Re: [marxistphilosophy] Re: [Marxism-Thaxis] O, Dialectics!
Hegel, Marx, and dialectic : a debate / Richard Norman and Sean Sayers. Brighton, Sussex : Harvester Press ; Atlantic Highlands, N.J. : Humanities Press, 1980. viii, 188 p. : ill. ; 23 cm. Sayers took the classical Stalinist (then Maoist) diamat party line, which I detest. Norman took the position I support: upholding the spirit of Engels while criticizing the letter. I reviewed this debate at length on the old marxism lists in the mod-90s. It's quite instructive for those caught up in those old debates. At 08:07 PM 5/26/2005 +, redtwister666 wrote: This is quite clear. I think the second point is particularly well put. What is the Richard Norman work you are referring to? Chris > (1) Seed, imaginary numbers as negation of negation: stated and argued in > this manner: these examples are empty verbiage. Engels was indeed in > pursuit of something much ore serious, but along the way he dropped a > number of ill-thought-out examples in his _unpublished_ writing, which was > later taken as gospel. > > (2) Confirmation of dialectical laws (or of formal logic): there is a basic > conflation between natural law and logical law. Engels seems to have > finessed the distinction, and the garbling was never corrected, though > there have been attempts to do so (cf. Richard Norman). Formal logical > laws make no direct assertions about ontological matters such as stasis, > motion, change, etc. The real issue is the relationship of logic to > ontology. These problems arise in the fusion of logic with ontology, as > occurs historically with interpretations of both formal and dialectical > logic. But if logic is conceived as a mode of valid and consistent > inference of statements one from another, and not as a direct set of > assertions about being, then the relationship between conceptions of logic > and ontology can evolve into a more mature analysis. If it turns out that > we cannot adequately formulate a system of assertions about being without > eliminating the contradictory relationships between categories, then > dialectical logic has something to do. But physical processes have nothing > to do with dialectical laws per se; rather, dialectical laws, if such > exist, are logical abstractions describing the categorial relationships of > concepts (which in turn reference empirical realities) one to another. > > (3) Confirmation of dialectical laws/processes: the historical problem with > diamat rhetoric is the positing of correlations of abstract categorial > statements (which cannot deduce empirical matters, as we should know since > Hume and Kant) with specific empirical contents (scientific theories & > examples of natural phenomena). To wit, your examples: ___ Marxism-Thaxis mailing list Marxism-Thaxis@lists.econ.utah.edu To change your options or unsubscribe go to: http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/marxism-thaxis
Re: [marxistphilosophy] marxistphilosophy] Re: [Marxism-Thaxis] O, Dialectics!
It's my understanding that the later Korsch was rather sympathetic towards logical positivism as indicated in the piece from his *Lenin as Philosopher*. I would speculate that he was perhaps influenced in this regard by his friend, Sidney Hook. Hook and Korsch were friends ever since Hook met up with him, while pursuing postdoc studies in central Europe. There he attended lectures by Korsch, and those along with his reading of Lukacs' *History and Class Consciousness*, profoundly shaped the young SIdney Hook's take on Marxism. This understanding of Marxism was reflected in Hook's *Towards the Understanding of Karl Marx*. http://www.crimsonbird.com/history/hook.htm Hook, a little later on would take an interest in the work that was being done by members of the Vienna Circle concerning logical positivism, especially the work of Otto Neurath. When Neurath visited the US in the late 1930s, Hook was one of his hosts, and Neurath's linkage of the positvists' distinction between science and metaphysics and the Marxist distinction between science and ideology, influenced Hook. Perhaps Hook influence Korsch along these lines as well, I don't know. Perhaps, Justin would know. Jim F. On Thu, 26 May 2005 14:31:28 -0400 Ralph Dumain <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> writes: > Very interesting. It is difficult to judge Korsch, Pennekoek, or > Lenin > from these fragments alone. A more detailed study of all three is > indicated, I see. Just a few hurried notes on the Korsch piece. > > >He never conceived of the difference between the "historical > materialism" > >of Marx and the "previous forms of materialism" as an unbreachable > >opposition arising from a real conflict of classes. He conceived it > rather > >as a more or less radical expression of one continuous > revolutionary > >movement. Thus Lenin's "materialistic" criticism of Mach and the > Machians, > >according to Pannekoek, failed even in its purely theoretical > purpose > >mainly because Lenin attacked the later attempts of bourgeois > naturalistic > >materialism not from the viewpoint of the historical materialism of > the > >fully developed proletarian class, but from a proceeding and > >scientifically less developed phase of bourgeois materialism. > > There is an obscurity here in delineating the precise relationship > between > the development of materialism and class conflict. > > >He fully acknowledges the tactical necessity, under the conditions > in > >pre-revolutionary Czarist Russia, of Lenin's relentless fight > against the > >left bolshevik, Bogdanov, and other more or less outspoken > followers of > >Mach's ideas who in spite of their good revolutionary intentions > actually > >jeopardised the unity and weakened the proven revolutionary energy > of the > >Marxist party by a revision of its "monolithic" materialistic > ideology. > > Korsch cites Pannekoek's view, which seems from an intellectual > standpoint > lacking in integrity, and then disagrees with it politically: > > >In fact, Pannekoek goes somewhat further in his positive > appreciation of > >Lenin's philosophical tactics of 1908 than seems justified to this > writer > >even in a retrospective analysis of the past. If he had > investigated, in > >his critical revision of Lenin's anti-Machist fight, the tendencies > > >represented by the Russian Machists as well as those of their > German > >rnasters he might have been warned against the unimpeachable > correctness > >of Lenin's attitude in the ideological struggles of 1908 by a later > > >occurrence. When Lenin, after 1908, was through with the Machist > >opposition which had arisen within the central committee of the > Bolshevik > >party itself, he regarded that whole incident as closed. > > Then a recitation of the sins perpetrated later by other Leninists > in > comdemning Bogdanov, which are redolent of Stalinist rhetoric. The > description of Bogdanov's philosophical position is no more > edifying. Korsch laments Lenin's attack against positivism as a > development of materialism. Furthermore, he judges it to be > opportunistic: > > >This fallacy is that the militant character of a revolutionary > materialist > >theory can and must be maintained against the weakening influences > of > >other apparently hostile theoretical tendencies by any means to the > > >exclusion of modifications made imperative by further scientific > criticism > >and research. This fallacious conception caused Lenin to evade > discussion > >on their merits of such new scientific concepts and theories that > in his > >judgement jeopardised the proved fighting value of that > revolutionary > >(though not necessarily proletarian revolutionary) materialist > philosophy > >that his Marxist party had adopted, less from Marx and Engels than > from > >their philosophical teachers, the bourgeois materialists from > Holbach to > >Feuerbach and their idealistic antagonist, the dialec
Re: [marxistphilosophy] marxistphilosophy] Re: [Marxism-Thaxis] O, Dialectics!
Very interesting. It is difficult to judge Korsch, Pennekoek, or Lenin from these fragments alone. A more detailed study of all three is indicated, I see. Just a few hurried notes on the Korsch piece. He never conceived of the difference between the "historical materialism" of Marx and the "previous forms of materialism" as an unbreachable opposition arising from a real conflict of classes. He conceived it rather as a more or less radical expression of one continuous revolutionary movement. Thus Lenin's "materialistic" criticism of Mach and the Machians, according to Pannekoek, failed even in its purely theoretical purpose mainly because Lenin attacked the later attempts of bourgeois naturalistic materialism not from the viewpoint of the historical materialism of the fully developed proletarian class, but from a proceeding and scientifically less developed phase of bourgeois materialism. There is an obscurity here in delineating the precise relationship between the development of materialism and class conflict. He fully acknowledges the tactical necessity, under the conditions in pre-revolutionary Czarist Russia, of Lenin's relentless fight against the left bolshevik, Bogdanov, and other more or less outspoken followers of Mach's ideas who in spite of their good revolutionary intentions actually jeopardised the unity and weakened the proven revolutionary energy of the Marxist party by a revision of its "monolithic" materialistic ideology. Korsch cites Pannekoek's view, which seems from an intellectual standpoint lacking in integrity, and then disagrees with it politically: In fact, Pannekoek goes somewhat further in his positive appreciation of Lenin's philosophical tactics of 1908 than seems justified to this writer even in a retrospective analysis of the past. If he had investigated, in his critical revision of Lenin's anti-Machist fight, the tendencies represented by the Russian Machists as well as those of their German rnasters he might have been warned against the unimpeachable correctness of Lenin's attitude in the ideological struggles of 1908 by a later occurrence. When Lenin, after 1908, was through with the Machist opposition which had arisen within the central committee of the Bolshevik party itself, he regarded that whole incident as closed. Then a recitation of the sins perpetrated later by other Leninists in comdemning Bogdanov, which are redolent of Stalinist rhetoric. The description of Bogdanov's philosophical position is no more edifying. Korsch laments Lenin's attack against positivism as a development of materialism. Furthermore, he judges it to be opportunistic: This fallacy is that the militant character of a revolutionary materialist theory can and must be maintained against the weakening influences of other apparently hostile theoretical tendencies by any means to the exclusion of modifications made imperative by further scientific criticism and research. This fallacious conception caused Lenin to evade discussion on their merits of such new scientific concepts and theories that in his judgement jeopardised the proved fighting value of that revolutionary (though not necessarily proletarian revolutionary) materialist philosophy that his Marxist party had adopted, less from Marx and Engels than from their philosophical teachers, the bourgeois materialists from Holbach to Feuerbach and their idealistic antagonist, the dialectical philosopher Hegel. Rather he stuck to his guns, preferring the immediate practical utility of a given ideology to its theoretical truth in a changing world. This doctrinaire attitude, by the way, runs parallel to Lenin's political practice. Indeed, such instrumentalism is fallacious, but is this a correct portrayal of Lenin's attitude towards scientific developments? I would add that one of the problems with the Marxist tradition is the general problem of the uneven development of science with respect to philosophy. A person that knows only one of these is generally ill-equipped to tackle the other. The moment Marxism was established institutionally as a body of thought, largely in the hands of the German Social Democrats, this problem was created, not by them specifically, but by the overall social fragmentation responsible for the fragmentation of intellectual trends. Further, the problem of uneven development was exacerbated by the importation of Marxism into backward Russia. I am puzzled by the following argument: It is a long way from Lenin's violent philosophical attack on Mach and Avenarius's "idealistic" positivism and empiriocriticism to that refined scientific criticism of the latest developments within the positivist camp which was published in 1938 in the extremely cultured periodical of the English Communist party.[8] Yet there is underlying this critical attack on the most progressive form of modern positivistic thought the same old Leninist fallacy. The cri
Re: [marxistphilosophy] marxistphilosophy] Re: [Marxism-Thaxis] O, Dialectics!
On Fri, 20 May 2005 20:52:44 - "redtwister666" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> writes: > This is more by way of a response to the distortion of both Mach and > materialism, for which I turn to Pannekoek, who was versed in > Marxism > and a practicing astronomer and scientist. IMO, Lenin's work is not > only bad Marxism, but ignores that Mach did correctly argue against > certain scientific theories of his day (the post-1875 Europe), about > which Lenin seems to know very little. > > http://www.geocities.com/~johngray/lenphl07.htm Karl Korsch wrote a response to Pannekoek in his *Lenin as Philosopher*. See: http://www.marxists.org/archive/korsch/1938/lenin-philosophy.htm Jim F. ___ Marxism-Thaxis mailing list Marxism-Thaxis@lists.econ.utah.edu To change your options or unsubscribe go to: http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/marxism-thaxis
