Re: [Fis] Mark Johnson. Less is more

[Joseph Brenner]

Dear Mark,

I find much novelty in your interesting approach as I read your note of 
October 1 and this one. This novelty should not be lost by imposing standard 
patterns of interpretation on it. If we really believe "it's time we confess 
in science just how little we know about language, that we explore 
language's mysteries", we might do well to consider the idea of Lao Tzu 
(Wang. 2013. /The Logic of Tao Philosophy/ that the obscurity, contradiction 
and ambiguity in linguistic description is not a 'mystery' but an indication 
of the proper way to understand the complex logical nature of reality.


Any proper theory of information should be capable of giving 
non-metaphorical meaning to the phrase, applicable to Chinese art and used 
in poetry by Browning and architecture by van der Rohe that "less is more".


Briefly,

Joseph

- Original Message - 
From: "Mark Johnson" 

To: "fis" 
Sent: Thursday, October 15, 2015 12:57 AM
Subject: Re: [Fis] Shannon-Weavers' Levels A, B, C.



Maybe I've missed something, but the subsumption I mentioned
(referring to Bateson) was not between A, B and C: these are
co-existent interacting dynamics as I understand them, and certainly a
very rigorous and powerful generative model.

I was worrying about subsumption of Bateson's "imagination" into
"rigour" Loet's model does have 'imagination' in it in the
generation of redundancies. But does it include the human imagination
capable of conceiving a model of itself?

I wonder if a possible answer to the question lies in Loet's work.
Human embodiment is a constraint which an abstract rigorous model can
never have. Within dynamics of mutual redundancy, won't the
complexities of mutual redundancies of embodied existence will always
outweigh the mutual redundancies that can be abstractly modelled?

best wishes,

Mark


On Wed, Oct 14, 2015 at 9:32 PM, Robert E. Ulanowicz  
wrote:



On 2015-10-14, at 12:38 PM, Marcus Abundis wrote:


RE Mark Johnson's post of Thu Oct 1 09:47:13 on Bateson and imagination

Two quick remarks:

1. It's not at all clear to me that C is subsumptive of B.

2. I would lobby for Shannon/Bayesian relationships as an intermediary
between A. and B (i.e., preliminary to "meaning").

Cheers to all,
Bob U.


. . .
 – Me Too!

RE Loet & Stan's postings beginning Thu Oct 1 21:19:50 . . .
>  I suggest to distinguish between three levels (following Weaver): <
> A. (Shannon-type) information processing ; <
> B. meaning sharing using languages;<
> C. translations among coded communications.<
> So, here we have a subsumptive hierarchy"<

I was wondering if this note means to imply an *all inclusive* list of
traits to be considered in modeling information? Or, alternatively . . 
.

what would such an all inclusive list look like?

Thanks!



Marcus Abundis
about.me/marcus.abundis



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Re: [Fis] Shannon-Weavers' Levels A, B, C.

[Loet Leydesdorff]

Dear Marcus, Mark, Bob, and colleagues, 

 

My ambition was a bit more modest: the paper does not contain a theory of 
meaning or a theory of everything. It is an attempt to solve a problem in the 
relation between sociology (i.c. Luhmann) focusing on meaning processing (and 
autopoiesis) and (Shannon-type) information theory. Luhmann left this problem 
behind by defining information as a selection, while in my opinion entropy is a 
measure of diversity and therefore variation. I was very happy to find the 
clues in Weaver’s contributions; Katherine Hayles has signaled this previously. 

 

Another author important in the background is Herbert Simon who specified the 
model of vertical differentiation (1973), but without having Maturana & 
Varela’s theory of autopoiesis for specification of the dynamics. I agree with 
Luhmann that one has to incorporate ideas from Husserl about horizons of 
meaning and Parsons’ symbolically generalize media as structuring these 
horizons for understanding the differentia specifica of the social as 
non-biological.

 

Mark more or less answers his own questions, don’t you? The constraints of the 
body provide the contingency. The options are not given, but constructed and 
need thus to be perceived, either by individuals or at the organizational (that 
is, social) level. The contingency also positions (as different from others) 
with whom we can then entertain “double contingencies” as the basis for 
generating variation in the communication. How this works and feeds back on the 
persons involved seems to me the subject of other disciplines like psychology 
and neurology. The subject of study is then no longer (or no longer 
exclusively) res cogitans.

 

For example, if a deaf person is provided with a cochlear implant, s/he may 
enter other domains of perception and be able to provide other contributions to 
the communication. The double contingencies between him/her and others can be 
expected to change.

 

Bob and his colleagues define information (2008; p. 28) as “natural selection 
assembling the very constraints on the release of energy that then constitutes 
work and the propagation of organization.” This may have meaning in a 
biological framework, in which selection is considered “natural” resulting in 
organization(s). In the cultural domain, organization (of meaning) remains 
constructed and contingent; selection is never “natural”, but based on codified 
expectations. The codes steer the system from above. Differently from 
biological and engineered systems, this next-order level does not have to be 
slower than the systems level (Simon). Expectations can proliferate 
intersubjectively at higher speeds than we can follow. For example, we have to 
catch up with the literature. Stock exchanges operate faster than local markets 
because of the more sophisticated codes that mediate the financial exchanges.

 

Maturana (1978, at p. 56) introduced the biologist as super-observer who does 
not participate in the biological phenomena under study, but constructs them: 
“Thus, talking human beings dwell in two non-intersecting phenomenal domains.” 
(italic added). Systems which operate exclusively in terms of expectations and 
anticipations of future states cannot be found in nature; they can only be 
considered reflexively. They allow us to de- and reconstruct in terms of 
improving the models, and thus sometimes find new options for technological 
intervention. Paradoxically, biology as a science is itself part of this 
cultural domain. For example, we have access to our body only in terms of 
perceptions (that are steered by expectations) and at the other end by 
knowledge-based interventions.

 

This is my second posting for this week. 

 

Best,

Loet

 

  _  

Loet Leydesdorff 

Professor Emeritus, University of Amsterdam
Amsterdam School of Communication Research (ASCoR)

  l...@leydesdorff.net ;  
 http://www.leydesdorff.net/ 
Honorary Professor,   SPRU, University of 
Sussex; 

Guest Professor   Zhejiang Univ., Hangzhou; 
Visiting Professor,   ISTIC, Beijing;

Visiting Professor,   Birkbeck, University of London; 

  
http://scholar.google.com/citations?user=ych9gNYJ&hl=en

 

From: Fis [mailto:fis-boun...@listas.unizar.es] On Behalf Of Marcus Abundis
Sent: Thursday, October 15, 2015 7:11 AM
To: fis@listas.unizar.es
Subject: [Fis] Shannon-Weavers' Levels A, B, C.

 

Hey Mark,

Sorry if I confused things by commenting on Bateson AND THEN 
Shannon-Weaver. In my mind those were two different matters, and did not merit 
my calling them out as such.

 

In general . . . 

I too never saw Shanon-Weaver's Levels A, B, C as complete. In fact, I 
thought that portrayal as barely (oddly) half-hearted, in co

Re: [Fis] Shannon-Weavers' Levels A, B, C.

[Bob Logan]

Dear Loet - I agree with your remarks: "Bob and his colleagues define 
information (2008; p. 28) as “natural selection assembling the very constraints 
on the release of energy that then constitutes work and the propagation of 
organization.” This may have meaning in a biological framework, in which 
selection is considered “natural” resulting in organization(s). In the cultural 
domain, organization (of meaning) remains constructed and contingent; selection 
is never “natural”, but based on codified expectations."

Our definition that you kindly referred do was meant strictly for the biotic 
domain and we contrasted it with symbolic information.

Thank for the mention of our work and best wishes - Bob


__

Robert K. Logan
Prof. Emeritus - Physics - U. of Toronto 
Fellow University of St. Michael's College
Chief Scientist - sLab at OCAD
http://utoronto.academia.edu/RobertKLogan
www.physics.utoronto.ca/Members/logan
www.researchgate.net/profile/Robert_Logan5/publications










On 2015-10-15, at 8:38 AM, Loet Leydesdorff wrote:

> Dear Marcus, Mark, Bob, and colleagues,
>  
> My ambition was a bit more modest: the paper does not contain a theory of 
> meaning or a theory of everything. It is an attempt to solve a problem in the 
> relation between sociology (i.c. Luhmann) focusing on meaning processing (and 
> autopoiesis) and (Shannon-type) information theory. Luhmann left this problem 
> behind by defining information as a selection, while in my opinion entropy is 
> a measure of diversity and therefore variation. I was very happy to find the 
> clues in Weaver’s contributions; Katherine Hayles has signaled this 
> previously.
>  
> Another author important in the background is Herbert Simon who specified the 
> model of vertical differentiation (1973), but without having Maturana & 
> Varela’s theory of autopoiesis for specification of the dynamics. I agree 
> with Luhmann that one has to incorporate ideas from Husserl about horizons of 
> meaning and Parsons’ symbolically generalize media as structuring these 
> horizons for understanding the differentia specifica of the social as 
> non-biological.
>  
> Mark more or less answers his own questions, don’t you? The constraints of 
> the body provide the contingency. The options are not given, but constructed 
> and need thus to be perceived, either by individuals or at the organizational 
> (that is, social) level. The contingency also positions (as different from 
> others) with whom we can then entertain “double contingencies” as the basis 
> for generating variation in the communication. How this works and feeds back 
> on the persons involved seems to me the subject of other disciplines like 
> psychology and neurology. The subject of study is then no longer (or no 
> longer exclusively) res cogitans.
>  
> For example, if a deaf person is provided with a cochlear implant, s/he may 
> enter other domains of perception and be able to provide other contributions 
> to the communication. The double contingencies between him/her and others can 
> be expected to change.
>  
> Bob and his colleagues define information (2008; p. 28) as “natural selection 
> assembling the very constraints on the release of energy that then 
> constitutes work and the propagation of organization.” This may have meaning 
> in a biological framework, in which selection is considered “natural” 
> resulting in organization(s). In the cultural domain, organization (of 
> meaning) remains constructed and contingent; selection is never “natural”, 
> but based on codified expectations. The codes steer the system from above. 
> Differently from biological and engineered systems, this next-order level 
> does not have to be slower than the systems level (Simon). Expectations can 
> proliferate intersubjectively at higher speeds than we can follow. For 
> example, we have to catch up with the literature. Stock exchanges operate 
> faster than local markets because of the more sophisticated codes that 
> mediate the financial exchanges.
>  
> Maturana (1978, at p. 56) introduced the biologist as super-observer who does 
> not participate in the biological phenomena under study, but constructs them: 
> “Thus, talking human beings dwell in two non-intersecting phenomenal 
> domains.” (italic added). Systems which operate exclusively in terms of 
> expectations and anticipations of future states cannot be found in nature; 
> they can only be considered reflexively. They allow us to de- and reconstruct 
> in terms of improving the models, and thus sometimes find new options for 
> technological intervention. Paradoxically, biology as a science is itself 
> part of this cultural domain. For example, we have access to our body only in 
> terms of perceptions (that are steered by expectations) and at the other end 
> by knowledge-based interventions.
>  
> This is my second posting for this week.
>  
> Best,
> Loet
>  
> Loet Leydesdorff
> Professor Emeritus, University