Re: Where has my gbde write performance gone?
For whatever it is worth, if I use geli rather than gbde I get normal (~30MB/s) performance. I also get the same slow gbde performance on 8.1-PRERELEASE as of last night. I've make a kernel swaping in files from 7.2 source to see if I got any improvement. I pulled in: geom_dev.c (with some hacks to get it compile) geom_slice.c geom_io.c None of those improved performance. If anyone has any suggestions for things to try, let me know. I am fine with switching to geli for some applications but I have about 12TB under gbde. That would be somewhat of a bear to copy over into geli. On Mon, May 17, 2010 at 7:32 PM, Joseph Gleason fired...@gmail.com wrote: Sometime between FreeBSD 7.2-RELEASE-p4 and 8.0-RELEASE write performance of gbde encrypted devices seems to have dropped significantly. A system I have running 7.2 seems to run gbde drives at or near the drive max rate (30-40MB/s) while I am seeing less than 10% of that on 8.0 systems. I get the same slow writes on 8.0-RELEASE-p2 as well as 8.0-RELEASE. Here is an example on a fresh 8.0 install which shows gbde taking the drive write performance of 40 MB/s down to 2.6 MB/s: lab# uname -a FreeBSD lab.int.fireduck.com 8.0-RELEASE FreeBSD 8.0-RELEASE #0: Sat Nov 21 15:02:08 UTC 2009 r...@mason.cse.buffalo.edu:/usr/obj/usr/src/sys/GENERIC amd64 lab# dd if=/dev/urandom of=/dev/ad4s1d bs=32k count=32k 32768+0 records in 32768+0 records out 1073741824 bytes transferred in 25.130537 secs (42726577 bytes/sec) lab# gbde init /dev/ad4s1d Enter new passphrase: Reenter new passphrase: lab# gbde attach /dev/ad4s1d Enter passphrase: lab# dd if=/dev/urandom of=/dev/ad4s1d.bde bs=32k count=32k 32768+0 records in 32768+0 records out 1073741824 bytes transferred in 401.097004 secs (2677013 bytes/sec) iostat from while that last 'dd' was running: tty ad4 cpu tin tout KB/t tps MB/s us ni sy in id 0 22 5.67 483 2.67 0 0 4 1 96 0 66 5.67 509 2.82 0 0 4 1 95 0 22 5.69 514 2.86 0 0 6 1 94 0 22 5.67 506 2.80 0 0 6 1 93 0 22 5.67 472 2.61 0 0 4 1 95 iostat on a FreeBSD 7.2-RELEASE-p4 box doing a similar operation: tin tout KB/t tps MB/s us ni sy in id 0 22 29.54 1208 34.86 3 0 56 2 39 0 22 29.56 1177 33.97 3 0 57 1 39 0 22 29.54 1201 34.64 3 0 58 2 37 0 22 29.57 1144 33.04 2 0 51 3 44 0 22 29.56 1126 32.52 3 0 54 2 42 0 22 29.53 1179 34.01 3 0 53 2 42 0 22 29.57 1165 33.65 2 0 58 2 38 One thing I notice is the larger block size the 7.2 writes but I don't imagine that would be that significant. I've been using FreeBSD in various amateurish and wrong ways since 2.2, so I wouldn't rule out me doing something stupid. If so, I'd love to know what. ___ freebsd-questions@freebsd.org mailing list http://lists.freebsd.org/mailman/listinfo/freebsd-questions To unsubscribe, send any mail to freebsd-questions-unsubscr...@freebsd.org
Where has my gbde write performance gone?
Sometime between FreeBSD 7.2-RELEASE-p4 and 8.0-RELEASE write performance of gbde encrypted devices seems to have dropped significantly. A system I have running 7.2 seems to run gbde drives at or near the drive max rate (30-40MB/s) while I am seeing less than 10% of that on 8.0 systems. I get the same slow writes on 8.0-RELEASE-p2 as well as 8.0-RELEASE. Here is an example on a fresh 8.0 install which shows gbde taking the drive write performance of 40 MB/s down to 2.6 MB/s: lab# uname -a FreeBSD lab.int.fireduck.com 8.0-RELEASE FreeBSD 8.0-RELEASE #0: Sat Nov 21 15:02:08 UTC 2009 r...@mason.cse.buffalo.edu:/usr/obj/usr/src/sys/GENERIC amd64 lab# dd if=/dev/urandom of=/dev/ad4s1d bs=32k count=32k 32768+0 records in 32768+0 records out 1073741824 bytes transferred in 25.130537 secs (42726577 bytes/sec) lab# gbde init /dev/ad4s1d Enter new passphrase: Reenter new passphrase: lab# gbde attach /dev/ad4s1d Enter passphrase: lab# dd if=/dev/urandom of=/dev/ad4s1d.bde bs=32k count=32k 32768+0 records in 32768+0 records out 1073741824 bytes transferred in 401.097004 secs (2677013 bytes/sec) iostat from while that last 'dd' was running: tty ad4 cpu tin tout KB/t tps MB/s us ni sy in id 022 5.67 483 2.67 0 0 4 1 96 066 5.67 509 2.82 0 0 4 1 95 022 5.69 514 2.86 0 0 6 1 94 022 5.67 506 2.80 0 0 6 1 93 022 5.67 472 2.61 0 0 4 1 95 iostat on a FreeBSD 7.2-RELEASE-p4 box doing a similar operation: tin tout KB/t tps MB/s us ni sy in id 0 22 29.54 1208 34.86 3 0 56 2 39 0 22 29.56 1177 33.97 3 0 57 1 39 0 22 29.54 1201 34.64 3 0 58 2 37 0 22 29.57 1144 33.04 2 0 51 3 44 0 22 29.56 1126 32.52 3 0 54 2 42 0 22 29.53 1179 34.01 3 0 53 2 42 0 22 29.57 1165 33.65 2 0 58 2 38 One thing I notice is the larger block size the 7.2 writes but I don't imagine that would be that significant. I've been using FreeBSD in various amateurish and wrong ways since 2.2, so I wouldn't rule out me doing something stupid. If so, I'd love to know what. ___ freebsd-questions@freebsd.org mailing list http://lists.freebsd.org/mailman/listinfo/freebsd-questions To unsubscribe, send any mail to freebsd-questions-unsubscr...@freebsd.org
GBDE encryped File system
In release 8.0 is GBDE now part of the base system? If not what is the /boot/loader.conf command to add to enable it? ___ freebsd-questions@freebsd.org mailing list http://lists.freebsd.org/mailman/listinfo/freebsd-questions To unsubscribe, send any mail to freebsd-questions-unsubscr...@freebsd.org
Re: GBDE encryped File system
On 3/20/10 6:29 AM, Aiza wrote: In release 8.0 is GBDE now part of the base system? If not what is the /boot/loader.conf command to add to enable it? You don't have to enable it. Nothing to add to the loader.conf. But if you want to mount the partitions during the boot: 18.16.1.2.1 Automatically Mounting Encrypted Partitions It is possible to create a script to automatically attach, check, and mount an encrypted partition, but for security reasons the script should not contain the gbde(8) password. Instead, it is recommended that such scripts be run manually while providing the password via the console or ssh(1). Please read: http://www.freebsd.org/doc/en_US.ISO8859-1/books/handbook/disks-encrypting.html -- Adam PAPAI ___ freebsd-questions@freebsd.org mailing list http://lists.freebsd.org/mailman/listinfo/freebsd-questions To unsubscribe, send any mail to freebsd-questions-unsubscr...@freebsd.org
GBDE and fixit.iso
Does the fixit.iso file include the GBDE application? ___ freebsd-questions@freebsd.org mailing list http://lists.freebsd.org/mailman/listinfo/freebsd-questions To unsubscribe, send any mail to freebsd-questions-unsubscr...@freebsd.org
hardening FreeBSD, already using GBDE
For example, the editor I use normally writes to /tmp -- I changed that, making it slower, but in the event that someone takes my laptop I want to sleep at night. I've no problem letting some poor person make a windoz machine out of my laptop -- but I don't want to share my work, my intellectual property. (I do research.) So, I'm looking for a list of changes to make, hacks really, that will further tighten up security. Can you point me to such a list of to-do's, please. Just send mail to henry.ol...@gmail.com --jg ___ freebsd-questions@freebsd.org mailing list http://lists.freebsd.org/mailman/listinfo/freebsd-questions To unsubscribe, send any mail to freebsd-questions-unsubscr...@freebsd.org
Re: hardening FreeBSD, already using GBDE
On 01/21/10 16:32, Henry Olyer wrote: For example, the editor I use normally writes to /tmp -- I changed that, making it slower, but in the event that someone takes my laptop I want to sleep at night. If you use a swap-backed memory drive (see http://man.freebsd.org/mdconfig) for /tmp and use geli to encrypt the swap, there would be no chance of recovery of your temporary files. I've no problem letting some poor person make a windoz machine out of my laptop -- but I don't want to share my work, my intellectual property. (I do research.) So, I'm looking for a list of changes to make, hacks really, that will further tighten up security. You did not specify anything really exact. You already encrypt your on-disk data. Do you always use encrypted network protocols like ssh and https? Strong passwords? Adequate physical security? Up-to-date software? ___ freebsd-questions@freebsd.org mailing list http://lists.freebsd.org/mailman/listinfo/freebsd-questions To unsubscribe, send any mail to freebsd-questions-unsubscr...@freebsd.org
Re: hardening FreeBSD, already using GBDE
On Thu, Jan 21, 2010 at 10:32:01AM -0500, Henry Olyer wrote: For example, the editor I use normally writes to /tmp -- I changed that, making it slower, but in the event that someone takes my laptop I want to sleep at night. I've no problem letting some poor person make a windoz machine out of my laptop -- but I don't want to share my work, my intellectual property. (I do research.) So, I'm looking for a list of changes to make, hacks really, that will further tighten up security. Can you point me to such a list of to-do's, please. Just send mail to henry.ol...@gmail.com If you encrypt everything on disk and make sure the machine is powered off any time you leave it, there is not much else you can do to protect it from physical access. That is, if someone can get their grubby little fingers on it, there is little you can do to absolutely prevent them from getting to the data. If they have physical access, they have the same tools you do. There are things such as putting on a BIOS password and encrypting everything and powering it off when it is not in your hands that can make it more difficult, but nothing that totally prevents seeing your stuff.You could remove the hard disk and take it with you everywhere. The only complete security is never to store your data anywhere - on a computer, on paper, even in your head -- you might talk in your sleep. So, make a good effort to make it difficult and then just resign yourself to living in the real world. jerry --jg ___ freebsd-questions@freebsd.org mailing list http://lists.freebsd.org/mailman/listinfo/freebsd-questions To unsubscribe, send any mail to freebsd-questions-unsubscr...@freebsd.org ___ freebsd-questions@freebsd.org mailing list http://lists.freebsd.org/mailman/listinfo/freebsd-questions To unsubscribe, send any mail to freebsd-questions-unsubscr...@freebsd.org
FBSD 7.2, on a CQ60-419WM Presario, about headphones, function keys, FVWM fonts, and GBDE
How do I get to use the headphones? The speaker works but continues to play when I plug in headphones. Also adjusting the keyboard function controls to control the sound, (o anything else,) does nothing -- what is with this? Last, how do I change the font size with FVWM? As you can see I am new to a lot of things. I develop and sometimes I'd like to use headphones and gasp!, put up a DVD movie. Using mplayer. I made sound work. Hey, for me that was big. Last (this time I really mean last,) I'm using GBDE. I'd like to hear from anyone else who uses it. I have questions. ___ freebsd-questions@freebsd.org mailing list http://lists.freebsd.org/mailman/listinfo/freebsd-questions To unsubscribe, send any mail to freebsd-questions-unsubscr...@freebsd.org
GBDE and GELI security
I've read reports to the effect that GBDE is vulnerable to online dictionary attacks unless two-factor authentication is used. The only such report I can find now is this discussion of NetBSD's CGD, where its author contrasts it with GBDE: http://www.onlamp.com/lpt/a/6384 Is this still the case? Are there any other security concerns related to GBDE's implementation that you might mention? How well does GELI stack up against GBDE? I was surprised to read that OpenBSD's svnd is vulnerable to *offline* dictionary attacks. Any comments on that? -- CCD CopyWrite Chad Perrin [ http://ccd.apotheon.org ] Sen. Dick Durbin, D-IL, to an RIAA executive: Are you headed to junior high schools to round up the usual suspects? ___ freebsd-questions@freebsd.org mailing list http://lists.freebsd.org/mailman/listinfo/freebsd-questions To unsubscribe, send any mail to [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Re: GBDE and GELI security
On Tue, 4 Dec 2007 17:04:23 -0700 Chad Perrin [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: I've read reports to the effect that GBDE is vulnerable to online dictionary attacks unless two-factor authentication is used. The only such report I can find now is this discussion of NetBSD's CGD, where its author contrasts it with GBDE: http://www.onlamp.com/lpt/a/6384 Is this still the case? Are there any other security concerns related to GBDE's implementation that you might mention? How well does GELI stack up against GBDE? I think it's this: http://mail-index.netbsd.org/tech-security/2005/03/02/0003.html I don't know much about the internals of GBDE, but if we take his description of it at face value, it seems to be fair criticism. I think it's actually saying that GBDE assumes the user will provide enough user-key entropy, and doesn't do anything to mitigate the use of weaker passphrases. Geli uses salt and PKCS #5 so it's pretty much blameless in this area. ___ freebsd-questions@freebsd.org mailing list http://lists.freebsd.org/mailman/listinfo/freebsd-questions To unsubscribe, send any mail to [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Re: gbde and geli - differences
On Wed, 21 Mar 2007 23:15:50 +0100 Roland Smith [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: On Wed, Mar 21, 2007 at 06:33:19PM +, RW wrote: How do you attach the dvd content? # geli attach /dev/cd0 Cannot read metadata from /dev/cd0: Invalid argument. geli attach -r /dev/cd0 Cannot read metadata from /dev/cd0: Invalid argument. I get the same error. Odd. I thought I used that trick before. It definitely works on the USB drives that I use as primary backup (no memory disk necessary in that case). I asked about this in the geom list. It turns out that the md device needs to have the same sector size as the DVD (2048 bytes). If you create it like this: mdconfig -a -t vnode -S 2048 -f imagefile it all works correctly. ___ freebsd-questions@freebsd.org mailing list http://lists.freebsd.org/mailman/listinfo/freebsd-questions To unsubscribe, send any mail to [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Re: gbde and geli - differences
On Sat, 24 Mar 2007 20:10:11 +0100 (CET) Wojciech Puchar [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: why there are both? what should i use to have better chance i will be able to recover data after say 10 years knowing password? I presume it's to do with geli using OpenSSL libraries and so picking-up hardware acceleration where available. I think gdbe is being sidelined. i switched to geli, making all my encrypted partition DVD sized, so i can back it up encrypted by writing whole device to DVD. How do you actually write the partition to the DVD? And can the DVD be mounted, or is it just a backup? If you do mount them, I'm wondering why you don't get the problem I had with the md filesystem. ___ freebsd-questions@freebsd.org mailing list http://lists.freebsd.org/mailman/listinfo/freebsd-questions To unsubscribe, send any mail to [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Re: gbde and geli - differences
why there are both? what should i use to have better chance i will be able to recover data after say 10 years knowing password? I presume it's to do with geli using OpenSSL libraries and so picking-up hardware acceleration where available. I think gdbe is being sidelined. i switched to geli, making all my encrypted partition DVD sized, so i can back it up encrypted by writing whole device to DVD. and geli uses 2-3 times less CPU time doing the same encryption. both can use passwords and key files. thank you ___ freebsd-questions@freebsd.org mailing list http://lists.freebsd.org/mailman/listinfo/freebsd-questions To unsubscribe, send any mail to [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Re: gbde and geli - differences
On Wed, Mar 21, 2007 at 12:13:21AM +, RW wrote: snip i need both encrypted partition and encrypted copies/DVDs. I'd be interested if anyone has a method for creating encrypted DVDs that still works. You can use a UFS filesystem on a DVD. In short: - create an file with random characters the size of a DVD. - use that as a vnode backed memory disk with mdconfig. - initialize and attach that with geli. - create a new filesystem on the geli device - mount it. But how do you put that on a DVD-R or DVD+R? growisofs -dvd-compat -Z /dev/dvd=$HOME/backupDVD.img Roland -- R.F.Smith http://www.xs4all.nl/~rsmith/ [plain text _non-HTML_ PGP/GnuPG encrypted/signed email much appreciated] pgp: 1A2B 477F 9970 BA3C 2914 B7CE 1277 EFB0 C321 A725 (KeyID: C321A725) pgpnxbkWa8ILl.pgp Description: PGP signature
Re: gbde and geli - differences
On Wed, 21 Mar 2007 08:02:51 +0100 Roland Smith [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: On Wed, Mar 21, 2007 at 12:13:21AM +, RW wrote: snip i need both encrypted partition and encrypted copies/DVDs. I'd be interested if anyone has a method for creating encrypted DVDs that still works. You can use a UFS filesystem on a DVD. In short: - create an file with random characters the size of a DVD. - use that as a vnode backed memory disk with mdconfig. - initialize and attach that with geli. - create a new filesystem on the geli device - mount it. But how do you put that on a DVD-R or DVD+R? growisofs -dvd-compat -Z /dev/dvd=$HOME/backupDVD.img How do you attach the dvd content? # geli attach /dev/cd0 Cannot read metadata from /dev/cd0: Invalid argument. geli attach -r /dev/cd0 Cannot read metadata from /dev/cd0: Invalid argument. I also tried acd0, and acd0t01 # ls -l /dev/*cd0* crw-rw-r-- 1 root operator0, 105 Mar 21 11:27 /dev/acd0 crw-r- 1 root operator0, 165 Mar 21 11:27 /dev/acd0t01 crw-rw-r-- 1 root operator0, 142 Mar 21 11:27 /dev/cd0 ___ freebsd-questions@freebsd.org mailing list http://lists.freebsd.org/mailman/listinfo/freebsd-questions To unsubscribe, send any mail to [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Re: gbde and geli - differences
On Wed, Mar 21, 2007 at 06:33:19PM +, RW wrote: How do you attach the dvd content? # geli attach /dev/cd0 Cannot read metadata from /dev/cd0: Invalid argument. geli attach -r /dev/cd0 Cannot read metadata from /dev/cd0: Invalid argument. I get the same error. Odd. I thought I used that trick before. It definitely works on the USB drives that I use as primary backup (no memory disk necessary in that case). The following is what I currently use to make encrypted backups to DVD, because it requires less interaction; I bundle appropriate numbers of files and directories up in tarfiles (bzip2-ed unless it contains photos etc), so that every tarfile is slightly under DVD size. I've put this in a script, because a lot of my directories don't grow very fast. Alternatively you can use a tool like dirsplit (http://freshmeat.net/projects/dirsplit/) to make file catalogs. Next I encrypt every tarfile with ccrypt(1) from ports, because it uses the Rijndael (aes) cipher. You can use another encryption program if you like, like enc(1) from OpenSSl with the Blowfish cipher, or gnupg with a symmetric cipher like aes256 or twofish or blowfish if you don't want to keep a separate key. Don't use crypt(1) or bdes(1), they're not considered safe anymore. The encypted file is then directly burned (as an image) with growisofs. To extract the contents I use the following command: cat /dev/cd0|ccrypt -d|tar xjf - The file is cat-ed because ccrypt doesn't want to open device files. This might be overkill, depending on who you're trying to protect the data from. If you burn the unencrypted tarfile to DVD, the average windows user wouldn't have a clue how to open it. Of course a 'file -s' would tell any competent sysadmin that you've burned a tarfile. OTOH, if you encypt the data and forget the keyphrase, your data is lost. Roland -- R.F.Smith http://www.xs4all.nl/~rsmith/ [plain text _non-HTML_ PGP/GnuPG encrypted/signed email much appreciated] pgp: 1A2B 477F 9970 BA3C 2914 B7CE 1277 EFB0 C321 A725 (KeyID: C321A725) pgp1EvjmUauvB.pgp Description: PGP signature
gbde and geli - differences
what they are. both works, both works right. geli has more options. why there are both? what should i use to have better chance i will be able to recover data after say 10 years knowing password? i need both encrypted partition and encrypted copies/DVDs. i use gbde for some time but not widely, can switch to any ___ freebsd-questions@freebsd.org mailing list http://lists.freebsd.org/mailman/listinfo/freebsd-questions To unsubscribe, send any mail to [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Re: gbde and geli - differences
On Tue, 20 Mar 2007 19:06:28 +0100 (CET) Wojciech Puchar [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: what they are. both works, both works right. geli has more options. why there are both? what should i use to have better chance i will be able to recover data after say 10 years knowing password? I presume it's to do with geli using OpenSSL libraries and so picking-up hardware acceleration where available. I think gdbe is being sidelined. i need both encrypted partition and encrypted copies/DVDs. I'd be interested if anyone has a method for creating encrypted DVDs that still works. A couple of years ago I played around with encrypted CDs by using a 650Mb file as a backing store for an encrypted md partition and then just burning a CD with that file on it. The same technique can be extended to DVDs by using using two or more backing files with gconcat, to get around the problem that an ISO 9660 filesystem wont support a single 4.7GB file. It worked at the time, but recently I found that the technique no longer works, gbde wouldn't attach the device as it's read-only. I know the behaviour has changed, because I had the old scripts, that had worked before. It's still possible to access the data by copying the backing files to disk, but that's not very practical. I guess it may be possible to work around the problem with a union filesystem, but I haven't pursued that yet. I understand that it's possible to encrypt a DVD+RW as an ordinary partition, but that it's painfully slow. And I don't really want to use RW disks. ___ freebsd-questions@freebsd.org mailing list http://lists.freebsd.org/mailman/listinfo/freebsd-questions To unsubscribe, send any mail to [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Re: gbde and geli - differences
On Tue, Mar 20, 2007 at 10:36:19PM +, RW wrote: On Tue, 20 Mar 2007 19:06:28 +0100 (CET) Wojciech Puchar [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: what they are. both works, both works right. geli has more options. why there are both? what should i use to have better chance i will be able to recover data after say 10 years knowing password? I presume it's to do with geli using OpenSSL libraries and so picking-up hardware acceleration where available. I think gdbe is being sidelined. geli uses the crypto(9) framework. Not sure about the OpenSSL libraries. i need both encrypted partition and encrypted copies/DVDs. I'd be interested if anyone has a method for creating encrypted DVDs that still works. You can use a UFS filesystem on a DVD. In short: - create an file with random characters the size of a DVD. - use that as a vnode backed memory disk with mdconfig. - initialize and attach that with geli. - create a new filesystem on the geli device - mount it. E.g: # dd if=/dev/random of=$HOME/backupDVD.img bs=1m count=4000 # mdconfig -a -t vnode -f $HOME/backupDVD.img (The name of the md device will be printed on stdout, e.g. 'md0'.) # geli init -l 256 /dev/md0 # geli attach /dev/md0 # newfs /dev/md0.eli # mount /dev/md0.eli /mnt/root Use it. Then: # umount /mnt/root # geli detach md0.eli # mdconfig -d -u 0 Roland -- R.F.Smith http://www.xs4all.nl/~rsmith/ [plain text _non-HTML_ PGP/GnuPG encrypted/signed email much appreciated] pgp: 1A2B 477F 9970 BA3C 2914 B7CE 1277 EFB0 C321 A725 (KeyID: C321A725) pgpUXO2KicCgJ.pgp Description: PGP signature
Re: gbde and geli - differences
On Wed, 21 Mar 2007 00:15:04 +0100 Roland Smith [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: On Tue, Mar 20, 2007 at 10:36:19PM +, RW wrote: On Tue, 20 Mar 2007 19:06:28 +0100 (CET) Wojciech Puchar [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: what they are. both works, both works right. geli has more options. why there are both? what should i use to have better chance i will be able to recover data after say 10 years knowing password? I presume it's to do with geli using OpenSSL libraries and so picking-up hardware acceleration where available. I think gdbe is being sidelined. geli uses the crypto(9) framework. Not sure about the OpenSSL libraries. I'm probably mixing up crypto(9) and crypto(3) i need both encrypted partition and encrypted copies/DVDs. I'd be interested if anyone has a method for creating encrypted DVDs that still works. You can use a UFS filesystem on a DVD. In short: - create an file with random characters the size of a DVD. - use that as a vnode backed memory disk with mdconfig. - initialize and attach that with geli. - create a new filesystem on the geli device - mount it. But how do you put that on a DVD-R or DVD+R? ___ freebsd-questions@freebsd.org mailing list http://lists.freebsd.org/mailman/listinfo/freebsd-questions To unsubscribe, send any mail to [EMAIL PROTECTED]
GBDE on top of SSHFS (on top of rsync.net)
I am successfully using sshfs with my offsite backup provider, rsync.net. I used these instructions: http://www.rsync.net/resources/howto/freebsd_sshfs.html and have my remote filesystem mounted locally. I decided that I would like to create a 4 GB GBDE image and place it on the mounted offsite-filesystem, and then mount that ... which is a mount on top of a mount, but theoretically it should work. But it doesn't. When I issue the command: gbde init /dev/md0 -i -L /etc/gbde/md0 and save the file in the vi editor, making no changes, I get this error after entering my password: Enter new passphrase: Reenter new passphrase: gbde: write: Input/output error # So I am mainly just curious - has anyone ever mounted a GBDE on top of an sshfs mounted filesystem ? Thanks. __ Do You Yahoo!? Tired of spam? Yahoo! Mail has the best spam protection around http://mail.yahoo.com ___ freebsd-questions@freebsd.org mailing list http://lists.freebsd.org/mailman/listinfo/freebsd-questions To unsubscribe, send any mail to [EMAIL PROTECTED]
size of crypto file systems geli/gbde
Hi: I want to create encrypted memory filesystems for backup, and selective data destruction: If I have data from different users say, each user's backup will be stored as different encrypted file systems. Then I can selectively destroy data from one user by throwing away the key. Now, how do I estimate the actual available space on an encrypted partition? Say, I need to backup 100MB - how big an mfs do I need to create in order that the encrypted file system will be 100MB? Secondly: Which of the two supported crypto file systems is recommended: ELI or BDE? PHK writes in the manpage of BDE that no audit of the code have been made, but no such warning appears on ELI. Which is strongest/fastest/most efficient/reliable? Thanks, Erik -- Ph: +34.666334818 web: http://www.locolomo.org X.509 Certificate: http://www.locolomo.org/crt/8D03551FFCE04F0C.crt Key ID: 69:79:B8:2C:E3:8F:E7:BE:5D:C3:C3:B1:74:62:B8:3F:9F:1F:69:B9 smime.p7s Description: S/MIME Cryptographic Signature
Re: help needed - GBDE mounts on top of FUSE sshfs (fails)
Ensel Sharon [EMAIL PROTECTED] writes: Any comments ? I really want an offsite encrypted volume. I have the offsite from rsync.net, and the transport is encrypted via sshfs, but I am paranoid and do not want them (or anyone) to see the contants, so I want to just upload a single 2gig file and make a GBDE on it. You could probably use geom_gate for it and forward the connection from the local ggatec to the remote ggated via your ssh connection. -- Christian Laursen ___ freebsd-questions@freebsd.org mailing list http://lists.freebsd.org/mailman/listinfo/freebsd-questions To unsubscribe, send any mail to [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Re: help needed - GBDE mounts on top of FUSE sshfs (fails)
On Tue, 28 Mar 2006, Christian Laursen wrote: Ensel Sharon [EMAIL PROTECTED] writes: Any comments ? I really want an offsite encrypted volume. I have the offsite from rsync.net, and the transport is encrypted via sshfs, but I am paranoid and do not want them (or anyone) to see the contants, so I want to just upload a single 2gig file and make a GBDE on it. You could probably use geom_gate for it and forward the connection from the local ggatec to the remote ggated via your ssh connection. Can you elaborate, or point me to a document that describes using geom_gate ? My only exposure to these things was with the GBDE HOWTO: http://0x06.sigabrt.de/howtos/freebsd_encrypted_image_howto.html Thanks. ___ freebsd-questions@freebsd.org mailing list http://lists.freebsd.org/mailman/listinfo/freebsd-questions To unsubscribe, send any mail to [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Re: help needed - GBDE mounts on top of FUSE sshfs (fails)
Ensel Sharon [EMAIL PROTECTED] writes: On Tue, 28 Mar 2006, Christian Laursen wrote: Ensel Sharon [EMAIL PROTECTED] writes: You could probably use geom_gate for it and forward the connection from the local ggatec to the remote ggated via your ssh connection. Can you elaborate, or point me to a document that describes using geom_gate ? My only exposure to these things was with the GBDE HOWTO: Read the man pages for ggatec and ggated. Furthermore read the man page for ssh, especially the part about the -L option. -- Christian Laursen ___ freebsd-questions@freebsd.org mailing list http://lists.freebsd.org/mailman/listinfo/freebsd-questions To unsubscribe, send any mail to [EMAIL PROTECTED]
help needed - GBDE mounts on top of FUSE sshfs (fails)
Hi, I have posted this before on -questions and -hackers, and gotten no response. Basically, I have remote storage that I can access over ssh (from rsync.net, who I _love_) and I use sshfs in FreeBSD 6.0 ports tree to mount my filesystem locally. I followed this FreeBSD sshfs tutorial: http://www.rsync.net/resources/howto/freebsd_sshfs.html The good news is, it works great. The bad news is, I cannot create a GBDE in the mounted sshfs. Here are the details: When I place the backing-store-file (for my GBDE) on a mounted sshfs (fuse) volume, it no longer works. Specifically, when I issue command: gbde init /dev/md0 -i -L /etc/gbde/md0 and save the resulting file that opens in my editor (without making any changes, as usual), after typing in my passphrase twice, I get this error: Enter new passphrase: Reenter new passphrase: gbde: write: Input/output error # Is this expected ? Is this a specific problem with fuse-fs, or would this fail if I tried to put the backing store on any kind of other mounted abnormal filesystem ? (say an NFS mount, or another md-backed mount point) Any comments ? I really want an offsite encrypted volume. I have the offsite from rsync.net, and the transport is encrypted via sshfs, but I am paranoid and do not want them (or anyone) to see the contants, so I want to just upload a single 2gig file and make a GBDE on it. thanks. ___ freebsd-questions@freebsd.org mailing list http://lists.freebsd.org/mailman/listinfo/freebsd-questions To unsubscribe, send any mail to [EMAIL PROTECTED]
GBDE error message - what does it mean?
Hello again everybody! A few days back I got my first GBDE-device up and running. After that I had a slight problem described in [EMAIL PROTECTED]. I already discribed this problem in a newsgroup (comp.unix.bsd.freebsd.misc) and didn't get much help there[1] (apart from the adive to use geli instead of gbde). So I could go on working I simply changed to the trial-and-error approach. Well, I never really got to solve the problem itself, but could create and mount filesystems on ad6s1c and I could also initialize and attach that device to the kernel, create a filesystem on ad6s1c.bde and use it normally. At least, as far as I can tell. But then I took a look in /var/log/messages and saw this: Jan 24 00:00:21 jon kernel:g_vfs_done():ad6s1c.bde[WRITE(offset=157273636864, length=131072)]error = 1 Jan 24 00:00:52 jon last message repeated 2 times Jan 24 00:02:56 jon last message repeated 8 times Jan 24 00:12:48 jon last message repeated 39 times Jan 24 00:23:08 jon last message repeated 40 times Jan 24 00:32:57 jon last message repeated 38 times Jan 24 00:42:46 jon last message repeated 38 times Jan 24 00:53:06 jon last message repeated 40 times Jan 24 01:02:55 jon last message repeated 38 times Jan 24 01:13:12 jon last message repeated 39 times [...] dmesg is also full of this (only the first line of this quote, of course). Asking aunt google wasn't too helpful this time. I found one more or less useful thread about this subject: http://unix.derkeiler.com/Mailing-Lists/FreeBSD/current/2005-11/0523.html A lot of talk and a fair bit of speculation, but what it boiled down to was, noone really knew what the problem was. There was a comment that maybe the device was full which in my case can't be since there are still som 38gigs free (of 149). Does anyone have an idea what I should do, or who I should bug? I'm not sure I want to write PHK an Email yet. Regards Chris [1] This is not a complaint, I guess noone had encountered and solved this problem before. ___ freebsd-questions@freebsd.org mailing list http://lists.freebsd.org/mailman/listinfo/freebsd-questions To unsubscribe, send any mail to [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Re: 6.0-SNAP005: pptpclient; mpd/ng; pf; tcpdrop; vidcontrol/saver; gbde/md
Ab Normal wrote: I've installed FreeBSD 6.0-CURRENT-SNAP005 (i386) on my stand-alone home computer, which connects to the internet via adsl. -CURRENT is development branch of FreeBSD and may be not very stable. Also it has many debuging options turned on (read /usr/src/UPDATING) so you may get performance reduction. Personaly, I use -CURRENT on my home PC, and it is faster than 5-STABLE on same hardware, but your experience may be other. ___ freebsd-questions@freebsd.org mailing list http://lists.freebsd.org/mailman/listinfo/freebsd-questions To unsubscribe, send any mail to [EMAIL PROTECTED]
6.0-SNAP005: pptpclient; mpd/ng; pf; tcpdrop; vidcontrol/saver; gbde/md
I've installed FreeBSD 6.0-CURRENT-SNAP005 (i386) on my stand-alone home computer, which connects to the internet via adsl. Being no expert, I don't presume to characterize the following observations as bugs (except, perhaps, with regard to tcpdrop), but I wonder if anyone else has experienced any of the same things. 1. In the past, using FreeBSD 4.9 and 4.10, I connected to my dsl modem/router using pptpclient. With pptpclient on 6.0, however, I noticed that download speed from the internet was very slow -- only about 20 percent of the rate I was accustomed to. A check with top revealed that pptp was utilizing 85 percent of the CPU. I recall seeing a lock-order-reversal message on a couple of occasions. (See the log excerpt below.) 2. I installed mpd to replace pptpclient. Downloading is fast again and CPU usage is back to normal, but I notice a couple of minor quirks. The first time after boot that I run my script to bring up the NIC (I don't bring up the NIC on boot) and to launch mpd, no connection occurs. On the second try it works, but I get the following message on standard error: WARNING: attempt to net_add_domain(netgraph) after domainfinalize(). The warning is not repeated on subsequent connects. I assume it is related to the loading of various ng modules. 3. I'm using pf with 6.0. When I kill (-SIGTERM) mpd to disconnect from the internet, and before I bring down the NIC, the following error message is returned: pf_test6: kif == NULL, if_xname ng0. It appears that pf is bothered by the disappearance of the ng0 interface. 4. After disconnecting from the internet I often have stuck tcp4 connections (perhaps due in part to my severe firewall rules). Thinking to remedy this little annoyance with tcpdrop. I created a perl script to parse the output of netstat -n - f inet and to call tcpdrop for each inet connection except the NIC-to-modem connection. I've tried running the script before and (mostly) after killing mpd. Sometimes it actually works, but most times tcpdrop triggers a kernel panic and auto reboot. I suspect that the differing results might be related to the state of the connection(s), or to the number of them. Maybe it's safe to dub this phenomenon a bug in view of the panic and reboot, even if I'm doing something wrong. 5. I do a lot of work (or at least activity) from the console, and enjoy the new VESA graphics console features. I compiled VESA and SC_PIXEL_MODE into the kernel, and it works fine with my Radeon 7000 card -- except that the screen blanker does not blank the screen. The cursor disappears, but otherwise the display persists. I suppose this may be a necessary consequence of using graphics mode. 6. Having used the vnconfig utility and the vncrypt port in FreeBSD 4.x to create file-backed encrypted devices, I applied an analogous procedure using mdconfig and gbde in 6.0. Although it works, processing of the encrypted file system seems quite sluggish with gbde compared to vncrypt. (I do realize that encryption entails overhead, and that gbde seems designed primarily for use with disks rather than files.) By the way, informationally, the recent zlib patch for FreeBSD 5.x would appear to work on 6.0. I actually did the one-line edit to inftrees.c manually rather than running patch, but it was the same line with the same line number employed by the patch. I also ran find-zlib, which indicates that zlib 1.2.2 is statically linked in a few system files -- eg., libstand.a, pxeboot, and loader (shouldn't do much harm there!). It's also statically linked, I think, in Opera 8.01, which could be dangerous. Log excerpt: one of the LORs with pptpclient -- Jul 3 23:32:55 localhost pptp[709]: anon log[ctrlp_disp:pptp_ctrl.c:880]: Outgoing call established (call ID 0, peer's call ID 0). Jul 3 23:32:58 localhost kernel: lock order reversal Jul 3 23:32:58 localhost kernel: 1st 0xc1b34270 rtentry (rtentry) @ /usr/src/sys/net/rtsock.c:434 Jul 3 23:32:58 localhost kernel: 2nd 0xc19ba77c radix node head (radix node head) @ /usr/src/sys/net/route.c:148 Jul 3 23:32:58 localhost kernel: KDB: stack backtrace: Jul 3 23:32:58 localhost kernel: kdb_backtrace(0,,c09293f0,c0929418,c08b3b64) at kdb_backtrace+0x29 Jul 3 23:32:58 localhost kernel: witness_checkorder(c19ba77c,9,c085a11c,94) at witness_checkorder+0x564 Jul 3 23:32:58 localhost kernel: _mtx_lock_flags(c19ba77c,0,c085a11c,94,7) at _mtx_lock_flags+0x5b Jul 3 23:32:58 localhost kernel: rtalloc1(c1d39c78,0,0,d745ab3c,0) at rtalloc1+0x61 Jul 3 23:32:58 localhost kernel: ifa_ifwithroute(801,c1d39c5c,c1d39c78,c1b34270,c19ba700) at ifa_ifwithroute+0x68 Jul 3 23:32:58 localhost kernel: rt_getifa(d745ab3c,0,c1b34210,c1d39c00,c091f680) at rt_getifa+0xa6 Jul 3 23:32:58 localhost kernel: route_output(c1a39400,c1b316f4,a0,c1a39400,1f60) at route_output+0x5c5 Jul 3 23:32:58 localhost kernel: raw_usend(c1b316f4,0,c1a39400,0,0,c1a47300) at raw_usend+0x60 Jul 3 23:32:58 localhost kernel
Re: 6.0-SNAP005: pptpclient; mpd/ng; pf; tcpdrop; vidcontrol/saver; gbde/md
I wrote: 1. In the past, using FreeBSD 4.9 and 4.10, I connected to my dsl modem/router using pptpclient. With pptpclient on 6.0, however, I noticed that download speed from the internet was very slow -- only about 20 percent of the rate I was accustomed to. A check with top revealed that pptp was utilizing 85 percent of the CPU. I recall seeing a lock-order-reversal message on a couple of occasions. (See the log excerpt below.) The LOR appears to be related to: http://lists.freebsd.org/pipermail/freebsd-net/2005-July/007834.html 3. I'm using pf with 6.0. When I kill (-SIGTERM) mpd to disconnect from the internet, and before I bring down the NIC, the following error message is returned: pf_test6: kif == NULL, if_xname ng0. It appears that pf is bothered by the disappearance of the ng0 interface. This report was also anticipated: http://lists.freebsd.org/pipermail/freebsd-pf/2005-July/001240.html Sorry for duplicating. While I'm at it, just one more thing... During shutdown of 6.0SNAP5 I always receive the message: unmount of /devfs failed (BUSY) or something quite similar to that. Seems harmless, though. -- A Happy User -- ___ NEW! Lycos Dating Search. The only place to search multiple dating sites at once. http://datingsearch.lycos.com ___ freebsd-questions@freebsd.org mailing list http://lists.freebsd.org/mailman/listinfo/freebsd-questions To unsubscribe, send any mail to [EMAIL PROTECTED]
GBDE - howto 2 factor auth?
I've found a few placed where Poul-Henning Kamp mentions that gbde will accept any byte string as a passphrase and that the design of gbde also makes 2 factor authentication possible. I took that to understand that I might be able to use a file of random data from a usb key (something I have) and a text passphrase (something I know) to encrypt my partitions (which I also think Poul mentions somewhere). I can't find any documentation on how this might be accomplished though. The closest thing I've found was a mailing list message from a couple years ago where someone had written a script to collect the information and run it through md5 to create a single text string that could be used on the command line with gbde and the -P/-p switches. With this md5 method, it seems (to my uneducated mind) that I'd be taking all the randomness in the file and my passphrase and turning it into a single fixed length string of lower case letters and numerals. Seems like there would be a better way. Plus you're putting the completed passphrase on the commandline where it can potentially be seen/copied by ps, etc... Does anyone else know the way this was intended to work? Can I just pipe the contents of a file to gbde and then it still prompts me for text that it combines to use for my passphrase? That would be nice if it were that simple. Please help :-) ___ freebsd-questions@freebsd.org mailing list http://lists.freebsd.org/mailman/listinfo/freebsd-questions To unsubscribe, send any mail to [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Re: gbde - destroying master key without lockfile
On Monday 28 March 2005 17:34, Peter Schuller wrote: Instead of destroy I use nuke. Thanks! ___ freebsd-questions@freebsd.org mailing list http://lists.freebsd.org/mailman/listinfo/freebsd-questions To unsubscribe, send any mail to [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Re: gbde - destroying master key without lockfile
Instead of destroy I use nuke. Thanks! -- / Peter Schuller, InfiDyne Technologies HB PGP userID: 0xE9758B7D or 'Peter Schuller [EMAIL PROTECTED]' Key retrieval: Send an E-Mail to [EMAIL PROTECTED] E-Mail: [EMAIL PROTECTED] Web: http://www.scode.org ___ freebsd-questions@freebsd.org mailing list http://lists.freebsd.org/mailman/listinfo/freebsd-questions To unsubscribe, send any mail to [EMAIL PROTECTED]
gbde - destroying master key without lockfile
Hello, I would like to use gbde to encrypt some disks. Using an external lockfile things work pretty much as documented (except for some options that aren't supported by the tool, but which are listed in the manpage). However, for this particular situation, I do not want to use an external lockfile. The manpage seems to imply that without -L/-l, the first sector is used as a lockfile. Indeed, I can init, attach and detach devices without an external lockfile. However, when I attempt to destroy the master key: # gbde destroy /dev/label/storage304 Enter passphrase: Opened with key 0 gbde: No -L option and no space in sector 0 for lockfile Trying to use -L for this particular operation fails: gbde: illegal option -- L Usage error: Invalid option And trying to specify -n -1 as the manpage says also fails: gbde: illegal option -- n Usage error: Invalid option So the question is - how do I destroy the master key (other than dd if=/dev/zero of=...) when not using an external lockfile? (The reason I do not want to use an external lockfile is simply that I do not see a need for it in my situation and I would feel much more comfortable if the gbde volume was self-contained; no need to backup anything else or keep it in synch.) -- / Peter Schuller, InfiDyne Technologies HB PGP userID: 0xE9758B7D or 'Peter Schuller [EMAIL PROTECTED]' Key retrieval: Send an E-Mail to [EMAIL PROTECTED] E-Mail: [EMAIL PROTECTED] Web: http://www.scode.org ___ freebsd-questions@freebsd.org mailing list http://lists.freebsd.org/mailman/listinfo/freebsd-questions To unsubscribe, send any mail to [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Re: gbde - destroying master key without lockfile
Peter Schuller wrote on Saturday 26 March 2005 12:09 in the group list.freebsd.questions: Hello, I would like to use gbde to encrypt some disks. Using an external lockfile things work pretty much as documented (except for some options that aren't supported by the tool, but which are listed in the manpage). However, for this particular situation, I do not want to use an external lockfile. The manpage seems to imply that without -L/-l, the first sector is used as a lockfile. Indeed, I can init, attach and detach devices without an external lockfile. However, when I attempt to destroy the master key: # gbde destroy /dev/label/storage304 Enter passphrase: Opened with key 0 gbde: No -L option and no space in sector 0 for lockfile Trying to use -L for this particular operation fails: gbde: illegal option -- L Usage error: Invalid option And trying to specify -n -1 as the manpage says also fails: gbde: illegal option -- n Usage error: Invalid option So the question is - how do I destroy the master key (other than dd if=/dev/zero of=...) when not using an external lockfile? (The reason I do not want to use an external lockfile is simply that I do not see a need for it in my situation and I would feel much more comfortable if the gbde volume was self-contained; no need to backup anything else or keep it in synch.) Instead of destroy I use nuke. ___ freebsd-questions@freebsd.org mailing list http://lists.freebsd.org/mailman/listinfo/freebsd-questions To unsubscribe, send any mail to [EMAIL PROTECTED]
vinum gbde
All, Is it possible to use vinum and gbde? I read in the handbook that they were not compatible, but saw a number of posts on the Internet that mention an integration of the two in 5.x. Thanks! --Nick ___ freebsd-questions@freebsd.org mailing list http://lists.freebsd.org/mailman/listinfo/freebsd-questions To unsubscribe, send any mail to [EMAIL PROTECTED]
gbde on gmirror supported?
Greetings, I have two drives (3 parts each) mirrored with gmirror. System performs as advertized. dna# gmirror label -v -b load hgsa da2 da3 Metadata value stored on da2. Metadata value stored on da3. Done. dna# ls /dev/mirror hgsahgsaa hgsac hgsas1 hgsas1c hgsas1d hgsas1e hgsas1f dna# newfs /dev/mirror/hgsas1d /dev/mirror/hgsas1d: 36864.0MB (75497472 sectors) block size 16384, fragment size 2048 using 201 cylinder groups of 183.77MB, 11761 blks, 23552 inodes. super-block backups (for fsck -b #) at: 160, 376512, 752864, 1129216, 1505568, 1881920, 2258272, 2634624, 3010976, 3387328, 3763680, ... Great, so now I'd like to use gbde on hgas1f. dna# gbde init /dev/mirror/hgsas1f -L /etc/hgsas1f.lock Enter new passphrase: Reenter new passphrase: dna# gbde attach mirror/hgsas1f -l /etc/hgsas1f.lock Enter passphrase: dna# So everything *seems* cool, but... dna# ls /dev/mirror/hgsas1f /dev/mirror/hgsas1f dna# ls /dev/mirror/hgsas1f.bde ls: /dev/mirror/hgsas1f.bde: No such file or directory dna# ls /dev/mirror hgsahgsas1 hgsas1c hgsas1d hgsas1e hgsas1f dna# ls /dev/*bde zsh: no matches found: /dev/*bde Should this have worked? Did I miss something obvious? obscure? Thanks, -sam ___ freebsd-questions@freebsd.org mailing list http://lists.freebsd.org/mailman/listinfo/freebsd-questions To unsubscribe, send any mail to [EMAIL PROTECTED]
gbde misconfiguration ?
Hi, I updated my kernel and built it from CURRENT. Everything went fine. When I rebooted the machine after mergemaster, I was prompted to enter passphrase for Disk Encryption, as below. Configuring Disk Encryption for NO. Enter passphrase: When I hit ENTER gbde: Attach to NO faile: Provider not found Attach Failed: attempt 1 of 3. Enter passphrase: I dont recall if I enabled gbde. Any idea, what might have happened ?. More importantly, can anyone tell me how to get around this and continue with my booting sequence ? In my previous build using STABLE, i didnt see this problem. Bala ___ [EMAIL PROTECTED] mailing list http://lists.freebsd.org/mailman/listinfo/freebsd-questions To unsubscribe, send any mail to [EMAIL PROTECTED]
gbde misconfiguration ?
Hi, I updated my kernel and built it from CURRENT. Everything went fine. When I rebooted the machine after mergemaster, I was prompted to enter passphrase for Disk Encryption, as below. Configuring Disk Encryption for NO. Enter passphrase: When I hit ENTER gbde: Attach to NO faile: Provider not found Attach Failed: attempt 1 of 3. Enter passphrase: I dont recall if I enabled gbde. Any idea, what might have happened ?. More importantly, can anyone tell me how to get around this and continue with my booting sequence ? Thanks in advance. Bala ___ [EMAIL PROTECTED] mailing list http://lists.freebsd.org/mailman/listinfo/freebsd-questions To unsubscribe, send any mail to [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Re: gbde misconfiguration ?
On 2004.10.07 09:51:17 -0700, Balakumar Velmurugan wrote: Hi, I updated my kernel and built it from CURRENT. Everything went fine. When I rebooted the machine after mergemaster, I was prompted to enter passphrase for Disk Encryption, as below. Configuring Disk Encryption for NO. Enter passphrase: When I hit ENTER gbde: Attach to NO faile: Provider not found Attach Failed: attempt 1 of 3. Enter passphrase: I think pjd has already fixed this (but I currently run RELENG_5, so I haven't tested it). Try to update your sources again and see if the problem isn't fixed. I dont recall if I enabled gbde. Any idea, what might have happened ?. If you do not recall you haven't seen it would then prompt you for a password no each boot. More importantly, can anyone tell me how to get around this and continue with my booting sequence ? In my previous build using STABLE, i didnt see this problem. Just FYI, STABLE is still RELENG_4/4.X... though we are getting closer at 5-STABLE/5.3-STABLE. -- Simon L. Nielsen FreeBSD Documentation Team pgp1xcbS4112v.pgp Description: PGP signature
Re: gbde misconfiguration ?
On Thu, Oct 07, 2004 at 09:51:17AM -0700, Balakumar Velmurugan wrote: Hi, I updated my kernel and built it from CURRENT. Everything went fine. When I rebooted the machine after mergemaster, I was prompted to enter passphrase for Disk Encryption, as below. Configuring Disk Encryption for NO. Enter passphrase: When I hit ENTER gbde: Attach to NO faile: Provider not found Attach Failed: attempt 1 of 3. Enter passphrase: I dont recall if I enabled gbde. Any idea, what might have happened ?. More importantly, can anyone tell me how to get around this and continue with my booting sequence ? In my previous build using STABLE, i didnt see this problem. Update and try again - this was fixed earlier today. Ceri -- I hear thought presenting the problem. -- dadadodo -c 1 Mail/trhodes pgpbSzq9P16A0.pgp Description: PGP signature
Re: gbde blackening feature - how can on disk keys be destroyed thoroughly?
In message [EMAIL PROTECTED], David Kreil writes: On a modern disk there is no sequence of writes that will guarantee you that your data is iretriveable lost. Even if you rewrite a thousand times, you cannot guard yourself against the sector being replaced by a bad block spare after the first write. Good point. In the rare chance event that this happens, it would indeed be bad news as an attacker would then only have to scan the bad blocks for possible copies of the key. He still has no way of recognizing the key though... A simple improvement on the present situation would already be if the keys were not overwritten with zeros but with random bits. I don't know how difficult it would be to attempt to physically write random bits multiple times but it would much strengthen the feature apart from the rare cases when the sectors of the masterkey have been remapped into bad blocks. Please read the paper, there is a reason why it is zero bits. What do you think? Is the required effort disproportional to the intended value of the blackening feature? Blackening adds no significant incremental security imo, on the other hand it is feasible to implement it, so I've put it on the todo list. -- Poul-Henning Kamp | UNIX since Zilog Zeus 3.20 [EMAIL PROTECTED] | TCP/IP since RFC 956 FreeBSD committer | BSD since 4.3-tahoe Never attribute to malice what can adequately be explained by incompetence. ___ [EMAIL PROTECTED] mailing list http://lists.freebsd.org/mailman/listinfo/freebsd-questions To unsubscribe, send any mail to [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Re: gbde blackening feature - how can on disk keys be destroyed thoroughly?
Dear Poul-Henning, On a modern disk there is no sequence of writes that will guarantee you that your data is iretriveable lost. Even if you rewrite a thousand times, you cannot guard yourself against the sector being replaced by a bad block spare after the first write. Good point. In the rare chance event that this happens, it would indeed be bad news as an attacker would then only have to scan the bad blocks for possible copies of the key. He still has no way of recognizing the key though... Right, he'd have to try them all. A simple improvement on the present situation would already be if the keys were not overwritten with zeros but with random bits. I don't know how difficult it would be to attempt to physically write random bits multiple times but it would much strengthen the feature apart from the rare cases when the sectors of the masterkey have been remapped into bad blocks. Please read the paper, there is a reason why it is zero bits. Sorry, forgot. What do you think? Is the required effort disproportional to the intended value of the blackening feature? Blackening adds no significant incremental security imo, From a security point of vie, yes. From a social/civil-liberties/legal point of view, I felt it was an excellent thing to have. on the other hand it is feasible to implement it, so I've put it on the todo list. That's great, thanks a lot! With best regards, David. Dr David Philip Kreil (`-''-/).___..--''`-._ Research Fellow`6_ 6 ) `-. ( ).`-.__.`) University of Cambridge(_Y_.)' ._ ) `._ `. ``-..-' ++44 1223 764107, fax 333992 _..`--'_..-_/ /--'_.' ,' www.inference.phy.cam.ac.uk/dpk20 (il),-'' (li),' ((!.-' ___ [EMAIL PROTECTED] mailing list http://lists.freebsd.org/mailman/listinfo/freebsd-questions To unsubscribe, send any mail to [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Re: gbde blackening feature - how can on disk keys be destroyed thoroughly?
In message [EMAIL PROTECTED], David Kreil writes: Hi, From what I can see so far, they are simply overwritten with zeros - is that right? If so, the blackening feature would be much weakend, as once can read up to 20 layers of data even under random data (and more under zeros). I would be most grateful for comments, or suggestions of where/how one could extend the code to do a secure wip of the key areas. Also, I know practically nothing of how I could to best get FreeBSD to physically write to disk (configurability of hardware cache etc permitting). On a modern disk there is no sequence of writes that will guarantee you that your data is iretriveable lost. Even if you rewrite a thousand times, you cannot guard yourself against the sector being replaced by a bad block spare after the first write. If your threat-analysis indicates this is a serious threat for you, you should arrange for simple physical destruction of your disk to be available. Most modern disks have one or more holes in the metal only covered by a metalic sticker. Pouring sulfuric acid through those openings is a good start. -- Poul-Henning Kamp | UNIX since Zilog Zeus 3.20 [EMAIL PROTECTED] | TCP/IP since RFC 956 FreeBSD committer | BSD since 4.3-tahoe Never attribute to malice what can adequately be explained by incompetence. ___ [EMAIL PROTECTED] mailing list http://lists.freebsd.org/mailman/listinfo/freebsd-questions To unsubscribe, send any mail to [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Re: gbde blackening feature - how can on disk keys be destroyed thoroughly?
Dear Poul-Henning, Thank you very much for your comments! From what I can see so far, they are simply overwritten with zeros - is that right? If so, the blackening feature would be much weakend, as one can read up to 20 layers of data even under random data (and more under zeros). I would be most grateful for comments, or suggestions of where/how one could extend the code to do a secure wipe of the key areas. Also, I know practically nothing of how I could to best get FreeBSD to physically write to disk (configurability of hardware cache etc permitting). On a modern disk there is no sequence of writes that will guarantee you that your data is iretriveable lost. Even if you rewrite a thousand times, you cannot guard yourself against the sector being replaced by a bad block spare after the first write. Good point. In the rare chance event that this happens, it would indeed be bad news as an attacker would then only have to scan the bad blocks for possible copies of the key. If your threat-analysis indicates this is a serious threat for you, you should arrange for simple physical destruction of your disk to be available. Most modern disks have one or more holes in the metal only covered by a metalic sticker. Pouring sulfuric acid through those openings is a good start. Hmm... to me, the main benefit of the blackening feature would seem to be the possibility of compliance with a court directive without disclosing confidential data. With multiple key holders, any particular person can maintain that they have done all they could to comply. Not only is the optics of having your disks are found in vats of sulfuric acid rather bad, it's also more unlikely that a moment of opportunity arises. A simple improvement on the present situation would already be if the keys were not overwritten with zeros but with random bits. I don't know how difficult it would be to attempt to physically write random bits multiple times but it would much strengthen the feature apart from the rare cases when the sectors of the masterkey have been remapped into bad blocks. As rightly pointed out in the manpages, the better the encryption gets, the more likely are attacks via other routes. Reading a few layers of the current masterkey location + all bad blocks with an MFM should cost no more than a few thousand $. What do you think? Is the required effort disproportional to the intended value of the blackening feature? With many thanks again for your help and best regards, David. Dr David Philip Kreil (`-''-/).___..--''`-._ Research Fellow`6_ 6 ) `-. ( ).`-.__.`) University of Cambridge(_Y_.)' ._ ) `._ `. ``-..-' ++44 1223 764107, fax 333992 _..`--'_..-_/ /--'_.' ,' www.inference.phy.cam.ac.uk/dpk20 (il),-'' (li),' ((!.-' ___ [EMAIL PROTECTED] mailing list http://lists.freebsd.org/mailman/listinfo/freebsd-questions To unsubscribe, send any mail to [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Re: gbde blackening feature - how can on disk keys be destroyed thoroughly?
Hi, From what I can see so far, they are simply overwritten with zeros - is that right? If so, the blackening feature would be much weakend, as once can read up to 20 layers of data even under random data (and more under zeros). I would be most grateful for comments, or suggestions of where/how one could extend the code to do a secure wip of the key areas. Also, I know practically nothing of how I could to best get FreeBSD to physically write to disk (configurability of hardware cache etc permitting). With best regards, David. Hello, I was wondering whether someone knowledgable about gbde internals could tell me how the keys are being destroyed on request under the blackening feature. Ideally, I'd like them to be overwritten with random data at least 20 times independently, but I suspect it may well be done in a different way. I'd be grateful for learning how the blackening works (and why!). With many thanks for your help in advance, David Kreil. Dr David Philip Kreil (`-''-/).___..--''`-._ Research Fellow`6_ 6 ) `-. ( ).`-.__.`) University of Cambridge(_Y_.)' ._ ) `._ `. ``-..-' ++44 1223 764107, fax 333992 _..`--'_..-_/ /--'_.' ,' www.inference.phy.cam.ac.uk/dpk20 (il),-'' (li),' ((!.-' ___ [EMAIL PROTECTED] mailing list http://lists.freebsd.org/mailman/listinfo/freebsd-questions To unsubscribe, send any mail to [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Re: gbde blackening feature - how can on disk keys be destroyed thoroughly?
On Friday 03 September 2004 07:18 pm, David Kreil wrote: Dear Vijay, I guess I took this off the list. It's OT, in my oppinion. Oh. Anywhere more appropriate to send it to that you could suggest at all? Now also trying freebsd-geom - would that have been the better place to send this to to start with? I don't know much of anything about data recovery. But, if you can recover data under 20 layers of random writes or 20 iterations of 0s, then how *can* you wipe a hard drive? Short, preferably, of setting fire to it :D While i am not an expert in this area, I can not help but wonder--- Who are you worried about recovering the data, under what circumstances? My best guess is that recovering anything from even _one_ data over-write is going to require that the recoverer have physical posession of the drive and very sophisticated equipment indeed. That means they have to be some branch of a govermnment. If you are going to attract attention of that caliber there are likely a lot of other easier means of finding out what you are up to. Otherwise, a good hot fire ought to be pretty final even for the CIA. -LenZ- Sigh, tricky, yes. Apparently wiping with 20 repeats of random noise does the trick (say from /dev/random or arc4random generated). The difficulty with modern file systems / operating systems / disk drives is actually getting the patterns written to the magnetic media. I'm writing to the list because both assessing whether there really is a risk and how to fix it requires quite a bot of knowledge that I lack, like knowing where to look in the gbde code (maybe I misunderstood?), or writing code that is disk driver/hardware caching aware and can hence force a flush. I'd be most grateful for any help or suggestions. With best regards, David. Hi, From what I can see so far, they are simply overwritten with zeros - is that right? If so, the blackening feature would be much weakend, as once can read up to 20 layers of data even under random data (and more under zeros). I would be most grateful for comments, or suggestions of where/how one could extend the code to do a secure wip of the key areas. Also, I know practically nothing of how I could to best get FreeBSD to physically write to disk (configurability of hardware cache etc permitting). With best regards, David. Hello, I was wondering whether someone knowledgable about gbde internals could tell me how the keys are being destroyed on request under the blackening feature. Ideally, I'd like them to be overwritten with random data at least 20 times independently, but I suspect it may well be done in a different way. I'd be grateful for learning how the blackening works (and why!). With many thanks for your help in advance, David Kreil. --- - Dr David Philip Kreil (`-''-/).___..--''`-._ Research Fellow`6_ 6 ) `-. ( ).`-.__.`) University of Cambridge(_Y_.)' ._ ) `._ `. ``-..-' ++44 1223 764107, fax 333992 _..`--'_..-_/ /--'_.' ,' www.inference.phy.cam.ac.uk/dpk20 (il),-'' (li),' ((!.-' ___ [EMAIL PROTECTED] mailing list http://lists.freebsd.org/mailman/listinfo/freebsd-questions To unsubscribe, send any mail to [EMAIL PROTECTED] -- Using Opera's revolutionary e-mail client: http://www.opera.com/m2/ Dr David Philip Kreil (`-''-/).___..--''`-._ Research Fellow`6_ 6 ) `-. ( ).`-.__.`) University of Cambridge(_Y_.)' ._ ) `._ `. ``-..-' ++44 1223 764107, fax 333992 _..`--'_..-_/ /--'_.' ,' www.inference.phy.cam.ac.uk/dpk20 (il),-'' (li),' ((!.-' ___ [EMAIL PROTECTED] mailing list http://lists.freebsd.org/mailman/listinfo/freebsd-questions To unsubscribe, send any mail to [EMAIL PROTECTED] ___ [EMAIL PROTECTED] mailing list http://lists.freebsd.org/mailman/listinfo/freebsd-questions To unsubscribe, send any mail to [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Re: gbde blackening feature - how can on disk keys be destroyed thoroughly?
On Fri, 03 Sep 2004 19:41:18 -0400, Len Zettel [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: snip While i am not an expert in this area, I can not help but wonder--- Who are you worried about recovering the data, under what circumstances? My best guess is that recovering anything from even _one_ data over-write is going to require that the recoverer have physical posession of the drive and very sophisticated equipment indeed. That means they have to be some branch of a govermnment. If you are going to attract attention of that caliber there are likely a lot of other easier means of finding out what you are up to. Otherwise, a good hot fire ought to be pretty final even for the CIA. -LenZ- I used to work in a lab and a co-worker had be a submarier for the US. He said that one of their projects was to figure out how to best destroy CDs for the government. Supposedly the CDs were recoverable even after cross-shredding. They either decided that melting them over a heatsink (coffee mug) in a microwave (also makes a nice ash tray) or going at them with an acetaline torch was the final solution. ___ [EMAIL PROTECTED] mailing list http://lists.freebsd.org/mailman/listinfo/freebsd-questions To unsubscribe, send any mail to [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Re: gbde blackening feature - how can on-disk keys be destroyed thoroughly?
Dear LenZ, Who are you worried about recovering the data, under what circumstances? The value of the blackening feature should be that you can give away the drive and your password, say, under pressure by the [court|mafia|whoever], without compromising any confidential information on the drive. My best guess is that recovering anything from even _one_ data over-write is going to require that the recoverer have physical posession of the drive and very sophisticated equipment indeed. That means they have to be some branch of a govermnment. Hmm, I much doubt that. True, you need a clean room and a magnetic force microscope. Even standard data recovery firms like www.dataclinic.co.uk, however, can recover data under up to 8 overwrites. (NB: No affiliation or recommendation there.) Government agencies can go deeper (20x or possibly more but it gets increasingly more difficult). If you are going to attract attention of that caliber there are likely a lot of other easier means of finding out what you are up to. Sure, like pointing an antenna at my computer while its running ;-) I guess my main point is: If there is a blackening feature which is designed to give users peace of mind about disclosing their password under pressure, and it is known that data can be recovered underneath simple overwrites for a pack of $$ but that writing a random pattern, say 30x, makes the delete safe, I'd much argue in favour of doing the latter. As the areas are small, this should be really quick, too. The problem is getting the multiple overwrites out to the magnetic media, rather than them sitting somewhere in a cache buffer in computer or drive memory. Otherwise, a good hot fire ought to be pretty final even for the CIA. Actually, the above firm specializes in Track 0 damage, fire damage, flood damage, impact damage and overwritten data... So, if a commercial enterprise can offer this, I don't think I'm unduly concerned. Depending on the country, dissolving the magnetic layer in acid or finely grinding it off are considered final for classified materials. Now, I'm not interested in an exercise of extreme paranoia. If overwritten keys can, however, easily be recovered then I'd consider this a relative weakness compared to all the sophisticated effort that has gone into the design of gbde and its encryption algorithms. My question hence remains, can someone more knowledgable than me maybe comment on whether I have misunderstood what gbde does, or else how the strength of the blackening could please be improved (i.e., how to do a 30x random wipe bypassing cache in a hardware independent manner)? With best regards, David. Dr David Philip Kreil (`-''-/).___..--''`-._ Research Fellow`6_ 6 ) `-. ( ).`-.__.`) University of Cambridge(_Y_.)' ._ ) `._ `. ``-..-' ++44 1223 764107, fax 333992 _..`--'_..-_/ /--'_.' ,' www.inference.phy.cam.ac.uk/dpk20 (il),-'' (li),' ((!.-' ___ [EMAIL PROTECTED] mailing list http://lists.freebsd.org/mailman/listinfo/freebsd-questions To unsubscribe, send any mail to [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Re: gbde blackening feature - how are the keys destroyed?
Hello, I was wondering whether someone knowledgable about gbde internals could tell me how the keys are being destroyed on request under the blackening feature. Ideally, I'd like them to be overwritten with random data at least 20 times independently, but I suspect it may well be done in a different way. I'd be grateful for learning how the blackening works (and why!). With many thanks for your help in advance, David Kreil. Dr David Philip Kreil (`-''-/).___..--''`-._ Research Fellow`6_ 6 ) `-. ( ).`-.__.`) University of Cambridge(_Y_.)' ._ ) `._ `. ``-..-' ++44 1223 764107, fax 333992 _..`--'_..-_/ /--'_.' ,' www.inference.phy.cam.ac.uk/dpk20 (il),-'' (li),' ((!.-' ___ [EMAIL PROTECTED] mailing list http://lists.freebsd.org/mailman/listinfo/freebsd-questions To unsubscribe, send any mail to [EMAIL PROTECTED]
GBDE
Hi everyone, is there an ETA for GBDE to move in the stable branch? Thanks, DrVince ___ [EMAIL PROTECTED] mailing list http://lists.freebsd.org/mailman/listinfo/freebsd-questions To unsubscribe, send any mail to [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Re: GBDE
In the last episode (Jul 01), DrVince said: Hi everyone, is there an ETA for GBDE to move in the stable branch? GBDE is based on GEOM, which is too large of a subsystem to be backported to 4.x. It'll be available in -STABLE when the stable tag gets shifted to the 5.x branch :) -- Dan Nelson [EMAIL PROTECTED] ___ [EMAIL PROTECTED] mailing list http://lists.freebsd.org/mailman/listinfo/freebsd-questions To unsubscribe, send any mail to [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Re: home on a gbde encrypted partion
On Sunday 23 May 2004 01:56, Robert Storey wrote: On Sat, 22 May 2004 12:54:29 +0200 platanthera [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: On Friday 21 May 2004 17:49, platanthera wrote: hi all, I want to move my home directory to a gbde encrypted partition. I plan to have only the default dotfiles in /home/xxx (before mounting the encrypted partition), log in as usual, attach and fsck the encrypted partion and then mount it 'over' /home/xxx. Is there anything wrong with this approach? hmm... obviously there is something wrong. I can't unmount my current home directory later. Not really surprising.. Interesting question. File /etc/passwd is where the system determines where a user's data files will be located. For example, user robert on my system: [EMAIL PROTECTED]:~ cat /etc/passwd | grep robert robert:*:1005:1006:User :/home/robert:/usr/local/bin/bash So just create a special user (using sysinstall), perhaps user secure. Instead of putting his login directory at /home/secure, put it on /secure (a directory you manually create) and (as root) mount /secure on an encrypted partition. After /secure is mounted, login as user secure. You'll have to tweak permissions of course so that user secure can read/write files on this partition. hi Robert, thanks for your reply. In the meantime I decided to move /home completely to an encrypted partition, which I attach and mount as root before logging in under my user account. Think that's the easiest approach.. best regards ___ [EMAIL PROTECTED] mailing list http://lists.freebsd.org/mailman/listinfo/freebsd-questions To unsubscribe, send any mail to [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Re: home on a gbde encrypted partion
On Friday 21 May 2004 17:49, platanthera wrote: hi all, I want to move my home directory to a gbde encrypted partition. I plan to have only the default dotfiles in /home/xxx (before mounting the encrypted partition), log in as usual, attach and fsck the encrypted partion and then mount it 'over' /home/xxx. Is there anything wrong with this approach? hmm... obviously there is something wrong. I can't unmount my current home directory later. Not really surprising.. ___ [EMAIL PROTECTED] mailing list http://lists.freebsd.org/mailman/listinfo/freebsd-questions To unsubscribe, send any mail to [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Re: home on a gbde encrypted partion
On Sat, 22 May 2004 12:54:29 +0200 platanthera [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: On Friday 21 May 2004 17:49, platanthera wrote: hi all, I want to move my home directory to a gbde encrypted partition. I plan to have only the default dotfiles in /home/xxx (before mounting the encrypted partition), log in as usual, attach and fsck the encrypted partion and then mount it 'over' /home/xxx. Is there anything wrong with this approach? hmm... obviously there is something wrong. I can't unmount my current home directory later. Not really surprising.. Interesting question. File /etc/passwd is where the system determines where a user's data files will be located. For example, user robert on my system: [EMAIL PROTECTED]:~ cat /etc/passwd | grep robert robert:*:1005:1006:User :/home/robert:/usr/local/bin/bash So just create a special user (using sysinstall), perhaps user secure. Instead of putting his login directory at /home/secure, put it on /secure (a directory you manually create) and (as root) mount /secure on an encrypted partition. After /secure is mounted, login as user secure. You'll have to tweak permissions of course so that user secure can read/write files on this partition. regards, Robert ___ [EMAIL PROTECTED] mailing list http://lists.freebsd.org/mailman/listinfo/freebsd-questions To unsubscribe, send any mail to [EMAIL PROTECTED]
home on a gbde encrypted partion
hi all, I want to move my home directory to a gbde encrypted partition. I plan to have only the default dotfiles in /home/xxx (before mounting the encrypted partition), log in as usual, attach and fsck the encrypted partion and then mount it 'over' /home/xxx. Is there anything wrong with this approach? Or is there a more elegant way? thanks in advance ___ [EMAIL PROTECTED] mailing list http://lists.freebsd.org/mailman/listinfo/freebsd-questions To unsubscribe, send any mail to [EMAIL PROTECTED]
gbde: total_sectors disagree
Hi, I wanted to toy around with an encrypted drive, so I added the GEOM_BDE option to my 5.2.1-P4 kernel and installed a 40Gb Maxtor I had laying around in an old Compaq PII. Now, all is well, until I try to initialize the drive: $ gbde init ad2s1c -L /etc/gbde/ad2s1c.lock gbde: total_sectors disagree with first_sector and last_sector Any idea what's going wrong? Regards, -- Maarten de Vries ___ [EMAIL PROTECTED] mailing list http://lists.freebsd.org/mailman/listinfo/freebsd-questions To unsubscribe, send any mail to [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Re: GBDE - Destroy command not working
It didn't work but after several other attempts. I've been able to run it using a specific combination. So to summarize, in my case, I can only run destroy : - using external lock files (-l parameter mandatory) - with the current key only (no -n -1 parameter to say destroy them all) - using /dev/xxx (xxx only doesn't work) First, what's not working : -- Without detached lockfile # kldload geom_bde # gbde init /dev/da0 -i # gbde attach da0 # gbde detach da0 # gbde destroy da0 Enter passphrase: gbde: read: Inappropriate ioctl for device and also # gbde destroy /dev/da0 Enter passphrase: gbde: No -L option and no space in sector 0 for lockfile -- With detached lockfile # gbde destroy da0 -l /etc/mykey Enter passphrase: gbde: Error 22 decrypting lock and then # gbde destroy /dev/da0 -l /etc/mykey Enter passphrase: Wrote key 0 at 5371894 And it worked for the current key. I also tried to use the -n x, --n x parameter (with x= -1, 1) but it never worked! At one point I even received a Fatal trap 12: page fault while in kernel mode (many of them in fact) Dany Nativel wrote: I've been playing around with GBDE under 5.2RC2-1. It's a fantastic encrypted FS. Following the man page, I've tried to use the destroy command but without success. Here is what I did to create the encrypted FS (for this test I didn't use the /dev/random to fill-up the disc). # kldload geom_bde # gbde init /dev/da0 -i # gbde setkey /dev/da0 -n 2 # gbde attach /dev/da0 # newfs /dev/da0.bde # mount /dev/da0.bde /mnt/usbkey -- use the FS, works fine # umount /mnt/usbkey # gbde detach da0 Then according to the man page I should use : #gbde destroy da0 -n -1 to purge all keys but I get : gbde: illegal option -- n so I changed to : #gbde destroy da0 --n -1 and got : gbde: read: Innapropriate ioctl for device so I changed to : #gbde destroy /dev/da0 --n -1 and this time I get the password prompt but it fails to destroy anything : Enter passphrase: Opened with key 0 gbde: No -L option and no space in sector 0 for lockfile Maybe I didn't understand the purpose of the this command. I thought it was going to replace each lock key with some random data. Can somebody explain me how to use the destroy command ? Thanks Dany ___ [EMAIL PROTECTED] mailing list http://lists.freebsd.org/mailman/listinfo/freebsd-questions To unsubscribe, send any mail to [EMAIL PROTECTED] ___ [EMAIL PROTECTED] mailing list http://lists.freebsd.org/mailman/listinfo/freebsd-questions To unsubscribe, send any mail to [EMAIL PROTECTED]
GBDE - Destroy command not working
I've been playing around with GBDE under 5.2RC2-1. It's a fantastic encrypted FS. Following the man page, I've tried to use the destroy command but without success. Here is what I did to create the encrypted FS (for this test I didn't use the /dev/random to fill-up the disc). # kldload geom_bde # gbde init /dev/da0 -i # gbde setkey /dev/da0 -n 2 # gbde attach /dev/da0 # newfs /dev/da0.bde # mount /dev/da0.bde /mnt/usbkey -- use the FS, works fine # umount /mnt/usbkey # gbde detach da0 Then according to the man page I should use : #gbde destroy da0 -n -1 to purge all keys but I get : gbde: illegal option -- n so I changed to : #gbde destroy da0 --n -1 and got : gbde: read: Innapropriate ioctl for device so I changed to : #gbde destroy /dev/da0 --n -1 and this time I get the password prompt but it fails to destroy anything : Enter passphrase: Opened with key 0 gbde: No -L option and no space in sector 0 for lockfile Maybe I didn't understand the purpose of the this command. I thought it was going to replace each lock key with some random data. Can somebody explain me how to use the destroy command ? Thanks Dany ___ [EMAIL PROTECTED] mailing list http://lists.freebsd.org/mailman/listinfo/freebsd-questions To unsubscribe, send any mail to [EMAIL PROTECTED]
RE: GBDE - Destroy command not working
Sorry I can not help you with your problem. An totally encrypted file system sounded very interesting, I tried to find GBDE in the FBSD ports/package collection and there is no hit on GBDE, or gbde, or encrypted FS. Would you please provide the ports name or an URL to where I can find out more about it? Thanks -Original Message- From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] Behalf Of Dany Nativel Sent: Monday, February 16, 2004 6:11 PM To: [EMAIL PROTECTED] Subject: GBDE - Destroy command not working I've been playing around with GBDE under 5.2RC2-1. It's a fantastic encrypted FS. Following the man page, I've tried to use the destroy command but without success. Here is what I did to create the encrypted FS (for this test I didn't use the /dev/random to fill-up the disc). # kldload geom_bde # gbde init /dev/da0 -i # gbde setkey /dev/da0 -n 2 # gbde attach /dev/da0 # newfs /dev/da0.bde # mount /dev/da0.bde /mnt/usbkey -- use the FS, works fine # umount /mnt/usbkey # gbde detach da0 Then according to the man page I should use : #gbde destroy da0 -n -1 to purge all keys but I get : gbde: illegal option -- n so I changed to : #gbde destroy da0 --n -1 and got : gbde: read: Innapropriate ioctl for device so I changed to : #gbde destroy /dev/da0 --n -1 and this time I get the password prompt but it fails to destroy anything : Enter passphrase: Opened with key 0 gbde: No -L option and no space in sector 0 for lockfile Maybe I didn't understand the purpose of the this command. I thought it was going to replace each lock key with some random data. Can somebody explain me how to use the destroy command ? Thanks Dany ___ [EMAIL PROTECTED] mailing list http://lists.freebsd.org/mailman/listinfo/freebsd-questions To unsubscribe, send any mail to [EMAIL PROTECTED] ___ [EMAIL PROTECTED] mailing list http://lists.freebsd.org/mailman/listinfo/freebsd-questions To unsubscribe, send any mail to [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Re: GBDE - Destroy command not working
You'll find more information in the handbook : http://www.freebsd.org/doc/en_US.ISO8859-1/books/handbook/disks-encrypting.html It can be enabled as a kernel option or loaded with klload so it's no part of the port tree but rather part of the base system (I hope I use the right wording here). Below you'll find some links to relevant documents. White paper on GBDE http://phk.freebsd.dk/pubs/bsdcon-03.gbde.paper.pdf Some slides on GBDE http://phk.freebsd.dk/pubs/bsdcon-03.slides.gbde.pdf Another how-to http://bsdhound.com/newsread_print.php?newsid=63 Encrypt a USB Thumbdrive using CFS or GBDE http://www.bsdnews.org/03/cryptusb.php And the man page http://www.freebsd.org/cgi/man.cgi?query=gbdesektion=4apropos=0manpath=FreeBSD+5.2-RELEASE+and+Ports JJB wrote: Sorry I can not help you with your problem. An totally encrypted file system sounded very interesting, I tried to find GBDE in the FBSD ports/package collection and there is no hit on GBDE, or gbde, or encrypted FS. Would you please provide the ports name or an URL to where I can find out more about it? Thanks -Original Message- From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] Behalf Of Dany Nativel Sent: Monday, February 16, 2004 6:11 PM To: [EMAIL PROTECTED] Subject: GBDE - Destroy command not working I've been playing around with GBDE under 5.2RC2-1. It's a fantastic encrypted FS. Following the man page, I've tried to use the destroy command but without success. Here is what I did to create the encrypted FS (for this test I didn't use the /dev/random to fill-up the disc). # kldload geom_bde # gbde init /dev/da0 -i # gbde setkey /dev/da0 -n 2 # gbde attach /dev/da0 # newfs /dev/da0.bde # mount /dev/da0.bde /mnt/usbkey -- use the FS, works fine # umount /mnt/usbkey # gbde detach da0 Then according to the man page I should use : #gbde destroy da0 -n -1 to purge all keys but I get : gbde: illegal option -- n so I changed to : #gbde destroy da0 --n -1 and got : gbde: read: Innapropriate ioctl for device so I changed to : #gbde destroy /dev/da0 --n -1 and this time I get the password prompt but it fails to destroy anything : Enter passphrase: Opened with key 0 gbde: No -L option and no space in sector 0 for lockfile Maybe I didn't understand the purpose of the this command. I thought it was going to replace each lock key with some random data. Can somebody explain me how to use the destroy command ? Thanks Dany ___ [EMAIL PROTECTED] mailing list http://lists.freebsd.org/mailman/listinfo/freebsd-questions To unsubscribe, send any mail to [EMAIL PROTECTED] ___ [EMAIL PROTECTED] mailing list http://lists.freebsd.org/mailman/listinfo/freebsd-questions To unsubscribe, send any mail to [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Re: GDBE and USB-sticks? [was: GBDE and file-backed filesystems?]
On Mon, 19 Jan 2004 19:59:07 -0500 Michael W. Oliver [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: One of the readers has replied privately, telling me there's a patch for FBSD 5.x, mdcrypt, he also supplied me with a URL for downloading(thank you very much!). GDBE, he told me, would most probably not work on md-filesystems. But another thing came to my mind - is it possible to encrypt partitions on a USB-stick using GDBE? (If that worked, it would remove the need for encrypted md-files...) Benjamin I will trade links with you. Here is a link to an article describing GBDE on a USB ThumbDrive. If you are not bound by a privacy request, please post the link to the patch you mention above. Hi, the one who responded to him without cc:'ing the list was me. Not out of privacy issues, simply because I responded german. Should have thought about a general interest on this topic and replied here. My fault. The link I gave him was http://archives.neohapsis.com/archives/freebsd/2002-08/0116.html The patch was written against a 5.x from Aug 2002, so if it cleanly applies to nowadays freeBSD I do not know. But from a first glance I think it should, though I am not that familiar with kernel code. Joerg pgp0.pgp Description: PGP signature
Re: GDBE and USB-sticks? [was: GBDE and file-backed filesystems?]
On Mon, 19 Jan 2004 19:59:07 -0500 Michael W. Oliver [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: I will trade links with you. Here is a link to an article describing GBDE on a USB ThumbDrive. If you are not bound by a privacy request, please post the link to the patch you mention above. Thank you very much! Uh, I would have posted the URL, now that I'm at home, but since it's already been posted by Mr. Pernfuss, ... I refer to his reply. =) I've tried setting up up an encrypted USB-stick, and it works. The tutorial explains how to encrypt the entire stick. Thanks! Well, I've got thank you. =) Kind regards, Benjamin pgp0.pgp Description: PGP signature
GBDE and file-backed filesystems?
Hello everybody, I've recently installed FreeBSD 5.2 on my desktop machine. I like FreeBSD very much, I did not make it my primary OS, so far, because of some issues. Among these was the cryptoloop-device I had been using under GNU/Linux, which I used for storing my diary. If I am going to make FreeBSD my primary OS, I need that functionality from FreeBSD, too. Now I read in the manual, that FreeBSD features GBDE (GEOM Based Disc Encryption) for creating encrypted filesystem. I am not sure, however, if GBDE will work with filesystems that do not reside on a physical disc. Does anybody know? I've read the manual and man-pages, but they do not seem to answer my question... Thanks a lot, Kind regards, Benjamin -- +++ GMX - die erste Adresse für Mail, Message, More +++ Bis 31.1.: TopMail + Digicam für nur 29 EUR http://www.gmx.net/topmail ___ [EMAIL PROTECTED] mailing list http://lists.freebsd.org/mailman/listinfo/freebsd-questions To unsubscribe, send any mail to [EMAIL PROTECTED]
GDBE and USB-sticks? [was: GBDE and file-backed filesystems?]
Hello once more, One of the readers has replied privately, telling me there's a patch for FBSD 5.x, mdcrypt, he also supplied me with a URL for downloading (thank you very much!). GDBE, he told me, would most probably not work on md-filesystems. But another thing came to my mind - is it possible to encrypt partitions on a USB-stick using GDBE? (If that worked, it would remove the need for encrypted md-files...) Thank you very much, kind regards, Benjamin pgp0.pgp Description: PGP signature
Re: GDBE and USB-sticks? [was: GBDE and file-backed filesystems?]
On Mon, Jan 19, 2004 at 06:52:32PM +0100, Benjamin Walkenhorst wrote: Hello once more, One of the readers has replied privately, telling me there's a patch for FBSD 5.x, mdcrypt, he also supplied me with a URL for downloading (thank you very much!). GDBE, he told me, would most probably not work on md-filesystems. But another thing came to my mind - is it possible to encrypt partitions on a USB-stick using GDBE? (If that worked, it would remove the need for encrypted md-files...) Benjamin I will trade links with you. Here is a link to an article describing GBDE on a USB ThumbDrive. If you are not bound by a privacy request, please post the link to the patch you mention above. http://www.bsdnews.org/03/cryptusb.php Thanks! -- Mike perl -e 'print unpack(u,88V]N=%C=\!I;F9O(EN(AE861EG,*);' pgp0.pgp Description: PGP signature
a Systemcrash, GBDE and fsck
Hello, my system crashed and the filessystems were not properly unmountet. After the reboot my GBDE partition makes some problems. When initializising GBDE and running fsck -p -t ffs /dev/ad1s1.bde this error occurs: /dev/ad1s1.bde: CG 416: BAD MAGIC NUMBER /dev/ad1s1.bde: UNEXPECTED SOFT UPDATE INCONSISTENCY; RUN fsck MANUALLY. When mounting the partition I can still access my data, but df shows this: /dev/ad1s1.bde 108G -1.3T 1.4T -1320% /$mountpoint And when I try to run fsck -t ffs /dev/ad1s1.bde It breaks with this: start (null) wait fsck_ffs /dev/ad1s1.bde ** /dev/ad1s1.bde ** Last Mounted on /mnt/server ** Phase 1 - Check Blocks and Sizes cannot alloc 3529461676 bytes for inoinfo UNEXPECTED SOFT UPDATE INCONSISTENCY fsck: /dev/ad1s1.bde: Segmentation fault I even tried to add some swap (so I got ca. 4G of swap + 512MB RAM) and tried again, but it's all the same. I hope someone here can help me. Thanks in advance Hagen ___ [EMAIL PROTECTED] mailing list http://lists.freebsd.org/mailman/listinfo/freebsd-questions To unsubscribe, send any mail to [EMAIL PROTECTED]
gbde and encryption of filesystems
Hi FreeBSD Gurus, Anyone out there who's using this new FreeBSD 5.0 filesystem encryption feature, gbde? If yes, may I ask to drop few lines with an example about hot to create/mount/umount an encrypted fs? The examples in the man don't work for me... Thanks Regards To Unsubscribe: send mail to [EMAIL PROTECTED] with unsubscribe freebsd-questions in the body of the message
gbde not initializing
I'm having troubles with gbde(4), I've read the man pages, and followed the examples, and it still doesn't work. bash-2.05b# gbde init /dev/ad0s2a -L /etc/ad0s2a.lock gbde: /dev/ad0s2a: No such file or directory bash-2.05b# bash-2.05b# ls /dev/ad0s* /dev/ad0s1 /dev/ad0s2 /dev/ad0s2a /dev/ad0s2b /dev/ad0s2c /dev/ad0s2d /dev/ad0s2e /dev/ad0s2f bash-2.05b# I don't see what's wrong. Can someone help me? bash-2.05b# uname -a FreeBSD shawns.lan 5.0-RELEASE FreeBSD 5.0-RELEASE #1: Tue Feb 11 18:17:04 MST 2003 [EMAIL PROTECTED]:/usr/obj/usr/src/sys/LATERALUS i386 bash-2.05b# To Unsubscribe: send mail to [EMAIL PROTECTED] with unsubscribe freebsd-questions in the body of the message
gbde
I keep ketting errors when trying to make my root filesystem encrypted: bash-2.05b# gbde init /dev/ad0s2a gbde: /dev/ad0s2a: No such file or directory bash-2.05b# bash-2.05b# ls /dev/ad0* /dev/ad0/dev/ad0s2 /dev/ad0s2b /dev/ad0s2d /dev/ad0s2f /dev/ad0s1 /dev/ad0s2a /dev/ad0s2c /dev/ad0s2e bash-2.05b# What am I doing wrong? I followed the man pages (gbde(4) and gbde(8)) exactly... bash-2.05b# uname -a FreeBSD shawns.lan 5.0-RELEASE FreeBSD 5.0-RELEASE #1: Tue Feb 11 18:17:04 MST 2003 [EMAIL PROTECTED]:/usr/obj/usr/src/sys/LATERALUS i386 bash-2.05b# To Unsubscribe: send mail to [EMAIL PROTECTED] with unsubscribe freebsd-questions in the body of the message
