Re: [liberationtech] The Internet Kill Switch; With Global Wiretapping Capability?

[Amin Sabeti]

It's so interesting! But for Yahoo it's not correct:

WHOIS information for yahoo.com:

[Querying whois.verisign-grs.com]
[whois.verisign-grs.com]
Whois Server Version 2.0
Domain names in the .com and .net domains can now be registered
with many different competing registrars. Go to http://www.internic.net
for detailed information.
   Domain Name: YAHOO.COM
   Registrar: MARKMONITOR INC.
   Whois Server: whois.markmonitor.com
   Referral URL: http://www.markmonitor.com
   Name Server: NS1.YAHOO.COM
   Name Server: NS2.YAHOO.COM
   Name Server: NS3.YAHOO.COM
   Name Server: NS4.YAHOO.COM
   Name Server: NS5.YAHOO.COM
   Status: clientDeleteProhibited
   Status: clientTransferProhibited
   Status: clientUpdateProhibited
   Status: serverDeleteProhibited
   Status: serverTransferProhibited
   Status: serverUpdateProhibited
   Updated Date: 18-dec-2011
   Creation Date: 18-jan-1995
   Expiration Date: 19-jan-2013

On 7 May 2012 10:40, Eugen Leitl  wrote:

>
> http://www.pastie.org/3867284
>
> The Internet Kill Switch; With Global Wiretapping Capability?
>
> One company to rule them all
> One company to find them;
> One company to bring them all
> And in the darkness bind them
>
>
> Recently run any whois queries on Google? No? How about Facebook? MSN, or
> Hotmail? Yahoo? You might be surprised, comparing the results.
>
> Nice, innit? See the "Last Updated" part also.
>
> The brand-protecting, anti-piracy company MarkMonitor Inc. has had all
> these DNS names under its control for several months now.
>
> They also control the Wikimedia name services, even though that doesn't
> show up on the Wikimedia.org whois record. There are many others. Apple.com
> falls under their jurisdiction, as does ubuntu.com. Nokia.com? Yep, under
> MarkMonitor. See a pattern here?
>
> MarkMonitor also is a trusted Certificate Authority; they have, in
> essence, the means to fabricate safe-looking SSL connections for you, to
> whichever host they want. Your browser will not sound any warnings of
> possible man-in-the-middle attacks.
>
> MarkMonitor is a company that can own most people's "Internet" in minutes.
> It now controls all three top free e-mail providers directly, and I suppose
> it's safe to say, most currently active social media sites too.
>
> See for yourself. Whois yahoo.com, whois google.com, whois gmail.com,
> whois facebook.com, whois fbcdn.com, whois hotmail.com, whois msn.com...
> the list seems endless.
>
>
> How'd all this happen?
>
> This company has acquired complete access to monitor, eavesdrop, censor
> and fake any user of these popular Internet services in about one year
> (2011). In almost complete silence. For several of the sites, it also
> provides "firewall proxy" services, which means it is actually paid to
> intercept all communications. In and out.
>
> The situation reminds me of Joseph Lieberman's 2010 initiative to create
> an "Internet kill switch" for the U.S.
>
> The government only needs to control this one company, and most social
> media, most free e-mail, most search engines will be under its control. Not
> to mention most operating systems, for both computers and mobile devices.
>
> Not only inside U.S., but globally. One company to rule them all.
>
> I, for one, would like to ask; WTF is going on? How did these guys, this
> relatively small domain-hogging and pirate-chasing company, get the
> resources to simply acquire the DNS records of all the most popular
> Internet services? How can this be so totally ignored by the media, and
> even privacy advocates? Even conspiracy theorists seem to be completely
> ignoring the situation.
>
>
> Secure communication is an illusion
>
> Only one company to rule them all? As if all this doesn't sound bad
> enough, the problem is far more widespread. MarkMonitor could easily act as
> a global "kill switch" for the sites under its rule. But as it turns out,
> most anyone with some resources could just as easily impersonate
> MarkMonitor itself.
>
> Because, as one might have noticed in the past few months, the whole SSL
> certificate scheme is broken. Not in a technical sense - there's no known
> inherent weakness in the algorithms. But the whole SSL protection is based
> on trust, and that trust has failed us.
>
> According to several sources, SSL CA certs are routinely given out to
> anyone willing to pay for them. As The Register points out in its analysis
> on TrustWave spying scandal:
>
> "Those defending Trustwave suggested that other vendors probably used the
> same approach for so-called "data loss prevention" environments - systems
> that inspect information flowing through a network to prevent leaks of
> commercially sensitive data."
> ...
> "In fact Geotrust was openly advertising a 'Georoot' product on their
> website until fairly recently."
>
> http://www.theregister.co.uk/2012/02/14/trustwave_analysis/
>
> Oh, so the ability to impersonate anyone is normal day-to-day practise for
> big business? Just imagine what government agencies must

[liberationtech] [SPAM:#] LGBT in Iran and Internet

[Amin Sabeti]

An interesting research about how LGBT in Iran are using internet...
Read here:
http://issuu.com/smallmedia/docs/lgbtrepublic?mode=window&backgroundColor=%2322

Download here: http://smallmediafoundation.com/files/LGBTRepublicofIran.pdf

Amin
Hear the voices of LGBT activists and (extra) ordinary LGBT Iranians



You are invited on the eve of IDAHO (the International Day Against
Homophobia, Biphobia and Transphobia)

*Wednesday May 16 at 6:30pm *
Amnesty International's Human Rights Action Centre, 17-25 New Inn Yard,
London, EC2A 3EA. Map:goo.gl/eS9C7

Small Media and the Peter Tatchell Foundation are hosting an event the
evening before IDAHO to celebrate the launch of "LGBT Republic of Iran", a
Small Media report that documents the views of a diverse range of LGBT
Iranians who have lived under the repressive and homophobic Iranian regime.

*Read the report online here:* goo.gl/D3l5r

The event includes an overview of the report's findings by Small Media's
Director of Operations, Dr Bronwen Robertson, a music performance from
Iranian guitarist Ramtin Montazemi, a Q&A panel of Iranian experts
moderated by the Guardian’s Brian Whitaker, a poetry reading of work by
Iranian LGBT literary activists, a short video screening about LGBT asylum
seekers in Turkey, and video messages from LGBT Iranians enduring the
repression of the Iranian government. Plus lesbian activist Shadi Amin,
human rights lawyer Mehri Jafari and journalist for the Guardian Saeed
Kamali Dehghan.

You are welcome to join us. Admission is free. But you need to reserve your
attendance in advance. Please register here: goo.gl/ZLjRL

*More information* from Bronwen Robertson: bron...@smallmedia.org.uk 0753
120 3113


*LGBT Iranians are suffering at the hands of the Iranian government. The
authorities repress and entrap them online, they are ostracised from
society, and find little solace in the asylum-seeking process.*


LGBT Iranians are routinely harassed both by society and by the state. Many
have been physically tortured and punished and some have been sentenced to
death solely because of their sexual orientation. One of the few ways LGBT
Iranians can express their true selves, find valuable information about
sexuality, health and identity, and build a sense of community is through
the internet, the use of which is also inherently dangerous in the Islamic
Republic of Iran.

*Quotes:*

*Bronwen Robertson, Director of Operations, Small Media*

"As a lesbian who lived in Iran for more than a year, I know first-hand how
oppressive Iranian society and the regime can be. This research report was
a passion project for me.

"The threat of the 'national internet', which has been a hot topic in the
media of late, is very real for Iran's minority communities, and because
Small Media believes in the power of technology to affect change, we are
particularly concerned at the heightened repression of online activity in
the Islamic Republic of Iran.

"The voices in our report cry out for action. Not only do LGBT Iranians
feel excluded from their society, they also fear entrapment and risk severe
punishments, such as torture and even death.

"In 2007, Ahmadinejad famously denied the existence of homosexuals in Iran.
But what thrives beneath the densely woven fabric of the regime are vibrant
LGBT communities who need our help".

*Peter Tatchell, Director of the Peter Tatchell Foundation*

"This is an extraordinary report which documents the normally hidden,
silenced voices of LGBT Iranians. These are moving personal testimonies of
the isolation, fear, alienation, suffering, rage and defiance of sexual
minorities living under the harsh homophobic rule of the Islamic Republic
of Iran.

"They show that despite state repression and the frequent compromises they
are forced to make to protect themselves, many Iranian LGBTs manage to get
on with their lives and to forge a sense of community and solidarity.

"The Peter Tatchell Foundation is honoured to work with Small Media to help
raise awareness of the lives and aspirations of LGBT Iranians - to give
them a platform to speak for themselves."

*Gay male, 26 years old, from Bandar Anzal*i

"If I said I saw myself as being part of this society, I’d be telling the
biggest lie of my life. I don’t see myself as part of this society at all.
That’s because of my homosexuality and the Iranian people’s mentality about
homosexuality … I usually refer to Iran as ‘your country’ instead of ‘my
country’ or ‘our country’ ... Words can’t describe how important the
internet is for me … Because I live in a really small city, where the
homosexual community (if there even is one in our city!) is very very
secretive … the only way for me is the internet"

*Male to female transsexual, 26 years old, from Lorestan*

"I am a human being, but I was created with an imperfection. I’m someone
that nobody wants to be friends with, someone that even her own family
doesn’t like … Nobody will employ me because of the way that I am … I long
to b

[liberationtech] How LGBT are using internet in Iran?

[Amin Sabeti]

An interesting research about how LGBT in Iran are using internet:
http://smallmediafoundation.com/files/LGBTRepublicofIran.pdf

Amin
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[liberationtech] Iranian Conservative Bloggers - April 2012

[Amin Sabeti]

Good piece about conservative bloggers in Persian cyberspace:
http://storify.com/smallmedia/iranian-conservative-bloggers-april-2012
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Re: [liberationtech] Iranian Conservative Bloggers - April 2012

[Amin Sabeti]

In general, the best definition is Conservative because some of them want
free market, internet without filtering, etc. and some of them not. They
are not like a bulk and there are lots of opinions amongst them. I think
Conservative is the best definition.

Amin

On 21 May 2012 21:08, elham gheytanchi  wrote:

>
> Wish they had defined "conservative bloggers" more clearly. In Persian we
> call a whole range of ideologies conservative: does the report mean
> Islamists/fundamentalists or those who are politically conservative? None
> of the groups have a conservative take on the economy- i.e. free market,
> etc.
>
> Best,
> elham gheytanchi
>
>
> --
> From: aminsab...@gmail.com
> Date: Mon, 21 May 2012 14:58:10 +0100
> To: liberationtech@lists.stanford.edu
> Subject: [liberationtech] Iranian Conservative Bloggers - April 2012
>
>
> Good piece about conservative bloggers in Persian cyberspace:
> http://storify.com/smallmedia/iranian-conservative-bloggers-april-2012
>
> ___ liberationtech mailing
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Re: [liberationtech] Websites blocked in UAE with Netsweeper

[Amin Sabeti]

Kaspersky said the link is not secure and it's phishing URL!

A

On 29 June 2012 17:06, Pranesh Prakash  wrote:

> Dear all,
> @Isac_anon and @Juzzy0 who work as Anonymous discovered this while snooping
> around Netsweeper's products:
>
> Main list of sites blocked in the UAE: http://goo.gl/wtxoB
> Secondary list, with pattern blocking: http://goo.gl/WaAb2
>
> Summary:
> * There were ALOTT of pornographic, sexual related (even Sex ED!!)
> * Dating sites and freaking MATRIMONIAL sites !! blocked!!
> * Any article, website, Facebook group etc. that is critical of the
> Government...
> * Sites that help bypass censorship I.E Proxies, VPN providers etc.
> * Support sites of religion's other than Islam ... eg:
> biblestudylessons.com etc.
> * The most shocking lots and lots of VOIP sites the reason is explained
> below
>
>
> Link to Anon statement: http://goo.gl/jmxd3
>
> Cheers,
> Pranesh
>
> --
> Pranesh Prakash  · Programme Manager · Centre for Internet and Society
> @pranesh_prakash · PGP ID 0x1D5C5F07 · http://cis-india.org
>
>
>
> ___
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Re: [liberationtech] Websites blocked in UAE with Netsweeper

[Amin Sabeti]

Here the reason:

The requested URL cannot be provided

*URL:*

http://pastehtml.com/raw/c3321xhl7.rtxt

*Blocked by Web Anti-Virus*

Reason: phishing URL

Detect method: databases

A

On 1 July 2012 14:38,  wrote:

> On Sun, Jul 01, 2012 at 12:37:38AM +0100, aminsab...@gmail.com wrote 6.2K
> bytes in 169 lines about:
> : Kaspersky said the link is not secure and it's phishing URL!
>
> Does it say why it's not secure and a phishing url? A quick glance
> shows it redirects to a pastehtml.com page with a few frames, some
> google-analytics, disqus frame, and some javascript calls to an
> auto-page-view counter.
>
> The first goo.gl link goes to http://pastehtml.com/view/c3321xhl7.rtxt
> Note that this is not a text file as one may expect in a quick glance.
>
> --
> Andrew
> http://tpo.is/contact
> pgp 0x6B4D6475
> ___
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[liberationtech] The Internet: A New Battleground for Conservative Politicians in Iran

[Amin Sabeti]

The internet, a highly contentious topic in Iran, is a site of frequent
dispute amongst the ruling establishment. In this report, Small Media
discusses a recent article about the Iranian government's internet strategy
published by Alef news, along with reactions to this article.

http://storify.com/smallmedia/alef-news-and-the-internet
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[liberationtech] A New Era for Iran’s Conservative Bloggers: Filtering, Detention, Prison

[Amin Sabeti]

The western media and scholarly community propagate the myth that
conservative bloggers are completely supported by the Iranian government,
but the reality is that many who comprise this subsector of Iranian
cyberspace have also been under intense pressure for their online
activities.
http://storify.com/smallmedia/a-new-era-for-iran-s-conservative-bloggers-filteri
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Re: [liberationtech] Liberationtech Mailing List Survey

[Amin Sabeti]

   - Would you like to make the Liberationtech archives *public* or *private
   *?
  - Public
  - *Private*
   - Should reply-to's be sent to the *entire list* or the *individual
   sender*?
  - *Entire List*
  - Individual Sender
   - Should we reduce or eliminate the list-email signature text?
  - Keep text signature as is
  - *Add  "-- " prior to text signature to enable auto-hiding*


On 20 August 2012 17:03,  wrote:

> On Fri, 10 Aug 2012 12:50:58 -0700
> Yosem Companys  wrote:
> > *SURVEY:*
> >
> >- Would you like to make the Liberationtech archives *public* or
> > *private *?
> >   - Public
> >   - Private
>
>
> Public
>
> >- Should reply-to's be sent to the *entire list* or the *individual
> >sender*?
> >   - Entire List
> >   - Individual Sender
> >- Should we reduce or eliminate the list-email signature text?
> >   - Keep text signature as is
> >   - Add  "-- " prior to text signature to enable auto-hiding in
> > most mailers
> >   - Eliminate text signature completely
>
> Entire list and add "--".
>
> >   - Private means that we would make the archives private and, if
> >   possible, add Internet standard email headers or robot
> > exclusions to restrict or prohibit archiving.  Mailing list
> > guidelines would also be amended to reflect the change.
>
> You would also need a policy on how to deal with people who forward or
> mirror the list content and archives.
>
> --
> Andrew
> http://tpo.is/contact
> pgp 0x6B4D6475
> ___
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[liberationtech] An interesting report about the Iranian conservative bloggers

[Amin Sabeti]

Hi,

Small Media has published a monthly report about the
Iranian conservative bloggers. The last report is about London Olympic 2012
and the next presidential election in Iran:
http://storify.com/smallmedia/iranian-conservative-bloggers-july-august-1

I strongly suggest to read this report that it gives you a new view about
this part of the Persian blogosphere that there isn't enough information.

Previous reports:
http://storify.com/smallmedia/iranian-conservative-bloggers-july-august
http://storify.com/smallmedia/conservative-bloggers-may-june
http://storify.com/smallmedia/iranian-conservative-bloggers-april-may-2012
http://storify.com/smallmedia/iranian-conservative-bloggers-april-2012

A
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Re: [liberationtech] Help Translate Cryptocat 2

[Amin Sabeti]

Cool :) I'll do the Persian language ;)

Amin

On 19 September 2012 14:36, Nadim Kobeissi  wrote:

> Dear friends,
> The Cryptocat Project needs your help with translating Cryptocat version
> 2 into more than 12 languages for our upcoming release. Languages
> include Catalan, Arabic, Chinese, Persian and more.
>
> You can easily help and contribute your translation online at
> https://www.transifex.com/projects/p/Cryptocat/ using an easy-to-use
> interface. The amount of strings we need translated is quite small and
> I'm sure each translation wouldn't take you more than 20 minutes if you
> know the language!
>
> Please help out by clicking the link above or share the link with your
> linguistically-savvy friends. Every translation is a huge help!
>
> Thanks very much,
> NK
> --
> Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password at:
> https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech
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Re: [liberationtech] Help Translate Cryptocat 2

[Amin Sabeti]

I tried to start but I couldn't. It seems the translation option is locked!

A

On 19 September 2012 14:36, Nadim Kobeissi  wrote:

> Dear friends,
> The Cryptocat Project needs your help with translating Cryptocat version
> 2 into more than 12 languages for our upcoming release. Languages
> include Catalan, Arabic, Chinese, Persian and more.
>
> You can easily help and contribute your translation online at
> https://www.transifex.com/projects/p/Cryptocat/ using an easy-to-use
> interface. The amount of strings we need translated is quite small and
> I'm sure each translation wouldn't take you more than 20 minutes if you
> know the language!
>
> Please help out by clicking the link above or share the link with your
> linguistically-savvy friends. Every translation is a huge help!
>
> Thanks very much,
> NK
> --
> Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password at:
> https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech
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Re: [liberationtech] Help Translate Cryptocat 2

[Amin Sabeti]

Cool and thanks :)

On 19 September 2012 14:55, Nadim Kobeissi  wrote:

> You've been given access!
>
> NK
>
> On 9/19/2012 9:43 AM, Amin Sabeti wrote:
> > I tried to start but I couldn't. It seems the translation option is
> locked!
> >
> > A
> >
> > On 19 September 2012 14:36, Nadim Kobeissi  > <mailto:na...@nadim.cc>> wrote:
> >
> > Dear friends,
> > The Cryptocat Project needs your help with translating Cryptocat
> version
> > 2 into more than 12 languages for our upcoming release. Languages
> > include Catalan, Arabic, Chinese, Persian and more.
> >
> > You can easily help and contribute your translation online at
> > https://www.transifex.com/projects/p/Cryptocat/ using an easy-to-use
> > interface. The amount of strings we need translated is quite small
> and
> > I'm sure each translation wouldn't take you more than 20 minutes if
> you
> > know the language!
> >
> > Please help out by clicking the link above or share the link with
> your
> > linguistically-savvy friends. Every translation is a huge help!
> >
> > Thanks very much,
> > NK
> > --
> > Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password at:
> > https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech
> >
> >
> >
> >
> > --
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Re: [liberationtech] Help Translate Cryptocat 2

[Amin Sabeti]

The Persian translation is done...

Amin

On 19 September 2012 16:00, Joanne Michele  wrote:

> I have a contact from Catalunya. I'll see if he can help.
>
> On Wed, Sep 19, 2012 at 10:15 AM, Nadim Kobeissi  wrote:
>
>> I should note that we urgently need the CATALAN translation done more
>> than any other. If you can help with that or know someone who speaks
>> Catalan, please contribute:
>> https://www.transifex.com/projects/p/Cryptocat/resource/cryptocat/
>>
>> NK
>>
>> On 9/19/2012 9:55 AM, Nadim Kobeissi wrote:
>> > You've been given access!
>> >
>> > NK
>> >
>> > On 9/19/2012 9:43 AM, Amin Sabeti wrote:
>> >> I tried to start but I couldn't. It seems the translation option is
>> locked!
>> >>
>> >> A
>> >>
>> >> On 19 September 2012 14:36, Nadim Kobeissi > >> <mailto:na...@nadim.cc>> wrote:
>> >>
>> >> Dear friends,
>> >> The Cryptocat Project needs your help with translating Cryptocat
>> version
>> >> 2 into more than 12 languages for our upcoming release. Languages
>> >> include Catalan, Arabic, Chinese, Persian and more.
>> >>
>> >> You can easily help and contribute your translation online at
>> >> https://www.transifex.com/projects/p/Cryptocat/ using an
>> easy-to-use
>> >> interface. The amount of strings we need translated is quite small
>> and
>> >> I'm sure each translation wouldn't take you more than 20 minutes
>> if you
>> >> know the language!
>> >>
>> >> Please help out by clicking the link above or share the link with
>> your
>> >> linguistically-savvy friends. Every translation is a huge help!
>> >>
>> >> Thanks very much,
>> >> NK
>> >> --
>> >> Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password at:
>> >> https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech
>> >>
>> >>
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> --
>> >> Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password at:
>> https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech
>> >>
>> --
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>
>
>
> --
> Joanne
>
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Re: [liberationtech] Viber is secure?

[Amin Sabeti]

Thanks guys, I sent an email to Viber and I haven't received any responses
from them.

Nathan is there any chances you or your colleagues test it and publish the
result? Because it so popular amongst the Iranian activists.

Thanks,

A

On 21 September 2012 01:04, Eric S Johnson  wrote:

> Popular in Ethiopia too (where I was, last week).
>
> ** **
>
> PGP<http://keyserver.pgp.com/vkd/DownloadKey.event?keyid=0xE0F58E0F1AF7E6F2>
> 
>
> ** **
>
> *From:* liberationtech-boun...@lists.stanford.edu [mailto:
> liberationtech-boun...@lists.stanford.edu] *On Behalf Of *Amin Sabeti
> *Sent:* Thursday, 20 September 2012 23:07
> *To:* Liberation Technologies
> *Subject:* [liberationtech] Viber is secure?
>
> ** **
>
> Hey LibTech,
>
> ** **
>
> At this time, Viber (http://www.viber.com/) is so popular amongst the
> Iranian people and it is one of the popular communication ways in Iran. **
> **
>
> ** **
>
> I was wondering to know this app is secure or not? The data is encrypted
> or not?
>
> ** **
>
> Thanks,
>
> ** **
>
> Amin
>
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[liberationtech] Iran blocks MP3, MP4, AVI and SWF files

[Amin Sabeti]

Iran's Filtering Committee is continuing to find innovative ways of
broadening the reach of online censorship in the Islamic Republic. This
week they implemented a protocol that prevents audiovisual material hosted
on external servers from entering Iran. Small Media reports.

http://storify.com/smallmedia/iran-blocks-mp3-mp4-avi-and-swf-files
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Re: [liberationtech] Uncensored Sina Weibo Search

[Amin Sabeti]

Hi,

The idea is so interesting and I like it.

Thanks to share it.

A

On 13 October 2012 06:53, Martin Johnson  wrote:

> As you know, Twitter, Facebook, Google+ etc are all blocked in China.
> Hundreds of millions of Chinese netizens use local microblogs, but these
> are all subject to strict self-censorship rules. The biggest one is Sina
> Weibo. We've identified more than 2000 keywords that users are not allowed
> to search for (https://en.greatfire.org/search/weibo-searches). But what
> if you could indeed search for these? What would you find?
>
> We've just created an uncensored version of Weibo Search:
> https://freeweibo.com. We mix the latest results (for keywords that
> aren't blocked) with cached results coming from the WeiboScope project as
> well as our own database. All in all, you can now find results for most
> keywords that you can't search for on Sina Weibo's official search.
>
> We put the website up on Thursday this week. Yesterday, TechInAsia wrote
> about our service (
> http://www.techinasia.com/free-weibo-totally-uncensored-sina-weibo-search/)
> as well as Solidot (
> http://internet.solidot.org/article.pl?sid=12/10/12/0511228). We got
> 1000+ visits in the first full day of existence, most of them from
> China. It's probably just a question of time before the site is blocked
> here, but we can always put up mirror sites.
>
> Your comments and ideas are much appreciated.
>
> https://freeweibo.com
>
> --
> Best
> Martin Johnson
> ---
> https://greatfire.org - Bringing Transparency To The Great Firewall Of
> China.
> @GreatFireChina (Twitter)
> https://plus.google.com/105751215620515077786
>
>
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Re: [liberationtech] safegmail-is-a-simple-way-to-encrypt-messages-in-gmail

[Amin Sabeti]

My question is why I should allow the extension to access to my inbox?

On 23 October 2012 13:32, Alec Muffett  wrote:

>
> without comment, endorsement or criticism, i mention:
>
>
> http://lifehacker.com/5953795/safegmail-is-a-simple-way-to-encrypt-messages-in-gmail
>
> i'll note however that it's open source, therefore it's secure. 
>
> -a
>
> --
> http://dropsafe.crypticide.com/aboutalecm
>
>
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Re: [liberationtech] OkayFreedom

[Amin Sabeti]

There are lots of reasons. For example one of them is it's FREE and another
one is sometimes some VPNs are working in Iran and some of them not. Also,
the Iranian people have trust to the foreign VPNs more than the reseller
inside Iran.

A

On 25 October 2012 17:40, micah anderson  wrote:

> Amin Sabeti  writes:
>
> > Some users from inside Iran have used OkayFreedom VPN:
> > http://www.okayfreedom.com/
> >
> > I'd like to know is it secure or not? Because I haven't read any news,
> > review, etc. about it.
>
> Personally, I agree with you that like using unknown VPNs is a
> concern. However, it might be better to ask those people why they chose
> that VPN, maybe they know someone running it, or have some other reason
> why?
>
> micah
>
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[liberationtech] OkayFreedom

[Amin Sabeti]

Hi team,

Some users from inside Iran have used OkayFreedom VPN:
http://www.okayfreedom.com/

I'd like to know is it secure or not? Because I haven't read any news,
review, etc. about it.

Cheers,

Amin
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Re: [liberationtech] OkayFreedom

[Amin Sabeti]

On 25 October 2012 21:26, hellekin  wrote:

> -BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-
> Hash: SHA256
>
> On 10/25/2012 02:07 PM, micah anderson wrote:
> >
> > full disclosure: i'm with riseup (and consider myself
> > trustworthy!), and I know a lot of activists also have a high
> > degree of trust in the work we do at riseup, perhaps partially
> > because we've been around for 12 years and have a lot of history
> > with social movements.
> >
> *** History is how trust grows within networks. I completely agree
> with the importance of that factor in choosing to cooperate (use that
> network) or defect.
>
> >
> > Issues of trust
> >
> *** Many factors come into play when you have to make a choice: among
> them, ignorance, emulation, and necessity (or the feeling of it) can
> put a lot of people in danger. Cooperate-first is a common strategy
> that's rewarding when it works, and, in that case, can be devastating
> when it fails. But you can't avoid people "feeling lucky".
>
> How to raise awareness of relevant information in a noisy, saturated,
> but distributed environment, so that it reaches the right people when
> they need it?
>
> For example, one of the most visible resources on using VPN services
> does not mention Riseup[1].
>
> (the following are hints to evaluate the danger, not in any case a
> statement that the software is insecure.)
>
> Steganos Software, the maker of OkayFreedom, is a German company, and
> has been around since 1996.
>
> As a Microsoft Partner, Steganos makes software for running on
> Microsoft's proprietary operating system as administrator.
>
> The OkayFreedom proprietary client program is available for download
> on major (commercial) software providers.
>
> It allows to "invite friends" by providing their email address,
> Facebook or Twitter accounts, in order to get "bonus traffic"
> (otherwise limited to 1GB per month in the gratis version). So,
> there's an incentive to go viral in order to augment the transmission
> capacity, which can help explain its popularity.
> *If I understand correctly, actually the VPN is not free! am I right?*



>
> In case of the user's device is confiscated by the police, usage of
> the software is not deniable.
>
> (disclaimer: I'm not a lawyer, so take the following with a mountain
> of salt.)
>
> Article 5.1 of the Terms of Service[1] seems to provide legal ground
> for Iran to sue Steganos Software, and forbid Iranians from further
> using the service, but that remains to be seen in a German court.
>
> The Terms of Service of OkayFreedom state that they restrict "the
> usage of OkayFreedom in any way that violates valid laws or
> regulations." It does not mention anything about jurisdiction, so the
> Iranian government could theoretically sue Steganos Software in
> Germany and eventually obtain some user data (email if transmitted) if
> so compelled by a German court of law--unlikely, but not excluded.
>
> In another point, users are held responsible for any damage they might
> cause to any third party while using the service: if Iran sues the
> company, and wins, the company can in turn sue its users according to
> the terms of their license agreement.
>
> How the company identifies the client for legal purpose, etc., remains
> unclear: it could be a unique client identifier, and what data is
> linked to that is unknown...
> **



> *I can say in worse scenario the Iranian government can obtain details of
> some users and it's possible because Germany and Iran has a good
> relationship! Therefore, this VPN is not a good option.*
>
> Regards,
>
> ==
> hk
>
> [1] http://en.flossmanuals.net/bypassing-censorship/ch025_what-is-vpn/
> [2] http://www.okayfreedom.com/tos/
>
> P.S.: I shamelessly say https://help.riseup.net/en/donate
> -BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-
> Version: GnuPG v1.4.12 (GNU/Linux)
> Comment: Using GnuPG with Mozilla - http://enigmail.mozdev.org/
>
> iQIcBAEBCAAGBQJQiaBZAAoJEDhjYTkcokoT1SgP/RZkLX+SSsyDcQguwR5zhl8S
> tOAP1nm4dAp8ekWvpRjy6nseW5F30C46glNOZcJmqquMcil4EIDhlUv0B1krCj3O
> KkIS1rIHcFu+6pROwWRkdEiNxhvBxS6nYEvaAZz3cTmfN2a40oCwjFtIhBZmc22+
> Zw5s5xXjyqGSd2vcK8KfwD2/mM03/DL3TYr9tOdRrOjgvvA26otU3zva6TaYHpK8
> biDdweeVWi/QHiGvCFgXsavWaUCVD9O3x6S9ECXfCZ8KPGHCkk5pA13zpopkcoft
> ihCUpUfOLGxFrletfSW8gq+LnfR3soMuzA/Hv+/7SqfBfKVQT9oYbZcdt57KU7VH
> KNx3SDgax0x9T90QsTxFALt2yBeKDAU91G4lGuArxPs4HuXiXTsbgidE2Z4zSRze
> n+Krpn0+1BsRolVsRXnkHHYLWQV0Og+OeboM0vzKLvwFpQ2QfrDunqHQuCPNX3+/
> VHTCF4sMYr7DgE5xfVpt3mtVlwu43y6Kju9mZkJi1RZTEgovu5wd2Lx5vUuy0ZDw
> 1hWevtdAQjgoSz8QBorhuwlPqSdI0/Te8dZyiRTo9CZ2jzIODjd9ENtB6FLBGKcC
> 0aWrCqmCR0q/Dxn7e8EFxEVdmKd0zux4SBhVcOvo7bbRr4W0NvJevuFyyGeKPgin
> +huXg9zHZzFZwRjfNhb3
> =d2dp
> -END PGP SIGNATURE-
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Re: [liberationtech] Upcoming CIMA Events

[Amin Sabeti]

Is it possible to watch them live stream?

A

Sent from my iPhone

On 27 Oct 2012, at 14:54, Yosem Companys  wrote:

> Adapting Social Media to Promote Credible Elections in Low Technology 
> Countries
> Tuesday, October 30, 2012
> 12:30 p.m.
> Host: Berkman Center for Internet & Society
> Featuring: Oluwaseun Odewale, Berkman Center Fellow
> Location: Berkman Center for Internet & Society, 23 Everett St, 2nd Floor
> Registration 
> Webcast 
>  
> Cybersecurity Summit
> October 31, 2012
> 8:00 a.m. - 2:00 p.m.
> Host: Washington Post
> Location: Washington Post, 1150 15th Street NW
> Register
>  
> Rumor as Resistance  
> November 1, 2012
> 4:30 p.m. - 6:00 p.m.
> Host: Center on Democracy, Development, and the Rule of Law
> Featuring: Jun Liu, Visiting Researcher, Stanford University
> Location: Wallenberg Theater, Wallenberg Hall, 450 Serra Mall, Building 160, 
> Stanford, CA 94305-2055
>  
> Reaping the Dividends of M-PESA: Mobile Money and its Applications in East 
> Africa  
> November 8, 2012
> 4:30 p.m. - 6:00 p.m.
> Host: Center on Democracy, Development, and the Rule of Law
> Featuring: Tavneet Suri, Assistant Professor of Applied Economics, MIT
> Location: Wallenberg Theater, Wallenberg Hall, 450 Serra Mall, Building 160, 
> Stanford, CA 94305-2055
> 
> Measuring Your Social Media Impact
> Friday, November 09, 2012
> 2:00 p.m.
> Host: Poynter News University
> Instructor: Ellyn Angelotti, Faculty, Digital Trends and Social Media, 
> Poynter Institute
> Register 
>   
> If you'd like to have your digital media event included in the next Digital 
> Media Mash Up, email c...@ned.org.
> 
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Re: [liberationtech] OkayFreedom

[Amin Sabeti]

Thanks Jake. I liked the analysis. I'll post about it in Farsi based on all
discussions around this VPN.

A

On 28 October 2012 00:12, Jacob Appelbaum  wrote:

> Nadim Kobeissi:
> > Nice analysis.
>
> These are just data points that clearly have no meaning. None at all.
> Why, if only a bug would tell me that it was exploitable, I still
> wouldn't believe it! Why are you convinced?!
>
> > Pursuant to this, I think downgrading this project from
> > OkayFreedom to MehFreedom would be more suitable.
>
> I'm just not sure - I mean, we have no evidence that computers or
> software used for security by high risk activists has ever been
> compromised. I think you're really jumping the gun by downgrading from
> Okay to Meh. So paranoid. Please Nadim, try to be serious. Next you'll
> mention JavaScript crypto and tell me that even *you* have concerns!
>
> (* I mean, really, I hope you're laughing now because everything above
> this part of the email is parody, a joke, a sad sad but oh so true joke. *)
>
> Sarcastically but without a hint of bitterness,
> Jake
>
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Re: [liberationtech] OkayFreedom

[Amin Sabeti]

Then I will wait for your post and then post in Farsi about it.

Thanks Nadim.

A

On 29 October 2012 01:58, Nadim Kobeissi  wrote:

> Hm. I'm frustrated by Eric's reply to the point where I'm going to do a
> complete audit of OkayFreedom and post any vulnerabilities and exploits
> I may find in public on my blog, including detailed instructions on how
> to break everything.
>
> Expect something within weeks.
> NK
>
> On 10/28/2012 9:46 PM, Eric S Johnson wrote:
> >> misremember the entire discussion; it happens to all of us!
> >
> > I imagine we each remember what best supports our own point of view. I'm
> > sure it happens to all of us!
> >
> >> open at the moment for those in the US is if we will have some kind of
> >> justice for this spying on all of us. It sure seems bleak.
> >
> > Yes, it does. I hope all the Amcits on this list have voted (or will do
> so)!
> >
> >> to make their own choices, to show data and stories about lessons we've
> >> learned the hard way, and when we are able, to offer solidarity where it
> >> is possible and welcome.
> >> What matters is that users must be protected against serious
> >> attackers.
> >
> > Agreed.
> >
> >> I personally feel like it is often suggested
> >> that the burden to show something is unsafe is on us.
> >
> > You assume everything is unsafe. Saying "telephones are dangerous. VPNs
> are
> > dangerous. Anything Microsoft is dangerous. Everything's
> dangerous"--well,
> > okay, sure, so is walking across the street (let alone just breathing,
> > especially for those of us who live in China). But if you have only ten
> > minutes to get this journo in Gyanja, Gomel, or Gonder to do something
> > different, even you (let alone the rest of us relative neophytes) aren't
> > going to be able to get him using TAILS. So, we have to prioritise.
> >   One way to prioritise is to assign various levels of likelihood to
> > the possible threats. And one way to do that, in turn, is to assess what
> we
> > do know about the threats which have proven problematic in the past.
> Sure,
> > we don't know what we don't know: epistemology and all that. But we can
> > tally up what we have learned, and use that as a basis, however
> imperfect,
> > for saying to the activist from Gweru: if we only have ten minutes, the
> goal
> > is to move toward mitigating problem X (and we'll only be able to provide
> > the simple solution which takes partial care of the problem--not a
> solution
> > which would keep the NSA off Jake's back, but a solution which is likely
> to
> > make this particular person safer). If we have an hour, we should be
> able to
> > help mitigate X, Y, and Z. Ideally, we'll have three days, and then we
> can
> > help mitigate all 15 top problems.
> >   To "there's no point in anything less than perfection"--well, yes,
> > we'll have to agree to disagree on that. I think there's huge value in
> > getting someone to use a solution which is "more secure" in their
> particular
> > context (ideally we get that knowledge from on-the-ground research in
> > addition to reports in Western media), even if it's not a perfect
> solution.
> >
> > What I don't get is why you work so hard to discredit folks rather than
> > educating them. All of us on this list know you're a God (despite your
> > sarcastic "perhaps I'm just dense"). We all understand you know more
> about
> > cybersecurity and cybersurveillance (never mind that you hate certain
> words)
> > than the rest of us combined. Everyone loves gaining from your experience
> > (e.g. (just to name the most recent examples) your teardown of
> OkayFreedom,
> > the VPN security paper to which you referred a couple days ago, etc.).
> >
> > Best,
> > Eric
> >
> > --
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Re: [liberationtech] Syria's Digital Proxy War | The Atlantic

[Amin Sabeti]

I read the article but I have some problems with the Iran's part. I'm not
expert in Syria issues, but I know the situation in Iran.

I completely agree Iran has a sophisticated censorship system on the
internet but I don't have one case that the Iran's regime tracks the user
remotely. I mean there isn't any piece of evidence that pro-regime hackers
sit in their room and then decide to breach to Mr. X's computer.

For the Iran's national internet, I'm wondering why all media from Iran to
western talk about something that Iran hasn't its infrastructures! In
reality, Iran can have the internal network for its safety against
cyberattacks like Stuxnet or Flame, but it is IMPOSSIBLE that Iran can cut
the internet permanently. In worse scenario, if Iran can cut the internet
for short time. For example, for two or three days but it's not possible to
cut the internet forever.

Cheers,

Amin

On 1 November 2012 20:19, Rachel Fredman  wrote:

> Of interest to many on this list:
>
> Syria's Digital Proxy War By Sean Lyngaas
>
> *Iran and the United States are squaring off in a life-or-death battle
> for information.*
> [image: RTR2YJLN-615.jpg]
> A Free Syrian Army fighter speaks on a radio in al Qusayr. (Goran
> Tomasevic/Reuters)
>
> There is a proxy war going on in Syria, one measured in megabytes rather
> than in arms. On one side, Iran is providing Bashar al-Assad's regime with
> the tools of digital dictatorship to locate and bait the Syrian opposition.
> On the other side, the United States is trying to help the opposition
> protect itself from such attacks and set up alternate channels of
> communication. The outcome of this proxy war will affect the lives of many
> Syrians and the credibility of the State Department's efforts to promote
> digital freedom internationally.
>
> The Syrian regime has long been interested in improving its online
> repression. Dlshad Othman, a member of the Syrian opposition and an
> Internet expert, says that in recent years the regime has sent its
> bureaucrats abroad for technical training in places like Dubai. But Assad's
> censorship efforts remained clumsy and at times ineffectual until the
> uprising against him began last year. He then re-opened social media to the
> public in order to better monitor and crush dissent, and confided in the
> Iranian Ministry of Intelligence and Security for surveillance techniques.
> We are now seeing Iran's sophisticated online crackdown on its own Green
> Movement in 2009 being applied by Assad in Syria. Pro-regime hackers pose
> as 
> dissidentsin
>  chat rooms to lure and locate the opposition before gunmen are
> dispatched to kill them.
>
> Contrary to recent reports that the Syrian regime could unplug the country
> from the web entirely, Assad considers the Internet a vital tool to winning
> the civil war. This is a cyber war, Othman told me. It is an opportune time
> for the United States to show that its support of digital freedom can save
> lives. If communications technology is the way in which the United States
> chooses to intervene in the Syrian conflict, why not unleash the full
> capabilities of American technology?
>
> An argument against arming the rebels is the possibility of weapons ending
> up in jihadist hands. But is communications equipment just as dangerous? On
> the contrary, more coordinated and safer communications between commanding
> officers in the Free Syrian Army and the jihadists who have joined their
> cause may help reel in the latter in a post-Assad Syria.
>
> There are currently two separate U.S. policies that are falling short of
> Washington's goal of safer and more widespread communication among the
> Syrian opposition. The first is American sanctions on Syria that make it
> more difficult for the regime's opponents to obtain vital anti-tracking
> software. With fewer tools to evade government surveillance, these Syrian
> activists are more vulnerable to Assad's death squads. The second is the
> State Department's distribution of satellite phones, modems, and other gear
> to the Syrian opposition through a training program based in Istanbul.
> Reports that this equipment has only on occasion reached the front lines
> bode ill for the rebels and for America's future influence in Syria.
>
> Secretary of State Hillary Clinton has made the freedom to communicate --
> whether online, on the phone, or in the public square -- a central goal of
> U.S. statecraft over the last four years. The State Department has ramped
> up funding for projects promoting Internet freedom, with $30 million
> allocated last year on circumventing censorship.
>
> But for every dollar the United States has spent on Internet freedom,
> countries like Iran and China have spent many times more in
> countermeasures. Iran has spent about $1 b

Re: [liberationtech] Arabic Pidgin-OTR Tutorial

[Amin Sabeti]

Is it possible send the English version that I can translate it for the Iranian 
users?

A

Sent from my iPhone

On 18 Nov 2012, at 14:42, KheOps  wrote:

> Le 18/11/2012 06:12, Nadim Kobeissi a écrit :
>> I just finished recording this Arabic Pidgin-OTR tutorial, which I hope
>> will be useful for Gazans...
>> 
>> Share widely! http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=hDPeGnzyBgg
> 
> Thanks, hopefully some Syrians could use it too.
> 
> Did you, in your tutorial, remind the watcher to disable logging in
> Piding? Since Pidgin logs in cleartext.
> 
> KheOps
> 
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Re: [liberationtech] Renesys: Syrian Internet Is Off The Air

[Amin Sabeti]

Akamai graph:
https://twitter.com/akamai_soti/status/274163048263057408/photo/1

On 29 November 2012 16:45, John Scott-Railton  wrote:

>
> Update via contacts: some mobile calls working for calling into Damascus.
>  Others not.
>
> J
>
> On Nov 29, 2012, at 11:41 AM, Morgan Marquis-Boire <
> morgan.marquisbo...@gmail.com> wrote:
>
> Note the following in the Renesys post:
> http://www.renesys.com/blog/2012/11/syria-off-the-air.shtml
>
> "Now, there are a few Syrian networks that are still connected to the
> Internet, still reachable by traceroutes, and indeed still hosting Syrian
> content. These are five networks that use Syrian-registered IP space, but
> the originator of the routes is actually Tata Communications. These are
> potentially offshore, rather than domestic, and perhaps not subject to
> whatever killswitch was thrown today within Syria.
>
> These five offshore survivors include the webservers that were implicated
> in the delivery of 
> malwaretargeting
>  Syrian activists in May of this year."
>
> On Thu, Nov 29, 2012 at 8:03 AM, Robert Guerra wrote:
>
>> Rafal,
>>
>> Thanks for sharing.
>>
>> Anyway I can access the details - without - having to login to Facebook.
>>  Thanks!
>>
>> Robert
>>
>>
>> On 2012-11-29, at 10:03 AM, Rafal Rohozinski wrote:
>>
>> We are tracking and reporting the same.  Cell phone, electricity, and
>> landlines reported down in several cities.
>>
>> https://www.facebook.com/Syrian.DS
>>
>>
>>
>> On Nov 29, 2012, at 9:57 AM, Enrique Piraces  wrote:
>>
>>  
>> http://www.renesys.com/blog/2012/11/syria-off-the-air.shtml
>>
>>  Is anyone else monitoring this?
>>
>>  Best,
>> Enrique Piraces
>> Human Rights Watch
>> https://www.hrw.org.org
>> https://www.twitter.com/epiraces
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Re: [liberationtech] Verification of Speak2Tweet Locales?

[Amin Sabeti]

Hi,

One of the good ways is to see the time of tweeting and check it with Syria
time. Generally, some people are living outside the country but they claim
they are in the country! Time Zone can help you to identify is he/she in
Syria or not.

A

On 30 November 2012 18:01, Ben Connors  wrote:

> Hi All,
>
> Washington Post Journalist here with a verification question.
> We're looking to do a little blogging on Speak 2 Tweet and Syria, but we
> want at least some layer of proof that the calls are coming from within the
> country. I'm fairly tech savvy but at a loss, as to how/whether that can be
> done.
>
> Would appreciate your help amplifying these voices.
>
> Best,
> Ben Connors
>
>
> @bcatdc
> 202.213.0674
> Video Innovation Editor | Washington Post
> Formerly Creative Strategist | The Stream , Al Jazeera English
>
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Re: [liberationtech] Renesys: Syrian Internet Is Off The Air

[Amin Sabeti]

For Iran's case, the government can cut off the Internet at any time but the 
problem at this stage which they have tried to solve it is the 
bank/military/etc. communication. If the Iranian government wants to cut the 
Internet, their communication will cut as well and because of it, they want to 
launch the national Internet.

I believe they want to have an Interanet for their communication that they can 
turn off the Internet in especial situation such as protests.

A

Sent from my iPhone

On 1 Dec 2012, at 01:22, "b.g. white"  wrote:

> Update (01:00 GMT, 30 Nov): The last 5 networks belonging to Syria, a set of 
> smaller netblocks previously advertised by Tata Communications, have been 
> torn down and are no longer routed. These blocks survived today's Internet 
> blackout in Syria, but 12 hours after the onset, they, too are off the air. 
> Traceroutes to these blocks now die on Tata's network in New Jersey, and 
> websites hosted in these blocks are no longer responding.
> http://www.renesys.com/blog/2012/11/syria-off-the-air.shtml#latest
> 
> On Nov 30, 2012 1:15 PM, "Amir Rahmati"  wrote:
>> Nice article. The information about Iran is inaccurate though. Iran only has 
>> 2 ASes which are both controlled by the government. They can easily limit or 
>> cut internet access at the times of their choosing and have done so 
>> frequently in the aftermath of their 2009 election.
>> 
>> --
>> Amir
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> On Fri, Nov 30, 2012 at 1:46 PM, James S. Tyre  wrote:
>>> Renesys has a nice follow up post today, the title explains the subject.
>>> 
>>>  
>>> 
>>> http://www.renesys.com/blog/2012/11/could-it-happen-in-your-countr.shtml
>>> 
>>>  
>>> 
>>> Could It Happen In Your Country?
>>> 
>>>  
>>> 
>>> By James Cowie on November 30, 2012 11:32 AM
>>> 
>>>  
>>> 
>>> --
>>> 
>>> James S. Tyre
>>> 
>>> Law Offices of James S. Tyre
>>> 
>>> 10736 Jefferson Blvd., #512
>>> 
>>> Culver City, CA 90230-4969
>>> 
>>> 310-839-4114/310-839-4602(fax)
>>> 
>>> jst...@jstyre.com
>>> 
>>> Policy Fellow, Electronic Frontier Foundation
>>> 
>>> https://www.eff.org
>>> 
>>>  
>>> 
>>> 
>>> --
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>> 
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Re: [liberationtech] Iranian flagpoles for jamming?

[Amin Sabeti]

I think this report will be useful: 
http://smallmedia.org.uk/sites/default/files/Satellite%20Jamming.pdf

Sent from my iPhone

On 30 Nov 2012, at 20:05, Joel Harding  wrote:

> I have some serious doubts if this is even possible.  My thoughts are
> that an antenna strong enough to hold up a flag would not be an
> efficient radiating element.  Wouldn't the wires be visible at the
> base?  Wouldn't there have to be some sort of a transmitter in fairly
> close proximity?  Is this just being fueled by conspiracy theorists or
> is this actually being done?  I don't recall seeing this before.
> 
> New flagpoles in Iran spark rumors of clandestine satellite jamming technology
> 
> By Lisa Daftari
> 
> Published November 30, 2012
> 
> http://www.foxnews.com/world/2012/11/30/new-flagpoles-in-iran-spark-rumors-clandestine-satellite-jamming-technology/
> 
> Flying the national flag usually signifies a display of pride or
> patriotism. But in Iran today, it may represent something much more
> sinister.
> 
> Sources and blog postings from inside Iran say that what seem to be
> simple flagpoles popping up all over Tehran and other large Iranian
> cities are actually clandestine electronic antennas, which use
> high-frequency waves to jam communications and block ordinary citizens
> from Internet, TV and radio signals. Some Iranians think the
> electronic emissions also may be hazardous to humans’ health.
> 
> Tehran residents and communication experts report an increase in
> jamming has coincided with the strategic placement of the towering
> metal flagpoles, as the government continues its ongoing campaign to
> block some 500 TV channels and 200 radio stations from outside Iran
> deemed too Western-oriented.
> 
> “Ever since 2009, the telecommunications masts have increased 10- to
> 15-fold. It’s not clear where these masts are, but many in Tehran,
> including myself, believe that these tall flagpoles recently placed
> around the perimeter of the city are jammers,” said Shahin, a
> 32-year-old Tehran-based blogger. The flagpoles are present in other
> large Iranian cities but are most prevalent in the capital, Shahin
> said.
> 
> “The regime fears the Internet and satellites coming into the country
> more than they do the opposition forces living here,” he added.
> “That’s how we know they would do anything in their power, including
> risking our health, to protect their existence.”
> 
> During the 2009 post-election uprisings, Iranian protesters who took
> to the streets turned to blogs and social networking sites like
> Facebook, Twitter and YouTube to voice and organize their opposition
> to the regime. Since then, the Iranian government has worked
> diligently to block access to such sites.
> 
> The jammer flagpole scheme “is very much in line with and fits the
> pattern they have been demonstrating since 2009,” said Austin Heap,
> executive director of the Censorship Research Center.
> 
> “The shape of the flagpole lends itself to house such a structure. If
> you notice the width of the pole decreasing as it gets taller, this is
> consistent with the design principles for good omni-directional
> broadcasting. … It’s a kill switch,” Heap explained.
> 
> “It’s just the next step in controlling what comes in and out of the
> country,” Heap said. “Iran is looking to become better at controlling
> the dialogue.”
> 
> The Iranian government has relied on two jamming techniques, according
> to Heap. One is the more widely used “satellite-to-satellite” method,
> in which waves are sent directly from one satellite to the other in an
> attempt to overwhelm the broadcast signal.
> 
> But foreign broadcast companies learned to work around that by
> switching signals, turning the censorship campaign into a
> cat-and-mouse game that requires more time and effort by the Iranian
> government to block each channel.
> 
> The flagpole jammers represent a second method, referred to as
> on-the-ground or local jamming. That process involves sending
> high-frequency microwaves over a larger area, saturating signals that
> jam incoming signals.
> 
> “This new type of jamming is a catch-all,” Heap said.  “It is a
> one-size-fits-all solution.”
> 
> The increase in jamming has been noted by the United States and
> European Union, both of whom announced new communications sanctions
> and warnings against the Iranian regime in November.
> 
> Since the 2009 uprisings, roughly $76 million of the total $11.5
> billion allocated to the Islamic Revolution Guard Corps has been spent
> on cyber warfare, the Iranian government once reported. Iran’s cyber
> police monitor the Internet, various websites, blogs and individuals
> suspected of using circumvention tools designed to evade the censors.
> 
> In early 2011, Iran unveiled plans for a “halal network,” or an
> “Islamically permissible” intranet that would disconnect the nation
> from the rest of the world. Such a service would automatically block
> popular global sites and search engines like 

Re: [liberationtech] Renesys: Syrian Internet Is Off The Air

[Amin Sabeti]

Actually, the whole bandwidth comes from one source and then divides amongst 
ISPs 

Sent from my iPhone

On 1 Dec 2012, at 18:30, Burkov Dmitry  wrote:

> are you sure?
> https://www.ripe.net/membership/indices/IR.html
> 
> On Nov 30, 2012, at 11:15 PM, Amir Rahmati wrote:
> 
>> Nice article. The information about Iran is inaccurate though. Iran only has 
>> 2 ASes which are both controlled by the government. They can easily limit or 
>> cut internet access at the times of their choosing and have done so 
>> frequently in the aftermath of their 2009 election.
>> 
>> --
>> Amir
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> On Fri, Nov 30, 2012 at 1:46 PM, James S. Tyre  wrote:
>>> Renesys has a nice follow up post today, the title explains the subject.
>>> 
>>>  
>>> 
>>> http://www.renesys.com/blog/2012/11/could-it-happen-in-your-countr.shtml
>>> 
>>>  
>>> 
>>> Could It Happen In Your Country?
>>> 
>>>  
>>> 
>>> By James Cowie on November 30, 2012 11:32 AM
>>> 
>>>  
>>> 
>>> --
>>> 
>>> James S. Tyre
>>> 
>>> Law Offices of James S. Tyre
>>> 
>>> 10736 Jefferson Blvd., #512
>>> 
>>> Culver City, CA 90230-4969
>>> 
>>> 310-839-4114/310-839-4602(fax)
>>> 
>>> jst...@jstyre.com
>>> 
>>> Policy Fellow, Electronic Frontier Foundation
>>> 
>>> https://www.eff.org
>>> 
>>>  
>>> 
>>> 
>>> --
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>>> https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech
>> 
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Re: [liberationtech] Iranian flagpoles for jamming?

[Amin Sabeti]

I completely agree with Collin. How is it possible that we can count on
Austin Heap?!

Cheers,

A

On 3 December 2012 13:13, Collin Anderson  wrote:

> I second Amin's suggestion on the Small Media report; this Fox News
> article is deeply misinformed. More than anything I am surprised that any
> media source is still citing Austin Heap as a credible source, however, the
> author's track record of stories seems to explain a lot. Unfortunately,
> with comments like "satellite-to-satellite jamming," Mr. Heap seems to know
> less about international broadcasting than he did Internet censorship.
>
>
>
> On Sat, Dec 1, 2012 at 2:38 PM, Amin Sabeti  wrote:
>
>> I think this report will be useful:
>> http://smallmedia.org.uk/sites/default/files/Satellite%20Jamming.pdf
>>
>> Sent from my iPhone
>>
>> On 30 Nov 2012, at 20:05, Joel Harding  wrote:
>>
>> I have some serious doubts if this is even possible.  My thoughts are
>> that an antenna strong enough to hold up a flag would not be an
>> efficient radiating element.  Wouldn't the wires be visible at the
>> base?  Wouldn't there have to be some sort of a transmitter in fairly
>> close proximity?  Is this just being fueled by conspiracy theorists or
>> is this actually being done?  I don't recall seeing this before.
>>
>> New flagpoles in Iran spark rumors of clandestine satellite jamming
>> technology
>>
>> By Lisa Daftari
>>
>> Published November 30, 2012
>>
>>
>> http://www.foxnews.com/world/2012/11/30/new-flagpoles-in-iran-spark-rumors-clandestine-satellite-jamming-technology/
>>
>> Flying the national flag usually signifies a display of pride or
>> patriotism. But in Iran today, it may represent something much more
>> sinister.
>>
>> Sources and blog postings from inside Iran say that what seem to be
>> simple flagpoles popping up all over Tehran and other large Iranian
>> cities are actually clandestine electronic antennas, which use
>> high-frequency waves to jam communications and block ordinary citizens
>> from Internet, TV and radio signals. Some Iranians think the
>> electronic emissions also may be hazardous to humans’ health.
>>
>> Tehran residents and communication experts report an increase in
>> jamming has coincided with the strategic placement of the towering
>> metal flagpoles, as the government continues its ongoing campaign to
>> block some 500 TV channels and 200 radio stations from outside Iran
>> deemed too Western-oriented.
>>
>> “Ever since 2009, the telecommunications masts have increased 10- to
>> 15-fold. It’s not clear where these masts are, but many in Tehran,
>> including myself, believe that these tall flagpoles recently placed
>> around the perimeter of the city are jammers,” said Shahin, a
>> 32-year-old Tehran-based blogger. The flagpoles are present in other
>> large Iranian cities but are most prevalent in the capital, Shahin
>> said.
>>
>> “The regime fears the Internet and satellites coming into the country
>> more than they do the opposition forces living here,” he added.
>> “That’s how we know they would do anything in their power, including
>> risking our health, to protect their existence.”
>>
>> During the 2009 post-election uprisings, Iranian protesters who took
>> to the streets turned to blogs and social networking sites like
>> Facebook, Twitter and YouTube to voice and organize their opposition
>> to the regime. Since then, the Iranian government has worked
>> diligently to block access to such sites.
>>
>> The jammer flagpole scheme “is very much in line with and fits the
>> pattern they have been demonstrating since 2009,” said Austin Heap,
>> executive director of the Censorship Research Center.
>>
>> “The shape of the flagpole lends itself to house such a structure. If
>> you notice the width of the pole decreasing as it gets taller, this is
>> consistent with the design principles for good omni-directional
>> broadcasting. … It’s a kill switch,” Heap explained.
>>
>> “It’s just the next step in controlling what comes in and out of the
>> country,” Heap said. “Iran is looking to become better at controlling
>> the dialogue.”
>>
>> The Iranian government has relied on two jamming techniques, according
>> to Heap. One is the more widely used “satellite-to-satellite” method,
>> in which waves are sent directly from one satellite to the other in an
>> attempt to overwhelm the broadcast signal.
>>
>> But foreign broadcast companies learned to work around that by
>> switching s

Re: [liberationtech] Another CA Compromise: TurkTrust

[Amin Sabeti]

One point: Most of the Iranian banks have bought SSL certification from 
TurkTrust. 

Sent from my iPhone

On 4 Jan 2013, at 01:41, Collin Anderson  wrote:

> On Thu, Jan 3, 2013 at 5:26 PM, Ruben Bloemgarten  wrote:
>> "you don´t know who I am, but only we know what we´re telling each other."
> 
> So essentially you and Nadim are arguing that, since CAs fail some of the 
> time, we should get rid of the whole system and end up in the same position 
> -- where there is no trust in validating that the person talking to you is 
> actually who they say they are? 
> 
> Does anyone believe that users will actually understand the difference?
> 
> 
> On Thu, Jan 3, 2013 at 5:26 PM, Ruben Bloemgarten  wrote:
>> Nadim,
>> 
>> I think its about time to have CA´s be peer accredited institutes
>> (EFF/tor/access now/my brother´s sister´s cousin/ whoever) issuing free
>> or at least at cost certs. That being said, I don´t think certs are very
>> good at preventing mitm anyway, that might be the case if a majority of
>> users would have the wherewithal for a more realistic reaction than "ooh
>> red/green is bad/good", and even then. Love ssl, don´t really care about
>> certs. So yes, lets dump "trust me, I´ve been certified" in favor of
>> "you don´t know who I am, but only we know what we´re telling each other."
>> 
>> - Ruben
>> 
>> On 01/04/2013 02:09 AM, Nadim Kobeissi wrote:
>> > Another CA has been found issuing SSL certificates for Google services.
>> > Mozilla has acted on the
>> > issue: 
>> > https://blog.mozilla.org/security/2013/01/03/revoking-trust-in-two-turktrust-certficates/
>> >
>> > The weird thing is that it's starting to appear less and less crazy to
>> > just get rid of the CA system and replace it with… nothing. What do you
>> > guys think?
>> >
>> > NK
>> >
>> >
>> > --
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>> > https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech
>> >
>> 
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> 
> 
> -- 
> Collin David Anderson
> averysmallbird.com | @cda | Washington, D.C.
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Re: [liberationtech] Another CA Compromise: TurkTrust

[Amin Sabeti]

I've checked some of the Iranian banks' SSL and found at least two of them
have changed the CA from TurkTrust to WoSign, Inc. in the US.

A

On 4 January 2013 10:09, Ralph Holz  wrote:

> On 01/04/2013 02:45 AM, Amin Sabeti wrote:
> > One point: Most of the Iranian banks have bought SSL certification from
> > TurkTrust.
>
> Indeed. And one of the solutions that Mozilla is considering is to limit
> Turktrust do .tr and .ir, by using the name extension in X.509.
>
> Ralph
>
> --
> Ralph Holz
> Network Architectures and Services
> Technische Universität München
> Phone +49 89 28918043
> http://www.net.in.tum.de/de/mitarbeiter/holz/
> PGP: A805 D19C E23E 6BBB E0C4  86DC 520E 0C83 69B0 03EF
>
>
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Re: [liberationtech] Skype Open Letter: CALL FOR SIGNATORIES

[Amin Sabeti]

I'd like to sign it as well, if I am eligible :)

Amin
On 16 January 2013 17:58, Paul Bernal (LAW)  wrote:

> I'd like to sign too, if you'd like it!
>
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Re: [liberationtech] Iran can develop the software to control social networks?

[Amin Sabeti]

Based on my experience, it's nearly impossible same as the National/Hala
internet.

On 17 January 2013 17:43, The Doctor  wrote:

> -BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-
> Hash: SHA1
>
> On 01/17/2013 11:27 AM, Amin Sabeti wrote:
>
> > *Is Iran capable of developing the software it would need to
> > control social networks?*
> >
> http://storify.com/smallmedia/is-iran-capable-of-developing-the-software-it-woul
>
> Iran?
> >
> I do not know.
>
> Contractors hired by the government of Iran?  Very likely.
>
> - --
> The Doctor [412/724/301/703] [ZS|Media]
> Developer, Project Byzantium: http://project-byzantium.org/
>
> PGP: 0x807B17C1 / 7960 1CDC 85C9 0B63 8D9F  DD89 3BD8 FF2B 807B 17C1
> WWW: https://drwho.virtadpt.net/
>
> "Squeal like a dialup for daddy!" --Jason
>
> -BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-
> Version: GnuPG v2.0.19 (GNU/Linux)
> Comment: Using GnuPG with undefined - http://www.enigmail.net/
>
> iEYEARECAAYFAlD4ODUACgkQO9j/K4B7F8FAvwCg7tghan3vmcjBbxkZFHpFx0RN
> cqcAnRuNT4XbWRvRWKnF2HBN2+9qIXi0
> =0iGH
> -END PGP SIGNATURE-
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[liberationtech] Android and iOS security document

[Amin Sabeti]

Hi guys,

I'm looking for documents about security on Android and iOS and how the
users can increase their security.

Is there someone here to suggest me good resources for this propose?

Amin
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Re: [liberationtech] Android and iOS security document

[Amin Sabeti]

Thanks a lot. Please keep me updated if you find the new resources.

Cheers,

A

On 25 January 2013 19:15, Cooper Quintin  wrote:

> Hi Amin,
> I did a presentation on mobile device security a while ago.  IT mostly
> focuses on Android, but there is some IOS stuff in there as well.  I
> have been considering turning it into a website or at least a document.
>  You can find it here:
> https://github.com/cooperq/spiders
>
> Cooper Quintin
> PGP Key ID: 75FB 9347 FA4B 22A0 5068 080B D0EA 7B6F F0AF E2CA
>
> On 01/25/2013 05:26 AM, Amin Sabeti wrote:
> > Hi guys,
> >
> > I'm looking for documents about security on Android and iOS and how the
> > users can increase their security.
> >
> > Is there someone here to suggest me good resources for this propose?
> >
> > Amin
> >
> >
> > --
> > Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password at:
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Re: [liberationtech] Whonix ALPHA 0.5.5 - Anonymous Operating System released

[Amin Sabeti]

I'd like to test it but I'm a bit worry about the security part!

On 2 March 2013 17:56, adrelanos  wrote:

> -BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-
> Hash: SHA512
>
> Hello everyone,
>
> Whonix is an operating system, designed with anonymity in mind. A new
> version, Whonix 0.5.5 has just been released.
>
> The new version contains many small security improvements, new
> features and bug fixes. User documentation and technical design can be
> found on it's homepage.
>
> Homepage:
>
> http://whonix.sf.net/
>
> If you want to read a longer introduction/release message, you can
> refer the the old one:
>
>
> https://mailman.stanford.edu/pipermail/liberationtech/2013-January/006707.html
>
> Cheers,
> adrelanos
> -BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-
>
> iQJ8BAEBCgBmBQJRMj1mXxSAAC4AKGlzc3Vlci1mcHJAbm90YXRpb25zLm9w
> ZW5wZ3AuZmlmdGhob3JzZW1hbi5uZXQ5QjE1NzE1MzkyNUMzMDNBNDIyNTNBRkI5
> QzEzMUFEMzcxM0FBRUVGAAoJEJwTGtNxOq7vBPIQAJpDV+pnWL/d5zCuKdsma8wx
> ehTCrxmuZC7eFHIFKcDMRz3F1hT1rq5eL0388fvI5Y/8tQFNoh5Wm8rsDvD3eOhk
> 2aGecYPYE6yj1UUMv57wzWVBR2Q3QfIr3Sk9iXLCF9rTM6yEuSBC9NgWEggV/Zeo
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> 7Mh9GGcIWWvIY7qJ0rMJ1uLIz8krvXrPjJpygFpIajZK5ROGaIWDRtcKQzD0yGkK
> Vq6QaASm+3YSiLHzr4QtcAU7lpEH+G3Rbv95eUjanpAeVEJMxT545XPJeOhOncTs
> c++cQjmOW185ho706MmVsfrj3JdY18t0m4/gwvhiqkHPfaFjmnUkR82KEpMCM75H
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> qZScqdOQp12Fc6D6ZoRl225rt0LqwYvH/wyrSPbh/X7NK+TI9MBvsmlz/bb/ofsR
> s+TTHdP0zV3wPLUFe/hc0fSxunFVXsZRBGxzTr+MlQAshMN3rBq0Z+4shWsjtn5j
> JXJ0EAteEXGRD5TPwZvb
> =F+WT
> -END PGP SIGNATURE-
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Re: [liberationtech] The Pirate Bay moving to North Korea, really ?

[Amin Sabeti]

See the update 3:
http://falkvinge.net/2013/03/05/evidence-the-pirate-bay-move-to-north-korea-was-a-prank-in-understandable-terms/

On 5 March 2013 10:12, Olivier Tesquet  wrote:

> Dear Libtechers,
>
> I was wondering what your thoughts were on this (so far a) rumor that The
> Pirate Bay has moved its servers to Democratic Peoples Republic of North
> Korea. It was first evoked by Rick Falkvinge yesterday, followed by a TPB
> statement ironically signed "Kim Jung-Bay", while the logo was revamped :
>
>
> http://falkvinge.net/2013/03/04/after-being-cut-from-norway-the-pirate-bay-returns-from-north-korea/
> https://thepiratebay.se/blog/229
>
> Now, unsurprisingly, some people are claiming it's a well executed fake
> using a BGP stunt, even though a traceroute actually lead to North Korea
> sole ISP, Star-KP :
>
> https://rdns.im/the-pirate-bay-north-korean-hosting-no-its-fake
>
> So far, I can't really tell what's the idea behind such a move, except the
> fact it's hard to assess (does North Korea even have broadband in
> sufficient proportions to host TPB ? I doubt so). The TPB as a history in
> cat-and-mouse game, as their shift from a .com to a .se domain name a few
> days after the MegaUpload raid proved. But now ? When DPRK meets the
> Internet, I can't help but thinking about 4chan pranks and Eric Schmidt
> looking at Kim Jong-Un looking at things.
>
> wdyt ?
>
> --
> Olivier Tesquet
> Reporter Médias/Net @ Télérama
> +33 (0)6 47 82 05 71
> +33 (0)1 55 30 56 51
> twitter.com/oliviertesquet
>
>
>
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[liberationtech] VPNs are blocked in Iran!

[Amin Sabeti]

Hi folks,

The Iranian government have been blocked all VPNs and the Iranian users
cannot connect through them. According to the my sources inside Iran,
Ultrasurf, Freegate and Psiphon are the only options that the Iranian users
can use it although some of them have the problem with these circumvention
tools as well.

Cheers,

Amin
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Re: [liberationtech] VPNs are blocked in Iran!

[Amin Sabeti]

I've seen the users have had problem with TOR as well.

On 9 March 2013 12:09, Andrew Lewis  wrote:

> No TOR?
>
>
> On Mar 10, 2013, at 12:17 AM, Amin Sabeti  wrote:
>
> Hi folks,
>
> The Iranian government have been blocked all VPNs and the Iranian users
> cannot connect through them. According to the my sources inside Iran,
> Ultrasurf, Freegate and Psiphon are the only options that the Iranian users
> can use it although some of them have the problem with these circumvention
> tools as well.
>
> Cheers,
>
> Amin
>
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>
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[liberationtech] Iran blocks use of tool to get around Internet filter

[Amin Sabeti]

http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/03/10/iran-internet-idUSL6N0C24M620130310

(Reuters) - Iranian authorities have blocked the use of most "virtual
private networks", a tool that many Iranians use to get around an extensive
government Internet filter, Iranian media quoted an official as saying on
Sunday.

A widespread government Internet filter prevents Iranians from accessing
many sites on the official grounds they are offensive or criminal.

Many Iranians evade the filter through use of VPN software, which provides
encrypted links directly to private networks based abroad, and can allow a
computer to behave as if it is based in another country.

But authorities have now blocked "illegal" VPN access, an Iranian
legislator told the Mehr news agency on Sunday. Iranian web users confirmed
that VPNs were blocked.

"Within the last few days illegal VPN ports in the country have been
blocked," said Ramezanali Sobhani-Fard, the head of parliament's
information and communications technology committee, according to Mehr.
"Only legal and registered VPNs can from now on be used."

Iran is holding a presidential election in June, its first since 2009, when
a disputed result led to the worst unrest since the 1979 Islamic revolution.

Protesters used services like Facebook to communicate during those "Green
Movement" demonstrations, and the government has taken steps to curb access
to the Internet in the last few months, apparently determined to prevent a
repeat this time.

An internet user named Mohamad from the Iranian city of Isfahan confirmed
that VPNs had been blocked.

"VPNs are cut off. They've shut all the ports," he said in a Facebook
message, adding that he was using another form of software to access the
service without a VPN. He said Skype and Viber, internet services used to
make telephone calls, had also been blocked.

In January, Mehdi Akhavan Behabadi, secretary of Iran's Supreme Cyberspace
Council, told Mehr that Internet users would soon be able to purchase
registered VPN connections and that other VPNs were illegal. Financial
institutions and other organisations might need to use VPNs for security
reasons, which would be a legal use, Behabadi said.

The government's move to block VPN access may also have inadvertently cut
off access to widely used sites such as Yahoo and Google, Sobhani-Fard told
Mehr on Sunday, adding that parliament would study the issue more this week.

Amin Sabeti, a UK-based researcher on Iranian media and the web, said
foreign companies such as airlines and banks had had problems using VPNs in
Iran.

Through government-registered VPNs, Sabeti said, authorities could be able
to monitor traffic more easily.

DETERIORATE

Millions of Iranians experienced disruption to email and Internet access
ahead of parliamentary elections last year.

"As the June election approaches ... Iran's Internet connectivity, and the
accessibility of uncensored information, continues to deteriorate," said a
report on Iran's Internet infrastructure published in March by the UK-based
group Small Media, which researches Internet use in Iran.

"Prominent Persian-language websites and other online services have been
filtered one by one, and communications with external platforms is becoming
progressively more difficult."

Iranian authorities banned Google's email service for a week last year but
reopened access after complaints from officials. They have also announced
plans to switch citizens onto a domestic Internet network which would be
largely isolated from the World Wide Web.
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[liberationtech] Spam from libtech

[Amin Sabeti]

Hi,

I've received a spam email from Libtech newsletter. The email address that sent 
it is kbgirlsox...@gmail.com and It contains nude pic.

A

Sent from my iPhone
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Re: [liberationtech] Please Vote on "Reply to" Question

[Amin Sabeti]

I'd like reply-to-all

On 21 March 2013 09:10, Guido Witmond  wrote:

> Dear Yosem,
>
> I vote for reply-to-poster.
>
> Your message really points out the problem: You ask us to connect to you,
> however, the reply button replies to the list.
>
>
> My 2cts. Guido Witmond.
>
>
>
>
> On 03/21/2013 02:17 AM, Yosem Companys wrote:
>
>> Dear Liberationtech list subscribers,
>>
>> Several of you have petitioned to change Liberationtech mailing list's
>> default "reply to" option from "reply-to-all" to "reply-to-poster."
>>   Given the debate (see links below), we have decided to put the issue
>> up for a vote:
>>
>>   * Do you want replies to Liberationtech list messages directed to
>> "reply-to-all" or "reply-to-poster"?
>>
>>
>  --
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[liberationtech] Upcoming Workshop: "Change Starts Here" (June 3 - 5)

[Amin Sabeti]

On June 3 - 5 we're hosting a workshop in central London. In partnership
with Decode Global  and New Media
Networks,
two amazing organisations, we'll explore how we can push for social change
in closed societies like Iran through mobile phones and stories.

It's a fantastic opportunity to work with leading experts and like-minded
people on ideas that can have a big impact.

After the workshop participants will be given the opportunity to evolve the
seeds planted during the workshop in online surgeries with the experts, and
we're anticipating seeing a couple of the ideas through to production.

Although it is free to attend the workshop, places are strictly limited.
The language of the workshop and application form is English, but it
doesn't matter if English is not your first language. There'll be a number
of people on hand to help with translation into Farsi, and as most of the
workshop is practical, language definitely won't be a barrier.

We'll be able to offer travel and accommodation assistance to some
attendees. Applications close next Monday, April 22 at 6PM London time, and
we'll let attendees know if they've been accepted by the following Monday
so there's plenty of time to arrange travel to London if necessary.

Download the invitation
letter
 and application
form for
more details, and don't hesitate to contact
us
if
you have any questions.

http://smallmedia.org.uk/content/83
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Re: [liberationtech] Investigating similar domain attacks

[Amin Sabeti]

Hi,

There are lots of fake domains that the pro-government of Iran
has launched it. These are some examples:

   - Original: BBCPersian.Com // Fake:PersianBBC.ir: They copy the theme
   and publish fake news
   - Original: kaleme.com // Fake: kalame.co: They copy the theme and
   publish fake new

Cheers,

Amin

On 9 May 2013 17:10, Michael Carbone  wrote:

> Hi Libtech,
>
> I'm currently working on the follow-up to a general report that we at
> Access released in 2012, “Global Civil Society At Risk: An Overview of Some
> of the Major Cyber Threats Facing Civil Society” and I'm looking for
> examples of 'similar domain' attacks -- attacks in which an adversary
> creates a similar-looking website to the targeted website with the
> intention of drawing readers from the original site. This fake domain may
> display content altered to an opposing view or serve malware to
> unsuspecting users. This can also include fake social media profiles of
> CSOs and media orgs.
>
> I have evidence from Iran, Vietnam, Belarus, and Thailand already and
> would like to build a more complete picture of these attacks if the data
> supports it.
>
> If you are aware of such attacks, please let me know if you haven't
> already. At minimum, I am looking for the url address of targeted domain
> (e.g. targeted-cso.org) and the url address of fake domain (e.g.
> fake-cso.net) and the type of attack (i.e. was it replicating or altering
> content, serving malware, etc).
>
> Feel free to contact me off-list, my PGP key is in my
> signature. Contributions and data can be anonymous or attributed as
> desired, and I'm open to feedback on the methodology as well as content.
>
> Thanks,
> Michael
>
> --
> Michael Carbone
> Manager of Tech Policy & Programs
> Access | https://www.accessnow.org
> mich...@accessnow.org | PGP: 0x81B7A13
>  PGP Fingerprint: 25EC 1D0F 2D44 C4F4 5BEF EF83 C471 AD94 81B7 A13E
>
> --
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[liberationtech] Has #Iran finally launched the #Halal ‘net?

[Amin Sabeti]

The 2013 Iranian presidential election is rapidly approaching, with the
first round of voting set to take place on June 14. This election is tipped
to be one of the most unpredictable contests in recent years, with the
conservative establishment having fragmented dramatically since 2009.
http://storify.com/smallmedia/has-iran-finally-launched-the-halal-net
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Re: [liberationtech] Cryptocat: Translation Volunteers Needed

[Amin Sabeti]

I've done the Persian language.

Amin

On 23 May 2013 10:29, Nadim Kobeissi  wrote:

> Dear LibTech,
> We're working on a couple of new Cryptocat features (encrypted file
> sharing over OTR/video chat) and we're wondering if you could help us
> translate those features into the 35+ languages in which Cryptocat is
> available.
>
> You can begin translating right now, right here!
> ---> https://www.transifex.com/projects/p/Cryptocat/resource/cryptocat/
>
> We have a bunch of languages done, but currently we still need help with:
> Burmese
> Irish
> Spanish
> Turkish
> Lithuanian
> Chinese (Hong Kong)
>  Chinese (China)
> Czech
> German
> Greek
> Russian
> Hebrew
> Estonian
> Japanese
> Basque
> Uighur
> Khmer
> Korean
> Persian
> Latvian
> Tibetan
> Polish
> Serbian
> Slovak
> Swedish
> Finnish
> Croatian
> Bulgarian
> Bengali
> Catalan
> Urdu
>
> More info about Cryptocat: https://crypto.cat
>
> Thank you!
>
> NK
>
> --
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Re: [liberationtech] Opt out of Prism

[Amin Sabeti]

I like the idea :) Cool...

On 12 June 2013 17:58, Andrea St  wrote:

> Dear friends,
>
> i would like to share with you this project and see your comments.
>
> http://prism-break.org/
>
>
> best,
> --
> Andrea Stroppa
> http://huffingtonpost.com/andrea-stroppa
> @andst7
>
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[liberationtech] Job oppurtunity: an Arabic speaking Online Platform Manager

[Amin Sabeti]

Hi guys,

Small Media wants to launch the Arabic e-Learning Platform and needs an
Arabic speaking Online Platform Manager. If you know someone, please pass
this email to him/her:

We are looking for an Arabic speaking Online Platform Manager to join our
team!
 tag:
Jobs 
 share this

   -
   

   -
   




Small Media is looking for an Arabic speaking Online Platform Manager to
help with launching an online training platform targeting the youth in MENA
region.

The project is intended to provide practical training and skills to Arab
youth (18-30 years old) utilizing a modern and edgy design and dynamic
online platform equipped with unique relevant content and networking
capabilities.

Applicant should be passionate about either and all: design, social media,
training, networking, Arab youth and making an impact through action
oriented skills building. The position requires a leader, and ideal for
someone who wants to build something from scratch and watch it grow.

This position can be filled remotley.


*Responsibilities:*

   - Be the primary person responsible for quality assurance and ensuring
   the diversity and relevancy of content for the Arabic e-learning courses
  - Intensive interfacing with course writers, leading to the
  development of a network of reliable and proficient course writers
  - Editing the courses to ensure accuracy and adherence to platform
  guidelines
  - Liaise with potential course writers, accept submissions, review
  and select
   - Be wholly responsible for managing and maintaining the reputation of
   the e-learning process in Arabic, including but not limited to:
  - Ensuring the smooth operation of the platform, liaising with Small
  Media’s Technology Team as necessary
  - Scheduling the courses
  - Facilitating the helpdesk for trainees and providing help in a
  timely and efficient manner, providing help as the need arises
  - Monitoring performance indicators, assessing performance with
  reference to targets, and presenting monthly reports including both
  narrative and metric indicators
   - Encourage the growth and development of an online community around the
   platform, a task that includes:
  - Managing the social media accounts for the platform (Twitter,
  Facebook, G+, YouTube) and developing an online community of users
   - Promote the e-learning platform in the broader Arabic webosphere
  - Managing, maintaining and moderating the blog. Create content to
  tag to penetrate into Arab language internet.
  - Foster and maintain connections with relevant individuals
  (bloggers, developers, IT experts, key social media
personalities), tapping
  into their extended networks to disseminate the platform and recruit new
  trainees
  - Build site’s SEO by building site’s linkages with other sites,
  building site’s tagging system
  - Identify sites to advertise with
  - Monitor marketing campaigns to determine best return on investment
  - Monitor site’s analytics to understand usage and gaps in marketing
   - Coordinating with the Farsi e-learning manager to share experiences

*Qualities:*

   - Self-starting- applicant should have experience with managing projects
   from start to finish.
   - Passion- applicant should be passionate about the potentials of online
   education and online networking particularly as it appeals to citizens
   rights and responsibilities, and citizen initiatives.
   - Problem solving- Applicant should be able to problem solve through
   project challenges independently and within a team.
   - Technology- Applicant should have an interest in technology,
   particularly website functionality and ensuring a quality user experience.
   - Training- Applicant should have a curiosity about the ways in which
   adults learn and the effective presentation of content and curriculum to
   ease learning.
   - Communication skills- Applicant must be able to communicate with a
   variety of people from contractors, to fellow colleagues, to designers
   across multiple languages. Effective communication and conflict resolution
   skills are essential for effective implementation of the project.
   - Social Media and website marketing- Applicant should understand how to
   market the site through content tagging, and other social media tools.
   Applicant should be interested in strategies to raise website SEO and other
   ways to increase website readership and conversions.
   - A

[liberationtech] Iranian Climbers vs. Western Media

[Amin Sabeti]

Hi guys,

Three Iranian climbers has been lost on Broad Peak and none of the Western
media hasn't talk about it!

The Iranian users on Twitter have tried to trend #IranianClimbers and
#BroadPeak to get an attention from media that they've completely boycotted
the news. They are so angry because they believe if the Obama's dog was
died, all media would talk about but the life of three Iranian people
doesn't an important issue.

Anyway, you can follow the latest news about this story from here:
http://altitudepakistan.blogspot.co.uk/2013/07/broad-peak-new-route-iranian-climbers.html
and
it would be great, if you circulate the news into your networks.

Cheers,

Amin
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Re: [liberationtech] Tango.me Hacked by the SEA

[Amin Sabeti]

Unfortunately, Tango has been so popular amongst the Iranian users since
Viber was blocked by the government!



On 22 July 2013 16:46, Collin Anderson  wrote:

> Libtech,
>
> Regrettably, it seems to have slipped the attention of most media, but the
> Syrian Electronic Army appears to have managed to compromise the network of
> the popular communications service Tango.
>
> They claim to have retrieved 10 Tb of backup data, so one might imagine
> there is a lot of useful data, perhaps call records, account information
> and source code, that might be used against those who are not particularly
> friendly with the Assad regime. Case in point, Tango seems to have
> experienced an increase in Iranian activist users, since it endured the
> government's connection throttling during the election better than most.
>
> Tango's only reply was that it experienced "brief, unauthorized access to
> some data," but exfiltrating multiple terabytes of data is no quick task.
> The question of replacing Skype on this list is pretty tired, but at least
> we can agree on not not giving vital data to a company that responds so
> irresponsibly to being hacked.
>
> http://www.sea.sy/article/id/1981/en
>
> Cordially,
> Collin
> --
> *Collin David Anderson*
> averysmallbird.com | @cda | Washington, D.C.
>
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Re: [liberationtech] Cryptocat: Call for Translators. Please Participate!

[Amin Sabeti]

I'll do the Persian language :)

A


On 20 August 2013 12:42, Nadim Kobeissi  wrote:

> Dear Libtech,
>
> Echoing Commotion's recent call for translators on this list:
>
> Cryptocat is adding cool new features (and modifying some existing ones)
> over the upcoming weeks, all of which necessitate the translation of
> various new words and sentences for the user interface. Currently,
> Cryptocat is available in almost 40 languages, and maintaining these
> translations would be impossible without the participation of language
> speakers from around the world.
>
> You can very easily contribute to Cryptocat translations here:
> https://www.transifex.com/projects/p/Cryptocat/resource/cryptocat/
>
> Just pick a language and fill it up to 100%! If you know people who can
> help, I urge you to please forward this email to them.
>
> The following languages are priority. Any language not on this list is
> considered not necessary to fully translate at the moment.
> Catalan
> Arabic
> Chinese (Hong Kong)
> Chinese (China)
> Urdu
> Tibetan
> Russian
> Estonian
> Czech
> German
> Danish
> Spanish
> Basque
> Greek
> Farsi
> French
> Japanese
> Hebrew
> Bengali
> Italian
> Khmer
> Korean
> Latvian
> Dutch
> Norwegian
> Polish
> Portuguese
> Bulgarian
> Swedish
> Turkish
> Vietnamese
> Uighur
>
> Thanks very much, and please don't forget to pass this around to people
> who may know these languages and be able to translate from English.
>
> NK
>
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[liberationtech] Hey Silicon Valley! Not every problem can be solved by giving people internet access or teaching them to code [feedly]

[Amin Sabeti]

  
 
Shared via feedly // published on GigaOM // visit site
Hey Silicon Valley! Not every problem can be solved by giving people internet 
access or teaching them to code
This might go without saying, but I’m probably one of the biggest boosters of 
technology there is, especially when it comes to the benefits of internet 
access and the startup ecosystem that has grown up around it: it’s what I write 
about, I use the internet and mobile technology all day, and I think internet 
access should probably be a human right. But even I know that there are some 
problems in the world — and some fairly significant ones — that can’t be solved 
by simply giving people internet access and teaching them how to code.

Unfortunately, Facebook founder Mark Zuckerberg and some tech entrepreneurs 
either don’t know this or are deliberately choosing to ignore it. And by doing 
so, they are only reinforcing the image of Silicon Valley and the 
technology-startup scene as a bubble of unrealistic expectations, if not 
outright blinkered ignorance about the world around it.

Zuckerberg’s new venture, known as Internet.org, is a joint project aimed at 
bringing easy and/or cheap internet access to those who don’t have it — 
primarily in non-Western countries — and arrived wrapped in a motivational and 
humanitarian-themed video that was largely based on some sections of a speech 
by John F. Kennedy (sections that were chosen rather selectively, as Alexis 
Madrigal notes in a post at The Atlantic). In this vision, internet access 
pretty much solves everything, and makes people’s lives immeasurably awesome:

Homelessness is not a “glitch”

The other exhibit in my Silicon Valley bubble-mentality case comes from 
entrepreneur Patrick McConlogue, who wrote a spectacularly thoughtless post for 
Medium — not the first one from a young entrepreneur, I should note — about how 
he believes that homeless people would be a lot better off if they learned how 
to program (McConlogue is a New Yorker, but I think his viewpoint is an Eastern 
extension of a common Silicon Valley mindset). He says he plans to conduct an 
experiment in which he offers a specific homeless man $100 or three books on 
JavaScript to see which he will take:

“I like to think I can see the few times when [a homeless person is] a wayward 
puzzle piece. It’s that feeling you get when you know the waiter, the cashier, 
the janitor is in the wrong place—they are smart, brilliant even. This is my 
attempt to fix one of those lost pieces.”

In an interview with the Huffington Post, the writer — a 23-year-old founder of 
Echo Republic — says that as a software engineer, “I see a glitch and I want to 
fix the glitch.” If I didn’t know better, I would think that McConlogue had 
been invented by author and internet gadfly Evgeny Morozov, who has become 
known for criticizing the technology-based mindset he calls “solutionism,” 
which sees the internet and gadgets as the answer to virtually any societal 
problem. McConlogue is like the poster child for this viewpoint.

In fact, the “technology will fix you” mentality in the piece was so 
overwhelming that at least some people in my Twitter stream thought it was a 
joke — a satire of Silicon Valley’s startup mentality and the focus on 
programming as the cure for every ill. Within a matter of hours, Harvard law 
student Sarah Jeong had created a Medium post that consisted of entries from a 
fictional advice column, where the answer to every personal problem is to learn 
how to code.

After reaching its peak at 117CE, the Roman Empire collapsed due to its total 
inability to teach its citizens to code.— 
Anil Dash (@anildash) August 22, 2013

A certain tone-deaf eagerness

Jessica Roy at Betabeat told McConlogue that “the homeless are not bit players 
in your imaginary entrepreneurial novella,” and Ezra Klein at the Washington 
Post said the most objectionable part of the essay was the writer’s attempt to 
“absorb this homeless man — a real person, with an actual history that 
McConlogue can’t really intuit by looking into his eyes — into his precanned, 
triumphant programmer narrative.” Kevin Roose at New York magazine said “Check 
back soon for McConlogue’s next post: ‘How Ruby on Rails Fixes Racism.’”

In an update and response to the outcry over his original post, McConlogue says 
he remains undaunted by the criticism he received, and that Leo — the homeless 
person he mentioned — has accepted his offer of programming instruction manuals 
and a free Chromebook instead of $100. He also says that he plans a meetup in 
New York in the future in order to “discuss some of the feedback” to his post 
and suggests this would be “a good venue for non-profits to connect around the 
issue of homelessness.”

 

It seems obvious that McConlogue’s heart is in the right place, and that he 
genuinely wants to help this young homeless man, just as it seems obvious (or 
at least arguable) that Mark Zuckerberg actually wants to try and improve 

Re: [liberationtech] Pretty hilarious

[Amin Sabeti]

T
​he brilliant idea :)​


On 23 August 2013 14:50, Daniel Sieradski  wrote:

> Introducing a brand new way to share everything.
>
> http://getprsm.com/
>
> A fun joke site created by a company somewhat disconcerting:
>
> https://datacoup.com/
>
> --
> Daniel Sieradski
> d...@danielsieradski.com
> http://danielsieradski.com
> 315.889.1444
>
> Follow me at http://twitter.com/selfagency
> Public key http://danielsieradski.com/share/ds_public.key
>
> Q: Why is this email five sentences or less?
> A: http://five.sentenc.es
>
>
>
> --
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[liberationtech] Iranian users vs. FB new policy

[Amin Sabeti]

Hi,

I was reading the new FB policy and this part was interesting for me as an
Iranian:

*Special Provisions Applicable to Users Outside the United States.*  We
> made clear that you are not allowed to use Facebook if you are prohibited
> from receiving products or services from the United States.


Regarding this article, Facebook can block and remove all users from Iran.
Am I right?

I think this article is a bit tricky. What do you think guys?

Amin
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Re: [liberationtech] Iranian users vs. FB new policy

[Amin Sabeti]

Then can we say FB can block the Iran's Supreme Leader page or the Rouhani one? 

Sent from my iPhone

On 3 Sep 2013, at 18:50, Collin Anderson  wrote:

> No, this is clearly covered by General License D for Iran and the 'personal 
> communications' exemptions in other sanctions regimes -- it's a nice find, 
> but I suspect it targets individuals designated under the SDN list.
> 
> 
> On Tue, Sep 3, 2013 at 12:55 PM, Amin Sabeti  wrote:
>> Hi,
>> 
>> I was reading the new FB policy and this part was interesting for me as an 
>> Iranian: 
>> 
>>> Special Provisions Applicable to Users Outside the United States.  We made 
>>> clear that you are not allowed to use Facebook if you are prohibited from 
>>> receiving products or services from the United States.
>> 
>> Regarding this article, Facebook can block and remove all users from Iran. 
>> Am I right?
>> 
>> I think this article is a bit tricky. What do you think guys?
>> 
>> Amin
>> 
>> --
>> Liberationtech is a public list whose archives are searchable on Google. 
>> Violations of list guidelines will get you moderated: 
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>> compa...@stanford.edu.
> 
> 
> 
> -- 
> Collin David Anderson
> averysmallbird.com | @cda | Washington, D.C.
> -- 
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Re: [liberationtech] Iranian users vs. FB new policy

[Amin Sabeti]

It was helpful :)

Thanks,

A


On 5 September 2013 06:26, Jillian C. York  wrote:

> Individuals on the SDN list can be searched here:
> http://sdnsearch.ofac.treas.gov/default.aspx
>
>
>  On Tue, Sep 3, 2013 at 11:45 AM, Amin Sabeti wrote:
>
>> Then can we say FB can block the Iran's Supreme Leader page or the
>> Rouhani one?
>>
>> Sent from my iPhone
>>
>> On 3 Sep 2013, at 18:50, Collin Anderson 
>> wrote:
>>
>> No, this is clearly covered by General License D for Iran and the
>> 'personal communications' exemptions in other sanctions regimes -- it's a
>> nice find, but I suspect it targets individuals designated under the SDN
>> list.
>>
>>
>> On Tue, Sep 3, 2013 at 12:55 PM, Amin Sabeti wrote:
>>
>>> Hi,
>>>
>>> I was reading the new FB policy and this part was interesting for me as
>>> an Iranian:
>>>
>>> *Special Provisions Applicable to Users Outside the United States.*  We
>>>> made clear that you are not allowed to use Facebook if you are prohibited
>>>> from receiving products or services from the United States.
>>>
>>>
>>> Regarding this article, Facebook can block and remove all users from
>>> Iran. Am I right?
>>>
>>> I think this article is a bit tricky. What do you think guys?
>>>
>>> Amin
>>>
>>> --
>>> Liberationtech is a public list whose archives are searchable on Google.
>>> Violations of list guidelines will get you moderated:
>>> https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech.
>>> Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password by emailing moderator at
>>> compa...@stanford.edu.
>>>
>>
>>
>>
>> --
>> *Collin David Anderson*
>> averysmallbird.com | @cda | Washington, D.C.
>>
>> --
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>
>
>
> --
> *Note: *I am slowly extricating myself from Gmail. Please change your
> address books to: jilliancy...@riseup.net or jill...@eff.org.
>
> US: +1-857-891-4244 | NL: +31-657086088
> site:  jilliancyork.com <http://jilliancyork.com/>* | *
> twitter: @jilliancyork* *
>
> "We must not be afraid of dreaming the seemingly impossible if we want the
> seemingly impossible to become a reality" - *Vaclav Havel*
>
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Re: [liberationtech] Localizing our circumvention tools

[Amin Sabeti]

Hi,

I can help you for Persian/Farsi.

My email address on Transifex is aminsab...@gmail.com.

Cheers,

Amin


On 13 November 2013 21:52, OpenITP Localization Management Service <
infol...@openitp.org> wrote:

>  Hello LibTech folks!
>
>  We've seen several projects asking for help with translating
> circumvention tools lately. To address this need, OpenITP has launched the
> Localization Management Service (LMS) to cultivate a community of
> volunteers to help with these goals.
>
>
> We are actively looking for individuals who want to help combat online
> surveillance and censorship worldwide. If you speak a second language (or
> more!) and are a fan of circumvention tools, we want to hear from you!
>
>
> What are some of tools we work on?
>
> Tor, Lantern, Cryptocat, Orbot, Psiphon, Commotion Wireless, GlobaLeaks,
> Martus, and more. A list of the current hub projects and other useful links
> can be found here:  https://openitp.org/localization/l10n.html
>
>
> If you have a project that needs localization and would like to join the
> hub, let us know! We will show you the features and benefits of Transifex
> and we can help you get your project set up.
>
> How Do I Contribute?
>
> We use a web based localization platform called Transifex to translate
> software strings, documentation, video subtitles and other materials that
> support the tools. If you have not created an account with Transifex, you
> can do so here: https://www.transifex.com/signin/?next=/start/
>
>
> Once you sign up, let us know your Transifex nickname so we can add you to
> the language teams on our hub projects.
>
> In addition, we have an IRC channel (freenode.net #l10n) and a mailing
> list l...@openitp.org, where you can interact with LMS team members,
> project developers, and other translators.
>
>
> How Much Time is Required?
>
> While there is no set time commitment, most of our members contribute a
> few hours a month, and you can play a key role in shaping tools used by
> people under oppressive regimes and ensure they can participate in a free
> and open Internet.
>
>
> What Will I be Localizing and Testing?
>
> You will be translating software, documentation, video, graphics, and
> websites. Basically, anything that is required for individuals to both
> learn and properly use these tools. Once a translation is complete,
> community members should test the tools and provide any cultural,
> linguistic, user experience, and technical input you have for developers.
>
>
>  Next Steps?
>
> Let us know you are interested by emailing us at infol...@openitp.org. If
> you have questions, please reach out as well.
>
>  Lastly, please fill out our short survey! This will help us better
> understand how to improve our services to our community of volunteers!
> http://bit.ly/1aXqEMn
>
> Best,
>
>  OpenITP Localization Management Service Team
>
> --
> Liberationtech is public & archives are searchable on Google. Violations
> of list guidelines will get you moderated:
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Re: [liberationtech] Localizing our circumvention tools

[Amin Sabeti]

Hi,

I'll look and edit/translate them regularly in my spare time :)

A


On 15 November 2013 19:36, Brian Conley  wrote:

> Hi Amin!
>
> Can you check out where we are at with the Persian translation of
> StoryMaker.
>
> https://www.transifex.com/projects/p/storymaker/
>
> We'd love any assistance you can provide!
>
> Brian
>
>
> On Fri, Nov 15, 2013 at 2:39 AM, Amin Sabeti  wrote:
>
>> Hi,
>>
>> I can help you for Persian/Farsi.
>>
>> My email address on Transifex is aminsab...@gmail.com.
>>
>> Cheers,
>>
>> Amin
>>
>>
>> On 13 November 2013 21:52, OpenITP Localization Management Service <
>> infol...@openitp.org> wrote:
>>
>>>  Hello LibTech folks!
>>>
>>>  We've seen several projects asking for help with translating
>>> circumvention tools lately. To address this need, OpenITP has launched the
>>> Localization Management Service (LMS) to cultivate a community of
>>> volunteers to help with these goals.
>>>
>>>
>>> We are actively looking for individuals who want to help combat online
>>> surveillance and censorship worldwide. If you speak a second language (or
>>> more!) and are a fan of circumvention tools, we want to hear from you!
>>>
>>>
>>> What are some of tools we work on?
>>>
>>> Tor, Lantern, Cryptocat, Orbot, Psiphon, Commotion Wireless, GlobaLeaks,
>>> Martus, and more. A list of the current hub projects and other useful links
>>> can be found here:  https://openitp.org/localization/l10n.html
>>>
>>>
>>> If you have a project that needs localization and would like to join the
>>> hub, let us know! We will show you the features and benefits of Transifex
>>> and we can help you get your project set up.
>>>
>>> How Do I Contribute?
>>>
>>> We use a web based localization platform called Transifex to translate
>>> software strings, documentation, video subtitles and other materials that
>>> support the tools. If you have not created an account with Transifex, you
>>> can do so here: https://www.transifex.com/signin/?next=/start/
>>>
>>>
>>> Once you sign up, let us know your Transifex nickname so we can add you
>>> to the language teams on our hub projects.
>>>
>>> In addition, we have an IRC channel (freenode.net #l10n) and a mailing
>>> list l...@openitp.org, where you can interact with LMS team members,
>>> project developers, and other translators.
>>>
>>>
>>> How Much Time is Required?
>>>
>>> While there is no set time commitment, most of our members contribute a
>>> few hours a month, and you can play a key role in shaping tools used by
>>> people under oppressive regimes and ensure they can participate in a free
>>> and open Internet.
>>>
>>>
>>> What Will I be Localizing and Testing?
>>>
>>> You will be translating software, documentation, video, graphics, and
>>> websites. Basically, anything that is required for individuals to both
>>> learn and properly use these tools. Once a translation is complete,
>>> community members should test the tools and provide any cultural,
>>> linguistic, user experience, and technical input you have for developers.
>>>
>>>
>>>  Next Steps?
>>>
>>> Let us know you are interested by emailing us at infol...@openitp.org.
>>> If you have questions, please reach out as well.
>>>
>>>  Lastly, please fill out our short survey! This will help us better
>>> understand how to improve our services to our community of volunteers!
>>> http://bit.ly/1aXqEMn
>>>
>>> Best,
>>>
>>>  OpenITP Localization Management Service Team
>>>
>>> --
>>> Liberationtech is public & archives are searchable on Google. Violations
>>> of list guidelines will get you moderated:
>>> https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech.
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>>> compa...@stanford.edu.
>>>
>>
>>
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>
>
>
> --
>
>
>
> Brian Conley
>
> Director, Small World News
>
> http://smallworldnews.tv
>
> m: 646.285.2046
>
> Skype: brianjoelconley
>
>
>
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[liberationtech] [SPAM:###] Iran Arrests 16 in New Crackdown on Internet Freedom

[Amin Sabeti]

While Rouhani and his team have claimed they will open doors of the internet to 
the Iranian people, but evidences show the fact is totally different.

http://mashable.com/2013/12/05/iran-arrests-16-internet-freedom-activists/

Despite lofty promises of more liberty, the crackdown on Internet 
freedomcontinues in Iran. However, this time, the victims aren't websites or 
encryption services — they're real people.

Iran's Revolutionary Guard arrested 16 cyber activists and journalists this 
week. The group is accused of working against the country's national security, 
having ties with foreign "enemy media" and designing anti-regime websites, 
according to Fars News and Mehr News, both press agencies believed to have 
close ties with the Iranian government.

SEE ALSO: The New Website That Makes the Case for Iran's Nuclear Energy Program

A person close to one of the activists arrested said he was "surprised" and 
"shocked."

The source, who would only speak toMashable anonymously for fear of reprisals, 
said the government was asking for 250 million Tomans (more than $80,000) for 
their release.

The first wave of arrests was reported on Tuesday, when popular Iranian 
technology news website Narenjiannounced that seven of its staffers had been 
detained the day before. A few hours later, the announcement was reportedly 
taken down.

On Wednesday, the Deputy General Prosecutor for the southeastern province of 
Kerman confirmed the arrests to Fars News, saying 16 people in total had been 
detained. But not all of them are affiliated with Narenji, and two were 
released on Thursday, according to sources.

This is the latest in a long string of incidents that seem to run contrary to 
President Hassan Rouhani's promises of easing restriction on free speech and 
Internet freedom.

But observers point that there is internal tension in the Iranian government.

While Rouhani and his staff preach for more freedom and use social media 
siteslike Twitter and Facebook — both of which are still blocked in Iran — 
insiders close to Supreme Leader Ali Khameneicall them out for using those 
social networks, and carry out arrests like these.

"It seems the hardliners inside Iran are against such changes," Nariman Gharib, 
an Iranian researcher based in London, told Mashable. "And by attacking an 
independent and a popular website like Narenji.ir and connecting it to 'foreign 
media,' they want to push back against Rouhani and show their disapproval of 
his attempt to ease the restrictions on the Internet in Iran."

Among the 16, a group of "young specialists in new media" — Ali Asghar Hormand, 
Abass Vahedi, Alireza Vaziri, Nassim Nikmehr, Malieh Nakehi, Mohammad Hossien 
Mossazadeh and Sara Sajad Pour — had their homes searched and personal 
belongings removed before being arrested and taken to an unknown location, 
according toReporters Without Borders.

However this latest wave of arrests is not just about the people, warns Gharib, 
who left Iran in 2011. Arresting journalists and activists sends a chilling 
message to other Iranians, especially bloggers.

"Such incident can have far more reaching impact on Iran’s independent media 
beyond a single website," Gharib said. "It can lead to widespread fear amongst 
Iranian bloggers and techies who will not feel safe any longer, especially at 
the time that they were thinking the situation will improve by the election of 
Rouhani."

Sent from my iPhone-- 
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Re: [liberationtech] Social Networks & Social Movements

[Amin Sabeti]

It's not free.

Sent from my iPhone

> On 21 Jan 2014, at 01:29, Yosem Companys  wrote:
> 
> From: David Tindall 
> 
> Some folks might be interested that a special issue of Social Movement
> Studies has been published on social networks and social movements.
> 
> Details are available at:
> 
> http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/toc/csms20/13/1
> 
> I believe access to this special issue is free.
> 
> DBT
> -- 
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Re: [liberationtech] blatant groveling: my book "It's Complicated"

[Amin Sabeti]

Hi,

It looks interesting :) I'll order it.

Cheers,

A


On 28 January 2014 19:40, Paul Bernal (LAW)  wrote:

>  Looks great - will order it, and tweet about it.
>
>  Paul
>
>
> Dr Paul Bernal
> Lecturer
> UEA Law School
> University of East Anglia
> Norwich Research Park
> Norwich NR4 7TJ
>
> email: paul.ber...@uea.ac.uk
> Web: http://www.paulbernal.co.uk/
> Blog: http://paulbernal.wordpress.com/
> Twitter: @paulbernalUK
>
>  On 28 Jan 2014, at 19:12, danah boyd  wrote:
>
>  Friends & Colleagues -
>
>  In less than a month, my new book - *"It's Complicated: The Social Lives
> of Networked Teens" *(see: http://www.danah.org/itscomplicated/ ) - will
> be published.  This is the product of ten years worth of research into how
> social media has inflected American teen life.  I'm writing today in the
> hopes that you might consider pre-ordering a copy (or two ).  This
> book (published by Yale University Press) is a cross trade/academic book.
> Pre-sales and first week sales significantly affect how a trade book is
> marketed and distributed. Even though this book is based on grounded data,
> I've written it to be publicly accessible in the hopes that parents,
> educators, journalists, and policy makers will read it and reconsider their
> attitude towards technology and teen practices.  The book covers everything
> from addiction, bullying, and online safety to privacy, inequality, and the
> digital natives debate. I suspect that the chapter on privacy might be of
> particular interest to the folks on this list.
>
>  If you have the financial wherewithal to buy a copy, I'd be super
> grateful.  If you don't, I *totally* understand.  Either way, I'd be super
> super super appreciative if you could help me get the word out about the
> book. I'm really hoping that this book will alter the public dialogue about
> teen use of social media.
>
>  *You can pre-order it at:*
> - Amazon (Hardcover, Kindle, Audiobook):
> http://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/ASIN/0300166311/apophenia-20
> - Powell's: http://www.powells.com/biblio/62-9780300166316-0
> - Yale University Press:
> http://yalepress.yale.edu/yupbooks/book.asp?isbn=9780300166316
>
>  Fingers crossed that y'all will find it useful and interesting.
>
>  {{hug}}
>
>  danah
>
>  --
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Re: [liberationtech] LUKS "Self-Destruct" feature introduced in Kali Linux

[Amin Sabeti]

In the Iran case, I think using TrueCrypt would be better because hiding
files is more important than destroying it. For instance, it would be not
practical to destroy files when the authorities confiscate your laptop.


On 30 January 2014 20:54, Sean Lynch  wrote:

>
> On Thu, Jan 30, 2014 at 1:00 AM, Maxim Kammerer  wrote:
>
>>
>> I can't think of a scenario where this functionality would be useful.
>> Reminds me of Greenwald using his boyfriend as a data mule  —
>> simultaneously trusting and mistrusting cryptography due to lack of
>> understanding of the concepts involved. If you want to move data
>> safely, encrypt it with an automatically-generated password of
>> sufficient entropy, and transmit the password separately — there is no
>> need to transmit the whole LUKS keyslot, which is large, and is just a
>> technical detail.
>>
>
> I don't think even this is useful. It'd be as easy or easier to go get the
> separately transmitted key than to get you to reveal it, and the same
> tactics that would get you to reveal the key could also get you to reveal
> its location or the identity of whoever has the key.
>
> In the more likely scenario, it's unlikely the bad guys are going to make
> any distinction between your refusing to reveal the key and your being
> unable to reveal the key. It's not like they're going to say "Damn, we've
> lost. Well, just let them go, then!"
>
> The only real protection from being compelled to reveal a key is for the
> bad guys not to know the encrypted data even exists.
>
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Re: [liberationtech] Research on censorship & mobile apps?

[Amin Sabeti]

Hi,

This one might be useful for you:
http://smallmedia.org.uk/sites/default/files/u17/Filtering%20Report-January14_rev3.pdf

BTW, what kind of information would you like to have? For the Iran case, I
can help you.

A


On 4 February 2014 15:06, Yosem Companys  wrote:

> From: Magdalena Olszanowski 
>
> I'm writing about censorship and Instagram and looking for more
> research on censorship and mobile apps. I can't seem to find any.
>
> Thank you so much
>
> Magdalena
>
> =^.^=
>
> Magdalena Olszanowski, PhD Student, SSHRC Fellow
> Senior Research Assistant, Mobile Media Lab
> HASTAC Scholar
> Communication Studies
> Concordia University
> Montreal, QC
>
> @raisecain
> --
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[liberationtech] Unmasking the hardliner webosphere in Iran

[Amin Sabeti]

​Hi folks,

Small Media has published a report about the hardliner webosphere in Iran.
The report is the first in-depth research about the hardline on the Persian
cyberspace with lots of interesting information.

You can read the report here: http://unmaskthearzeshi.com

I was one of the senior researchers in this report and I'll be happy to
receive your feedback about it.

Cheers,

Amin
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[liberationtech] Iran's ICT budget analysis

[Amin Sabeti]

Hi folks,

Small Media has published a comprehensive budget analysis for the ICT
Ministry:
http://smallmedia.org.uk/sites/default/files/u8/InternetInfrastructure_Jan14.pdf

The analysis is interesting because it is the first budget that Rouhani's
government has submitted and can show his policy about the Internet,
National Internet (SHOMA), etc.

Cheers,

Amin
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Re: [liberationtech] Many VPNs and Psiphon are currently blocked in Iran right now

[Amin Sabeti]

Hi,

The important point that we must not forget is the first priority for users
in Iran is access. It means users would like to check their FB & Twitter
accounts. Therefore, TOR is not feasible solution for them because they
have not high speed internet connection.

Cheers,

A


On 22 February 2014 03:21, Nathan of Guardian
wrote:

> -BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-
> Hash: SHA1
>
> On 02/21/2014 09:54 PM, Nima Fatemi wrote:
> > Nariman Gharib:
> >>> so if anybody can help me to tell me which these tools in below
> >>> are safe it would be great.
> > I've double checked that Tor works just fine in Iran. This is for
> > both vanilla (normal Tor Browser Bundle) and Pluggable Transports
> > Bundle (including but not limited to obfsproxy).
> >
> > Android users can use Orbot to access Tor network.
> >
> > I believe we have the necessary tools, what we certainly need here
> > is to educate ppl on how to use it safely.
>
> Yes, my question is why Nariman didn't have Orbot on his list in the
> first place? Perhaps people don't consider Tor to be a VPN, or don't
> know it is available on Android?
>
> - From the Tor metrics site (and as Nima said), there seems to be about
> 25,000 active Tor sessions per day from Iran, via direct access (not
> using a bridge):
>
> https://metrics.torproject.org/users.html?graph=userstats-relay-country&start=2013-11-24&end=2014-02-22&country=ir&events=off#userstats-relay-country
>
> We receive many emails each day from users in Iran, and it is
> definitely working for a good number of them. I know that with Google
> Play Store, Iranian users can search for Orbot, but when they try to
> download it, it is blocked with a 403 Forbidden error by a filter on
> the Iranian side. We do however offer direct downloads of our software
> (see the support link below)
>
> Maybe we need to create a version of this tutorial that can be
> published in Farsi on a site people visit?
>
> https://guardianproject.info/howto/browsefreely/
>
> We've also recently created a simple support message that could be
> sent out, to help people debug issues they might be having access
> downloads, configuring the software and so on:
>
> https://dev.guardianproject.info/projects/support/wiki/Orbot_Auto_Response
>
> As for the other solutions, the only one that looks trustworthy is
> Shadowsocks, though it is just a SOCK5 proxy system, which means it is
> limited to the amount of proxy server IPs you can setup and host.
>
> +n
>
>
>
> -BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-
> Version: GnuPG v1.4.11 (GNU/Linux)
> Comment: Using GnuPG with Thunderbird - http://www.enigmail.net/
>
> iQIcBAEBAgAGBQJTCBfRAAoJEKgBGD5ps3qpnzMP/2r8VC/oAjubz7Tr+Ba8GRwP
> cdDuhOEIHF5bVIfz6djYqU9UK732OSS6CIBBQ3e+oiOqU3e4moJOjMykqleGG917
> tQ+ddXm1EdPmUM8e9vQbHimY5mUhm9qpnPrbkyfC4Gm1ZFr+bUDb/a9rR+BUH97d
> p4Qos0yiTXorgOv1iDo5KPOjRyIsGt2+jRj+fhaXSqk8Gv/j3a7YurR/E6pjF957
> GpyjU4Imog6a3l5dseDaqurkVJp7xR6rgWbDwv7uDBKAc3GvO8a/JTW2BqdRumw/
> XvBNLJ8OJm/Iy1QJbF4xwauuBxWSWOrxT9L8ZpYc5blG5MnydQTqtzPD53a7NOSz
> WWlEHmreriaguXs+K3jS1aryV1GJPaue/s1dVs7WgGB0Us7lMlFxeYwQzDdrbdFk
> h/gOKXu+Cd9ey+5/bH2BEqzJc3RB4/VzMYZ99fzK7lumrqo3lLexvC4QLwY9kuhd
> vpbar2VVJ6ofEZ2ZZ3dNCOYsu2G5YJ5k2z2FCXfd1uW0OWD2HOT5VB6CkSbR/tW3
> C8dtgPg0uh432JW6/3icuk0GEzfXmaBxg09aHjXzCgt5wWRAjSv83KBdIc3DK1n6
> CMe9j2O1rsyK24CoXD89oBb4Jf7HuUGu9A2G+/6T+rNtjYE2Z4wkvTgfqN3beaLh
> NqoeV9c9aS16Q17r8uNA
> =pKCP
> -END PGP SIGNATURE-
> --
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Re: [liberationtech] Many VPNs and Psiphon are currently blocked in Iran right now

[Amin Sabeti]

On 22 February 2014 19:17, Brian Conley  wrote:

> Amin,
>
> Do Iranians ever attempt checking the mobile versions of these sites? In
> my experience even in low bandwidth environments, if you are patient, the
> mobile sites work much better.
>
Unfortunately, TOR is famous as a slow tool in Iran! I haven't checked with
users inside the country about the mobile version. I'll hope it works
better than the desktop version.​​

> Perhaps this is a combination of lack of awareness and lack of patience. I
> understand Iranian youth and folks only concerned with general internet use
> may lack patience, but activists journalists and civil society members
> should be taught practical steps and be encouraged to recognize the
> internet is not magic, therefore sometimes patience is a necessity. There
> are such varying responses any the usability of tor and other products
> inside Iran it seems likely there is a dearth of practical knowledge and an
> excess of user error.
>
Based on my experience, journalists and activists don't care about their
security because there are lot of myths that the government can monitor
everything and they cannot do anything! Unfortunately, there is lack of
knowledge in Iran and cyber activists need to be trained. BTW, general
users don't care about security and the important thing for them is access.
I thing Nariman talked about general users.

Cheers,

A

> ​​
>
On Feb 22, 2014 11:04 AM, "Amin Sabeti"  wrote:
>
>> Hi,
>>
>> The important point that we must not forget is the first priority for
>> users in Iran is access. It means users would like to check their FB &
>> Twitter accounts. Therefore, TOR is not feasible solution for them because
>> they have not high speed internet connection.
>>
>> Cheers,
>>
>> A
>>
>>
>> On 22 February 2014 03:21, Nathan of Guardian <
>> nat...@guardianproject.info> wrote:
>>
>>> -BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-
>>> Hash: SHA1
>>>
>>> On 02/21/2014 09:54 PM, Nima Fatemi wrote:
>>> > Nariman Gharib:
>>> >>> so if anybody can help me to tell me which these tools in below
>>> >>> are safe it would be great.
>>> > I've double checked that Tor works just fine in Iran. This is for
>>> > both vanilla (normal Tor Browser Bundle) and Pluggable Transports
>>> > Bundle (including but not limited to obfsproxy).
>>> >
>>> > Android users can use Orbot to access Tor network.
>>> >
>>> > I believe we have the necessary tools, what we certainly need here
>>> > is to educate ppl on how to use it safely.
>>>
>>> Yes, my question is why Nariman didn't have Orbot on his list in the
>>> first place? Perhaps people don't consider Tor to be a VPN, or don't
>>> know it is available on Android?
>>>
>>> - From the Tor metrics site (and as Nima said), there seems to be about
>>> 25,000 active Tor sessions per day from Iran, via direct access (not
>>> using a bridge):
>>>
>>> https://metrics.torproject.org/users.html?graph=userstats-relay-country&start=2013-11-24&end=2014-02-22&country=ir&events=off#userstats-relay-country
>>>
>>> We receive many emails each day from users in Iran, and it is
>>> definitely working for a good number of them. I know that with Google
>>> Play Store, Iranian users can search for Orbot, but when they try to
>>> download it, it is blocked with a 403 Forbidden error by a filter on
>>> the Iranian side. We do however offer direct downloads of our software
>>> (see the support link below)
>>>
>>> Maybe we need to create a version of this tutorial that can be
>>> published in Farsi on a site people visit?
>>>
>>> https://guardianproject.info/howto/browsefreely/
>>>
>>> We've also recently created a simple support message that could be
>>> sent out, to help people debug issues they might be having access
>>> downloads, configuring the software and so on:
>>>
>>>
>>> https://dev.guardianproject.info/projects/support/wiki/Orbot_Auto_Response
>>>
>>> As for the other solutions, the only one that looks trustworthy is
>>> Shadowsocks, though it is just a SOCK5 proxy system, which means it is
>>> limited to the amount of proxy server IPs you can setup and host.
>>>
>>> +n
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> -BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-
>>> Version: GnuPG v1.4.11 (GNU/Linux)
>>> Comment: Using GnuPG with Thu

Re: [liberationtech] Many VPNs and Psiphon are currently blocked in Iran right now

[Amin Sabeti]

​Guys, we are talking about massive audience not activists or journalists!
I believe we should care more about massive audience not activists because
they can find someone to help them. For instance, they have lots of friends
outside the country to buy VPN or other commercial circumvention tools BUT
general users have not this kinds of contact.

It's so interesting for me when someone says TOR does work then it's their
problem to use it not us! BTW, I believe TOR is a good tool to hide your
identification and for majority in Iran it's not the issue because they
don't care about NSA/ GCHQ surveillance.

It would be better to think as a general user not someone who is activist
and support freedom of expression.

Cheers,

A


On 23 February 2014 07:11, Collin Anderson wrote:

>
> On Sat, Feb 22, 2014 at 9:35 PM, Nathan of Guardian <
> nat...@guardianproject.info> wrote:
>
>> I just hope that the "Tor is slow" meme, along with
>> other famous ones like "PGP is hard" and "No one cares about privacy",
>> are continued to be challenged, tested and not accepted as inevitable.
>>
>
>
> Certainly, however, I am testing this meme now, and it has validity. I,
> right now, pulled the latest version of Tor to a Linux machine in Iran and
> did a comparative measurement of throughput with and without. Although the
> download started out reasonably fast, after a few seconds it seems probably
> that my connection was throttled down. Whereas without Tor, my throughput
> averaged 84.81 Kbps, with it is currently 14.66 Kbps and rapidly dropping.
> If anyone doubts that Tor's overhead is that high, at some point I could
> keep tearing down connections and narrow the likelihood of a poorly
> performing bridge. However, factually, Tor is slow.
>
>
> --
> *Collin David Anderson*
> averysmallbird.com | @cda | Washington, D.C.
>
> --
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Re: [liberationtech] Privus?

[Amin Sabeti]

"absolutely unbreakable security"? Are you sure?

I don't believe it! 100% security is a myth... Don't even think about it :)

A


On 28 February 2014 17:31, Mrs. Y. wrote:

> hahahhahahah
>
> unbreakableI think I just peed myself.
>
> On 2/28/14, 12:27 PM, Hisham wrote:
> > Hello LibTech crowd,
> >
> > Sorry if this has been discussed here before but is anybody here
> > familiar with a software called Privus?
> > https://www.kickstarter.com/projects/857935876/175768761?token=bbfb88ac
> >
> > Its developers promote it as an encryption service that "offers
> > absolutely unbreakable security".
> > It uses OTP encryption technology, that developers claim is harder to
> > break that PGP.
> >
> > I thought I should ask the list before I consider sharing widely.
> >
> > Any thoughts welcome.
> >
> > Cheers,
> >
> > Hisham
> >
> >
> >
> > --
> >
> > Hisham Almiraat
> >
> > director,advox.org 
> >
> >
> > 
> >
> > @almiraat |@advox <
> https://twitter.com/Advox>
> >
> > skype: hisham_almiraat
> >
> >
> > ---
> >
> > I encrypt at his...@riseup.net ,
> >
> > fingerprint: ED94 D1CC 39AA F63E 1762 898B CE99 66E4 B371 9B7E
> >
> >
> >
> --
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Re: [liberationtech] Here is a list of TrueCrypt compatible disk encryption tools

[Amin Sabeti]

Thanks for sharing the link.

A


On 30 May 2014 01:07, Nicholas Merrill  wrote:

> Here's a list of Truecrypt compatible file encryption software .. some
> compromises required, but maybe it will suffice for the time being
>
>
> http://www.hacker10.com/encryption-software-2/list-of-truecrypt-compatible-encryption-software/
>
> -Nick
>
> --
> Nicholas Merrill
> Executive Director
> The Calyx Institute
> 287 Spring Street
> New York, NY 10013
> email: n...@calyx.com
> xmpp:  n...@calyxinstitute.org
>
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Re: [liberationtech] when you are using Tor, Twitter will blocked your acc

[Amin Sabeti]

Rick, I think you delete the problem instead of solving it!




On 9 June 2014 11:30, Rich Kulawiec  wrote:

> On Sat, Jun 07, 2014 at 10:39:06AM +0100, Nariman Gharib wrote:
> > what solution do you have for solve this problem?
>
> Don't use Twitter.
>
> Yes, I'm quite serious.  Twitter has clearly stated that they're delighted
> to provide censorship-on-demand for any country that asks nicely:
>
>
> http://www.businessinsider.com/twitter-censors-political-accounts-2014-5
>
> and even some that don't ask nicely:
>
>
> https://www.techdirt.com/articles/20140521/08242627307/pakistan-internet-content-regulator-asks-twitter-to-take-down-blasphemous-search.shtml
>
> and it's only going to get worse:
>
>
> http://gigaom.com/2014/05/21/twitters-selective-censorship-of-tweets-may-be-the-best-option-but-its-still-censorship/
>
> because Twitter wants to do business in those countries, like selling
> data on users to advertisers:
>
>
> http://thinkprogress.org/economy/2014/04/16/3427404/twitters-acquisition-of-gnip/
>
> Consider: if Twitter is so ready, willing and able to cave in to these
> demands, what possible reason is there to think that they won't give in
> just as quickly to *other* demands -- like for a data dump on all the
> users in a particular country or following particular accounts or using
> particular tags, including their login history with IP addresses, OS
> fingerprint, and everything else that they have on them?
>
> To borrow a phrase, it's just...good business.
>
> ---rsk
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Re: [liberationtech] Recent iOS privacy checks

[Amin Sabeti]

Thanks for sharing the blog link.


On 8 July 2014 09:25, Cody Tarrant  wrote:

> Dear all,
>
> As a newcomer to iOS, I was pleasantly surprised to see such a
> fine-grained check, to see if the user will allow sharing location.
>
> http://mine.sent.as/ios8-perm-screenshot.jpg
>
> Looking further, I came across an excellent blog post discussing all
> these permissions in iOS8 here:
>
> http://lmjabreu.com/post/ios-8-privacy-updates/
>
> This should put to rest any doubt, that users would not want to wield
> fairly fine-grained control over their privacy, and that such control
> cannot be provided without great difficulty to the user.
>
> Cody Tarrant
>
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[liberationtech] Bitcoin in Iran

[Amin Sabeti]

Hi,

This report might be interesting for people who follow Bitcoin news:
http://www.smallmedia.org.uk/content/119

Since the emergence of Bitcoin back in 2009, a variety of national
> governments have been grappling with the conundrum of how far they should
> recognise, and regulate the cryptocurrency. Whilst some countries including
> Germany, the United Kingdom, and the United States have taken a fairly
> laissez faire approach towards Bitcoin, the Russian and Indian governments
> have led the charge in pushing for greater state oversight.
>
> Iran, meanwhile, has been far more sluggish in formulating a coherent
> Bitcoin policy - only in the early months of 2014 have politicians and
> regulators started to take an interest. Our report this month reviews the
> initial findings of Iranian research into Bitcoin, explores potential
> policy implications, and evaluates the impact of Bitcoin in Iran up until
> the present day.
>
> Iran has been far more active on the web censorship front, however. This
> month’s report also tracks the state’s latest efforts to control and filter
> web content, ahead of the upcoming roll-out of Iran’s ‘intelligent
> filtering’, or ‘Favourable Cyberspace’ system. This report also documents
> the progress of Iran’s latest infrastructure development projects, as it
> pushes to modernise and expand the country’s Internet infrastructure
> networks.


Cheers,

Amin
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[liberationtech] Something wrong with Riseup

[Amin Sabeti]

Hi,

I tried to login to https://mail.riseup.net but it shows me this message:

Hello - you are visiting fulvetta.riseup.net, this host is no longer
available. Please go to https://mail.riseup.net instead, please update your
bookmarks!

Do you have any idea?

Cheers,

Amin
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[liberationtech] Time validation for 2-step verification codes

[Amin Sabeti]

Hi,

Recently, a bunch of Iranian journalists/ activists have been targeted by
Iranian hackers.

Some of them said their 2-step verification was active during the attack
but hacker could reuse the code that sent by Google via SMS and passed
2-step verification!

I was wonder to know if some folks here know the validation time for the
2-step verification code that users receive through SMS not the app.

Cheers,

Amin
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Re: [liberationtech] Time validation for 2-step verification codes

[Amin Sabeti]

Hi,

As Collin mentioned, my question is simple and the only person answered it
is Nadim. I know all of staff that you said but I want to know the lifetime
of the code that Google sends via SMS.

I know the code lifetime for the Google Authenticator apps is around 32
seconds but I don't have any idea about the SMS code.

Thanks,

Amin


On 28 August 2014 01:05, Collin Anderson  wrote:

> In this case, it appears that the victims were deceived by a well-attended
> phishing campaign into giving up both their password and their SMS-provided
> 2FA code. Amin is simply asking what the lifetime of that code is, since it
> is not nearly as short as the Authenticator-provided number.
>
>
> On Wed, Aug 27, 2014 at 6:46 PM, John Adams  wrote:
>
>> I don't know where you're getting your information from, but I audited
>> Google's 2FA when I worked at Twitter.  The attack scenario that is
>> described here is simply not possible without the endpoint being
>> owned.
>>
>> Code replay is not possible. Once a code is accepted, it cannot be
>> used again to log in.
>>
>> The SMS attack is substantially more likely, but you can disable SMS
>> codes in preferences. You should not use SMS at all if you can avoid
>> it.
>>
>> Additionally, in order to get past 2FA, the attacker would have to
>> have the user's password. All of this points to some sort of remote
>> access tool or keylogger being active on the activist's machine.
>>
>> -j
>>
>>
>> On Wed, Aug 27, 2014 at 10:08 AM, Nadim Kobeissi 
>> wrote:
>> > The two-step verification used by Google is based on the TOTP protocol
>> [1]
>> > which is the open standard for this sort of thing.
>> >
>> > To answer your questions Amin:
>> >
>> > 1. Tokens last 60 seconds according to the TOTP standard.
>> > 2. Your journalist friends would be very well-advised to use an app [2]
>> > instead of SMS codes. By using an authenticator app, they will be able
>> to
>> > obtain codes without using SMS and even with their phone completely not
>> > connected to a network.
>> >
>> > [1] http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6238
>> > [2] https://support.google.com/accounts/answer/1066447?hl=en
>> >
>> >
>> >
>> > On Wed, Aug 27, 2014 at 11:29 AM, Amin Sabeti 
>> wrote:
>> >>
>> >> Hi,
>> >>
>> >> Recently, a bunch of Iranian journalists/ activists have been targeted
>> by
>> >> Iranian hackers.
>> >>
>> >> Some of them said their 2-step verification was active during the
>> attack
>> >> but hacker could reuse the code that sent by Google via SMS and passed
>> >> 2-step verification!
>> >>
>> >> I was wonder to know if some folks here know the validation time for
>> the
>> >> 2-step verification code that users receive through SMS not the app.
>> >>
>> >> Cheers,
>> >>
>> >> Amin
>> >>
>> >> --
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>
>
> --
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> averysmallbird.com | @cda | Washington, D.C.
>
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Re: [liberationtech] Iranian and Twitter's Dick Costolo

[Amin Sabeti]

Twitter supports SMS in Iran and the only thing is they must add Iran in
the list.

On 29 September 2014 06:12, John Adams  wrote:

> Uh, as far as I know Twitter did not have per-country restrictions on
> 2FA. Perhaps this is because of limited SMS support, but Twitter did
> not restrict 2FA per-country.
>
> -j
>
>
> On Sun, Sep 28, 2014 at 4:33 AM, Nariman Gharib 
> wrote:
> > Hi,
> >
> > This week, Dick constolo did a good job which,  he spoke with Iran
> foreign
> > minister on the phone and sent tweet to Hassan Rouhani about unblocking
> > Twitter In Iran.
> >
> > Today, Iranian Twitter users have launched a new campaign and asking,
> > D.constolo to add Iran to Twitter country list for 2step verification and
> > more security for users inside Iran.
> >
> > more: https://twitter.com/ListenToUs/status/516186457527300096
> >
> > Thanks
> > Nariman
> > @Listentous
> >
> > --
> > PGP: 084F 95C0 BD1B B15A 129C 90DB A539 6393 6999 CBB6
> >
> > --
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Re: [liberationtech] Tor Project website blocked by many UK ISPs as "adult content"

[Amin Sabeti]

It works for me on Sky and O2 without any problem.

On 7 November 2014 06:24, Arzak Khan  wrote:

> Somewhat similar to Pakistan.
>
> Arzak Khan
> Director |Internet Policy Observatory Pakistan (*iPOP*) | Tel +92 81
> 9211464 | Twitter: @internetpolicyp |Web: www.ipop.org.pk |
>
>
>
> > Date: Thu, 6 Nov 2014 20:27:23 +
> > From: liberationt...@lewman.us
> > To: liberationtech@lists.stanford.edu
> > Subject: Re: [liberationtech] Tor Project website blocked by many UK
> ISPs as "adult content"
> >
> > On Thu, Nov 06, 2014 at 11:11:00AM -0500, grif...@cryptolab.net wrote
> 0.8K bytes in 0 lines about:
> > : Apparently allowing unsurveilled/unfiltered speech is considered adult
> > : content by many UK service providers.
> >
> > It seems the list has expanded over the years,
> https://blog.torproject.org/blog/tale-new-censors-vodafone-uk-t-mobile-uk-o2-uk-and-t-mobile-usa?amp
> >
> > --
> > Andrew
> > http://www.lewman.is/
> > pgp 0x6B4D6475
> > --
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Re: [liberationtech] Receiving phone verification and 2-Step Verification codes through a 'number inside Iran'

[Amin Sabeti]

Google has sent its codes via SMS with Iranian number since 6 months ago.

On 16 January 2015 at 17:39, Collin Anderson 
wrote:

>
> On Fri, Jan 16, 2015 at 12:10 PM, elham gheytanchi 
> wrote:
>
>> I think it means the codes are generated by the state agencies.
>>
>
> They are not, the international companies would contract with an SMS
> gateway to send codes. That SMS gateway should be a more or less a dumb
> pipe that transmits whatever it is sent by the provider. It so happens that
> now the pipe is closer to the user but the source stays the same. The SMS
> gateway and telecommunications companies can certainly surveil or modify
> the content (the latter wouldn't be useful for 2FA), but it should not
> generate the codes.
>
>
> --
> *Collin David Anderson*
> averysmallbird.com | @cda | Washington, D.C.
>
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Re: [liberationtech] Open Source Videoconference platform

[Amin Sabeti]

Jitsi works perfectly for low-bandwidth consumption and easy to use for
non-techies.

On 18 January 2015 at 23:06, Andrés Leopoldo Pacheco Sanfuentes <
alps6...@gmail.com> wrote:

> Are these platforms scalable to many participants? easy to use for
> non-techies? low-bandwidth consumption? easy to share live via ustream or
> other live video streaming platform? easy to record and post later in
> youtube or other widely available video platforms?
>
>
> Best Regards | Cordiales Saludos | Grato,
>
> Andrés L. Pacheco Sanfuentes
> 
> +1 (347) 766-5008
>
> On Sun, Jan 18, 2015 at 4:30 PM, Julian Oliver 
> wrote:
>
>> ..on Sun, Jan 18, 2015 at 08:16:22AM -0600, Andrés Leopoldo Pacheco
>> Sanfuentes wrote:
>> > Is there such a thing? Reliable? Skype sucks, and it is a Microsoft
>> product
>> > now (too flickery, etc.), and I don't know of others..
>>
>> Jitsi with XMPP (jabber) works well for me. I've given a few video
>> lectures
>> using it.
>>
>> https://jitsi.org/
>> https://jitsi.org/index.php/Register/Register
>>
>> With Chromium or Chrome you can also use Jiti purely in the browser,
>> albeit I
>> haven't had great luck with it:
>>
>> https://meet.jit.si/
>>
>> A similar offering is:
>>
>> http://talky.io
>>
>> Cheers,
>>
>> --
>> Julian Oliver
>> http://julianoliver.com
>> http://criticalengineering.org
>> PGP key: https://julianoliver.com/key.asc
>> Beware the auto-complete life.
>>
>>
>
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[liberationtech] Umbrella App

[Amin Sabeti]

Hi folks,

A friend of mine asked me about this app: https://secfirst.org/umbrella.html

I didn't hear about it and I was wondering to know if someone in the list
knows and audits the app.

Cheers,

Amin
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[liberationtech] Thunderbird's Bug

[Amin Sabeti]

Hi folks,

It seems Thunderbird has a dangerous bug that can put people in risk.

I have 5 various Gmail accounts on Thunderbird. Each Gmail address use its
own Outgoing Server (SMTP). It means I have 5 smtp.googlemail.com. But for
some reasons, SMTP for one Gmail ccount has been changed from the correct
SMTP to another one. Consequently, if I don't check SMTP of my account on
Thunderbird, the email will send through another email address to the
recipient. For instance, I'd like to send an email from aminsabeti [at]
gmail [dot] com to someone, if the SMTP has been changed, I think I'm
sending my email via aminsabeti while the recipient will see from another
email on my Thunderbird such as x...@gmail.com!

I hope my explanation is clear. This bug can be dangerous when people have
their real email address and pseudonym email address on Thunderbird which
has happened more than 10 times for me.

I hope someone from Thunderbird is here and can fix this annoying bug which
can be risky for people who live in some countries such as Iran.

Cheers,

Amin
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[liberationtech] The Truth about Iranian Search Engines

[Amin Sabeti]

Hi,

We've published a comprehensive report about Iranian search engines and how
they try to change users' behaviour by results manipulation. Also, you can
find latest news about the Internet censorship and policy in Iran.

Please let me know if you have any question regarding this report and feel
free to send your feedback.

Cheers,

Amin

***
In mid-February, Iranian officials announced the launch of three domestic
search engines, which they claim can be used without any interference from
the filtering system. This month’s report puts this claim to the test by
searching for some sensitive keywords on Iranian search engines and
comparing the results to Google.

It won’t come as a surprise to readers that our findings suggest that
Iranian search engines do indeed filter results for some sensitive
keywords. However, it turns out that this filtering sometimes works in
unexpected ways, and other times results we thought might be censored were
actually pretty easy to find.

We think this report offers some introductory insights into how Iranian
search engines work, and how they interact with the country’s filtering
system. In addition to this feature, we’ve also got more information about
a “spy operation” in which eight Facebook ‘activists’ were arrested, the
ICT Ministry’s latest comments about 3G and 4G mobile communications
technology, along with other ICT-related statements from politicians and
policymakers.

If you are interested in discussing further any of the issues raised in
this report, please join our group on LinkedIn. [1]

Read more: http://smallmedia.org.uk/sites/default/files/u8/IIIP_Mar2015.pdf
[PDF]

[1] https://www.linkedin.com/groups?home=&gid=8292252&trk=anet_ug_hm
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Re: [liberationtech] Free or Cheap VPN for OS X?

[Amin Sabeti]

Probably, this service will help you: https://www.privateinternetaccess.com/

On 5 May 2015 at 15:08,  wrote:

> Hi,
>
> Can anyone recommend a free or cheap VPN for OS X (a Psiphon 3
> equivalent)?
>
> Before anyone says it, I'm well aware of the various dangers related to
> VPNs and the availability of TOR etc but I'm just looking for something for
> low risk stuff when travelling etc.
>
> Thanks.
> -A
>
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Re: [liberationtech] tracking government internet blocking

[Amin Sabeti]

Hi,

Regarding Iran's case, you can find useful information here:
http://smallmedia.org.uk/term/1/47

Cheers,

Amin

On 16 August 2015 at 04:37, Robert Guerra  wrote:

> Tanya,
>
> You ask a good question… likely many will answer on the list.
>
> Let me provide a list of a few resources that could be of interest.
>
>
> Herdict is a user-driven platform for identifying web blockages as they
> happen
> www.herdict.org/
>
> Open Observatory of Network Interference (OONI)
> A free software, global observation network for detecting censorship,
> surveillance and traffic manipulation on the internet
> https://ooni.torproject.org/
>
> The OpenNet Initiative - a collaborative project that concluded in 2014
> that was a pioneer in documenting internet censorship and internet controls.
> https://opennet.net/
>
> The Access series represents three edited volumes published by the OpenNet
> Initiative and MIT Press that document nearly a decade of extensive
> technical and in-field research on the trends and patterns shaping
> information controls around the world.
> http://access.opennet.net/
>
> I’ll let others share other resources and tools…
>
> regards
>
> Robert
> --
> Robert Guerra
> Phone: +1 416-893-0377
> Twitter: twitter.com/netfreedom
> Email: rgue...@privaterra.org
> PGP Keys : https://keybase.io/rguerra
>
>
> On 15 Aug 2015, at 22:18, Tanya Rabourn wrote:
>
> Hi all,
>>
>> I know several of you monitor Internet blocking and other interference by
>> governments, so I have a couple questions for you. Is there a site
>> somewhere that gives up-to-the minute information about who is blocking
>> what? Is there a guide that outlines how to use tools for monitoring
>> blocking or bandwidth throttling (including tools for use *inside* the
>> country)?
>>
>> Thanks!
>>
>> -Tanya
>>
>>
>> --
>> Tanya Rabourn
>> User Experience Designer
>> Doctoral Candidate, The University of Texas at Austin
>> tanya.rabo...@gmail.com
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
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[liberationtech] New report on Iranian attitudes to privacy online

[Amin Sabeti]

Hi all,

We have just published a report
on
Iranian attitudes towards online privacy. This report offers an
unprecedented look at how Iranians think about privacy online.

The August 2015 Iranian Internet Infrastructure and Policy (IIIP) report

presents the results of a privacy survey distributed to a mailing list of
more than 100,000 Iranian internet users, in order to paint a picture of
their attitudes towards privacy and gain insights into their online
security practices.

Much has been written about European and American attitudes toward internet
privacy, but as far as we can tell, this is the first English-language
research project that addresses Iranian perceptions of the topic.

“Whatever analytical insights we in the West have acquired while thinking
> about the Internet in the democratic context are rarely invoked when we
> look at authoritarian states.”
> - Evgeny Morozov, The Net Delusion


After receiving more than 2,000 responses, an initial picture of Iranian
attitudes to privacy has started to emerge. Here are some of our key
findings:


   -

   A decisive majority of respondents take few steps to protect their
   privacy, but conceded they would like to do more.
   -

   Most respondents reported a disillusionment with the state of life in
   Iran generally, and dissatisfaction with the government in particular.
   -

   Respondents most strongly associated the notion of privacy with
   security.
   -

   When it comes to privacy protections, Iranian social networks are the
   least trusted media, while text and instant messaging were also viewed with
   suspicion.


The sensitive nature of Internet policy in Iran makes it extremely
difficult to conduct survey research on the topic. While our mailing list
gave us access to a large number of Iranian internet users, we cannot
assume our sample is representative of the entire population. Still, the
way Iranians view privacy online remain an understudied but important
topic. We hope our initial foray into the field will be supplemented by
further research.

Cheers,

Amin
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[liberationtech] Rewiring Iran’s Supreme Council of Cyberspace

[Amin Sabeti]

A few weeks ago, the International Campaign for Human Rights in Iran
(ICHRI) published a fascinating article on personnel changes that might
impact internet policy in the country. The piece focuses on Supreme Leader
Ayatollah Khamenei’s recent announcement that authority over Internet
policy in Iran will be concentrated in the Supreme Council of Cyberspace
(SCC), a body created by the Supreme Leader back in 2012.

Iranian internet policy is an issue near and dear to Small Media’s heart,
so we decided to probe this issue a bit further. Drawing on some of our own
research into the SCC, we’ve taken a detailed look at the issues raised by
ICHRI. Based on that review, we offer the following observations.

https://medium.com/@small.media/rewiring-iran-s-supreme-council-of-cyberspace-117ac60e00d7
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[liberationtech] Iran responses to CotozenLab report

[Amin Sabeti]

Gholamreza Jalali, head of Passive Defence Organisation (PDO) reacts to
recent Citizen Lab's report [1] and said the IRGC has never tried to hack
Iranians' Google Drive accounts. [2]

[1] https://citizenlab.org/2015/08/iran_two_factor_phishing/
[2]
http://www.yjc.ir/fa/news/5350588/%D9%87%DA%A9-%DA%A9%D8%A7%D8%B1%D8%A8%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%86-%D8%A7%D8%B2-%D8%B3%D9%88%DB%8C-%D9%86%DB%8C%D8%B1%D9%88%D9%87%D8%A7%DB%8C-%D9%85%D8%B3%D9%84%D8%AD-%DA%A9%D8%B0%D8%A8-%D9%85%D8%AD%D8%B6-%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%AA
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[liberationtech] An Iranian Story: From Viber to Telegram

[Amin Sabeti]

Hi all,

Messaging apps have become very popular in Iran. You might hear about
Telegram which is very popular in Iran or Viber which was popular two years
ago.

In the new brand research which has done by Small Media and I, you can find
the story of mobile apps in Iran and people's opinion about them. For
instance, Iranians believe Telegram is total secure while Viber is not at
all. Also, they don't trust Iranian mobile apps such as Bisphone and
Dialog/GLX.

You can read the full research here
.

Thanks,

Amin
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[liberationtech] VPN HexaTech

[Amin Sabeti]

Hi folks,

VPN HexaTech has become popular amongst Iranians:
https://itunes.apple.com/us/app/vpn-hexatech-free-proxy-vpn/id1053874290?mt=8

I've done a brief research and found out an Indian company is behind it. I
cannot find anything else.

Have you heard about this VPN by any chance?

Thanks,

A
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Re: [liberationtech] VPN HexaTech

[Amin Sabeti]

Hi,

To be honest, I haven't got any info apart from the company location.

A



On 3 February 2016 at 14:53, Seamus Tuohy  wrote:

> Hey Amin,
>
> What have you found so far? With that I might be able to pull some more
> info for you.
>
> Best,
> s2e
>
> On Wed, Feb 3, 2016 at 6:08 AM, Amin Sabeti  wrote:
>
>> Hi folks,
>>
>> VPN HexaTech has become popular amongst Iranians:
>> https://itunes.apple.com/us/app/vpn-hexatech-free-proxy-vpn/id1053874290?mt=8
>>
>> I've done a brief research and found out an Indian company is behind it.
>> I cannot find anything else.
>>
>> Have you heard about this VPN by any chance?
>>
>> Thanks,
>>
>> A
>>
>> --
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>>
>
>
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[liberationtech] Filterwatch, a series of podcast about Iran's Filternet

[Amin Sabeti]

Hi,

We've recently released a new brand podcast at Small Media: Filterwatch. A
press release is included below, and you can listen to the first episode
here , and the
second episode here
.

The recent implementation of the nuclear deal brought with it the hope that
the Iranian internet might become a bit more open and free. But is Iran’s
old habit of internet filtering really going to die that easily?

This is one of many questions that our brand new podcast series Filterwatch
sets out to address. Over the past few years, Small Media has published
monthly reports detailing the latest developments in Iranian internet
policy. We’ve investigated topics including Iran’s domestic search engines,
its annual ICT budget, and recent shakeups at the country’s top internet
policy body.

We see this podcast series as an opportunity to go beyond the headlines to
cover Iranian internet censorship and policy in an engaging and accessible
way. Each episode will include a quick roundup of ICT news, and in-depth
discussion of our feature topic, and a look at what Iranian politicians and
public officials are saying about internet policy.

In short, this podcast is a one stop shop for all the latest news and
analysis about the Iranian internet.

In our first episode
, we discuss our
predictions for the Iranian internet in 2016.

Will Facebook and Twitter be unblocked? Is Iran set to become a regional
startup powerhouse? And what’s going to happen with messaging apps like
Viber and Telegram?

Our second episode
 breaks down
Iran’s recently announced ICT budget.  We crunch the numbers and discuss
what they suggest about Rouhani’s commitment to infrastructure spending,
Iran’s national internet, domestic developers, and more.


Thanks,


Amin
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[liberationtech] A research about the ICT infrastructure

[Amin Sabeti]

Hi folks,

Currently, I'm working on a research about how the ICT infrastructure could
help suppressive governments around the world to prosecute its citizens.

As I am in the initial stage of the research, I need someone(s) who can
help me to create a list with details that how the ICT infrastructure
(i.e. Telecommunication Company) can help a government to collect data
against its citizen and prosecute them.

I appreciate if someone in this list can help me regarding this research.
You can contact me via aminsabeti [at] gmail [dot] com.

Thanks,

Amin
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Re: [liberationtech] Telegram and Iran and of course Google Play - FYI

[Amin Sabeti]

Hi,

It seems Google has collaborated with Russian and Iranian governments as
they've suspended our app for the second time while they did an extensive
review before the second submission of the app.

While we fight back the Iranian government about blocking Telegram, Google
seems is in the evil side. Look at this tweet thread:

https://twitter.com/AminSabeti/status/997553178823548928?s=19

Cheers,

Amin

On Sat, 5 May 2018, 20:59 Yosem Companys,  wrote:

> Hi Amin and Nariman,
>
> I'm delighted to hear that you took the time to work on such an important
> initiative and for providing the detailed explanation. Please keep us
> posted on your progress and on what we can do to assist you.
>
> (And by "we" I mean the grassroots or netroots Liberationtech community,
> not Stanford.)
>
> Thanks,
> Yosem
>
> On Sat, May 5, 2018 at 5:05 AM, Nariman Gharib 
> wrote:
>
>> Hi Libtech,
>>
>> Last week Amin Sabeti and I have launched a open source app of Telegram
>> with Psiphon VPN built into it.
>> www.TelegarmDR.com
>>
>>
>> https://www.rferl.org/a/iranian-expats-launch-own-telegram-with-built-in-proxy-to-counter-filtering-at-home-/29204673.html
>>
>> In just one day it got more day 1m installs and also it was trending on
>> Google Play in communication apps category.
>>
>> https://twitter.com/NarimanGharib/status/991756403256840193
>>
>> Many of our friends have criticized us that we shouldn't developed this
>> or we shouldn't trust Telegram or... but we are care about people's access
>> to free and open content.
>>
>> Then a day after that I have received this email from Google that your
>> app package name and your app name are similar to other services and they
>> have asked me to change our app name and send it back again to Google, but
>> we don't want to do this because our users will get confused and they will
>> not trust in us anymore. so our app status is still suspended from Google
>> Play. p.s I already approached to Telegram and waiting for their help too.
>>
>>  https://twitter.com/NarimanGharib/status/991930080808067073
>>
>> Then I searched Google Play for "Telegram" and I found out this:
>>
>> https://twitter.com/NarimanGharib/status/992723876311457794
>> https://twitter.com/GEsfandiari/status/992728876156637185
>>
>> Then today I have received messages from Iran that there are some apps in
>> Iranian app market CafeBazaar which can bypass the censorship but
>> government officials didn't remove them yet. like this one:
>> https://cafebazaar.ir/app/ir.hotgram.mobile.android/?l=en
>>
>> but see what they did to Telegram app with more than 40m installs in Iran:
>> https://cafebazaar.ir/app/org.telegram.messenger/?l=en
>>
>> Sorry for long email!
>>
>> Best,
>>
>> --
>> PGP: 0xa53963936999cbb6
>> @NarimanGharib <https://twitter.com/narimangharib>
>>
>> --
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