Re: [IPsec] Error in RFC6290
I agree. On Dec 26, 2012, at 7:58 PM, Valery Smyslov sva...@gmail.com wrote: Hi Yaron, oh, you've catched one more error in this text - it mixed up terms ticket (used in RFC5723 as Session Resumption ticket) and token (used in RFC6290 as QCD token). I din't notice that. You are right, that ticket (Session Resumption) is sent in IKE_SESSION_RESUME, but RFC6290 talks where QCD token must be sent. And from my understanding of the whole protocol it must not be sent in clear under any circumstances (otherwise eavesdropper can easily tear down IKE SA), so the only logical place for it in case of IKE SA resumption is IKE_AUTH exchange that immediately follows IKE_SESSION_RESUME. So, I think, correct text should be: For session resumption, as specified in [RFC5723], the situation is similar. The responder, which is necessarily the peer that has crashed, SHOULD send a new QCD_TOKEN in IKE_AUTH exchange that immediately followes IKE_SESSION_RESUME exchange. If the Initiator is also a token maker, it needs to send a QCD_TOKEN in the same IKE_AUTH exchange. Best wishes, Valery. ___ IPsec mailing list IPsec@ietf.org https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/ipsec
Re: [IPsec] Error in RFC6290
Hi I agree with point #2. I'll leave it to some of the session resumption experts to comment on point #1. It's a little late for Merry Christmas, so just happy new year. Yoav -Original Message- From: ipsec-boun...@ietf.org [mailto:ipsec-boun...@ietf.org] On Behalf Of Valery Smyslov Sent: Wednesday, December 26, 2012 8:11 AM To: ipsec@ietf.org Subject: [IPsec] Error in RFC6290 Hi, RFC6290 (Quick Crash Detection) contains an error. In Section 4.3 it states: For session resumption, as specified in [RFC5723], the situation is similar. The responder, which is necessarily the peer that has crashed, SHOULD send a new ticket within the protected payload of the IKE_SESSION_RESUME exchange. If the Initiator is also a token maker, it needs to send a QCD_TOKEN in a separate INFORMATIONAL exchange. But IKE_SESSION_RESUME exchange, as specified in RFC5723, doesn't contain any protected payload - it is completely in clear and must be followed by IKE_AUTH exchange. I suspect this error came from early versions of IKE SA Resumption protocol that, as far as I remember, did contain protected payload. But currently this para should look like: For session resumption, as specified in [RFC5723], the situation is similar. The responder, which is necessarily the peer that has crashed, SHOULD send a new ticket in IKE_AUTH exchange that immediately followed IKE_SESSION_RESUME exchange. If the Initiator is also a token maker, it needs to send a QCD_TOKEN in the same IKE_AUTH exchange. And one more consideration. In Section 4.1 RFC6290 states: o Protocol ID (1 octet) MUST be 1, as this message is related to an IKE SA. o SPI Size (1 octet) MUST be zero, in conformance with Section 3.10 of [RFC5996]. I think here we have contradiction with RFC5996 (despite clamed conformance with it). In abovementioned Section 3.10 it is written: o Protocol ID (1 octet) - If this notification concerns an existing SA whose SPI is given in the SPI field, this field indicates the type of that SA. For notifications concerning Child SAs, this field MUST contain either (2) to indicate AH or (3) to indicate ESP. Of the notifications defined in this document, the SPI is included only with INVALID_SELECTORS and REKEY_SA. If the SPI field is empty, this field MUST be sent as zero and MUST be ignored on receipt. Let me emphasize that RFC5996 clearly requires that If the SPI field is empty, Protocol ID field MUST be sent as zero and MUST be ignored on receipt, but RFC6290 while requiring SPI field to be empty, requres Protocol ID field to be non-zero. Actually, I see no value in this requirement, as Protocol ID MUST be ignored on receipt anyway (if SPI field is empty), so it just complicates protocol and makes it cumbersome. Merry Christmas, Valery Smyslov. ___ IPsec mailing list IPsec@ietf.org https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/ipsec Email secured by Check Point ___ IPsec mailing list IPsec@ietf.org https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/ipsec
Re: [IPsec] Error in RFC6290
Hi Yoav, Valery, Valery is right that the IKE_SESSION_RESUME exchange does not have a protected payload. But his new text is incorrect, since the (session resumption) ticket is sent in IKE_SESSION_RESUME and not in the immediately following IKE_AUTH (he might have got it mixed with the ticket sent when *requesting* a ticket). So I guess we should just replace within the protected payload of the IKE_SESSION_RESUME exchange by within the IKE_SESSION_RESUME exchange. According to http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Christmas#Listing, it's still more than a week until the Eastern Churches' Christmas. So Merry Christmas to some of us, and a Happy New Year to all. Thanks, Yaron On 12/26/2012 10:42 AM, Yoav Nir wrote: Hi I agree with point #2. I'll leave it to some of the session resumption experts to comment on point #1. It's a little late for Merry Christmas, so just happy new year. Yoav -Original Message- From: ipsec-boun...@ietf.org [mailto:ipsec-boun...@ietf.org] On Behalf Of Valery Smyslov Sent: Wednesday, December 26, 2012 8:11 AM To: ipsec@ietf.org Subject: [IPsec] Error in RFC6290 Hi, RFC6290 (Quick Crash Detection) contains an error. In Section 4.3 it states: For session resumption, as specified in [RFC5723], the situation is similar. The responder, which is necessarily the peer that has crashed, SHOULD send a new ticket within the protected payload of the IKE_SESSION_RESUME exchange. If the Initiator is also a token maker, it needs to send a QCD_TOKEN in a separate INFORMATIONAL exchange. But IKE_SESSION_RESUME exchange, as specified in RFC5723, doesn't contain any protected payload - it is completely in clear and must be followed by IKE_AUTH exchange. I suspect this error came from early versions of IKE SA Resumption protocol that, as far as I remember, did contain protected payload. But currently this para should look like: For session resumption, as specified in [RFC5723], the situation is similar. The responder, which is necessarily the peer that has crashed, SHOULD send a new ticket in IKE_AUTH exchange that immediately followed IKE_SESSION_RESUME exchange. If the Initiator is also a token maker, it needs to send a QCD_TOKEN in the same IKE_AUTH exchange. And one more consideration. In Section 4.1 RFC6290 states: o Protocol ID (1 octet) MUST be 1, as this message is related to an IKE SA. o SPI Size (1 octet) MUST be zero, in conformance with Section 3.10 of [RFC5996]. I think here we have contradiction with RFC5996 (despite clamed conformance with it). In abovementioned Section 3.10 it is written: o Protocol ID (1 octet) - If this notification concerns an existing SA whose SPI is given in the SPI field, this field indicates the type of that SA. For notifications concerning Child SAs, this field MUST contain either (2) to indicate AH or (3) to indicate ESP. Of the notifications defined in this document, the SPI is included only with INVALID_SELECTORS and REKEY_SA. If the SPI field is empty, this field MUST be sent as zero and MUST be ignored on receipt. Let me emphasize that RFC5996 clearly requires that If the SPI field is empty, Protocol ID field MUST be sent as zero and MUST be ignored on receipt, but RFC6290 while requiring SPI field to be empty, requres Protocol ID field to be non-zero. Actually, I see no value in this requirement, as Protocol ID MUST be ignored on receipt anyway (if SPI field is empty), so it just complicates protocol and makes it cumbersome. Merry Christmas, Valery Smyslov. ___ IPsec mailing list IPsec@ietf.org https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/ipsec Email secured by Check Point ___ IPsec mailing list IPsec@ietf.org https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/ipsec ___ IPsec mailing list IPsec@ietf.org https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/ipsec
Re: [IPsec] Error in RFC6290
Hi Yaron, oh, you've catched one more error in this text - it mixed up terms ticket (used in RFC5723 as Session Resumption ticket) and token (used in RFC6290 as QCD token). I din't notice that. You are right, that ticket (Session Resumption) is sent in IKE_SESSION_RESUME, but RFC6290 talks where QCD token must be sent. And from my understanding of the whole protocol it must not be sent in clear under any circumstances (otherwise eavesdropper can easily tear down IKE SA), so the only logical place for it in case of IKE SA resumption is IKE_AUTH exchange that immediately follows IKE_SESSION_RESUME. So, I think, correct text should be: For session resumption, as specified in [RFC5723], the situation is similar. The responder, which is necessarily the peer that has crashed, SHOULD send a new QCD_TOKEN in IKE_AUTH exchange that immediately followes IKE_SESSION_RESUME exchange. If the Initiator is also a token maker, it needs to send a QCD_TOKEN in the same IKE_AUTH exchange. Best wishes, Valery. Hi Yoav, Valery, Valery is right that the IKE_SESSION_RESUME exchange does not have a protected payload. But his new text is incorrect, since the (session resumption) ticket is sent in IKE_SESSION_RESUME and not in the immediately following IKE_AUTH (he might have got it mixed with the ticket sent when *requesting* a ticket). So I guess we should just replace within the protected payload of the IKE_SESSION_RESUME exchange by within the IKE_SESSION_RESUME exchange. According to http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Christmas#Listing, it's still more than a week until the Eastern Churches' Christmas. So Merry Christmas to some of us, and a Happy New Year to all. Thanks, Yaron On 12/26/2012 10:42 AM, Yoav Nir wrote: Hi I agree with point #2. I'll leave it to some of the session resumption experts to comment on point #1. It's a little late for Merry Christmas, so just happy new year. Yoav -Original Message- From: ipsec-boun...@ietf.org [mailto:ipsec-boun...@ietf.org] On Behalf Of Valery Smyslov Sent: Wednesday, December 26, 2012 8:11 AM To: ipsec@ietf.org Subject: [IPsec] Error in RFC6290 Hi, RFC6290 (Quick Crash Detection) contains an error. In Section 4.3 it states: For session resumption, as specified in [RFC5723], the situation is similar. The responder, which is necessarily the peer that has crashed, SHOULD send a new ticket within the protected payload of the IKE_SESSION_RESUME exchange. If the Initiator is also a token maker, it needs to send a QCD_TOKEN in a separate INFORMATIONAL exchange. But IKE_SESSION_RESUME exchange, as specified in RFC5723, doesn't contain any protected payload - it is completely in clear and must be followed by IKE_AUTH exchange. I suspect this error came from early versions of IKE SA Resumption protocol that, as far as I remember, did contain protected payload. But currently this para should look like: For session resumption, as specified in [RFC5723], the situation is similar. The responder, which is necessarily the peer that has crashed, SHOULD send a new ticket in IKE_AUTH exchange that immediately followed IKE_SESSION_RESUME exchange. If the Initiator is also a token maker, it needs to send a QCD_TOKEN in the same IKE_AUTH exchange. And one more consideration. In Section 4.1 RFC6290 states: o Protocol ID (1 octet) MUST be 1, as this message is related to an IKE SA. o SPI Size (1 octet) MUST be zero, in conformance with Section 3.10 of [RFC5996]. I think here we have contradiction with RFC5996 (despite clamed conformance with it). In abovementioned Section 3.10 it is written: o Protocol ID (1 octet) - If this notification concerns an existing SA whose SPI is given in the SPI field, this field indicates the type of that SA. For notifications concerning Child SAs, this field MUST contain either (2) to indicate AH or (3) to indicate ESP. Of the notifications defined in this document, the SPI is included only with INVALID_SELECTORS and REKEY_SA. If the SPI field is empty, this field MUST be sent as zero and MUST be ignored on receipt. Let me emphasize that RFC5996 clearly requires that If the SPI field is empty, Protocol ID field MUST be sent as zero and MUST be ignored on receipt, but RFC6290 while requiring SPI field to be empty, requres Protocol ID field to be non-zero. Actually, I see no value in this requirement, as Protocol ID MUST be ignored on receipt anyway (if SPI field is empty), so it just complicates protocol and makes it cumbersome. Merry Christmas, Valery Smyslov. ___ IPsec mailing list IPsec@ietf.org https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/ipsec Email secured by Check Point ___ IPsec mailing list IPsec@ietf.org https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/ipsec
[IPsec] Error in RFC6290
Hi, RFC6290 (Quick Crash Detection) contains an error. In Section 4.3 it states: For session resumption, as specified in [RFC5723], the situation is similar. The responder, which is necessarily the peer that has crashed, SHOULD send a new ticket within the protected payload of the IKE_SESSION_RESUME exchange. If the Initiator is also a token maker, it needs to send a QCD_TOKEN in a separate INFORMATIONAL exchange. But IKE_SESSION_RESUME exchange, as specified in RFC5723, doesn't contain any protected payload - it is completely in clear and must be followed by IKE_AUTH exchange. I suspect this error came from early versions of IKE SA Resumption protocol that, as far as I remember, did contain protected payload. But currently this para should look like: For session resumption, as specified in [RFC5723], the situation is similar. The responder, which is necessarily the peer that has crashed, SHOULD send a new ticket in IKE_AUTH exchange that immediately followed IKE_SESSION_RESUME exchange. If the Initiator is also a token maker, it needs to send a QCD_TOKEN in the same IKE_AUTH exchange. And one more consideration. In Section 4.1 RFC6290 states: o Protocol ID (1 octet) MUST be 1, as this message is related to an IKE SA. o SPI Size (1 octet) MUST be zero, in conformance with Section 3.10 of [RFC5996]. I think here we have contradiction with RFC5996 (despite clamed conformance with it). In abovementioned Section 3.10 it is written: o Protocol ID (1 octet) - If this notification concerns an existing SA whose SPI is given in the SPI field, this field indicates the type of that SA. For notifications concerning Child SAs, this field MUST contain either (2) to indicate AH or (3) to indicate ESP. Of the notifications defined in this document, the SPI is included only with INVALID_SELECTORS and REKEY_SA. If the SPI field is empty, this field MUST be sent as zero and MUST be ignored on receipt. Let me emphasize that RFC5996 clearly requires that If the SPI field is empty, Protocol ID field MUST be sent as zero and MUST be ignored on receipt, but RFC6290 while requiring SPI field to be empty, requres Protocol ID field to be non-zero. Actually, I see no value in this requirement, as Protocol ID MUST be ignored on receipt anyway (if SPI field is empty), so it just complicates protocol and makes it cumbersome. Merry Christmas, Valery Smyslov. ___ IPsec mailing list IPsec@ietf.org https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/ipsec
