Re: Multiple email addresses - any alternative to ask everyone to sign all my keys?
On 7/25/2013 2:05 AM, Heinz Diehl wrote:
The listserver should deliver the listmail with a reply-to header
which points back to the list. I do that manually to avoid that simply
hitting the reply-button sends mail directly to the sender, and not to
the list. In procmail, something like that will do:
:0fh
| ${FORMAIL} -IReply-To: gnupg-users@gnupg.org
I am using Thuderbird, I am not certain how to do add that header to my replies
in this program. It has a Reply List button I just forgot to use it.
Chris
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[Announce] [security fix] Libgcrypt 1.5.3 released
Hello! I am pleased to announce the availability of Libgcrypt version 1.5.3. This is a *security fix* release for the stable branch. Libgcrypt is a general purpose library of cryptographic building blocks. It is originally based on code used by GnuPG. It does not provide any implementation of OpenPGP or other protocols. Thorough understanding of applied cryptography is required to use Libgcrypt. Noteworthy changes in version 1.5.3: * Mitigate the Yarom/Falkner flush+reload side-channel attack on RSA secret keys. See http://eprint.iacr.org/2013/448. [ Note that Libgcrypt is used by GnuPG 2.x and thus this release fixes the above problem. The fix for GnuPG 2.0 can be found in the just released GnuPG 1.4.14. ] Source code is hosted at the GnuPG FTP server and its mirrors as listed at http://www.gnupg.org/download/mirrors.html . On the primary server the source file and its digital signatures is: ftp://ftp.gnupg.org/gcrypt/libgcrypt/libgcrypt-1.5.3.tar.bz2 (1.5M) ftp://ftp.gnupg.org/gcrypt/libgcrypt/libgcrypt-1.5.3.tar.bz2.sig This file is bzip2 compressed. A gzip compressed version is also available: ftp://ftp.gnupg.org/gcrypt/libgcrypt/libgcrypt-1.5.3.tar.gz (1.8M) ftp://ftp.gnupg.org/gcrypt/libgcrypt/libgcrypt-1.5.3.tar.gz.sig Alternativley you may upgrade version 1.5.2 using this patch file: ftp://ftp.gnupg.org/gcrypt/libgcrypt/libgcrypt-1.5.2-1.5.3.diff.bz2 (4k) The SHA-1 checksums are: 2c6553cc17f2a1616d512d6870fe95edf6b0e26e libgcrypt-1.5.3.tar.bz2 184405c91d1ab4877caefb1a6458767e5f0b639e libgcrypt-1.5.3.tar.gz b711fe3ddf534bb6f11823542036eb4a32e0c914 libgcrypt-1.5.2-1.5.3.diff.bz2 For help on developing with Libgcrypt you should read the included manual and optional ask on the gcrypt-devel mailing list [1]. A listing with commercial support offers for Libgcrypt and related software is available at the GnuPG web site [2]. The driving force behind the development of Libgcrypt is my company g10 Code. Maintenance and improvement of Libgcrypt and related software takes up most of our resources. To allow us to continue our work on free software, we ask to either purchase a support contract, engage us for custom enhancements, or to donate money: http://g10code.com/gnupg-donation.html Many thanks to all who contributed to Libgcrypt development, be it bug fixes, code, documentation, testing or helping users. Happy hacking, Werner [1] See http://www.gnupg.org/documentation/mailing-lists.html . [2] See http://www.gnupg.org/service.html -- Die Gedanken sind frei. Ausnahmen regelt ein Bundesgesetz. pgpodQtloLQdK.pgp Description: PGP signature ___ Gnupg-announce mailing list gnupg-annou...@gnupg.org http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-announce___ Gnupg-users mailing list Gnupg-users@gnupg.org http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users
[Announce] [security fix] GnuPG 1.4.14 released
Hello! We are pleased to announce the availability of a new stable GnuPG-1 release: Version 1.4.14. This is a *security fix* release and all users of GnuPG 2.0 are advised to updated to this version. See below for the impact of the problem. For users of GnuPG = 2.0 a new version of Libgcrypt (1.5.3) has been released which fixes the problem for them. The GNU Privacy Guard (GnuPG) is GNU's tool for secure communication and data storage. It is a complete and free replacement of PGP and can be used to encrypt data and to create digital signatures. It includes an advanced key management facility, smartcard support and is compliant with the OpenPGP Internet standard as described by RFC-4880. Note that this version is from the GnuPG-1 series and thus smaller than those from the GnuPG-2 series, easier to build, and also better portable to ancient platforms. In contrast to GnuPG-2 (e.g version 2.0.20) it comes with no support for S/MIME, Secure Shell, or other tools useful for desktop environments. Fortunately you may install both versions alongside on the same system without any conflict. What's New === * Mitigate the Yarom/Falkner flush+reload side-channel attack on RSA secret keys. See http://eprint.iacr.org/2013/448. * Fixed IDEA for big-endian CPUs * Improved the diagnostics for failed keyserver lockups. * Minor bug and portability fixes. Impact of the Cache Side-Channel Attack === Here is the abstract from the Yarom and Falkner paper: Flush+Reload is a cache side-channel attack that monitors access to data in shared pages. In this paper we demonstrate how to use the attack to extract private encryption keys from GnuPG. The high resolution and low noise of the Flush+Reload attack enables a spy program to recover over 98% of the bits of the private key in a single decryption or signing round. Unlike previous attacks, the attack targets the last level L3 cache. Consequently, the spy program and the victim do not need to share the execution core of the CPU. The attack is not limited to a traditional OS and can be used in a virtualised environment, where it can attack programs executing in a different VM. I general the use of private keys on multi-user machines is imminent dangerous due to a variety of possibly attacks. Example for such attacks are locally exploitable vulnerabilities and all kind of side channel attacks which can't be mitigated by the operating system. Thus the best advise is to use a private key only on a fully trusted machine; i.e. a machine with full control over the software which may run on it. However, it is common to put private keys on servers for example to process encrypted mail. If the server hardware is shared with other users it is thus important to update GnuPG so to avoid the described attack. On a pure desktop machine, with only one user, mounting this attack is probably not effective because there are easier ways to gain access to the machine and thus the keys. For best protection of private keys, smartcards are often the best choice. Getting the Software First of all, decide whether you really need GnuPG version 1.4.x - most users are better off with the modern GnuPG 2.0.x version. Then follow the instructions found at http://www.gnupg.org/download/ or read on: GnuPG 1.4.14 may be downloaded from one of the GnuPG mirror sites or direct from ftp://ftp.gnupg.org/gcrypt/ . The list of mirrors can be found at http://www.gnupg.org/mirrors.html . Note, that GnuPG is not available at ftp.gnu.org. On the mirrors you should find the following files in the *gnupg* directory: gnupg-1.4.14.tar.bz2 (3601k) gnupg-1.4.14.tar.bz2.sig GnuPG source compressed using BZIP2 and OpenPGP signature. gnupg-1.4.14.tar.gz (4967k) gnupg-1.4.14.tar.gz.sig GnuPG source compressed using GZIP and OpenPGP signature. gnupg-1.4.13-1.4.14.diff.bz2 (14k) A patch file to upgrade a 1.4.13 GnuPG source tree. This patch does not include updates of the language files. Select one of them. To shorten the download time, you probably want to get the BZIP2 compressed file. Please try another mirror if exceptional your mirror is not yet up to date. In the *binary* directory, you should find these files: gnupg-w32cli-1.4.14.exe (1567k) gnupg-w32cli-1.4.14.exe.sig GnuPG compiled for Microsoft Windows and OpenPGP signature. This is a command line only version; the source files are the same as given above. Note, that this is a minimal installer and unless you are just in need for the gpg binary, you are better off using the full featured installer at http://www.gpg4win.org . Checking the Integrity == In order to check that the version of GnuPG which you are going to install is an original and unmodified one, you can do it in one of the following ways: * If you already have a
Re: Multiple email addresses - any alternative to ask everyone to sign all my keys?
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE- Hash: SHA512 Hi On Wednesday 24 July 2013 at 5:09:13 PM, in mid:20130724160913.gc27...@pvv.ntnu.no, Einar Ryeng wrote: it is primarily the _person_ I trust, not e.g. his employer Assuming you mean the everyday usage rather than the OpenPGP-specific meaning of the word trust. There are plenty of people I have no basis to trust, except in the context of me-in-my-job-role interacting with them-in-their-job-role. - -- Best regards MFPAmailto:expires2...@ymail.com Gypsy Dwarf Escapes Prison: Small Medium at large -BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE- iQCVAwUBUfEcj6ipC46tDG5pAQqgAgP/agqbPu2KA+DwfUt3D5DD2N1lqzf5gE6y e2JpOvvGmXufZjWX0a4pWvgpHFXHDaLkEbzGjJPdYbWQJhfItALwIsdqNklQ/Mv+ jwLL0Mw/dBaL9eldGdZGt05TDyGLmVKiESkHXJc0cl+iw7rSijxBFFMhMh3QcCHi 82L0uNdn+Ic= =rfr/ -END PGP SIGNATURE- ___ Gnupg-users mailing list Gnupg-users@gnupg.org http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users
Re: Multiple email addresses - any alternative to ask everyone to sign all my keys?
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE- Hash: SHA512 Hi On Wednesday 24 July 2013 at 10:33:18 AM, in mid:51ef9f5e.7030...@spth.de, Philipp Klaus Krause wrote: I just want multiple security levels: Decrypt mail addressed to the university address, but not mail addressed to my private address on the university computer. Decrypt both types of mail on my private computer. If the University allows this, it suggests a hole in their data security policies. Assuming they are up to scratch with their own firewall, anti-virus, security updates, etc. they have no control over such things on the private computers of their staff. It sounds like what you actually need is, for example, a University laptop to access your University email when away from your office. After all the security I want works when using two separate keypairs (but that has the disadvantage of other people having to sign multiple keys). Nobody *has to* sign *any* key unless they want to. In the case of your University key, why does it need signatures from anybody other than the University's own IT or security departments? And does the University set an additional decryption key (so that communications can be answered in the event of a staff member being unexpectedly unavailable) and a designated revoker (for use as soon as a staff member leaves)? - -- Best regards MFPAmailto:expires2...@ymail.com The secret to creativity is knowing how to hide your sources. -BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE- iQCVAwUBUfErh6ipC46tDG5pAQoC9AQAyExfRcSSZxDwa7dXQ9GERrqYwetEmOdM Sn4kmv2VQ9zQcNyfz6IxODFYTkxCeq5hvX6eLMYUGJO6rJZEfaAClKfS3o+c2WUF F+psvwq6Ooo1Sxdx42K5i01Ljn4XA84Vc5+G2Kpy3SjQgUXEr5JZO2KvRhiAo3zC Xv2I5gRxnh8= =owry -END PGP SIGNATURE- ___ Gnupg-users mailing list Gnupg-users@gnupg.org http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users
Re: gpg-agent, authentication key, and ssh
On Tue, 23 Jul 2013 06:34, m...@0x01b.net said: As I understand it, I can create an authentication subkey and use some utility to convert that to an ssh key. If this conversion is possible, then why can't the gpg-agent consider private auth (sub)keys along with ssh keys loaded via the SSH_AUTH_SOCK protocol? It does this if the authkey is on a smart-card. We can't further automate this because the gpg-agent protocol requires that gpg-agent tells ssh all available keys so that ssh can ask the server whether it is willing to accept a certain key. With the dozens of auth-keys in a keyring this is a privacy problem and a performance problem. So what we require is that non-smartcard keys to be used with ssh are listed in ~/.gnupg/sshcontol . With GnuPG 2.1 the whole thing will become easier because the gpg-agent has direct access to all private keys and thus there is no more need to consult gpg to convert the non-smartcard keys. This will actually allow to write a small GUI to maintain the sshcontrol file. Also, out of curiosity... Would it be possible to multiplex the GPG_AGENT_INFO protocol with SSH_AUTH_SOCK? Damien Miller of OpenSSH has talked about unix socket forwarding [0], but nothing has come of it. I think it'd be a big win In theory yes. If you want to try: gpg-agent 2.1 can use TCP instead of a local socket to accept connection from gpg. It is a debugging aid because there is no security - tunneling this via ssh would give you this security. Salam-Shalom, Werner -- Die Gedanken sind frei. Ausnahmen regelt ein Bundesgesetz. ___ Gnupg-users mailing list Gnupg-users@gnupg.org http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users
Are SHA1 sums on gnupg.org checked regularly?
Hi everybody, on http://www.gnupg.org/download/integrity_check.en.html SHA1 sums of gnupg software are published and it is said: To be sure that this page has not been tampered, you may want to compare the list below with the one included in the announcement mail posted to several mailing list. Which mailing lists are meant? Can't emails be tempered, too? If I've just downloaded gnupg and if I'm not on any mailing list, what can I do? I feel it would be nice to add the following lines to the descrition on the homepage: The authors of gnupg keep an offline copy of the SHA1 sums of their programs and try to compare them with the SHA1 sums presented here every week. Thus, if you have been comparing your SHA 1 sum with the one on the homepage for several days and they matched every time, you can be rather sure your version of gnupg has not been tampered. My question now is: Does such a check realy take place and if so, how often is it preformed? Further I feel the following lines should be added to the homepage, especialy because it might be useful for windows users: In order to calculate the SHA1 sums you should at least use two different programs. On the internet many free programs can be found which can be used for that. What do you think? I'm grateful for answers. Jan ___ Gnupg-users mailing list Gnupg-users@gnupg.org http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users
Why trust gpg4win?
Hi everybody, why should I trust gpg4win? I have doubts since it was ordered by the Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik (BSI), which has close connections to secret services. Is gunPT any better? Finally, why should I trust gunpg? I'm a windows user. Thanks for any answers, Jan ___ Gnupg-users mailing list Gnupg-users@gnupg.org http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users
GPG weakness
Hi. I'm not a member of this list, but have read an article that I'd like to share, and put into your knowledge (if you don't know it already) because I think is rather important. In said article, about security in the Cloud you can read this: «Michael Bailey, a computer security researcher at the University of Michigan, notes that the software attacked—an e-mail encryption program called GNUPrivacy guard—is known to leak information, and that the experiment wasn’t carried out inside a real commercial cloud environment.» Source: http://www.technologyreview.com/news/506976/how-to-steal-data-from-your-neighbor-in-the-cloud/ I always thought that GnuPG was rather secure, but it seems that among experts it's a well known weak and poor ciphering technology which no security experts consider seriously. At least that's the impression I get reading said article. Are devs taking some measures to make GPG really secure? Regards. ___ Gnupg-users mailing list Gnupg-users@gnupg.org http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users
Re: [Announce] [security fix] GnuPG 1.4.14 released
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE- Hash: SHA512 Werner Koch wrote on 7/25/13 6:26 AM: Hello! We are pleased to announce the availability of a new stable GnuPG-1 release: Version 1.4.14. This is a *security fix* release and all users of GnuPG 2.0 are advised to updated to this version. See below for the impact of the problem. Hi, - From Terminal: Version info: gnupg 1.4.14 Configured for: Darwin (x86_64-apple-darwin12.4.0) gpg (GnuPG) 1.4.14 Copyright (C) 2013 Free Software Foundation, Inc. License GPLv3+: GNU GPL version 3 or later http://gnu.org/licenses/gpl.html This is free software: you are free to change and redistribute it. There is NO WARRANTY, to the extent permitted by law. Home: ~/.gnupg Supported algorithms: Pubkey: RSA, RSA-E, RSA-S, ELG-E, DSA Cipher: IDEA (S1), 3DES (S2), CAST5 (S3), BLOWFISH (S4), AES (S7), AES192 (S8), AES256 (S9), TWOFISH (S10), CAMELLIA128 (S11), CAMELLIA192 (S12), CAMELLIA256 (S13) Hash: MD5 (H1), SHA1 (H2), RIPEMD160 (H3), SHA256 (H8), SHA384 (H9), SHA512 (H10), SHA224 (H11) Compression: Uncompressed (Z0), ZIP (Z1), ZLIB (Z2), BZIP2 (Z3) Thank you. Charly 0x15E4F2EA Mac OS X 10.8.3 (12D78) MacBook Intel C2Duo 2GHz 13-inch, Aluminum, Late 2008 . GnuPG v2.0.19 (Darwin) - gpg (GnuPG) 1.4.14 TB 17.0.7 Enigmail version 1.5.1 (20130205-0013) -BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE- Version: GnuPG v1.4.14 (Darwin) iQIcBAEBCgAGBQJR8X6zAAoJEPPf0YAV5PLqPeQQAJHGfEXMUq5FloKmRn6HJk28 +Svxu2+4+LUhGOlbABwzieG0YdphKND4bpr88C5itC31LHcpDO/Z4RWh8MFM9Gdf kk6MTwQtJ07AE/mH2FdWe8o2WM4rvPUda7b2rQARwjrzTGU2DxZd5QLlX5mwyQr6 8gsKyNmuO6lakafJ+kv+t7nux5zdubVRvUQ8QEow80JA13fFt82dOy0Zub/qHblM mR/sVKHwdzT0jhhehs85yjOFBIGFUtDgELukf8o/6YaLb12yZXCPpBBoVOrnJ1WS U9VDxUXdeXEjuha/UvV6GSdeiO700dOkDJQohNdv6wq9YLpfT8rlBvBt1b7Dj0TT OBtj8h6z3yzAGlXtlJ+L2iPmr8bHn8SSjtX6gghnoft5Y2V8IQpb2plaJa5UCGRX 7h4AkbrSWYcQ0KBV5Yw57Ox/Gd6vTbNF40Y+vDCCtynV+TiEADGP01DRYm27+rOC cJVYXhsZpAj/W7oIqdiOYqWXhQGDWAKHX+Zgs2DOOJkb0QntB0QFIaaEN/1/eKIC 0r+r8qsAL2ZIMPOVaTkBWvAUQs38gOgst/JCVV9lB0W20+V4qFiScqgfoNPt7rOz IAGWKHF7KiIfOcKfb0v7NUw6IzXh7yD1XIPTj7UVpEG+TDj+soi1ku8UzWD1ax7N iQ5Xm5x5lqiQ7DmRbsSH =qpe3 -END PGP SIGNATURE- ___ Gnupg-users mailing list Gnupg-users@gnupg.org http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users
Re: GPG weakness
On 07/25/2013 08:59 AM, Manu García wrote: Are devs taking some measures to make GPG really secure? I am not an encryption expert, but if I were going to store a lot of stuff in the cloud, I would not use GPG or any other public (assymetric) key encryption system. I would use a simpler symmetric key, since no one other than I would need to know the key. The scheme outlined in the article is by no means new. It has been known at least 10 years and probably even more. It is of theoretical interest only, IMAO. As for the part of your post shown above, measures to make GPG really secure from what threats? Because the answer to that question really matters. I bet they cannot make it secure from my posting my private key on Facebook, for example, or from some black hat torturing my passphrase out of me, or from the FBI putting a keylogger on my machine, or even more easy, from my sending an encrypted e-mail to a friend of mine who then forwards it unencrypted to someone else. The developers of GPG cannot do anything to protect against these threats. -- .~. Jean-David Beyer Registered Linux User 85642. /V\ PGP-Key:166D840A 0C610C8B Registered Machine 1935521. /( )\ Shrewsbury, New Jerseyhttp://counter.li.org ^^-^^ 16:20:01 up 44 days, 18:06, 2 users, load average: 4.22, 4.50, 4.72 ___ Gnupg-users mailing list Gnupg-users@gnupg.org http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users
Re: Why trust gpg4win?
On 7/25/13, takethe...@gmx.de takethe...@gmx.de wrote: Hi everybody, why should I trust gpg4win? I have doubts since it was ordered by the Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik (BSI), which has close connections to secret services. Is gunPT any better? Finally, why should I trust gunpg? First of all, it is ok to have doubts. Basically, your concern is that some German federal institution implemented a back door in gpg4win (in this case). This is theoretically and practically possible, but there's one big problem with this: gpg4win (as gnupg, too) is _free software_ [1]. Free has to be understood as in free speech not free beer (although it often means both). This basically means, that everyone(!) can access, modify and redistribute the source code of the program (see [2] if you're interested). There are lots of people (usually volunteers from all over the wold) who do peer reviews on the sources (and if you start with [2], _you_ can be another one). Therefore, changes that look like back doors are VERY unlikely to find their way in a release, because hundreds of people are looking how the software evolves and will reject such a patch. This is the/a major thing behind the necessity for free and open software, such as the free operating system GNU/Linux. There's nobody you just have to trust, because _you_ can verify what the program actually does (as said above, by looking at the code and compiling it yourself). ( Besides, I think that, usually, the BSI people are good people. ) I'm a windows user. When you're used to gpg4win (or OpenPGP/cryptography in general), I strongly recommend you to switch from windows to a free operating system, preferably GNU/Linux. You may also have a look at the various Live CDs, e.g. [3] and [4]. You can download and burn an iso-image to a CD/DVD and then boot a complete GNU/Linux OS without making actual changes on your hard disk. [1] http://www.gpg4win.org/about.html [2] http://www.gpg4win.org/download.html, then look for source code package [3] https://tails.boum.org [4] http://www.knoppix.org/ Cheers, -- atair04 ___ Gnupg-users mailing list Gnupg-users@gnupg.org http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users
Re: GPG weakness
On 07/25/2013 12:59 PM, Manu García wrote: Hi. I'm not a member of this list, but have read an article that I'd like to share, and put into your knowledge (if you don't know it already) because I think is rather important. In said article, about security in the Cloud you can read this: «Michael Bailey, a computer security researcher at the University of Michigan, notes that the software attacked—an e-mail encryption program called GNUPrivacy guard—is known to leak information, and that the experiment wasn’t carried out inside a real commercial cloud environment.» Source: http://www.technologyreview.com/news/506976/how-to-steal-data-from-your-neighbor-in-the-cloud/ I always thought that GnuPG was rather secure, but it seems that among experts it's a well known weak and poor ciphering technology which no security experts consider seriously. At least that's the impression I get reading said article. This work doesn't question the security of encrypted messages. It's clear from context that they're running GnuPG on a VM in the cloud. Even without VM-VM leakage, that's not secure, because the host can see everything. Are devs taking some measures to make GPG really secure? We trust that they are ;) ___ Gnupg-users mailing list Gnupg-users@gnupg.org http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users
Re: GPG weakness
I believe the issue here is that if you are running inside a virtual machine, information can leak between VMs and the VM host about certain CPU flags/etc. This can lead to the ability to steal data. In general GnuPG is pretty secure and does a good job at keeping data protected even if an adversary is on the local machine... however when you are sharing cycles or have malware running on your machine, the security game is no longer yours and you are gambling. A step in the right direction would be to use a hardware token, but if you have malware running, it could interject itself into the signature flow and have the device sign its own data instead of data you provide... On Thu, Jul 25, 2013 at 8:59 AM, Manu García variosin...@gmail.com wrote: Hi. I'm not a member of this list, but have read an article that I'd like to share, and put into your knowledge (if you don't know it already) because I think is rather important. In said article, about security in the Cloud you can read this: «Michael Bailey, a computer security researcher at the University of Michigan, notes that the software attacked—an e-mail encryption program called GNUPrivacy guard—is known to leak information, and that the experiment wasn’t carried out inside a real commercial cloud environment.» Source: http://www.technologyreview.com/news/506976/how-to-steal-data-from-your-neighbor-in-the-cloud/ I always thought that GnuPG was rather secure, but it seems that among experts it's a well known weak and poor ciphering technology which no security experts consider seriously. At least that's the impression I get reading said article. Are devs taking some measures to make GPG really secure? Regards. ___ Gnupg-users mailing list Gnupg-users@gnupg.org http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users -- Thomas Harning Jr. (http://about.me/harningt) ___ Gnupg-users mailing list Gnupg-users@gnupg.org http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users
Re: Why trust gpg4win?
Hi, Reference: From: atair atai...@googlemail.com Date: Thu, 25 Jul 2013 21:17:43 + atair wrote: ... Therefore, changes that look like back doors are VERY unlikely to find their way in a release, because hundreds of people are looking how the software evolves and will reject such a patch. ... Yes, malign code would have to hide in plain view in source ( most likely evil patches wouldn't get past the view of the people commiting the `improvement' to the source repository ;-). However you missed the point that many MS users are not programmers, will not be compiling their own binaries, so any malign entity could regularly hack their nasty extras in, compile issue binaries that dont match published source (sure that would breach licence, but irrelevant to an evil doer), those without access to exactly the same set of compiler tools would not easily knowof embedded evil extra mods. The solution of course is as you urged takethe...@gmx.de , to get a free operating system such as Linux or BSD, complete with free build tools compile your own (even non programmers can do that, eg on an OS downloaded from http://www.freebsd.org just type cd /usr/ports/security/gnupg ; make install ) However for some thats too much effort, for them greater risk, their choice. Cheers, Julian -- Julian Stacey, BSD Unix Linux C Sys Eng Consultant, Munich http://berklix.com Reply below not above, like a play script. Indent old text with . Send plain text. No quoted-printable, HTML, base64, multipart/alternative. ___ Gnupg-users mailing list Gnupg-users@gnupg.org http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users
Re: GPG weakness
On 7/25/2013 8:59 AM, Manu García wrote: I'm not a member of this list, but have read an article that I'd like to share, and put into your knowledge (if you don't know it already) because I think is rather important. It is not very important, to be honest, but we still thank you for bringing it here. :) In said article, about security in the Cloud you can read this: «Michael Bailey, a computer security researcher at the University of Michigan, notes that the software attacked—an e-mail encryption program called GNUPrivacy guard—is known to leak information, and that the experiment wasn’t carried out inside a real commercial cloud environment.» The overwhelming majority of technology journalism is somewhere between wildly uninformed and complete bollocks. This article is one of them. The first rule of using GnuPG -- and this is something that the GnuPG developers strongly endorse -- is that *you must control the physical hardware GnuPG is running on*. If you don't, then there is literally no end to the malfeasance an attacker can perpetrate. If you don't have physical control over the hardware, don't run GnuPG on it! So, in light of this first rule, is it really all that surprising that GnuPG should have security problems when it's run in the cloud -- which means running it on hardware you don't physically control? Rule One exists for a reason. Violate Rule One and it becomes pretty easy to play hob with GnuPG. This article is all about some researchers who violated Rule One and discovered a new way to play hob. It's interesting research, but completely irrelevant to GnuPG users who are wise enough to obey Rule One. :) I always thought that GnuPG was rather secure, but it seems that among experts it's a well known weak and poor ciphering technology which no security experts consider seriously. Beware of all experts. An ex is a has-been, and a spurt is a drip under pressure. For what it does -- securing communications in transit -- GnuPG is a well-regarded piece of software which is widely used in some extremely demanding fields. I have personally seen it used by international telecommunications companies to secure tens of millions of dollars of transactions, for instance. At least that's the impression I get reading said article. And this is why you should beware of all tech journalism. The overwhelming majority of it is simply awful and uninformed. ___ Gnupg-users mailing list Gnupg-users@gnupg.org http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users
--batch --gen-key error with Key-Type: default
Hi list, when I try to generate a key in batch mode, I get an error whenever Key-Type and Subkey-Type is default. I'm wondering if I'm doing something wrong or if this is a bug. There is no problem when I replace the value default with a proper algorithm name (such as RSA). This is the command I'm using: $ gpg --homedir=batchtest --batch --gen-key EOF Key-Type: default Subkey-Type: default Name-Real: Joe Tester Name-Comment: with stupid passphrase Name-Email: j...@foo.bar Expire-Date: 0 Passphrase: abc %commit EOF This is the output I'm getting: gpg: -:1: invalid algorithm The problem occurs on my Debian 7.1 and Ubuntu 13.04 machines, both running gpg (GnuPG) 1.4.12 According to this manual on gnupg.org, 'default' should work as a Key-Type: http://www.gnupg.org/documentation/manuals/gnupg-devel/Unattended-GPG-key-generation.html algo may either be an OpenPGP algorithm number or a string with the algorithm name. The special value ‘default’ may be used for algo to create the default key type; in this case a ‘Key-Usage’ shall not be given and ‘default’ also be used for ‘Subkey-Type’. Am I the culprit here, or is there a bug to squash? :) -- Mikael MMN-o Nordfeldth XMPP/mail: m...@hethane.se http://blog.mmn-o.se/ signature.asc Description: OpenPGP digital signature ___ Gnupg-users mailing list Gnupg-users@gnupg.org http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users
Re: Why trust gpg4win?
On 7/25/2013 3:34 PM, takethe...@gmx.de wrote: why should I trust gpg4win? It's been years -- 25 years or more -- since I've read Victor Milan's The Cybernetic Samurai. I only remember one scene from the novel, but it's a scene of such vividness that it's been permanently burned into my brain. The short version of it is, someone who is scared, in fear for her life, and really needs a friend, asks a mercenary if she can trust him. I'm not going to answer that, he tells her. Deciding who to trust and why is on you, not me. A word of advice, sister... when you meet a guy who says you can trust him? Don't. It never ends well. Why should you trust GPG4WIN? Beats me. That's on you. All that we can do is answer questions. If you have specific questions that can be factually answered, I'd love to help you with them. But I'm not going to tell you that you should trust GPG4WIN, and I don't think you should believe anyone who tells you otherwise. ___ Gnupg-users mailing list Gnupg-users@gnupg.org http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users
Re: PEBKAC (was GPG weakness)
On 07/25/2013 12:59 PM, Manu García wrote: Hi. I'm not a member of this list, but have read an article that I'd like to share, and put into your knowledge (if you don't know it already) because I think is rather important. In said article, about security in the Cloud you can read this: «Michael Bailey, a computer security researcher at the University of Michigan, notes that the software attacked—an e-mail encryption program called GNUPrivacy guard—is known to leak information, and that the experiment wasn’t carried out inside a real commercial cloud environment.» Source: http://www.technologyreview.com/news/506976/how-to-steal-data-from-your-neighbor-in-the-cloud/ I always thought that GnuPG was rather secure, but it seems that among experts it's a well known weak and poor ciphering technology which no security experts consider seriously. At least that's the impression I get reading said article. Are devs taking some measures to make GPG really secure? PEBKAC. I went to Herr Professor's web-site and there was nothing to verify the statement. From now on do your own checking before asking these questions. http://web.eecs.umich.edu/~mibailey/ Here is what most people did with Windows: Used it out of the box as-is. Should we turn off auto-run, the infamous idea that made Stuxnet possible? No! Should we install Firefox plus Noscript? Noo! Should we stop reading POP email with email clients that render HTML and use something like Thunderbird or another email client that doesn't render HTML? Why do I want to use my dad's type of email? I use OutLook's web-mail most of the time anyway doggone it! I love those phish and make sure I click on the links that infect my Windows system! http://securemecca.com/public/NoPhishProblems.txt Let's do all of these other things wrong and when we install GnuPG, by all means we should NOT use an OpenPGP card instead of the files. After all, we want the hacker to not only get the pass-phrase with their key-logger, we want them to get the whole darn key-ring as well. We have to take pity on the poor hacker and help them. What's the fun in there not being any files except stubs on the file system saying the keys are really on the OpenPGP card? Oh no, we got hacked and instead of cleaning up the machine and making it safer ahd then just changing the pass-phrase (we used an OpenPGP card) out went our entire key-ring with our keys given a life-time of forever which now belongs to the hacker as well because we refused to use an OpenPGP card. BTW, most people now use iPhone instead. They love Apple tracking their every move and getting an ad to go to Joe's Bistro because they are listed as being near the bistro based on their iPhone giving out its geo-location information and Apple giving that information because Joe's Bistro pays them to do it and it is about lunch time anyway isn't it? Finally, I have no doubt that this will be quoted as authoritative by Wikipedia. I have news for you. In the olden days the statement made at Technology Review without corroboration is known as hear-say. Hear-say is deemed as inadmissable in a court of law. Therefore, as Judge Hobbit I deem it inadmissable in my court-room. Furthermore I could find no place where Associate Professor Michael Donald Bailey at the University of Michigan ever made such a statement. Case Closed Judge Henry Hertz Hobbit Re: Signed, sealed, and delivered signature.asc Description: OpenPGP digital signature ___ Gnupg-users mailing list Gnupg-users@gnupg.org http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users
Re: Why trust gpg4win?
Am Do 25.07.2013, 18:31:17 schrieb Robert J. Hansen: Why should you trust GPG4WIN? Beats me. That's on you. No. That is a question that can easily be answered by the public (in both directions) and already has been answered here. Not the why is up to him but the final whether is. :-) Hauke -- Crypto für alle: http://www.openpgp-schulungen.de/fuer/bekannte/ OpenPGP: 7D82 FB9F D25A 2CE4 5241 6C37 BF4B 8EEF 1A57 1DF5 signature.asc Description: This is a digitally signed message part. ___ Gnupg-users mailing list Gnupg-users@gnupg.org http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users
Re: Why trust gpg4win?
On Thu, 25 Jul 2013 21:34, takethe...@gmx.de said: why should I trust gpg4win? I have doubts since it was ordered by the Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik (BSI), which has close connections to secret services. Is gunPT any better? Finally, If you are interested in my take on this, you may want to read: http://rem.eifzilla.de/archives/2013/07/16/gpg4win-and-the-feds Salam-Shalom, Werner -- Die Gedanken sind frei. Ausnahmen regelt ein Bundesgesetz. ___ Gnupg-users mailing list Gnupg-users@gnupg.org http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users
Re: Are SHA1 sums on gnupg.org checked regularly?
On Thu, 25 Jul 2013 21:33, takethe...@gmx.de said: Which mailing lists are meant? Can't emails be tempered, too? If I've The GnuPG mailing list and all the mailing list archives. If an attacker would modify the archive on the gnupg.org server, he would also need to change the independent archives like gmane etc. I pretty sure this will be spotted relatively soon. Oh and well the attacker would also need to tell you why the signature of the mail does not anymore check out. In any case we don't rely on the checksums but on the OpenPGP signatures which are created by me using a smartcard hosted key. But see also the article I mentioned in my other reply. Shalom-Salam, Werner -- Die Gedanken sind frei. Ausnahmen regelt ein Bundesgesetz. ___ Gnupg-users mailing list Gnupg-users@gnupg.org http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users
Re: Why trust gpg4win?
On Thu, 25 Jul 2013, takethe...@gmx.de wrote: why should I trust gpg4win? I have doubts since it was ordered by the Bundesamt f?r Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik (BSI), which has close connections to secret services. Is gunPT any better? Finally, why should I trust gunpg? I'm a windows user. implicit in your question, you seem to think windows is secure against govt spying... if you run windows, then gpg4win should be the least of your security concerns. windows doesn't get infected with spyware... it *IS* spyware. MS has long been known to be in bed with govt spy agencies. *ANY* software running on windows is vulnerable to govt (and other 3rd party) spying. -- ...atom http://atom.smasher.org/ 762A 3B98 A3C3 96C9 C6B7 582A B88D 52E4 D9F5 7808 - Scrubbing floors and emptying bedpans has as much dignity as the Presidency. -- Richard Nixon ___ Gnupg-users mailing list Gnupg-users@gnupg.org http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users
Re: Why trust gpg4win?
On 07/25/2013 07:34 PM, takethe...@gmx.de wrote: Hi everybody, why should I trust gpg4win? I have doubts since it was ordered by the Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik (BSI), which has close connections to secret services. Is gunPT any better? Finally, why should I trust gunpg? I'm a windows user. That is up to you, but since GPG4WIN has both GnuPG and many bundled GUI apps and is freely available from Gnu there is nothing to prevent BSI from using it. Many human rights activists also use either GPG4WIN or the pay version of OpenPGP, PGP from Symantec. Does that have any effect on your decision? Did you mean GnuPT? Under the hood it still is just WinPT plus GnuPG so you are back at the same feeding trough. It is just that WinPT is older than the GUI tools bundled with GnuPG in GPG4WIN. A better question might be, should I trust Windows? With the 10,000 malware I have studied with only a few POC DMG files for Macintosh and the rest being almost all Windows binaries maybe not. I think what you want is GPG4WIN from http://gpg4win.org which is newer than Windows PT and works much better. Both WinPT and Kleopatra and the other programs bundled into GPG4WIN are using GnuPG at the core. WinPT is just the older GUI technology that goes with GnuPG on Windows. GPG4WIN includes newer GUI tools that should work better. HHH ___ Gnupg-users mailing list Gnupg-users@gnupg.org http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users
Re: GPG keys for multiple email accounts
This topic is not yet solved for me, sorry for the long inactivity... I tried the following approach which is inspired by the debian hints [1][2]. [1] http://keyring.debian.org/creating-key.html [2] http://wiki.debian.org/subkeys # preparing clean environment for testing $ mkdir /data/tmp/todel/gpghome-todelete $ export GNUPGHOME=/data/tmp/todel/gpghome-todelete $ gpg2 -k gpg: keyring `/data/tmp/todel/gpghome-todelete/pubring.gpg' created gpg: /data/tmp/todel/gpghome-todelete/trustdb.gpg: trustdb created $ gpg2 -K gpg: keyring `/data/tmp/todel/gpghome-todelete/secring.gpg' created # create a sign only key first, and then add another sign key and another encryption key $ gpg2 --gen-key gpg (GnuPG) 2.0.14; Copyright (C) 2009 Free Software Foundation, Inc. This is free software: you are free to change and redistribute it. There is NO WARRANTY, to the extent permitted by law. Please select what kind of key you want: (1) RSA and RSA (default) (2) DSA and Elgamal (3) DSA (sign only) (4) RSA (sign only) Your selection? 3 DSA keys may be between 1024 and 3072 bits long. What keysize do you want? (2048) 3072 Requested keysize is 3072 bits Please specify how long the key should be valid. 0 = key does not expire n = key expires in n days nw = key expires in n weeks nm = key expires in n months ny = key expires in n years Key is valid for? (0) 2y Key expires at 2015-07-26T01:51:16 CEST Is this correct? (y/N) y GnuPG needs to construct a user ID to identify your key. Real name: Test Key Email address: Comment: You selected this USER-ID: Test Key Change (N)ame, (C)omment, (E)mail or (O)kay/(Q)uit? O You need a Passphrase to protect your secret key. gpg: problem with the agent: Not implemented // * what does/should this tell me? * // We need to generate a lot of random bytes. It is a good idea to perform some other action (type on the keyboard, move the mouse, utilize the disks) during the prime generation; this gives the random number generator a better chance to gain enough entropy. gpg: WARNING: some OpenPGP programs can't handle a DSA key with this digest size gpg: key CDFD0D80 marked as ultimately trusted public and secret key created and signed. gpg: checking the trustdb gpg: 3 marginal(s) needed, 1 complete(s) needed, PGP trust model gpg: depth: 0 valid: 1 signed: 0 trust: 0-, 0q, 0n, 0m, 0f, 1u gpg: next trustdb check due at 2015-07-25 pub 3072D/CDFD0D80 2013-07-25 [expires: 2015-07-25] Key fingerprint = 6FF6 3569 1EEC F4D7 6D33 5B4F 8F37 FCE1 CDFD 0D80 uid Test Key Note that this key cannot be used for encryption. You may want to use the command --edit-key to generate a subkey for this purpose. $ gpg2 --edit-key CDFD0D80 gpg (GnuPG) 2.0.14; Copyright (C) 2009 Free Software Foundation, Inc. This is free software: you are free to change and redistribute it. There is NO WARRANTY, to the extent permitted by law. Secret key is available. pub 3072D/CDFD0D80 created: 2013-07-25 expires: 2015-07-25 usage: SC trust: ultimate validity: ultimate [ultimate] (1). Test Key Command addkey Key is protected. You need a passphrase to unlock the secret key for user: Test Key 3072-bit DSA key, ID CDFD0D80, created 2013-07-25 Please select what kind of key you want: (3) DSA (sign only) (4) RSA (sign only) (5) Elgamal (encrypt only) (6) RSA (encrypt only) Your selection? 5 ELG keys may be between 1024 and 4096 bits long. What keysize do you want? (2048) 4096 Requested keysize is 4096 bits Please specify how long the key should be valid. 0 = key does not expire n = key expires in n days nw = key expires in n weeks nm = key expires in n months ny = key expires in n years Key is valid for? (0) 2w Key expires at 2013-08-09T01:54:07 CEST Is this correct? (y/N) y Really create? (y/N) y gpg: problem with the agent: Not implemented We need to generate a lot of random bytes. It is a good idea to perform some other action (type on the keyboard, move the mouse, utilize the disks) during the prime generation; this gives the random number generator a better chance to gain enough entropy. pub 3072D/CDFD0D80 created: 2013-07-25 expires: 2015-07-25 usage: SC trust: ultimate validity: ultimate sub 4096g/52C7F578 created: 2013-07-25 expires: 2013-08-08 usage: E [ultimate] (1). Test Key Command addkey Key is protected. You need a passphrase to unlock the secret key for user: Test Key 3072-bit DSA key, ID CDFD0D80, created 2013-07-25 Please select what kind of key you want: (3) DSA (sign only) (4) RSA (sign only) (5) Elgamal (encrypt only) (6) RSA (encrypt only) Your selection? 3 DSA keys may be between 1024 and 3072 bits long. What keysize do you want? (2048) 3072 Requested keysize is 3072 bits Please specify how long the key should be valid. 0 = key does not expire n = key expires in n days nw = key expires
Clearsign text document with multiple keys?
Hi, can a plain text document be clear signed by multiple keys at the same time? (Hold by different people.) One can create a plain text file a, clear sign it and get a.asc. Another one can clear sign a.asc and get a.asc.asc. One who wants to verify it, can first verify the signature of the second one, then the signature of the first one. Its a bit cumbersome. Is it possible to verify the document in one run and get a list of signers? Cheers, adrelanos ___ Gnupg-users mailing list Gnupg-users@gnupg.org http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users
Re: Why trust gpg4win?
On 7/25/2013 3:34 PM, takethe...@gmx.de wrote: why should I trust gpg4win? I have doubts since it was ordered by the Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik (BSI), which has close connections to secret services. Is gunPT any better? Finally, why should I trust gunpg? I'm a windows user. Some thoughts -- First, if you're concerned about the involvement of government intelligence agencies then you're on the wrong mailing list. They're already here, and for the most part they're quite helpful individuals. Consider In-Q-Tel. In-Q-Tel is a nonprofit venture capital firm that invests in technology companies for the purpose of keeping the United States intelligence community ahead of the curve. If there's going to be some big sweeping change rocking through the tech world in the next few years, it's In-Q-Tel's job to know about it, potentially to invest in it, and to keep the U.S. intelligence community abreast of it. (In-Q-Tel is *not* a government agency: it just has deep ties to the intelligence community.) Now, if you were to go over a list of In-Q-Tel personnel, you'd find that a very senior person within In-Q-Tel has posted to this list in recent memory, reads this list regularly, and when he speaks generally gives very good advice. (I'm not publicizing this person's name because I don't want him to get deluged in mail. However, he is public about his association with In-Q-Tel, so I don't feel there's a problem with saying this person exists.) Should we shun this person from the community? Would telling this person hit the road, Jack, we don't want you around here any more make any of us safer? Or would we instead lose the contributions of someone who has a unique and useful perspective, and who has always given sage counsel? John W. Moore, who hasn't been seen on these lists in a long time, was always quite open about his past as a United States Marine and his time spent working for the NSA while in uniform. John was always patient and helpful with newbies. He was an important part of Enigmail. Should we stop using Enigmail because John W. Moore once worked for Fort Meade? I live in the Washington D.C. metro area and attend a handful of computer forensics conferences around here. A couple of years ago I wound up sitting in an auditorium at the NSA, because they were willing to host one of the conferences. Should I be shunned because I've been inside an NSA auditorium? When I was in graduate school and working in electronic voting, my advisor and I wound up having a couple of conversations with CIA personnel who wanted our opinions on the trustworthiness of foreign elections -- can the results from this country be trusted? sort of thing. Should I be shunned because I've briefed a couple of people about the electoral conditions in remote, far-off places? My father is a federal judge: does that make me any more suspect? One of my friends is an FBI agent: maybe that ought disqualify me? ... It is completely natural to have concerns about the trustworthiness of GnuPG and to wonder whether it has ties to the BSI and/or BND. But I respectfully suggest that if you're going to worry about that, you should first worry about the GnuPG community as a whole. Within this community there exist an awful lot of people who have ties to the government, to law-enforcement, to intelligence agencies, and more. But that doesn't mean we're the bad guys, and it doesn't mean the community is endangered because we're present. I believe it's quite the opposite. The In-Q-Tel executive has an incredible perspective on developing technologies, and we all benefit from that. John Moore's firsthand knowledge of history was very useful to us. For me, growing up around government and law-enforcement taught me a lot about how they think and see the world, and I can impart some of that. The moral of the story, I think, is that you shouldn't be worried about the BSI or the BND. Worry about people instead. Ask yourself this question: do you really believe Werner would deliberately compromise GnuPG in order to satisfy a demand from the BND? If your answer is yes, then you probably shouldn't use GnuPG at all. If your answer is no, then it doesn't matter if Werner is working for the BND himself. (He's not, by the way.) If you don't believe Werner would do that to you, then there's no problem. In the end, it's all a question of trust... and that means it's something that *only you* can answer. ___ Gnupg-users mailing list Gnupg-users@gnupg.org http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users
