Re: [FRIAM] faith, zombies, and crazy people
Glen, I am honestly confused at this point about what you are looking for in your main question. To be experiencing something or reacting to something requires two entities with a relationship between them. How do you separate that table from the experience of that table? Well, one is the table, the other is a particular type of relationship between an organism and the table. Your question strikes me as roughly akin to asking how we distinguish between that table and me standing on the table. In both cases there is a table, but in the latter we are interested in a relationship between me and the table. I don't think Zombies are any particular help in understand the standing on relationship, and I also don't think they are of any particular help in understanding the reacting to relationship. On other notes: 1) Your friend clearly wants to tailgate. We know she does because, she does so when given the opportunity, and she expends effort to continue doing so (i.e., she regulates her speed with the person she is closely following, etc.). Now, I fully agree with you - it is fascinating that her behavior changes when it is pointed out. We could have a great time analyzing that. However, whatever our analysis revealed wouldn't undo the original observation that (until someone points out the behavior) she clearly wants to tailgate. 2) This way of thinking leads to suspicion of the often-assumed-to-be-clear distinction between mental processes labeled with different terms. For example, we might see a person raising a full cup to their mouths and ask them why they were doing it. The person says because I was thirsty. If we further asked them, perhaps posing as a person with poor English skills, what thirsty meant, then they might elaborate to I wanted liquid. But, of course, that answer alone is incoherent. The raising-cup-to-mouth behavior is not just the want of liquid, it is also the belief that raising-cup-to-mouth will result in having-liquid. That is, if we are looking at behavior, there might not be as clear a distinction between want and belief as we have been lead to believe/desire. Does that clarify anything? Eric P.S. In the second note above, we could have gone straight to the belief that drinking would relieve thirst, but given our current example, it seemed better to get the word want involved. On Tue, Sep 18, 2012 11:53 AM, glen g...@ropella.name wrote: ERIC P. CHARLES wrote at 09/18/2012 07:46 AM: Trying to be a sophisticated Nick: Faith doesn't underlies reality, but it underlies all experience. And by experience, I mean it underlies all the way you act and react towards reality. This doesn't give you a theory of everything, but it might give you a theory of everything psychological. I could tolerate that position. But I'm not going to. The whole question of ascribing the potentiality for sane actions to crazy people (be they Muslim or Atheist) hinges on the Cartesian partition. Nick (sophisticated or not) argues against the partition: mind is matter, no more no less. Hence, if faith underlies experience and experience is matter, then either we can separate experience from non-experience or all matter is experience. By accusing Nick of claiming that faith underlies all reality, I am pressing for _his_ technique for separating experience from everything else. Zombies are one rhetorical tool for doing that. -- To return to the zombies... the usual riddle of the Cartesian zombie goes something like this: 1. Imagine a Person who is trying to catch you, perhaps to eat you. You run through the woods, twisting and turning, but your adversary always changes to stay on your trail. Let us all agree from the beginning that said Person stays on your trail BECAUSE he intends to catch and eat you. 2. Now imagine a Zombie who is trying to catch you and eat you. The Zombie makes all the same alterations of course to stay on your trail that the Person would have made in the same situation. But now, let us all agree that the Zombie has no intention. 3. Insert mystery music here. Aha! How would you ever know the difference? If we can imagine a Zombie doing everything it can to stay on your trail, but without wanting to catch you, then we can never know anything about the mind of another. Because I thought of this mystery, I am really smart! But you'll have to take my word on it, because a Zombie could have said all the same things without any smarts. Ooooh, see, I made it a meta-mystery - super clever points achieved! -- Nick's assertion is to declare point 2 a blatant falsity. To be trying to catch you or to want to catch you, is nothing other than to be varying behavior so as to stay on your trail. That is, you can imagine a try-less and want-less thing coming towards you, for as long as you run in a straight line. As soon as you start turning, and the thing chasing you turns as a function of the changes in your trajectory, such that it
Re: [FRIAM] faith, zombies, and crazy people
ERIC P. CHARLES wrote at 09/19/2012 07:05 AM: I am honestly confused at this point about what you are looking for in your main question. Hm. I feel like we've wandered down some semantic rat hole. Let me restate my main question: What is the difference between thought and action? The original question involved faith and crazy people because that's the particular context we were in. But I assert that faith is just a specific type of thought. So, I broadened it to thought. And I also asserted that we ascribe crazy to people when we can't tell a believable story about their motivations. Nick asserted that faith underlies all justification _and_ that belief is action. That lead me to challenge the combination of those by inferring (from those 2 assertions of Nick's) that faith must underlie all reality. So, the question in full context becomes: What specific actions constitute faith? All the rest of the below are distracting tangents, I think. I don't think Zombies are any particular help in understand the standing on relationship, and I also don't think they are of any particular help in understanding the reacting to relationship. I brought up zombies solely in the context of distinguishing between some thing that is an end in itself versus some thing whose purpose is imputed by another thing. They help in that discussion, but not the one you want to have. A zombie is a person who's actions are perfectly predictable from her inputs and initial conditions. An actor is a person who's actions are only approximable from inputs and initial conditions. This relates to belief and intention only in the sense that some of us claim beliefs and intentions (examples of thought) are reducible to actions. All I want is at least one, preferably many, forward and inverse maps from actions to thoughts and from thoughts to actions. I ask for that because I'm a big believer in Feynman's aphorism: What I cannot create, I do not understand. It's all fine and dandy to assert that thoughts are actions, but unless we can synthesize at least one thought from some set of actions, we're just blowing smoke. I don't know how to do it. And frankly, I believe thoughts are not reducible to actions. But I'd love to try if I could get some help from those of us who do believe in the reduction. On other notes: 1) Your friend clearly wants to tailgate. We know she does because, she does so when given the opportunity, and she expends effort to continue doing so (i.e., she regulates her speed with the person she is closely following, etc.). Now, I fully agree with you - it is fascinating that her behavior changes when it is pointed out. We could have a great time analyzing that. However, whatever our analysis revealed wouldn't undo the original observation that (until someone points out the behavior) she clearly wants to tailgate. I disagree. She does NOT want to tailgate. Her want is something else. Her S.O. claims that she tailgates because it frees her up to think about other things. She tailgates because she feels safer following someone else down the road. It limits the number of ways she might get in an accident. In fact, what she does is only considered tailgating when the density of cars on the road is low. When it's high and the space buffer between any two cars is, in general, small, she wouldn't be considered to be tailgating. But I suspect if we measured her distance, it would be about the same as it is in low density traffic. The reason I point that out is because ascriptive words like want, belief, and intention are all inadequate for describing action. They are not actions. They are something more. Merely measuring actions fails to compose a measure for thought (and vice versa). I.e. not only do thoughts not reduce to actions, measures of thoughts do not reduce to measures of actions. They come close, but are not complete. And it's in that incompleteness that I propose actor status ... incompressibility ... lies. 2) This way of thinking leads to suspicion of the often-assumed-to-be-clear distinction between mental processes labeled with different terms. For example, we might see a person raising a full cup to their mouths and ask them why they were doing it. The person says because I was thirsty. If we further asked them, perhaps posing as a person with poor English skills, what thirsty meant, then they might elaborate to I wanted liquid. But, of course, that answer alone is incoherent. The raising-cup-to-mouth behavior is not just the want of liquid, it is also the belief that raising-cup-to-mouth will result in having-liquid. That is, if we are looking at behavior, there might not be as clear a distinction between want and belief as we have been lead to believe/desire. Does that clarify anything? Not to me. What I want is a set of steps, a procedure, for generating a belief (or any thought) from a set of actions. If you said something like:
Re: [FRIAM] faith, zombies, and crazy people
Dear Glen You've confused me even more now. So I'll just come to your last para I don't want want to be involved. 8^) I'm trying to simplify the discussion down to an actionable point. Which is why I'll ask again: If faith is a collection of actions, what actions constitute faith? Praxis ?. FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College lectures, archives, unsubscribe, maps at http://www.friam.org
Re: [FRIAM] faith, zombies, and crazy people
Sarbajit Roy wrote at 09/19/2012 08:30 AM: I don't want want to be involved. 8^) I'm trying to simplify the discussion down to an actionable point. Which is why I'll ask again: If faith is a collection of actions, what actions constitute faith? Praxis ?. Heh, you didn't provide enough context for me to guess what you mean by that word. I'm looking for normal actions ... like go to the store or pick your nose or kneel in front of that plastic statue for 12 hours ... play with that snake ... eat this wafer ... stare at that table for 24 hours ... etc. We need a sequence of actions that might actually cause a person to have faith. -- glen FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College lectures, archives, unsubscribe, maps at http://www.friam.org
Re: [FRIAM] faith, zombies, and crazy people
Sorry http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Praxis_(Eastern_Orthodoxy) Orthodox writers use the term praxis to refer to what others, using an English rather than a Greek word, call practice of the faith, especially with regard to ascetic and liturgical life. Praxis is key to Eastern Orthodox understanding because it is the basis of faith and works and the understanding of not separating the two. The importance of praxis, in the sense of action, is indicated in the dictum of Saint Maximus the Confessor: Theology without action is the theology of demons.[3] On 9/19/12, glen g...@ropella.name wrote: Sarbajit Roy wrote at 09/19/2012 08:30 AM: I don't want want to be involved. 8^) I'm trying to simplify the discussion down to an actionable point. Which is why I'll ask again: If faith is a collection of actions, what actions constitute faith? Praxis ?. Heh, you didn't provide enough context for me to guess what you mean by that word. I'm looking for normal actions ... like go to the store or pick your nose or kneel in front of that plastic statue for 12 hours ... play with that snake ... eat this wafer ... stare at that table for 24 hours ... etc. We need a sequence of actions that might actually cause a person to have faith. -- glen FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College lectures, archives, unsubscribe, maps at http://www.friam.org
Re: [FRIAM] faith, zombies, and crazy people
We need a sequence of actions that might actually cause a person to have faith. 2 examples. a) way cults work, and b) ways a magnet works. In a (religious) cult, the newbies are first encouraged to join in on simple actions like clapping. This is a psychological device to get them to participate and show that nobody objects to their actions. Then they are encouraged to sing a little bit .. moving onto dancing, chanting, praise be the lording or whatever Pick a magnet, any magnet. Pick a piece of unmagnetic iron. Gently stroke said magnet in the same direction repeatedly over said piece of iron. Note those little (Brainwashed) magnetic dipoles lining up just so ... That's how the faith model and Al-Qaeda works. Sarbajit On 9/19/12, glen g...@ropella.name wrote: Praxis ?. Heh, you didn't provide enough context for me to guess what you mean by that word. I'm looking for normal actions ... like go to the store or pick your nose or kneel in front of that plastic statue for 12 hours ... play with that snake ... eat this wafer ... stare at that table for 24 hours ... etc. We need a sequence of actions that might actually cause a person to have faith. -- glen FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College lectures, archives, unsubscribe, maps at http://www.friam.org FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College lectures, archives, unsubscribe, maps at http://www.friam.org
Re: [FRIAM] faith, zombies, and crazy people
Thanks for the clarity on praxis. That word has too much baggage for me to be comfortable with it. Using it would beg people to talk about stuff unrelated to Nick's assertion. Sarbajit Roy wrote at 09/19/2012 10:46 AM: We need a sequence of actions that might actually cause a person to have faith. 2 examples. a) way cults work, and b) ways a magnet works. In a (religious) cult, the newbies are first encouraged to join in on simple actions like clapping. This is a psychological device to get them to participate and show that nobody objects to their actions. Then they are encouraged to sing a little bit .. moving onto dancing, chanting, praise be the lording or whatever Pick a magnet, any magnet. Pick a piece of unmagnetic iron. Gently stroke said magnet in the same direction repeatedly over said piece of iron. Note those little (Brainwashed) magnetic dipoles lining up just so ... That's how the faith model and Al-Qaeda works. Excellent! Both of these approach what is necessary for Nick to be able to reconcile the 2 assertions that faith underlies all justification and belief is action. They are incomplete in different ways: In (a), there is still a missing piece between the social comfort brought by the increasing participation in various activities versus some belief ascribed to the cult members. I would posit that a mole/infiltrator could participate in a cult quite a long time, dancing, changing, murdering starlets in their homes, etc. _without_ actually believing the doctrines of the cult (much like most Catholics I've met). So, what we need is an idea of how we get to belief from these actions. How do we distinguish lip service or facetious dancing and chanting from the chanting and dancing of the true believers? (b) is inadequate for a different reason, I think. The brainwashing of the molecules is a type of memory, which gets at the previous conversations. Is memory required for belief? I'd tentatively say yes. But I have yet to hear an answer from those who believe that belief is (reducible to) action. If their answer is no, then we'd have to begin discussing whether there is any temporal quality to belief at all. E.g. can one only believe what they're doing at any given instant and the concept of belief is incoherent for discussions of future and past? If their answer is yes, then we have to decide whether memory (of some type) is sufficient for belief. E.g. are there types of memory that do not amount to belief? Like if I know that some person thinks 1+1=3, I can remember that, suspend disbelief, and play along with that equation for awhile without believing it. -- glen FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College lectures, archives, unsubscribe, maps at http://www.friam.org
Re: [FRIAM] faith, zombies, and crazy people
Glen said: In [Sarbajit's example of cult indoctrination], there is still a missing piece between the social comfort brought by the increasing participation in various activities versus some belief ascribed to the cult members. I would posit that a mole/infiltrator could participate in a cult quite a long time, dancing, changing, murdering starlets in their homes, etc. _without_ actually believing the doctrines of the cult (much like most Catholics I've met). So, what we need is an idea of how we get to belief from these actions. How do we distinguish lip service or facetious dancing and chanting from the chanting and dancing of the true believers? - But Glen, when you talk about the infiltrator, or the person paying lip-service, you are just appealing to a larger pattern of behavior. Agreeing with your assertion, faking belief looks different than belief... if you can see enough of the person's behavior and/or see a close enough level of detail. We distinguish the two exactly by determining which larger pattern of behavior exists. This is not proposing some radically new way of thinking about psychology... it is proposing that we deal with psychology the same way any other science deals with its special subject matter. Take Chemistry: There are many, many chemicals that look the same to the human eye, and which react the same under many conditions (for example, when a set volume is put on a scale), but which react differently under other conditions (for example, when put in a particular solution). The chemicals are distinguished by observing a variety of ways in which the chemicals interact with the world. Similarly, a person who believes X and a person faking belief in X are distinguished by observing a wide variety of ways in which the people interact with the world. Also, for the record, one of the problems with using moles is that it is very difficult to get people capable of participating in cultural practices of these sorts over extended periods without becoming believers. The practices become normal to you, the group becomes your group, and even if you can still turn them in/report on them/whatever you are supposed to do, you become sympathetic. FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College lectures, archives, unsubscribe, maps at http://www.friam.org
Re: [FRIAM] faith, zombies, and crazy people
ERIC P. CHARLES wrote at 09/19/2012 02:54 PM: But Glen, when you talk about the infiltrator, or the person paying lip-service, you are just appealing to a larger pattern of behavior. Aha!! Excellent! So, tell me how to classify the patterns so that one pattern is just lip service and the other is belief! If you do that, then we'll have our objective function. I can develop an algorithm for that and we'll be able to automatically distinguish zombies from actors. Then we can begin building machines that try to satisfy it. Agreeing with your assertion, faking belief looks different than belief... if you can see enough of the person's behavior and/or see a close enough level of detail. The former, again, sounds like memory. The latter is something else. It implies something about scale. We know actions are multi-scale (anatomy, physiology, chemistry, physics). Is there a cut-off below which we need not go? Genes? Chemicals? Or does the multiscalar requirements for measuring belief extend all the way down? a person who believes X and a person faking belief in X are distinguished by observing a wide variety of ways in which the people interact with the world. So, in addition to memory and crossing scales, the measures are also multivalent at any one instant or any one scale. Also, for the record, one of the problems with using moles is that it is very difficult to get people capable of participating in cultural practices of these sorts over extended periods without becoming believers. The practices become normal to you, the group becomes your group, and even if you can still turn them in/report on them/whatever you are supposed to do, you become sympathetic. Uh-oh. This makes it sound like not only is there a multi-scale problem, but there may also be a hybrid requirement. The mole either continuously transitions from non-belief to belief or there's a threshold. I.e. some parts of our classifying predicate will be continuous and some will be discrete. I have to admit, this seems like a really difficult multi-objective selection method. Building a machine that generates belief from a collection of mechanisms, thereby satisfying the criteria, will be exceedingly difficult, at least as difficult as artificial life and intelligence. But this is what we have to do if we're going to continue claiming that beliefs reduce to actions. -- glen FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College lectures, archives, unsubscribe, maps at http://www.friam.org
Re: [FRIAM] faith, zombies, and crazy people
On 9/19/12 4:29 PM, glen wrote: I.e. some parts of our classifying predicate will be continuous and some will be discrete. I have to admit, this seems like a really difficult multi-objective selection method. Use tabu search (https://projects.coin-or.org/metslib), encoding the transition rate as binary numbers in the state space. Marcus FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College lectures, archives, unsubscribe, maps at http://www.friam.org
[FRIAM] Cognition and Calculus, WAS: faith, zombies, and crazy people
I agree, here, that faking X is one organizational level above doing x. What tempts us to error is the notion that mental states are instantaneous, rather smeared over time and space. I sometimes wonder what the relation is between how we think about cogntions …. Thoughts, feelings, motives, etc. …. And how we thing about velocity. Perhaps because of speedometers, we think that speed is a thing that can be true at an instant. But speed does not live in an instant, it LIVES in the domain of delta-T. I have wondered for years about the relation between our contemporary notions of mind and the calculus. The calculus allows us to squinch down things that live in the domain of Delta-t into instants. Similarly, our way of talking about feelings, motives, thoughts, etc., squinches these patterns of activity down into instants, when they themselves live in the domain of delta-t. Not to mention, the domain of delta[delta-t] and the domain of delta[delta[delta-t]], etc., ad nauseam. My history of modern philosophy is TERRIBLE but it seems to me that Descartes’s notion that a mind is the sort of thing that can be seen veridically only by the mind-holder leads to the calculus. Was my high school math teacher (who was also the football coach) correct to tell me that the Cartesian plane is where the calculus was born? Nick From: friam-boun...@redfish.com [mailto:friam-boun...@redfish.com] On Behalf Of ERIC P. CHARLES Sent: Wednesday, September 19, 2012 5:55 PM To: glen Cc: The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group Subject: Re: [FRIAM] faith, zombies, and crazy people Glen said: In [Sarbajit's example of cult indoctrination], there is still a missing piece between the social comfort brought by the increasing participation in various activities versus some belief ascribed to the cult members. I would posit that a mole/infiltrator could participate in a cult quite a long time, dancing, changing, murdering starlets in their homes, etc. _without_ actually believing the doctrines of the cult (much like most Catholics I've met). So, what we need is an idea of how we get to belief from these actions. How do we distinguish lip service or facetious dancing and chanting from the chanting and dancing of the true believers? - But Glen, when you talk about the infiltrator, or the person paying lip-service, you are just appealing to a larger pattern of behavior. Agreeing with your assertion, faking belief looks different than belief... if you can see enough of the person's behavior and/or see a close enough level of detail. We distinguish the two exactly by determining which larger pattern of behavior exists. This is not proposing some radically new way of thinking about psychology... it is proposing that we deal with psychology the same way any other science deals with its special subject matter. Take Chemistry: There are many, many chemicals that look the same to the human eye, and which react the same under many conditions (for example, when a set volume is put on a scale), but which react differently under other conditions (for example, when put in a particular solution). The chemicals are distinguished by observing a variety of ways in which the chemicals interact with the world. Similarly, a person who believes X and a person faking belief in X are distinguished by observing a wide variety of ways in which the people interact with the world. Also, for the record, one of the problems with using moles is that it is very difficult to get people capable of participating in cultural practices of these sorts over extended periods without becoming believers. The practices become normal to you, the group becomes your group, and even if you can still turn them in/report on them/whatever you are supposed to do, you become sympathetic. FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College lectures, archives, unsubscribe, maps at http://www.friam.org
Re: [FRIAM] faith, zombies, and crazy people
Glen: (aside) In addition to my faith hat, I also have a designer/manufacturer of programmable logic controller hat. To design an artificial life form (android / zombie ...) capable of successfully passing among humans in a religious (faith) setting you would probably need tons of memory (or else some channeling reinforcement, probabilistic determinative etc. mechanism) and the ability to dynamically mimic emotions such as boredom, guilt, trust, sin, obedience, lip-service etc. The zombie wouldn't have to bring much knowledge or wisdom to this setting as the more brain dead it is the easier it is for to pass. FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College lectures, archives, unsubscribe, maps at http://www.friam.org
Re: [FRIAM] faith, zombies, and crazy people
Robots do lip service quite handily. We value your call. Nick -Original Message- From: friam-boun...@redfish.com [mailto:friam-boun...@redfish.com] On Behalf Of Sarbajit Roy Sent: Wednesday, September 19, 2012 11:22 PM To: The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group Subject: Re: [FRIAM] faith, zombies, and crazy people Glen: (aside) In addition to my faith hat, I also have a designer/manufacturer of programmable logic controller hat. To design an artificial life form (android / zombie ...) capable of successfully passing among humans in a religious (faith) setting you would probably need tons of memory (or else some channeling reinforcement, probabilistic determinative etc. mechanism) and the ability to dynamically mimic emotions such as boredom, guilt, trust, sin, obedience, lip-service etc. The zombie wouldn't have to bring much knowledge or wisdom to this setting as the more brain dead it is the easier it is for to pass. FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College lectures, archives, unsubscribe, maps at http://www.friam.org FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College lectures, archives, unsubscribe, maps at http://www.friam.org
Re: [FRIAM] faith, zombies, and crazy people
Apparently its not so simple to achieve The Artificial Life of Synthetic Actors http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.13.8387rep=rep1type=pdf Lots of dynamic collisions and collision detection mechanisms floating about. Just came across this http://www.forbes.com/sites/parmyolson/2012/06/14/cyber-security-and-the-rise-of-the-silicon-based-life-form/ Silicon-based life forms now make short work of tasks that once took us many man hours to accomplish. In addition to carrying crushing computational loads without complaint, they deliver our communications at the speed of light, transact business on our behalf and help us more efficiently perform the tasks we still perform. We think a lot about the way we interact with them. Few of us, however, think about how silicon-based life forms interact with one another. On 9/20/12, Nicholas Thompson nickthomp...@earthlink.net wrote: Robots do lip service quite handily. We value your call. Nick -Original Message- From: friam-boun...@redfish.com [mailto:friam-boun...@redfish.com] On Behalf Of Sarbajit Roy Sent: Wednesday, September 19, 2012 11:22 PM To: The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group Subject: Re: [FRIAM] faith, zombies, and crazy people Glen: (aside) In addition to my faith hat, I also have a designer/manufacturer of programmable logic controller hat. To design an artificial life form (android / zombie ...) capable of successfully passing among humans in a religious (faith) setting you would probably need tons of memory (or else some channeling reinforcement, probabilistic determinative etc. mechanism) and the ability to dynamically mimic emotions such as boredom, guilt, trust, sin, obedience, lip-service etc. The zombie wouldn't have to bring much knowledge or wisdom to this setting as the more brain dead it is the easier it is for to pass. FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College lectures, archives, unsubscribe, maps at http://www.friam.org FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College lectures, archives, unsubscribe, maps at http://www.friam.org FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College lectures, archives, unsubscribe, maps at http://www.friam.org
