > "Matrix" universes and Boltzmann brains, you need to suppose there is > something beyond your own thoughts. So I guess in the future I need to be more clear about where I'm assuming physicalism to make arguments against it. I'm not actually arguing that "Matrix" universes and Boltzmann brains exist. I'm saying that IF we assume Physicalism, I don't see how we can rule out Matrix universes and Boltzmann brains, except by fiat. They seem to be "likely" consequences of Physicalist assumptions. As likely as the mainstream physicalist conclusions that the world really is (generally) as it appears to be. I commented on Sean Carroll's position on "Cognative Instability" in "The Past Hypothesis" thread. Cognative instability is only a problem if you refuse to relinquish the starting assumption that an independently existing physical world is the cause of our experiences. > And I doubt you've had an infinite > number of thoughts about anything. If physicalism and
Re: The 'no miracles' argument against scientific realism
On 5/11/2010 4:18 PM, Rex Allen wrote: On Thu, Apr 15, 2010 at 11:01 PM, rexallen...@gmail.com wrote: Let's assume that our best scientific theories tell us something true about the way the world *really* is, in an ontological sense. And further, for simplicity, let's assume a deterministic interpretation of those theories. In this view, the universe as we know it began ~13.7 billion years ago. We'll set aside any questions about what, if anything, preceded the first instant and just draw a line there and call that our "initial state". Given the specifics of that initial state, plus the particular causal laws of physics that we have, the universe can only evolve along one path. The state of the universe at this moment is entirely determined by two, and only two, things: its initial state and its casual laws. But this means that the development of our scientific theories *about* the universe was also entirely determined by the initial state of the universe and it's causal laws. Our discovery of the true nature of the universe has to have been "baked into" the structure of the universe in its first instant. By comparison, how many sets of *possible* initial states plus causal laws are there that would give rise to conscious entities who develop *false* scientific theories about their universe? It seems to me that this set of "deceptive" universes is likely much larger than the set of "honest" universes. What would make universes with honest initial conditions + causal laws more probable than deceptive ones? For every honest universe it would seem possible to have an infinite number of deceptive universes that are the equivalent of "The Matrix" - they give rise to conscious entities who have convincing but incorrect beliefs about how their universe really is. These entities' beliefs are based on perceptions that are only illusions, or simulations (naturally occurring or intelligently designed), or hallucinations, or dreams. It seems to me that it would be a bit of a miracle if it turned out that we lived in a universe whose initial state and causal laws were such that they gave rise to conscious entities whose beliefs about their universe were true beliefs. Note that Gottlob Ernst Schulze made a similar point in Aenesidemus (1792): “Where do the representations that we possess originate, and how do they come to be in us? This has been for a long time one of the most important questions in philosophy. Common opinion has rightly held that, since the representations in us are not the objects themselves being represented, the connection between our representations and the things outside us must be established above all by a careful and sound answer to this question. It is in this way that certitude must be sought regarding the reality of the different components of our knowledge. [...] As determined by the Critique of Pure Reason, the function of the principle of causality thus undercuts all philosophizing about the where or how of the origin of our cognitions. All assertions on the matter, and every conclusion drawn from them, become empty subtleties, for once we accept that determination of the principle as our rule of thought, we could never ask, ‘Does anything actually exist which is the ground and cause of our representations?’ We can only ask, ‘How must the understanding join these representations together, in keeping with the pre-determined functions of its activity, in order to gather them as one experience?’” I'm confused about your theory of this, Rex. You talk about "honest" vs "dishonest:" universes and how the initial conditions must determine what theories we have about the universe and since there are a lot more dishonest ones than honest (a point not in evidence) we have no reason to believe our theories of the universe. But then you cite Schulze and Kant who contend that you have no reason to think there is a universe or causal laws or anything except your cognitions. You can't draw any conclusions about probability from that. Before you can count up the infinite number of "Matrix" universes and Boltzmann brains, you need to suppose there is something beyond your own thoughts. And I doubt you've had an infinite number of thoughts about anything. Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: The 'no miracles' argument against scientific realism
On Thu, Apr 15, 2010 at 11:01 PM, rexallen...@gmail.com wrote: > Let's assume that our best scientific theories tell us something true > about the way the world *really* is, in an ontological sense. And > further, for simplicity, let's assume a deterministic interpretation > of those theories. > > In this view, the universe as we know it began ~13.7 billion years > ago. We'll set aside any questions about what, if anything, preceded > the first instant and just draw a line there and call that our > "initial state". > > Given the specifics of that initial state, plus the particular causal > laws of physics that we have, the universe can only evolve along one > path. The state of the universe at this moment is entirely determined > by two, and only two, things: its initial state and its casual laws. > > But this means that the development of our scientific theories *about* > the universe was also entirely determined by the initial state of the > universe and it's causal laws. Our discovery of the true nature of > the universe has to have been "baked into" the structure of the > universe in its first instant. > > By comparison, how many sets of *possible* initial states plus causal > laws are there that would give rise to conscious entities who develop > *false* scientific theories about their universe? It seems to me that > this set of "deceptive" universes is likely much larger than the set > of "honest" universes. > > What would make universes with honest initial conditions + causal laws > more probable than deceptive ones? For every honest universe it would > seem possible to have an infinite number of deceptive universes that > are the equivalent of "The Matrix" - they give rise to conscious > entities who have convincing but incorrect beliefs about how their > universe really is. These entities' beliefs are based on perceptions > that are only illusions, or simulations (naturally occurring or > intelligently designed), or hallucinations, or dreams. > > It seems to me that it would be a bit of a miracle if it turned out > that we lived in a universe whose initial state and causal laws were > such that they gave rise to conscious entities whose beliefs about > their universe were true beliefs. Note that Gottlob Ernst Schulze made a similar point in Aenesidemus (1792): “Where do the representations that we possess originate, and how do they come to be in us? This has been for a long time one of the most important questions in philosophy. Common opinion has rightly held that, since the representations in us are not the objects themselves being represented, the connection between our representations and the things outside us must be established above all by a careful and sound answer to this question. It is in this way that certitude must be sought regarding the reality of the different components of our knowledge. [...] As determined by the Critique of Pure Reason, the function of the principle of causality thus undercuts all philosophizing about the where or how of the origin of our cognitions. All assertions on the matter, and every conclusion drawn from them, become empty subtleties, for once we accept that determination of the principle as our rule of thought, we could never ask, ‘Does anything actually exist which is the ground and cause of our representations?’ We can only ask, ‘How must the understanding join these representations together, in keeping with the pre-determined functions of its activity, in order to gather them as one experience?’” -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: The 'no miracles' argument against scientific realism
On 20 Apr 2010, at 05:22, Rex Allen wrote: On Sun, Apr 18, 2010 at 2:48 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 18 Apr 2010, at 03:15, rexallen...@gmail.com wrote: I agree in theory, though I still hold to my "consciousness is fundamental and uncaused" mantra! Would you agree that the distribution of prime numbers is "uncaused". I would say that anyone starting with the same assumptions and using the same rules of inference would reach the same conclusions. OK, but only if they are searching all conclusions. If not they could as well get very different theorems. I would not go so far as to say that the assumptions, rules of inference, OR conclusions exist, except as objects of thought. I guess you mean "don't exist". I am OK with that. Those things exists at higher epistemological level, than the basic "Ex" in the base theory. I can understand that consciousness is fundamental, and "uncaused". Yet it is explainable in term of simpler things, like numbers and elementary operations, in term of high level self-consistency. I agree that I can use numbers to represent and model aspects of what I perceive, but this falls far short of "explaining" consciousness. Actually I was slightly wrong, and consciousness is more better explained in term of true self-consistency. This is enough to make consciousness not descfribable by anything in a thurd person way. The theory explains consciousness including why we cannot explain consciousness in any third person way. consciousness is only livable, never describable. Like the first person, well, like all hypostases in which the letter "p" appears without the scope of an arithmetical modality. In the DM theory, consciousness is fundamental, yet not primary. You can 'almost' define consciousness by the unconscious, or instinctive, or automated inference of self-consistency, or of a reality (it is more or less equivalent in DM). Fundamental but not primary. Hmmm. That sounds interesting, but I'm not sure what you mean by it. Fundamental means that it plays a big role. Primary means that we use the notion undefined in the starting postulate. If you only know numbers as they appear in your conscious thoughts, how is it possible to conclude that they are more "primal" than the only medium in which you know them to exist? I don't know if anything exist. We cannot know if a theory is true. But I have been convinced of the truth of elementary arithmetic in high school, and it is a subtheory of all fundamental theories. If only two things exist, numbers and consciousness, in some relationship to each other, how do you decide which is first and which is second? Numbers cause thought. Thought causes numbers. Why prefer one over the other? Because no theory can explain the numbers without postulating them. This is the failure of logicism. Then comp explains consciousness from number, including why a gap has to remain. It explains why all universal numbers arrive at that conclusion from logic + self- introspection. If they're co-equal, then it's two sides of the same coin... For numbers, you need just "0", successors, addition and multiplication. Then consciousness is explained by the self- referential abilities of universal numbers (Löbian numbers). This explain consciousness (cf the 8 hypostases) and this include matter and the relation matter/consciousness, and this in a testable way. It is the whole coupling consciousness/realities which can be explained by addition and multiplication (or abstraction and application, etc.) once we bet on DM. Again you use the word "explained". But I think you mean "described". Hmm... You may say "meta-describe", given that the theory prevent consciousness to be described, or even associate to any finite things in a 1-1 way. It is like "truth"; no machine can describe its truth predicate. There are none. Consciousness is fractal and beyond description. This explain the usual difficulties people have with that concept. Privately, by contrast, we can know some truth (like I'm conscious), but we can never communicate them as such. Can anything fundamental ever be communicated to someone not already possessing knowledge of it? You are right. In that sense, numbers are like consciousness. But numbers are far simpler, and we can, and usually do, agree on the axioms they have to obey. That is hardly the case for consciousness. I already said this, and you answered me that you are not searching a theory, just asserting consciousness is primary. No problem with that. It means we are not doing the same kind of research. I don't *propose* a theory of mind or of matter, I derive them from the digital mechanist assumption. More exactly I provide an argumentation showing why we HAVE TO derive them from that assumption, and in AUDA, I show precisely how to derive them, and give the first results wh
Re: The 'no miracles' argument against scientific realism
On Sun, Apr 18, 2010 at 2:48 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: > > On 18 Apr 2010, at 03:15, rexallen...@gmail.com wrote: >> I agree in theory, though I still hold to my "consciousness is >> fundamental and uncaused" mantra! > > > Would you agree that the distribution of prime numbers is "uncaused". I would say that anyone starting with the same assumptions and using the same rules of inference would reach the same conclusions. I would not go so far as to say that the assumptions, rules of inference, OR conclusions exist, except as objects of thought. > I can understand that consciousness is fundamental, and "uncaused". Yet it > is explainable in term of simpler things, like numbers and elementary > operations, in term of high level self-consistency. I agree that I can use numbers to represent and model aspects of what I perceive, but this falls far short of "explaining" consciousness. > In the DM theory, consciousness is fundamental, yet not primary. You can > 'almost' define consciousness by the unconscious, or instinctive, or > automated inference of self-consistency, or of a reality (it is more or less > equivalent in DM). Fundamental but not primary. Hmmm. That sounds interesting, but I'm not sure what you mean by it. If you only know numbers as they appear in your conscious thoughts, how is it possible to conclude that they are more "primal" than the only medium in which you know them to exist? If only two things exist, numbers and consciousness, in some relationship to each other, how do you decide which is first and which is second? Numbers cause thought. Thought causes numbers. Why prefer one over the other? If they're co-equal, then it's two sides of the same coin... > It is the whole coupling consciousness/realities which can be explained by > addition and multiplication (or abstraction and application, etc.) once we > bet on DM. Again you use the word "explained". But I think you mean "described". > Privately, by contrast, we can know some truth (like I'm conscious), but we > can never communicate them as such. Can anything fundamental ever be communicated to someone not already possessing knowledge of it? -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: The 'no miracles' argument against scientific realism
On 18 Apr 2010, at 03:15, rexallen...@gmail.com wrote: On Apr 16, 4:02 am, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 16 Apr 2010, at 05:01, rexallen...@gmail.com wrote: What would make universes with honest initial conditions + causal laws more probable than deceptive ones? For every honest universe it would seem possible to have an infinite number of deceptive universes that are the equivalent of "The Matrix" - they give rise to conscious entities who have convincing but incorrect beliefs about how their universe really is. These entities' beliefs are based on perceptions that are only illusions, or simulations (naturally occurring or intelligently designed), or hallucinations, or dreams. It seems to me that it would be a bit of a miracle if it turned out that we lived in a universe whose initial state and causal laws were such that they gave rise to conscious entities whose beliefs about their universe were true beliefs. That is the whole problem. The revenge of Descartes Malin génie. But the UDA shows that the honest universe, below our substitution level is a sum on all the fiction, and that sums is unique, if defined. The logic of self-reference shows at least that the measure 1 is well defined and obeys no classical, quantum-like, logic. I agree in theory, though I still hold to my "consciousness is fundamental and uncaused" mantra! Would you agree that the distribution of prime numbers is "uncaused". I can understand that consciousness is fundamental, and "uncaused". Yet it is explainable in term of simpler things, like numbers and elementary operations, in term of high level self-consistency. Physical causality, like moral responsibility, is a high level emergent notion, in the mechanist theory. Sometimes it seems as though I can interpret what you say as being compatible with that view, and sometimes not. Maybe we're looking at two sides of the same coin...but maybe we're not... I am a logician. All I say is that IF we are digitally emulable THEN the laws of physics emerge (in this precise way ...). It makes the Digital Mechanist theory (DM, alias Comp) experimentally testable (and confirmed by QM up to now). In the DM theory, consciousness is fundamental, yet not primary. You can 'almost' define consciousness by the unconscious, or instinctive, or automated inference of self-consistency, or of a reality (it is more or less equivalent in DM). It is the whole coupling consciousness/realities which can be explained by addition and multiplication (or abstraction and application, etc.) once we bet on DM. You say to Skeletori: It seems to me that for every possible universe there are an infinite number of possible "deceptive" simulations of it. This is very plausible. But for the universe being simulated, there is only one possible "honest" instance of it. This is ambiguous. IF QM is correct, you have to simulate infinitely many similar computations, multiplying locally the local version of the cosmos (unless P = NP, etc. ). The normal (Gaussian) branch or reality win the measure battle by being stabilizing on some dovetail on the reals (or complexes, quaternions, octonions). If just DM is correct, you cannot simulate the physical reality: it is only an appearance coming from the first person plural indeterminacy (as seen by relative universal numbers). This follows from the UD Argument. So...if we assume that physicalism/materialism is true, it would seem that we should also assume that our perceptions don't tell us anything about the true underlying nature of reality. Yes. At best, our perceptions only tell us about the rules of our (probably naturally occuring) simulation. What we perceive ABOVE our substitution level is a probable and contingent universal (in Post-Church-Turing sense) neighborhood. They all exist in elementary arithmetic. What we 'perceive' below our substitution level has to result from a sum on all (relative) computations going through my current computational states. Self-reference logic can justify the symmetric and linear aspect of the bottom. (genuine stable consciousness seems to need depth and linearity). Depth = 'intrinsic long computation': it makes us 'absolutely RARE'. Linearity is eventually responsible for the multiplications and the contagiousness of multiplication, and for the appearance of first person PLURAL points of view. It makes us relatively NUMEROUS. But more likely, our perceptions only tell us about our perceptions...and it's a mistake to infer anything further with respect to ontology. I would say that we can infer theories, and they work or not in some spectrum. But we cannot derive any ontological certainty. So it is simpler to assume the simplest ontology possible, and derive higher notions, like Plotinus' hypostases (including quanta and qualia) from it. In science we can never know when we are true, but we can communicate and refut
Re: The 'no miracles' argument against scientific realism
On Apr 16, 6:29 am, Skeletori wrote: > On Apr 16, 6:01 am, "rexallen...@gmail.com" > wrote: > > > What would make universes with honest initial conditions + causal laws > > more probable than deceptive ones? For every honest universe it would > > seem possible to have an infinite number of deceptive universes that > > are the equivalent of "The Matrix" - they give rise to conscious > > entities who have convincing but incorrect beliefs about how their > > universe really is. These entities' beliefs are based on perceptions > > that are only illusions, or simulations (naturally occurring or > > intelligently designed), or hallucinations, or dreams. > > > It seems to me that it would be a bit of a miracle if it turned out > > that we lived in a universe whose initial state and causal laws were > > such that they gave rise to conscious entities whose beliefs about > > their universe were true beliefs. > > I agree, if the initial conditions and laws are complex enough that > the Matrix is directly baked there. Assuming physicalism, the complexity we see around us had to come from somewhere, right? And there are only two choices: either the initial conditions, or the causal laws (which may have a probablistic aspect). > If we want to talk about > probabilities we'd need to assign some measure to possible universes, > and most of the mass will be concentrated on the simple universes. > However, "simple" in this case doesn't mean much and wouldn't preclude > Matrix-like universes. Indeed! "Peter van Inwagen proposed a rather peculiar answer to the question why there exists anything at all. His reasoning is as follows. there may exist an infinite number of worlds full of diverse beings, but only one empty world. Therefore the probability of the empty world is zero, while the probability of a (non-empty) is one. This apparently simple reasoning is based on very strong an essentially arbitrary assumptions. First of all, that there may exist an infinite number of worlds (that they have at least a potential existence); secondly, that probability theory as we know it may be applied to them (in other words that probability theory is in a sense aprioristic with respect to these worlds); and thirdly, that they come into being on the principle of 'greater probability.' The following question may be put with respect to this mental construct: 'Why does it exist, rather than nothing?'" - Michael Heller > It's even worse when you consider how much more likely it is that we > live in a simulation :). Although, for every simulated world there's a > possible universe with the exact same structure, so it might be > difficult to distinguish between the two, even in principle. It seems to me that for every possible universe there are an infinite number of possible "deceptive" simulations of it. But for the universe being simulated, there is only one possible "honest" instance of it. So...if we assume that physicalism/materialism is true, it would seem that we should also assume that our perceptions don't tell us anything about the true underlying nature of reality. At best, our perceptions only tell us about the rules of our (probably naturally occuring) simulation. But more likely, our perceptions only tell us about our perceptions...and it's a mistake to infer anything further with respect to ontology. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: The 'no miracles' argument against scientific realism
On Apr 16, 4:02 am, Bruno Marchal wrote: > On 16 Apr 2010, at 05:01, rexallen...@gmail.com wrote: > > > What would make universes with honest initial conditions + causal laws > > more probable than deceptive ones? For every honest universe it would > > seem possible to have an infinite number of deceptive universes that > > are the equivalent of "The Matrix" - they give rise to conscious > > entities who have convincing but incorrect beliefs about how their > > universe really is. These entities' beliefs are based on perceptions > > that are only illusions, or simulations (naturally occurring or > > intelligently designed), or hallucinations, or dreams. > > > It seems to me that it would be a bit of a miracle if it turned out > > that we lived in a universe whose initial state and causal laws were > > such that they gave rise to conscious entities whose beliefs about > > their universe were true beliefs. > > That is the whole problem. The revenge of Descartes Malin génie. > > But the UDA shows that the honest universe, below our substitution > level is a sum on all the fiction, and that sums is unique, if > defined. The logic of self-reference shows at least that the measure 1 > is well defined and obeys no classical, quantum-like, logic. I agree in theory, though I still hold to my "consciousness is fundamental and uncaused" mantra! Sometimes it seems as though I can interpret what you say as being compatible with that view, and sometimes not. Maybe we're looking at two sides of the same coin...but maybe we're not... > PS I do have some serious Mail problem yesterderday, so in absence of > answer, it means that I did not get your mail. Sorry. All is well! -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: The 'no miracles' argument against scientific realism
On Fri, Apr 16, 2010 at 9:51 AM, Jason Resch wrote: > > On Thu, Apr 15, 2010 at 10:01 PM, rexallen...@gmail.com > wrote: >> >> What would make universes with honest initial conditions + causal laws >> more probable than deceptive ones? For every honest universe it would >> seem possible to have an infinite number of deceptive universes that >> are the equivalent of "The Matrix" - they give rise to conscious >> entities who have convincing but incorrect beliefs about how their >> universe really is. These entities' beliefs are based on perceptions >> that are only illusions, or simulations (naturally occurring or >> intelligently designed), or hallucinations, or dreams. >> > > One reason might be that for life to evolve, and therefore lead to conscious > observers, the process of life must be able to "learn" true or approximately > true laws of physics. While true there are more possible ways to imagine > yourself being in some simulated or dream-like environment, consider the > possibilities that get you there. In a universe without evolution the > initial condition must be that sophisticated reality generating environment, > of which there are very few. Why do you say there are very few? Again, it seems to me that for any "honest" universe, there would be an infinite number of "deceptive" universes that mimic it's appearance. Unless you have some reason to exclude universes like I described in my response to Brent. > However in a universe with evolution, the > initial condition can be a more or less random arrangement of particles, for > which there are far more possibilities. FIRST: Evolution doesn't add anything. It's all in the initial conditions and causal laws. In a determinisitic universe, things can only happen one way. Evolution is just a label that we put on the way that they appear to have happened in our universe. Evolution is a description, not an explanation. SECOND: Your statement is only true if our causal laws are such that any random starting conditions lead to conscious life. But there all that you've done is moved the "specialness" from the initial conditions to the causal laws. You are claiming that our universe has a "special" set of causal laws that can start with nearly any random arrangement of matter and end up with conscious life that will be able to perceive true things about their universe. A good analogy would be the quicksort algorithm, which can start with any randomly arranged list and always produce a sorted list from it. BUT, the quicksort algorithm is special. If you just randomly generate programs and try to run them, the probability of getting one that will correctly sort any unordered list must be very low compared to the probability of getting a program that won't do anything useful at all, or sorts the list incorrectly, or sorts it very inefficiently. Equivalently, if you just randomly chose sets of causal laws, the probability of selecting a set of laws that can start from almost any random arrangement of matter and from that always produce conscious life that perceives true things about the laws that gave rise to it must also be very low. Right? -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: The 'no miracles' argument against scientific realism
On Thu, Apr 15, 2010 at 11:41 PM, Brent Meeker wrote: > On 4/15/2010 8:01 PM, rexallen...@gmail.com wrote: > >> Let's assume that our best scientific theories tell us something >> true about the way the world *really* is, in an ontological sense. >> And further, for simplicity, let's assume a deterministic >> interpretation of those theories. > > Haven't you heard? Almost all scientific theories are false; that's why we > keep changing them. First, I mean "scientific realism" in the sense described by this Wikipedia article: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Scientific_realism Which I'm not sure you are taking into account in your response. Second, you say "almost" all scientific theories are false. Which scientific theories do you believe are not false in a scientific realist sense? And third, I set the bar somewhat lower than you imply. A closer reading of my first sentence shows that I am only assuming that our best scientific theories tell us something true about the way the world really is (ontologically)...not that they are true in every respect. This would be in opposition to a purely empirical, Kantian, instrumentalist view that our scientific theories tell us about our perceptions without necessarily revealing anything about what really exists. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Instrumentalism >> It seems to me that it would be a bit of a miracle if it turned >> out that we lived in a universe whose initial state and causal >> laws were such that they gave rise to conscious entities >> whose beliefs about their universe were true beliefs. > > I think you need the concept of "approximately true", otherwise you will > conclude there are no true beliefs whatsoever - in which case "true" loses > all meaning. The approximation can be both in scope and accuracy. Then I > think it might be possible to show that all conscious entities arising > through deterministic evolution of the universe must have approximately true > beliefs. So given our current knowledge of the universe, it would seem that a computer simulation of a human brain would be conscious in the same way that I am conscious. Some kinds of 2-D cellular automata are Turing complete and thus could run such a simulation and also have a cache of data that could be fed into the brain simulation in a way that the simulated brain would interpret as sensory data from a surrounding environment. No simulation of the environment actually needs to be done, just time-indexed lookup tables of equivalent data. Going further, it seems possible that a very simple "physical" universe could exist with the bare minimum of furniture (e.g., 1 spatial dimension, 1 time dimension, only 1 type of particle that has 2 states, etc.) necessary to implement such a cellular automaton, and a single causal law that was the equivalent of Rule 110. Given the right initial conditions, this cellular automaton would give rise to a human consciousness whose beliefs about how his physical universe really was would be false. Only his beliefs about his perceptions would be true...e.g. "I believe that I'm having the experience of seeing 3 birds fly overhead" would be a true belief. However, "I believe that three birds flew overhead" would be a false belief...because there really are no birds in that universe (not even simulated ones). Also, since that universe only has 1 spatial dimension, there were be no "overhead" either. The birds and the extra two spatial dimensions would only exist in the mind of the simulated brain. They would only exist within his perception, not external and independent of it. SO...it seems to me that it is NOT possible to show that all conscious entities arising through deterministic evolution of a universe must have approximately true beliefs. Unless you can show that the above scenario is impossible. A good XKCD comic that runs along similar lines! http://www.xkcd.com/505/ >> Note that a similar argument can also be made if we choose >> an indeterministic interpretation of our best scientific >> theories. > > Except in a stochastic universe another form of "approximately true" is > introduced: approximation in probability. Note that even if a universe is > deterministic, it may be strictly unpredictable because at any give time > only a portion of the initial state can have affected us due to the finite > speed of light. So new and unpredictable information continually reaches > us. So this is operationally equivalent to inherent randomness. An interesting point. But I don't see that it changes any of the conclusions I drew in my initial post...do you? My central point is that if we are in a deterministic universe, then for us to have *any* true understanding of this universe, that understanding *must* have already been implicit and inevitable in the universe's first instant. Which doesn't seem probable if you were selecting a universe at random from the list of conceivable universes. The most common type of conceivable univers
Re: The 'no miracles' argument against scientific realism
On Thu, Apr 15, 2010 at 10:01 PM, rexallen...@gmail.com < rexallen...@gmail.com> wrote: > Let's assume that our best scientific theories tell us something true > about the way the world *really* is, in an ontological sense. And > further, for simplicity, let's assume a deterministic interpretation > of those theories. > > In this view, the universe as we know it began ~13.7 billion years > ago. We'll set aside any questions about what, if anything, preceded > the first instant and just draw a line there and call that our > "initial state". > > Given the specifics of that initial state, plus the particular causal > laws of physics that we have, the universe can only evolve along one > path. The state of the universe at this moment is entirely determined > by two, and only two, things: its initial state and its casual laws. > > But this means that the development of our scientific theories *about* > the universe was also entirely determined by the initial state of the > universe and it's causal laws. Our discovery of the true nature of > the universe has to have been "baked into" the structure of the > universe in its first instant. > > By comparison, how many sets of *possible* initial states plus causal > laws are there that would give rise to conscious entities who develop > *false* scientific theories about their universe? It seems to me that > this set of "deceptive" universes is likely much larger than the set > of "honest" universes. > > What would make universes with honest initial conditions + causal laws > more probable than deceptive ones? For every honest universe it would > seem possible to have an infinite number of deceptive universes that > are the equivalent of "The Matrix" - they give rise to conscious > entities who have convincing but incorrect beliefs about how their > universe really is. These entities' beliefs are based on perceptions > that are only illusions, or simulations (naturally occurring or > intelligently designed), or hallucinations, or dreams. > > One reason might be that for life to evolve, and therefore lead to conscious observers, the process of life must be able to "learn" true or approximately true laws of physics. While true there are more possible ways to imagine yourself being in some simulated or dream-like environment, consider the possibilities that get you there. In a universe without evolution the initial condition must be that sophisticated reality generating environment, of which there are very few. However in a universe with evolution, the initial condition can be a more or less random arrangement of particles, for which there are far more possibilities. Jason -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: The 'no miracles' argument against scientific realism
On Apr 16, 6:01 am, "rexallen...@gmail.com" wrote: > What would make universes with honest initial conditions + causal laws > more probable than deceptive ones? For every honest universe it would > seem possible to have an infinite number of deceptive universes that > are the equivalent of "The Matrix" - they give rise to conscious > entities who have convincing but incorrect beliefs about how their > universe really is. These entities' beliefs are based on perceptions > that are only illusions, or simulations (naturally occurring or > intelligently designed), or hallucinations, or dreams. > > It seems to me that it would be a bit of a miracle if it turned out > that we lived in a universe whose initial state and causal laws were > such that they gave rise to conscious entities whose beliefs about > their universe were true beliefs. I agree, if the initial conditions and laws are complex enough that the Matrix is directly baked there. If we want to talk about probabilities we'd need to assign some measure to possible universes, and most of the mass will be concentrated on the simple universes. However, "simple" in this case doesn't mean much and wouldn't preclude Matrix-like universes. It's even worse when you consider how much more likely it is that we live in a simulation :). Although, for every simulated world there's a possible universe with the exact same structure, so it might be difficult to distinguish between the two, even in principle. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: The 'no miracles' argument against scientific realism
On 16 Apr 2010, at 05:01, rexallen...@gmail.com wrote: What would make universes with honest initial conditions + causal laws more probable than deceptive ones? For every honest universe it would seem possible to have an infinite number of deceptive universes that are the equivalent of "The Matrix" - they give rise to conscious entities who have convincing but incorrect beliefs about how their universe really is. These entities' beliefs are based on perceptions that are only illusions, or simulations (naturally occurring or intelligently designed), or hallucinations, or dreams. It seems to me that it would be a bit of a miracle if it turned out that we lived in a universe whose initial state and causal laws were such that they gave rise to conscious entities whose beliefs about their universe were true beliefs. That is the whole problem. The revenge of Descartes Malin génie. But the UDA shows that the honest universe, below our substitution level is a sum on all the fiction, and that sums is unique, if defined. The logic of self-reference shows at least that the measure 1 is well defined and obeys no classical, quantum-like, logic. Bruno PS I do have some serious Mail problem yesterderday, so in absence of answer, it means that I did not get your mail. Sorry. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: The 'no miracles' argument against scientific realism
On 4/15/2010 8:01 PM, rexallen...@gmail.com wrote: Let's assume that our best scientific theories tell us something true about the way the world *really* is, in an ontological sense. And further, for simplicity, let's assume a deterministic interpretation of those theories. In this view, the universe as we know it began ~13.7 billion years ago. We'll set aside any questions about what, if anything, preceded the first instant and just draw a line there and call that our "initial state". Given the specifics of that initial state, plus the particular causal laws of physics that we have, the universe can only evolve along one path. The state of the universe at this moment is entirely determined by two, and only two, things: its initial state and its casual laws. But this means that the development of our scientific theories *about* the universe was also entirely determined by the initial state of the universe and it's causal laws. Our discovery of the true nature of the universe has to have been "baked into" the structure of the universe in its first instant. By comparison, how many sets of *possible* initial states plus causal laws are there that would give rise to conscious entities who develop *false* scientific theories about their universe? It seems to me that this set of "deceptive" universes is likely much larger than the set of "honest" universes. Haven't you heard? Almost all scientific theories are false; that's why we keep changing them. In fact a survey (that included medical research) found that 90% of the published, peer reviewed papers were contravened within ten years (I expect that excluding medical research would look better - but the trend would still hold). What would make universes with honest initial conditions + causal laws more probable than deceptive ones? For every honest universe it would seem possible to have an infinite number of deceptive universes that are the equivalent of "The Matrix" - they give rise to conscious entities who have convincing but incorrect beliefs about how their universe really is. These entities' beliefs are based on perceptions that are only illusions, or simulations (naturally occurring or intelligently designed), or hallucinations, or dreams. It seems to me that it would be a bit of a miracle if it turned out that we lived in a universe whose initial state and causal laws were such that they gave rise to conscious entities whose beliefs about their universe were true beliefs. I think you need the concept of "approximately true", otherwise you will conclude there are no true beliefs whatsoever - in which case "true" loses all meaning. The approximation can be both in scope and accuracy. Then I think it might be possible to show that all conscious entities arising through deterministic evolution of the universe must have approximately true beliefs. Note that a similar argument can also be made if we choose an indeterministic interpretation of our best scientific theories. Except in a stochastic universe another form of "approximately true" is introduced: approximation in probability. Note that even if a universe is deterministic, it may be strictly unpredictable because at any give time only a portion of the initial state can have affected us due to the finite speed of light. So new and unpredictable information continually reaches us. So this is operationally equivalent to inherent randomness. Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
The 'no miracles' argument against scientific realism
Let's assume that our best scientific theories tell us something true about the way the world *really* is, in an ontological sense. And further, for simplicity, let's assume a deterministic interpretation of those theories. In this view, the universe as we know it began ~13.7 billion years ago. We'll set aside any questions about what, if anything, preceded the first instant and just draw a line there and call that our "initial state". Given the specifics of that initial state, plus the particular causal laws of physics that we have, the universe can only evolve along one path. The state of the universe at this moment is entirely determined by two, and only two, things: its initial state and its casual laws. But this means that the development of our scientific theories *about* the universe was also entirely determined by the initial state of the universe and it's causal laws. Our discovery of the true nature of the universe has to have been "baked into" the structure of the universe in its first instant. By comparison, how many sets of *possible* initial states plus causal laws are there that would give rise to conscious entities who develop *false* scientific theories about their universe? It seems to me that this set of "deceptive" universes is likely much larger than the set of "honest" universes. What would make universes with honest initial conditions + causal laws more probable than deceptive ones? For every honest universe it would seem possible to have an infinite number of deceptive universes that are the equivalent of "The Matrix" - they give rise to conscious entities who have convincing but incorrect beliefs about how their universe really is. These entities' beliefs are based on perceptions that are only illusions, or simulations (naturally occurring or intelligently designed), or hallucinations, or dreams. It seems to me that it would be a bit of a miracle if it turned out that we lived in a universe whose initial state and causal laws were such that they gave rise to conscious entities whose beliefs about their universe were true beliefs. Note that a similar argument can also be made if we choose an indeterministic interpretation of our best scientific theories. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
