Dear All:
I am also in Bali and have been since last Monday. Rado's report was spot on.
Regarding the new German pledge, the German NGO and other EU people I spoke to
here believe Germany can achieve this target, or get close. As many of you
know, Germany has implemented a number of innovative policies and are
considering many more. Among the fastest growing climate initiative is the
expansion of distributed solar in Germany - the result of a handsome reverse
metering rate guarantees that has taken off across the country and finding
great popular support. There is hope, but as of yet no great expectation, that
this could be replicated
That said, even with the EU forging ahead and exerting great leadership in a
number of areas, the global numbers simply do not add up unless there are
significant policy breakthroughs in the US, China and India. Even the policy
that passed out of committee in the senate, and which will not become law in
its current form, does not come close to meeting the interim 2020 reductions
needed by Annex 1 parties although it does do a reasonable job with the 2050
numbers.
Other random and complete personal observations:
This is the most logistically complex global environmental negotiation I have
been to in the 17 years I have been going to these (ozone, chemicals and
climate). The large number of interconnected agenda items and contact groups
not only make it difficult to follow - for observers, delegates and even the
Secretariat, but also are impacting prospects for effective deliberations and
effective results. This is one reason they will be many more meetings next
year, to give all the parallel tracks their own space. Still, I would be very
interested in speaking with someone about doing an article on this issue - how
the logistical density/complexity has grown and arguments for and against this
complexity/density impacting outcomes and effectiveness.
There is great deal of rhetoric about urgency - but very little urgent
diplomatic action. Thus, the political talks are extremely depressing--
especially compared with the very important agreement in Montreal earlier this
year on accelerating the HCFC phase-out under the ozone protocol (which to be
fair, can be traced to a US backed proposal and diligent efforts).
At the same time, while the global politics are depressing, there are large and
increasing efforts at city, state, and corporate levels around the world. Many
innovative and successful policy experiments and technological developments are
occurring all around the world.
This is exciting but it also serves to highlight the depressing paradox -
Nearly all countries agree on what we need to do (in a macro sense) and most
are aware that technologies and policy options exist to make immediate strides
to significantly lower GHG emissions (the low hanging fruit involving energy
efficiency, deforestation, and several other actions is immense) but yet they
cannot collectively agree to do so which limits the willingness of many to take
large unilateral action. This is another reason the German and EU
pronouncements are so important - someone has to go first and show it can be
done a very reasonable costs.
My prediction for new treaty in 2009/2010: 30% reductions for Annex 1 by 2020
and some sector specific agreements for binding policies involving developing
countries - e.g. HFCs, cement, smelting, refining, deforestation, etc. that
can be linked to specific flexibility mechanisms. The agreement on management
and funding of the adaptation fund (through a 2% tax on CDMs) will be copied in
some form to create a dedicated resource stream for incremental cost assistance
or introduction of new technology.
After Poland in 2008 and Copenhagen in 2009 the circus might head to Kingston
in 2010 - start packing your bathers (swimsuits).
The 2009 deadline could become 2010, not on paper but in practice. No one wants
to say it publicly but many delegates, including some aggressive EU folks, that
it might be necessary to engage the new US administration for longer than 11
months in order to get a treaty that will work. Many admit they do not want to
replicate the Kyoto experience of an artificial deadline contributing to the
creation of a very suboptimal treaty. Thus, it might take until 2010 to get an
architecture for large A-11 reductions, some time of commitments by large
developing countries, a real deforestation deal, and other aspects of the
foreseen treaty.
As Radoslav noted, the adaptation fund deal is important. The failure to get a
real deal on avoided deforestation, let alone technology, is a significant but
not unexpected failure. I agree with him that some developing countries were
rather bitter about both issues, particular technology, but it also might have
been the result of the SBI and SBSTA discussions concluding on these issues -
via acknowledgement of no deal - at 1 am that contributed to the usually frank
exchanges. As with technology issues, real deforestation incentives will now
likely only be addressed successfully as part of the final package in 2009/2010.
There are several US delegations here: The top officials from state toeing the
party line; many others from other agencies or lower ranks at state who clearly
want the US to engage; state officials especially from California, touting how
they are implementing real USA climate policy despite the whitehouse; Kerry's
brief appearance on behalf of the Dems in Congress, who have also sent a couple
of letters; and the increasing vocal pro-climate policy voices within certain
sectors the US/global business community.
The Saudis are brilliant at delaying, obscuring and general mucking up the
works. Their continued statements on the importance of a future agreement
including compensation for oil exporters for lost revenue due to nations taking
action on climate change, are only the most public part of this. Their
statements and action in various contact groups and plenary and even, I am
told, in internal G-77 coordination meetings, continually slow down the
process, introduce extraneous issues, etc.
The Chinese have been very engaged, very productive and not necessarily
obstructionist. Many see this as an excellent sign for a deal in 2009/2010. To
be sure they are not shy about pursuing the interest (the closed contact group
discussions on getting payments for destroying a particular GHG/ODS that is
produced when creating another GHG/ODS were particularly lively).
There is little understanding of how policy is made in the US - or how
dysfunctional that policy making can be: how long it takes, the complex
committee system, the ability of 40 senators, or even a smaller number, to
block things, how easy it is for well financed lobbying groups to stall or much
things up. There is also a less than widespread understanding that, unlike in
many countries, its is very difficult for the US to agree to aspirational
targets in a treaty as the ratification process involves the creation of
specific enabling legislation that must show how the treaty will be fulfilled.
Australia, despite the Kyoto ratification, has not been a positive force and
while they are not completely in lock-step with all aspects of the US go slow
approaches here (as Japan largely is), the lack of a complete change in their
policy has disappointed many - and not just in the NGO community.
Is this a global climate policy negotiation or a carbon market industry meeting?
Even with more meetings being scheduled for the next two years, they is
increasing grumbling that more steps have to be taken to decouple the
negotiations from the trade fair/side event circus. Some efforts were made to
do this in Vienna this past year with some success.
Mitsubishi officials are pushing awareness of their very nice plug in electric
car that will come to market in Japan in 2010 but probably not to the USA till
2012 (i did not get a chance to drive it but did sit in it). Assuming the Volt
comes online and other companies pull through, urban drivers will have plenty
of plug in choices for cars to satisfy a days worth of local commuting. It
will be interesting to study the introduction of these vehicles and their
acceptance. The market will have to transfer to plugs and very high mileage
hybrid relatively quickly for transport emissions to come down as much as they
need to.
see ya
david
David Leonard Downie
Columbia University
Director, Global Roundtable on Climate Change
Associate Director, Graduate Program in Climate and Society
212-854-5725; [EMAIL PROTECTED]
________________________________
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] on behalf of Neil E Harrison
Sent: Wed 12/12/2007 10:08 AM
To: Radoslav Dimitrov; [EMAIL PROTECTED]; Global Environmental Education;
[EMAIL PROTECTED]
Cc: Chris WODSKOU; David Matthew Brock; Raphael Lencucha; rafael chichek
Subject: RE: update from Bali
Radoslav:
An interesting take on the meeting that we outsiders don't get from other
sources. I don't set much store by the German commitment: it is easy talk but
means almost nothing until they translate that into real action. Given the
recent implementation cock-ups in the EU on related policies including the
distribution of carbon credits - a stupid idea in itself - I'm not going to
hold my breath that they will reach the target or even make a good start on
necessary economic and behavioral changes.
Cheers,
Neil
-----Original Message-----
From: Radoslav Dimitrov [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]
Sent: Wednesday, December 12, 2007 5:08 AM
To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]; Global Environmental Education; [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Cc: Chris WODSKOU; David Matthew Brock; Raphael Lencucha; rafael chichek
Subject: update from Bali
Dear colleagues,
Cheers from Bali!
A few minutes ago, Germany's Minister received a two-minute ovation
after announcing Germany's unilateral commitment to reduce emissions by 40
percent by 2050, and said that the motto of this conference should be changed
from "You first" to "Me, too." I am writing from Plenary. New Zealand's
Minister for Climate Change Issues just stated that New Zealand would like to
see a new annex to the Kyoto Protocol that deals with deforestation. Here there
is a strong push on reduced emissions from deforestation and forest degradation
(REDD). The meeting is unusually hectic and of stunning complexity. There are
thirty different contact groups and informal consultations on various issues:
tech transfer, adaptation, the three different post-2012 processes, etc etc.
Even large delegations complain of overload and inability to follow all
discussions.
Some substantive updates: One success yesterday was agreement on the
long awaited Adaptation Fund. 2) Failure of the talks on technology transfer
(under the SBI). Many are really angry about it. 3) Still complete stalemate on
key elements of the Bali Roadmap. Bitter disagreement on whether to include
text on the 25-40 percent range of emission reductions by 2020. The Bali
Roadmap is supposed to be on purely procedural issues of launching and
organizing the post-2012 negotiations. Instead, the Europeans are fighting hard
to include in the text substantive elements such as the the 25-40 % cuts. My
personal view is the EU is shooting themselves in the foot: generating long
fights over substance is putting the horse before the cart and poses the risk
of preventing the launch of the negotiations in the first place.
Canada is in a really tough spot. They cornered themselves in a very
difficult negotiating position when they demanded binding commitments from
developing countries AND at the same time requested special treatment and
"differentiation" based on national circumstances. A lot of hype about this.
People here are saying "Canada simply isn't powerful enough to be able to
maintain such strong positions." The NGOs just won't let go, making Canada the
laughing stock.
These are only a few of the overwhelming number of issues here.
Regards,
Radoslav S. Dimitrov, Ph.D.
Assistant Professor
Department of Political Science
University of Western Ontario
Social Science Centre
London, Ontario
Canada N6A 5C2
Tel. +1(519) 661-2111 ext. 85023
Fax +1(519) 661-3904
Email: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
