Re: [Marxism-Thaxis] O, Dialectics! :Bakhurst

2005-06-27 Thread Victor

Steve and Ralph,
Thanks for all the help.
Oudeyis
- Original Message - 
From: "Steve Gabosch" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
To: "Forum for the discussion of theoretical issues raised by Karl Marx and 
thethinkers he inspired" 

Sent: Sunday, June 26, 2005 21:31
Subject: Re: [Marxism-Thaxis] O, Dialectics! :Bakhurst


This 6/26 post by Victor seems like a good
stopping place for the moment - I need to put our
discussion about ideality aside for just a little
while to tend to other projects, but I am
certainly interested.  I will follow up.  Victor
is perfectly correct, I must show what I claim.

BTW, for anyone trying to follow this discussion,
two different essays by Ilyenkov are quoted in
Victor's post, both available on the internet at:
http://www.marxists.org/archive/ilyenkov/index.htm

The main essay Victor and I have been debating interpretations of is:
The Concept of the Ideal
http://www.marxists.org/archive/ilyenkov/works/ideal/ideal.htm

This essay appeared in the book Problems of
Dialectical Materialism; Progress Publishers,
1977 and was scanned by Andy Blunden.  The
numbering both Victor and I have been using
refers to the sequence of 142 paragraphs in that
essay.  In Victor's 6/26 post, he quotes from paragraphs 49, 50 and 51.

I have an important side point to bring up about
this essay.  In my scrutiny of this on-line
version, the only version I have, I believe there
are some scanning errors and possibly some
original translation errors to contend
with.  There is also some reason to wonder if the
original Russian that the translation was based
on may also contain editorial errors.  In other
words, this version must be read with caution,
and if something does not make sense, it may not
be Ilyenkov's original writing.  I bring this up
because there are a handful of places in the
essay where publishing errors like these seem to
contribute to confusion over what Ilyenkov was really saying.

In his 6/26 post Victor also quotes Ilyenkov
using paragraph numbers  57, 58, 59,
60.  However, these are from a different essay -
chapter 8 in DIALECTICAL LOGIC (1974), Part Two ­
Problems of the Marxist-Leninist Theory of Dialectics
8: The Materialist Conception of Thought as the Subject Matter of Logic
http://www.marxists.org/archive/ilyenkov/works/essays/essay8.htm

The scanned book is Dialectical Logic, Essays on
its History and Theory; Progress Publishers,
1977; English translation 1977 by H. Campbell
Creighton; Transcribed: Andy Blunden; HTML Markup: Andy Blunden.

BTW, these paragraphs (found on pages 285-288)
are from the same essay Victor mentioned on 5/26
and I quoted from on 5/30, and which were
discussed a little on this list.  The question of
the ideal is a major topic of this essay and I
agree with Victor that it should be discussed in
conjunction with the Concept of the Ideal essay
when we take this topic up again.

The philosophical work we are doing here is to
try to untangle the ideal and the material,
closely studying Ilyenkov's work on this complex
question in doing so.  In the process, it seems
we should also seek to keep untangled which
citation by our philosopher-teacher we are talking about.

:-))
Best,
~ Steve




___
At 07:32 PM 6/26/2005 +0200, Oudeyis (Victor) wrote:


- Original Message - From: "Steve Gabosch" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
To: "Forum for the discussion of theoretical issues raised by Karl Marx and 
thethinkers he inspired" 

Sent: Sunday, June 26, 2005 12:40
Subject: Re: [Marxism-Thaxis] O, Dialectics! :Bakhurst



I am responding to a 6/22/2005 post from Victor, which I quote from.

The quote below is a good example of where I think Victor gets Ilyenkov 
wrong 180 degrees.  In the general section of Ilyenkov's 1977 essay "The 
Concept of the Ideal" that Victor quotes from, I believe Ilyenkov is 
making just the opposite point that Victor attributes to him.


Victor quotes Ilyenkov:
"Paragraph 53:  It is this fact, incidentally, that explains the 
persistent survival of such "semantic substitutions"; indeed, when we are 
talking about nature, we are obliged to make use of the available 
language of natural science, the "language of science" with its 
established and generally understood "meanings". It is this, 
specifically, which forms the basis of the arguments of logical 
positivism, which quite consciously identifies "nature" with the 
"language" in which people talk and write about nature.


Paragraph 54: It will be appreciated that the main difficulty and, 
therefore, the main problem of philosophy is not to distinguish and 
counterpose everything that is "in the consciousness of the individual" 
to everything that is outside this individual consciousness (this is 
hardly ever difficult to do), but to delimit the world of collectively 
acknowledged notions, that is, the whole socially organised world of 
intellectual culture with all its stable and materially established 
universal patterns, and 

[Marxism-Thaxis] O, Dialectics! :Bakhurst

2005-06-27 Thread Charles Brown

 
> Victor:

I'm not sure of it either.

However, it appears to me that we can distinguish social labour, direct 
cooperation, from characteristically human labour, that is social labour 
that is special since it involves the production and use of tools for 
realization of material social goals.  This distinction allows us to talk 
about the simplest and most abstract kinds of ideality as being pre or 
proto-human.  It also appears to me that labour has to be social before it 
can be instrumental, i.e. involve the development of social practices of 
making and use of tools.

^^^
CB: If I might argue with you comradely here. I would say that though
toolmaking and use are famously characterized as uniquely human, there are
examples of chimps and other animals using tools. The qualitative aspect of
instrumental action is not unique to humans.  Humans are unique in the scale
and complexity of their toolmaking and use, which is possible because
ideality allows a toolmaking _tradition_ to develop.

^^^

Of course once men make and use tools they expand their labour practice and 
thereby the inventory of objectified activities embodied in idealities, and 
thereby make culture a universal of human life activity


___
Marxism-Thaxis mailing list
Marxism-Thaxis@lists.econ.utah.edu
To change your options or unsubscribe go to:
http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/marxism-thaxis


[Marxism-Thaxis] O, Dialectics! :BakhurstVictor

2005-06-27 Thread Charles Brown
Victor 
> 
> CB: Here we see why the transgenerational transmission of how to
make and use tools is the key type of social connection defining humans.
There are studies showing that chimps , on their own , int the wild, make
and use  tools, such as sticks to dig in ant hills. But they don't pass on
to the next generation how to do it.

But they do or at least the women do:

-clip-


Actually, we've known for a long time that social groups of monkeys
and apes develop special cultural traits that are intergenerational for the
group and distinctive from those of other groups.  This was first noticed by
Japanese researchers into the behaviour of different groups of Japanese
Macaques.
Some groups wash their food others don't, some bath in the hot
spring waters while others don't enter the water at all and so on.  Since
then animal ethologists in Africa and Asia have been mapping the "cultural
traditions" of our anthropoid brothers.

Clearly, monkeys and apes do have "cultural traditions" that are
passed between generations, but it is much less sure that these traditions
are anything more than particular features of an otherwise "non-cultural"
array of practices.  What distinguishes human culture from that of other
creatures is its universality, i.e. man's absolute dependence on culture to
learn how to behave at all.


^
CB: Yes, however, what apes and monkeys have is "monkey see monkey do"
traditions, i.e. imitation. They don't have culture, because they don't have
symbolling or _ideality_ .  They are limited in what can be passed on to new
generations by what can be taught through imitation. The distinguishing
characteristic of humans is ideality which allows a qualitatively different
passage of experiences between generations.

^^




In truth, we should expect that ideality (and tool making) would
appear
historically, first, as a particularity, an abstracted individual
feature of
the universal life activity that preceeded it, rather than as a
full-blown
universal as it is for modern humans.  In principle, the development
of a
universal such as social labour, tool making and commodity
production should
first appear as an individual case, become a particular class of
phenomena
as it expands beyond the individual case (as it does for learned
termite
fishing among chimpanzees) and only become a universal when it
becomes the
way things are done by everyone.

> Ideality is necessary for this transgenerational transmission to
become as
> efficient and extensive as it has among humans.
>
> Thus , "imagination" ( ideality) , planning, focus for days,
weeks, years 
> at
> a time on the same goal and purpose, all based on ideality and 
> imagination,
> are the distinguishing characteristics of human labor, not tool
use.
>
> On the other hand, the individual hunter or laborer's imagination
and
> ideality contains so much information because many others are able
to 
> "put"
> info into the "system" or ideological system or cultural tradition
that
> makes that imagination.
>
> Notice for example, that the significance of upright posture for
hunting 
> is
> not only , as Engels refers to, the freeing of the hands for tool
and 
> weapon
> making and use. Ancient humans defeated their prey by long
distance 
> running.
> Upright posture slowed humans down so that in a short sprint, they
didn't
> catch the faster prey, but they would trek the prey down with long

> distance
> running. This requires longer focus of attention, planning than
quick
> instinctive attacks. The legs are as significant as the hands in
the
> original human labors.
>
> The cooperation among those in the living generation, among the
living, is
> also potentially enhanced by ideality.
>
> Of course, after the rise of class exploitative society, ideality
becomes
> the basis for more anti-cooperation among humans than among
chimps. 
> Ideality
> turns into its opposite with the rise of class divided society. In
> particular, predominantly physical labor is antagonized to
predominantly
> idealist labor, and the repressive career of the ideal is begun.
>
>




___
Marxism-Thaxis mailing list
Marxism-Thaxis@lists.econ.utah.edu
To change your options or unsubscribe go to:
http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/marxism-thaxis