Re: [FRIAM] All hail confirmation bias!

[Eric Smith]

Hi Glen,

> On Apr 25, 2019, at 11:53 PM, glen∈ℂ  wrote:
> 
> Yes!  I can't seem to find a copy of the article.  But going on your 
> description and the figures, it looks like an excellent example of treating 
> hierarchy as something to measure rather than impute. (The silverchair.com 
> link didn't work, unfortunately.)
> 
> Until I can find a copy, some of what you say is provocative. It seems to me 
> that talking directly about the graph (or network, an alternative Potochnik 
> mentions) is the more literal concept, where level and hierarchy are the more 
> metaphorical ones. Even the concept of accretion (temporal layering) is, to 
> me, more meaningful than level or hierarchy.  So, the question remains *what* 
> advantage do we gain from "zooming out" and thinking in terms of hierarchy 
> and levels that we didn't already have in terms of [a]cyclic, temporal or 
> structural, graphs?  Is the advantage largely rhetorical and communicative, 
> accounting for the variations in the way the audience and participants think? 
> Or are there, eg experimental design, questions and measures we can take that 
> are made more precise and testable in terms of level and hierarchy versus 
> graphs?

Yes, only limited roles for this case.  

I believe I am thinking of the levels as proxies for roughly sequential 
intervals of time.  I can't establish any strict notion of concurrency among 
features within a level, but in a context where I think both chemistry and 
accumulating structure were in transition during the era when this molecular 
assembly came into existence, I think of the features that don’t have 
dependency relations as probably having arisen in a common horizon of this 
transition.  If we had only RNA, it would be good to know that there was a 
concrete way to quantify what one was referring to, but the equivalence classes 
on their own might have limited weight.  When we realize, however, that the 
proteins are also undergoing a transition that spans remarkably qualitatively 
different types, that each stage in that transition is recapitulated in several 
different proteins, that there is a clear directionality from simple to complex 
in the sequence, that the multiple instances at each stage roughly align with a 
common equivalence class in the RNA sequence, and that in addition to the 
structural changes that distinguish stages within the proteins, there are also 
changes in the way they interact with the RNA (protein side chains in the later 
stages start to displace Mg++ ions as the coordinators of RNA folding, which 
had been the sole coordinators in the earlier stages), one gets a qualitative 
impression of clines, which luckily it is possible to attach to quantities in a 
few features.

All best,

Eric


> 
> On 4/24/19 4:51 PM, Eric Smith wrote:
>> Here is a nice example, of that onus accepted and handled clearly.
>> https://www.nature.com/articles/nature07749
>> Topic is the accretionary dependency structure in the large subunit of the 
>> ribosome.
>> In particular, see Fig. 2, which my image-page on chrome is showing me at 
>> this URL (don’t know if these URLs produce equivalent output for different 
>> users):
>> https://www.google.com/search?q=bokov+and+steinberg+ribosome&source=lnms&tbm=isch&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwjXjfm58unhAhXKzLwKHXG5B60Q_AUIDigB&biw=1371&bih=745#imgrc=uExkhZIl02WciM:
>> The primitive data is a set of links between locations in folded RNA, which 
>> can be assigned a directionality that is very likely a dynamically 
>> meaningful one.  The result is a graph with directed links.  It is an 
>> empirical question whether the graph is cyclic or acyclic, with the answer 
>> being the latter.  The primitive data structure is only the acyclic graph.  
>> However, a second question is whether the nodes in the graph admit a partial 
>> order, and if so, which sets of nodes constitute each distinct level within 
>> that order.  That question too has an answer in terms of the maximal extent 
>> to which the equivalence class defining a level can be extended, without 
>> violating the dependency structure in the underlying DAG.  Nodes in a level 
>> need not have been historically contemporaneous, but they reflect assembly 
>> conditions, as nodes at higher levels “plug into” nodes at lower levels, and 
>> thus require them to be in place.  This seems extremely likely to reflect an 
>> actual historical accretionary sequence, in which equivalence of nodes 
>> within a level quantifies the ambiguity of how they may have related in time.
>> Lots more has been done to extend this data to a detailed module 
>> decomposition, with or without the level post-processing.  Through all of 
>> it, the level decomposition continues to be salient, as levels by the 
>> analysis of the DAG also correspond roughly to horizons for generations of 
>> peptide structure.  See
>> https://watermark.silverchair.com/msx086.pdf?token=AQECAHi208BE49Ooan9kkhW_Ercy7Dm3ZL_9Cf3qfKAc485ysgAAAjwwggI4BgkqhkiG9w0BBwa

Re: [FRIAM] A question for tomorrow

[uǝlƃ ☣]

What was the result of this morning's conversation?

On 4/25/19 10:50 PM, Nick Thompson wrote:
> What does a Turing Machine know?


-- 
☣ uǝlƃ


FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv
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Re: [FRIAM] A question for tomorrow

[Russ Abbott]

Nick, I can't believe you are asking such a question -- unless by "know"
you mean something very different from the common understanding. No
computer *knows* anything, although it may have lots of stored information.
(*Information *is meant in the Shannon sense.)

For example, Oxford defines
 knowledge as "Facts,
information, and skills acquired through experience or education; the
theoretical or practical understanding of a subject." This is distinct
from, for example, having access to an encyclopedia--or even having memorized
the contents of one. Turing machines, and computers in general, do not have
an *understanding *of anything--even though they may have lots of
Shannon-style information (which *we *understand as) related to some
subject.

(Like Glen, though, I am interested in the results, if any, of this
morning's meeting.)

-- Russ Abbott
Professor, Computer Science
California State University, Los Angeles


On Fri, Apr 26, 2019 at 2:38 PM uǝlƃ ☣  wrote:

> What was the result of this morning's conversation?
>
> On 4/25/19 10:50 PM, Nick Thompson wrote:
> > What does a Turing Machine know?
>
>
> --
> ☣ uǝlƃ
>
> 
> FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv
> Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College
> to unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com
> archives back to 2003: http://friam.471366.n2.nabble.com/
> FRIAM-COMIC 
> http://friam-comic.blogspot.com/ by Dr. Strangelove
>

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Re: [FRIAM] A question for tomorrow

[Frank Wimberly]

On the way to Friam I said to Nick.  Turing Machines don't know anything.
They may store representations of knowledge.  I further said that a
photograph also represents knowledge.  For example, the number of floors of
a given building.  Most people would be puzzled by the question, "What does
a photo know?"

There were multiple parallel conversations after we arrived.  I don't
recall additional discussions about what Turing Machines know.

---
Frank Wimberly

My memoir:
https://www.amazon.com/author/frankwimberly

My scientific publications:
https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Frank_Wimberly2

Phone (505) 670-9918

On Fri, Apr 26, 2019, 8:06 PM Russ Abbott  wrote:

> Nick, I can't believe you are asking such a question -- unless by "know"
> you mean something very different from the common understanding. No
> computer *knows* anything, although it may have lots of stored
> information. (*Information *is meant in the Shannon sense.)
>
> For example, Oxford defines
>  knowledge as "Facts,
> information, and skills acquired through experience or education; the
> theoretical or practical understanding of a subject." This is distinct
> from, for example, having access to an encyclopedia--or even having memorized
> the contents of one. Turing machines, and computers in general, do not have
> an *understanding *of anything--even though they may have lots of
> Shannon-style information (which *we *understand as) related to some
> subject.
>
> (Like Glen, though, I am interested in the results, if any, of this
> morning's meeting.)
>
> -- Russ Abbott
> Professor, Computer Science
> California State University, Los Angeles
>
>
> On Fri, Apr 26, 2019 at 2:38 PM uǝlƃ ☣  wrote:
>
>> What was the result of this morning's conversation?
>>
>> On 4/25/19 10:50 PM, Nick Thompson wrote:
>> > What does a Turing Machine know?
>>
>>
>> --
>> ☣ uǝlƃ
>>
>> 
>> FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv
>> Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College
>> to unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com
>> archives back to 2003: http://friam.471366.n2.nabble.com/
>> FRIAM-COMIC 
>> http://friam-comic.blogspot.com/ by Dr. Strangelove
>>
> 
> FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv
> Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College
> to unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com
> archives back to 2003: http://friam.471366.n2.nabble.com/
> FRIAM-COMIC http://friam-comic.blogspot.com/ by Dr. Strangelove
>

FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv
Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College
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Re: [FRIAM] A question for tomorrow

[Marcus Daniels]

Turing machines can perform an algorithm like an auto-encoding deep neural net, 
where a picture of a tree could be categorized as a tree in some internal node. 
 Likewise activating that internal node might generate an image of a tree (when 
the Turing machine dreams).

From: Friam  on behalf of Frank Wimberly 

Reply-To: The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group 
Date: Friday, April 26, 2019 at 8:19 PM
To: "russ.abb...@gmail.com" , The Friday Morning Applied 
Complexity Coffee Group 
Subject: Re: [FRIAM] A question for tomorrow

On the way to Friam I said to Nick.  Turing Machines don't know anything.  They 
may store representations of knowledge.  I further said that a photograph also 
represents knowledge.  For example, the number of floors of a given building.  
Most people would be puzzled by the question, "What does a photo know?"

There were multiple parallel conversations after we arrived.  I don't recall 
additional discussions about what Turing Machines know.
---
Frank Wimberly

My memoir:
https://www.amazon.com/author/frankwimberly

My scientific publications:
https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Frank_Wimberly2

Phone (505) 670-9918

On Fri, Apr 26, 2019, 8:06 PM Russ Abbott 
mailto:russ.abb...@gmail.com>> wrote:
Nick, I can't believe you are asking such a question -- unless by "know" you 
mean something very different from the common understanding. No computer knows 
anything, although it may have lots of stored information. (Information is 
meant in the Shannon sense.)

For example, Oxford 
defines knowledge as 
"Facts, information, and skills acquired through experience or education; the 
theoretical or practical understanding of a subject." This is distinct from, 
for example, having access to an encyclopedia--or even having memorized the 
contents of one. Turing machines, and computers in general, do not have an 
understanding of anything--even though they may have lots of Shannon-style 
information (which we understand as) related to some subject.

(Like Glen, though, I am interested in the results, if any, of this morning's 
meeting.)

-- Russ Abbott
Professor, Computer Science
California State University, Los Angeles


On Fri, Apr 26, 2019 at 2:38 PM uǝlƃ ☣ 
mailto:geprope...@gmail.com>> wrote:
What was the result of this morning's conversation?

On 4/25/19 10:50 PM, Nick Thompson wrote:
> What does a Turing Machine know?


--
☣ uǝlƃ


FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv
Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College
to unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com
archives back to 2003: http://friam.471366.n2.nabble.com/
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Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College
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Re: [FRIAM] A question for tomorrow

[Nick Thompson]

Russ II, 

 

Good to be back in touch with you. 

 

The question is certainly naïve.  So nobody other than me (John? Jon? David? 
Lee?  Eric?  HELP!) is willing to breath some life into it, then that IS its 
answer.   But while awaiting Higher Authority, let me say a couple of things.  
See Larding. 

 

Nick 

 

Nicholas S. Thompson

Emeritus Professor of Psychology and Biology

Clark University

  
http://home.earthlink.net/~nickthompson/naturaldesigns/

 

From: Friam [mailto:friam-boun...@redfish.com] On Behalf Of Russ Abbott
Sent: Friday, April 26, 2019 8:06 PM
To: The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group 
Subject: Re: [FRIAM] A question for tomorrow

 

Nick, I can't believe you are asking such a question -- unless by "know" you 
mean something very different from the common understanding.

[NST==>  If I remember correctly our earlier argument, yours is an inprinciple 
argument against any claim that machines and humans are ever doing the same 
thing, right?  So, I could imagine the most complicated computer imaginable … 
quantum computer, or whatever you guys would call it … and you would say that 
that computer cannot “know” or “think” or “feel” or “perceive”, etc.  <==nst] 

No computer knows anything, although it may have lots of stored information. 
(Information is meant in the Shannon sense.) 

[NST==>So, there is no intentionality in Shannon Weaver “information”, right.  
SW information is not “information that …”.  But SW information is a concept 
that grows out of communication theory, right?  So, Dawes communicated one bit 
of information when he hung out the lanterns at the top of the Old North 
Church.  (“One if by land and two if by sea, and I on the opposite shore shall 
be.”), if you take for granted that the British were coming, one way or the 
other.  So the basic idea is that before the lanterns went up, Revere (on the 
other shore) had two possibilities, and after the lanterns went up, he had only 
one.  His uncertainty, if you will was reduced by one bit by the information 
communicated by Dawes’s lanterns.  I am not sure what it means to talk about SW 
information outside of a communication context.  <==nst] 

 

For example, Oxford defines 
  knowledge as "Facts, 
information, and skills acquired through experience or education; the 
theoretical or practical understanding of a subject." This is distinct from, 
for example, having access to an encyclopedia--or even having memorized the 
contents of one. Turing machines, and computers in general, do not have an 
understanding of anything--even though they may have lots of Shannon-style 
information (which we understand as) related to some subject.

 

(Like Glen, though, I am interested in the results, if any, of this morning's 
meeting.)

[NST==>I think most people thought it was an ill-formed question, but were too 
polite to say so.  <==nst] 

 

I will lard Frank’s message in the next email.

 

Thanks, again, 

 

N

 

-- Russ Abbott   
Professor, Computer Science
California State University, Los Angeles

 

 

On Fri, Apr 26, 2019 at 2:38 PM uǝlƃ ☣ mailto:geprope...@gmail.com> > wrote:

What was the result of this morning's conversation?

On 4/25/19 10:50 PM, Nick Thompson wrote:
> What does a Turing Machine know?


-- 
☣ uǝlƃ


FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv
Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College
to unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com
archives back to 2003: http://friam.471366.n2.nabble.com/ 
 
FRIAM-COMIC http://friam-comic.blogspot.com/ by Dr. Strangelove


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Re: [FRIAM] A question for tomorrow

[Nick Thompson]

Larding below.

 

Nicholas S. Thompson

Emeritus Professor of Psychology and Biology

Clark University

  
http://home.earthlink.net/~nickthompson/naturaldesigns/

 

From: Friam [mailto:friam-boun...@redfish.com] On Behalf Of Frank Wimberly
Sent: Friday, April 26, 2019 8:19 PM
To: russ.abb...@gmail.com; The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group 

Subject: Re: [FRIAM] A question for tomorrow

 

On the way to Friam I said to Nick.  Turing Machines don't know anything.  They 
may store representations of knowledge. [NST==>Frank: This is how I understand 
you.  The relation between a Turing Machine and knowledge is like the relation 
between Mathematics and the events or processes it models.  All the knowledge 
is in the interpretation  translate “life” into something that the Math or 
Machine can compute and in the interpretation that translate the results of the 
computation back into life.  Let’s see.  What am I accusing you of here.  OH.  
I have it.  I am accusing you of a mathematicians understanding of computation. 
 Is that understanding of that relation canonical?   <==nst]  I further said 
that a photograph also represents knowledge.  For example, the number of floors 
of a given building.  Most people would be puzzled by the question, "What does 
a photo know?"[NST==>I think the metaphor is unfair.  Nobody has ever accused a 
photograph of being able to play chess, or to engage in other tasks which are 
broadly seen (at least by defrocked English majors) as cognitive.  <==nst]  

 

There were multiple parallel conversations after we arrived.  I don't recall 
additional discussions about what Turing Machines know.

[NST==>Except at the very end, after 3 hours of discussing other things.  By 
that time I was exhausted, and I don’t remember what we said.  We spent a lot 
of time exploring our attractions to unorthodox scientific opinion in such 
matters as MSG and headaches, auras, pigeon navigation, an even, by 
implication, the tin-hat stuff.  It’s a question I would love to poll the FRIAM 
list on:  How many of you engage in unproven health practices of various sorts, 
even though “science” tells you they are worthless?  Why, exactly?  How is that 
consistent with your criticisms of  climate science deniers?  <==nst] 

Gotta go, 

Thanks everybody, 

 

N

---
Frank Wimberly

My memoir:
https://www.amazon.com/author/frankwimberly

My scientific publications:
https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Frank_Wimberly2

Phone (505) 670-9918

 

On Fri, Apr 26, 2019, 8:06 PM Russ Abbott mailto:russ.abb...@gmail.com> > wrote:

Nick, I can't believe you are asking such a question -- unless by "know" you 
mean something very different from the common understanding. No computer knows 
anything, although it may have lots of stored information. (Information is 
meant in the Shannon sense.) 

 

For example, Oxford defines 
  knowledge as "Facts, 
information, and skills acquired through experience or education; the 
theoretical or practical understanding of a subject." This is distinct from, 
for example, having access to an encyclopedia--or even having memorized the 
contents of one. Turing machines, and computers in general, do not have an 
understanding of anything--even though they may have lots of Shannon-style 
information (which we understand as) related to some subject.

 

(Like Glen, though, I am interested in the results, if any, of this morning's 
meeting.)

 

-- Russ Abbott   
Professor, Computer Science
California State University, Los Angeles

 

 

On Fri, Apr 26, 2019 at 2:38 PM uǝlƃ ☣ mailto:geprope...@gmail.com> > wrote:

What was the result of this morning's conversation?

On 4/25/19 10:50 PM, Nick Thompson wrote:
> What does a Turing Machine know?


-- 
☣ uǝlƃ


FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv
Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College
to unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com
archives back to 2003: http://friam.471366.n2.nabble.com/ 
 
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Re: [FRIAM] A question for tomorrow

[Russ Abbott]

Good to talk to you again also, Nick.

You characterized me as saying, *"yours is an in principle argument against
any claim that machines and humans are ever doing the same thing, right?" *
I wouldn't go that far. One might argue that as physical beings, we are
machines of a sort, so there's not such a clear line between machines and
humans. One of our current scientific challenges is to figure out how to
characterize it and how to push entities across it.

But moving to shallower water, consider this example. Presumably, no one
would say that a standard washing machine knows how to clean clothes. A
washing machine is built to control the flow of water in and out of its
tank, to rotate its agitator for given periods of time, etc. We then
informally say that the washing machine is cleaning the clothes. But it's
not. It just performing mechanical actions that result in what we think of
as clean clothes.

Suppose we made the washing machine smarter. Suppose it had sensors that
could sense the chemicals that we consider "dirt," and selected actions
from its repertoire of actions that reduced the level of those chemicals
below some minimal threshold. Would one say that it then knows how to clean
clothes? I would say that it doesn't--except in an informal way of talking.
The washing machine is built of physical components, sensors, etc. along
with algorithms that (again) produce what *we *think of as clean clothes.
But the washing machine doesn't think of them as clean clothes. It doesn't
think of anything. It just does what it does.

Is there anything one might add to our washing machine so that we would
want to say that it knows how to clean clothes. I can't think of any
incremental steps. For me to attribute the washing machine with knowing how
to clean clothes I would insist that it have consciousness and subjective
experience. I know that's a big jump; it's the line between machines and
humans that I would draw. I'm now recalling, Nick, that you don't believe
in consciousness and subjective experience. Right? So we are probably at an
impasse since we no longer have a common vocabulary. But even if the
position I'm assuming you hold on consciousness and subjective experience
were not a problem, I'd still be stuck. I have no idea how to build
consciousness and subjective experience into a washing machine. This is
probably where we got stuck the last time we talked about this. I guess we
drifted back out to the deeper water anyway. Oh, well. Perhaps it was worth
reviewing the issue. Perhaps not.

-- Russ

On Fri, Apr 26, 2019 at 8:55 PM Nick Thompson 
wrote:

> Larding below.
>
>
>
> Nicholas S. Thompson
>
> Emeritus Professor of Psychology and Biology
>
> Clark University
>
> http://home.earthlink.net/~nickthompson/naturaldesigns/
>
>
>
> *From:* Friam [mailto:friam-boun...@redfish.com] *On Behalf Of *Frank
> Wimberly
> *Sent:* Friday, April 26, 2019 8:19 PM
> *To:* russ.abb...@gmail.com; The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee
> Group 
> *Subject:* Re: [FRIAM] A question for tomorrow
>
>
>
> On the way to Friam I said to Nick.  Turing Machines don't know anything.
> They may store representations of knowledge. *[NST==>Frank: This is how I
> understand you.  The relation between a Turing Machine and knowledge is
> like the relation between Mathematics and the events or processes it
> models.  All the knowledge is in the interpretation  translate “life” into
> something that the Math or Machine can compute and in the interpretation
> that translate the results of the computation back into life.  Let’s see.
> What am I accusing you of here.  OH.  I have it.  I am accusing you of a
> mathematicians understanding of computation.  Is that understanding of that
> relation canonical?   <==nst] * I further said that a photograph also
> represents knowledge.  For example, the number of floors of a given
> building.  Most people would be puzzled by the question, "What does a photo
> know?"*[NST==>I think the metaphor is unfair.  Nobody has ever accused a
> photograph of being able to play chess, or to engage in other tasks which
> are broadly seen (at least by defrocked English majors) as cognitive.
> <==nst] *
>
>
>
> There were multiple parallel conversations after we arrived.  I don't
> recall additional discussions about what Turing Machines know.
>
> *[NST==>Except at the very end, after 3 hours of discussing other things.
> By that time I was exhausted, and I don’t remember what we said.  We spent
> a lot of time exploring our attractions to unorthodox scientific opinion in
> such matters as MSG and headaches, auras, pigeon navigation, an even, by
> implication, the tin-hat stuff.  It’s a question I would love to poll the
> FRIAM list on:  How many of you engage in unproven health practices of
> various sorts, even though “science” tells you they are worthless?  Why,
> exactly?  How is that consistent with your criticisms of  climate science
> deniers?  <==nst] *
>
> *Gotta go, *
>
> *Thanks everybody, *
>

[FRIAM] Just an amusing obervation: number of addblock scripts needed

[Gillian Densmore]

I just for fun thread, and not sure better here or wedtech mail list.  But
it's also a distrubinbly bad trend:
I personally have on chrome: 4 differerent adblockers Addblock Plus, Ublock
both get installed bassically after installing a browser
Youtube adblocker
A Facebook adblocker

Trying to find a twitter adblocker as well

On my phone tried to get some adblockers to work (costs me money to get
spammed I discovered)

That's several different addblockers just to fix or filter out spam. That's
nuts!

How many adblocking or popup filters: adons or user or possibly greese
monkey scripts are folks up to these days?  I've had pretty good luck in
the past with ghostery to a point. But sometimes it breaks FB Messenger or
Hangouts (google) wich alas ugh I use (to much!) to get even voicemail
transcripts I've discovered -_-

So how many filters are people up to now? any ideas what can be done to get
those arguable leaches off the weby-web so websites work?

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Re: [FRIAM] A question for tomorrow

[Nick Thompson]

Russ, 

 

Thanks for stating the issues so precisely.  

 

You perhaps my side of the argument a tad too strongly.  It’s not that I think 
that self-conscious (etc.) doesn’t exist; it’s that I think of it as a material 
relation.  So anywhere, anytime, etc., that material relation can be generated, 
there consciousness exists.  It’s sort of like what Christ said: “wherever any 
number shall come together in my name, there shall I be.” Sorry, I am probably 
being silly there, but I just love that quote.)

 

Nick 

 

Nicholas S. Thompson

Emeritus Professor of Psychology and Biology

Clark University

  
http://home.earthlink.net/~nickthompson/naturaldesigns/

 

From: Friam [mailto:friam-boun...@redfish.com] On Behalf Of Russ Abbott
Sent: Friday, April 26, 2019 10:44 PM
To: The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group 
Subject: Re: [FRIAM] A question for tomorrow

 

Good to talk to you again also, Nick.

 

You characterized me as saying, "yours is an in principle argument against any 
claim that machines and humans are ever doing the same thing, right?" 

I wouldn't go that far. One might argue that as physical beings, we are 
machines of a sort, so there's not such a clear line between machines and 
humans. One of our current scientific challenges is to figure out how to 
characterize it and how to push entities across it.

 

But moving to shallower water, consider this example. Presumably, no one would 
say that a standard washing machine knows how to clean clothes. A washing 
machine is built to control the flow of water in and out of its tank, to rotate 
its agitator for given periods of time, etc. We then informally say that the 
washing machine is cleaning the clothes. But it's not. It just performing 
mechanical actions that result in what we think of as clean clothes. 

 

Suppose we made the washing machine smarter. Suppose it had sensors that could 
sense the chemicals that we consider "dirt," and selected actions from its 
repertoire of actions that reduced the level of those chemicals below some 
minimal threshold. Would one say that it then knows how to clean clothes? I 
would say that it doesn't--except in an informal way of talking. The washing 
machine is built of physical components, sensors, etc. along with algorithms 
that (again) produce what we think of as clean clothes. But the washing machine 
doesn't think of them as clean clothes. It doesn't think of anything. It just 
does what it does.

 

Is there anything one might add to our washing machine so that we would want to 
say that it knows how to clean clothes. I can't think of any incremental steps. 
For me to attribute the washing machine with knowing how to clean clothes I 
would insist that it have consciousness and subjective experience. I know 
that's a big jump; it's the line between machines and humans that I would draw. 
I'm now recalling, Nick, that you don't believe in consciousness and subjective 
experience. Right? So we are probably at an impasse since we no longer have a 
common vocabulary. But even if the position I'm assuming you hold on 
consciousness and subjective experience were not a problem, I'd still be stuck. 
I have no idea how to build consciousness and subjective experience into a 
washing machine. This is probably where we got stuck the last time we talked 
about this. I guess we drifted back out to the deeper water anyway. Oh, well. 
Perhaps it was worth reviewing the issue. Perhaps not.

 

-- Russ 

 

On Fri, Apr 26, 2019 at 8:55 PM Nick Thompson mailto:nickthomp...@earthlink.net> > wrote:

Larding below.

 

Nicholas S. Thompson

Emeritus Professor of Psychology and Biology

Clark University

  
http://home.earthlink.net/~nickthompson/naturaldesigns/

 

From: Friam [mailto:friam-boun...@redfish.com 
 ] On Behalf Of Frank Wimberly
Sent: Friday, April 26, 2019 8:19 PM
To: russ.abb...@gmail.com  ; The Friday Morning 
Applied Complexity Coffee Group mailto:friam@redfish.com> >
Subject: Re: [FRIAM] A question for tomorrow

 

On the way to Friam I said to Nick.  Turing Machines don't know anything.  They 
may store representations of knowledge. [NST==>Frank: This is how I understand 
you.  The relation between a Turing Machine and knowledge is like the relation 
between Mathematics and the events or processes it models.  All the knowledge 
is in the interpretation  translate “life” into something that the Math or 
Machine can compute and in the interpretation that translate the results of the 
computation back into life.  Let’s see.  What am I accusing you of here.  OH.  
I have it.  I am accusing you of a mathematicians understanding of computation. 
 Is that understanding of that relation canonical?   <==nst]  I further said 
that a photograph also represents knowledge.  For example, the number of floors 
of a give