Re: [Fis] Music : Noise = Meaning : Data

[Bruno Marchal]

Dear Stan,


> On 20 Mar 2018, at 20:22, Stanley N Salthe  wrote:
> 
> Bruno -- In this context I like to point out the constraints on our abilities 
> of perception.  First, we are physical.

That is a strong metaphysical assumption. See my paper for showing this is not 
compatible with the Digital Mechanist hypothesis in the cognitive science, 
which is my working hypothesis. 

Perception is a relative indexical relation between a (digital) machine 
(number, combinators, pattern of game of life, whatever) and other plausible, 
from its perspective, universal or not entities (infinitely many below the 
substitution level, making both matter and consciousness not Turing emulable 
(in the Mechanist perspective).

There are evidences for a physical reality, but I am not sure there are 
evidence for a primary physical reality. The use of math in physics is well 
explained if the physical appears to be a mathematical reality seen from 
internal creature represented, relatively incarnated or implemented in that 
mathematical reality.

I can prove, if you agree with very elementary arithmetic, the existence of the 
computations and the machine running them. I cannot prove the existence of a 
physical universe, but if Mechanism is true, the physical universe appearance 
can and must be explained by a statistics on all computations (seen in a first 
person way). That makes mechanism testable and indeed, thanks to Quantum 
Mechanics (without collapse) it fits very well up to now.





> Thus:
> 
> {physical {material {biological {animal {mammal {primate {human {socialized 
> {with accumulated personal history }


Ok, but you will need “magical” (non Turing emulable, nor Recoverable) ability 
in your matter to select some computation. 

You invoke the God “Matter", but if it plays a role, I am no more sure I can 
say yes to …the doctor and survive qua computation.

Mechanism and Materialism, which are often used together, can be shown 
incompatible (it is basically my PhD thesis, and it is summed up in most of my 
papers).

So it is more like

{arithmetical{dream-like{biological{conscious{physical{{animal {mammal {primate 
{human {socialized {with accumulated personal history }



> 
> Hence, actuality is for us non-existent.

? 
Is not actuality existent *for us*, phenomenologically, and non-existent 
Ontologically, I guess you mean.  I am not sure I understand well.


> We live in a constructed reality.

The whole physicalness is indeed the arithmetic seen from the internal 
arithmetical beings, but the person attached to them are not arithmetical not 
even analytical (not even third person describable in any way).

I am aware that what I say contradicts 1500 years of (Aristotelian) theology, 
but then it was enforced by 1500 years of argument per authority, sometimes 
violent.

Best, 

Bruno





> 
> STAN
> 
> On Tue, Mar 20, 2018 at 12:23 PM, Bruno Marchal  > wrote:
> Hi Dai, Hi Carl, Hi colleagues,
> 
> > On 19 Mar 2018, at 16:22, Dai Griffiths  > > wrote:
> >
> > On 15/03/18 10:11, Karl Javorszky wrote:
> >
> > >To me, it does not appear necessary to make a distinction between 
> > >“reality” and “data”
> >
> > That's a defensible position, but it does constrain 'reality' to 'that 
> > which we can perceive'. Which would rule out the reality of things that we 
> > cannot perceive, e.g. explanatory mechanisms, or the insides of black holes.
> 
> If not the whole of mathematics.
> 
> To be provocative, I would me more like thinking that the data are an 
> observer tiny distorted part of reality, especially that we can never 
> distinguishes possibly genuine data with hallucinations and dreams.
> 
> In the computationalist theory, a data is the input to some machine/number 
> program, the execution is the arithmetical semantic of some universal number 
> getting the machine and the data has its input.
> 
> Now a data can be anything, and can be interpreted, and handled, quite 
> differently, if at all, by different universal, or not, programs. I identify 
> the person by its set of beliefs, and the first person by its subset of true 
> beliefs. Incompleteness makes this working well.
> 
> 
> >
> > > just like there is no necessity for musicians to distinguish between the 
> > > note printed on the partiture,
> > > and the acoustic sound, or for Chess champions to distinguish between the 
> > > description of the position
> > > in the protocol of the game and the actual pieces one can hold in his 
> > > hands.
> >
> > I do not think that these are the same case.
> 
> I think that equating reality and data would lead to solipsism (which is 
> phenomenologically correct but ontologically incorrect).
> 
> Also, is there a reality?
> 
> And what could it be?
> 
> We can’t answer, but we can do hypothesis/theory, and with mechanism the 
> physical reality becomes a 

Re: [Fis] Welcome to Knowledge Market and the FIS Sci-coins

[Michel Petitjean]

Dear Arturo,
Sorry for my naive question, but isn't the named set theory something
different from the set theory?
Best,
Michel.

2018-03-22 7:48 GMT+01:00 :
> Dear Mark,
> the named set theory does not solve the Russell paradox.
> Therefore  it would be better to use, in such approaches, the best theory 
> available, i.e., the Fraenkel-Zermelo sets.
> In turn, the latter displays some limits: for example, the need of a set with 
> infinite elements.
> Therefore, set theory is not able to tackle information problems.
> You have to go back to other mathematical approaches.

 . . .

> Arturo Tozzi
> AA Professor Physics, University North Texas
> Pediatrician ASL Na2Nord, Italy
> Comput Intell Lab, University Manitoba
> http://arturotozzi.webnode.it/
>
> ___
> Fis mailing list
> Fis@listas.unizar.es
> http://listas.unizar.es/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/fis
>
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[Fis] Theory of named sets (TNS) and General Information Theory (GIT)

[Krassimir Markov]

Dear Mark and Colleagues,

Thank you for the nice remarks!

The concept “INFOS” had been proposed in the end of 1989.
The second part of the General Information Theory (GIT) is just the “Theory of 
INFOS”.
The are many interesting ideas about INFOS, some of them you have pointed.
Step by step I shall present them in FIS.

The fundamental triad is the very basic concept of the mathematics – remember 
the formula “y=f(x)”. 
It is the very basic model concept, too. 

Especially about your Theory of named sets (TNS) and my Multi-domain 
information model (MDIM) I want to mention:
- both represent the same idea but from different points of view -  TNS is a 
mathematical theory, MDIM is an information theory (for modeling) of the brain 
activities;
- they were invented independently in the same time in the end of seventies of 
last century – the TNS first known (for me) publication is in 1982 in Dushanbe; 
the MDIM (and GIT) first publication was in 1984 in Plovdiv; In 1988, in 
Warsaw, prof. Viktor Policarpovich Gladun had pointed on the similarity and the 
correspondence between TNS and MDIM;
-TNS had been proved by the great number of the MDIM practical realizations;
- now the Resource Definition Framework (RDF) of W3C  is a world accepted 
paradigm for representing Big Data. RDF is based just on triples! MDIM covers 
all possibilities of RDF and respectively – of TNS.

During the years, the GIT had been developed on the fundament of MDIM and on 
the experiments with its practical realizations.  

Friendly greetings
Krassimir





From: Burgin, Mark 
Sent: Thursday, March 22, 2018 12:42 AM
To: fis@listas.unizar.es 
Subject: Re: [Fis] Welcome to Knowledge Market and the FIS Sci-coins

Dear Krassimir and other FISers,

After reading the interesting contribution of Krassimir, I would like to share 
with you some of my impressions and ideas.

I like very much the term INFOS suggested by Krassimir. It’s possible to 
suggest that Krassimir assumed the following definition.
An INFOS is a system functioning (behavior) of which is regulated by 
information.
This definition implies that each INFOS has an information processor. 
Then it is possible to distinguish different categories and types of INFOS. For 
instance:
 INFOS only with acceptors/receptors
 INFOS only with effectors
 INFOS with both acceptors/receptors and effectors
Then it is possible to develop an interesting theory of INFOS. 

At the same time, the difference between reality and consciousness needs 
improvement because what many people mean using the word reality is actually 
only one of the variety of realities, namely, the physical or material reality, 
while consciousness is a part of the mental reality. It is possible to find 
more information about different realities and their interaction in the book 
(Burgin, Structural Reality, 2012). Please, don’t confuse Structural Reality 
with virtual reality.  

One more issue from the interesting contribution of Krassimir, which allows 
further development, is the structure of a model. Namely, the relation (s, e, 
r) between a model s of an entity r forms not simply a triple but a fundamental 
triad, which is also called a named set.

Why this is important? The reason to conceive the structure (s, e, r) as a 
fundamental triad or a named set is that there is an advanced mathematical 
theory of named sets, the most comprehensive exposition of which is in the book 
(Burgin, Theory of Named Sets, 2011), and it is possible to use this 
mathematical theory for studying and using models. For instance, the structure 
from Figure 1 in Krassimir’s letter is a morphism of named sets. Named set 
theory describes many properties of such morphism and categories built of named 
sets and their morphism. The structures from Figure 2 in Krassimir’s letter are 
chains of named sets, which are also studied in named set theory.

To conclude it is necessary to understand that if we want to apply mathematics 
in some area it is necessary to use adequate areas of mathematics. As Roger 
Bacon wrote, All science requires mathematics, but mathematics provides 
different devices that are suited to different input. In this respect, when you 
give good quality grains to a mathematical mill, it outputs good quality flour, 
while if you put the same grains into a mathematical petrol engine, it outputs 
trash.

The theory of named sets might be very useful for information studies because 
named sets and their chains allow adequate reflection of information and 
information processes.
 
Sincerely,
Mark


On 3/11/2018 3:34 PM, Krassimir Markov wrote:

   

  Dear Colleagues,



  This letter contains more than one theme, so it is structured as follow:

  - next step in “mental model” explanation;

  - about “Knowledge market”, FIS letters’ sequences and FIS Sci-coins.

   

  1. The next step in “mental model” explanation:

   

  Let remember shortly my letter from 05.03.2018.

   

  To avoid misunderstandings with concepts 

Re: [Fis] Welcome to Knowledge Market and the FIS Sci-coins

[tozziarturo]

Dear Mark, 

the named set theory does not solve the Russell paradox.

Therefore  it would be better to use, in such approaches, the best theory 
available, i.e., the Fraenkel-Zermelo sets. 

In turn, the latter displays some limits: for example, the need of a set with 
infinite elements. 

Therefore, set theory is not able to tackle information problems.

You have to go back to other mathematical approaches. 

  


> Il 21 marzo 2018 alle 23.42 "Burgin, Mark"  ha scritto:
> 
> Dear Krassimir and other FISers,
> 
> After reading the interesting contribution of Krassimir, I would like to 
> share with you some of my impressions and ideas.
> 
> I like very much the term INFOS suggested by Krassimir. It’s possible to 
> suggest that Krassimir assumed the following definition.
> An INFOS is a system functioning (behavior) of which is regulated by 
> information.
> This definition implies that each INFOS has an information processor.
> Then it is possible to distinguish different categories and types of 
> INFOS. For instance:
>  INFOS only with acceptors/receptors
>  INFOS only with effectors
>  INFOS with both acceptors/receptors and effectors
> Then it is possible to develop an interesting theory of INFOS.
> 
> At the same time, the difference between reality and consciousness needs 
> improvement because what many people mean using the word reality is actually 
> only one of the variety of realities, namely, the physical or material 
> reality, while consciousness is a part of the mental reality. It is possible 
> to find more information about different realities and their interaction in 
> the book (Burgin, Structural Reality, 2012). Please, don’t confuse Structural 
> Reality with virtual reality. 
> 
> One more issue from the interesting contribution of Krassimir, which 
> allows further development, is the structure of a model. Namely, the relation 
> (s, e, r) between a model s of an entity r forms not simply a triple but a 
> fundamental triad, which is also called a named set.
> 
> Why this is important? The reason to conceive the structure (s, e, r) as 
> a fundamental triad or a named set is that there is an advanced mathematical 
> theory of named sets, the most comprehensive exposition of which is in the 
> book (Burgin, Theory of Named Sets, 2011), and it is possible to use this 
> mathematical theory for studying and using models. For instance, the 
> structure from Figure 1 in Krassimir’s letter is a morphism of named sets. 
> Named set theory describes many properties of such morphism and categories 
> built of named sets and their morphism. The structures from Figure 2 in 
> Krassimir’s letter are chains of named sets, which are also studied in named 
> set theory.
> 
> To conclude it is necessary to understand that if we want to apply 
> mathematics in some area it is necessary to use adequate areas of 
> mathematics. As Roger Bacon wrote, All science requires mathematics, but 
> mathematics provides different devices that are suited to different input. In 
> this respect, when you give good quality grains to a mathematical mill, it 
> outputs good quality flour, while if you put the same grains into a 
> mathematical petrol engine, it outputs trash.
> 
> The theory of named sets might be very useful for information studies 
> because named sets and their chains allow adequate reflection of information 
> and information processes.
>  
> Sincerely,
> Mark
> 
> On 3/11/2018 3:34 PM, Krassimir Markov wrote:
> 
> > >  
> > Dear Colleagues,
> >  
> > This letter contains more than one theme, so it is structured as 
> > follow:
> > - next step in “mental model” explanation;
> > - about “Knowledge market”, FIS letters’ sequences and FIS 
> > Sci-coins.
> >  
> > 1. The next step in “mental model” explanation:
> >  
> > Let remember shortly my letter from 05.03.2018.
> >  
> > To avoid misunderstandings with concepts Subject, agent, animal, 
> > human, society, humanity, living creatures, etc., in [1] we use the 
> > abstract concept “INFOS” to denote every of them as well as all of 
> > artificial creatures which has features similar to the former ones.
> >  
> > Infos has possibility to reflect the reality via receptors and to 
> > operate with received reflections in its memory. The opposite is possible - 
> > via effectors Infos has possibility to realize in reality some of its 
> > (self-) reflections from its consciousness.
> >  
> > The commutative diagram on Figure 1 represents modeling relations. 
> > In the frame of diagram:
> > - in reality: real models: s is a model of r,
> > - in consciousness: mental models: si is a mental model of ri;
> > - between reality and consciousness: perceiving data and creating 
> > mental