Re: GnuPG 2.1 beta 3 released
Perhaps you find this relevant. I don't even begin to see why you are interested in this. But who knows. On Mon, Dec 26, 2011 at 9:42 PM, Werner Koch w...@gnupg.org wrote: On Sun, 25 Dec 2011 19:00, nicholas.c...@gmail.com said: It would be very good if there were still a way to completely 'sandox' (for want of a better term) an instance of gpg, so that it uses its own key rings and trust databases. I certainly find that for testing purposes it is very useful indeed. On previous versions --homedir does this nicely. A easy way to do this is: GNUPGHOME=/foo/bar gpg-agent --daemon sh and then do whatever you want in this shell. If you are done run give an exit and with a few seconds that gpg-agent will be terminated. That is how I do almost all tests. Salam-Shalom, Werner -- Die Gedanken sind frei. Ausnahmen regelt ein Bundesgesetz. ___ Gnupg-devel mailing list gnupg-de...@gnupg.org http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-devel ___ Gnupg-users mailing list Gnupg-users@gnupg.org http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users
Re: GnuPG 2.1 beta 3 released
sorry my previous message was sent in error. Please disregard. Thank you. On Tue, Dec 27, 2011 at 4:42 AM, Veet Vivarto viva...@gmail.com wrote: Perhaps you find this relevant. I don't even begin to see why you are interested in this. But who knows. On Mon, Dec 26, 2011 at 9:42 PM, Werner Koch w...@gnupg.org wrote: On Sun, 25 Dec 2011 19:00, nicholas.c...@gmail.com said: It would be very good if there were still a way to completely 'sandox' (for want of a better term) an instance of gpg, so that it uses its own key rings and trust databases. I certainly find that for testing purposes it is very useful indeed. On previous versions --homedir does this nicely. A easy way to do this is: GNUPGHOME=/foo/bar gpg-agent --daemon sh and then do whatever you want in this shell. If you are done run give an exit and with a few seconds that gpg-agent will be terminated. That is how I do almost all tests. Salam-Shalom, Werner -- Die Gedanken sind frei. Ausnahmen regelt ein Bundesgesetz. ___ Gnupg-devel mailing list gnupg-de...@gnupg.org http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-devel ___ Gnupg-users mailing list Gnupg-users@gnupg.org http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users
Re: maximum passphrase for symmetric encryption ?
On 2011-12-27 23:14, ved...@nym.hush.com wrote: Is there a maximum size for a passphrase for symmetric encryption in gnupg, or does a passphrase exceeding a certain size not add any further security to the process? Example, The session key for AES 256 is 64 hexadecimal characters. The approximate equivalent in brute force work is 20 diceware words. [ 7776^19 2^256 7776^20 ]. A string of 15 diceware words is often more than 64 characters. I can't tell for gpg specifically but it's not so much about characters. It's about entropy. Natural language is redundant, and diceware uses words from natural language. Let's say we all adopted the convention to write every character twice, to recover from errors in transmission. Is ttrraannssmmiiiioonn any more secure than transmission, given that an attacker knows you're doubling every letter? No, because it doesn't have more entropy. So don't measure characters, your upper bound is entropy, so 20 diceware words apparently contain 256 bits of entropy (based on your numbers). That means any more than 20 words isn't going to add for the case of AES-256. Like I said, this is not gpg-specific. For all I know, gpg might cut off after the 64th character and drop entropy from your passphrase. But that sounds unlikely. Wikipedia is great for further reading. -- PGP: A0E4 B2D4 94E6 20EE 85BA E45B 63E4 2BD8 C58C 753A PGP: 2C23 EBFF DF1A 840D 2351 F5F5 F25B A03F 2152 36DA -- nameserver 217.79.186.148 nameserver 178.63.26.172 http://opennicproject.org/ -- No situation is so dire that panic cannot make it worse. signature.asc Description: OpenPGP digital signature ___ Gnupg-users mailing list Gnupg-users@gnupg.org http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users
maximum passphrase for symmetric encryption ?
Is there a maximum size for a passphrase for symmetric encryption in gnupg, or does a passphrase exceeding a certain size not add any further security to the process? Example, The session key for AES 256 is 64 hexadecimal characters. The approximate equivalent in brute force work is 20 diceware words. [ 7776^19 2^256 7776^20 ]. A string of 15 diceware words is often more than 64 characters. Does increasing the passphrase string to more than 64 characters add any security? Truecrypt full disk encryption insists on a maximum of 64 characters for the passphrase. (This is even more relevant in my case, where I routinely use 3DES ;-) ) (am not familiar enough with the primitives of symmetric encryption in how a string to key symmetric encryption works.) TIA, vedaal ___ Gnupg-users mailing list Gnupg-users@gnupg.org http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users
Re: maximum passphrase for symmetric encryption ?
There may be some errors in my reply, so if so, please notify me. On Tue, Dec 27, 2011 at 11:23:50PM +0100, Jerome Baum wrote: On 2011-12-27 23:14, ved...@nym.hush.com wrote: The approximate equivalent in brute force work is 20 diceware words. [ 7776^19 2^256 7776^20 ]. A string of 15 diceware words is often more than 64 characters. I can't tell for gpg specifically but it's not so much about characters. It's about entropy. Natural language is redundant, and diceware uses words from natural language. Yes, but each word in the diceware list contains about 12.9 bits of entropy, due to the random nature of rolling a fair D6. So, for a passphrase that is 20 diceware words, it contains roughly 258-bits of entropy, as he identified. It's easy to calculate entropy in a truly random environment: H = L*log2(N) where 'H' is the entropy value in binary bits, 'L' is the length of the message, 'log2()' is the log base-2 function, and 'N' is the possible number of characters the system can have. The only time when this equation becomes more complicated, is when predictable patterns, such as can be found in human language, are found. So don't measure characters, your upper bound is entropy, so 20 diceware words apparently contain 256 bits of entropy (based on your numbers). That means any more than 20 words isn't going to add for the case of AES-256. And this is the point, right here. A passphrase that has more binary bits of entropy, than the containing system, won't provide you with any additional benefit, or security. So, in the case with a 20 word, diceware passphrase, provided that the RNG building the AES 256-bit environment is truly random data, any additional entropy in the passphrase, won't buy you any additional security in the encrypted data. -- . o . o . o . . o o . . . o . . . o . o o o . o . o o . . o o o o . o . . o o o o . o o o signature.asc Description: Digital signature ___ Gnupg-users mailing list Gnupg-users@gnupg.org http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users
Re: maximum passphrase for symmetric encryption ?
On 2011-12-28 00:27, Aaron Toponce wrote: On Tue, Dec 27, 2011 at 11:23:50PM +0100, Jerome Baum wrote: I can't tell for gpg specifically but it's not so much about characters. It's about entropy. Natural language is redundant, and diceware uses words from natural language. Yes, but each word in the diceware list contains about 12.9 bits of entropy, due to the random nature of rolling a fair D6. How is this in conflict with what I said? -- PGP: A0E4 B2D4 94E6 20EE 85BA E45B 63E4 2BD8 C58C 753A PGP: 2C23 EBFF DF1A 840D 2351 F5F5 F25B A03F 2152 36DA -- nameserver 217.79.186.148 nameserver 178.63.26.172 http://opennicproject.org/ -- No situation is so dire that panic cannot make it worse. signature.asc Description: OpenPGP digital signature ___ Gnupg-users mailing list Gnupg-users@gnupg.org http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users
Re: German Privacy Foundation Crypto-stick
After installing the package the UDEV rule should be located at /lib/udev/rules.d/40-cryptostick.rules Please check. Am 27.12.2011 09:00, schrieb mcmurphy: Hi, thank you for the answer. There is no difference. I'm not sure, whether the installation works. There is no new rule in /etc/udev/rules.d. Is it gnupg-ccid.rules in /etc/udev/? However: Nothing changed for not-sudoer-user. Maybe there is something wrong with udev or gpg? mcmurphy On 27.12.2011 00:50, Crypto Stick wrote: Hi! Please install this package (UDEV rule) and it should work. https://www.assembla.com/spaces/cryptostick/documents/ds_EMCisGr4k7QeJe5cbCb/download/ds_EMCisGr4k7QeJe5cbCb Am 27.12.2011 00:46, schrieb mcmurphy: Hi, i'm trying to work with the Crypto-stick of the German Privacy Foundation (https://www.privacyfoundation.de/crypto_stick/crypto_stick_english/) under ubuntu 11 64-bit. Unfortunately it works only for root or sudoers. An UNPRVILEGED user gets the following message: $ gpg --card-status gpg: selecting openpgp failed: unknown command gpg: OpenPGP Karte ist nicht vorhanden: Allgemeiner Fehler I searched a lot, tried some udev-rules, i.e. http://dokuwiki.nausch.org/doku.php/centos:cryptos or http://lists.gnupg.org/pipermail/gnupg-users/2011-February/040781.html. It makes no difference. Maybe you have some hints for solving this problem. Thanx mcmurphy ___ Gnupg-users mailing list Gnupg-users@gnupg.org http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users signature.asc Description: OpenPGP digital signature ___ Gnupg-users mailing list Gnupg-users@gnupg.org http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users
maximum passphrase for symmetric encryption ?
Jerome Baum jerome at jeromebaum.com wrote on Tue Dec 27 23:23:50 CET 2011 : gpg might cut off after the 64th character and drop entropy from your passphrase. But that sounds unlikely. That's exactly my question. Does gnupg have a maximum string length for a passphrase, and restrict itself to the entropy contained within that length? (Apparently not.) I tried symmetrically encrypting, using a string of 65 characters, and it works, and requires exactly those 65 characters to decrypt. (Substituting any other character for the 65th character does not decrypt). Curious as to why Truecrypt does not accept more than 64, for whole disk encryption. vedaal ___ Gnupg-users mailing list Gnupg-users@gnupg.org http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users
--trusted-key
--trusted-key long key ID Assume that the specified key (which must be given as a full 8 byte key ID) is as trustworthy as one of your own secret keys. This option is useful if you don't want to keep your secret keys (or one of them) online but still want to be able to check the validity of a given recipient's or signator's key. I read this definition online, but I can't seem to get a grasp on what it is used for. As it sounds as though it may have use for something I want to do, I was hoping someone could elaborate a bit on this. It may be clear as glass to most of you, but I am not seeing it (sorry). Thanks. ___ Gnupg-users mailing list Gnupg-users@gnupg.org http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users
Re: --trusted-key
Am Mittwoch, 28. Dezember 2011, 03:08:15 schrieb John A. Wallace: Assume that the specified key (which must be given as a full 8 byte key ID) is as trustworthy as one of your own secret keys. This option is useful if you don't want to keep your secret keys (or one of them) online but still want to be able to check the validity of a given recipient's or signator's key. I read this definition online, but I can't seem to get a grasp on what it is used for. See --export-secret-subkeys. (gpg main key offline) as input for your favorite search engine answers possibly remaing questions. Hauke -- PGP: D44C 6A5B 71B0 427C CED3 025C BD7D 6D27 ECCB 5814 signature.asc Description: This is a digitally signed message part. ___ Gnupg-users mailing list Gnupg-users@gnupg.org http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users
Re: --trusted-key
On 2011-12-28 03:08, John A. Wallace wrote: --trusted-key long key ID Assume that the specified key (which must be given as a full 8 byte key ID) is as trustworthy as one of your own secret keys. This option is useful if you don't want to keep your secret keys (or one of them) online but still want to be able to check the validity of a given recipient's or signator's key. I read this definition online, but I can't seem to get a grasp on what it is used for. As it sounds as though it may have use for something I want to do, I was hoping someone could elaborate a bit on this. It may be clear as glass to most of you, but I am not seeing it (sorry). Thanks. You can't set ultimate trust on a public key unless you have the corresponding private key. So this is a way of telling gnupg not to require that, e.g. if you have the key on another computer and gnupg can't know that. For instance, I keep two key: 0x215236DA and 0xC58C753A. But only 0xC58C753A is on my machine, 0x215236DA is stored somewhere safe, so I don't want it on here. But I still want to ultimately trust 0x215236DA because, well, it's my key. So my gpg.conf says trusted-key 215236DA. -- PGP: A0E4 B2D4 94E6 20EE 85BA E45B 63E4 2BD8 C58C 753A PGP: 2C23 EBFF DF1A 840D 2351 F5F5 F25B A03F 2152 36DA -- nameserver 217.79.186.148 nameserver 178.63.26.172 http://opennicproject.org/ -- No situation is so dire that panic cannot make it worse. signature.asc Description: OpenPGP digital signature ___ Gnupg-users mailing list Gnupg-users@gnupg.org http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users
Re: maximum passphrase for symmetric encryption ?
On Tue, Dec 27, 2011 at 07:54:05PM -0500, ved...@nym.hush.com wrote: That's exactly my question. Does gnupg have a maximum string length for a passphrase, and restrict itself to the entropy contained within that length? Not to my knowledge. OpenPGP does not specify a maximum string length for a passphrase, and it's limited only to the amount of memory you have, or in some cases 2^61 bytes (which is essentially unlimited). I tried symmetrically encrypting, using a string of 65 characters, and it works, and requires exactly those 65 characters to decrypt. (Substituting any other character for the 65th character does not decrypt). Yes. When you use a passphrase to encrypt, the entire passphrase is hashed, so if the input is at all different, the passphrase will be rejected. Most modern OpenPGP implementations repeatedly hash the passphrase and use salt (8 bytes of random data stored with the passphrase to make the hash unique even if you reuse the passphrase). This makes brute-force attempts slower since more computation is required. -- brian m. carlson / brian with sandals: Houston, Texas, US +1 832 623 2791 | http://www.crustytoothpaste.net/~bmc | My opinion only OpenPGP: RSA v4 4096b: 88AC E9B2 9196 305B A994 7552 F1BA 225C 0223 B187 signature.asc Description: Digital signature ___ Gnupg-users mailing list Gnupg-users@gnupg.org http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users
Re: --trusted-key
On 28-12-2011 3:08, John A. Wallace wrote: --trusted-key long key ID Assume that the specified key (which must be given as a full 8 byte key ID) Perhaps it would be better to expand this option so it will also accept the full key signature (and also check against the full sig) now that intentional collisions of the 8-byte keyID can be generated. -- Met vriendelijke groet / With kind regards, Johan Wevers PGP/GPG public keys at http://www.xs4all.nl/~johanw/pgpkeys.html ___ Gnupg-users mailing list Gnupg-users@gnupg.org http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users
