Dear All:
I am also in Bali and have been since last Monday. Rado's report was spot on.
Regarding the new German pledge, the German NGO and other EU people I spoke to
here believe Germany can achieve this target, or get close. As many of you
know, Germany has implemented a number of innovative policies and are
considering many more. Among the fastest growing climate initiative is the
expansion of distributed solar in Germany - the result of a handsome reverse
metering rate guarantees that has taken off across the country and finding
great popular support. There is hope, but as of yet no great expectation, that
this could be replicated
That said, even with the EU forging ahead and exerting great leadership in a
number of areas, the global numbers simply do not add up unless there are
significant policy breakthroughs in the US, China and India. Even the policy
that passed out of committee in the senate, and which will not become law in
its current form, does not come close to meeting the interim 2020 reductions
needed by Annex 1 parties although it does do a reasonable job with the 2050
numbers.
Other random and complete personal observations:
This is the most logistically complex global environmental negotiation I have
been to in the 17 years I have been going to these (ozone, chemicals and
climate). The large number of interconnected agenda items and contact groups
not only make it difficult to follow - for observers, delegates and even the
Secretariat, but also are impacting prospects for effective deliberations and
effective results. This is one reason they will be many more meetings next
year, to give all the parallel tracks their own space. Still, I would be very
interested in speaking with someone about doing an article on this issue - how
the logistical density/complexity has grown and arguments for and against this
complexity/density impacting outcomes and effectiveness.
There is great deal of rhetoric about urgency - but very little urgent
diplomatic action. Thus, the political talks are extremely depressing--
especially compared with the very important agreement in Montreal earlier this
year on accelerating the HCFC phase-out under the ozone protocol (which to be
fair, can be traced to a US backed proposal and diligent efforts).
At the same time, while the global politics are depressing, there are large and
increasing efforts at city, state, and corporate levels around the world. Many
innovative and successful policy experiments and technological developments are
occurring all around the world.
This is exciting but it also serves to highlight the depressing paradox -
Nearly all countries agree on what we need to do (in a macro sense) and most
are aware that technologies and policy options exist to make immediate strides
to significantly lower GHG emissions (the low hanging fruit involving energy
efficiency, deforestation, and several other actions is immense) but yet they
cannot collectively agree to do so which limits the willingness of many to take
large unilateral action. This is another reason the German and EU
pronouncements are so important - someone has to go first and show it can be
done a very reasonable costs.
My prediction for new treaty in 2009/2010: 30% reductions for Annex 1 by 2020
and some sector specific agreements for binding policies involving developing
countries - e.g. HFCs, cement, smelting, refining, deforestation, etc. that
can be linked to specific flexibility mechanisms. The agreement on management
and funding of the adaptation fund (through a 2% tax on CDMs) will be copied in
some form to create a dedicated resource stream for incremental cost assistance
or introduction of new technology.
After Poland in 2008 and Copenhagen in 2009 the circus might head to Kingston
in 2010 - start packing your bathers (swimsuits).
The 2009 deadline could become 2010, not on paper but in practice. No one wants
to say it publicly but many delegates, including some aggressive EU folks, that
it might be necessary to engage the new US administration for longer than 11
months in order to get a treaty that will work. Many admit they do not want to
replicate the Kyoto experience of an artificial deadline contributing to the
creation of a very suboptimal treaty. Thus, it might take until 2010 to get an
architecture for large A-11 reductions, some time of commitments by large
developing countries, a real deforestation deal, and other aspects of the
foreseen treaty.
As Radoslav noted, the adaptation fund deal is important. The failure to get a
real deal on avoided deforestation, let alone technology, is a significant but
not unexpected failure. I agree with him that some developing countries were
rather bitter about both issues, particular technology, but it also might have
been the result of the SBI and SBSTA discussions concluding on these issues -
via acknowledgement of no deal -
