Re: the redness of the red
On 31 Jan 2010, at 03:10, soulcatcher☠ wrote: I see a red rose. You see a red rose. Is your experience of redness the same as mine? 1. Yes, they are identical. 2. They are different as long as neural organization of our brains is slightly different, but you are potentially capable of experiencing my redness with some help from neurosurgeon who can shape your brain in the way as mine is. 3. They are different as long as some 'code' of our brains is slightly different but you (and every machine) is potentially capable of experiencing my redness if they somehow achieve the same 'code'. 5. They are different and absolutely private - you (and anybody else, be it a human or machine) don't and can't experience my redness. 6. The question doesn't have any sense because ... (please elaborate) 7. ... What is your opinion? It is between 3 and 5, I would say. Intuitively, assuming that the mechanist substitution level being high, e may expect our qualia to differ between us, as much as the shape of our body. But then logic can explain that in such place (other's experience) intuition might not be the best adviser. My (naive) answer is (3). Our experiences are identical (would a correct term be 'ontologically identical'?) as long as they have the same symbolic representation and the symbols have the same grounding in the physical world. The part about grounding is just an un-educated guess, I don't understand the subject and have only an intuitive feeling that semantics (what computation is about) is important and somehow determined by the physical world out there. You are right. Our first person consciousness stability has to rely on the infinite computations which statistically stabilize the physical world. But the semantics will be typically a creation of the person's brain. Let me explain with example. Suppose, that you: 1. simulate my brain in a computer program, so we can say that this program represents my brain in your symbols. 2. simulate a red rose 3. feed rose data into my simulated brain. I think (more believe than think) that this simulated brain won't see my redness - in fact, it won't see nothing at all cause it isn't conscious. Then digital mechanism is false, or you have chosen an incorrect level of substitution, and your brain may have to include a part of the environment. But if you: 1. make a robot that simulates my brain in my symbols i.e. behaves (relative to the physical world) in the same ways as I do 2. show a rose to the robot I think that robot will experience the same redness as me. See Jason Resch comment. Would be glad if somebody suggests something to read about 'symbols grounding', semantics, etc., I have a lot of confusion here, I've always thought that logic is a formal language for a 'syntactic' manipulation with 'strings' that acquire meaning only in our minds. Actually logic is more about the relation between syntax and semantics. Both syntax and semantics, and the relation in between are studied mathematically by logicians. I would suggest you to study a good introduction to mathematical logic like the book by Elliot Mendelson. See: http://www.amazon.com/Introduction-Mathematical-Fourth-Elliott-Mendelson/dp/0412808307 But logic is not a formal language. It is the informal mathematical study OF formal languages and theories together with their semantics/ meaning. (Proof theory, model theory, computability theory, axiomatic set theory, etc.) Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: the redness of the red
What would you say about this setup: Computer Simulation-Physical Universe-Your Brain That is to say, what if our physical universe were simulated in some alien's computer instead of being some primitive physical world? This setup doesn't sound very convincing to me: - I believe that simulated objects (agents) can't be conscious - I believe that I am consious = I'm not simulated and all the universe is not simulated. And another interesting thought experiment to think about: What if a baby from birth was never allowed to see the real world, but instead were given VR goggles providing a realistic interactive environment, entirely generated from a computer simulation. Would that infant be unconscious of the things it saw? This argument sound better, but still: 1. Goggles are not enough - baby learns via active interaction with the outside world, i.e. motor function matters and you should provide baby with a full-body armor that completely simulates the environment and makes interaction consistent (so haptic, proprioceptive and visual experiences don't contradict each other). But that's hard and maybe impossible - you can't (or can?) completely prevent the contaminating influence of the world - for example, you should feed the baby. 2. The most important is that baby has nervous system that evolved for a very long time and already somehow encodes external symbols. You just substituting real input with virtual input but that virtual input is already properly encoded and speaks the symbolic language that is grounded in real world and comprehensible by baby's brain. 3. Baby, itself, is real and made from matter and, maybe, real baby in VR != virtual baby in VR. In the other words, there is a special class of real Turing machine implementations that posses the meaning grounded in the environment. OK, i agree that it's very tempting to accept computationalism, but i'm still not ready, maybe gotta try harder ) -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: the redness of the red
On Mon, Feb 1, 2010 at 8:05 AM, soulcatcher☠ soulcatche...@gmail.comwrote: What would you say about this setup: Computer Simulation-Physical Universe-Your Brain That is to say, what if our physical universe were simulated in some alien's computer instead of being some primitive physical world? This setup doesn't sound very convincing to me: - I believe that simulated objects (agents) can't be conscious - I believe that I am consious = I'm not simulated and all the universe is not simulated. And another interesting thought experiment to think about: What if a baby from birth was never allowed to see the real world, but instead were given VR goggles providing a realistic interactive environment, entirely generated from a computer simulation. Would that infant be unconscious of the things it saw? This argument sound better, but still: 1. Goggles are not enough - baby learns via active interaction with the outside world, i.e. motor function matters and you should provide baby with a full-body armor that completely simulates the environment and makes interaction consistent (so haptic, proprioceptive and visual experiences don't contradict each other). But that's hard and maybe impossible - you can't (or can?) completely prevent the contaminating influence of the world - for example, you should feed the baby. 2. The most important is that baby has nervous system that evolved for a very long time and already somehow encodes external symbols. You just substituting real input with virtual input but that virtual input is already properly encoded and speaks the symbolic language that is grounded in real world and comprehensible by baby's brain. 3. Baby, itself, is real and made from matter and, maybe, real baby in VR != virtual baby in VR. In the other words, there is a special class of real Turing machine implementations that posses the meaning grounded in the environment. Maybe we have definitions for what is meant by simulation. I say this because of your last comment about meaning needing to be grounded in an environment. Within realistic computer simulations there is an environment which encodes many of the same relations we are used to. Concreteness of objects, Newtonian mechanics ( http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Ae6ovaDBiDE ), light effects ( http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lvI1l0nAd1c ) etc. are all embedded within the code that informs the simulation how to evolve, just as the laws of physics would in a physical world. Do you see the meaning of physical laws being somehow different from the programmed laws that simulate an environment? Jason -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: the redness of the red
Do you see the meaning of physical laws being somehow different from the programmed laws that simulate an environment? Yes, I feel that simulated mind is not identical to the real one. Simulation is only the extension of the mind - just a tool, a mental crutch, a pluggable module that gives you additional abilities. For example, if I had the computation power of my brain sufficient enough, I could simulate other minds entirely in my mind (in imagination, whatever) - but these imaginary minds won't be conscious, will they? In the other words: 1. I accept that computation is a description (the impretaive one) of reality, like math (declarative) or human language. 2. I don't believe (for now) that it has any meaning (and consciousness) per se. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: the redness of the red
On Mon, Feb 1, 2010 at 9:27 AM, soulcatcher☠ soulcatche...@gmail.comwrote: Do you see the meaning of physical laws being somehow different from the programmed laws that simulate an environment? Yes, I feel that simulated mind is not identical to the real one. Simulation is only the extension of the mind - just a tool, a mental crutch, a pluggable module that gives you additional abilities. For example, if I had the computation power of my brain sufficient enough, I could simulate other minds entirely in my mind (in imagination, whatever) - but these imaginary minds won't be conscious, will they? I think that depends on the level of resolution to which you are simulating them. The people you see in your dreams aren't conscious, but if a super intelligence could simulate another's mind to the resolution of their neurons, I think those simulated persons would be conscious. In the other words: 1. I accept that computation is a description (the impretaive one) of reality, like math (declarative) or human language. There is a difference between computation as a description (say a print out or CD containing a program's source code) and the computation as an action or process. The CD wouldn't be conscious, but if you loaded it into a computer and executed it, I think it would be. 2. I don't believe (for now) that it has any meaning (and consciousness) per se. So you think the software mind in a software environment would never question the redness of red, when the robot brain would? Jason -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: the redness of the red
I think those simulated persons would be conscious. The possibility of superintelligence that creates worlds in its dreams kinda freaks me out :) So you think the software mind in a software environment would never question the redness of red, when the robot brain would? No, I think that good enough simulation of me must question the redness of the red simply by definition - because I'm questioning and it simulates my behavior. Nevertheless, I think that this simulation won't be conscious and has only descriptive power, like a reflection in the mirror (bad example but confers the idea). But I can't tell what exactly is the difference, what is that obscure physicalist principle that I meant speaking about symbol grounding in the real world and that makes me (and not my simulation) conscious. ok, suppose we'll record a day in the life of my simulation and then replay it - will it still be conscious? -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: the redness of the red
soulcatcher? wrote: Do you see the meaning of physical laws being somehow different from the programmed laws that simulate an environment? Yes, I feel that simulated mind is not identical to the real one. Simulation is only the extension of the mind - just a tool, a mental crutch, a pluggable module that gives you additional abilities. For example, if I had the computation power of my brain sufficient enough, I could simulate other minds entirely in my mind (in imagination, whatever) - but these imaginary minds won't be conscious, will they? In the other words: 1. I accept that computation is a description (the impretaive one) of reality, like math (declarative) or human language. 2. I don't believe (for now) that it has any meaning (and consciousness) per se. I would say that it gets its meaning (interpretation) from you. The meaning you assign it comes from your internal model of the world you interact with. This is partly hardwired by evolution and partly learned from your experience. Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: the redness of the red
On Mon, Feb 1, 2010 at 12:10 PM, soulcatcher☠ soulcatche...@gmail.comwrote: I think those simulated persons would be conscious. The possibility of superintelligence that creates worlds in its dreams kinda freaks me out :) Carl Sagan in Cosmos said that in the Hindu religion, there are an infinite number of Gods, each dreaming their own universe: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4E-_DdX8Ke0 So you think the software mind in a software environment would never question the redness of red, when the robot brain would? No, I think that good enough simulation of me must question the redness of the red simply by definition - because I'm questioning and it simulates my behavior. Nevertheless, I think that this simulation won't be conscious and has only descriptive power, like a reflection in the mirror (bad example but confers the idea). But I can't tell what exactly is the difference, what is that obscure physicalist principle that I meant speaking about symbol grounding in the real world and that makes me (and not my simulation) conscious. ok, suppose we'll record a day in the life of my simulation and then replay it - will it still be conscious? I don't think your recording will be conscious. It lacks the causal relations that give meaning to its symbols. I believe the symbols are grounded and related to each other through their interactions in the processing by the CPU/Turing machine/physical laws. Do you think the redness of red is a physical property of red light or an internal property of you (the organization of neurons in your brain)? Jason -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: the redness of the red
On Sat, Jan 30, 2010 at 8:10 PM, soulcatcher☠ soulcatche...@gmail.comwrote: Let me explain with example. Suppose, that you: 1. simulate my brain in a computer program, so we can say that this program represents my brain in your symbols. 2. simulate a red rose 3. feed rose data into my simulated brain. I think (more believe than think) that this simulated brain won't see my redness - in fact, it won't see nothing at all cause it isn't conscious. But if you: 1. make a robot that simulates my brain in my symbols i.e. behaves (relative to the physical world) in the same ways as I do 2. show a rose to the robot I think that robot will experience the same redness as me. Would be glad if somebody suggests something to read about 'symbols grounding', semantics, etc., I have a lot of confusion here, I've always thought that logic is a formal language for a 'syntactic' manipulation with 'strings' that acquire meaning only in our minds. When I play a video game I am conscious. Presumably I would still be conscious even using a fully immersive system like the vertebrain system described on this page ( http://marshallbrain.com/discard8.htm ). If that is true, and you agree with me so far, do you think a brain in a vat ( http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Brain_in_a_vat ) would be conscious? Would it be conscious whether its optic nerve were connected to a webcam or connected to the TV/OUT port of a video game? What about a human brain that spent its whole life as a brain in a vat from the time it was born (assuming it were given a robot body for input, or assuming it was given a computer game realistic reality)? I am curious at what point you think the consciousness would cease. If you agree that the brain in the vat would be conscious in all cases (even when given input from a video game) and you agree that a robot body with a software brain would be conscious, why would it stop working when you put a software brain in the same position as the brain in a vat? Jason -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: the redness of the red
Jason Resch wrote: On Sat, Jan 30, 2010 at 8:10 PM, soulcatcher☠ soulcatche...@gmail.com mailto:soulcatche...@gmail.com wrote: Let me explain with example. Suppose, that you: 1. simulate my brain in a computer program, so we can say that this program represents my brain in your symbols. 2. simulate a red rose 3. feed rose data into my simulated brain. I think (more believe than think) that this simulated brain won't see my redness - in fact, it won't see nothing at all cause it isn't conscious. But if you: 1. make a robot that simulates my brain in my symbols i.e. behaves (relative to the physical world) in the same ways as I do 2. show a rose to the robot I think that robot will experience the same redness as me. Would be glad if somebody suggests something to read about 'symbols grounding', semantics, etc., I have a lot of confusion here, I've always thought that logic is a formal language for a 'syntactic' manipulation with 'strings' that acquire meaning only in our minds. When I play a video game I am conscious. Presumably I would still be conscious even using a fully immersive system like the vertebrain system described on this page ( http://marshallbrain.com/discard8.htm ). If that is true, and you agree with me so far, do you think a brain in a vat ( http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Brain_in_a_vat ) would be conscious? Would it be conscious whether its optic nerve were connected to a webcam or connected to the TV/OUT port of a video game? What about a human brain that spent its whole life as a brain in a vat from the time it was born (assuming it were given a robot body for input, or assuming it was given a computer game realistic reality)? I am curious at what point you think the consciousness would cease. I think that if the brain in a vat had sufficient efferent/afferent nerve connections so that it was able to both perceive and and act in the world (either real or virtual) then it would be conscious. If it were very restricted, e.g. it only go to play the same virtual video game over and over, it's consciousness would be similarly limited (I think there are degrees of consciousness). And if it were too limited it would crash. Brent If you agree that the brain in the vat would be conscious in all cases (even when given input from a video game) and you agree that a robot body with a software brain would be conscious, why would it stop working when you put a software brain in the same position as the brain in a vat? Jason -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: the redness of the red
On Sat, Jan 30, 2010 at 8:10 PM, soulcatcher☠ soulcatche...@gmail.comwrote: I see a red rose. You see a red rose. Is your experience of redness the same as mine? 1. Yes, they are identical. 2. They are different as long as neural organization of our brains is slightly different, but you are potentially capable of experiencing my redness with some help from neurosurgeon who can shape your brain in the way as mine is. 3. They are different as long as some 'code' of our brains is slightly different but you (and every machine) is potentially capable of experiencing my redness if they somehow achieve the same 'code'. 5. They are different and absolutely private - you (and anybody else, be it a human or machine) don't and can't experience my redness. 6. The question doesn't have any sense because ... (please elaborate) 7. ... What is your opinion? My (naive) answer is (3). Our experiences are identical (would a correct term be 'ontologically identical'?) as long as they have the same symbolic representation and the symbols have the same grounding in the physical world. The part about grounding is just an un-educated guess, I don't understand the subject and have only an intuitive feeling that semantics (what computation is about) is important and somehow determined by the physical world out there. Let me explain with example. Suppose, that you: 1. simulate my brain in a computer program, so we can say that this program represents my brain in your symbols. 2. simulate a red rose 3. feed rose data into my simulated brain. I think (more believe than think) that this simulated brain won't see my redness - in fact, it won't see nothing at all cause it isn't conscious. But if you: 1. make a robot that simulates my brain in my symbols i.e. behaves (relative to the physical world) in the same ways as I do 2. show a rose to the robot I think that robot will experience the same redness as me. Would be glad if somebody suggests something to read about 'symbols grounding', semantics, etc., I have a lot of confusion here, I've always thought that logic is a formal language for a 'syntactic' manipulation with 'strings' that acquire meaning only in our minds. I have to disagree with your intuition that grounding in the physical world is required. What would you say about the possibility that our whole universe is running in some computer? According to your intuition: Physical Universe-Your Brain = Conscious Physical Universe-Robot Brain = Conscious Physical Universe-Computer Simulation-Software Brain = Not Conscious What would you say about this setup: Computer Simulation-Physical Universe-Your Brain That is to say, what if our physical universe were simulated in some alien's computer instead of being some primitive physical world? Also, what would the non-conscious software brain say if someone asked it what it saw? Would the software simulation of your brain ever feel bewilderment over its sensations or wonder about consciousness? Would it ever compose an e-mail on topics such as the redness of red or would that activity be impossible for the software brain fed simulated input? If you expect different behavior in any conceivable situation between the robot brain fed input from a camera, and the software brain fed input from the simulation, assuming the programming and input are identical, I think this leads to a contradiction. Equivalent Turing machines should evolve identically given the same input. Therefore there should be no case in which the robot would write an e-mail questioning the redness of red, but the software simulation would not. Jason -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: the redness of the red
On Sun, Jan 31, 2010 at 5:45 PM, Jason Resch jasonre...@gmail.com wrote: On Sat, Jan 30, 2010 at 8:10 PM, soulcatcher☠ soulcatche...@gmail.comwrote: I see a red rose. You see a red rose. Is your experience of redness the same as mine? 1. Yes, they are identical. 2. They are different as long as neural organization of our brains is slightly different, but you are potentially capable of experiencing my redness with some help from neurosurgeon who can shape your brain in the way as mine is. 3. They are different as long as some 'code' of our brains is slightly different but you (and every machine) is potentially capable of experiencing my redness if they somehow achieve the same 'code'. 5. They are different and absolutely private - you (and anybody else, be it a human or machine) don't and can't experience my redness. 6. The question doesn't have any sense because ... (please elaborate) 7. ... What is your opinion? My (naive) answer is (3). Our experiences are identical (would a correct term be 'ontologically identical'?) as long as they have the same symbolic representation and the symbols have the same grounding in the physical world. The part about grounding is just an un-educated guess, I don't understand the subject and have only an intuitive feeling that semantics (what computation is about) is important and somehow determined by the physical world out there. Let me explain with example. Suppose, that you: 1. simulate my brain in a computer program, so we can say that this program represents my brain in your symbols. 2. simulate a red rose 3. feed rose data into my simulated brain. I think (more believe than think) that this simulated brain won't see my redness - in fact, it won't see nothing at all cause it isn't conscious. But if you: 1. make a robot that simulates my brain in my symbols i.e. behaves (relative to the physical world) in the same ways as I do 2. show a rose to the robot I think that robot will experience the same redness as me. Would be glad if somebody suggests something to read about 'symbols grounding', semantics, etc., I have a lot of confusion here, I've always thought that logic is a formal language for a 'syntactic' manipulation with 'strings' that acquire meaning only in our minds. I have to disagree with your intuition that grounding in the physical world is required. What would you say about the possibility that our whole universe is running in some computer? According to your intuition: Physical Universe-Your Brain = Conscious Physical Universe-Robot Brain = Conscious Physical Universe-Computer Simulation-Software Brain = Not Conscious What would you say about this setup: Computer Simulation-Physical Universe-Your Brain That is to say, what if our physical universe were simulated in some alien's computer instead of being some primitive physical world? Also, what would the non-conscious software brain say if someone asked it what it saw? Would the software simulation of your brain ever feel bewilderment over its sensations or wonder about consciousness? Would it ever compose an e-mail on topics such as the redness of red or would that activity be impossible for the software brain fed simulated input? If you expect different behavior in any conceivable situation between the robot brain fed input from a camera, and the software brain fed input from the simulation, assuming the programming and input are identical, I think this leads to a contradiction. Equivalent Turing machines should evolve identically given the same input. Therefore there should be no case in which the robot would write an e-mail questioning the redness of red, but the software simulation would not. Jason And another interesting thought experiment to think about: What if a baby from birth was never allowed to see the real world, but instead were given VR goggles providing a realistic interactive environment, entirely generated from a computer simulation. Would that infant be unconscious of the things it saw? Jason -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: the redness of the red
On Sat, Jan 30, 2010 at 8:10 PM, soulcatcher☠ soulcatche...@gmail.comwrote: I see a red rose. You see a red rose. Is your experience of redness the same as mine? 1. Yes, they are identical. 2. They are different as long as neural organization of our brains is slightly different, but you are potentially capable of experiencing my redness with some help from neurosurgeon who can shape your brain in the way as mine is. 3. They are different as long as some 'code' of our brains is slightly different but you (and every machine) is potentially capable of experiencing my redness if they somehow achieve the same 'code'. 5. They are different and absolutely private - you (and anybody else, be it a human or machine) don't and can't experience my redness. 6. The question doesn't have any sense because ... (please elaborate) 7. ... What is your opinion? I think our brains are wired similarly enough that most people experience colors similarly, excepting the tetrachromats and color blind. Consider the following other sensations, and how similar you think they might be between people: a needle prick, coldness, a high-pitched sound, hunger, complete darkness. Is complete darkness between two people more or less the same, what about the sound of an 8 KHz tone? To answer this question, I would say somewhere between 1 and 2, they are probably very close between any two random normal humans but perhaps not identical. This is not to say that an alien with a differently evolved and structured brain could not have a completely different experience when looking at a rose; I just think our brains are wired similarly enough that red to you could be as much red to me as coldness to you is coldness to me. The higher the information content of the experience, however, the more room there is for possible difference. Jason My (naive) answer is (3). Our experiences are identical (would a correct term be 'ontologically identical'?) as long as they have the same symbolic representation and the symbols have the same grounding in the physical world. The part about grounding is just an un-educated guess, I don't understand the subject and have only an intuitive feeling that semantics (what computation is about) is important and somehow determined by the physical world out there. Let me explain with example. Suppose, that you: 1. simulate my brain in a computer program, so we can say that this program represents my brain in your symbols. 2. simulate a red rose 3. feed rose data into my simulated brain. I think (more believe than think) that this simulated brain won't see my redness - in fact, it won't see nothing at all cause it isn't conscious. But if you: 1. make a robot that simulates my brain in my symbols i.e. behaves (relative to the physical world) in the same ways as I do 2. show a rose to the robot I think that robot will experience the same redness as me. Would be glad if somebody suggests something to read about 'symbols grounding', semantics, etc., I have a lot of confusion here, I've always thought that logic is a formal language for a 'syntactic' manipulation with 'strings' that acquire meaning only in our minds. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.comeverything-list%2bunsubscr...@googlegroups.com . For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
the redness of the red
I see a red rose. You see a red rose. Is your experience of redness the same as mine? 1. Yes, they are identical. 2. They are different as long as neural organization of our brains is slightly different, but you are potentially capable of experiencing my redness with some help from neurosurgeon who can shape your brain in the way as mine is. 3. They are different as long as some 'code' of our brains is slightly different but you (and every machine) is potentially capable of experiencing my redness if they somehow achieve the same 'code'. 5. They are different and absolutely private - you (and anybody else, be it a human or machine) don't and can't experience my redness. 6. The question doesn't have any sense because ... (please elaborate) 7. ... What is your opinion? My (naive) answer is (3). Our experiences are identical (would a correct term be 'ontologically identical'?) as long as they have the same symbolic representation and the symbols have the same grounding in the physical world. The part about grounding is just an un-educated guess, I don't understand the subject and have only an intuitive feeling that semantics (what computation is about) is important and somehow determined by the physical world out there. Let me explain with example. Suppose, that you: 1. simulate my brain in a computer program, so we can say that this program represents my brain in your symbols. 2. simulate a red rose 3. feed rose data into my simulated brain. I think (more believe than think) that this simulated brain won't see my redness - in fact, it won't see nothing at all cause it isn't conscious. But if you: 1. make a robot that simulates my brain in my symbols i.e. behaves (relative to the physical world) in the same ways as I do 2. show a rose to the robot I think that robot will experience the same redness as me. Would be glad if somebody suggests something to read about 'symbols grounding', semantics, etc., I have a lot of confusion here, I've always thought that logic is a formal language for a 'syntactic' manipulation with 'strings' that acquire meaning only in our minds. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: the redness of the red
soulcatcher? wrote: I see a red rose. You see a red rose. Is your experience of redness the same as mine? 1. Yes, they are identical. 2. They are different as long as neural organization of our brains is slightly different, but you are potentially capable of experiencing my redness with some help from neurosurgeon who can shape your brain in the way as mine is. 3. They are different as long as some 'code' of our brains is slightly different but you (and every machine) is potentially capable of experiencing my redness if they somehow achieve the same 'code'. 5. They are different and absolutely private - you (and anybody else, be it a human or machine) don't and can't experience my redness. 6. The question doesn't have any sense because ... (please elaborate) 7. ... What is your opinion? My (naive) answer is (3). Our experiences are identical (would a correct term be 'ontologically identical'?) as long as they have the same symbolic representation and the symbols have the same grounding in the physical world. The part about grounding is just an un-educated guess, I don't understand the subject and have only an intuitive feeling that semantics (what computation is about) is important and somehow determined by the physical world out there. Let me explain with example. Suppose, that you: 1. simulate my brain in a computer program, so we can say that this program represents my brain in your symbols. 2. simulate a red rose 3. feed rose data into my simulated brain. I think (more believe than think) that this simulated brain won't see my redness - in fact, it won't see nothing at all cause it isn't conscious. But if you: 1. make a robot that simulates my brain in my symbols i.e. behaves (relative to the physical world) in the same ways as I do 2. show a rose to the robot I think that robot will experience the same redness as me. Would be glad if somebody suggests something to read about 'symbols grounding', semantics, etc., I have a lot of confusion here, I've always thought that logic is a formal language for a 'syntactic' manipulation with 'strings' that acquire meaning only in our minds. I agree with your intuition that the semantics of thought and consciousness must be grounded in interaction with the world and is relative to that world. It does leave a puzzle about how private internal thoughts, that seem to have no reference to the external world, e.g. pure mathematics, get grounded. I guess it is via indirect chains of reference. Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
