Re: [FRIAM] Downward causation

2017-11-23 Thread Eric Charles 
"causality makes reference to experiments or to nothing whatsoever"

Well sure if we have a generous definition of "experiment". I think you
might be better served by the word "investigation".

A consequence is something that would be experienced under some arranged
circumstances (or you are talking nonsense). Whether you want to call the
act-of-arrangement an experiment is a semantic distraction. Let's say I
have the idea that "George is in the elevator" and I make that thought more
clear in my mind by thinking through the consequences. One consequence is
that if I go to where the elevator door is going to open and wait there, I
will see George after the door opens. Is that an experiment? Personally, I
would say "yes", but a very minimal sort. A more pretentious scientist -
and certainly anyone committed to evangelical scientism
<https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Scientism>- would scoff at applying such a
noble label to such a mundane act. Is it an investigatory act? I think
everyone would grant it that status.

At some point in his Harvard lectures Perice rephrases his Pragmatic Maxim
as follows:
Pragmatism is the principle that every theoretical judgment expressible in
a sentence in the indicative mood is a confused form of thought whose only
meaning, if it has any, lies in its tendency to enforce a corresponding
practical maxim expressible as a conditional sentence having its apodosis
in the imperative mood.

So far as I am comfortable with such language, I think it means: Anytime
someone trying to make a truth claim about the world, they would be better
served by making if-then claims, where the "then" clause states a thing you
will do. For example, "George is in the elevator" should be understood as
shorthand for an elaborate collection of statements such as "If you want to
see George, you will stand in front of the elevator door as it opens", "If
you measure the weight of the elevator before and after the passenger
exits, you will find it different by one-George's-worth of weight," and "If
you want to kill George, you will kill a person in the elevator."




---
Eric P. Charles, Ph.D.
Supervisory Survey Statistician
U.S. Marine Corps


On Thu, Nov 23, 2017 at 7:44 AM, Eric Charles <
eric.phillip.char...@gmail.com> wrote:

> Frank, Nick,
> I highly recommend that the book "Beyond Versus
> <http://fixingpsychology.blogspot.com/2015/08/does-nature-versus-nurture-makes-sense.html>".
> Though it limits itself to the context of the nature vs. nurture debates
> (over a century's worth of them), it fits this context because it is a
> book-length study of the differences in mindset and result between trying
> to predict variation and trying to elucidate causal mechanisms. To set the
> task of determining whether variation in smoking habits relate to variation
> in cancer rates is quite a different task from trying to determine
> biological pathways that lead from smoking to cancer. Statistics plays a
> role in both, to be sure, but the roles are very different and should not
> be confused.
>
>
> ---
> Eric P. Charles, Ph.D.
> Supervisory Survey Statistician
> U.S. Marine Corps
> 
>
> On Thu, Nov 23, 2017 at 1:29 AM, Nick Thompson  > wrote:
>
>> Frank,
>>
>>
>>
>> I suspect that “actual” causation is just the hypostization of
>> statistical causation.   But we’ll see.
>>
>>
>>
>> I look forward to talking about the models.
>>
>>
>>
>> Nick
>>
>>
>>
>> Nicholas S. Thompson
>>
>> Emeritus Professor of Psychology and Biology
>>
>> Clark University
>>
>> http://home.earthlink.net/~nickthompson/naturaldesigns/
>>
>>
>>
>> *From:* Friam [mailto:friam-boun...@redfish.com] *On Behalf Of *Frank
>> Wimberly
>> *Sent:* Wednesday, November 22, 2017 10:13 PM
>>
>> *To:* The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group <
>> friam@redfish.com>
>> *Subject:* Re: [FRIAM] Downward causation
>>
>>
>>
>> Nick,
>>
>>
>>
>> They are not beyond your ability to understand.  I am happy to explain as
>> much as you like.
>>
>>
>>
>> Frank
>>
>> Frank Wimberly
>> Phone (505) 670-9918
>>
>>
>>
>> On Nov 22, 2017 10:10 PM, "Nick Thompson" 
>> wrote:
>>
>> Hi Frank,
>>
>>
>>
>> Please forgive me for not being adequately responsive.  I have looked at
>> some of the sources you have mentioned and they are beyond my ability to
>> understand.  So, I am dependent on you (or others) to explain to me how
>> those models work.

Re: [FRIAM] Downward causation

2017-11-23 Thread Eric Charles 
Frank, Nick,
I highly recommend that the book "Beyond Versus
<http://fixingpsychology.blogspot.com/2015/08/does-nature-versus-nurture-makes-sense.html>".
Though it limits itself to the context of the nature vs. nurture debates
(over a century's worth of them), it fits this context because it is a
book-length study of the differences in mindset and result between trying
to predict variation and trying to elucidate causal mechanisms. To set the
task of determining whether variation in smoking habits relate to variation
in cancer rates is quite a different task from trying to determine
biological pathways that lead from smoking to cancer. Statistics plays a
role in both, to be sure, but the roles are very different and should not
be confused.


---
Eric P. Charles, Ph.D.
Supervisory Survey Statistician
U.S. Marine Corps


On Thu, Nov 23, 2017 at 1:29 AM, Nick Thompson 
wrote:

> Frank,
>
>
>
> I suspect that “actual” causation is just the hypostization of statistical
> causation.   But we’ll see.
>
>
>
> I look forward to talking about the models.
>
>
>
> Nick
>
>
>
> Nicholas S. Thompson
>
> Emeritus Professor of Psychology and Biology
>
> Clark University
>
> http://home.earthlink.net/~nickthompson/naturaldesigns/
>
>
>
> *From:* Friam [mailto:friam-boun...@redfish.com] *On Behalf Of *Frank
> Wimberly
> *Sent:* Wednesday, November 22, 2017 10:13 PM
>
> *To:* The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group <
> friam@redfish.com>
> *Subject:* Re: [FRIAM] Downward causation
>
>
>
> Nick,
>
>
>
> They are not beyond your ability to understand.  I am happy to explain as
> much as you like.
>
>
>
> Frank
>
> Frank Wimberly
> Phone (505) 670-9918
>
>
>
> On Nov 22, 2017 10:10 PM, "Nick Thompson" 
> wrote:
>
> Hi Frank,
>
>
>
> Please forgive me for not being adequately responsive.  I have looked at
> some of the sources you have mentioned and they are beyond my ability to
> understand.  So, I am dependent on you (or others) to explain to me how
> those models work.  Now, I realize that this perhaps brings us to the
> threshold of our old argument about whether mathematics needs explanation …
> it just is,  You like it or you don’t.   Sounds like a good discussion to
> have on Friday
>
>
>
> Nick
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
> Nicholas S. Thompson
>
> Emeritus Professor of Psychology and Biology
>
> Clark University
>
> http://home.earthlink.net/~nickthompson/naturaldesigns/
>
>
>
> *From:* Friam [mailto:friam-boun...@redfish.com] *On Behalf Of *Frank
> Wimberly
> *Sent:* Wednesday, November 22, 2017 9:55 PM
> *To:* The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group <
> friam@redfish.com>
> *Subject:* Re: [FRIAM] Downward causation
>
>
>
> Nick,
>
>
>
> Whenever I say this it doesn't seem to register.  Pearl, Glymour, Spirtes,
> et al have put statistical causal reasoning on a firm foundation.  This
> involves learning causal models from observational rather that experimental
> data, including data from the past.  Also remember the distinction between
> "actual" causation (hitting this jar with a hammer causes it to break) and
> statistical causation (smoking causes cancer).
>
>
>
> There is an extensive and growing literature on these topics.
>
>
>
> Frank
>
>
>
>
>
> Frank Wimberly
> Phone (505) 670-9918
>
>
>
> On Nov 22, 2017 9:43 PM, "Nick Thompson" 
> wrote:
>
> Hi, Eric,
>
>
>
> Well, I would like to say that my personal version of the Pragmatic Maxim:
>
>
>
> *Consider what possible experimental effects the invocation of your
> conception has; those effects are the entire meaning of your conception.*
>
>
>
> … means that the causality makes reference to experiments or to nothing
> whatsoever.   The problem is, of course, that strictly speaking that means
> we cannot apply causality to past events, including evolutionary ones.
> That would seem to be overkill.   There is, of course, the comparative
> method and, of course, “thought experiments.”   Nothing in the maxim, I
> suppose, requires me to actually perform the experiment; only to
> conceptualize it.  Seems like mushy ground.
>
>
>
> Nick
>
>
>
>
>
> Nicholas S. Thompson
>
> Emeritus Professor of Psychology and Biology
>
> Clark University
>
> http://home.earthlink.net/~nickthompson/naturaldesigns/
>
>
>
> *From:* Friam [mailto:friam-boun...@redfish.com] *On Behalf Of *Carl
> Tollander
> *Sent:* Wednesday, November 22, 2017 7:10 PM
> *To:* The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Cof

Re: [FRIAM] Downward causation

2017-11-22 Thread Nick Thompson 
Frank, 

 

I suspect that “actual” causation is just the hypostization of statistical 
causation.   But we’ll see. 

 

I look forward to talking about the models.  

 

Nick 

 

Nicholas S. Thompson

Emeritus Professor of Psychology and Biology

Clark University

 <http://home.earthlink.net/~nickthompson/naturaldesigns/> 
http://home.earthlink.net/~nickthompson/naturaldesigns/

 

From: Friam [mailto:friam-boun...@redfish.com] On Behalf Of Frank Wimberly
Sent: Wednesday, November 22, 2017 10:13 PM
To: The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group 
Subject: Re: [FRIAM] Downward causation

 

Nick,

 

They are not beyond your ability to understand.  I am happy to explain as much 
as you like.

 

Frank

Frank Wimberly
Phone (505) 670-9918

 

On Nov 22, 2017 10:10 PM, "Nick Thompson" mailto:nickthomp...@earthlink.net> > wrote:

Hi Frank, 

 

Please forgive me for not being adequately responsive.  I have looked at some 
of the sources you have mentioned and they are beyond my ability to understand. 
 So, I am dependent on you (or others) to explain to me how those models work.  
Now, I realize that this perhaps brings us to the threshold of our old argument 
about whether mathematics needs explanation … it just is,  You like it or you 
don’t.   Sounds like a good discussion to have on Friday 

 

Nick 

 

 

 

Nicholas S. Thompson

Emeritus Professor of Psychology and Biology

Clark University

 <http://home.earthlink.net/~nickthompson/naturaldesigns/> 
http://home.earthlink.net/~nickthompson/naturaldesigns/

 

From: Friam [mailto:friam-boun...@redfish.com 
<mailto:friam-boun...@redfish.com> ] On Behalf Of Frank Wimberly
Sent: Wednesday, November 22, 2017 9:55 PM
To: The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group mailto:friam@redfish.com> >
Subject: Re: [FRIAM] Downward causation

 

Nick,

 

Whenever I say this it doesn't seem to register.  Pearl, Glymour, Spirtes, et 
al have put statistical causal reasoning on a firm foundation.  This involves 
learning causal models from observational rather that experimental data, 
including data from the past.  Also remember the distinction between "actual" 
causation (hitting this jar with a hammer causes it to break) and statistical 
causation (smoking causes cancer).

 

There is an extensive and growing literature on these topics.  

 

Frank

 

 

Frank Wimberly
Phone (505) 670-9918  

 

On Nov 22, 2017 9:43 PM, "Nick Thompson" mailto:nickthomp...@earthlink.net> > wrote:

Hi, Eric, 

 

Well, I would like to say that my personal version of the Pragmatic Maxim:

 

Consider what possible experimental effects the invocation of your conception 
has; those effects are the entire meaning of your conception.

 

… means that the causality makes reference to experiments or to nothing 
whatsoever.   The problem is, of course, that strictly speaking that means we 
cannot apply causality to past events, including evolutionary ones.  That would 
seem to be overkill.   There is, of course, the comparative method and, of 
course, “thought experiments.”   Nothing in the maxim, I suppose, requires me 
to actually perform the experiment; only to conceptualize it.  Seems like mushy 
ground.  

 

Nick  

 

 

Nicholas S. Thompson

Emeritus Professor of Psychology and Biology

Clark University

 <http://home.earthlink.net/~nickthompson/naturaldesigns/> 
http://home.earthlink.net/~nickthompson/naturaldesigns/

 

From: Friam [mailto:friam-boun...@redfish.com 
<mailto:friam-boun...@redfish.com> ] On Behalf Of Carl Tollander
Sent: Wednesday, November 22, 2017 7:10 PM
To: The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group mailto:friam@redfish.com> >
Subject: Re: [FRIAM] Downward causation

 

One of the recurring conundrums of teaching.  Finger pointing at the moon

 

 

On Nov 22, 2017 14:32, "Eric Charles" mailto:eric.phillip.char...@gmail.com> > wrote:

"Is there any way to put those two things together:  the abduction thing and 
the misattribution thing? "




I would head in a different direction. The question is about, how one does the 
attribution; the answer is, most people do it poorly. In a large part, the 
history of scientific method is a history of determining the conditions under 
which we allow causal attributions. When I used to teach, I illustrated this 
most directly in my intro-to-behaviorism class. 

 

That class included a lot of discussion of applied behavior analysis (altering 
the environment of a person in an effort to improve their behavioral 
functioning within that environment). The central challenge is that the ABA 
practitioner typically only has access to the (usually a) child for a very 
limited time, and you don't want to jump to the conclusion that your efforts 
are working when external factors might equally explain the change in the 
child's behavior. We work up from very basic methods of increa

Re: [FRIAM] Downward causation

2017-11-22 Thread Frank Wimberly 
Nick,

They are not beyond your ability to understand.  I am happy to explain as
much as you like.

Frank

Frank Wimberly
Phone (505) 670-9918

On Nov 22, 2017 10:10 PM, "Nick Thompson" 
wrote:

> Hi Frank,
>
>
>
> Please forgive me for not being adequately responsive.  I have looked at
> some of the sources you have mentioned and they are beyond my ability to
> understand.  So, I am dependent on you (or others) to explain to me how
> those models work.  Now, I realize that this perhaps brings us to the
> threshold of our old argument about whether mathematics needs explanation …
> it just is,  You like it or you don’t.   Sounds like a good discussion to
> have on Friday
>
>
>
> Nick
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
> Nicholas S. Thompson
>
> Emeritus Professor of Psychology and Biology
>
> Clark University
>
> http://home.earthlink.net/~nickthompson/naturaldesigns/
>
>
>
> *From:* Friam [mailto:friam-boun...@redfish.com] *On Behalf Of *Frank
> Wimberly
> *Sent:* Wednesday, November 22, 2017 9:55 PM
> *To:* The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group <
> friam@redfish.com>
> *Subject:* Re: [FRIAM] Downward causation
>
>
>
> Nick,
>
>
>
> Whenever I say this it doesn't seem to register.  Pearl, Glymour, Spirtes,
> et al have put statistical causal reasoning on a firm foundation.  This
> involves learning causal models from observational rather that experimental
> data, including data from the past.  Also remember the distinction between
> "actual" causation (hitting this jar with a hammer causes it to break) and
> statistical causation (smoking causes cancer).
>
>
>
> There is an extensive and growing literature on these topics.
>
>
>
> Frank
>
>
>
>
>
> Frank Wimberly
> Phone (505) 670-9918
>
>
>
> On Nov 22, 2017 9:43 PM, "Nick Thompson" 
> wrote:
>
> Hi, Eric,
>
>
>
> Well, I would like to say that my personal version of the Pragmatic Maxim:
>
>
>
> *Consider what possible experimental effects the invocation of your
> conception has; those effects are the entire meaning of your conception.*
>
>
>
> … means that the causality makes reference to experiments or to nothing
> whatsoever.   The problem is, of course, that strictly speaking that means
> we cannot apply causality to past events, including evolutionary ones.
> That would seem to be overkill.   There is, of course, the comparative
> method and, of course, “thought experiments.”   Nothing in the maxim, I
> suppose, requires me to actually perform the experiment; only to
> conceptualize it.  Seems like mushy ground.
>
>
>
> Nick
>
>
>
>
>
> Nicholas S. Thompson
>
> Emeritus Professor of Psychology and Biology
>
> Clark University
>
> http://home.earthlink.net/~nickthompson/naturaldesigns/
>
>
>
> *From:* Friam [mailto:friam-boun...@redfish.com] *On Behalf Of *Carl
> Tollander
> *Sent:* Wednesday, November 22, 2017 7:10 PM
> *To:* The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group <
> friam@redfish.com>
> *Subject:* Re: [FRIAM] Downward causation
>
>
>
> One of the recurring conundrums of teaching.  Finger pointing at the
> moon
>
>
>
>
>
> On Nov 22, 2017 14:32, "Eric Charles" 
> wrote:
>
> "Is there any way to put those two things together:  the abduction thing
> and the misattribution thing? "
>
>
> I would head in a different direction. The question is about, how one does
> the attribution; the answer is, most people do it poorly. In a large part,
> the history of scientific *method *is a history of determining the
> conditions under which we allow causal attributions. When I used to teach,
> I illustrated this most directly in my intro-to-behaviorism class.
>
>
>
> That class included a lot of discussion of applied behavior analysis
> (altering the environment of a person in an effort to improve their
> behavioral functioning within that environment). The central challenge is
> that the ABA practitioner typically only has access to the (usually a)
> child for a very limited time, and you don't want to jump to the conclusion
> that your efforts are working when external factors might equally explain
> the change in the child's behavior. We work up from very basic methods of
> increasing confidence. We eventually build up to an ABAB design, in which
> the prospective solution is applied, then removed, then applied, then
> removed. Every time the problem behavior goes away, comes back, goes away,
> and comes back, etc., our confidence increases that our intervention is 
> *causing
> *the improvement in behavior, becaus

Re: [FRIAM] Downward causation

2017-11-22 Thread Nick Thompson 
Hi Frank, 

 

Please forgive me for not being adequately responsive.  I have looked at some 
of the sources you have mentioned and they are beyond my ability to understand. 
 So, I am dependent on you (or others) to explain to me how those models work.  
Now, I realize that this perhaps brings us to the threshold of our old argument 
about whether mathematics needs explanation … it just is,  You like it or you 
don’t.   Sounds like a good discussion to have on Friday 

 

Nick 

 

 

 

Nicholas S. Thompson

Emeritus Professor of Psychology and Biology

Clark University

 <http://home.earthlink.net/~nickthompson/naturaldesigns/> 
http://home.earthlink.net/~nickthompson/naturaldesigns/

 

From: Friam [mailto:friam-boun...@redfish.com] On Behalf Of Frank Wimberly
Sent: Wednesday, November 22, 2017 9:55 PM
To: The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group 
Subject: Re: [FRIAM] Downward causation

 

Nick,

 

Whenever I say this it doesn't seem to register.  Pearl, Glymour, Spirtes, et 
al have put statistical causal reasoning on a firm foundation.  This involves 
learning causal models from observational rather that experimental data, 
including data from the past.  Also remember the distinction between "actual" 
causation (hitting this jar with a hammer causes it to break) and statistical 
causation (smoking causes cancer).

 

There is an extensive and growing literature on these topics.  

 

Frank

 

 

Frank Wimberly
Phone (505) 670-9918

 

On Nov 22, 2017 9:43 PM, "Nick Thompson" mailto:nickthomp...@earthlink.net> > wrote:

Hi, Eric, 

 

Well, I would like to say that my personal version of the Pragmatic Maxim:

 

Consider what possible experimental effects the invocation of your conception 
has; those effects are the entire meaning of your conception.

 

… means that the causality makes reference to experiments or to nothing 
whatsoever.   The problem is, of course, that strictly speaking that means we 
cannot apply causality to past events, including evolutionary ones.  That would 
seem to be overkill.   There is, of course, the comparative method and, of 
course, “thought experiments.”   Nothing in the maxim, I suppose, requires me 
to actually perform the experiment; only to conceptualize it.  Seems like mushy 
ground.  

 

Nick  

 

 

Nicholas S. Thompson

Emeritus Professor of Psychology and Biology

Clark University

 <http://home.earthlink.net/~nickthompson/naturaldesigns/> 
http://home.earthlink.net/~nickthompson/naturaldesigns/

 

From: Friam [mailto:friam-boun...@redfish.com 
<mailto:friam-boun...@redfish.com> ] On Behalf Of Carl Tollander
Sent: Wednesday, November 22, 2017 7:10 PM
To: The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group mailto:friam@redfish.com> >
Subject: Re: [FRIAM] Downward causation

 

One of the recurring conundrums of teaching.  Finger pointing at the moon

 

 

On Nov 22, 2017 14:32, "Eric Charles" mailto:eric.phillip.char...@gmail.com> > wrote:

"Is there any way to put those two things together:  the abduction thing and 
the misattribution thing? "




I would head in a different direction. The question is about, how one does the 
attribution; the answer is, most people do it poorly. In a large part, the 
history of scientific method is a history of determining the conditions under 
which we allow causal attributions. When I used to teach, I illustrated this 
most directly in my intro-to-behaviorism class. 

 

That class included a lot of discussion of applied behavior analysis (altering 
the environment of a person in an effort to improve their behavioral 
functioning within that environment). The central challenge is that the ABA 
practitioner typically only has access to the (usually a) child for a very 
limited time, and you don't want to jump to the conclusion that your efforts 
are working when external factors might equally explain the change in the 
child's behavior. We work up from very basic methods of increasing confidence. 
We eventually build up to an ABAB design, in which the prospective solution is 
applied, then removed, then applied, then removed. Every time the problem 
behavior goes away, comes back, goes away, and comes back, etc., our confidence 
increases that our intervention is causing the improvement in behavior, because 
it is increasingly unlikely that some other factor just so happens to be 
varying at exactly the same times. 

 

Part of the process of "becoming" "a scientist" is increasingly the 
sophistication of research needed before you draw such conclusions... or, 
perhaps more accurately, how well you match the tentativeness-vs-solidity of 
your beliefs to the type of empirical evidence in favor of them. Eventually one 
is drawing on a wealth of difficult-to-specify domain-specific knowledge in 
support of any conclusion, but likely justifies the conclusion on the basis of 
the latest bit

Re: [FRIAM] Downward causation

2017-11-22 Thread Frank Wimberly 
Nick,

Whenever I say this it doesn't seem to register.  Pearl, Glymour, Spirtes,
et al have put statistical causal reasoning on a firm foundation.  This
involves learning causal models from observational rather that experimental
data, including data from the past.  Also remember the distinction between
"actual" causation (hitting this jar with a hammer causes it to break) and
statistical causation (smoking causes cancer).

There is an extensive and growing literature on these topics.

Frank



Frank Wimberly
Phone (505) 670-9918

On Nov 22, 2017 9:43 PM, "Nick Thompson"  wrote:

> Hi, Eric,
>
>
>
> Well, I would like to say that my personal version of the Pragmatic Maxim:
>
>
>
> *Consider what possible experimental effects the invocation of your
> conception has; those effects are the entire meaning of your conception.*
>
>
>
> … means that the causality makes reference to experiments or to nothing
> whatsoever.   The problem is, of course, that strictly speaking that means
> we cannot apply causality to past events, including evolutionary ones.
> That would seem to be overkill.   There is, of course, the comparative
> method and, of course, “thought experiments.”   Nothing in the maxim, I
> suppose, requires me to actually perform the experiment; only to
> conceptualize it.  Seems like mushy ground.
>
>
>
> Nick
>
>
>
>
>
> Nicholas S. Thompson
>
> Emeritus Professor of Psychology and Biology
>
> Clark University
>
> http://home.earthlink.net/~nickthompson/naturaldesigns/
>
>
>
> *From:* Friam [mailto:friam-boun...@redfish.com] *On Behalf Of *Carl
> Tollander
> *Sent:* Wednesday, November 22, 2017 7:10 PM
> *To:* The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group <
> friam@redfish.com>
> *Subject:* Re: [FRIAM] Downward causation
>
>
>
> One of the recurring conundrums of teaching.  Finger pointing at the
> moon
>
>
>
>
>
> On Nov 22, 2017 14:32, "Eric Charles" 
> wrote:
>
> "Is there any way to put those two things together:  the abduction thing
> and the misattribution thing? "
>
>
> I would head in a different direction. The question is about, how one does
> the attribution; the answer is, most people do it poorly. In a large part,
> the history of scientific *method *is a history of determining the
> conditions under which we allow causal attributions. When I used to teach,
> I illustrated this most directly in my intro-to-behaviorism class.
>
>
>
> That class included a lot of discussion of applied behavior analysis
> (altering the environment of a person in an effort to improve their
> behavioral functioning within that environment). The central challenge is
> that the ABA practitioner typically only has access to the (usually a)
> child for a very limited time, and you don't want to jump to the conclusion
> that your efforts are working when external factors might equally explain
> the change in the child's behavior. We work up from very basic methods of
> increasing confidence. We eventually build up to an ABAB design, in which
> the prospective solution is applied, then removed, then applied, then
> removed. Every time the problem behavior goes away, comes back, goes away,
> and comes back, etc., our confidence increases that our intervention is 
> *causing
> *the improvement in behavior, because it is increasingly unlikely that
> some other factor just so happens to be varying at exactly the same times.
>
>
>
> Part of the process of "becoming" "a scientist" is increasingly the
> sophistication of research needed before you draw such conclusions... or,
> perhaps more accurately, how well you match the tentativeness-vs-solidity
> of your beliefs to the type of empirical evidence in favor of them.
> Eventually one is drawing on a wealth of difficult-to-specify
> domain-specific knowledge in support of any conclusion, but likely
> justifies the conclusion on the basis of the latest bit of crucial evidence
> (the one which, for them, solidifies the pattern).
>
>
>
> Though... suddenly I might have a legitimate response to your inquiry: I
> would hypothesize that people often mistakenly point at the bit of
> information that was crucial to them, rather than the larger pattern that
> the crucial bit of information brought into focus.
>
>
>
> With Murder on the Orient Express on my mind Hercule Poirot would
> narrate such a thing explicitly, would he not? He would say "The crucial
> clue in helping me unravel my confusion was X" and then he would explain
> the larger pattern thus illuminated. A lesser detective would act as if the
> clue itself were crucial in its own right -

Re: [FRIAM] Downward causation

2017-11-22 Thread Nick Thompson 
Hi, Eric, 

 

Well, I would like to say that my personal version of the Pragmatic Maxim:

 

Consider what possible experimental effects the invocation of your conception 
has; those effects are the entire meaning of your conception.

 

… means that the causality makes reference to experiments or to nothing 
whatsoever.   The problem is, of course, that strictly speaking that means we 
cannot apply causality to past events, including evolutionary ones.  That would 
seem to be overkill.   There is, of course, the comparative method and, of 
course, “thought experiments.”   Nothing in the maxim, I suppose, requires me 
to actually perform the experiment; only to conceptualize it.  Seems like mushy 
ground.  

 

Nick  

 

 

Nicholas S. Thompson

Emeritus Professor of Psychology and Biology

Clark University

 <http://home.earthlink.net/~nickthompson/naturaldesigns/> 
http://home.earthlink.net/~nickthompson/naturaldesigns/

 

From: Friam [mailto:friam-boun...@redfish.com] On Behalf Of Carl Tollander
Sent: Wednesday, November 22, 2017 7:10 PM
To: The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group 
Subject: Re: [FRIAM] Downward causation

 

One of the recurring conundrums of teaching.  Finger pointing at the moon

 

 

On Nov 22, 2017 14:32, "Eric Charles" mailto:eric.phillip.char...@gmail.com> > wrote:

"Is there any way to put those two things together:  the abduction thing and 
the misattribution thing? "




I would head in a different direction. The question is about, how one does the 
attribution; the answer is, most people do it poorly. In a large part, the 
history of scientific method is a history of determining the conditions under 
which we allow causal attributions. When I used to teach, I illustrated this 
most directly in my intro-to-behaviorism class. 

 

That class included a lot of discussion of applied behavior analysis (altering 
the environment of a person in an effort to improve their behavioral 
functioning within that environment). The central challenge is that the ABA 
practitioner typically only has access to the (usually a) child for a very 
limited time, and you don't want to jump to the conclusion that your efforts 
are working when external factors might equally explain the change in the 
child's behavior. We work up from very basic methods of increasing confidence. 
We eventually build up to an ABAB design, in which the prospective solution is 
applied, then removed, then applied, then removed. Every time the problem 
behavior goes away, comes back, goes away, and comes back, etc., our confidence 
increases that our intervention is causing the improvement in behavior, because 
it is increasingly unlikely that some other factor just so happens to be 
varying at exactly the same times. 

 

Part of the process of "becoming" "a scientist" is increasingly the 
sophistication of research needed before you draw such conclusions... or, 
perhaps more accurately, how well you match the tentativeness-vs-solidity of 
your beliefs to the type of empirical evidence in favor of them. Eventually one 
is drawing on a wealth of difficult-to-specify domain-specific knowledge in 
support of any conclusion, but likely justifies the conclusion on the basis of 
the latest bit of crucial evidence (the one which, for them, solidifies the 
pattern). 

 

Though... suddenly I might have a legitimate response to your inquiry: I would 
hypothesize that people often mistakenly point at the bit of information that 
was crucial to them, rather than the larger pattern that the crucial bit of 
information brought into focus. 

 

With Murder on the Orient Express on my mind Hercule Poirot would narrate 
such a thing explicitly, would he not? He would say "The crucial clue in 
helping me unravel my confusion was X" and then he would explain the larger 
pattern thus illuminated. A lesser detective would act as if the clue itself 
were crucial in its own right - "This is the key!" - even if it was a trivial 
thing on its own, thus committing a dramatic misattribution by virtue of not 
being self-aware of the abduction taking place. 

 

Did that get anywhere? 

 

 


---
Eric P. Charles, Ph.D.
Supervisory Survey Statistician

U.S. Marine Corps

 

On Wed, Nov 22, 2017 at 1:07 AM, Nick Thompson mailto:nickthomp...@earthlink.net> > wrote:

Hi, Eric, 

 

Thank you, Eric.   OF COURSE, that is what I should have said.  Thank you for 
saying it so excellently.  Peirce did in fact see causal attribution as a form 
of abduction.  I  would hope I would have thought to say it myself, if I wasn’t 
so distracted by the “counter-factual” thang.  But that way of speaking makes 
me CRAY-ZEEE.  How can something defined in terms of something that didn’t 
happen

 

Before you wrote, I was about to get on my “mystery” high horse.  A mystery, 
you remember, is a confusion arrived at when a bit of language is appl

Re: [FRIAM] Downward causation

2017-11-22 Thread Carl Tollander 
One of the recurring conundrums of teaching.  Finger pointing at the
moon


On Nov 22, 2017 14:32, "Eric Charles" 
wrote:

> "Is there any way to put those two things together:  the abduction thing
> and the misattribution thing? "
>
> I would head in a different direction. The question is about, how one does
> the attribution; the answer is, most people do it poorly. In a large part,
> the history of scientific *method *is a history of determining the
> conditions under which we allow causal attributions. When I used to teach,
> I illustrated this most directly in my intro-to-behaviorism class.
>
> That class included a lot of discussion of applied behavior analysis
> (altering the environment of a person in an effort to improve their
> behavioral functioning within that environment). The central challenge is
> that the ABA practitioner typically only has access to the (usually a)
> child for a very limited time, and you don't want to jump to the conclusion
> that your efforts are working when external factors might equally explain
> the change in the child's behavior. We work up from very basic methods of
> increasing confidence. We eventually build up to an ABAB design, in which
> the prospective solution is applied, then removed, then applied, then
> removed. Every time the problem behavior goes away, comes back, goes away,
> and comes back, etc., our confidence increases that our intervention is 
> *causing
> *the improvement in behavior, because it is increasingly unlikely that
> some other factor just so happens to be varying at exactly the same times.
>
> Part of the process of "becoming" "a scientist" is increasingly the
> sophistication of research needed before you draw such conclusions... or,
> perhaps more accurately, how well you match the tentativeness-vs-solidity
> of your beliefs to the type of empirical evidence in favor of them.
> Eventually one is drawing on a wealth of difficult-to-specify
> domain-specific knowledge in support of any conclusion, but likely
> justifies the conclusion on the basis of the latest bit of crucial evidence
> (the one which, for them, solidifies the pattern).
>
> Though... suddenly I might have a legitimate response to your inquiry: I
> would hypothesize that people often mistakenly point at the bit of
> information that was crucial to them, rather than the larger pattern that
> the crucial bit of information brought into focus.
>
> With Murder on the Orient Express on my mind Hercule Poirot would
> narrate such a thing explicitly, would he not? He would say "The crucial
> clue in helping me unravel my confusion was X" and then he would explain
> the larger pattern thus illuminated. A lesser detective would act as if the
> clue itself were crucial in its own right - "This is the key!" - even if it
> was a trivial thing on its own, thus committing a dramatic misattribution
> by virtue of not being self-aware of the abduction taking place.
>
> Did that get anywhere?
>
>
>
> ---
> Eric P. Charles, Ph.D.
> Supervisory Survey Statistician
> U.S. Marine Corps
> 
>
> On Wed, Nov 22, 2017 at 1:07 AM, Nick Thompson  > wrote:
>
>> Hi, Eric,
>>
>>
>>
>> Thank you, Eric.   OF COURSE, that is what I should have said.  Thank you
>> for saying it so excellently.  Peirce did in fact see causal attribution as
>> a form of abduction.  I  would hope I would have thought to say it myself,
>> if I wasn’t so distracted by the “counter-factual” thang.  But that way of
>> speaking makes me CRAY-ZEEE.  How can something defined in terms of
>> something that didn’t happen
>>
>>
>>
>> Before you wrote, I was about to get on my “mystery” high horse.  A
>> mystery, you remember, is a confusion arrived at when a bit of language is
>> applied to a situation where it doesn’t really work.  Causal attributions
>> are often falsely singular, in the sense that , we often speak as if  the
>> motion of a billiard ball was caused by the motion of the cue ball, say.
>> But what we really have to back those attributions up is a pattern of
>> relations between impacts of cue balls and motions of object balls.  When
>> we step up to the next level of organization, the confusion disappears,
>> doesn’t it?  Events of Type A are said to cause events of type B when
>> experiments with proper controls show that an increase in the occurrence of
>> type B events is dependent upon the previous occurrence of Type A events.
>> But to say that any particular Type A event causes a Type B event is an
>> abuse of language, a mystery.
>>
>>
>>
>> Is there any way to put those two things together:  the abduction thing
>> and the misattribution thing?
>>
>>
>>
>> Nick
>>
>>
>>
>> Nicholas S. Thompson
>>
>> Emeritus Professor of Psychology and Biology
>>
>> Clark University
>>
>> http://home.earthlink.net/~nickthompson/naturaldesigns/
>>
>>
>>
>> *From:* Friam [mailto:friam-boun...@redfish.com] *On Behalf Of *Eric
>> Charles
>> *Sent:* Tuesday, November 21, 2017 6:43 PM
>> *To:* The Friday Morning A

Re: [FRIAM] Downward causation

2017-11-22 Thread Eric Charles 
"Is there any way to put those two things together:  the abduction thing
and the misattribution thing? "

I would head in a different direction. The question is about, how one does
the attribution; the answer is, most people do it poorly. In a large part,
the history of scientific *method *is a history of determining the
conditions under which we allow causal attributions. When I used to teach,
I illustrated this most directly in my intro-to-behaviorism class.

That class included a lot of discussion of applied behavior analysis
(altering the environment of a person in an effort to improve their
behavioral functioning within that environment). The central challenge is
that the ABA practitioner typically only has access to the (usually a)
child for a very limited time, and you don't want to jump to the conclusion
that your efforts are working when external factors might equally explain
the change in the child's behavior. We work up from very basic methods of
increasing confidence. We eventually build up to an ABAB design, in which
the prospective solution is applied, then removed, then applied, then
removed. Every time the problem behavior goes away, comes back, goes away,
and comes back, etc., our confidence increases that our intervention
is *causing
*the improvement in behavior, because it is increasingly unlikely that some
other factor just so happens to be varying at exactly the same times.

Part of the process of "becoming" "a scientist" is increasingly the
sophistication of research needed before you draw such conclusions... or,
perhaps more accurately, how well you match the tentativeness-vs-solidity
of your beliefs to the type of empirical evidence in favor of them.
Eventually one is drawing on a wealth of difficult-to-specify
domain-specific knowledge in support of any conclusion, but likely
justifies the conclusion on the basis of the latest bit of crucial evidence
(the one which, for them, solidifies the pattern).

Though... suddenly I might have a legitimate response to your inquiry: I
would hypothesize that people often mistakenly point at the bit of
information that was crucial to them, rather than the larger pattern that
the crucial bit of information brought into focus.

With Murder on the Orient Express on my mind Hercule Poirot would
narrate such a thing explicitly, would he not? He would say "The crucial
clue in helping me unravel my confusion was X" and then he would explain
the larger pattern thus illuminated. A lesser detective would act as if the
clue itself were crucial in its own right - "This is the key!" - even if it
was a trivial thing on its own, thus committing a dramatic misattribution
by virtue of not being self-aware of the abduction taking place.

Did that get anywhere?



---
Eric P. Charles, Ph.D.
Supervisory Survey Statistician
U.S. Marine Corps


On Wed, Nov 22, 2017 at 1:07 AM, Nick Thompson 
wrote:

> Hi, Eric,
>
>
>
> Thank you, Eric.   OF COURSE, that is what I should have said.  Thank you
> for saying it so excellently.  Peirce did in fact see causal attribution as
> a form of abduction.  I  would hope I would have thought to say it myself,
> if I wasn’t so distracted by the “counter-factual” thang.  But that way of
> speaking makes me CRAY-ZEEE.  How can something defined in terms of
> something that didn’t happen
>
>
>
> Before you wrote, I was about to get on my “mystery” high horse.  A
> mystery, you remember, is a confusion arrived at when a bit of language is
> applied to a situation where it doesn’t really work.  Causal attributions
> are often falsely singular, in the sense that , we often speak as if  the
> motion of a billiard ball was caused by the motion of the cue ball, say.
> But what we really have to back those attributions up is a pattern of
> relations between impacts of cue balls and motions of object balls.  When
> we step up to the next level of organization, the confusion disappears,
> doesn’t it?  Events of Type A are said to cause events of type B when
> experiments with proper controls show that an increase in the occurrence of
> type B events is dependent upon the previous occurrence of Type A events.
> But to say that any particular Type A event causes a Type B event is an
> abuse of language, a mystery.
>
>
>
> Is there any way to put those two things together:  the abduction thing
> and the misattribution thing?
>
>
>
> Nick
>
>
>
> Nicholas S. Thompson
>
> Emeritus Professor of Psychology and Biology
>
> Clark University
>
> http://home.earthlink.net/~nickthompson/naturaldesigns/
>
>
>
> *From:* Friam [mailto:friam-boun...@redfish.com] *On Behalf Of *Eric
> Charles
> *Sent:* Tuesday, November 21, 2017 6:43 PM
> *To:* The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group <
> friam@redfish.com>
> *Subject:* Re: [FRIAM] Downward Hicausation
>
>
>
> What great timing! One of the best philosophy comics on the web right now
> is "Existential Comics." This very week they took a swipe at "causation."
> Here is an adventure of She

Re: [FRIAM] Downward causation

2017-11-21 Thread Nick Thompson 
Hi, Eric, 

 

Thank you, Eric.   OF COURSE, that is what I should have said.  Thank you for 
saying it so excellently.  Peirce did in fact see causal attribution as a form 
of abduction.  I  would hope I would have thought to say it myself, if I wasn’t 
so distracted by the “counter-factual” thang.  But that way of speaking makes 
me CRAY-ZEEE.  How can something defined in terms of something that didn’t 
happen

 

Before you wrote, I was about to get on my “mystery” high horse.  A mystery, 
you remember, is a confusion arrived at when a bit of language is applied to a 
situation where it doesn’t really work.  Causal attributions are often falsely 
singular, in the sense that , we often speak as if  the motion of a billiard 
ball was caused by the motion of the cue ball, say.  But what we really have to 
back those attributions up is a pattern of relations between impacts of cue 
balls and motions of object balls.  When we step up to the next level of 
organization, the confusion disappears, doesn’t it?  Events of Type A are said 
to cause events of type B when experiments with proper controls show that an 
increase in the occurrence of type B events is dependent upon the previous 
occurrence of Type A events.  But to say that any particular Type A event 
causes a Type B event is an abuse of language, a mystery.  

 

Is there any way to put those two things together:  the abduction thing and the 
misattribution thing?  

 

Nick 

 

Nicholas S. Thompson

Emeritus Professor of Psychology and Biology

Clark University

  
http://home.earthlink.net/~nickthompson/naturaldesigns/

 

From: Friam [mailto:friam-boun...@redfish.com] On Behalf Of Eric Charles
Sent: Tuesday, November 21, 2017 6:43 PM
To: The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group 
Subject: Re: [FRIAM] Downward Hicausation

 

What great timing! One of the best philosophy comics on the web right now is 
"Existential Comics." This very week they took a swipe at "causation." Here is 
an adventure of Sherlock Hume: http://existentialcomics.com/comic/212

I suspect that the best I can do to contribute beyond that is to try fall back 
on my role of scolding Nick. 

Nick should be asserting that "causation" is a metaphor. The billiard ball are 
the understood scenario. Billiard balls sitting on a still table, unmolested 
don't move. But if you knock one ball into another ball, the other ball move 
so. When I say something like "The approaching lion caused the gazelle to 
move", I am invoking the metaphor that the lion-gazelle relationship is like 
that of the billiard balls. Had the lion not been doing what it was doing, the 
gazelle would not have moved away. It isn't simply a "counterfactual." It is an 
assertion (an abduction) regarding broad patterns of gazelle behavior that can 
be readily observed under many other situations.** Some of those, I have 
presumably already seen. Those constitute the "basic implication" of the 
metaphor. Others I have not observed, and those constitute potential 
investigatory events - not ethereal thought experiments. As in true of any 
metaphor, there are also aspects of the billiard-ball scenario I do not intend 
to map perfectly onto the lion-gazelle scenario (e.g., the lion and gazelle are 
not spheres). 

So that is where Hume and those like him go wrong. They want to beat the 
billiard balls scenario itself to death. But that's not how metaphors work. 
There is something understood about the billiard balls, and it is 
that-understood-thing that is being generalized to another scenario. Any 
attempt to explain the billiard balls will involve evoking different metaphors, 
which would entail different assertions (abductions). There is no foundation 
(Peirce tells us, amongst others), Descartes was on a fool's errand: In the 
land of inference, it is turtles all the way down. 

 

** The breadth of the patterns being referenced is, I believe, where Frank's 
point about probability slips in. One could certainly simplify the complexity 
of the assertion by making lumping similar scenarios together and speaking 
about the probability of a certain gazelle behavior within the cluster of 
similar situations. 

 





---
Eric P. Charles, Ph.D.
Supervisory Survey Statistician

U.S. Marine Corps

 

On Tue, Nov 21, 2017 at 5:08 PM, gⅼеɳ ☣ mailto:geprope...@gmail.com> > wrote:

Also Known As: Beware equating experience with existence.

On 11/21/2017 02:00 PM, Frank Wimberly wrote:
> Beware the tendency to think that if you can't immediately measure something 
> then it doesn't exist.


--
☣ gⅼеɳ



FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv
Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College
to unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com
FRIAM-COMIC http://friam-comic.blogspot.com/ by Dr. Strangelove

 


FRIAM

Re: [FRIAM] Downward causation

2017-11-19 Thread Frank Wimberly 
Nick, you must have known you would eventually provoke me:

-Correlation is not causation
Sometimes you can infer a causal direction from observational data.
Interested readers can see
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC5340263/
By my former colleagues Scheines and Ramsey.

-Hume
After writing a long alternative to the counterfactual definition of
causation, he concluded with a statement that A causes B if B would not
have occurred unless A had occurred.

Frank

Frank Wimberly
Phone (505) 670-9918

On Nov 19, 2017 3:28 PM, "Nick Thompson"  wrote:

> Thanks, Roger.  I LIKE it.
>
>
>
> When people say, “Correlation is not causation” they are living in a
> momentary illusion that they know what causation is.  AT the very least,
> causation consists of the results of some number of experiments in which
> the second correlate is denied by a failure to produce the first, but not
> vv.  But most people want more from causal statements.  They want
> METAPHYSICS.  As I guess Hume was fond of pointing out, Causes are
> attributions we make to experiences, not things experiences do to one
> another.   For someone to deny the existence of downward causality, that
> person has first to state what it is s/he imagines that s/he is denying.
> In my world, where “causes” are just “prior necessary or sufficient
> correlates”, if we can show that demands on the bean plant as a whole lead
> to changes in its parts, we have “downward causation”.  And there is no
> juicier form of downward causation to be had, or to be denied.
>
>
>
> Nick
>
>
>
> Nicholas S. Thompson
>
> Emeritus Professor of Psychology and Biology
>
> Clark University
>
> http://home.earthlink.net/~nickthompson/naturaldesigns/
>
>
>
> *From:* Friam [mailto:friam-boun...@redfish.com] *On Behalf Of *Roger
> Critchlow
> *Sent:* Sunday, November 19, 2017 10:31 AM
> *To:* The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group <
> friam@redfish.com>
> *Subject:* Re: [FRIAM] Downward causation
>
>
>
> Nick --
>
>
>
> Sure, bean plants growing in time lapse is an excellent example of coarse
> graining.  And you can imagine an animator making a cartoon of the same
> time lapse, in fact, I remember a classic cartoon doing this, even to the
> point of giving the plant hands to reach with and a face.  While the video
> might be taken to be caused by underlying microscopic dynamics too detailed
> to be specified except in imagination, the cartoon clearly is the
> animator's expression of a coarse grained understanding of the plant.
>
>
>
> So this may be a dodge, but it seems an interesting dodge.  It seems that
> everyone knows that correlation is not causation, yet all causal
> explanations start with correlation, and only become causal when someone
> tweaks the causal levers to get the predicted effects and describes how to
> do it in a way that can be replicated.
>
>
>
> So when you manipulate the source of light to manipulate the plant's
> growth, the plant depends on the coarse grained result to live.  The plant
> does not depend on a microscopic trajectory to live because any particular
> microscopic trajectory is impossibly improbable, the plant depends on vast
> numbers of trajectories which all lead to the required coarse grained
> result, or something close enough for jazz.  The plant is organized in such
> a way that it marshalls sufficient microscopic resources to accomplish its
> coarse grained purposes.
>
>
>
> -- rec --
>
>
>
> On Sun, Nov 19, 2017 at 11:49 AM, Nick Thompson <
> nickthomp...@earthlink.net> wrote:
>
> Ahh!  Thanks Roger.  That blows some life into it for me.  Is watching a
> bean plant grow in time lapse an example of coarse-graining?  So let’s
> imagine we are watching such an image and we notice that the plant “reaches
> for the sun”.  (I.e., we move the light around and the plant follows it as
> it grows.)Now let’s also imagine (ex hypothesis, mind you!) that the
> plant puts out extra roots on the opposite side to stabilize it.  I would
> call that top-down causation, I guess.
>
>
>
> I dunno.  Anything that comes out of SFI is kind of ink-blots for me.
>
>
>
> Nick
>
>
>
> Nicholas S. Thompson
>
> Emeritus Professor of Psychology and Biology
>
> Clark University
>
> http://home.earthlink.net/~nickthompson/naturaldesigns/
>
>
>
> *From:* Friam [mailto:friam-boun...@redfish.com] *On Behalf Of *Roger
> Critchlow
> *Sent:* Sunday, November 19, 2017 3:01 AM
>
>
> *To:* The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group <
> friam@redfish.com>
> *Subject:* Re: [FRIAM] Downward causation
>
>
>
> I looked at the abstract and tho

Re: [FRIAM] Downward causation

2017-11-19 Thread Nick Thompson 
Thanks, Roger.  I LIKE it.  

 

When people say, “Correlation is not causation” they are living in a momentary 
illusion that they know what causation is.  AT the very least, causation 
consists of the results of some number of experiments in which the second 
correlate is denied by a failure to produce the first, but not vv.  But most 
people want more from causal statements.  They want METAPHYSICS.  As I guess 
Hume was fond of pointing out, Causes are attributions we make to experiences, 
not things experiences do to one another.   For someone to deny the existence 
of downward causality, that person has first to state what it is s/he imagines 
that s/he is denying.  In my world, where “causes” are just “prior necessary or 
sufficient correlates”, if we can show that demands on the bean plant as a 
whole lead to changes in its parts, we have “downward causation”.  And there is 
no juicier form of downward causation to be had, or to be denied. 

 

Nick  

 

Nicholas S. Thompson

Emeritus Professor of Psychology and Biology

Clark University

 <http://home.earthlink.net/~nickthompson/naturaldesigns/> 
http://home.earthlink.net/~nickthompson/naturaldesigns/

 

From: Friam [mailto:friam-boun...@redfish.com] On Behalf Of Roger Critchlow
Sent: Sunday, November 19, 2017 10:31 AM
To: The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group 
Subject: Re: [FRIAM] Downward causation

 

Nick --

 

Sure, bean plants growing in time lapse is an excellent example of coarse 
graining.  And you can imagine an animator making a cartoon of the same time 
lapse, in fact, I remember a classic cartoon doing this, even to the point of 
giving the plant hands to reach with and a face.  While the video might be 
taken to be caused by underlying microscopic dynamics too detailed to be 
specified except in imagination, the cartoon clearly is the animator's 
expression of a coarse grained understanding of the plant.

 

So this may be a dodge, but it seems an interesting dodge.  It seems that 
everyone knows that correlation is not causation, yet all causal explanations 
start with correlation, and only become causal when someone tweaks the causal 
levers to get the predicted effects and describes how to do it in a way that 
can be replicated.

 

So when you manipulate the source of light to manipulate the plant's growth, 
the plant depends on the coarse grained result to live.  The plant does not 
depend on a microscopic trajectory to live because any particular microscopic 
trajectory is impossibly improbable, the plant depends on vast numbers of 
trajectories which all lead to the required coarse grained result, or something 
close enough for jazz.  The plant is organized in such a way that it marshalls 
sufficient microscopic resources to accomplish its coarse grained purposes.

 

-- rec --

 

On Sun, Nov 19, 2017 at 11:49 AM, Nick Thompson mailto:nickthomp...@earthlink.net> > wrote:

Ahh!  Thanks Roger.  That blows some life into it for me.  Is watching a bean 
plant grow in time lapse an example of coarse-graining?  So let’s imagine we 
are watching such an image and we notice that the plant “reaches for the sun”.  
(I.e., we move the light around and the plant follows it as it grows.)Now 
let’s also imagine (ex hypothesis, mind you!) that the plant puts out extra 
roots on the opposite side to stabilize it.  I would call that top-down 
causation, I guess. 

 

I dunno.  Anything that comes out of SFI is kind of ink-blots for me.  

 

Nick 

 

Nicholas S. Thompson

Emeritus Professor of Psychology and Biology

Clark University

 <http://home.earthlink.net/~nickthompson/naturaldesigns/> 
http://home.earthlink.net/~nickthompson/naturaldesigns/

 

From: Friam [mailto:friam-boun...@redfish.com 
<mailto:friam-boun...@redfish.com> ] On Behalf Of Roger Critchlow
Sent: Sunday, November 19, 2017 3:01 AM


To: The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group mailto:friam@redfish.com> >
Subject: Re: [FRIAM] Downward causation

 

I looked at the abstract and thought, of course, if you "coarse grain" the 
visual field, then you synthesize objects out of groups of pixels that cohere 
together in time and space.  In time you might even come to blame the imputed 
objects for their presumed effects in the world.  Perhaps it's an illusion, or 
a hallucination, or a tautology, but once you summon a coarse grained entity 
into existence it will have coarse grained consequences, including changes of 
behavior in the summoner which are explained as reactions to coarse grained 
observations.

 

So I didn't read as hard as Nick, I just took the operational view laid out in 
the abstract and imagined it.  Causation is at root a tool that helps an 
organism to live long and to prosper.  The observation and reaction which saves 
a life or facilitates reproduction or helps progeny mature is primary.

 

-- rec --

 

On Sat, Nov 18, 2017 at 11:25 PM, Nick Thompson mailto:nickt

Re: [FRIAM] Downward causation

2017-11-19 Thread Roger Critchlow 
Nick --

Sure, bean plants growing in time lapse is an excellent example of coarse
graining.  And you can imagine an animator making a cartoon of the same
time lapse, in fact, I remember a classic cartoon doing this, even to the
point of giving the plant hands to reach with and a face.  While the video
might be taken to be caused by underlying microscopic dynamics too detailed
to be specified except in imagination, the cartoon clearly is the
animator's expression of a coarse grained understanding of the plant.

So this may be a dodge, but it seems an interesting dodge.  It seems that
everyone knows that correlation is not causation, yet all causal
explanations start with correlation, and only become causal when someone
tweaks the causal levers to get the predicted effects and describes how to
do it in a way that can be replicated.

So when you manipulate the source of light to manipulate the plant's
growth, the plant depends on the coarse grained result to live.  The plant
does not depend on a microscopic trajectory to live because any particular
microscopic trajectory is impossibly improbable, the plant depends on vast
numbers of trajectories which all lead to the required coarse grained
result, or something close enough for jazz.  The plant is organized in such
a way that it marshalls sufficient microscopic resources to accomplish its
coarse grained purposes.

-- rec --

On Sun, Nov 19, 2017 at 11:49 AM, Nick Thompson 
wrote:

> Ahh!  Thanks Roger.  That blows some life into it for me.  Is watching a
> bean plant grow in time lapse an example of coarse-graining?  So let’s
> imagine we are watching such an image and we notice that the plant “reaches
> for the sun”.  (I.e., we move the light around and the plant follows it as
> it grows.)Now let’s also imagine (ex hypothesis, mind you!) that the
> plant puts out extra roots on the opposite side to stabilize it.  I would
> call that top-down causation, I guess.
>
>
>
> I dunno.  Anything that comes out of SFI is kind of ink-blots for me.
>
>
>
> Nick
>
>
>
> Nicholas S. Thompson
>
> Emeritus Professor of Psychology and Biology
>
> Clark University
>
> http://home.earthlink.net/~nickthompson/naturaldesigns/
>
>
>
> *From:* Friam [mailto:friam-boun...@redfish.com] *On Behalf Of *Roger
> Critchlow
> *Sent:* Sunday, November 19, 2017 3:01 AM
>
> *To:* The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group <
> friam@redfish.com>
> *Subject:* Re: [FRIAM] Downward causation
>
>
>
> I looked at the abstract and thought, of course, if you "coarse grain" the
> visual field, then you synthesize objects out of groups of pixels that
> cohere together in time and space.  In time you might even come to blame
> the imputed objects for their presumed effects in the world.  Perhaps it's
> an illusion, or a hallucination, or a tautology, but once you summon a
> coarse grained entity into existence it will have coarse grained
> consequences, including changes of behavior in the summoner which are
> explained as reactions to coarse grained observations.
>
>
>
> So I didn't read as hard as Nick, I just took the operational view laid
> out in the abstract and imagined it.  Causation is at root a tool that
> helps an organism to live long and to prosper.  The observation and
> reaction which saves a life or facilitates reproduction or helps progeny
> mature is primary.
>
>
>
> -- rec --
>
>
>
> On Sat, Nov 18, 2017 at 11:25 PM, Nick Thompson <
> nickthomp...@earthlink.net> wrote:
>
> Hi, Roger,
>
>
>
> Can you say what you thought was “nice” about it.  (As you know, it makes
> me nervous to disagree with you about stuff).  I struggled with the
> article.  I thought at one point she confused aggregate with emergent
> properties. Emergent properties are properties of the whole that are
> dependent on the temporal or spatial arrangement of the parts.  Thus the
> enzymatic properties of proteins, which depend on the arrangement of their
> amino acids, are emergent properties.   Also, the standard definition of
> materialism is the believe that everything real consists of *matter and
> its relations. * So entertaining the notion that relations are not
> material (and therefore incapable of being causal) is … well … silly.
>  Finally, I have always suspected that downward causation is an example of
> a “mystery” i.e., confusion that arises when words are applied to a
> situation where they aren’t equal to the task.  (“What is the sound of one
> hand clapping?”)  I think whenever we talk about causes we are trying to do
> with physical events what we do with social and legal ones … we are trying
> to assign responsibility for event so we can blame or praise the thing that
> “caused” it.  It

Re: [FRIAM] Downward causation

2017-11-19 Thread Nick Thompson 
Ahh!  Thanks Roger.  That blows some life into it for me.  Is watching a bean 
plant grow in time lapse an example of coarse-graining?  So let’s imagine we 
are watching such an image and we notice that the plant “reaches for the sun”.  
(I.e., we move the light around and the plant follows it as it grows.)Now 
let’s also imagine (ex hypothesis, mind you!) that the plant puts out extra 
roots on the opposite side to stabilize it.  I would call that top-down 
causation, I guess. 

 

I dunno.  Anything that comes out of SFI is kind of ink-blots for me.  

 

Nick 

 

Nicholas S. Thompson

Emeritus Professor of Psychology and Biology

Clark University

 <http://home.earthlink.net/~nickthompson/naturaldesigns/> 
http://home.earthlink.net/~nickthompson/naturaldesigns/

 

From: Friam [mailto:friam-boun...@redfish.com] On Behalf Of Roger Critchlow
Sent: Sunday, November 19, 2017 3:01 AM
To: The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group 
Subject: Re: [FRIAM] Downward causation

 

I looked at the abstract and thought, of course, if you "coarse grain" the 
visual field, then you synthesize objects out of groups of pixels that cohere 
together in time and space.  In time you might even come to blame the imputed 
objects for their presumed effects in the world.  Perhaps it's an illusion, or 
a hallucination, or a tautology, but once you summon a coarse grained entity 
into existence it will have coarse grained consequences, including changes of 
behavior in the summoner which are explained as reactions to coarse grained 
observations.

 

So I didn't read as hard as Nick, I just took the operational view laid out in 
the abstract and imagined it.  Causation is at root a tool that helps an 
organism to live long and to prosper.  The observation and reaction which saves 
a life or facilitates reproduction or helps progeny mature is primary.

 

-- rec --

 

On Sat, Nov 18, 2017 at 11:25 PM, Nick Thompson mailto:nickthomp...@earthlink.net> > wrote:

Hi, Roger, 

 

Can you say what you thought was “nice” about it.  (As you know, it makes me 
nervous to disagree with you about stuff).  I struggled with the article.  I 
thought at one point she confused aggregate with emergent properties. Emergent 
properties are properties of the whole that are dependent on the temporal or 
spatial arrangement of the parts.  Thus the enzymatic properties of proteins, 
which depend on the arrangement of their amino acids, are emergent properties.  
 Also, the standard definition of materialism is the believe that everything 
real consists of matter and its relations.  So entertaining the notion that 
relations are not material (and therefore incapable of being causal) is … well 
… silly.   Finally, I have always suspected that downward causation is an 
example of a “mystery” i.e., confusion that arises when words are applied to a 
situation where they aren’t equal to the task.  (“What is the sound of one hand 
clapping?”)  I think whenever we talk about causes we are trying to do with 
physical events what we do with social and legal ones … we are trying to assign 
responsibility for event so we can blame or praise the thing that “caused” it.  
It’s a form of animism.  To say that A is a cause of B is only to say that 
variations in A have been shown, experimentally, to be necessary and or 
sufficient for variations in B.  Causal statements ALWAYS come with an “other 
things being equal” clause, ceteris paribus.  To the extent that emergent 
properties can be shown to be necessary or sufficient for some change in the 
property of some parts of the whole, we have downward causation, no?   Now the 
shape of the hemoglobin molecule is an emergent property of that molecule which 
determines whether it binds oxygen in its active site.  Whether or not it has 
oxygen bound to its active site determines its shape.  Surely one of these is 
downward causation.  I am just no sure which. (};-|)

 

Nick 

 

 

Nicholas S. Thompson

Emeritus Professor of Psychology and Biology

Clark University

 <http://home.earthlink.net/~nickthompson/naturaldesigns/> 
http://home.earthlink.net/~nickthompson/naturaldesigns/

 

From: Friam [mailto:friam-boun...@redfish.com 
<mailto:friam-boun...@redfish.com> ] On Behalf Of Roger Critchlow
Sent: Saturday, November 18, 2017 6:15 PM
To: The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group mailto:friam@redfish.com> >
Subject: Re: [FRIAM] Downward causation

 

Nice.

 

-- rec --

 

 

On Sat, Nov 18, 2017 at 12:29 PM, Carl Tollander mailto:c...@plektyx.com> > wrote:

Of interest, also the whole issue... 
http://rsta.royalsocietypublishing.org/content/375/2109/20160338

 

C

 



FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv
Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College
to unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com
FR

Re: [FRIAM] Downward causation

2017-11-19 Thread Roger Critchlow 
I looked at the abstract and thought, of course, if you "coarse grain" the
visual field, then you synthesize objects out of groups of pixels that
cohere together in time and space.  In time you might even come to blame
the imputed objects for their presumed effects in the world.  Perhaps it's
an illusion, or a hallucination, or a tautology, but once you summon a
coarse grained entity into existence it will have coarse grained
consequences, including changes of behavior in the summoner which are
explained as reactions to coarse grained observations.

So I didn't read as hard as Nick, I just took the operational view laid out
in the abstract and imagined it.  Causation is at root a tool that helps an
organism to live long and to prosper.  The observation and reaction which
saves a life or facilitates reproduction or helps progeny mature is primary.

-- rec --

On Sat, Nov 18, 2017 at 11:25 PM, Nick Thompson 
wrote:

> Hi, Roger,
>
>
>
> Can you say what you thought was “nice” about it.  (As you know, it makes
> me nervous to disagree with you about stuff).  I struggled with the
> article.  I thought at one point she confused aggregate with emergent
> properties. Emergent properties are properties of the whole that are
> dependent on the temporal or spatial arrangement of the parts.  Thus the
> enzymatic properties of proteins, which depend on the arrangement of their
> amino acids, are emergent properties.   Also, the standard definition of
> materialism is the believe that everything real consists of *matter and
> its relations. * So entertaining the notion that relations are not
> material (and therefore incapable of being causal) is … well … silly.
>  Finally, I have always suspected that downward causation is an example of
> a “mystery” i.e., confusion that arises when words are applied to a
> situation where they aren’t equal to the task.  (“What is the sound of one
> hand clapping?”)  I think whenever we talk about causes we are trying to do
> with physical events what we do with social and legal ones … we are trying
> to assign responsibility for event so we can blame or praise the thing that
> “caused” it.  It’s a form of animism.  To say that A is a cause of B is
> only to say that variations in A have been shown, experimentally, to be
> necessary and or sufficient for variations in B.  Causal statements ALWAYS
> come with an “other things being equal” clause, *ceteris paribus*.  To
> the extent that emergent properties can be shown to be necessary or
> sufficient for some change in the property of some parts of the whole, we
> have downward causation, no?   Now the shape of the hemoglobin molecule is
> an emergent property of that molecule which determines whether it binds
> oxygen in its active site.  Whether or not it has oxygen bound to its
> active site determines its shape.  Surely one of these is downward
> causation.  I am just no sure which. (};-|)
>
>
>
> Nick
>
>
>
>
>
> Nicholas S. Thompson
>
> Emeritus Professor of Psychology and Biology
>
> Clark University
>
> http://home.earthlink.net/~nickthompson/naturaldesigns/
>
>
>
> *From:* Friam [mailto:friam-boun...@redfish.com] *On Behalf Of *Roger
> Critchlow
> *Sent:* Saturday, November 18, 2017 6:15 PM
> *To:* The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group <
> friam@redfish.com>
> *Subject:* Re: [FRIAM] Downward causation
>
>
>
> Nice.
>
>
>
> -- rec --
>
>
>
>
>
> On Sat, Nov 18, 2017 at 12:29 PM, Carl Tollander  wrote:
>
> Of interest, also the whole issue... http://rsta.
> royalsocietypublishing.org/content/375/2109/20160338
>
>
>
> C
>
>
>
>
> 
> FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv
> Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College
> to unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com
> FRIAM-COMIC http://friam-comic.blogspot.com/ by Dr. Strangelove
>
>
>
> 
> FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv
> Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College
> to unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com
> FRIAM-COMIC http://friam-comic.blogspot.com/ by Dr. Strangelove
>

FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv
Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College
to unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com
FRIAM-COMIC http://friam-comic.blogspot.com/ by Dr. Strangelove

Re: [FRIAM] Downward causation

2017-11-18 Thread Nick Thompson 
Hi, Roger, 

 

Can you say what you thought was “nice” about it.  (As you know, it makes me 
nervous to disagree with you about stuff).  I struggled with the article.  I 
thought at one point she confused aggregate with emergent properties. Emergent 
properties are properties of the whole that are dependent on the temporal or 
spatial arrangement of the parts.  Thus the enzymatic properties of proteins, 
which depend on the arrangement of their amino acids, are emergent properties.  
 Also, the standard definition of materialism is the believe that everything 
real consists of matter and its relations.  So entertaining the notion that 
relations are not material (and therefore incapable of being causal) is … well 
… silly.   Finally, I have always suspected that downward causation is an 
example of a “mystery” i.e., confusion that arises when words are applied to a 
situation where they aren’t equal to the task.  (“What is the sound of one hand 
clapping?”)  I think whenever we talk about causes we are trying to do with 
physical events what we do with social and legal ones … we are trying to assign 
responsibility for event so we can blame or praise the thing that “caused” it.  
It’s a form of animism.  To say that A is a cause of B is only to say that 
variations in A have been shown, experimentally, to be necessary and or 
sufficient for variations in B.  Causal statements ALWAYS come with an “other 
things being equal” clause, ceteris paribus.  To the extent that emergent 
properties can be shown to be necessary or sufficient for some change in the 
property of some parts of the whole, we have downward causation, no?   Now the 
shape of the hemoglobin molecule is an emergent property of that molecule which 
determines whether it binds oxygen in its active site.  Whether or not it has 
oxygen bound to its active site determines its shape.  Surely one of these is 
downward causation.  I am just no sure which. (};-|)

 

Nick 

 

 

Nicholas S. Thompson

Emeritus Professor of Psychology and Biology

Clark University

 <http://home.earthlink.net/~nickthompson/naturaldesigns/> 
http://home.earthlink.net/~nickthompson/naturaldesigns/

 

From: Friam [mailto:friam-boun...@redfish.com] On Behalf Of Roger Critchlow
Sent: Saturday, November 18, 2017 6:15 PM
To: The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group 
Subject: Re: [FRIAM] Downward causation

 

Nice.

 

-- rec --

 

 

On Sat, Nov 18, 2017 at 12:29 PM, Carl Tollander mailto:c...@plektyx.com> > wrote:

Of interest, also the whole issue... 
http://rsta.royalsocietypublishing.org/content/375/2109/20160338

 

C

 



FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv
Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College
to unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com
FRIAM-COMIC http://friam-comic.blogspot.com/ by Dr. Strangelove

 


FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv
Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College
to unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com
FRIAM-COMIC http://friam-comic.blogspot.com/ by Dr. Strangelove

Re: [FRIAM] Downward causation

2017-11-18 Thread Roger Critchlow 
Nice.

-- rec --


On Sat, Nov 18, 2017 at 12:29 PM, Carl Tollander  wrote:

> Of interest, also the whole issue... http://rsta.
> royalsocietypublishing.org/content/375/2109/20160338
>
> C
>
>
> 
> FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv
> Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College
> to unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com
> FRIAM-COMIC http://friam-comic.blogspot.com/ by Dr. Strangelove
>

FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv
Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College
to unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com
FRIAM-COMIC http://friam-comic.blogspot.com/ by Dr. Strangelove

[FRIAM] Downward causation

2017-11-18 Thread Carl Tollander 
Of interest, also the whole issue...
http://rsta.royalsocietypublishing.org/content/375/2109/20160338

C

FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv
Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College
to unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com
FRIAM-COMIC http://friam-comic.blogspot.com/ by Dr. Strangelove