Re: Progress report......
on re-reading this, I think John and I are saying the same thing. I missed that in my earlier read. Serves me for replying too early in the morning :-( --On torsdag, januar 27, 2005 09:07:11 +0100 Harald Tveit Alvestrand [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: John, just one comment: --On 26. januar 2005 10:55 -0500 John C Klensin [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: However, if the terms and conditions of the current relationship with Foretec were acceptable to us long-term, we would not have initiated the Admin Reorganization process, which you, as participants in the community, presumably know perfectly well I believe (and have told Bob Kahn that too) that if the Foretec stuff had been working perfectly, we would STILL do the reorganization. In fact, I believe that if it had been a fully functional working relationship with nobody seeing an advantage to the current undefined state of relationships, the reorganization would have happened long before I took on the job as IETF chair. As you known, having been part of the effort to take steps in the same direction Harald ___ Ietf mailing list Ietf@ietf.org https://www1.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/ietf ___ Ietf mailing list Ietf@ietf.org https://www1.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/ietf
Re: Progress report......
--On Thursday, 27 January, 2005 09:07 +0100 Harald Tveit Alvestrand [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: John, just one comment: --On 26. januar 2005 10:55 -0500 John C Klensin [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: However, if the terms and conditions of the current relationship with Foretec were acceptable to us long-term, we would not have initiated the Admin Reorganization process, which you, as participants in the community, presumably know perfectly well I believe (and have told Bob Kahn that too) that if the Foretec stuff had been working perfectly, we would STILL do the reorganization. In fact, I believe that if it had been a fully functional working relationship with nobody seeing an advantage to the current undefined state of relationships, the reorganization would have happened long before I took on the job as IETF chair. As you known, having been part of the effort to take steps in the same direction Well, not exactly. Yes, I have believed for many years that it would serve the IETF well to have a mutually-acceptable written agreement with CNRI (or Foretec) that clarified a number of issues about secretariat management, finances, the authority locus of a number of decisions, and the questions associated with IPR. If such an agreement had been concluded six or eight years ago, and worked well, I think we would still have eventually evolved toward some sort of administrative reorganization, if only to consolidate the income and expenditure streams so that they could be looked at as a complete picture. But this particular reorg process has been characterized by a crisis mentality and a sense of got to get it done quickly even if it means pushing our procedural boundaries really hard urgency. That would probably not have been necessary in the presence of a smoothly-functioning secretariat working under a clear and mutually acceptable agreement about responsibilities and authority. That sense of urgency and the associated short deadlines have consumed a good deal of community energy that, IMO, would have been better spent on production of high-quality standards. In general, neither crisis mentalities nor procedural shortcuts lead to carefully thought out and well-reasoned results (I think this process has done amazingly well despite that impediment). Conversely, I wish we were able to focus the same level of attention and expedited handling on WG-based standards and other documents. regards, john ___ Ietf mailing list Ietf@ietf.org https://www1.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/ietf
Re: Progress report......
--On Thursday, 27 January, 2005 10:51 +0100 Harald Tveit Alvestrand [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: on re-reading this, I think John and I are saying the same thing. I missed that in my earlier read. Serves me for replying too early in the morning :-( Even earlier in the morning here :-( But, yes, I think we are largely in agreement, inevitable small differences in perspective notwithstanding. john ___ Ietf mailing list Ietf@ietf.org https://www1.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/ietf
Re: Progress report......
--On 27. januar 2005 04:57 -0500 John C Klensin [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: But this particular reorg process has been characterized by a crisis mentality and a sense of got to get it done quickly even if it means pushing our procedural boundaries really hard urgency. That would probably not have been necessary in the presence of a smoothly-functioning secretariat working under a clear and mutually acceptable agreement about responsibilities and authority. I agree. That sense of urgency and the associated short deadlines have consumed a good deal of community energy that, IMO, would have been better spent on production of high-quality standards. In general, neither crisis mentalities nor procedural shortcuts lead to carefully thought out and well-reasoned results (I think this process has done amazingly well despite that impediment). Another reason for pushing for a finish has been the realization that this group, like all IETF groups, IS capable of discussing issues forever, and that we cannot get our energy back until we finish this one. Conversely, I wish we were able to focus the same level of attention and expedited handling on WG-based standards and other documents. Yes, and I believe that to some degree, we are. I am quite happy that the IESG has been able to keep its nose to the grindstone and push out almost one document approval per day over the same period as this discussion has been going on.. (15 document approvals and 25 protocol actions since December 6, according to my ietf-announce logs - including the resolution of a few thorny issues of long standing). But it will be good to get it over with. Harald ___ Ietf mailing list Ietf@ietf.org https://www1.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/ietf
Re: IAOC Responsibilities - updated
Bob, thank you for your note! Some comments to some particular points in your message: It was recently pointed out that issues concerning confidentiality of information may not have been adequately addressed; patent submissions may also place additional constraints and restrictions on what individuals or organizations may do with certain information or material for IETF purposes. Indeed, this is but one aspect of a much larger topic that has not been discussed in any real depth. There are other important issues that merit attention in this context, insurance, clear indication of who has signature authority and for what actions, ownership of copyright claims in IETF documentation -- to name a few. The issues of copyrights and patents as they relate to Internet standards are the purview of the IPR working group. Issues have been raised recently that the IETF currently does not get enough rights from authors of Internet standards to give permissions it needs to others - this is a topic of some complexity, and I invite anyone who wants to discuss it to go to the IPR WG's mailing list. The IETF has traditionally largely refused to deal with confidential information as part of its standards process. Although CNRI has been responsible for all aspects of the IETF Secretariat for over sixteen years, and, prior to 1998, provided technical leadership to the IETF as well, since then the provision of IETF Secretariat services has been carried out by Foretec Seminars, Inc. under contract to CNRI. CNRI continues to provide the IETF Secretariat function, and maintains the oversight of the IETF Secretariat services provided by Foretec. These CNRI activities are the province of many of the topics discussed in connection with the IASA activity and the IAOC in particular. One of the aspects of this oversight activity is quality control of not only the services provided in support of the IETF, but policies and procedures to govern the contribution and use of information or material that may be subject to patents, copyright or other rights or interests (“intellectual property”). I believe that the IETF has set its own procedures for this. See RFC 3667, RFC 3668. I do not know that we have ever had an IPR issue raised that related to documents outside those used in the standards process. Among the issues to consider is (if CNRI does not provide the IETF Secretariat function) who will be responsible for administration and quality control over the use of trademarks, and how will that responsibility be carried out; who will be responsible for managing confidential and/or proprietary information or materials developed for or contributed to the IETF and its other constituent bodies such as the IETF Secretariat; and how can intellectual property rights or interests in such information or material best be transferred to other parties in the event a transition is required. It would be desirable to start a discussion on these topics prior to concluding on the BCP, recognizing that all the long-term issues will undoubtedly not be resolved up front. The current relevant text in the draft BCP (-05) is: The IASA is responsible for undertaking any and all required actions that involve trademarks on behalf of the IETF. As you say, it's unlikely that all the long-term issues will be resolved up front CNRI has made the IETF leadership aware of the fact that CNRI may have substantial objections to certain of the proposed roles for ISOC going forward. While none of the issues raised to date appear to be such that they cannot be resolved by the parties, subject to the adoption of appropriate resolutions by both the CNRI Board of Directors and the ISOC Board of Directors, to date, the discussions leading to any resolution of this matter have not taken place. The time is ripe to deal with these issues and not to put this discussion off to some future time. Absent any other arrangement, CNRI intends to continue to hold the IETF-related assets, including intellectual property rights or interests therein, that have been developed over many years; however, we are willing to consider transferring these assets in a trust arrangement for use by the IETF in the future, subject to oversight by IAOC acting as trustees for the IETF in the public interest. I am not certain how such an arrangement would hang together. The IAOC as constituted is not a separate legal entity, but an oversight body for the IASA function. I believe that the IASA could do most, if not all, of the functions you outline below, without any modification to the current (-05) version of the BCP draft. Specifically, in order to enable the IAOC to assume such trust responsibility, it is important to add this task to the list of IAOC responsibilities in the draft IASA (proposed BCP 04), section 3.2 as follows: Proposed Additional IAOC Responsibilities: * Serve as Trustees for IETF-related patent, copyright, trademark and other rights or interests in IETF assets,
Sole source contracts and the BCP
John, forgive me for pulling a reset here - but I've become sufficiently lost in the various threads on the progress report heading that I'm no longer certain which questions you've raised, which have been answered, which have been overtaken by events, and which are no longer relevant. So let me start over. To my mind, there are 2 basic questions to raise: - Does the BCP as written give the IAD the power to receive an unsolicited offer for a service that might otherwise have been put out for bid, consider it, consult on it, decide that it is the best thing for the IETF, propose to ISOC and the IAOC that this is a good thing for the IETF and is financially responsible, and, after getting approval from them, sign the deal? I believe the answer is yes - the business of the IASA is the IAD's to administer. If we (as represented by the IAOC) don't like it, we chastise him/her or fire him/her. And I believe that has been true at least since version -00 (I did not check the scenario O text). As a subsidiary question: Should the BCP give the IAD that power? Here too, I believe the answer is yes - you've written some great pieces on why the IAD needs considerable autonomy on how to do business in the past. And the other basic question: - Is the deal that Neustar has said that they are considering offering the best thing for the IETF? I believe the answer here is we don't know, but it might be - and you may consider the message from Leslie and the subsequent discussion to be a part of the transition team attempting to get a head start on the consultation that the IAD will have to do in order to decide that issue. I'm sure that there are all sorts of ramifications and implications of both those two questions - but do you agree that these are the 2 core questions on the thread, and that they are different? Harald ___ Ietf mailing list Ietf@ietf.org https://www1.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/ietf
Call for consensus(minus): draft-ietf-iasa-bcp-05
Folks, the latest draft - draft-ietf-iasa-bcp-05 - was published yesterday. The editors believe that we now have text known to be acceptable to the IETF consensus on all issues raised except the issue of appeals, where we are still searching for a proper understanding and consensus. I would like to verify this with the community, by asking the question is this document OK somewhat differently from before. I *know* that there are always things that could be phrased better, safeguards that can be lowered or raised, concerns that could be addressed either in this document or in others. But - in the interest of eventually stabilizing the document, I'll ask it this way: Are there issues in the document now, apart from the appeals question, that cause you to believe that this document should not be approved as-is as IETF consensus?In other words: Are there show-stopper issues in -05? I will ask the same question (separately) of the ISOC BoT, the IESG and the IAB. If no show-stopper issues emerge, and we achieve a consensus on appeals, I will send out a (brief) request for minor issues you have identified such as spelling errors, get those incorporated in an -06, and ask for formal approval of that in all relevant bodies. If show-stopper issues emerge, and it's clear to the IETF that they are show-stoppers. the show stops. Of course. Harald ___ Ietf mailing list Ietf@ietf.org https://www1.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/ietf
Re: Mud. Clear as. Re: Rough consensus? #425 3.5
Hi Eric, At 5:40 PM -0800 1/26/05, Eric Rescorla wrote: With that in mind, I would like to suggest the following principles: 1. The IETF community should have input on the internal rules set by the IASA and the IASA should be required to respond to comments by the community on said rules. 2. While the IASA's behavior should be constrained by BCPs (as it will be constrained by the first one) we should in general refrain from enacting specific internal IASA rules changes by BCP. If it is believed that the IAOC is making bad decisions we have a mechanism for unseating them. 3. Decisions of the IAOC should be appealable (following the usual 2026 appeal chain) on the sole grounds that the IASA's processes were not followed. Those decisions should NOT be appealable on the grounds that the decisions were simply bad ones. I think that something along these lines could meet all of my principles. BTW, I don't feel that I have any special right to set the principles for this mechanism, so folks should feel free to add new ones or argue with the ones I put forward... Your proposal certainly meets the following ones: (2) It is well-enough specified (here and in RFC 2026) that person who is not a (past or present) member of the I* could use it. (4) Any member of the community can make a review request (or appeal) and get a response. (5) There is at least one level of escalation possible. (In fact, there are three.) Your criteria are different than mine, and therefore there may be some disagreement on: (3) Review requests should be limited to situations where the IAOC violates written procedures (their own or a BCP) and/or makes a decisions that is against the best interests of the IETF. You only want to allow appeals based on the fact that a published rule was not followed, and I would like to allow appeals based on both of the above criteria. I don't know how close or how far we are on this... My idea is that the IAOC should not be able to make decisions that are damaging to the IETF without any community recourse, just because there is no written rule that prevents it. If we are going to use the full appeals chain (which I totally support), I would like to see appeals based on the best interests of the IETF constrained to being escalated to the IESG and IAB (since they are chosen by the IETF) and only allow process-based appeals to be escalated to the ISOC BoT -- much as we do today for technical vs. process appeals of WG decisions. I do not think that it is the ISOC BoT's place to be the ultimate arbiter what is in the best interests of the IETF. We also seem to have some disagreement on: (1) A review request cannot overturn a signed contract or hiring decision. And (6) The IAB, IESG and ISOC BoT (in hearing an appeal) cannot overturn a decision of the IAOC, only advise the IAOC that they believe that an incorrect decision was made. I feel quite strongly about principle (1), as I don't know how the IAOC could negotiate and administer contracts if they might, at any time, be overturned by someone else. And, I don't even know what it would mean to overturn a signed contract, since it would then be outside the control of IASA to change it. I do think that the IAOC's contract negotiation rules should include a period of public comment on major decisions before they sign binding contracts or MOUs, but that is a subject for future IAOC operating procedures, not for this document, I guess. I am actually not strongly in favor of principle (6) myself. I think that the IAB, IESG and ISOC BoT could be trusted to decide whether overturning a particular (non-binding) decision is appropriate in a particular situation. But, others seemed to feel strongly that allowing anyone else to overturn any decision of the IAOC would be very bad. I can't say that I fully understand why. Please note that principle (6) does allow the IAOC to overturn an IAD or IAOC decision based on a review request/appeal. It also allows the IAOC to overturn a decision based on advice from the IAB, IESG or ISOC BoT that it would be best to do so. So, I am comfortable with this one either way. Do you have a strong opinion on this one way or the other? Margaret ___ Ietf mailing list Ietf@ietf.org https://www1.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/ietf
Re: Mud. Clear as. Re: Rough consensus? #425 3.5
I am actually not strongly in favor of principle (6) myself. I think that the IAB, IESG and ISOC BoT could be trusted to decide whether overturning a particular (non-binding) decision is appropriate in a particular situation. But, others seemed to feel strongly that allowing anyone else to overturn any decision of the IAOC would be very bad. I can't say that I fully understand why. Hi, Margaret, There are probably a variety of reasons why people might have this view, but mine are: - if we have people on IAB/IESG who are better at making IAOC decisions than the IAOC is, we have the wrong people on the IAOC (or perhaps the wrong people on IAB/IESG, but that's another story), and - some decisions are always bad (let's start a land war in Asia), but most bad decisions are more obviously bad when looking back, so we're usually talking about second-guessing based on hindsight. So it's not that I don't trust the IAB/IESG to decide whether overturning a decision is appropriate in a particular situation, it's that I don't like what that says about our structure and processes. Saying, you guys didn't think about X when you made this decision, and you should think about it the next time this decision matters is fine with me. Spencer ___ Ietf mailing list Ietf@ietf.org https://www1.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/ietf
Re: Mud. Clear as. Re: Rough consensus? #425 3.5
Margaret Wasserman [EMAIL PROTECTED] writes: At 5:40 PM -0800 1/26/05, Eric Rescorla wrote: With that in mind, I would like to suggest the following principles: 1. The IETF community should have input on the internal rules set by the IASA and the IASA should be required to respond to comments by the community on said rules. 2. While the IASA's behavior should be constrained by BCPs (as it will be constrained by the first one) we should in general refrain from enacting specific internal IASA rules changes by BCP. If it is believed that the IAOC is making bad decisions we have a mechanism for unseating them. 3. Decisions of the IAOC should be appealable (following the usual 2026 appeal chain) on the sole grounds that the IASA's processes were not followed. Those decisions should NOT be appealable on the grounds that the decisions were simply bad ones. I think that something along these lines could meet all of my principles. BTW, I don't feel that I have any special right to set the principles for this mechanism, so folks should feel free to add new ones or argue with the ones I put forward... Your proposal certainly meets the following ones: (2) It is well-enough specified (here and in RFC 2026) that person who is not a (past or present) member of the I* could use it. (4) Any member of the community can make a review request (or appeal) and get a response. (5) There is at least one level of escalation possible. (In fact, there are three.) Your criteria are different than mine, and therefore there may be some disagreement on: (3) Review requests should be limited to situations where the IAOC violates written procedures (their own or a BCP) and/or makes a decisions that is against the best interests of the IETF. You only want to allow appeals based on the fact that a published rule was not followed, and I would like to allow appeals based on both of the above criteria. I don't know how close or how far we are on this... My idea is that the IAOC should not be able to make decisions that are damaging to the IETF without any community recourse, just because there is no written rule that prevents it. The problem is that best interests of the IETF is a completely amorophous standard (In my view, chocolate helps people think better so we need chocolate chip cookies in order to produce better standards), so I don't seee how this rules out any appeals at all. We also seem to have some disagreement on: (1) A review request cannot overturn a signed contract or hiring decision. And (6) The IAB, IESG and ISOC BoT (in hearing an appeal) cannot overturn a decision of the IAOC, only advise the IAOC that they believe that an incorrect decision was made. I feel quite strongly about principle (1), as I don't know how the IAOC could negotiate and administer contracts if they might, at any time, be overturned by someone else. And, I don't even know what it would mean to overturn a signed contract, since it would then be outside the control of IASA to change it. Yes, I think this is absolutely correct. I am actually not strongly in favor of principle (6) myself. I think that the IAB, IESG and ISOC BoT could be trusted to decide whether overturning a particular (non-binding) decision is appropriate in a particular situation. But, others seemed to feel strongly that allowing anyone else to overturn any decision of the IAOC would be very bad. I can't say that I fully understand why. Please note that principle (6) does allow the IAOC to overturn an IAD or IAOC decision based on a review request/appeal. It also allows the IAOC to overturn a decision based on advice from the IAB, IESG or ISOC BoT that it would be best to do so. So, I am comfortable with this one either way. Do you have a strong opinion on this one way or the other? I could live either way, but my original thought was that in the case of allegations that the IAOC had not followed its internal rules, the IESG and IAB could overturn its decisions. Certainly, they can impose new rules on it through the RFC process -Ekr ___ Ietf mailing list Ietf@ietf.org https://www1.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/ietf
Re: Call for consensus(minus): draft-ietf-iasa-bcp-05
No show stoppers. Personally, I also think the text in 3.5 and 3.6 provides enough checks and balances to get IASA started, and we should defer the review/appeal debate until later. I consider it more urgent to have the BCP approved as a stake in the ground than to make it perfect. Brian Harald Tveit Alvestrand wrote: Folks, the latest draft - draft-ietf-iasa-bcp-05 - was published yesterday. The editors believe that we now have text known to be acceptable to the IETF consensus on all issues raised except the issue of appeals, where we are still searching for a proper understanding and consensus. I would like to verify this with the community, by asking the question is this document OK somewhat differently from before. I *know* that there are always things that could be phrased better, safeguards that can be lowered or raised, concerns that could be addressed either in this document or in others. But - in the interest of eventually stabilizing the document, I'll ask it this way: Are there issues in the document now, apart from the appeals question, that cause you to believe that this document should not be approved as-is as IETF consensus?In other words: Are there show-stopper issues in -05? I will ask the same question (separately) of the ISOC BoT, the IESG and the IAB. If no show-stopper issues emerge, and we achieve a consensus on appeals, I will send out a (brief) request for minor issues you have identified such as spelling errors, get those incorporated in an -06, and ask for formal approval of that in all relevant bodies. If show-stopper issues emerge, and it's clear to the IETF that they are show-stoppers. the show stops. Of course. Harald ___ Ietf mailing list Ietf@ietf.org https://www1.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/ietf ___ Ietf mailing list Ietf@ietf.org https://www1.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/ietf
Re: Mud. Clear as. Re: Rough consensus? #425 3.5
Hi Eric, The problem is that best interests of the IETF is a completely amorophous standard (In my view, chocolate helps people think better so we need chocolate chip cookies in order to produce better standards), so I don't seee how this rules out any appeals at all. This is a good point, and I could live with your formulation. Most of the important ways that the IAOC could violate the best interests of the IETF are (and should continue to be) captured in the written rules anyway. For instance, any reasonable example I can think of at the moment is covered by one of more of the IASA BCP principles. I feel quite strongly about principle (1), as I don't know how the IAOC could negotiate and administer contracts if they might, at any time, be overturned by someone else. And, I don't even know what it would mean to overturn a signed contract, since it would then be outside the control of IASA to change it. Yes, I think this is absolutely correct. Good. I think everyone is in agreement about this. Do you have a strong opinion on this one way or the other? I could live either way, but my original thought was that in the case of allegations that the IAOC had not followed its internal rules, the IESG and IAB could overturn its decisions. Certainly, they can impose new rules on it through the RFC process Okay, so we both could go either way on this... So, here is an attempt at some text that captures our current agreement. I'm not trying to slip anything in here, so let me know if I seem to be getting it wrong: Remove the current sections 3.5 and 3.6 and replace them with a new section 3.5: 3.5 Review and Appeal of IAD and IAOC Decision The IAOC is directly accountable to the IETF community for the performance of the IASA. In order to achieve this, the IAOC and IAD will ensure that guidelines are developed for regular operational decision making. Where appropriate, these guidelines should be developed with public input. In all cases, they must be made public. Additionally, the IASA should ensure there are reported objective performance metrics for all IETF administrative support activities. In the case where someone questions that a decision or action of the IAD or the IAOC has been undertaken in accordance with IETF BCPs or IASA operational guidelines (including the creation and maintenance of an appropriate set of operational guidelines), he or she may ask the IAOC for a formal review of the decision or action. The request for review is addressed to the IAOC chair and should include a description of the decision or action to be reviewed, an explanation of how the decision or action violates the BCPs or operational guidelines, and a suggestion for how the situation could be rectified. All requests for review will be publicly posted, and the IAOC is expected to respond to these requests within a reasonable period, typically within 90 days. It is up to the IAOC to determine what type of review and response is required, based on the nature of the review request. Based on the results of the review, the IAOC may choose to overturn their own decision and/or to change their operational guidelines to prevent further misunderstandings. If a member of the community is not satisfied with the IAOC's response to his or her review request, he or she may escalate the issue by appealing the decision or action to the IESG, using the appeals procedures outlined in RFC 2026 [RFC2026]. If he or she is not satisfied with the IESG response, he or she can escalate the issue to the IAB and on the ISOC Board of Trustees, as described in RFC 2026. The IESG, IAB or ISOC BoT will review the decision of the IAD or IAOC to determine whether it was made in accordance with existing BCPs and operational guidelines. As a result of this review, the IESG, IAB or ISOC BoT may decide to initiate changes to the BCPs governing IAOC actions. They may also advise the IAOC to modify existing operational guidelines to avoid similar issues in the future and/or may advise the IAOC to re-consider their decision or action. In exceptional cases, when no other recourse seems reasonable, the IESG, IAB or ISOC BoT may overturn or reverse a non-binding decision or action of the IAOC. This should be done after careful consideration and consultation with the IAOC regarding the ramifications of this action. In no circumstances may the IESG or IAB overturn a decision of the IAOC that involves a binding contract or overturn a personnel-related action (such as hiring, firing, promotion, demotion, performance reviews, salary adjustments, etc.). [The last paragraph is likely to be the most controversial, as I am not sure that we have consensus that the IAB or IESG should be able to overturn or reverse a decision or action of the IAOC at all.] ___
Re: Legal review results 1: Intellectual property (fwd)
This didn't seem to make it -- Forwarded message -- Date: Wed, 26 Jan 2005 15:51:43 -0500 (EST) From: Dean Anderson [EMAIL PROTECTED] To: Contreras, Jorge [EMAIL PROTECTED] Cc: ietf@ietf.org, Harald Tveit Alvestrand [EMAIL PROTECTED] Subject: Re: Legal review results 1: Intellectual property (fwd) Did you get a look at this below? It seems to have been lost in the noise, so I'll repost. The notion of giving source code but retaining patent rights is not entirely academic. Novell asserted (for a while anyway) that it never transfered patents covering Unix to SCO. Some people/companies are certainly interested in selling/transferring copyright and patent rights separately, as well as trademarks (e.g. the Unix trademark now owned by The Open Group) The IETF needs to get everything necessary to use the software and/or data, and everything necessary to give the software/data to someone else to use. --Dean -- Forwarded message -- Date: Mon, 24 Jan 2005 00:09:57 -0500 (EST) From: Dean Anderson [EMAIL PROTECTED] To: Harald Tveit Alvestrand [EMAIL PROTECTED] Cc: ietf@ietf.org Subject: Re: Legal review results 1: Intellectual property One problem: One can have full control over the software source code copyright but not over the patents that cover use of the software. If you don't have a patent license, you can't use patented software. The text should be modified to include specifications that one is given control over the applicable copyrights, patents, and trademarks as necessary for use by the general public. As someone pointed out, open source software should meet the definition. Open patents should also meet this definition. Aside: This is an example of why you should avoid the term intellectual property. There is really no such thing as intellectual property. Instead there are patents, copyrights, and trademarks. Each of these are unique. Thinking of a single concept of intellectual property leads one to miss the differences between them. patents, copyrights, trademarks is just a few more letters to type, and leads to much greater clarity. intellectual property is a term, like partial-birth abortion that was made up by one side to advance its views. Neither are technical terms. Both are misleading. --Dean On Fri, 21 Jan 2005, Harald Tveit Alvestrand wrote: In this and a few later messages, I'm relaying comments from Jorge Contreras, the IETF's pro bono legal counsel. 1. Intellectual Property. I think I understand the reason for including an explicit requirement that IP created in support of IETF activities be usable by IETF on a perpetual basis. The way this concept is expressed, however, should probably be adjusted slightly to reflect the way IP rights are actually conveyed and licensed. Old Text (Sec. 3.1, paragraphs 5-6) The IAD is responsible for ensuring that all contracts give IASA and the IETF the perpetual right to use, display, distribute, reproduce, modify and create derivatives of all data created in support of IETF activities. This is necessary to make sure the IETF has access to the data it needs at all times, and to ensure that the IASA can change contractors as needed without disrupting IETF work. Whenever reasonable, if software is developed under an IASA contract it should should remain usable by the IETF beyond the terms of the contract. Some ways of achieving this are by IASA ownership or an open source license; an open source license is preferable. The IAD shall decide how best to serve the IETF's interests when making such contracts. Suggested new text (Sec. 3.1, paragraphs 5-6) (A) If a contract entered into by ISOC on behalf of IASA and/or the IETF (an IASA Contract) provides for the creation, development, modification or storage of any data (including, without limitation, any data relating to IETF membership, documents, archives, mailing lists, correspondence, financial records, personnel records and the like) (Data), then the IAD shall ensure that such contract grants to ISOC the perpetual, irrevocable right, on behalf of IASA and IETF, to use, display, distribute, reproduce, modify and create derivatives of such Data. ISOC will permit IASA and its designee(s) to have sole control and custodianship of such Data, and ISOC will not utilize or access such Data in connection with any ISOC function other than IETF without the written consent of the IAD. (B) If an IASA Contract provides for the creation, development or modification of any software (including, without limitation, any search tools, indexing tools and the like) (Developed Software) then the IAD shall, whenever reasonable and practical, ensure that such contract either (a) grants ownership of such Developed Software to ISOC, or (b) grants ISOC a perpetual, irrevocable
Re: Mud. Clear as. Re: Rough consensus? #425 3.5
I like this formulation. A couple of suggested tweaks, inline: Margaret Wasserman wrote: Remove the current sections 3.5 and 3.6 and replace them with a new section 3.5: 3.5 Review and Appeal of IAD and IAOC Decision The IAOC is directly accountable to the IETF community for the performance of the IASA. In order to achieve this, the IAOC and IAD will ensure that guidelines are developed for regular operational decision making. Where appropriate, these guidelines should be developed with public input. In all cases, they must be made public. Additionally, the IASA should ensure there are reported objective performance metrics for all IETF administrative support activities. In the case where someone questions that a decision or action of the IAD or the IAOC has been undertaken in accordance with IETF BCPs or IASA operational guidelines (including the creation and maintenance of an appropriate set of operational guidelines), he or she may ask the IAOC for a formal review of the decision or action. The request for review is addressed to the IAOC chair and should include a description of the decision or action to be reviewed, an explanation of how the decision or action violates the BCPs or operational guidelines, and a suggestion for how the situation could be rectified. All requests for review will be publicly posted, and the IAOC is expected to respond to these requests within a reasonable period, typically within 90 days. It is up to the IAOC to determine what type of review and response is required, based on the nature of the review request. Based on the results of the review, the IAOC may choose to overturn their own decision and/or to change their operational guidelines to prevent further misunderstandings. If a member of the community is not satisfied with the IAOC's response to his or her review request, he or she may escalate the issue by appealing the decision or action to the IESG, using the appeals procedures outlined in RFC 2026 [RFC2026]. If he or she is not satisfied with the IESG response, he or she can escalate the issue to the IAB and on the ISOC Board of Trustees, as described in RFC 2026. The IESG, IAB or ISOC BoT will review the decision of the IAD or IAOC I'm stumbling over the IESG, IAB or ISOC BoT. I understand you're saying whichever it is at this level of the appeal, but it comes off sounding a bit like whoever gets around to replying. Perhaps it could be rewritten as: The reviewing body (IESG, IAB or ISOC BoT, as appropriate) will ... and then subsequent instances of IESG, IAB... would be replaced with the reviewing body? to determine whether it was made in accordance with existing BCPs and operational guidelines. As a result of this review, the IESG, IAB or ISOC BoT may decide to initiate changes to the BCPs governing IAOC actions. I suggest spelling out the initiate changes -- ...may decide to initiate the required public consensus process to change the BCPs... They may also advise the IAOC to modify existing operational guidelines to avoid similar issues in the future and/or may advise the IAOC to re-consider their decision or action. In exceptional cases, when no other recourse seems reasonable, the IESG, IAB or ISOC BoT may overturn or reverse a non-binding decision or action of the IAOC. This should be done after careful consideration and consultation with the IAOC regarding the ramifications of this action. In no circumstances may the IESG or IAB overturn a decision of the IAOC that involves a binding contract or overturn a personnel-related action (such as hiring, firing, promotion, demotion, performance reviews, salary adjustments, etc.). [The last paragraph is likely to be the most controversial, as I am not sure that we have consensus that the IAB or IESG should be able to overturn or reverse a decision or action of the IAOC at all.] Leslie. ___ Ietf mailing list Ietf@ietf.org https://www1.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/ietf
BCP sec 4 - end of term
not a showstopper but it woudl eb good to be clear the text curently says: Subject to paragraph 2 of Section 4.1, appointed members of the IAOC serve two year terms. IAOC terms normally end at the first IETF meeting of a year, just as as IAB and IESG terms do. I suggest changing this to say Subject to paragraph 2 of Section 4.1, appointed members of the IAOC serve two year terms. IAOC terms normally end at the end of the first IETF meeting of a year. its good to be specific as to when during the meeting Scott ___ Ietf mailing list Ietf@ietf.org https://www1.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/ietf
Re: Mud. Clear as. Re: Rough consensus? #425 3.5
Hi Leslie, I like this formulation. A couple of suggested tweaks, inline: ...and I like your tweaks :-). They make the text much clearer. Thanks. Margaret ___ Ietf mailing list Ietf@ietf.org https://www1.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/ietf
Re: Mud. Clear as. Re: Rough consensus? #425 3.5
I am happy with both as well. thanks a. On 27 jan 2005, at 20.30, Margaret Wasserman wrote: Hi Leslie, I like this formulation. A couple of suggested tweaks, inline: ...and I like your tweaks :-). They make the text much clearer. Thanks. Margaret ___ Ietf mailing list Ietf@ietf.org https://www1.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/ietf ___ Ietf mailing list Ietf@ietf.org https://www1.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/ietf
Re: Mud. Clear as. Re: Rough consensus? #425 3.5
I think we are very close here. I can live with Margaret's text with Leslie's proposed changes. It's actually very close to something I would be happy with. I've been rethinking my position since yesterday. I realized that most of what I want does not require formalism or requires very little formalism. In particular, I'm happy to live with a system in which decisions are not overturned except by the IAOC (although I like In addition, I think requiring requests for appeal/review to be acted on when they are simply arguing that decision is bad instead of that decisions did not follow written procedures/rules would be open to abuse. Here is what I want in addition to Margaret's formulation. I want to see if I can get agreement on these (I suspect the answer will be yes) before working on text. IT may turn out that the BCP is the wrong place for such text. * The IAOC can choose to overturn or otherwise act to reverse a decision if it believes that is the best course of action to follow. Examples include changing procedures if they happen not to work very well or attempting to buy out or terminate a contract if it is clear that the contract is no longer in the IASA's best interest. * Members of the IAOC may take into account comments from the community and may decide to reconsider a decision based on such comments even if no formal requirement to review the decision or to respond to the comments exists. In other words if the community convinces the IAOC they were wrong, it is reasonable for the IAOC to go do something about it. * The IAOC should listen to comments. By this I mean that they should be aware of comments they are receiving and weight them according to their value. It's fine to ignore pointless comments; probably even fine to pay less attention to comments from people who have a track record of not providing useful input. It would not be desirable for the IAOC to have completely ignored a constructive, well-reasoned comment simply because there was no formal obligation to respond to the comment. (The IAOC still might not respond, but someone should have at least read the comment and considered what it said) * It is reasonable for individuals, groups or organized bodies to comment to the community and the IAOC on IAOC decisions. For example if the IAOC selected a meeting sight according to its criteria and the IESG noticed that many working group chairs and document authors were unwilling to come to this sight, it would be reasonable for the IESG to inform the IAOC of this observation. Depending on costs of canceling a meeting, it might (although probably would not) be reasonable for the IESG to ask the IAOC to reconsider. When I phrase things this way instead of in thinking about them in the context of formal appeals and reviews, they become stunningly obvious at least for me. If these things are not true, I don't think we are living up to an open transparent process receptive to the needs of the IETF community. On the other hand, these things are sufficiently obvious that perhaps nothing needs to be said about them. There is one area where text might be useful. I'd feel more comfortable if we added text encouraging members of the community with comments about decisions to make those comments to the community at large and/or the IAOC even if their comments did not meet the criteria for formal review/appeal. Sorry to run such a long chase and end up back mostly at nothing. --Sam ___ Ietf mailing list Ietf@ietf.org https://www1.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/ietf
Re: Progressing Re: Progress report......
--At 11:37 AM -0500 1/26/05, John C Klensin wrote: Of course, if Neustar agrees to whatever provisions are in the BCP, and whatever details about those provisions that the IAOC specifies, and is able to do so --which Harald's note indicates they are prepared to do-- then this should not be an issue. So you don't have to rely solely on Harald or Leslie's attestations, the answer from the horse's mouth is yes, NeuStar's fully prepared and able to contract with the (ISOC-based) IAOC consistent with the BCP. And, yes, it's intentionally to make all of these concerns a non-issue. Just to clarify, our interest here is solely an attempt to facilitate a smooth transition of the secretariat operations into an environment consistent with the adminrest objectives. We're proposing to structure this as a non-profit, provide complete financial and operational transparency, open-source the tools, make all IPR we can unequivocally available, and enter into a contract with IAOC specifying all of this in writing for a limited term that includes termination for cause. there's no other motive here than to ensure a smooth transition for the benefit of the community. Best of all, we're not the ones making that determination! If this doesn't have the support of the TT and the community, then we won't proceed. We've commenced discussions with the TT and now the community, even though sensitive negotiations are still ongoing, to ensure this can be done for the community's best interest. That's why we can't say more yet regarding the proposed transaction, but are discussing how this scenario would work in the context of the BCP and for the best interests of the community, so we can try to be responsive to that. Discussions or questions are welcome, with the proviso that we obviously can't comment on pending acquisitions in detail. R, Mark Mark D. Foster | EMAIL: [EMAIL PROTECTED] SVP CTO | NeuStar, Inc. TEL: +1 571 434 5410/5411 | FAX: +1 571 434 5489 46000 Center Oak Plaza | Sterling, VA 20166 ___ Ietf mailing list Ietf@ietf.org https://www1.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/ietf
Re: Sole source contracts and the BCP
bb --On Thursday, January 27, 2005 1:23 PM +0100 Harald Tveit Alvestrand [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: John, forgive me for pulling a reset here - but I've become sufficiently lost in the various threads on the progress report heading that I'm no longer certain which questions you've raised, which have been answered, which have been overtaken by events, and which are no longer relevant. So let me start over. To my mind, there are 2 basic questions to raise: - Does the BCP as written give the IAD the power to receive an unsolicited offer for a service that might otherwise have been put out for bid, consider it, consult on it, decide that it is the best thing for the IETF, propose to ISOC and the IAOC that this is a good thing for the IETF and is financially responsible, and, after getting approval from them, sign the deal? I believe the answer is yes - the business of the IASA is the IAD's to administer. If we (as represented by the IAOC) don't like it, we chastise him/her or fire him/her. And I believe that has been true at least since version -00 (I did not check the scenario O text). As a subsidiary question: Should the BCP give the IAD that power? Here too, I believe the answer is yes - you've written some great pieces on why the IAD needs considerable autonomy on how to do business in the past. Indeed. And I believe it is yes as well. But there was a relatively long thread in which various people argued that the RFP process was the system's method of guaranteeing efficiency and minimal cost. If we are going to permit things to be done without RFPs and competitive bidding, then that source of guarantees, whether realistic or not, disappears. So we had better understand what we are getting ourselves into here and I think that creates a third core question, see below. And the other basic question: - Is the deal that Neustar has said that they are considering offering the best thing for the IETF? I believe the answer here is we don't know, but it might be - and you may consider the message from Leslie and the subsequent discussion to be a part of the transition team attempting to get a head start on the consultation that the IAD will have to do in order to decide that issue. I'm sure that there are all sorts of ramifications and implications of both those two questions - but do you agree that these are the 2 core questions on the thread, and that they are different? Two of the three core questions. And, assuming the best thing for the IETF is considered broadly and as a whole system, yes. The other core question, IMO, is whether the notion of sole source procurements based on unsolicited proposals requires some tuning of the BCP. I don't know if it does or not... Pro change: To the extent to which people are assuming the RFP Process is an important source of both transparency and efficiency, then we should have some special provisions about sole source activities. Otherwise, we could easily see a scenario in which a proposal comes to the IAD, the IAD recommends its approval to the IAOC, a contract is written and signed, and the first time the community hears about any of it is after the contract is signed, which is too late to stop or undo anything. I note that, in organizations that are normally required to do things by competitive bids, sole-source contracts are normally prohibited or very specific procedures are established for handling them. The change to the BCP could be as minimal as a requirement that the IAOC establish clear rules and principles for the handling for sole-source contracts before awarding any, expose those rules to the community for comment, etc. Or we could reverse our general assumption that only general principles appear in the BCP and could actually specify some requirements on the procedure (although it isn't clear to me why we would want to do that). Con change: The IAOC will almost certainly take it on itself to establish appropriate procedures and get general review of them. If they aren't sensitive enough to the community to do that, they should be fired (for some definition of fired). And the worst thing that can happen if they don't establish appropriate rules before contracts are let is that the community can end up irreversibly committed to a multi-year contract under unfavorable circumstances before the problem is noticed and remedies applied and maybe that isn't too bad. So no textual change is needed. I suspect my biases are clear but YMMD. john ___ Ietf mailing list Ietf@ietf.org https://www1.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/ietf
