Re: [FRIAM] Dope slaps, anyone? Text displaying correctly?
EricS and Glen, Sorry, again. Here is the short version. I apologize, again, for appending that great wadge of gunk. I found the second Feferman even harder to understand than the first. Glen, can you give me a little help on what you meant by a languageless language. Thanks, all On Sun, Jan 15, 2023 at 4:09 PM Nicholas Thompson wrote: > Aw crap! The shortish answer that I meant to send had all sorts of junk > appended! Sorry. Will resend soon. [blush] > > Sent from my Dumb Phone > > On Jan 12, 2023, at 8:54 PM, Nicholas Thompson > wrote: > > > Dear EricS, Glen, and anybody else who is following. > > Thank you so much for pitching in. As I have often said, I am incapable > of thinking alone, so your comments are wonderfully welcome. And thank you > also for confirming that what I wrote was readable. I am having to work in > gmail at the moment, which is , to me, an unfamiliar medium. > > First, Eric: I am trying to talk math-talk in this passage, so poetry is > not an excuse if I fail to be understood by you. > > *FWIW: as I have heard these discussions over the years, to the extent > that there is a productive analogy, I would say (unapologetically using my > words, and not trying to quote his) that Peirce’s claimed relation between > states of knowledge and truth (meaning, some fully-faithful representation > of “what is the case”) is analogous to the relation of sample estimators in > statistics to the quantity they are constructed to estimate. We don’t have > any ontological problems understanding sample estimators and the quantities > estimated, as both have status in the ordinary world of empirical things. > In our ontology, they are peers in some sense, but they clearly play > different roles and stand for different concepts.* > > I like very much what you have written here and think it states, perhaps > more precisely than I managed, exactly what I was trying to say. I do want > to further stress the fact that if a measurement system is tracking a > variate that is going to stabilize in the very long run, then it will on > average approximate that value with greater precision the more measures are > taken. Thus, not only does the vector of the convergence constitute > evidence for the location of the truth, the fact that there is convergence > is evidence that there is a truth to be located. Thus I agree with you > that the idea behind Peirce's notion of truth is the central limit theorem. > > Where we might disagree is whether there is any meaning to truth beyond > that central limit. This is where I found you use of "ontology" so > helpful. When talking about statistics, we are always talking about > mathematical structures in experience and nothing beyond that. We are > assuredly talking about only one kind of thing. However, I see you > wondering, are there things to talk about beyond the statistical structures > of experience? I hear you wanting to say "yes" and I see me wanting to > say "no". > > God knows ... and I use the term advisedly ... my hankering would seem to > be arrogant to the point of absurdity. Given all the forms of discourse in > which the words "truth" and "real" are used, all the myriad language games > in which these words appear as tokens, how, on earth, could I (or Peirce) > claim that there exists one and only one standard by which the truth of any > proposition or the reality of any abject can be demonstrated? I think I > have to claim (and I think Peirce claims it) that whatever people may say > about how they evaluate truth or reality claims, their evaluation always > boils down to an appeal to the long run of experience. > > Our difference of opinion, if we have one, is perhaps related to the > difference of opinion between James and Peirce concerning the relation > between truth as a believed thing and truth as a thing beyond the belief of > any finite group of people. James was a physician, and presumably knew a > lot about the power of placebos. He also was a ditherer, who famously took > years to decide whom to marry and agonized about it piteously to his > siblings. James was fascinated by the power of belief to make things true > and the power of doubt to make them impossible. Who could jump a chasm who > did not believe that he could jump a chasm! For Peirce, this sort of > thinking was just empty psychologizing. Truth was indeed a kind of > opinion, but it was the final opinion, that opinion upon which the > operation of scientific practices and logical inquiry would inevitably > converge. > > EricC, the Jamesian, will no doubt have a lot to say about this, including > that it is total garbage. > > As for Fefferman, my brief attempt to learn enough about Fefferman to > appear intelligent led me to the website, > http://www.vipfaq.com/Charles%20Fefferman.html, which might be the > weirdest website I have ever gone to. I don't THINK that a language-free > language is my unicorn, but Glen NEVER says something for
Re: [FRIAM] Dope slaps, anyone? Text displaying correctly?
Aw crap! The shortish answer that I meant to send had all sorts of junk appended! Sorry. Will resend soon. [blush] Sent from my Dumb PhoneOn Jan 12, 2023, at 8:54 PM, Nicholas Thompson wrote:Dear EricS, Glen, and anybody else who is following. Thank you so much for pitching in. As I have often said, I am incapable of thinking alone, so your comments are wonderfully welcome. And thank you also for confirming that what I wrote was readable. I am having to work in gmail at the moment, which is , to me, an unfamiliar medium.First, Eric: I am trying to talk math-talk in this passage, so poetry is not an excuse if I fail to be understood by you. FWIW: as I have heard these discussions over the years, to the extent that there is a productive analogy, I would say (unapologetically using my words, and not trying to quote his) that Peirce’s claimed relation between states of knowledge and truth (meaning, some fully-faithful representation of “what is the case”) is analogous to the relation of sample estimators in statistics to the quantity they are constructed to estimate. We don’t have any ontological problems understanding sample estimators and the quantities estimated, as both have status in the ordinary world of empirical things. In our ontology, they are peers in some sense, but they clearly play different roles and stand for different concepts.I like very much what you have written here and think it states, perhaps more precisely than I managed, exactly what I was trying to say. I do want to further stress the fact that if a measurement system is tracking a variate that is going to stabilize in the very long run, then it will on average approximate that value with greater precision the more measures are taken. Thus, not only does the vector of the convergence constitute evidence for the location of the truth, the fact that there is convergence is evidence that there is a truth to be located. Thus I agree with you that the idea behind Peirce's notion of truth is the central limit theorem. Where we might disagree is whether there is any meaning to truth beyond that central limit. This is where I found you use of "ontology" so helpful. When talking about statistics, we are always talking about mathematical structures in experience and nothing beyond that. We are assuredly talking about only one kind of thing. However, I see you wondering, are there things to talk about beyond the statistical structures of experience? I hear you wanting to say "yes" and I see me wanting to say "no". God knows ... and I use the term advisedly ... my hankering would seem to be arrogant to the point of absurdity. Given all the forms of discourse in which the words "truth" and "real" are used, all the myriad language games in which these words appear as tokens, how, on earth, could I (or Peirce) claim that there exists one and only one standard by which the truth of any proposition or the reality of any abject can be demonstrated? I think I have to claim (and I think Peirce claims it) that whatever people may say about how they evaluate truth or reality claims, their evaluation always boils down to an appeal to the long run of experience. Our difference of opinion, if we have one, is perhaps related to the difference of opinion between James and Peirce concerning the relation between truth as a believed thing and truth as a thing beyond the belief of any finite group of people. James was a physician, and presumably knew a lot about the power of placebos. He also was a ditherer, who famously took years to decide whom to marry and agonized about it piteously to his siblings. James was fascinated by the power of belief to make things true and the power of doubt to make them impossible. Who could jump a chasm who did not believe that he could jump a chasm! For Peirce, this sort of thinking was just empty psychologizing. Truth was indeed a kind of opinion, but it was the final opinion, that opinion upon which the operation of scientific practices and logical inquiry would inevitably converge. EricC, the Jamesian, will no doubt have a lot to say about this, including that it is total garbage. As for Fefferman, my brief attempt to learn enough about Fefferman to appear intelligent led me to the website, http://www.vipfaq.com/Charles%20Fefferman.html, which might be the weirdest website I have ever gone to. I don't THINK that a language-free language is my unicorn, but Glen NEVER says something for nothing, so I am withholding judgement until he boxes my ears again. I think my unicorn may be that all truth is statistical and, therefore, provisional. Literally: a seeing into the future. Thanks again for helping out, you guys!Nick Consider, for a moment, the role of placebos in medicine. Consider the ritual of transubstantiation. At the moment that you sip it, is the contents of the chalice Really "blood."Peirce writes, "Consider what effects, which may have practical bearing, the
