RE: Clarification of Terms (was RE: What We Can Know About the World)
John M: >To Searle's book-title: it implies that we already >HAVE discovered what the 'mind' is. Well, we did not. >At least not to the satisfaction of the advanced >thinking community. > >John M I think the name was a play the name of another book "The discovery of the mind" by Bruno Snell Searle's too smart to allude to literality like that. Indeed the whole book is about our lack of success in the quest. Vernumft ly yours :-) Colin
Re: Clarification of Terms (was RE: What We Can Know About the World)
Hi John, Le 01-août-05, à 16:57, John M a écrit : Also simulating menatlity from computer expressions seems reversing the fact that in comp (AI etc.) the computer science attempts to simulate certain and very limited items we already discovered from our "mind". Except that since Turing, Church, Godel ... we know that we don't know what is a computer. There are no theory capable of completely describing what they can or cannot do. Remember I insist that comp entails we cannot even know which machine we are, although we can bet on some substitution level in front of the doctor (for the worst or for the best). The discovery of computers makes us much more ignorant. Computers will make our lives much less easy. Hopefully more funny too but it depends in part from us (the human, here). Kind Regards, Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
RE: Clarification of Terms (was RE: What We Can Know About the World)
--- Lee Corbin <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > Russell writes > > > John M. wrote > > > > > To Russell's 4 coordinates of (any?) event: how > come > > > the occurrence (event!) of a 'good idea' in my > mind - > > > (mind: not a thing, not a place, not > time-restricted) > > > should have t,x,y,z coordinates? > > [Russell?] > > I would say that the event occurs in your brain > (the neural correlate > > of whatever is going on in your mind). Whatever > is going on in your > > mind is something else - an "observation" perhaps. > [JM]: I guess whatever is observable in your brainfunctions is not the event but its reflection. The event itself is the 'occurrence' what you deem 'observation', while you observe it only as it happenned. It is quite clear as you call the brain a "neural correlate", which makes it clear that it is not the originating, neither executing factor, just a correlate of such. Exactly the 'hard problem' since Kohler's Gestalt. I like the "correlate", it is pointing to the inseparability of the functions as we try to decipher them. To the translations in Russell's other post: I take translation = transfiguration, I read in 5 languages and saw 'good' translations with different meanings. Nothing beats the 'original' written in a mother-tongue John M
RE: Clarification of Terms (was RE: What We Can Know About the World)
Aditya writes > [LC]: > > Well, Russell did also say that OMs and events seemed to him about as > > alike as chalk and cheese. It's starting to look that way: > > > So, alas, it seems that the firmly established meanings of > > "event" and "observer moment" can't really be said to be at > > all the same thing. (Folks like Russell and Hal have been > > using the term "OM" for years and years, and "event" has > > a pretty standard meaning in physics.) Observer moments have > > to do with something conscious (and, evidently, pretty complex). > > And of course, as Hal wrote later on, consciousness exists on > > a gray scale. > > Then dare I say that any Theory based on this "restricted" definition > of OMs (happening to observers with consciousness/intelligence > "comparable" to ours) can never be as complete as a theory based on > the much simpler (and encompassing) notion of events. I am hugely sympathetic to the point of view you are proposing, namely that theories based on OMs do have inherent weaknesses, and are quite out of line with the progress sciences has shown historically. Most of the proponents of OM-based theories will succumb to the temptation to resort to introspection as an investigation tool. Yes, some will at all times keep flexibly in mind the realization that any OM explanation must be totally consistent with its dual event-based explanation. However, it's the eternal search for ever simpler more unifying explanation that fuels the search for a way to avoid another dualism (so it seems to me), the idea that mathematics and physics are separate. That is, they want to derive everything about physics from the platonic existence of mathematical patterns. > Ok, the above sounds a bit arrogant on my part, but its just that when > I think of Big things like ToEs, I am much more comfortable without > the burden of assuming that I am special in some way. If it were so, > It would either be too much of a coincidence, or some act of a God > that I can never hope to explain to myself. Yes, some of Wheeler's theories (e.g. an observer created universe) have this very characteristic: the observer (to me an immensely complicated machine, a johnny-come-lately in evolution) is placed at the center and deemed fundamental. But to be fair, the time-deniers (the math Platonists who seek everything explained by patterns) allow that all conscious, complex entities have non-trivial OMs. > I can only agree to disagree by saying that any theory that explains > consciousness in terms of something more than just "interference of > events" on a HUGE scale, is pretty much the same as explaining away > [coincidence] as acts of a God: that unreachable, unfathomable "entity". Yeah, well said. Lee
RE: Clarification of Terms (was RE: What We Can Know About the World)
To the quote of Lee's remark: I would try "Vernumft" (which may as well be similarly inaccurate for 'consciousness'). There were some German speaking souls(!) who used it quite effectively . I try for'mind':the mentality aspect of the living complexity which says not much more if 'mentality' is not properly identified. However referring to the complexity of the 'living creatures' it points to a function which is inseparable from the substrate it goes together with (brain and the rest of the world). So I would not agree with Baum as to the 'brain' running the program for thinking, which is a tool in the complexity 'running' in concert with the rest of it. Also simulating menatlity from computer expressions seems reversing the fact that in comp (AI etc.) the computer science attempts to simulate certain and very limited items we already discovered from our "mind". "Living" I use instead of "human", of course. But that comes from my generalization trend of terms beyond our human only pretension. To Searle's book-title: it implies that we already HAVE discovered what the 'mind' is. Well, we did not. At least not to the satisfaction of the advanced thinking community. John M --- "[EMAIL PROTECTED]" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > [Lee wrote:] > >Interesting note about "mind": there is no German > language > >equivalent for it. Another reason to be *very* > careful when > >employing it. possibility of > >Teutonic zombies elided.> > > > >In a very deep (but non-mathematical) book, "What > is Thought?" > >by Eric Baum, the author decides to use "mind" as > the name of > >the program the brain runs, and it seems to work > out well. > > > >Lee > > What is going on? Another book is quoted and it too > is right in front of me. I conclude there is a > hidden web cam somewhere in my office I love > causality. :) > > As regards the book contents. I have to go through > it in moiré detail but at first run through he makes > precisely the same mistakes as all the other > functionalists outlined so well in > > Searle J. R. 1992. The rediscovery of the mind. > Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press. xv, 270 p. > > Once again: A metaphor based on a lack of > imagination. The fallacy: that because our mind is > so adept at constructing ontologies that therefore > there is such things as 'things' in the universe. > There are ways of constructing 'thought' that have > no need for prescription of an ontology of any sort > yet appears to be so. Including Germans! > > Baum cannot make any empirical predictions of brain > matter. Nice read...but no progress has been made > except to shoehorn the received view into the > limelight. > > Are we ever going to get past this? > > Cheers > > Colin > >
Re: Clarification of Terms (was RE: What We Can Know About the World)
[LC]: > Well, Russell did also say that OMs and events seemed to him about as > alike as chalk and cheese. It's starting to look that way: > So, alas, it seems that the firmly established meanings of > "event" and "observer moment" can't really be said to be at > all the same thing. (Folks like Russell and Hal have been > using the term "OM" for years and years, and "event" has > a pretty standard meaning in physics.) Observer moments have > to do with something conscious (and, evidently, pretty complex). > And of course, as Hal wrote later on, consciousness exists on > a gray scale. Then dare I say that any Theory based on this "restricted" definition of OMs (happening to observers with consciousness/intelligence "comparable" to ours) can never be as complete as a theory based on the much simpler (and encompassing) notion of events. Ok, the above sounds a bit arrogant on my part, but its just that when I think of Big things like ToEs, I am much more comfortable without the burden of assuming that I am special in some way. If it were so, It would either be too much of a coincidence, or some act of a God that I can never hope to explain to myself. I can only agree to disagree by saying that any theory that explains consciousness in terms of something more than just "interference of events" on a HUGE scale, is pretty much the same as explaining away coincidents as acts of a God: that unreachable, unfathomable "entity". -- Aditya Varun Chadha adichad AT gmail.com http://www.adichad.com
RE: Clarification of Terms (was RE: What We Can Know About the World)
[Lee wrote:] >Interesting note about "mind": there is no German language >equivalent for it. Another reason to be *very* careful when >employing it. Teutonic zombies elided.> > >In a very deep (but non-mathematical) book, "What is Thought?" >by Eric Baum, the author decides to use "mind" as the name of >the program the brain runs, and it seems to work out well. > >Lee What is going on? Another book is quoted and it too is right in front of me. I conclude there is a hidden web cam somewhere in my office I love causality. :) As regards the book contents. I have to go through it in moiré detail but at first run through he makes precisely the same mistakes as all the other functionalists outlined so well in Searle J. R. 1992. The rediscovery of the mind. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press. xv, 270 p. Once again: A metaphor based on a lack of imagination. The fallacy: that because our mind is so adept at constructing ontologies that therefore there is such things as 'things' in the universe. There are ways of constructing 'thought' that have no need for prescription of an ontology of any sort yet appears to be so. Including Germans! Baum cannot make any empirical predictions of brain matter. Nice read...but no progress has been made except to shoehorn the received view into the limelight. Are we ever going to get past this? Cheers Colin
RE: Clarification of Terms (was RE: What We Can Know About the World)
[Lee wrote:] >Interesting note about "mind": there is no German language >equivalent for it. Another reason to be *very* careful when >employing it. Teutonic zombies elided.> > >In a very deep (but non-mathematical) book, "What is Thought?" >by Eric Baum, the author decides to use "mind" as the name of >the program the brain runs, and it seems to work out well. > >Lee What is going on? Another book is quoted and it too is right in front of me. I conclude there is a hidden web cam somewhere in my office I love causality. :) As regards the book contents. I have to go through it in moiré detail but at first run through he makes precisely the same mistakes as all the other functionalists outlined so well in Searle J. R. 1992. The rediscovery of the mind. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press. xv, 270 p. Once again: A metaphor based on a lack of imagination. The fallacy: that because our mind is so adept at constructing ontologies that therefore there is such things as 'things' in the universe. There are ways of constructing 'thought' that have no need for prescription of an ontology of any sort yet appears to be so. Including Germans! Baum cannot make any empirical predictions of brain matter. Nice read...but no progress has been made except to shoehorn the received view into the limelight. Are we ever going to get past this? Cheers Colin
RE: Clarification of Terms (was RE: What We Can Know About the World)
Lee wrote: >Interesting note about "mind": there is no German language >equivalent for it. Another reason to be *very* careful when >employing it. Teutonic zombies elided.> > >In a very deep (but non-mathematical) book, "What is Thought?" >by Eric Baum, the author decides to use "mind" as the name of >the program the brain runs, and it seems to work out well. > >Lee What is going on? Another book is quoted and it too is right in front of me. I conclude there is a hidden web cam somewhere in my office I love causality. :) As regards the book contents. I have to go through it in more detail but at first run through he makes precisely the same mistakes as all the other functionalists outlined so well in ... Searle J. R. 1992. The rediscovery of the mind. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press. Chapter 2 Once again: Baum formulates a metaphor based on a lack of imagination. The fallacy: that because our mind is so adept at constructing ontologies that therefore there is such things as 'things' in the universe. There are ways of constructing 'thought' that have no need for prescription of an ontology of any sort but where it can appear to be that way. Including Germans! Baum cannot make any empirical predictions of brain matter. Nice read...but no progress has been made except to shoehorn the received view into the limelight. Are we ever going to get past this? Cheers Colin
Re: Clarification of Terms (was RE: What We Can Know About the World)
On Sun, Jul 31, 2005 at 08:09:46PM -0700, Lee Corbin wrote:
>
> Interesting note about "mind": there is no German language
> equivalent for it. Another reason to be *very* careful when
> employing it. Teutonic zombies elided.>
>
I am surprised about that! The word "der Geist" sprang immediately to
mind as the translation.
According to my German/English disctionary, the relevant words were:
die Seele (psychology)
der Geist (intellect)
das Gemuet (feelings)
das? Lust (desire/inclination) (bsp ich habe Lust zu es machen)
So Geist or Seele would in fact be the closest translations to how I
used mind above. Similarly in French, the word esprit would be
used. In English, these two words have become corrupted to Ghost and
Spirit, meaning much the same thing as each in English, but somewhat
different to the original language meanings. In Seele becomes Soul in English.
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RE: Clarification of Terms (was RE: What We Can Know About the World)
Russell writes > John M. wrote > > > I believe if we are up to identifying concepts with > > common sense content as well, we should not restrict > > ourselves into the model-distinctions of (any) physics > > but generalize the meanings beyond such restrictions. I agree: that is, so long as we can smoothly extend the concepts from daily life without conflict with other areas of knowledge. > > To Russell's 4 coordinates of (any?) event: how come > > the occurrence (event!) of a 'good idea' in my mind - > > (mind: not a thing, not a place, not time-restricted) > > should have t,x,y,z coordinates? > > I would say that the event occurs in your brain (the neural correlate > of whatever is going on in your mind). Whatever is going on in your > mind is something else - an "observation" perhaps. Interesting note about "mind": there is no German language equivalent for it. Another reason to be *very* careful when employing it. In a very deep (but non-mathematical) book, "What is Thought?" by Eric Baum, the author decides to use "mind" as the name of the program the brain runs, and it seems to work out well. Lee
Re: Clarification of Terms (was RE: What We Can Know About the World)
On Sun, Jul 31, 2005 at 02:00:30PM -0700, John M wrote:
> I salute Lee's new subject designation.
>
> I believe if we are up to identifying concepts with
> common sense content as well, we should not restrict
> ourselves into the model-distinctions of (any) physics
> but generalize the meanings beyond such restrictions.
> Of course: I am no physicist. My apologies.
>
> To Russel's 4 coordinates of (any?) event: how come
> the occurrence (event!) of a 'good idea' in my mind -
> (mind: not a thing, not a place, not time-restricted)
> should have t,x,y,z coordinates?
>
> Naively yours
>
> John Mikes
>
I would say that the event occurs in your brain (the neural correlate
of whatever is going on in your mind). Whatever is going on in your
mind is something else - an "observation" perhaps.
I'm only pointing to my understanding of these terms - I'm willing to
change terminology if its useful to do so.
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Re: What We Can Know About the World
I would not be surprised if there were some sort of duality
relationship (note: mathematical term employed here) between observer
moment and event, appropriately defined, however it is unclear how one
might adjust the definitions I gave to illuminate such a duality.
Cheers
On Sun, Jul 31, 2005 at 10:44:17AM -0400, Stephen Paul King wrote:
> Hi Russel,
>
>A possibly related question. Given your definition of events and OMs,
> does it not seem that they complement each other, assuming that events have
> more quatities associated, such as 4-momentum-energy?
>
> Onward!
>
> Stephen
>
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RE: What We Can Know About the World
Brent writes > [Lee writes] > > [Jesse wrote] > > > Sure, but all of this is compatible with an idealist philosophy where > > > reality is made up of nothing but observer-moments at the most > > > fundamental level--something like the "naturalistic panpsychism" > > > discussed on that webpage I mentioned. > > > > The disagreement I have with what you have written > > is that I do *not* see observer-moments as the most > > fundamental entities. > > There are two distinct kinds of "fundamental". OMs may be epistemologically > fundamental, but not ontologically fundamental. We'll see about that! :-) > Starting with what we think we know, we develop a model > of reality which goes beyond what we directly experience. > It's the best explanation of our experience that > there is a reality not dependent on our thoughts. I can't argue with that. Yes, indeed, whether individually as we develop from childhood, or historically, as we develop away from primitive concepts, (but NOT philologically, as we develop from early life forms), we fashion all these complicated explanations of what lies beyond what we directly experience, e.g., other parts of the light spectrum. Key is the fantastic accuracy of these models. Fifteen or more decimal places of accuracy! Let us never forget this! But I'd suggest that even the stance of a tiger is that of an explorer who's ready to learn about some aspect of his environment which has so far escaped him (like lunch). So the tiger too in a sense understands that there is a reality not dependent on his thoughts. I would say that *epistemologically* fundamental are the usual objects of childhood, which we still regard as primary most of each day. You know there's a keyboard in front of you, and about other practical realities that do not permit you to post all day long on the Everything list. Lee > > It's just so much *clearer* to me to see them arising > > only after 13.7 billion years or so (locally) and that\ > > they obtain *only* as a result of physical processes. > > That seems to be the most parsimonious explanation. > > Brent Meeker
Re: Clarification of Terms (was RE: What We Can Know About the World)
I salute Lee's new subject designation. I believe if we are up to identifying concepts with common sense content as well, we should not restrict ourselves into the model-distinctions of (any) physics but generalize the meanings beyond such restrictions. Of course: I am no physicist. My apologies. To Russel's 4 coordinates of (any?) event: how come the occurrence (event!) of a 'good idea' in my mind - (mind: not a thing, not a place, not time-restricted) should have t,x,y,z coordinates? Naively yours John Mikes --- Lee Corbin <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > Russell submits the following as clarifications: > > > An event is a particular set of coordinates > (t,x,y,z) in 4D > > spacetime. This is how it is used in GR, anyway. > > > > An observer moment is a set of constraints, or > equivalently > > information known about the world (obviously at a > moment of time). > > It [the observer moment] corresponds the the > "state" vector \psi > > of quantum mechanics. > > and Stephen inquires > > > Hi Russell, > > A possibly related question. Given your > definition of events and OMs, > > does it not seem that they complement each other, > assuming that events have > > more quatities associated, such as > 4-momentum-energy? > > Well, Russell did also say that OMs and events > seemed to him about as > alike as chalk and cheese. It's starting to look > that way: > > I quote Hal: > > Calling them [causal patterns] "observer > moments" seems > to be a bit of a stretch, given the enormous > number of > orders of magnitude difference between what we > would > normally recognize as a conscious OM and one of > these > trivial ones [e.g. a 302-neuron nematode OM]. > > So, alas, it seems that the firmly established > meanings of > "event" and "observer moment" can't really be said > to be at > all the same thing. (Folks like Russell and Hal have > been > using the term "OM" for years and years, and "event" > has > a pretty standard meaning in physics.) Observer > moments have > to do with something conscious (and, evidently, > pretty complex). > And of course, as Hal wrote later on, consciousness > exists on > a gray scale. > > Lee > > P.S. In normal physics an event, as Russell says, is > associated > with coordinates. Nonetheless I, for one, had always > supposed > that indeed something was happening there, e.g., a > photon was > emitted. Well, in familiar physics we may also say > that in the > usual three-space there is quantum activity at each > point. This, > at least for me, makes the terms a little more > meaningful. > >
Clarification of Terms (was RE: What We Can Know About the World)
Russell submits the following as clarifications: > An event is a particular set of coordinates (t,x,y,z) in 4D > spacetime. This is how it is used in GR, anyway. > > An observer moment is a set of constraints, or equivalently > information known about the world (obviously at a moment of time). > It [the observer moment] corresponds the the "state" vector \psi > of quantum mechanics. and Stephen inquires > Hi Russell, > A possibly related question. Given your definition of events and OMs, > does it not seem that they complement each other, assuming that events have > more quatities associated, such as 4-momentum-energy? Well, Russell did also say that OMs and events seemed to him about as alike as chalk and cheese. It's starting to look that way: I quote Hal: Calling them [causal patterns] "observer moments" seems to be a bit of a stretch, given the enormous number of orders of magnitude difference between what we would normally recognize as a conscious OM and one of these trivial ones [e.g. a 302-neuron nematode OM]. So, alas, it seems that the firmly established meanings of "event" and "observer moment" can't really be said to be at all the same thing. (Folks like Russell and Hal have been using the term "OM" for years and years, and "event" has a pretty standard meaning in physics.) Observer moments have to do with something conscious (and, evidently, pretty complex). And of course, as Hal wrote later on, consciousness exists on a gray scale. Lee P.S. In normal physics an event, as Russell says, is associated with coordinates. Nonetheless I, for one, had always supposed that indeed something was happening there, e.g., a photon was emitted. Well, in familiar physics we may also say that in the usual three-space there is quantum activity at each point. This, at least for me, makes the terms a little more meaningful.
Re: What We Can Know About the World
Hi Russel,
A possibly related question. Given your definition of events and OMs,
does it not seem that they complement each other, assuming that events have
more quatities associated, such as 4-momentum-energy?
Onward!
Stephen
- Original Message -
From: "Russell Standish" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
To: "Lee Corbin" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Cc:
Sent: Sunday, July 31, 2005 12:40 AM
Subject: Re: What We Can Know About the World
On Sat, Jul 30, 2005 at 12:25:48PM -0700, Lee Corbin wrote:
This is not to say that progress is impossible. Consider an idea
like Aditya has: what is the real difference between an event
and an observer-moment? In trying to answer that question, many
of us may learn something (at least for our own purposes).
Err, an event is a particular set of coordinates (t,x,y,z) in 4D
spacetime. This is how it is used in GR, anyway.
An observer moment is a set of constraints, or equivalently
information known about the world (obviously at a moment of time). It
corresponds the the "state" vector \psi of quantum mechanics.
Perhaps you have different definitions of these terms, but it seems
like chalk and cheese to me.
Cheers
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RE: What We Can Know About the World
Jesse Mazer writes: > as I said, my idea is > that *all* possible causal patterns qualify as "observer-moments", not just > complex ones like ours. And I don't disagree that complex observer-moments > are generally the result of a long process of evolution in the physical > universe, it's just that I think at a most fundamental level the "physical > universe" would be reducible to an enormous pattern of causal relationships > which can be broken down into the relationships between a lot of > sub-patterns, each of which is an observer-moment. The idea that physics > should ultimately be explainable in terms of nothing more than causal > relationships between events, and that higher-order concepts like > "particles" and "spacetime" would emerge from this level of explanation, is > an idea that some approaches to quantum gravity seem to favor, like loop > quantum gravity--it's at least not out of the question that a final > "physical" ToE would be about nothing more than causal relationships between > events. If so, it would just be a different "interpretation" of this theory > to say that each sub-network in this universal causal network would be an > observer-moment of some kind, and my "meta-physical" speculation would be > that you could *start* by looking at all possible finite causal networks and > finding a unique measure on them, and the appearance of the huge causal > network we call the "physical universe" could be derived from the > relationships between all the sub-patterns implied by this unique measure. This is a very interesting speculation which raises some random questions and comments: 1. One problem I have is with the notion of causality. Do you view this as something that is well defined, the degree and/or kind of causality that one node in a causal network applies to another? Would it be merely a boolean (node A either does or does not have a causal influence on node B) or would it be more complex (node A promotes B while inhibiting C)? I realize that these are detailed questions to be asked of an embryonic theory but it would help to understand what your notion of causality is. One of my concerns is that some universes may not have causality as well defined as ours does, and I wonder how well your theory would work there. In fact, even in our universe one can certainly imagine situations and relationships between events where the existence or degree of causality is not at all well defined. I'm worried about basing a model for consciousness on something as abstract and ill defined as causality. Are we replacing one mystery with another? 2. If we think of the "causal pattern" which corresponds to a conventional observer-moment, say your experience of eating a particular bite of cherry pie, would you imagine that this is something which could in principle be diagrammed, and/or represented in some kind of canonical form? So we could point to this picture and say, this *is* that particular experience of eating that byte of cherry pie. That would be pretty cool, and I do think that ultimately any theory of consciousness is going to have to be able to do something like this. 3. Presumably the actual causal patterns of our conscious moments are very large. We have trillions of neurons each with tens of thousands of synapses, firing at hundreds or thousands of times per second. That's a lot of activity, all of it intricately linked into what might well be called a causal network, although the "causality" involved is quite complex and involves integration over time. But assuming that we could in fact imagine representing that in canonical form, clearly the representation would be very large. We could imagine successively simpler "causal patterns" until we got down to quite trivial ones. Calling them "observer moments" seems to be a bit of a stretch, given the enormous number of orders of magnitude difference between what we would normally recognize as a conscious OM and one of these trivial ones. But on the other hand I agree that we could probably not draw a line in this succession of causal patterns and say this half are conscious, this half are unconscious. Presumably we are talking about shades of gray here, degrees of consciousness. It never completely goes away, although it certainly gets close enough to zero for all practical purposes. 4. Another point is that for a "causal pattern" to actually be recognizably conscious requires more than complexity. One can imagine any number of causal networks of perhaps tremendous complexity that would not seem particularly likely to correspond to what we would recognize as conscious experience. (In terms of the "shades of gray" analogy, even though the networks are at least slightly conscious by definition, there would still be virtually no "gray" there.) 5. To me, this points to the problem with panpsychism theories like this. On the one hand, everything is conscious (at least a little bit). This saves us from t
Re: What We Can Know About the World
[RS] On 7/31/05, Russell Standish <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > On Sat, Jul 30, 2005 at 12:25:48PM -0700, Lee Corbin wrote: > > > > This is not to say that progress is impossible. Consider an idea > > like Aditya has: what is the real difference between an event > > and an observer-moment? In trying to answer that question, many > > of us may learn something (at least for our own purposes). > > > > Err, an event is a particular set of coordinates (t,x,y,z) in 4D > spacetime. This is how it is used in GR, anyway. > > An observer moment is a set of constraints, or equivalently > information known about the world (obviously at a moment of time). It > corresponds the the "state" vector \psi of quantum mechanics. > > Perhaps you have different definitions of these terms, but it seems > like chalk and cheese to me. > Lets not constrain an "event" to mean something only in 4-space. Take any N-Space and you can define it in terms of a set of N-dim. events. Ofcourse I agree with your definition, am just making it scale over dimensions. Now consider an "observer moment" to be exactly what you are defining it to be: information KNOWN about the world at a moment of time. The "coming to know" of any information corresponds to an "event". Thus an "observer moment" is well-defined if and only if "event" is defined. In other words, an Observer-Moment exists iff it's corresponding "coming to know" event exists for "some" observer. In terms of light cones, OMs are the Events at and "after" the crossing over of light cones. I think the distinction is not a qualitative one between the two, only those events which interfere with the set of events "observable" by "us" (who are also just sets of events) correspond to "observer-moments" in "our universe". So the set of OMs is simply a subset of the set of all events. refer to my previous mail about the multiverse as a partition with equivalence classes which are maximal sets of connected "observer moments", in other words, maximal sets of "mutually interfering events". visualize this as connected components of a graph. Defining entities in more than one different sets of words does not rule out their qualitative identity. Every Observer-Moment is an event. Every event is an Observer-Moment in some universe. -- Aditya Varun Chadha adichad AT gmail.com http://www.adichad.com
Re: What We Can Know About the World
On Sat, Jul 30, 2005 at 12:25:48PM -0700, Lee Corbin wrote:
>
> This is not to say that progress is impossible. Consider an idea
> like Aditya has: what is the real difference between an event
> and an observer-moment? In trying to answer that question, many
> of us may learn something (at least for our own purposes).
>
Err, an event is a particular set of coordinates (t,x,y,z) in 4D
spacetime. This is how it is used in GR, anyway.
An observer moment is a set of constraints, or equivalently
information known about the world (obviously at a moment of time). It
corresponds the the "state" vector \psi of quantum mechanics.
Perhaps you have different definitions of these terms, but it seems
like chalk and cheese to me.
Cheers
--
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(offlist) RE: What We Can Know About the World (fwd)
> -Original Message- > From: Brent Meeker [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] > Sent: Saturday, July 30, 2005 12:29 AM > To: Lee Corbin > Subject: Re: What We Can Know About the World > > > On 29-Jul-05, you wrote: > > > Jesse writes > > > >>> I meant that your perceptions have physiological causes > >>> because your brain is a part of an obviously successful > >>> survival machine designed by evolution. > >> > >> Sure, but all of this is compatible with an idealist philosophy where > >> reality is made up of nothing but observer-moments at the most > >> fundamental level--something like the "naturalistic panpsychism" > >> discussed on that webpage I mentioned. > > > > The disagreement I have with what you have written > > is that I do *not* see observer-moments as the most > > fundamental entities. > > There are two distinct kinds of "fundamental". OMs may be epistemologically > fundamental, but not ontologically fundamental. Starting with what we > think we know, we develop a model of reality which goes beyond what we > directly experience. It's the best explanation of our experience that > there is a reality not dependent on our thoughts. > > > >It's just so much *clearer* > > to me to see them arising only after 13.7 billion > > years or so (locally) and that they obtain *only* as > > a result of physical processes. > > That seems to be the most parsimonious explanation. > > > > Brent Meeker
Re: What We Can Know About the World
Whoa! A simple question that just opened up SO many things in my mind! (maybe a few screws too:-) ) Blabber on I shall! [LC]: > By "event" do you mean an event that leaves a record? Just > wondering. "leaves a record" is the same as saying "affects/causes/interferes with other events". Side Note: Beware the pitfalls of visualizing this as a temporal cause-effect relationship though, we are talking of events, which happen in space-time, not space. Better to understand it as "interference". I think that if we consider an ENTIRE intricate interference-connected web of events, we are in fact considering one equivalence class from the partition called "multiverse". The equivalence relation creating this partition is the "interferes with" relation. And each equivalence class is a "universe". Side Note: If you are following till here, then please help me a bit with the reflexive part of the "interferes with" equivalence. How does an event interfere with itself? I am going the base the rest of the post on this assumption, and unfortunately I currently cannot substantiate it. But now this is a perfect example of something that our brain can "define" but not model. Because from our perspective, until and unless an event "interferes with" our universe, it is in "some other universe" which we have no way of describing. Therefore yes, for us the "knowable universe" at any time can only have events that leave records in our universe, or events that form part of our interference web. BUT, since "coming to know" is itself only an event, it is ALWAYS possible that even our notion of "knownable universe" is incomplete. This is because we ALWAYS have the potential to be "unlucky enough" to not "feel" some interference from an event that we currently believe is in "some other universe" and therefore "unknowable". It is just a matter of not being in the right place at the right time. So although I cannot say for sure whether there even exist events that "do not leave a record", but if they do exist, then they are unknowable. By their very definition they do not "affect" us in ANY way, and therefore can be ignored in a ToE. But the problem is, we have NO way of knowing that an event SURELY does NOT leave a record! Having said this, the universe seems to be at BEST only recursively enumerable to us, not recursive. Because while we CAN observe what's INSIDE it, we have NO way of saying what's OUTSIDE (yet INSIDE the "multiverse"). So my concluding claim is this: We may some day have a ToE that is in fact Consistent and Complete (finally TRUE), but we will NEVER be sure that it is so. [LC] > Thanks for a nice try at clearing up what Jesse, at least, > and I were discussing. Maybe now I have managed to complicate things again:-) -- Aditya Varun Chadha adichad AT gmail.com http://www.adichad.com
RE: What We Can Know About the World
Chris writes
> Im dont know. Im in two minds now. I think my own objection to Sam Johnsons
> 'refutation' is based on a very strict definition of knowledge which entails
> some notion of certainty. To be only 99% certain is not enough on this
> definition to know something. Its a little sceptical isnt it? We lock people
> away on a weaker definition that that. We dont require certainty to inhibit
> someones freedom, why then in philosophy or science?
*Certainty* is a bug-a-boo. It is a great and dreadful siren call
that must be ignored. Certainty does not exist. All our claims
are only conjectural. While it may be argued that for each of
us Descartes' "I think therefore I am" is pretty certain, it
just doesn't carry much information and is kind of useless.
Have you studied any PCR? That is, "Pan-Critical Rationalism"?
A number of us here would highly recommend it. It really seems
to be the best overall philosophy. It's powered by the single
most powerful idea in science, evolution.
> Beyond the impressive and dazzling display of mathematics here and beyond
> Berkley's almost pathological suspicion of perceptual inference, any theory
> that denies extension is deeply unintuitive. Clearly the onus is on
> Idealists - of whatever ilk - to present an explanation of non - extended
> extension that makes some sense, rather than just make the mind boggle. It
> does feel sometimes as though Idealists are sophists tinkering with logic
> more than reality - how things could have been, rather than are.
Well, that's how it *feels* to me too. Unfortunately, if things could
be *proven*, then either the realists or the idealists would have given
up centuries ago. Sure, sometimes the advocates in one camp or the other
really are ignorant, or you can show that there are some facts that as
individuals they've really not taken into account in their thinking.
But abandon all hope that any philosophical movement can be shown to
be incorrect.
This is not to say that progress is impossible. Consider an idea
like Aditya has: what is the real difference between an event
and an observer-moment? In trying to answer that question, many
of us may learn something (at least for our own purposes).
> Why, I feel like asking, would the cause of my perceptions be so different
> from the picture of the world effected?
I guess you mean "what could cause my perceptions that would
be different from the picture of the world influenced or affected?".
> Doesnt it make more sense to say that the world appears extended,
> material and not 'ideal' because that is in fact how it is, there
> must be a symmetry between what is perceived and what causes those
> perceptions even if we can not probe that symmetry to any
> satisfaction?
Yeah, I'd say so. "The *fact* that the world is material" is
a wonderful first approximation, and I heartily endorse it.
Of course, Eternal Truth #2 intercedes ("every statement must
be further modified") and so it has to be qualified.
First, it's not a fact, really. We're best off to *regard*
it as a fact, of course, for many reasons (chiefly because
you don't go to jail when you fail to pay your bills, etc.).
But it could be that we're just processes within some
unimaginable substrate. E.g., we could be computer
simulations. But I expect you know all this.
Second, it's so *close* to being a fact, given our theories
of physics, that every other alternative I know of pales
into improbable (but not impossible) insignificance. Even
if we were a computer simulation, for example, chances are
very good that MWI is true, and that sometime somewhen
there really was a good old Milky Way galaxy with versions
of us in it.
> Im not sure that a realist would be happy by transcendental
> argument like that, but it makes a little sense to me.
>
> Perhaps there is something in Sam Johnson's quip afterall.
Well, *this* realist finds it palatable, (if it turns out that
it's really right to call me a realist, I guess it is).
Lee
RE: What We Can Know About the World
Aditya writes > At the risk of barging in once again, Oh, please forget about all that! No one should apologize for it. Ever. I (Lee) had written > > When in the laboratory we examine the concepts mice > > have of the world, we can easily see their limitations. > > What would we think of mice who attempted to found all > > of reality on "mouse observer moments"? and Jesse wrote > Since there is nothing specifically human about my idea of > "observer-moments" this analogy doesn't really work. I meant only to say that it's obvious how limited the ideas of biological machines can be, *especially* when they consult their subjective ideas. Aditya continues > I agree more with this version of "observer-moments". An assumption > that an "observer" is a human or even a "biological" entity is being > narrow-minded IMO. Quite right. > I think a common error that we make is to assume some vague concept of > "consciousness" and then limit our notion of observation as a process > that only "conscious" entities can undertake/undergo. That sounds so sensible. > We only believe we are conscious, we have no "proof" or "physical > evidence", because ALL our thought-systems ASSUME consciousness, it is > just a human axiom. Or taken another way, conscious is a human-made > word representing just the way we (and our "close relatives" for the > relatively liberal) work. Nothing special about it. I *think* that that has to be right. > Why not allow "observation" to be any event in which any set of > entities (even the most "fundamental" entities) interact among each > other in any way? After all, human observation can be explained as the > "physical" interactions of our senses/brain with "other" entities. > (i.e. just events) > > Notice that this "definition" (or description, for the > "definition"-averse) cuts through a WHOLE lot of assumptions, > ultimately revealing (at least to me) the IDENTITY (sameness) of the > terms "Event" and "Observer-Moment". I suspect that we will be driven to accept this just as you have written it. > Further, no version of "Observation" adopted by any Idealists violates > this definition. Also, the converse is not hard to accept if we are > just a bit more open minded (doing away with the "speciality" of human > thought). Well, taken literally your statement cannot be correct. There will be versions of the concept "Observation" that will be adopted by some idealists that indeed violate your definition. > In the system that emerges, yes, Observer-Moments alone ARE a > candidate for giving us a ToE, but for this, they cannot be > differentiated from our simple notion of "Event". (The realist > favours the term Event, the Idealist favours Observer-Moment) By "event" do you mean an event that leaves a record? Just wondering. Meanwhile, yes: if we have observer moments, and mice have observer moments, then so will ants and even thermometers. (A thermometer observes the temperature and its mercury expands or contracts accordingly.) Thanks for a nice try at clearing up what Jesse, at least, and I were discussing. Lee > I have been tilted towards what this list seems to call "realism" > since the start, but I maintain that digging deep enough, the realism > and idealism being discussed here aren't that different if we just use > a "Realish-Idealish, Idealish-Realish" dictionary, and I believe all > terms in either "language" have equivalent translations in the other. > > I think Mazer has put this across quite nicely, so I pause here.
RE: What We Can Know About the World
Hi Lee; Im dont know. Im in two minds now. I think my own objection to Sam Johnsons 'refutation' is based on a very strict definition of knowledge which entails some notion of certainty. To be only 99% certain is not enough on this definition to know something. Its a little sceptical isnt it? We lock people away on a weaker definition that that. We dont require certainty to inhibit someones freedom, why then in philosophy or science? Certainly the consequences of relaxing such a definition of knowledge are only a fraction as serious in those disciplines. Well, infact in science too we dont apply that much rigour, theories are corroborated or not to a certain degree. They stand or fall on pragmatic grounds. People use Newton's math in many circumstances, whilst knowing Einstein's math reflects reality more accurately. It doesnt matter when Newton's math are suffiecient practically speaking. Logically in kicking the stone SJ doesnt raise a counterargument many rationalists are going to worry about, but he does make a powerful appeal to our intuition that ought to have worried an empiricist like Berkley - any empiricist really. The very fact he invokes a God (unempirically) leads one to argue why such an inference is permissable, but the inference of a genuinely extended world is not. They both serve the same purpose, to maintain the existance of things when unpercieved. Beyond the impressive and dazzling display of mathematics here and beyond Berkley's almost pathological suspicion of perceptual inference, any theory that denies extension is deeply unintuitive. Clearly the onus is on Idealists - of whatever ilk - to present an explanation of non - extended extension that makes some sense, rather than just make the mind boggle. It does feel sometimes as though Idealists are sophists tinkering with logic more than reality - how things could have been, rather than are. Why, I feel like asking, would the cause of my perceptions be so different from the picture of the world effected? Doesnt it make more sense to say that the world appears extended, material and not 'ideal' because that is in fact how it is, there must be a symmetry between what is percieved and what causes those perceptions even if we can not probe that symmetry to any satisfaction. Im not sure that a reaist would be happy by transcendental argument like that, but it makes a little sense to me. Perhaps there is something in Sam Johnson's quip afterall. Many Regards Chris. From: "Lee Corbin" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> Reply-To: <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> To: "EverythingList" Subject: RE: What We Can Know About the World Date: Fri, 29 Jul 2005 20:29:14 -0700 Jesse writes > Lee Corbin wrote: > > > >Chris writes > > > > > >>Samuel Johnson did refute Berkeley. > > > > > > The main thrust of Berkley's argument is to show > > > that sensory perception is > > > indirect, and therefore the existence of a > > > material cause for those perceptions is an > > > unjustified inference in contravention of > > > Occam's razor. The argument that the look, > > > texture, smell, taste and sound of an object > > > are apprehended indirectly is successful in > > > my opinion, and I don't feel any need > > > to defend it unless someone really thinks > > > a defence is required. > > > > Do *you* contend that the existence of material > > causes for your perceptions is unjustified? Good grief. > > How do you define "material causes"? I stay clean away from definitions, sorry. I gave reasons earlier why definitions don't work. I expect that you want to know what was meant when Chris and I were writing. I'll get to that. > It seems to me you are conflating idealism with > solipsism, or the idea that the outside universe > doesn't have any existence outside of my perception > of it, and that there are no objective truths about > external reality outside of my subjective ideas about > it. Well, no, I understand the difference, and agree with the characterization of it you gave. It sounds as though you believe in the existence of things "out there" independent of your perceptions of it. That is, if you were given a drug that cut off your senses, then you'd figure that the outside world was still there even though you could no longer sense it. We agree on that. Customarily (whether people like you and me are sensing that outside world or not), we believe that for the most part here on Earth, at least, there are a lot of material objects around. Tables, chairs, rocks, and cars for instance. We can then go further and say that in this model, even peoples bodies are material objects, and obey the usual high school laws of phy
Re: What We Can Know About the World
Le 30-juil.-05, à 08:53, Lee Corbin a écrit : When in the laboratory we examine the concepts mice have of the world, we can easily see their limitations. What would we think of mice who attempted to found all of reality on "mouse observer moments"? Give them time! Mice will probably discover that reality is made of mice observer moments the day they will bet on identifying mice with hopefully consistent machine. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
Re: What We Can Know About the World
Le 30-juil.-05, à 17:18, Aditya Varun Chadha a écrit : I think Mazer has put this across quite nicely, so I pause here. I agree with you and Jesse Mazer. Except that Jesse points on a "speculation on the observer-moments", where I find enough to speculate on the truth on the comp hypothesis which is implicitly or explicitly a common hypothesis in both physics and cognitive science. Since there is nothing specifically human about my idea of "observer-moments" this analogy doesn't really work. Jesse I agree more with this version of "observer-moments". An assumption that an "observer" is a human or even a "biological" entity is being narrow-minded IMO. OK. Many people tend to forget that rather key point. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
Re: What We Can Know About the World
Dear Jesse and Lee, I must interject! - Original Message - From: "Jesse Mazer" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> To: <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>; Sent: Saturday, July 30, 2005 9:32 AM Subject: RE: What We Can Know About the World Lee Corbin wrote: snip [LC] The disagreement I have with what you have written is that I do *not* see observer-moments as the most fundamental entities. It's just so much *clearer* to me to see them arising only after 13.7 billion years or so (locally) and that they obtain *only* as a result of physical processes. [JM] Ok, but even if you don't agree with this speculation about observer-moments being the most fundamental entities, criticizing this speculation on the basis of it being anti-realist seems misguided. Also, as I said, my idea is that *all* possible causal patterns qualify as "observer-moments", not just complex ones like ours. And I don't disagree that complex observer-moments are generally the result of a long process of evolution in the physical universe, it's just that I think at a most fundamental level the "physical universe" would be reducible to an enormous pattern of causal relationships which can be broken down into the relationships between a lot of sub-patterns, each of which is an observer-moment. The idea that physics should ultimately be explainable in terms of nothing more than causal relationships between events, and that higher-order concepts like "particles" and "spacetime" would emerge from this level of explanation, is an idea that some approaches to quantum gravity seem to favor, like loop quantum gravity--it's at least not out of the question that a final "physical" ToE would be about nothing more than causal relationships between events. If so, it would just be a different "interpretation" of this theory to say that each sub-network in this universal causal network would be an observer-moment of some kind, and my "meta-physical" speculation would be that you could *start* by looking at all possible finite causal networks and finding a unique measure on them, and the appearance of the huge causal network we call the "physical universe" could be derived from the relationships between all the sub-patterns implied by this unique measure. Obviously I don't expect you to agree with this speculation, but I'm just pointing out that it isn't anti-realist, nor does it contradict your statement about our particular type of consciousness being the result of a long process of evolution. [SPK] It is my deep suspicion that this idea that there exists a "unique measure" on the equivalence class (?) of "all possible finite causal networks" is fallacious because it is equivalent to a observational P.o.V. that instantiates the *true* state of motion/rest of a system. For this measure to exist (in the a priori sense) then there must be an a priori instantiation and mutual comparison of all possible finite networks, a diffeomorphism matching. This is Barbour fallacy, the assumption that the results of a Process can obtain independent of the implementation of the Process. Unless one is going to make the leap of faith that it is possible for a computation to occur in zero time and necessitating zero resourse consuption - the ultimate "everything from nothing" violation of thermodynamics - this idea rapidly is seen to be absurd. When will you guys learn the lesson of Relativity: There is no prefered frame; there are only invariances. [LC] When in the laboratory we examine the concepts mice have of the world, we can easily see their limitations. What would we think of mice who attempted to found all of reality on "mouse observer moments"? [JM] Since there is nothing specifically human about my idea of "observer-moments" this analogy doesn't really work. [SPK] Nice try, Jesse! If our idea of an Observer Moment is to be coherent at all, there must exist OMs for *any* possible entity, including that of Mice and Men. Onward! Stephen PS, my critique is missing something but I don't have the time to correct it now. :_(
Fwd: What We Can Know About the World
sorry for the misaddressing... -- Forwarded message -- From: Aditya Varun Chadha <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> Date: Jul 30, 2005 8:47 PM Subject: Re: What We Can Know About the World To: Jesse Mazer <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> At the risk of barging in once again, > Since there is nothing specifically human about my idea of > "observer-moments" this analogy doesn't really work. > > Jesse I agree more with this version of "observer-moments". An assumption that an "observer" is a human or even a "biological" entity is being narrow-minded IMO. I think a common error that we make is to assume some vague concept of "consciousness" and then limit our notion of observation as a process that only "conscious" entities can undertake/undergo. We only believe we are conscious, we have no "proof" or "physical evidence", because ALL our thought-systems ASSUME consciousness, it is just a human axiom. Or taken another way, conscious is a human-made word representing just the way we (and our "close relatives" for the relatively liberal) work. Nothing special about it. Why not allow "observation" to be any event in which any set of entities (even the most "fundamental" entities) interact among each other in any way? After all, human observation can be explained as the "physical" interactions of our senses/brain with "other" entities. (i.e. just events) Notice that this "definition" (or description, for the "definition"-averse) cuts through a WHOLE lot of assumptions, ultimately revealing (at least to me) the IDENTITY (sameness) of the terms "Event" and "Observer-Moment". Further, no version of "Observation" adopted by any Idealists violates this definition. Also, the converse is not hard to accept if we are just a bit more open minded (doing away with the "speciality" of human thought). In the system that emerges, yes, Observer-Moments alone ARE a candidate for giving us a ToE, but for this, they cannot be differentiated from our simple notion of "Event". (The realist favours the term Event, the Idealist favours Observer-Moment) I have been tilted towards what this list seems to call "realism" since the start, but I maintain that digging deep enough, the realism and idealism being discussed here aren't that different if we just use a "Realish-Idealish, Idealish-Realish" dictionary, and I believe all terms in either "language" have equivalent translations in the other. I think Mazer has put this across quite nicely, so I pause here. -- Aditya Varun Chadha adichad AT gmail.com http://www.adichad.com
RE: What We Can Know About the World
Lee Corbin wrote: Jesse writes > > I meant that your perceptions have physiological causes > > because your brain is a part of an obviously successful > > survival machine designed by evolution. > > Sure, but all of this is compatible with an idealist philosophy where > reality is made up of nothing but observer-moments at the most fundamental > level--something like the "naturalistic panpsychism" discussed on that > webpage I mentioned. The disagreement I have with what you have written is that I do *not* see observer-moments as the most fundamental entities. It's just so much *clearer* to me to see them arising only after 13.7 billion years or so (locally) and that they obtain *only* as a result of physical processes. Ok, but even if you don't agree with this speculation about observer-moments being the most fundamental entities, criticizing this speculation on the basis of it being anti-realist seems misguided. Also, as I said, my idea is that *all* possible causal patterns qualify as "observer-moments", not just complex ones like ours. And I don't disagree that complex observer-moments are generally the result of a long process of evolution in the physical universe, it's just that I think at a most fundamental level the "physical universe" would be reducible to an enormous pattern of causal relationships which can be broken down into the relationships between a lot of sub-patterns, each of which is an observer-moment. The idea that physics should ultimately be explainable in terms of nothing more than causal relationships between events, and that higher-order concepts like "particles" and "spacetime" would emerge from this level of explanation, is an idea that some approaches to quantum gravity seem to favor, like loop quantum gravity--it's at least not out of the question that a final "physical" ToE would be about nothing more than causal relationships between events. If so, it would just be a different "interpretation" of this theory to say that each sub-network in this universal causal network would be an observer-moment of some kind, and my "meta-physical" speculation would be that you could *start* by looking at all possible finite causal networks and finding a unique measure on them, and the appearance of the huge causal network we call the "physical universe" could be derived from the relationships between all the sub-patterns implied by this unique measure. Obviously I don't expect you to agree with this speculation, but I'm just pointing out that it isn't anti-realist, nor does it contradict your statement about our particular type of consciousness being the result of a long process of evolution. When in the laboratory we examine the concepts mice have of the world, we can easily see their limitations. What would we think of mice who attempted to found all of reality on "mouse observer moments"? Since there is nothing specifically human about my idea of "observer-moments" this analogy doesn't really work. Jesse
RE: What We Can Know About the World
Jesse writes > > I meant that your perceptions have physiological causes > > because your brain is a part of an obviously successful > > survival machine designed by evolution. > > Sure, but all of this is compatible with an idealist philosophy where > reality is made up of nothing but observer-moments at the most fundamental > level--something like the "naturalistic panpsychism" discussed on that > webpage I mentioned. The disagreement I have with what you have written is that I do *not* see observer-moments as the most fundamental entities. It's just so much *clearer* to me to see them arising only after 13.7 billion years or so (locally) and that they obtain *only* as a result of physical processes. When in the laboratory we examine the concepts mice have of the world, we can easily see their limitations. What would we think of mice who attempted to found all of reality on "mouse observer moments"? Unfortunately for the ultimate survival prospects of mice, they're not capable of understanding evolution and their own highly contingent appearance in it. We are, and we should be talking as though we do understand. > So does this mean you have no problem with idealism per > se, as long as it does not claim that there is no external reality > independent of *my* perceptions of it (even if this external reality > consists of nothing but other observer-moments, with some sort of measure > attached to each)? Is there anyone on this list who disagrees with the idea > of such an external reality? If not, then who are your criticisms aimed at? It all depends on which way you think the explanations gain the most mileage. You can start with these "human observer moments"---which are in principle not comparable from one entity to another and about which anyone's opinion is as good as anyone else's, or you can start from what we have learned so far about the universe we're embedded in. Lee
RE: What We Can Know About the World
Lee Corbin wrote: Jesse writes > Lee Corbin wrote: > > > >Chris writes > > > > > >>Samuel Johnson did refute Berkeley. > > > > > > The main thrust of Berkley's argument is to show > > > that sensory perception is > > > indirect, and therefore the existence of a > > > material cause for those perceptions is an > > > unjustified inference in contravention of > > > Occam's razor. The argument that the look, > > > texture, smell, taste and sound of an object > > > are apprehended indirectly is successful in > > > my opinion, and I don't feel any need > > > to defend it unless someone really thinks > > > a defence is required. > > > > Do *you* contend that the existence of material > > causes for your perceptions is unjustified? Good grief. > > How do you define "material causes"? I stay clean away from definitions, sorry. I gave reasons earlier why definitions don't work. I expect that you want to know what was meant when Chris and I were writing. I'll get to that. > It seems to me you are conflating idealism with > solipsism, or the idea that the outside universe > doesn't have any existence outside of my perception > of it, and that there are no objective truths about > external reality outside of my subjective ideas about > it. Well, no, I understand the difference, and agree with the characterization of it you gave. It sounds as though you believe in the existence of things "out there" independent of your perceptions of it. That is, if you were given a drug that cut off your senses, then you'd figure that the outside world was still there even though you could no longer sense it. We agree on that. Customarily (whether people like you and me are sensing that outside world or not), we believe that for the most part here on Earth, at least, there are a lot of material objects around. Tables, chairs, rocks, and cars for instance. We can then go further and say that in this model, even peoples bodies are material objects, and obey the usual high school laws of physics. (They have mass, often reflect light, and so forth.) So by > > Do *you* contend that the existence of material > > causes for your perceptions is unjustified? I meant that your perceptions have physiological causes because your brain is a part of an obviously successful survival machine designed by evolution. Sure, but all of this is compatible with an idealist philosophy where reality is made up of nothing but observer-moments at the most fundamental level--something like the "naturalistic panpsychism" discussed on that webpage I mentioned. So does this mean you have no problem with idealism per se, as long as it does not claim that there is no external reality independent of *my* perceptions of it (even if this external reality consists of nothing but other observer-moments, with some sort of measure attached to each)? Is there anyone on this list who disagrees with the idea of such an external reality? If not, then who are your criticisms aimed at? Jesse
RE: What We Can Know About the World
Jesse writes > Lee Corbin wrote: > > > >Chris writes > > > > > >>Samuel Johnson did refute Berkeley. > > > > > > The main thrust of Berkley's argument is to show > > > that sensory perception is > > > indirect, and therefore the existence of a > > > material cause for those perceptions is an > > > unjustified inference in contravention of > > > Occam's razor. The argument that the look, > > > texture, smell, taste and sound of an object > > > are apprehended indirectly is successful in > > > my opinion, and I don't feel any need > > > to defend it unless someone really thinks > > > a defence is required. > > > > Do *you* contend that the existence of material > > causes for your perceptions is unjustified? Good grief. > > How do you define "material causes"? I stay clean away from definitions, sorry. I gave reasons earlier why definitions don't work. I expect that you want to know what was meant when Chris and I were writing. I'll get to that. > It seems to me you are conflating idealism with > solipsism, or the idea that the outside universe > doesn't have any existence outside of my perception > of it, and that there are no objective truths about > external reality outside of my subjective ideas about > it. Well, no, I understand the difference, and agree with the characterization of it you gave. It sounds as though you believe in the existence of things "out there" independent of your perceptions of it. That is, if you were given a drug that cut off your senses, then you'd figure that the outside world was still there even though you could no longer sense it. We agree on that. Customarily (whether people like you and me are sensing that outside world or not), we believe that for the most part here on Earth, at least, there are a lot of material objects around. Tables, chairs, rocks, and cars for instance. We can then go further and say that in this model, even peoples bodies are material objects, and obey the usual high school laws of physics. (They have mass, often reflect light, and so forth.) So by > > Do *you* contend that the existence of material > > causes for your perceptions is unjustified? I meant that your perceptions have physiological causes because your brain is a part of an obviously successful survival machine designed by evolution. Lee
RE: What We Can Know About the World
Lee Corbin wrote: Chris writes > >>Samuel Johnson did refute Berkeley. > > The main thrust of Berkley's argument is to show that sensory perception is > indirect, and therefore the existence of a material cause for those > perceptions is an unjustified inference in contravention of Occam's razor. > The argument that the look, texture, smell, taste and sound of an object are > apprehended indirectly is successful in my opinion, and I don't feel any need > to defend it unless someone really thinks a defence is required. Do *you* contend that the existence of material causes for your perceptions is unjustified? Good grief. How do you define "material causes"? It seems to me you are conflating idealism with solipsism, or the idea that the outside universe doesn't have any existence outside of my perception of it, and that there are no objective truths about external reality outside of my subjective ideas about it. But even though I lean towards idealism, I certainly believe that other minds (or 'observer-moments') have an independent existence outside of my perceptions of them when I interact with them (with 'interactions' explained in terms of different oberver-moments affecting one another's measure, perhaps); I see other minds "from the outside", but they have an independent experience of themselves "from the inside". And I also lean towards panpsychism, which would imply that everything we label as a physical process can really be understood as just another observer-moment (perhaps a very simple one) viewed "from the outside". So rocks, stars, quarks, etc. would have just as much of an independent existence as other people, in terms of this hypothesis. I suggest checking out the article on "Naturalistic Panpsychism" at http://www.hedweb.com/lockwood.htm which gives a pretty good summary of the idea, although I don't agree with every aspect of his version of it. Jesse
Re: What We Can Know About the World
Please see interleaved in the remnants of the text below John Mikes --- Bruno Marchal <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > > Le 27-juil.-05, à 20:11, Lee Corbin a écrit : > > > Build carefully upon what is simple and knowable, > and keep the > > wild theories to a minimum. Even then, the world > is hardly > > simple, but at least we've got a chance. > > I agree completely. > Only 'that much' is knowable, especially simple, so we have no choice. Wild theories? Who is to label it? > > > > >> In other words, dualists and materialists > contravene Occam, not > >> idealists. I don't see how Johnson refuted that. > > > > Materialists do not contravene Occam. > > Subtance-materialists does. Imo. (but we can go back > on this latter). > Occam principlised our human knowledge based model. It may well be that there are much more simple solutions beyond our horizon of knowability. Even our present level of epistemicly supplied cognitive inventory is VERY limited - to say it mildly. > > > The simplest explanation is > > that there is a world "out there" and that our > brains are survival > > machines designed by evolution to thrive in it. > > I agree. But it is just the recent "logical" path. > Atoms and waves also > are "survival" machines, then eventually the laws of > physics themselves > emerge from simpler things (like immaterial > relations between prime > numbers for example). > Simplest...see above. "out there"? we are 'out there'. There is no "US and the rest of the world out there". What are we so special ABOVE(?) those figments we call "atoms" etc. to put our 'mentality' (ideational basis) into a special box? It may be different (for us), maybe we see more complexity in ourselves because we know more about ourselves. > > > The phantasms that > > occasionally infest our awareness and > consciousness causally arise > > as side-effects of how our brains work, that's > all. > > I disagree completely. Take a physicist of mass M, > and another one of > mass m. physicists obey to the laws of physics, all > right? (It is *the* > Everett motto). Snip the enjoyable monolog about physicists as objects. * I cannot 'disagree completely' untill we agree in the elusive phantasm called consciousness. No such 'thing'. > Consciousness is the most powerful force in the > multi ... multiverses. SNIP > And then, just defining "consciousness" by > unconscious (automated) > inference of self-consistency, not only explains > this self-speeding up > process, but it can explain why matter or > consciousness *looks* > epiphenomenal. "epi" (or endo) to what? * > > > > The simplest explanation does *not* start with > perceptions and > > all the rest of that stuff, for a number of > > reasons. The primary > > reason is that you can't truly communicate them to > others---after > > all, your brain may not work the same as theirs. > As Wittgenstein > > said, "Of what we cannot speak thereof we must be > silent". > > > Well, apparently, either Wittgenstein missed the > opportunity to remain silent, BRAVO > or we have the right to ask him "What are > you really talking > about, M. Wittgenstein?". But I agree with > Wittgenstein: there exists > propositions which although true cannot be > communicated or justified. SNIP > Bruno > > http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ > Remark: ever since we have a way of communication we try to complete (verb) our feeble imagination about the world according to the ever increasing level of the knowables. Our models (so far) have always been totally boundary-enclosed and we did not even think beyond them "Natural laws". "logical laws", ONE cause, the axioms and givens to make such views work AND math as the main adjuvant of that fantastic and fruitful edifice we have built called "scientific worldview". All human thought. Only lately (½ c.?) do some looked-down minds attempt to 'look beyond' - even violating the Witgenstein norm. J.M. >
Re: What We Can Know About the World
Le 27-juil.-05, à 20:11, Lee Corbin a écrit : Build carefully upon what is simple and knowable, and keep the wild theories to a minimum. Even then, the world is hardly simple, but at least we've got a chance. I agree completely. In other words, dualists and materialists contravene Occam, not idealists. I don't see how Johnson refuted that. Materialists do not contravene Occam. Subtance-materialists does. Imo. (but we can go back on this latter). The simplest explanation is that there is a world "out there" and that our brains are survival machines designed by evolution to thrive in it. I agree. But it is just the recent "logical" path. Atoms and waves also are "survival" machines, then eventually the laws of physics themselves emerge from simpler things (like immaterial relations between prime numbers for example). The phantasms that occasionally infest our awareness and consciousness causally arise as side-effects of how our brains work, that's all. I disagree completely. Take a physicist of mass M, and another one of mass m. physicists obey to the laws of physics, all right? (It is *the* Everett motto). So the physicists will attract each other proportionaly to mM/r^2 (r being the distance between the two physicists). Believe me but that attraction is negligible compared to the usual psychological repulsions and attraction among colleagues! Consciousness is the most powerful force in the multi ... multiverses. It entails the biggest self-speeding up of self-organisation of information possible. Fears can transform itself into bombs, cathedral or libraries. And then, just defining "consciousness" by unconscious (automated) inference of self-consistency, not only explains this self-speeding up process, but it can explain why matter or consciousness *looks* epiphenomenal. (The self-speeding up is related to theorems by Godel and Blum in logic and computer science.) (This can also be related to works by I.J. Goods on a modelisation of "free-will" in term of relative computations speed). The simplest explanation does *not* start with perceptions and all the rest of that stuff, for a number of reasons. The primary reason is that you can't truly communicate them to others---after all, your brain may not work the same as theirs. As Wittgenstein said, "Of what we cannot speak thereof we must be silent". Well, apparently, either Wittgenstein missed the opportunity to remain silent, or we have the right to ask him "What are you really talking about, M. Wittgenstein?". But I agree with Wittgenstein: there exists propositions which although true cannot be communicated or justified. (And, as a reminder, I recall that Dt or equivalently ~Bf, are such proposition in the near death OMs of the Papaioannou's multiverses. This at least gives a picture capable of making Wittgenstein consistent. Good because with such sentences (also said by Lao Tseu btw) we are playing near ... inconsistency. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
RE: What We Can Know About the World
Hi Lee; You see Samuel Johnson as a realist? I think I started off a naive realist, became a realist and quickly became confounded by the absurdity of the position. If I 'understood that there can be things like optical illusions', I did so honestly, they told me something very clear about the nature of perception which makes realism look as naive as naive realism. We have strong perceptions when we dream, we dont always know we are dreaming. Sense data is what we are directly aware of, mental representations. When we are not dreaming, we are still only directly aware of sense data. However justifiable, the external world is an inference from these representations whatever they are instantiated in. How can I on the one hand be told that light falls upon my retina creating an image that is upside down, then be told that I see things directly and as they are? It makes no sense. Its blind hope and is obviously wrong. The world does not look upside down. The very fact the image gets flipped the right way up is enough to demonstrate I am in the grip of a cognitive representation. No. Berkley is right on that score. with regards to the question of whether Johnson refuted Berkley. I cant see how he did. many regards Chris. From: "Lee Corbin" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> Reply-To: <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> To: "EverythingList" Subject: RE: What We Can Know About the World Date: Wed, 27 Jul 2005 11:11:33 -0700 Chris writes > >>Samuel Johnson did refute Berkeley. > > The main thrust of Berkley's argument is to show that sensory perception is > indirect, and therefore the existence of a material cause for those > perceptions is an unjustified inference in contravention of Occam's razor. > The argument that the look, texture, smell, taste and sound of an object are > apprehended indirectly is successful in my opinion, and I don't feel any need > to defend it unless someone really thinks a defence is required. Do *you* contend that the existence of material causes for your perceptions is unjustified? Good grief. As for your other statement, these senses are indeed, just as you say, apprehended indirectly. (That's the difference between realists and naive realists, e.g., children.) Of course there is no need for you to defend that, because no one here would disagree. > Afterall, on any view there is a translation of 'signals' of many > different forms (light waves, sound waves) , into various 'signals' > of the same form (neurons firing) which become synaesthetically > unified into a whole, such that we associate the smell, taste, > colour and texture of say an orange, as being qualities of the > same object. Of course. > ...Berkley's move here is to insist that it we have enough > information now to create the appearance of a 3 dimensional > world out of elements that are not intrinsically extended. I'm not sure what you mean. By elements already in the brain? Yes, that's true. But they got into the brain by the aforementioned processes, as you know. Don't lose sight of the fact that almost all the information came from outside. > By Occam then, we should not infer something for which there is no > requirement - however firmly that inference has been imbedded in us. > We should stick to using what we can know directly. Perception. You don't know all this complicated crap (neurons, perception, inference, the whole nine yards) nearly as well as you know the monitor in front of you. The problem is the word "know". The first things you knew consciously, and knew well, were things outside your skin: your mother and father, and tables and chairs. Let's resist the temptation to begin using words in other ways. Much, much later you ceased being a naive realist and became a realist. You understood that there can be things like optical illusions, and altered states of consciousness. You even understood that your own exalted consciousness is not anything to be utterly depended upon, because one can be sick or crazy. (If it hasn't happened to you yet, then just stay around a few more decades.) Build carefully upon what is simple and knowable, and keep the wild theories to a minimum. Even then, the world is hardly simple, but at least we've got a chance. > In other words, dualists and materialists contravene Occam, not > idealists. I don't see how Johnson refuted that. Materialists do not contravene Occam. The simplest explanation is that there is a world "out there" and that our brains are survival machines designed by evolution to thrive in it. The phantasms that occasionally infest our awareness and consciousness causally arise as side-effects of how our brains work, that's all. The simplest explanation does *not* start with perceptions and all the rest of that stuff,
RE: What We Can Know About the World
Chris writes > >>Samuel Johnson did refute Berkeley. > > The main thrust of Berkley's argument is to show that sensory perception is > indirect, and therefore the existence of a material cause for those > perceptions is an unjustified inference in contravention of Occam's razor. > The argument that the look, texture, smell, taste and sound of an object are > apprehended indirectly is successful in my opinion, and I don't feel any need > to defend it unless someone really thinks a defence is required. Do *you* contend that the existence of material causes for your perceptions is unjustified? Good grief. As for your other statement, these senses are indeed, just as you say, apprehended indirectly. (That's the difference between realists and naive realists, e.g., children.) Of course there is no need for you to defend that, because no one here would disagree. > Afterall, on any view there is a translation of 'signals' of many > different forms (light waves, sound waves) , into various 'signals' > of the same form (neurons firing) which become synaesthetically > unified into a whole, such that we associate the smell, taste, > colour and texture of say an orange, as being qualities of the > same object. Of course. > ...Berkley's move here is to insist that it we have enough > information now to create the appearance of a 3 dimensional > world out of elements that are not intrinsically extended. I'm not sure what you mean. By elements already in the brain? Yes, that's true. But they got into the brain by the aforementioned processes, as you know. Don't lose sight of the fact that almost all the information came from outside. > By Occam then, we should not infer something for which there is no > requirement - however firmly that inference has been imbedded in us. > We should stick to using what we can know directly. Perception. You don't know all this complicated crap (neurons, perception, inference, the whole nine yards) nearly as well as you know the monitor in front of you. The problem is the word "know". The first things you knew consciously, and knew well, were things outside your skin: your mother and father, and tables and chairs. Let's resist the temptation to begin using words in other ways. Much, much later you ceased being a naive realist and became a realist. You understood that there can be things like optical illusions, and altered states of consciousness. You even understood that your own exalted consciousness is not anything to be utterly depended upon, because one can be sick or crazy. (If it hasn't happened to you yet, then just stay around a few more decades.) Build carefully upon what is simple and knowable, and keep the wild theories to a minimum. Even then, the world is hardly simple, but at least we've got a chance. > In other words, dualists and materialists contravene Occam, not > idealists. I don't see how Johnson refuted that. Materialists do not contravene Occam. The simplest explanation is that there is a world "out there" and that our brains are survival machines designed by evolution to thrive in it. The phantasms that occasionally infest our awareness and consciousness causally arise as side-effects of how our brains work, that's all. The simplest explanation does *not* start with perceptions and all the rest of that stuff, for a number of reasons. The primary reason is that you can't truly communicate them to others---after all, your brain may not work the same as theirs. As Wittgenstein said, "Of what we cannot speak thereof we must be silent". Lee
Re: What We Can Know About the World
Hi Bruno;
There are problems with Berkley to be sure, but I dont think Johnson had
much of a grasp of them. Are there good objections to Berkley? Certainly.
Did SJ propose any? Not really.
I agree ontologically. But I disagree epistemologically. It is like with
Mendeleev classification of the elements (atoms). It was wise to infer the
existence of "unknown atoms" from the holes provided by the classification.
I have a similar approach to Berkley which revolves around Occam's principle
of sufficiency. With regards to perception being the essence of existance,
what happens when things are not percieved? A perception or idea must exist
in a mind, right? Furthermore, in some sense a mind must be concieved of (by
Berkley) in terms of ideas too, So what are minds percieved by? Gaps like
these in my opinion, break Occam's principle of sufficiency. It leads to
Berkley positing a God which percieves all ideas (unpercieved things and
percieving minds). This enables 'the dark side of the moon' to exist
unpercieved and for percieving minds themselves to exist. However, I think
in satisfying the sufficiency principle, Berkley now breaks Occam's appeal
for simplicity.
In a way he has been forced to make a non empirical deduction which should
really be abhorrent to him. Perhaps an ad hoc invention might be more
accurate, in so far as God is invoked for theoretical difficulties
primarily.
So a view-point should always to be completed as much as possible.
As shown, Berkley arguably does complete his theory. However, not in a way
that 'makes it possible to get in a quicker way some possible contradiction
(internal or with facts).'.
At this point then, Berkley is on unsteady ground, because we want some
means of falsification, I feel cheated that there isnt one, especially from
an empiricist. Internally though, I think he is largely consistant.
Perception.
Oops! Mhhh... Tricky word which has a foot in "knowing" (first person)
Firstly, I use the word in the sense that this is what Berkley would have
used. I think there is a problem with how Berkley uses it. I think he plays
on a similarity between 'idea', 'mind' and 'perception'. I think you can
trap Berkley into a position where he has to admit that ideas are percieved,
which suggests again a two part process, an indirection. A translation.
However, with regards to :
and a foot in some infered third person describable "reality".
Berkley has a third person describable reality. It is just not a material
one. Berkley is no solipsist. He does not deny objective reality. He basis
reality on a different substance and preserves it in the mind of God. Like
Leibniz. This is why Johnson is wrong, he thinks that Berkley is denying the
existance of things. Its a consequence of thinking dualistically. Dualists
naturally regard 'mentality' as less substantial than matter, Idealists
dont. It is their substance of choice in a sense. Materialism and Idealism
are very similar. Its monism really, as opposed to dualism. Think of the way
Marx (materialism) flips Hegel (idealism).
In otherwords, dualists and materialists contravene Occam, not idealists.
i dont see how Johnson refuted that.
Very well said. But idealist are not necessarily solispsist, and once you
can acknowledge the existence of one "other", or even just this set {1, 2,
3, 4, ...} (in the company of addition and multiplication), then there is
a vast realm full of ... surprises (counter-intuitive truth which we can
"know" but only indirectly. (A little like you need two eyes to imagine 3D,
you need two brains to make a genuine proof or a genuine bet).
Not quite sure what you are getting at here The truth is always
incomplete from a single perspective?
Many Regards
Chris.
Bruno
regards.
From: "Lee Corbin" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Reply-To: <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
To:
Subject: What We Can Know About the World
Date: Tue, 26 Jul 2005 02:19:49 -0700
Stathis writes
> > When 99% of the human race use the word "reality", they mean
> > the world outside their skins.
> >
> > If you sacrifice our common understanding of "reality", then
> > you'll find yourself in a hole out of which you'll never climb.
>
> Yes, but what *is* this 3D world we can all stub our toe on?
Korzybski would warn: beware the "is" of identity :-)
> If we go back to the start of last century, Rutherford's
> quaintly pre-QM atom, amazingly, turned out to be mostly
> empty space. Did this mean that, suddenly, it doesn't hurt
> when you walk into a brick wall, because it isn't nearly as
> solid as you initially thought it was? Of course not; our
> experience of the world is one thing, and the "reality"
> behi
Re: What We Can Know About the World
Le 27-juil.-05, à 15:55, chris peck a écrit :
Samuel Johnson did refute Berkeley.
The main thrust of Berkley's argument is to show that sensory
perception is indirect, and therefore the existance of a material
cause for those perceptions is an unjustified inference in
contravention of Occam's razor. The argument that the look, texture,
smell, taste and sound of an object are apprehended indirectly is
successful in my opinion, and I dont feel any need to defend it unless
someone really thinks a defence is required. Aterall, on any view
there is a translation of 'signals' of many different forms (light
waves, sound waves) , into various 'signals' of the same form (neurons
firing) which become synaesthetically unified into a whole, such that
we associate the smell, taste, colour and texture of say an orange, as
being qualities of the same object. That kicking a rock hurts, for
example, does not establish that the 'material world' is apprehended
directly, or that the concept of a material world is anything more
than an inference.
I dont think this is really what Johnson meant, but the only challenge
his 'refutation' genuinely offers is with regards to extension. How is
the size of an object, or its ability to exist and move (by being
kicked) in a 3 dimensional realm, derived from perception alone? Our
grasp of a 3 dimensional world is dependent on our stereoscopic
perception. Its only when there are two seperate perceptions of the
world of the same type (eg. left and right eye) that we apprehend a
properly 3 dimensionally world, each of these perceptions is however
intrinsically 2 dimensional. It is the mental combination of these
slightly different images from which we derive an extended world. This
is probably more controversial, but Berkley's move here is to insist
that it we have enough information now to create the appearance of a 3
dimensional world out of elements that are not intrinsically extended.
By Occam then, we should not infer something for which there is no
requirement - however firmly that inference has been imbedded in us.
We should stick to using what we can know directly.
I agree ontologically. But I disagree epistemologically. It is like
with Mendeleev classification of the elements (atoms). It was wise to
infer the existence of "unknown atoms" from the holes provided by the
classification. So a view-point should always to be completed as much
as possible. This makes it possible to get in a quicker way some
possible contradiction (internal or with facts). Remember that Occam
was proposing the razor for the number of hypotheses. In this list most
people tend to agree that we should have as few postulates as possible.
This makes the set of possibilities bigger and we take it as face value
(most are inspired or encouraged by Everett quantum mechanics (the
"many world").
Perception.
Oops! Mhhh... Tricky word which has a foot in "knowing" (first person)
and a foot in some infered third person describable "reality".
In otherwords, dualists and materialists contravene Occam, not
idealists. i dont see how Johnson refuted that.
Very well said. But idealist are not necessarily solispsist, and once
you can acknowledge the existence of one "other", or even just this set
{1, 2, 3, 4, ...} (in the company of addition and multiplication),
then there is a vast realm full of ... surprises (counter-intuitive
truth which we can "know" but only indirectly. (A little like you need
two eyes to imagine 3D, you need two brains to make a genuine proof or
a genuine bet).
Bruno
regards.
From: "Lee Corbin" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Reply-To: <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
To:
Subject: What We Can Know About the World
Date: Tue, 26 Jul 2005 02:19:49 -0700
Stathis writes
> > When 99% of the human race use the word "reality", they mean
> > the world outside their skins.
> >
> > If you sacrifice our common understanding of "reality", then
> > you'll find yourself in a hole out of which you'll never climb.
>
> Yes, but what *is* this 3D world we can all stub our toe on?
Korzybski would warn: beware the "is" of identity :-)
> If we go back to the start of last century, Rutherford's
> quaintly pre-QM atom, amazingly, turned out to be mostly
> empty space. Did this mean that, suddenly, it doesn't hurt
> when you walk into a brick wall, because it isn't nearly as
> solid as you initially thought it was? Of course not; our
> experience of the world is one thing, and the "reality"
> behind the experience is a completely different thing.
That's *exactly* right. We *could* have been designed by
evolution not to hurt when we walked into a wall. For certain
reasons, we were not designed that way.
RE: What We Can Know About the World
Samuel Johnson did refute Berkeley. The main thrust of Berkley's argument is to show that sensory perception is indirect, and therefore the existance of a material cause for those perceptions is an unjustified inference in contravention of Occam's razor. The argument that the look, texture, smell, taste and sound of an object are apprehended indirectly is successful in my opinion, and I dont feel any need to defend it unless someone really thinks a defence is required. Aterall, on any view there is a translation of 'signals' of many different forms (light waves, sound waves) , into various 'signals' of the same form (neurons firing) which become synaesthetically unified into a whole, such that we associate the smell, taste, colour and texture of say an orange, as being qualities of the same object. That kicking a rock hurts, for example, does not establish that the 'material world' is apprehended directly, or that the concept of a material world is anything more than an inference. I dont think this is really what Johnson meant, but the only challenge his 'refutation' genuinely offers is with regards to extension. How is the size of an object, or its ability to exist and move (by being kicked) in a 3 dimensional realm, derived from perception alone? Our grasp of a 3 dimensional world is dependent on our stereoscopic perception. Its only when there are two seperate perceptions of the world of the same type (eg. left and right eye) that we apprehend a properly 3 dimensionally world, each of these perceptions is however intrinsically 2 dimensional. It is the mental combination of these slightly different images from which we derive an extended world. This is probably more controversial, but Berkley's move here is to insist that it we have enough information now to create the appearance of a 3 dimensional world out of elements that are not intrinsically extended. By Occam then, we should not infer something for which there is no requirement - however firmly that inference has been imbedded in us. We should stick to using what we can know directly. Perception. In otherwords, dualists and materialists contravene Occam, not idealists. i dont see how Johnson refuted that. regards. From: "Lee Corbin" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> Reply-To: <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> To: Subject: What We Can Know About the World Date: Tue, 26 Jul 2005 02:19:49 -0700 Stathis writes > > When 99% of the human race use the word "reality", they mean > > the world outside their skins. > > > > If you sacrifice our common understanding of "reality", then > > you'll find yourself in a hole out of which you'll never climb. > > Yes, but what *is* this 3D world we can all stub our toe on? Korzybski would warn: beware the "is" of identity :-) > If we go back to the start of last century, Rutherford's > quaintly pre-QM atom, amazingly, turned out to be mostly > empty space. Did this mean that, suddenly, it doesn't hurt > when you walk into a brick wall, because it isn't nearly as > solid as you initially thought it was? Of course not; our > experience of the world is one thing, and the "reality" > behind the experience is a completely different thing. That's *exactly* right. We *could* have been designed by evolution not to hurt when we walked into a wall. For certain reasons, we were not designed that way. > If it is discovered tomorrow beyond any doubt that the > entire universe is just a game running in the down time > on God's pocket calculator, how is this fundamentally > different to discovering that, contrary to appearances, > atoms are mostly empty space, or subatomic particles have > no definite position, or any other weird theory of modern > physics? Good analogy! The world surprises us all the time, especially the more we learn about it. It would be bizarre if it did not, (we'd probably have to abandon most of our theories). > And how could, say, the fact that brick walls feel solid enough > possibly count as evidence against such an anti-realist theory? Occam's razor. We go with the simplest theory. Imagine that you and I believe we are standing next to a wall. Our conjecture is that it has certain properties. We may need it to protect us. If we're wrong, nature will make short work of us. That we have survived this long is a strong indication that the wall really is there. In fact, on some level of practicality, it is foolish to debate the existence of the wall. Samuel Johnson did refute Berkeley. Lee _ Be the first to hear what's new at MSN - sign up to our free newsletters! http://www.msn.co.uk/newsletters
What We Can Know About the World
Stathis writes > > When 99% of the human race use the word "reality", they mean > > the world outside their skins. > > > > If you sacrifice our common understanding of "reality", then > > you'll find yourself in a hole out of which you'll never climb. > > Yes, but what *is* this 3D world we can all stub our toe on? Korzybski would warn: beware the "is" of identity :-) > If we go back to the start of last century, Rutherford's > quaintly pre-QM atom, amazingly, turned out to be mostly > empty space. Did this mean that, suddenly, it doesn't hurt > when you walk into a brick wall, because it isn't nearly as > solid as you initially thought it was? Of course not; our > experience of the world is one thing, and the "reality" > behind the experience is a completely different thing. That's *exactly* right. We *could* have been designed by evolution not to hurt when we walked into a wall. For certain reasons, we were not designed that way. > If it is discovered tomorrow beyond any doubt that the > entire universe is just a game running in the down time > on God's pocket calculator, how is this fundamentally > different to discovering that, contrary to appearances, > atoms are mostly empty space, or subatomic particles have > no definite position, or any other weird theory of modern > physics? Good analogy! The world surprises us all the time, especially the more we learn about it. It would be bizarre if it did not, (we'd probably have to abandon most of our theories). > And how could, say, the fact that brick walls feel solid enough > possibly count as evidence against such an anti-realist theory? Occam's razor. We go with the simplest theory. Imagine that you and I believe we are standing next to a wall. Our conjecture is that it has certain properties. We may need it to protect us. If we're wrong, nature will make short work of us. That we have survived this long is a strong indication that the wall really is there. In fact, on some level of practicality, it is foolish to debate the existence of the wall. Samuel Johnson did refute Berkeley. Lee
