Re: [Ietf-dkim] Rechartering

2023-01-05 Thread Dave Crocker

On 1/5/2023 9:20 AM, Alessandro Vesely wrote:
How about "replay-resistant protocol"? 


btw, it isn't clear that 'protocol' is what a solution will be. might 
be.  might not.  might be purely operational conventions, for example.


d/

--
Dave Crocker
Brandenburg InternetWorking
bbiw.net
mast:@dcrocker@mastodon.social

___
Ietf-dkim mailing list
Ietf-dkim@ietf.org
https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/ietf-dkim


Re: [Ietf-dkim] Rechartering

2023-01-05 Thread Michael Thomas


On 1/5/23 10:17 AM, Wei Chuang wrote:



On Thu, Jan 5, 2023 at 10:06 AM Michael Thomas  wrote:


On 1/5/23 9:20 AM, Alessandro Vesely wrote:
> On Thu 05/Jan/2023 17:33:36 +0100 Murray S. Kucherawy wrote:
>> I've added a few proposed milestones with dates
>
> I wouldn't call "replay-resistant DKIM enhancement(s)" the
> deliverable.  I understand the WG name is DKIM, but two of the
> proposed drafts don't even mention it.  We may call ARC a "kind of
> DKIM", but a solution based on it would be better called an ARC
> enhancement, no?
>
> How about "replay-resistant protocol"?
>
Sorry, ARC is a failed experiment that doesn't deliver what it was
supposed to deliver.


I disagree that it's a failed experiment.  We're using ARC results for 
forwarders who choose to generate them.
Well, it doesn't do what it was purported to do. That and it doesn't do 
anything that DKIM couldn't do in the first place since nobody can say 
why the seal is actually needed.


The DKIM wg should have no part of it. It should be
completely out of scope.


I agree with Alessandro's proposed language change that allows for 
ARC.  Moreover ARC is subject to the same replay issue as DKIM and 
needs some sort of fix.


DKIM is a full internet standard and ARC is an experiment. This is the 
DKIM wg. ARC had no problem copying the DKIM output. Nothing that 
happens here will change that.


It's bad enough that this wg is considering doing unnatural acts with 
the envelope, it would be even worse to require it down a rat hole of a 
failed experiment.


Mike
___
Ietf-dkim mailing list
Ietf-dkim@ietf.org
https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/ietf-dkim


[Ietf-dkim] Yet another draft

2023-01-05 Thread Alessandro Vesely

Here's another idea to tell legitimate vs. abusive forwarding:

https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-vesely-email-agreement/


Best
Ale
--



___
Ietf-dkim mailing list
Ietf-dkim@ietf.org
https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/ietf-dkim


Re: [Ietf-dkim] Rechartering

2023-01-05 Thread Dave Crocker

On 1/5/2023 11:03 AM, Wei Chuang wrote:



1. The motivation for the current effort has been exploitation of
re-posting to exploit a DKIM reputation.

2. Are there any other kinds of replay scenarios that are an issue
now?
I suspect there aren't.


While not exactly ARC replay, we've seen recently that spammers are 
exploring munging the ARC headers.  One campaign had them swapping a 
complete ARC header set into another message.  In another they added 
an incomplete set.  Consequently we're worried about the spammers 
exploiting ARC vulnerabilities.


There are some possibilities this suggests.

1. We could seek to explore and counter-act all (or a wide range) of 
replay scenarios, independent of their type or actual presence.  That 
is, both replays that are present in the wild and replays that are 
merely deemed possible, no matter how or why they do or might occur.


2. We could focus only on the know replay efforts so far, independent of 
type or degree of threat.


3. We could focus only on known, significant replay efforts.

4. and so on...

Of these, only 4 ensures focused, pragmatic efforts, where there is 
actual pressure to find a remedy sooner rather than later.


The others seem more like research topics.

d/

--
Dave Crocker
Brandenburg InternetWorking
bbiw.net
mast:@dcrocker@mastodon.social
___
Ietf-dkim mailing list
Ietf-dkim@ietf.org
https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/ietf-dkim


Re: [Ietf-dkim] Rechartering

2023-01-05 Thread Wei Chuang
On Thu, Jan 5, 2023 at 10:43 AM Dave Crocker  wrote:

> On 1/5/2023 9:20 AM, Alessandro Vesely wrote:
> > I wouldn't call "replay-resistant DKIM enhancement(s)" the
> > deliverable.  I understand the WG name is DKIM, but two of the
> > proposed drafts don't even mention it.  We may call ARC a "kind of
> > DKIM", but a solution based on it would be better called an ARC
> > enhancement, no?
> >
> > How about "replay-resistant protocol"?
>
> Just to explore this a bit further:
>
> 1. The motivation for the current effort has been exploitation of
> re-posting to exploit a DKIM reputation.
>
> 2. Are there any other kinds of replay scenarios that are an issue now?
> I suspect there aren't.
>

While not exactly ARC replay, we've seen recently that spammers are
exploring munging the ARC headers.  One campaign had them swapping a
complete ARC header set into another message.  In another they added an
incomplete set.  Consequently we're worried about the spammers exploiting
ARC vulnerabilities.

-Wei


> 3. Whatever mechanisms are developed to prevent or mitigate replay,
> their current use will be to deal with a DKIM-related replay problem.
>
> It's likely to be useful for the working group name to relate to a
> specific, real and current problem, even if a technical solution doesn't
> explicitly deal with the technical details of that problem.
>
> d/
>
> --
> Dave Crocker
> Brandenburg InternetWorking
> bbiw.net
> mast:@dcrocker@mastodon.social
>
> ___
> Ietf-dkim mailing list
> Ietf-dkim@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/ietf-dkim
>


smime.p7s
Description: S/MIME Cryptographic Signature
___
Ietf-dkim mailing list
Ietf-dkim@ietf.org
https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/ietf-dkim


Re: [Ietf-dkim] Rechartering

2023-01-05 Thread Dave Crocker

On 1/5/2023 9:20 AM, Alessandro Vesely wrote:
I wouldn't call "replay-resistant DKIM enhancement(s)" the 
deliverable.  I understand the WG name is DKIM, but two of the 
proposed drafts don't even mention it.  We may call ARC a "kind of 
DKIM", but a solution based on it would be better called an ARC 
enhancement, no?


How about "replay-resistant protocol"? 


Just to explore this a bit further:

1. The motivation for the current effort has been exploitation of 
re-posting to exploit a DKIM reputation.


2. Are there any other kinds of replay scenarios that are an issue now?  
I suspect there aren't.


3. Whatever mechanisms are developed to prevent or mitigate replay, 
their current use will be to deal with a DKIM-related replay problem.


It's likely to be useful for the working group name to relate to a 
specific, real and current problem, even if a technical solution doesn't 
explicitly deal with the technical details of that problem.


d/

--
Dave Crocker
Brandenburg InternetWorking
bbiw.net
mast:@dcrocker@mastodon.social

___
Ietf-dkim mailing list
Ietf-dkim@ietf.org
https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/ietf-dkim


Re: [Ietf-dkim] Rechartering

2023-01-05 Thread Wei Chuang
On Thu, Jan 5, 2023 at 10:06 AM Michael Thomas  wrote:

>
> On 1/5/23 9:20 AM, Alessandro Vesely wrote:
> > On Thu 05/Jan/2023 17:33:36 +0100 Murray S. Kucherawy wrote:
> >> I've added a few proposed milestones with dates
> >
> > I wouldn't call "replay-resistant DKIM enhancement(s)" the
> > deliverable.  I understand the WG name is DKIM, but two of the
> > proposed drafts don't even mention it.  We may call ARC a "kind of
> > DKIM", but a solution based on it would be better called an ARC
> > enhancement, no?
> >
> > How about "replay-resistant protocol"?
> >
> Sorry, ARC is a failed experiment that doesn't deliver what it was
> supposed to deliver.


I disagree that it's a failed experiment.  We're using ARC results for
forwarders who choose to generate them.


> The DKIM wg should have no part of it. It should be
> completely out of scope.
>

I agree with Alessandro's proposed language change that allows for ARC.
Moreover ARC is subject to the same replay issue as DKIM and needs some
sort of fix.

-Wei


>
> Mike
>
> ___
> Ietf-dkim mailing list
> Ietf-dkim@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/ietf-dkim
>


smime.p7s
Description: S/MIME Cryptographic Signature
___
Ietf-dkim mailing list
Ietf-dkim@ietf.org
https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/ietf-dkim


Re: [Ietf-dkim] Rechartering

2023-01-05 Thread Michael Thomas


On 1/5/23 9:20 AM, Alessandro Vesely wrote:

On Thu 05/Jan/2023 17:33:36 +0100 Murray S. Kucherawy wrote:

I've added a few proposed milestones with dates


I wouldn't call "replay-resistant DKIM enhancement(s)" the 
deliverable.  I understand the WG name is DKIM, but two of the 
proposed drafts don't even mention it.  We may call ARC a "kind of 
DKIM", but a solution based on it would be better called an ARC 
enhancement, no?


How about "replay-resistant protocol"?

Sorry, ARC is a failed experiment that doesn't deliver what it was 
supposed to deliver. The DKIM wg should have no part of it. It should be 
completely out of scope.


Mike

___
Ietf-dkim mailing list
Ietf-dkim@ietf.org
https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/ietf-dkim


Re: [Ietf-dkim] Rechartering

2023-01-05 Thread Alessandro Vesely

On Thu 05/Jan/2023 17:33:36 +0100 Murray S. Kucherawy wrote:

I've added a few proposed milestones with dates


I wouldn't call "replay-resistant DKIM enhancement(s)" the deliverable.  I 
understand the WG name is DKIM, but two of the proposed drafts don't even 
mention it.  We may call ARC a "kind of DKIM", but a solution based on it would 
be better called an ARC enhancement, no?


How about "replay-resistant protocol"?


Best
Ale
--





___
Ietf-dkim mailing list
Ietf-dkim@ietf.org
https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/ietf-dkim


Re: [Ietf-dkim] Rechartering

2023-01-05 Thread Murray S. Kucherawy
On Sat, Dec 31, 2022 at 3:02 PM Murray S. Kucherawy 
wrote:

> On Sat, Dec 31, 2022 at 2:43 PM Dave Crocker  wrote:
>
>> The initial effort to form a working group in the IETF was pretty casual
>> and surfaced a lack of sufficient consensus among advocates.  The IETF
>> said go away until there's more agreement.
>>
>> We went away for a year, during which we developed the original version
>> of DKIM, which demonstrated the coherence.
>>
>> The current effort has none of that existing critical mass of work and
>> agreement.  This makes the effort quite a lot riskier.
>>
>> The fact that things are taking quite a few months doesn't help.
>>
>
> That's true.  I'd forgotten this bit of the history.
>
> If we think this constraint is appropriate, I'm fine to include it.  Does
> someone want to propose a sentence or two?  I need to avoid getting my
> wrist slapped for both championing the charter and writing it.
>

The IESG approved the proposed charter to go out for external review.  I've
added a few proposed milestones with dates (these can be edited later) and
taken a run at editing the text to add the constraints people were
proposing.  Please review and let me know if I got it wrong or missed any
feedback, or if the dates on the milestones are not realistic.  They were
selected on the assumption that we charter and have co-chairs in place by
the end of January.

https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/charter-ietf-dkim/

Lastly, I have one co-chair volunteer, but I need a second, preferably
someone who has chaired something in the IETF before.  Please let me know
if you'd like to either volunteer or nominate someone.

-MSK
___
Ietf-dkim mailing list
Ietf-dkim@ietf.org
https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/ietf-dkim