I agree, here, that faking X is one organizational level above doing x.  What  
tempts us to error is the notion that mental states are instantaneous, rather 
smeared over time and space.  

 

I sometimes wonder what the relation is between how we think about cogntions …. 
Thoughts, feelings, motives, etc. …. And how we thing about velocity.   Perhaps 
because of speedometers, we think that speed is a thing that can be true at an 
instant.  But speed does not live in an instant, it LIVES in the domain of 
delta-T.   I have wondered for years about the relation between our 
contemporary notions of mind and the calculus.  The calculus allows us to 
squinch down things that live in the domain of Delta-t into instants.  
Similarly, our way of talking about feelings, motives, thoughts, etc., 
squinches these patterns of activity down into instants, when they themselves 
live in the domain of delta-t.  Not to mention, the domain of delta[delta-t] 
and the domain of delta[delta[delta-t]], etc.,  ad nauseam.   My history of 
modern philosophy  is TERRIBLE but it seems to me that Descartes’s notion that 
a mind is the sort of thing that can be seen veridically only by the 
mind-holder leads to the calculus.   Was my high school math teacher (who was 
also the football coach)  correct to tell me that the Cartesian plane is where 
the calculus was born?

 

 

Nick 

 

From: friam-boun...@redfish.com [mailto:friam-boun...@redfish.com] On Behalf Of 
ERIC P. CHARLES
Sent: Wednesday, September 19, 2012 5:55 PM
To: glen
Cc: The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group
Subject: Re: [FRIAM] faith, zombies, and crazy people

 

Glen said: In [Sarbajit's example of cult indoctrination], there is still a 
missing piece between the social comfort brought by the increasing 
participation in various activities versus some belief ascribed to the cult 
members. I would posit that a mole/infiltrator could participate in a cult 
quite a long time, dancing, changing, murdering starlets in their homes, etc. 
_without_ actually believing the doctrines of the cult (much like most 
Catholics I've met). So, what we need is an idea of how we get to belief from 
these actions. How do we distinguish "lip service" or facetious dancing and 
chanting from the chanting and dancing of the true believers? 

 
-----

But Glen, when you talk about the infiltrator, or the person
"paying lip-service", you are just appealing to a larger pattern of
behavior.

Agreeing with your assertion, "faking belief" looks different
than "belief"... if you can see enough of the person's behavior and/or see a
close enough level of detail.

We distinguish the two exactly by
determining which larger pattern of behavior exists. This is not proposing some
radically new way of thinking about psychology... it is proposing that we deal
with psychology the same way any other science deals with its special subject
matter. Take Chemistry: 

There are many, many chemicals that look the
same to the human eye, and which react the same under
many conditions (for example, when a set volume is put on a scale), but which
react differently under other conditions (for example, when put in a particular
solution). The chemicals are distinguished by observing a variety of ways in
which the chemicals interact with the world. Similarly, a person who believes X
and a person faking belief in X are distinguished by observing a wide variety
of ways in which the people interact with the world.

Also, for the
record, one of the problems with using "moles" is that it is very difficult to
get people capable of participating in cultural practices of these sorts over
extended periods without becoming believers. The practices become normal to
you, the group becomes "your group", and even if you can still turn them
in/report on them/whatever you are supposed to do, you become sympathetic.
 
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