[liberationtech] Forum today (6/1, 12:15-12:55pm in 460-126): Honors and M.S. Project presentations

[Yosem Companys]

From: Todd Davies 
To: symsys-eve...@lists.stanford.edu at
https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/symsys-events



*Symbolic Systems Forum *presents
*Honors and M.S. Project Presentations*
by
Harry Simon (Senior Honors Student) and Chan, Chi Ling (M.S. Candidate)
Symbolic Systems Program


Monday, June 1, 2015
12:15-12:55 pm
Building 460, Room 126
map link: http://campus-map.stanford.edu/index.cfm?ID=01-460


ABSTRACTS:
*12:30-12:55 **(b) Chan, Chi Ling: "Investigating Diffusion of Political
Participation and Social Information in Online Petitioning" (Advisor: Todd
Davies, Symbolic Systems Program; Second Reader: Lee Ross, Psychology
Department)*
Contemporary collective action increasingly takes place on internet-based
platforms, leaving behind digital footprints that can help us better
understand the dynamics of mobilization. Petition signing is one such form
of collective action that is gaining popularity as more activists take
social movements online. What motivates people to lend ideological support
for such campaigns, and what dynamics drive the diffusion of social
information that determine the success or failure of an online petition?
Using data from the White House's official petition platform, WeThePeople,
this project tries to detect patterns in petitions data to understand why
some online collective action are massively successful, and others
relegated to relative obscurity.


Lunch will be served


This is the last Symbolic Systems Forum of the 2014-'15 academic year. The
Forum will return in the fall.
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[liberationtech] "Securing Email Communications from Facebook" offering PGP support

[Steve Weis]

Hi Libtech. Facebook added support to put a PGP public key to your
profile and optionally use it to encrypt email notifications that are
sent to you:
https://www.facebook.com/notes/protect-the-graph/securing-email-communications-from-facebook/1611941762379302

Special thanks to the beta testers who helped in development, several
of whom are on this list.
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Re: [liberationtech] "Securing Email Communications from Facebook" offering PGP support

[Thomas Delrue]

On 06/01/2015 01:46 PM, Steve Weis wrote:
> Hi Libtech. Facebook added support to put a PGP public key to your
> profile and optionally use it to encrypt email notifications that are
> sent to you:
> https://www.facebook.com/notes/protect-the-graph/securing-email-communications-from-facebook/1611941762379302

Forgive my ignorance but what is the point of this 'feature'?
Wouldn't FB (and thus anyone able to coerce FB as well) still have the
unencrypted data?

Wooden leg, meet band-aid.

For those who don't remember, there was an excellent and very plausible
'Suppose if' situation written up about a year ago on libtech by rsk.
The relevant part went something like this (and I've attached the
original mail as well to give credit where it is due):

---BEGIN---
"You see, Twitter wants to do business here in Elbonia.  So does
Facebook. So I would summon their corporate weasels to a meeting.  In
that meeting, one of my minions (you don't think I'd do this personally,
do you?) would explain to them that we must protect our great nation
from subversives and criminals and anarchists and terrorists (ding ding
ding magic word!) and thus we must have certain data fed to us...or,
most regrettably, we will not be able to allow them to do business in
our country.

I think they'll cave.  Don't you?  After all, there are profits to be
made and it's such a small thing that I'm asking."
END

Sure, that e-mail notification "can't be decrypted" but that doesn't
mean the same as "the same information is secure and not available
through other means either".

I fail to see how this is anything more than smoke and mirrors giving
the illusion of secure communications.

--- Begin Message ---
On Mon, Jun 09, 2014 at 07:52:51PM -0700, Seth wrote:
> I'm in agreement with pretty much all the points made, but how do
> you feel this approach?
> 
> 1) ALWAYS publish the original source information via
> freedom/privacy/dignity respecting services using a name-space (a
> DNS domain,.onion,.gnu,.i2p,namecoin,whatever) that you control.
> 
> 2) Syndicate a copy of that information to the CSW (Corporate
> Surveillance Whore) networks such as Google/Facebook/Twitter to
> obtain the widest reach.
> 
> 3) Ease out of the CSW networks as your home grown following reaches
> critical mass.

I see where you're going with this, and I agree with the goal.  But I still
have a major problem with point #2.  Let me try to explain why via a
fictitious example.

Suppose that I were the dictator of Elbonia (the mythical country from
Dilbert cartoons).  I would be autocratic, ruthless...oh, wait, I already
*am* those things...anyway, I would be the typical tyrant attempting
to retain power in the face of democratic movements and civil rights
movements and worker's rights movement and other petty annoyances.

I would *not* block Twitter.  I would *not* block Facebook.  I would *not*
block Instagram or any of the others either.  I wouldn't do this because
the idealistic, enthusiastic, hard-working, noble young people who are
most likely to pose a serious threat to my supremacy and are also naive,
gullible, careless and stupid.  They're using Twitter and Facebook and
the rest and that is extremely helpful to me, since I very much would
like to monitor them and know who they are and where they are and what
they're up to.  They've wiretapped themselves, saving me much of the
trouble and expense.

Instead -- because I *am* the dictator, thank you very much -- I
would order the long-since nationalized telecoms and ISPs to provide a
real-time feed of network traffic to my intelligence agency.  I would
monitor who is following #OverthrowTheDictator and who is liking the
"DesposeTheDictator" page.   And so on.

And when the moment came that I felt really threatened, I would decapitate
their movement by disappearing the 22 or 37 or whatever most active
participants.  Not a tidy solution, I'll grant you, but effective in the
short term and it would certainly discourage others.  I could probably
do this 3-4 times before they caught on that they were making a major
strategic mistake.  That might buy me another decade in power.

Now you might say...but what about HTTPS?  Would about VPNs?  What about
Tor?  ("What about Houston?  What about Detroit?" Thank you David Byrne.)

Yeah.  I know.  Most inconvenient.  Fortunately, I have another way.
Several other ways, actually.

You see, Twitter wants to do business here in Elbonia.  So does Facebook.
So I would summon their corporate weasels to a meeting.  In that meeting,
one of my minions (you don't think I'd do this personally, do you?) would
explain to them that we must protect our great nation from subversives
and criminals and anarchists and terrorists (ding ding ding magic word!)
and thus we must have certain data fed to us...or, most regrettably,
we will not be able to allow them to do business in our country.

I think they'll cave.  Don't you?  After all, there are profits to be
made and it's such a small thing tha

Re: [liberationtech] "Securing Email Communications from Facebook" offering PGP support

[Steve Weis]

Facebook is sending the email, so, yes they know the content of the
messages they are sending. Without encryption, third-party email
providers will also see that content. If the mail providers don't
support STARTTLS, contents may also be exposed in transit and exposed
to more parties.

Encrypting email with PGP helps protect contents so they aren't
exposed in transit or while stored with email providers. Personally, I
would like to have the option to receive encrypted email for all my
online services.

Incidentally, Google has some data on which domains support STARTTLS
if you're interested:
http://www.google.com/transparencyreport/saferemail/data/


On Mon, Jun 1, 2015 at 12:35 PM, Thomas Delrue  wrote:
> On 06/01/2015 01:46 PM, Steve Weis wrote:
> > Hi Libtech. Facebook added support to put a PGP public key to your
> > profile and optionally use it to encrypt email notifications that are
> > sent to you:
> > https://www.facebook.com/notes/protect-the-graph/securing-email-communications-from-facebook/1611941762379302
>
> Forgive my ignorance but what is the point of this 'feature'?
> Wouldn't FB (and thus anyone able to coerce FB as well) still have the
> unencrypted data?
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Re: [liberationtech] "Securing Email Communications from Facebook" offering PGP support

[Parker Higgins]

On 06/01/2015 12:35 PM, Thomas Delrue wrote:
> On 06/01/2015 01:46 PM, Steve Weis wrote:
>> Hi Libtech. Facebook added support to put a PGP public key to your
>> profile and optionally use it to encrypt email notifications that are
>> sent to you:
>> https://www.facebook.com/notes/protect-the-graph/securing-email-communications-from-facebook/1611941762379302
> Forgive my ignorance but what is the point of this 'feature'?
> Wouldn't FB (and thus anyone able to coerce FB as well) still have the
> unencrypted data?
>
> Wooden leg, meet band-aid.

Facebook is offering end-to-end encryption. If you don't trust the other
end of an end-to-end connection, this won't help that particular
problem. But there are plenty of well-attested benefits of end-to-end
encryption for all sorts of other threats.

Thanks,
Parker

-- 
Parker Higgins
Director of Copyright Activism
Electronic Frontier Foundation
https://eff.org

815 Eddy Street
San Francisco, CA 94109-7701

I prefer to use encrypted email.

Public key: https://www.eff.org/files/2014/11/03/gphkey.txt
Fingerprint: 4FF3 AA1B D29E 1638 32DE C765 9433 5F88 9A36 7709

Learn how to encrypt your email with the Email Self Defense guide:
https://emailselfdefense.fsf.org/en/

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Re: [liberationtech] "Securing Email Communications from Facebook" offering PGP support

[Hassen Selmi]

Most of time hacking a facebook  account  starts by compromising  the related  
email address to reset  the password later.  The reset  link will be sent 
through  email. If encrypted this email  will be  read only by the owner of the 
private key in his end machine. 

H.
-- 
Sent from my Android device with K-9 Mail. Please excuse my brevity.
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Re: [liberationtech] "Securing Email Communications from Facebook" offering PGP support

[z...@manian.org]

Facebook is an identity provider.

GPG is a failed(so far?) system for confidentiality and massively
successful system for managing identity(Hello Debian!)

For their notification system, FB is leveraging GPG as an identity provider
to say" only a person who has a certain private key should be able to reset
access credentials for this account".

It is a totally awesome breakthrough in the use of cryptography for robust,
casual attestation of identity over an insecure channel and it leverages an
existing toolchain rather than inventing a new one.

Initially this is only available to cryptonerds but as the community
fulfills the moral imperative to solve the usability problems it will
become more widely available.




On Mon, Jun 1, 2015 at 3:09 PM, Parker Higgins  wrote:

> On 06/01/2015 12:35 PM, Thomas Delrue wrote:
> > On 06/01/2015 01:46 PM, Steve Weis wrote:
> >> Hi Libtech. Facebook added support to put a PGP public key to your
> >> profile and optionally use it to encrypt email notifications that are
> >> sent to you:
> >>
> https://www.facebook.com/notes/protect-the-graph/securing-email-communications-from-facebook/1611941762379302
> > Forgive my ignorance but what is the point of this 'feature'?
> > Wouldn't FB (and thus anyone able to coerce FB as well) still have the
> > unencrypted data?
> >
> > Wooden leg, meet band-aid.
>
> Facebook is offering end-to-end encryption. If you don't trust the other
> end of an end-to-end connection, this won't help that particular
> problem. But there are plenty of well-attested benefits of end-to-end
> encryption for all sorts of other threats.
>
> Thanks,
> Parker
>
> --
> Parker Higgins
> Director of Copyright Activism
> Electronic Frontier Foundation
> https://eff.org
>
> 815 Eddy Street
> San Francisco, CA 94109-7701
>
> I prefer to use encrypted email.
>
> Public key: https://www.eff.org/files/2014/11/03/gphkey.txt
> Fingerprint: 4FF3 AA1B D29E 1638 32DE C765 9433 5F88 9A36 7709
>
> Learn how to encrypt your email with the Email Self Defense guide:
> https://emailselfdefense.fsf.org/en/
>
> --
> Liberationtech is public & archives are searchable on Google. Violations
> of list guidelines will get you moderated:
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> Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password by emailing moderator at
> compa...@stanford.edu.
>
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Re: [liberationtech] "Securing Email Communications from Facebook" offering PGP support

[Thomas Delrue]

On 06/01/2015 06:09 PM, Parker Higgins wrote:
> On 06/01/2015 12:35 PM, Thomas Delrue wrote:
>> On 06/01/2015 01:46 PM, Steve Weis wrote:
>>> Hi Libtech. Facebook added support to put a PGP public key to your
>>> profile and optionally use it to encrypt email notifications that are
>>> sent to you:
>>> https://www.facebook.com/notes/protect-the-graph/securing-email-communications-from-facebook/1611941762379302
>> Forgive my ignorance but what is the point of this 'feature'?
>> Wouldn't FB (and thus anyone able to coerce FB as well) still have the
>> unencrypted data?
>>
>> Wooden leg, meet band-aid.
> 
> Facebook is offering end-to-end encryption. If you don't trust the other
> end of an end-to-end connection, this won't help that particular
> problem. But there are plenty of well-attested benefits of end-to-end
> encryption for all sorts of other threats.

I think this addresses my concern. Thank you Parker.
Can you point me to resources of the benefits to me if I do indeed find
myself in the situation of not trusting the other party.

The point I was trying to make (in a veiled way) was that FB should/can
indeed not be trusted and I am therefore questioning the usefulness of
this feature when it involves that site.

Sure, Google/Hotmail won't be able to scan your (now encrypted)
GMail/Hotmail inbox notifications from FB and understand the content of
them but to what purpose? Is FB just trying to prevent Google/Hotmail
from gathering your FB 'graph'?
On the other hand, for those communications where it matters that no-one
else can see them, against whom is this protecting me?

I think that I still stand by my claim that this is nothing more but
smoke and mirrors giving the illusion of 'secure' communications.



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Re: [liberationtech] "Securing Email Communications from Facebook" offering PGP support

[Thomas Delrue]

On 06/01/2015 06:19 PM, z...@manian.org wrote:
> For their notification system, FB is leveraging GPG as an identity 
> provider to say" only a person who has a certain private key
> should be able to reset access credentials for this account".

I had not thought of this and I think that this is a good point.
I do however question whether this is the purpose of this feature, I
think it is more of a side-effect.

> On Mon, Jun 1, 2015 at 3:09 PM, Parker Higgins  
> wrote:
> 
>> On 06/01/2015 12:35 PM, Thomas Delrue wrote:
>>> On 06/01/2015 01:46 PM, Steve Weis wrote:
 Hi Libtech. Facebook added support to put a PGP public key
 to your profile and optionally use it to encrypt email 
 notifications that are sent to you:
 
>> https://www.facebook.com/notes/protect-the-graph/securing-email-communications-from-facebook/1611941762379302
>>>
>>
>> 
Forgive my ignorance but what is the point of this 'feature'?
>>> Wouldn't FB (and thus anyone able to coerce FB as well) still 
>>> have the unencrypted data?
>>> 
>>> Wooden leg, meet band-aid.
>> 
>> Facebook is offering end-to-end encryption. If you don't trust 
>> the other end of an end-to-end connection, this won't help that 
>> particular problem. But there are plenty of well-attested 
>> benefits of end-to-end encryption for all sorts of other 
>> threats.



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Re: [liberationtech] "Securing Email Communications from Facebook" offering PGP support

[Matt Mackall]

On Mon, 2015-06-01 at 18:26 -0400, Thomas Delrue wrote:
> On 06/01/2015 06:19 PM, z...@manian.org wrote:
> > For their notification system, FB is leveraging GPG as an identity 
> > provider to say" only a person who has a certain private key
> > should be able to reset access credentials for this account".
> 
> I had not thought of this and I think that this is a good point.
> I do however question whether this is the purpose of this feature, I
> think it is more of a side-effect.

Nope, it's two distinct features:

- enter your public key so it's displayed and downloadable from your
public profile
- check a separate box to enable encrypted notifications

Further, I'll note that you don't have to trust Facebook can't be
coerced for encrypted notifications to be useful. You just have to trust
that -your enemies- can't coerce them. For many of Facebook's 1.44
billion users, this is probably true.

-- 
Mathematics is the supreme nostalgia of our time.

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Re: [liberationtech] "Securing Email Communications from Facebook" offering PGP support

[Brian Conley]

" Further, I'll note that you don't have to trust Facebook can't be
coerced for encrypted notifications to be useful. You just have to trust
that -your enemies- can't coerce them. For many of Facebook's 1.44
billion users, this is probably true."

+1
On Jun 1, 2015 3:48 PM, "Matt Mackall"  wrote:

> On Mon, 2015-06-01 at 18:26 -0400, Thomas Delrue wrote:
> > On 06/01/2015 06:19 PM, z...@manian.org wrote:
> > > For their notification system, FB is leveraging GPG as an identity
> > > provider to say" only a person who has a certain private key
> > > should be able to reset access credentials for this account".
> >
> > I had not thought of this and I think that this is a good point.
> > I do however question whether this is the purpose of this feature, I
> > think it is more of a side-effect.
>
> Nope, it's two distinct features:
>
> - enter your public key so it's displayed and downloadable from your
> public profile
> - check a separate box to enable encrypted notifications
>
> Further, I'll note that you don't have to trust Facebook can't be
> coerced for encrypted notifications to be useful. You just have to trust
> that -your enemies- can't coerce them. For many of Facebook's 1.44
> billion users, this is probably true.
>
> --
> Mathematics is the supreme nostalgia of our time.
>
> --
> Liberationtech is public & archives are searchable on Google. Violations
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Re: [liberationtech] "Securing Email Communications from Facebook" offering PGP support

[Andrés Pacheco]

Hehehe, "smoke & mirrors!" Come on people! All these Internet Services freebies 
are all there to collect your private information! They can say whatever to 
keep you "comfortable," but that's it! They're still "hunters & gatherers!" ;-)



> On Jun 1, 2015, at 5:21 PM, Thomas Delrue  wrote:
> 
>> On 06/01/2015 06:09 PM, Parker Higgins wrote:
>>> On 06/01/2015 12:35 PM, Thomas Delrue wrote:
 On 06/01/2015 01:46 PM, Steve Weis wrote:
 Hi Libtech. Facebook added support to put a PGP public key to your
 profile and optionally use it to encrypt email notifications that are
 sent to you:
 https://www.facebook.com/notes/protect-the-graph/securing-email-communications-from-facebook/1611941762379302
>>> Forgive my ignorance but what is the point of this 'feature'?
>>> Wouldn't FB (and thus anyone able to coerce FB as well) still have the
>>> unencrypted data?
>>> 
>>> Wooden leg, meet band-aid.
>> 
>> Facebook is offering end-to-end encryption. If you don't trust the other
>> end of an end-to-end connection, this won't help that particular
>> problem. But there are plenty of well-attested benefits of end-to-end
>> encryption for all sorts of other threats.
> 
> I think this addresses my concern. Thank you Parker.
> Can you point me to resources of the benefits to me if I do indeed find
> myself in the situation of not trusting the other party.
> 
> The point I was trying to make (in a veiled way) was that FB should/can
> indeed not be trusted and I am therefore questioning the usefulness of
> this feature when it involves that site.
> 
> Sure, Google/Hotmail won't be able to scan your (now encrypted)
> GMail/Hotmail inbox notifications from FB and understand the content of
> them but to what purpose? Is FB just trying to prevent Google/Hotmail
> from gathering your FB 'graph'?
> On the other hand, for those communications where it matters that no-one
> else can see them, against whom is this protecting me?
> 
> I think that I still stand by my claim that this is nothing more but
> smoke and mirrors giving the illusion of 'secure' communications.
> 
> 
> 
> -- 
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Re: [liberationtech] "Securing Email Communications from Facebook" offering PGP support

[John Sullivan]

Thomas Delrue  writes:

> On 06/01/2015 06:19 PM, z...@manian.org wrote:
>> For their notification system, FB is leveraging GPG as an identity 
>> provider to say" only a person who has a certain private key
>> should be able to reset access credentials for this account".
>
> I had not thought of this and I think that this is a good point.
> I do however question whether this is the purpose of this feature, I
> think it is more of a side-effect.
>

It may also help them reduce phishing/spamming, if enough users use it
-- phony Facebook notifications are pretty common, and that's one thing
this addresses pretty well.

-john

-- 
John Sullivan | Executive Director, Free Software Foundation
GPG Key: 61A0963B | http://status.fsf.org/johns | http://fsf.org/blogs/RSS

Do you use free software? Donate to join the FSF and support freedom at
.
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Re: [liberationtech] "Securing Email Communications from Facebook" offering PGP support

[Parker Higgins]

On 06/01/2015 04:20 PM, John Sullivan wrote:
> Thomas Delrue  writes:
>
>> On 06/01/2015 06:19 PM, z...@manian.org wrote:
>>> For their notification system, FB is leveraging GPG as an identity 
>>> provider to say" only a person who has a certain private key
>>> should be able to reset access credentials for this account".
>> I had not thought of this and I think that this is a good point.
>> I do however question whether this is the purpose of this feature, I
>> think it is more of a side-effect.
>>
> It may also help them reduce phishing/spamming, if enough users use it
> -- phony Facebook notifications are pretty common, and that's one thing
> this addresses pretty well.
By the same token, another non-obvious problem this could address is
password resets. At first glance it looks like this effectively raises
the level of your (knowledge-factor) security from that of your email
inbox to that of your private key.

Thanks,
Parker

-- 
Parker Higgins
Director of Copyright Activism
Electronic Frontier Foundation
https://eff.org

815 Eddy Street
San Francisco, CA 94109-7701

I prefer to use encrypted email.

Public key: https://www.eff.org/files/2014/11/03/gphkey.txt
Fingerprint: 4FF3 AA1B D29E 1638 32DE C765 9433 5F88 9A36 7709

Learn how to encrypt your email with the Email Self Defense guide:
https://emailselfdefense.fsf.org/en/

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