Re: [liberationtech] Twitter Underground Market Research - pdf
On Wed, Jun 05, 2013 at 06:33:16PM -0400, Rich Kulawiec wrote: > One more point: operations that are this incompetent and negligent > cannot possibly provide any real assurance of security and privacy > to their users, because their putative operators are no longer in > full control of them. Not really. Oh, they can make noises about > doing so, and they can pretend that they're doing so...but they can't. > > ---rsk > > [1] One of the most profound, useful, cogent statements on this > point comes from Paul Vixie via the NANOG mailing list: > > If you give people the means to hurt you, and they do it, and > you take no action except to continue giving them the means to > hurt you, and they take no action except to keep hurting you, > then one of the ways you can describe the situation is "it isn't > scaling well". > > This explains, in one sentence, precisely why we have a spam problem > in 2013, thirty years after the fix for it was completely understood. > > [2] One baseline test of this is to find out whether mail to the RFC-2142 > stipulated address abuse@[domain] is handled properly. Responsible, > professional operations route traffic sent to that address to a person > or a team (depending on operation size/scope) who are ready and able > to immediately investigate incidents and make the abuse stop. > Irresponsible/abuse magnet operations route it to autoresponders > and/or incompetent people, or blackhole it, or forward it to the > abusers (yes, really) or simply don't support the address. This is a really deeply interesting assertion. You seem to imagine a bright line of "abuse" that is agreed on by all parties, with a policy that can be implemented by thoughtful operators to "make the abuse stop". I submit that that is not the real world, in many different dimensions. I operate a large Tor exit node. My provider has an abuse helpdesk which gets quite a large number of complaints due to attackers using Tor to log into freemail accounts (over SSL) where the freemail provider includes the IP of the HTTPS client in the Received (or similar) headers of their outbound spam. How is my transit provider, or myself as a Tor exit node operator, supposed to take action to stop this abuse? Even if I could, I'm certainly not going to prevent people from logging into their webmail over HTTPS over Tor. My provider notifies me when an abuse complaint is filed against my Tor exit IP address. Is my provider committing the sin you enumerated above, of "forward[ing the abuse complaint] to the abuser"? If I were running a shady business on this machine rather than a Tor exit node (which distinction is, apparently, lost on some folks), then I suspect you'd answer "yes". The abuse complaints are sometimes very questionable, resulting in signficant load on the (expensive) "person or team who is ready and able to immediately investigate" at very low cost to the complainer. -andy -- Too many emails? Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password by emailing moderator at compa...@stanford.edu or changing your settings at https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech
Re: [liberationtech] Twitter Underground Market Research - pdf
On Tue, Jun 04, 2013 at 06:44:37PM +0100, Bernard Tyers - ei8fdb wrote: > I wonder if there is any connection between these merchants and botnets? > Botnet owners or spammers would seem like a great source of "valid" IDs. Let me introduce a term you might/might not have heard before in other contexts to this conversation: "abuse magnet". An abuse magnet is a service whose operators either (a) did not anticipate the ways in which it would be abused and architect to defeat them or (b) did anticipate them, but simply didn't care to spend the time and money necessary. In both cases the operators have thus neatly shifted the burden of damage control (in terms of effort, money, etc.) onto the entire rest of the Internet. Given that in nearly all such instances, "the entire rest of the Internet" takes no action (or even realizes that this has happened) this is usually an extremely cost-effective, low-risk strategy. Scummy, but cost-effective and low-risk. [1] An example of this would be Yahoo's email service. After Yahoo made the decision some years ago to fire/layoff/disband its abuse team, it wasn't long until spammers, phishers, scammers, etc. realized that they could move in and take over the place. And they did. Why not? As a result, outbound abuse from Yahoo's email service is chronic and pervasive. So is abuse support using it, i.e., it's quite popular as a location for phisher dropboxes, it's frequently used to register spammer/phisher/typosquatter/etc. domains, and so on. Anyway, I don't particularly mean to pound on Yahoo -- although they certainly deserve it. My more general point is that there are entire classes of abuse magnets out there which are either overrun by abusers or in the process of being so. To name a few: - freemail services - URL shorteners - "social networks" - cheap domains It's therefore not at all surprising to see abusers such as phishers, spammers and botnet operators utilizing these in combination: they're zero/low-cost resources, they're available in abundance, they have non-existent or wholly dysfunctional abuse desks [2], and there are few, if any, consequences for engaging in massive abuse. [3] And I do mean "massive": for example, I wouldn't be surprised at all if someone put proof on the table that 90% of all freemail accounts or 90% of Twitter accounts are owned by abusers. I'm not saying that's true, because I can't prove it's true: I'm just saying that I wouldn't even raise an eyebrow if someone else proved it to me, because it seems quite reasonable. The same will eventually be true (if it isn't already) on "social networks" because there's no reason for it not to be, and every reason for abusers to make it so. Besides: who's going to stop them? Certainly not service operators who want to tell their venture capitalists/shareholders that they have 5.7 bajillion users...even if they really do know that 5.1 bajillion of those are bogus. What, *exactly*, is their motivation to do something about that? (And besides, there is substantial evidence supporting the proposition that some of them ARE the abusers.) And all of this is before we get to the problem of hijacked accounts, i.e., those which were opened by real live legitimate users but don't belong to them any more. (In the case of freemail providers, this is already epidemic. And getting worse.) The fix for this mess is to think about the potential for abuse while ideas are still at the back-of-the-envelope or scribbled-on-a-whiteboard stage. But few people do that, and as a result they create architectures that are difficult to defend from abuse in production even if they *want* to do so. It almost never seems to occur to them, at that early stage, that their shiny new creation may have uses other than the ones they envision for it. "It's a poor atom blaster that won't point both ways." --- Isaac Asimov, "Foundation" One more point: operations that are this incompetent and negligent cannot possibly provide any real assurance of security and privacy to their users, because their putative operators are no longer in full control of them. Not really. Oh, they can make noises about doing so, and they can pretend that they're doing so...but they can't. ---rsk [1] One of the most profound, useful, cogent statements on this point comes from Paul Vixie via the NANOG mailing list: If you give people the means to hurt you, and they do it, and you take no action except to continue giving them the means to hurt you, and they take no action except to keep hurting you, then one of the ways you can describe the situation is "it isn't scaling well". This explains, in one sentence, precisely why we have a spam problem in 2013, thirty years after the fix for it was completely understood. [2] One baseline test of this is to find out whether mail to the RFC-2142 stipulated address abuse@[domain] is handled prop
Re: [liberationtech] Twitter Underground Market Research - pdf
Dear friends, About Bernard: Yes i think there are connections between these merchants and botnets. And yes, if you follow a fake account (you know this is fake) probably if you see his followers you can find the "botnet" but is not easy ;-) About Mark: There are many tools but they don't work ( 90% of journalists think yes, we demostrate not). We find a good way how to find fake followers but there is a cost and we have no funds. Sorry for my english! :( 2013/6/4 Mark Nelson > Thank you for this, Andrea. > > I have rather the opposite question. Is there any way for an account > holder to verify that their followers are real humans, who are following > them with intent rather than because they own a bot-net compromised > computer? > > I smell the opportunity for a follower auditing business. > > Best, > > Mark > > > On Tuesday, June 4, 2013, Bernard Tyers - ei8fdb wrote: > >> -BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE- >> Hash: SHA1 >> >> Thanks Andrea for answering my questions. >> >> So regarding the cost its due to the extra PVA bypass, which the >> "follower merchants" charge for..I wonder if there is any connection >> between these merchants and botnets? Botnet owners or spammers would seem >> like a great source of "valid" IDs. >> >> I wonder if "limit" in tracing fake followers is useful for something >> else other than zombie accounts... >> >> thanks again. >> >> >> On 3 Jun 2013, at 21:11, Andrea St wrote: >> >> > Hi all, >> > and thank for the questions. >> > >> > On twitter you need to bypass captcha, buy a "black software" >> > (botnets), buy premium proxy address. >> > >> > On facebook you need to bypass captcha, buy a "black software", buy >> > premium proxy address , pva bypasser (phone verification code) and >> > verified email. >> > >> > -- >> > >> > About Mercedes Benz and others brand i don't know what people think >> > about but this is a good question and if there are any sociologists >> > here, please ping us! >> > >> > >> > -- >> > >> > Impossible to prove if X bought fake followers and this is the main >> > reason because people do it. >> > >> > 2013/6/3 Bernard Tyers : >> >> Hello Andrea, >> >> >> >> Thanks for sending the presentation. Very interesting. >> >> >> >> I have a few questions: >> >> >> >> - how did you calculate the "variable cost" for creating a Twitter >> account >> >> and a Facebook account? >> >> - why the difference in cost of creation of each? (Maybe I am missing >> >> something obvious...) >> >> - is it possible to quantify the negative effect of a popular twitter >> >> account (ending Mercedes Benz, or some celebrity) being exposed as >> buying >> >> followers? (i.e.: does anyone care?) >> >> - what do you think it the affect is on the reputation of the account >> owner? >> >> Is it possible to prove a user did not buy followers? As in, is it >> possible >> >> to prove someone else bought the followers for another account? >> >> >> >> Thanks very much! >> >> >> >> Bernard >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> Andrea St wrote: >> >>> >> >>> Dear friends, >> >>> >> >>> Two weeks ago we presented at Nexa For Internet & Society our Research >> >>> about Twitter and underground market. >> >>> Now you can download here: >> >>> http://nexa.polito.it/nexacenterfiles/lunch-11-de_micheli-stroppa.pdf >> >>> >> >>> >> >>> Our research on Nyt part1: >> >>> >> >>> >> http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/04/05/fake-twitter-followers-becomes-multimillion-dollar-business/ >> >>> Our research on Nyt part2 : >> >>> >> >>> >> http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/04/25/researchers-call-out-twitter-celebrities-with-suspicious-followings/ >> >>> >> >>> Now we're working on Facebook. If you have any idea or you would like >> >>> to get in touch my >> >>> email is: and...@gmail.com >> >>> >> >>> Best, >> >>> A >> >> >> >> >> >> Sent from my tiny electronic gadget. Please excuse my brevity and >> (probable) >> >> spelling mistakes. >> >> >> >> -- >> >> Too many emails? Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password by >> >> emailing moderator at compa...@stanford.edu or changing your settings >> at >> >> https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech >> > >> > >> > >> > -- >> > Andrea Stroppa >> > http://huffingtonpost.com/andrea-stroppa >> > @andst7 >> > -- >> > Too many emails? Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password by >> emailing moderator at compa...@stanford.edu or changing your settings at >> https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech >> >> - -- >> Bernard / bluboxthief / ei8fdb >> >> IO91XM / www.ei8fdb.org >> >> -BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE- >> Version: GnuPG/MacGPG2 v2.0.17 (Darwin) >> Comment: GPGTools - http://gpgtools.org >> >> iQEcBAEBAgAGBQJRrieGAAoJENsz1IO7MIrreV0IAJjamQcxspvyGoaw0ZeR48gi >> FkucjdJAuoIKjs2l/TRtuaPnNonrsEk+jEipCQcn7zIzv+rYge4o3pBCgp+k06o0 >> V69gtB9pN3zbj74vqc964XW5W96So+kkk+pCYVwSM/uuY2QyBO/oaKYUBs/BUIs9 >> NDMdSkKKDAhpaoMWxSN1+aIKRHY2qWOIdzB9uHlIIyZsArwtUG9igbIOvjBDYGJl >> WZ8orR/B2XfKh4p
Re: [liberationtech] Twitter Underground Market Research - pdf
Thank you for this, Andrea. I have rather the opposite question. Is there any way for an account holder to verify that their followers are real humans, who are following them with intent rather than because they own a bot-net compromised computer? I smell the opportunity for a follower auditing business. Best, Mark On Tuesday, June 4, 2013, Bernard Tyers - ei8fdb wrote: > -BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE- > Hash: SHA1 > > Thanks Andrea for answering my questions. > > So regarding the cost its due to the extra PVA bypass, which the "follower > merchants" charge for..I wonder if there is any connection between these > merchants and botnets? Botnet owners or spammers would seem like a great > source of "valid" IDs. > > I wonder if "limit" in tracing fake followers is useful for something else > other than zombie accounts... > > thanks again. > > > On 3 Jun 2013, at 21:11, Andrea St wrote: > > > Hi all, > > and thank for the questions. > > > > On twitter you need to bypass captcha, buy a "black software" > > (botnets), buy premium proxy address. > > > > On facebook you need to bypass captcha, buy a "black software", buy > > premium proxy address , pva bypasser (phone verification code) and > > verified email. > > > > -- > > > > About Mercedes Benz and others brand i don't know what people think > > about but this is a good question and if there are any sociologists > > here, please ping us! > > > > > > -- > > > > Impossible to prove if X bought fake followers and this is the main > > reason because people do it. > > > > 2013/6/3 Bernard Tyers >: > >> Hello Andrea, > >> > >> Thanks for sending the presentation. Very interesting. > >> > >> I have a few questions: > >> > >> - how did you calculate the "variable cost" for creating a Twitter > account > >> and a Facebook account? > >> - why the difference in cost of creation of each? (Maybe I am missing > >> something obvious...) > >> - is it possible to quantify the negative effect of a popular twitter > >> account (ending Mercedes Benz, or some celebrity) being exposed as > buying > >> followers? (i.e.: does anyone care?) > >> - what do you think it the affect is on the reputation of the account > owner? > >> Is it possible to prove a user did not buy followers? As in, is it > possible > >> to prove someone else bought the followers for another account? > >> > >> Thanks very much! > >> > >> Bernard > >> > >> > >> > >> Andrea St > wrote: > >>> > >>> Dear friends, > >>> > >>> Two weeks ago we presented at Nexa For Internet & Society our Research > >>> about Twitter and underground market. > >>> Now you can download here: > >>> http://nexa.polito.it/nexacenterfiles/lunch-11-de_micheli-stroppa.pdf > >>> > >>> > >>> Our research on Nyt part1: > >>> > >>> > http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/04/05/fake-twitter-followers-becomes-multimillion-dollar-business/ > >>> Our research on Nyt part2 : > >>> > >>> > http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/04/25/researchers-call-out-twitter-celebrities-with-suspicious-followings/ > >>> > >>> Now we're working on Facebook. If you have any idea or you would like > >>> to get in touch my > >>> email is: and...@gmail.com > >>> > >>> Best, > >>> A > >> > >> > >> Sent from my tiny electronic gadget. Please excuse my brevity and > (probable) > >> spelling mistakes. > >> > >> -- > >> Too many emails? Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password by > >> emailing moderator at compa...@stanford.edu or changing > your settings at > >> https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech > > > > > > > > -- > > Andrea Stroppa > > http://huffingtonpost.com/andrea-stroppa > > @andst7 > > -- > > Too many emails? Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password by > emailing moderator at compa...@stanford.edu or changing > your settings at > https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech > > - -- > Bernard / bluboxthief / ei8fdb > > IO91XM / www.ei8fdb.org > > -BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE- > Version: GnuPG/MacGPG2 v2.0.17 (Darwin) > Comment: GPGTools - http://gpgtools.org > > iQEcBAEBAgAGBQJRrieGAAoJENsz1IO7MIrreV0IAJjamQcxspvyGoaw0ZeR48gi > FkucjdJAuoIKjs2l/TRtuaPnNonrsEk+jEipCQcn7zIzv+rYge4o3pBCgp+k06o0 > V69gtB9pN3zbj74vqc964XW5W96So+kkk+pCYVwSM/uuY2QyBO/oaKYUBs/BUIs9 > NDMdSkKKDAhpaoMWxSN1+aIKRHY2qWOIdzB9uHlIIyZsArwtUG9igbIOvjBDYGJl > WZ8orR/B2XfKh4pG9eV36aBzr2rsx7JDbXVgFh/tY8mDpx3GryHsOGpdtOAiQWIw > 8FpTlgkQHm3ed7+4cw3Jbald9UGdn8/ffQL1ySREinokiJh7dKA9++YrtoW0Hic= > =FBU3 > -END PGP SIGNATURE- > -- > Too many emails? Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password by > emailing moderator at compa...@stanford.edu or changing > your settings at > https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech > -- Too many emails? Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password by emailing moderator at compa...@stanford.edu or changing your settings at https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech
Re: [liberationtech] Twitter Underground Market Research - pdf
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE- Hash: SHA1 Thanks Andrea for answering my questions. So regarding the cost its due to the extra PVA bypass, which the "follower merchants" charge for..I wonder if there is any connection between these merchants and botnets? Botnet owners or spammers would seem like a great source of "valid" IDs. I wonder if "limit" in tracing fake followers is useful for something else other than zombie accounts... thanks again. On 3 Jun 2013, at 21:11, Andrea St wrote: > Hi all, > and thank for the questions. > > On twitter you need to bypass captcha, buy a "black software" > (botnets), buy premium proxy address. > > On facebook you need to bypass captcha, buy a "black software", buy > premium proxy address , pva bypasser (phone verification code) and > verified email. > > -- > > About Mercedes Benz and others brand i don't know what people think > about but this is a good question and if there are any sociologists > here, please ping us! > > > -- > > Impossible to prove if X bought fake followers and this is the main > reason because people do it. > > 2013/6/3 Bernard Tyers : >> Hello Andrea, >> >> Thanks for sending the presentation. Very interesting. >> >> I have a few questions: >> >> - how did you calculate the "variable cost" for creating a Twitter account >> and a Facebook account? >> - why the difference in cost of creation of each? (Maybe I am missing >> something obvious...) >> - is it possible to quantify the negative effect of a popular twitter >> account (ending Mercedes Benz, or some celebrity) being exposed as buying >> followers? (i.e.: does anyone care?) >> - what do you think it the affect is on the reputation of the account owner? >> Is it possible to prove a user did not buy followers? As in, is it possible >> to prove someone else bought the followers for another account? >> >> Thanks very much! >> >> Bernard >> >> >> >> Andrea St wrote: >>> >>> Dear friends, >>> >>> Two weeks ago we presented at Nexa For Internet & Society our Research >>> about Twitter and underground market. >>> Now you can download here: >>> http://nexa.polito.it/nexacenterfiles/lunch-11-de_micheli-stroppa.pdf >>> >>> >>> Our research on Nyt part1: >>> >>> http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/04/05/fake-twitter-followers-becomes-multimillion-dollar-business/ >>> Our research on Nyt part2 : >>> >>> http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/04/25/researchers-call-out-twitter-celebrities-with-suspicious-followings/ >>> >>> Now we're working on Facebook. If you have any idea or you would like >>> to get in touch my >>> email is: and...@gmail.com >>> >>> Best, >>> A >> >> >> Sent from my tiny electronic gadget. Please excuse my brevity and (probable) >> spelling mistakes. >> >> -- >> Too many emails? Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password by >> emailing moderator at compa...@stanford.edu or changing your settings at >> https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech > > > > -- > Andrea Stroppa > http://huffingtonpost.com/andrea-stroppa > @andst7 > -- > Too many emails? Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password by > emailing moderator at compa...@stanford.edu or changing your settings at > https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech - -- Bernard / bluboxthief / ei8fdb IO91XM / www.ei8fdb.org -BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE- Version: GnuPG/MacGPG2 v2.0.17 (Darwin) Comment: GPGTools - http://gpgtools.org iQEcBAEBAgAGBQJRrieGAAoJENsz1IO7MIrreV0IAJjamQcxspvyGoaw0ZeR48gi FkucjdJAuoIKjs2l/TRtuaPnNonrsEk+jEipCQcn7zIzv+rYge4o3pBCgp+k06o0 V69gtB9pN3zbj74vqc964XW5W96So+kkk+pCYVwSM/uuY2QyBO/oaKYUBs/BUIs9 NDMdSkKKDAhpaoMWxSN1+aIKRHY2qWOIdzB9uHlIIyZsArwtUG9igbIOvjBDYGJl WZ8orR/B2XfKh4pG9eV36aBzr2rsx7JDbXVgFh/tY8mDpx3GryHsOGpdtOAiQWIw 8FpTlgkQHm3ed7+4cw3Jbald9UGdn8/ffQL1ySREinokiJh7dKA9++YrtoW0Hic= =FBU3 -END PGP SIGNATURE- -- Too many emails? Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password by emailing moderator at compa...@stanford.edu or changing your settings at https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech
Re: [liberationtech] Twitter Underground Market Research - pdf
Hi Kyle and all, sometimes bots spread malicious link on twitter. Yes, same on Facebook. The curious fact: i followed a bitly link with a phishing page. I added a '+' on the link and i saw it took 24.000 clicks. Terrific 2013/6/4 Kyle Maxwell : > I'm particularly curious if you've found anything in your research > here relating these phenomena to malware distribution or other social > attacks (e.g. scams or phishing). > > On Sat, Jun 1, 2013 at 7:49 AM, Andrea St wrote: >> Dear friends, >> >> Two weeks ago we presented at Nexa For Internet & Society our Research >> about Twitter and underground market. >> Now you can download here: >> http://nexa.polito.it/nexacenterfiles/lunch-11-de_micheli-stroppa.pdf >> >> >> Our research on Nyt part1: >> http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/04/05/fake-twitter-followers-becomes-multimillion-dollar-business/ >> Our research on Nyt part2 : >> http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/04/25/researchers-call-out-twitter-celebrities-with-suspicious-followings/ >> >> Now we're working on Facebook. If you have any idea or you would like >> to get in touch my email is: and...@gmail.com >> >> Best, >> A >> >> -- >> Andrea Stroppa >> http://huffingtonpost.com/andrea-stroppa >> @andst7 >> -- >> Too many emails? Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password by >> emailing moderator at compa...@stanford.edu or changing your settings at >> https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech > -- > Too many emails? Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password by > emailing moderator at compa...@stanford.edu or changing your settings at > https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech -- Andrea Stroppa http://huffingtonpost.com/andrea-stroppa @andst7 -- Too many emails? Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password by emailing moderator at compa...@stanford.edu or changing your settings at https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech
Re: [liberationtech] Twitter Underground Market Research - pdf
I'm particularly curious if you've found anything in your research here relating these phenomena to malware distribution or other social attacks (e.g. scams or phishing). On Sat, Jun 1, 2013 at 7:49 AM, Andrea St wrote: > Dear friends, > > Two weeks ago we presented at Nexa For Internet & Society our Research > about Twitter and underground market. > Now you can download here: > http://nexa.polito.it/nexacenterfiles/lunch-11-de_micheli-stroppa.pdf > > > Our research on Nyt part1: > http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/04/05/fake-twitter-followers-becomes-multimillion-dollar-business/ > Our research on Nyt part2 : > http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/04/25/researchers-call-out-twitter-celebrities-with-suspicious-followings/ > > Now we're working on Facebook. If you have any idea or you would like > to get in touch my email is: and...@gmail.com > > Best, > A > > -- > Andrea Stroppa > http://huffingtonpost.com/andrea-stroppa > @andst7 > -- > Too many emails? Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password by > emailing moderator at compa...@stanford.edu or changing your settings at > https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech -- Too many emails? Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password by emailing moderator at compa...@stanford.edu or changing your settings at https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech
Re: [liberationtech] Twitter Underground Market Research - pdf
Hi all, and thank for the questions. On twitter you need to bypass captcha, buy a "black software" (botnets), buy premium proxy address. On facebook you need to bypass captcha, buy a "black software", buy premium proxy address , pva bypasser (phone verification code) and verified email. -- About Mercedes Benz and others brand i don't know what people think about but this is a good question and if there are any sociologists here, please ping us! -- Impossible to prove if X bought fake followers and this is the main reason because people do it. 2013/6/3 Bernard Tyers : > Hello Andrea, > > Thanks for sending the presentation. Very interesting. > > I have a few questions: > > - how did you calculate the "variable cost" for creating a Twitter account > and a Facebook account? > - why the difference in cost of creation of each? (Maybe I am missing > something obvious...) > - is it possible to quantify the negative effect of a popular twitter > account (ending Mercedes Benz, or some celebrity) being exposed as buying > followers? (i.e.: does anyone care?) > - what do you think it the affect is on the reputation of the account owner? > Is it possible to prove a user did not buy followers? As in, is it possible > to prove someone else bought the followers for another account? > > Thanks very much! > > Bernard > > > > Andrea St wrote: >> >> Dear friends, >> >> Two weeks ago we presented at Nexa For Internet & Society our Research >> about Twitter and underground market. >> Now you can download here: >> http://nexa.polito.it/nexacenterfiles/lunch-11-de_micheli-stroppa.pdf >> >> >> Our research on Nyt part1: >> >> http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/04/05/fake-twitter-followers-becomes-multimillion-dollar-business/ >> Our research on Nyt part2 : >> >> http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/04/25/researchers-call-out-twitter-celebrities-with-suspicious-followings/ >> >> Now we're working on Facebook. If you have any idea or you would like >> to get in touch my >> email is: and...@gmail.com >> >> Best, >> A > > > Sent from my tiny electronic gadget. Please excuse my brevity and (probable) > spelling mistakes. > > -- > Too many emails? Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password by > emailing moderator at compa...@stanford.edu or changing your settings at > https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech -- Andrea Stroppa http://huffingtonpost.com/andrea-stroppa @andst7 -- Too many emails? Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password by emailing moderator at compa...@stanford.edu or changing your settings at https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech
Re: [liberationtech] Twitter Underground Market Research - pdf
Hello Andrea, Thanks for sending the presentation. Very interesting. I have a few questions: - how did you calculate the "variable cost" for creating a Twitter account and a Facebook account? - why the difference in cost of creation of each? (Maybe I am missing something obvious...) - is it possible to quantify the negative effect of a popular twitter account (ending Mercedes Benz, or some celebrity) being exposed as buying followers? (i.e.: does anyone care?) - what do you think it the affect is on the reputation of the account owner? Is it possible to prove a user did not buy followers? As in, is it possible to prove someone else bought the followers for another account? Thanks very much! Bernard Andrea St wrote: >Dear friends, > >Two weeks ago we presented at Nexa For Internet & Society our Research >about Twitter and underground market. >Now you can download here: >http://nexa.polito.it/nexacenterfiles/lunch-11-de_micheli-stroppa.pdf > > >Our research on Nyt part1: >http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/04/05/fake-twitter-followers-becomes-multimillion-dollar-business/ >Our research on Nyt part2 : >http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/04/25/researchers-call-out-twitter-celebrities-with-suspicious-followings/ > >Now we're working on Facebook. If you have any idea or you would like >to get in touch my email is: and...@gmail.com > >Best, >A > >-- >Andrea Stroppa >http://huffingtonpost.com/andrea-stroppa >@andst7 >-- >Too many emails? Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password by >emailing moderator at compa...@stanford.edu or changing your settings >at https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech Sent from my tiny electronic gadget. Please excuse my brevity and (probable) spelling mistakes.-- Too many emails? Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password by emailing moderator at compa...@stanford.edu or changing your settings at https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech
Re: [liberationtech] Twitter Underground Market Research - pdf
On Sat, Jun 01, 2013 at 02:49:48PM +0200, Andrea St wrote: > Two weeks ago we presented at Nexa For Internet & Society our Research > about Twitter and underground market. Interesting presentation. To follow up on one of the points it makes, one of the things I've long since concluded is that (to a good first approximation) the numbers of likes/followers/fans/whatever on all these so-called "social networks" are completely fabricated nonsense. (So, probably, are most of the users. They most certainly are on all freemail providers, and there's little reason why the people responsible for that situation can't apply the same techniques elsewhere.) Not to put too fine a point on it, but if any of those numbers are accurate: it's an accident. All these mechanisms are readily manipulated by anyone with a little time, clue or money. And as to "money", there's a booming underground economy in buying/selling likes/followers/fans; a rudimentary search of my small domain database turned up over 3000 involved in doing so, and I'm sure that's just the tip of the iceberg. Appended below is a random (and somewhat mind-numbing) sample of 100 just to give y'all some idea what's out there. (BTW, I'm sure some of these are multiple heads of the same hydra.) Apparently there are now operations out there which attempt to calculate some kind of score for people based on their likes/followers/fans/etc. Frankly, they might as well use a random number generator; they'd achieve an equivalent level of accuracy. ---rsk addmoretwitterfollowers.com, 138fastfreelikes.info, get156instantfreelikes.info, contentlikes.com, get27000likes.info, 250followers.com, fanslikeshortcut.com, leaguefollower.com, freetwitterfollowers.net, get186fastfreelikes.info, get175fastfreelikes.info, click4followers.com, buyfollowersontwittercheap.com, 360likes.com, quickinstagramfollowers.com, realfollowers.info, get202freelikes.info, morefollowers4u.info, likesandfollowersnow.com, get158freelikesnow.info, instafollowers.us, followersforless.com, ebuytwitterfollowers.org, pinterestfollowersshop.com, arfblikes.net, quicktwitterfollowers.info, fav-teamfollower.com, get113freelikesnow.info, earnfblikes.com, google-plus-followers.net, frenzyfollowers.info, followerblog.org, facebook-likes-store.com, puretwitterfollowers.com, instafollowers4u.com, milliontwitterfollowers.net, artoffollowership.com, get-likes.com, buytwitterfollowersonline.com, buy-twitter-followers-fast.com, get198instantfreelikes.info, cheaptwitterfollowerz.com, reluctant-follower.com, get174instantfreelikes.info, get164fastfreelikes.info, buyrealfansandlikes.com, gettargetedfollowers.com, get126instantfreelikes.info, flockoffollowers.info, 116fastfreelikes.info, flyfollowers.com, getmorelikesnow.com, 183fastfreelikes.info, get14000likes.info, buyifollower.com, buy-twitterfollowers.com, gaintwitterfollowers.biz, getfollowersonpinterest.com, get178fastfreelikes.info, mymediafollowers.com, fasttwitterfollowers.net, howtofindfollowersontwitter.com, fansnfollowers.net, googleplusfollower.com, fbfanslikeservice.com, bulkyoutubelikes.com, get119instantfreelikes.info, 99followers.com, yourfirstfollower.com, get101fastfreelikes.info, needfacebooklikes.net, googlecirclefollowers.com, likes4you.info, followersmultiplier.com, 1337followers.com, getfreefollowers.info, getpaidforyourlikes.info, 100followers.com, get161freelikesnow.info, get152likesfree.info, twitterfollowersdaily.com, fanstofollowers.net, buyfacebookilikes.com, get151likesfree.info, goalfollower.net, get46klikes.info, increasemytwitterfollowers.com, instagramfollowersservice.com, get49klikes.info, 130fastfreelikes.info, doubleyourfblikes.info, get129freelikesnow.info, buyinstagramfollowers9.com, 48kfreelikesnow.info, buycheappinterestfollowers.org, getyourfblikes.com, get248freelikes.info, get125likesfree.info, buyfblikes.net, ibuyfacebooklikes.com -- Too many emails? Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password by emailing moderator at compa...@stanford.edu or changing your settings at https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech
[liberationtech] Twitter Underground Market Research - pdf
Dear friends, Two weeks ago we presented at Nexa For Internet & Society our Research about Twitter and underground market. Now you can download here: http://nexa.polito.it/nexacenterfiles/lunch-11-de_micheli-stroppa.pdf Our research on Nyt part1: http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/04/05/fake-twitter-followers-becomes-multimillion-dollar-business/ Our research on Nyt part2 : http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/04/25/researchers-call-out-twitter-celebrities-with-suspicious-followings/ Now we're working on Facebook. If you have any idea or you would like to get in touch my email is: and...@gmail.com Best, A -- Andrea Stroppa http://huffingtonpost.com/andrea-stroppa @andst7 -- Too many emails? Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password by emailing moderator at compa...@stanford.edu or changing your settings at https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech
