where is the private key ?
Title: Message Hi, I am generating client certificates using this method at the openssl server: openssl genrsa -des3 -out user.key 1024 openssl req -new -config openssl.cnf -key user.key -out user.csr openssl ca -config openssl.cnf -cert CA.pem -in user.csr -keyfile CA.key -out user.crt After this, I am exporting the user.crt to the browser for that user. Its working fine. Now, I would like to know where the private key of the user is ? I am using the user.crt to put it in the user entry in the ldap server. Does this user.crt contain client's private key also ? If I need the user.crt in pkcs12 format, I use openssl pkcs12 -export -in user.crt -inkey user.key -out user.pfx Anything wrong with this export ? Does it contain the private key ? I am doing all these without proper knowledge of openssl. Half knowledge is dangerous. But I can't help it now. So kindly bear with me if there's anything stupid in the method above. thanx and regards sarath
upgrade ssl
Dear sirs, I would like to know how to upgrade my old version of openssl to the newest one. your help will be great appricated!! Best regards, Paul Lam -- __ Your favorite stores, helpful shopping tools and great gift ideas. Experience the convenience of buying online with Shop@Netscape! http://shopnow.netscape.com/ Get your own FREE, personal Netscape Mail account today at http://webmail.netscape.com/ __ OpenSSL Project http://www.openssl.org User Support Mailing List[EMAIL PROTECTED] Automated List Manager [EMAIL PROTECTED]
免费赠送你日本礼品！只要填张表格即可！
Title: Mail __ OpenSSL Project http://www.openssl.org User Support Mailing List[EMAIL PROTECTED] Automated List Manager [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Re: Java toolkit for SSL???
Richard Hassinger <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> writes: > I have used SSLava before and it is capable, but it > was only needed because it was a browser applet and we > had a Java 1.1 target. If you're using Java 2 then > JSSE is the way to go. The major problem with JSSE is that it isn't Open Source. You are allowed to redistribute the binary under certain terms but you can't redistribute the source at all and you certainly can't modify it. JSSE will be part of JDK 1.4 but currently it needs to be obtained separately from Sun. If these restrictions are OK with you then JSSE is a reasonable choice. Otherwise, you should probably check out PureTLS which is (as far as I know) equally capable to JSSE and is Open Source. PureTLS can be found at http://www.rtfm.com/puretls -Ekr -- [Eric Rescorla [EMAIL PROTECTED]] http://www.rtfm.com/ __ OpenSSL Project http://www.openssl.org User Support Mailing List[EMAIL PROTECTED] Automated List Manager [EMAIL PROTECTED]
RE: Java toolkit for SSL???
I have used SSLava before and it is capable, but it was only needed because it was a browser applet and we had a Java 1.1 target. If you're using Java 2 then JSSE is the way to go. --- Tat Sing Kong <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > > I'm sure I heard of one a while back called SSLava > or something, but there > definitely is one. > > Tat. > > Hi, > > > > i tried to find a toolkit that can handle C and > Java to make sure > > being 100% compatible,because we have a > networkclient > > application written in C,and also a Browser > application written in Java. > > > > Does anybody know a good SSL toolkit for java? > > > > Thanks > > Larry > > > > __ > OpenSSL Project > http://www.openssl.org > User Support Mailing List > [EMAIL PROTECTED] > Automated List Manager [EMAIL PROTECTED] __ Do You Yahoo!? Send your FREE holiday greetings online! http://greetings.yahoo.com __ OpenSSL Project http://www.openssl.org User Support Mailing List[EMAIL PROTECTED] Automated List Manager [EMAIL PROTECTED]
enter your email get your money!!!!!
Title: Mail __ OpenSSL Project http://www.openssl.org User Support Mailing List[EMAIL PROTECTED] Automated List Manager [EMAIL PROTECTED]
enter your email get your money!!!!!
Title: Mail __ OpenSSL Project http://www.openssl.org User Support Mailing List[EMAIL PROTECTED] Automated List Manager [EMAIL PROTECTED]
[Fwd: IETF: MD5 and SHA-1]
Jeff Schiller ([EMAIL PROTECTED]) is the IETF Security Area co-director. The SAAG is the Security Area Advisory Group. I wrote to him and said: > I thought I recalled that the IETF says "avoid MD5 use SHA-1" but a > Google search for that dictum turns up too much chaff. His reply, quoted with permission, ias as follows: > We have indeed said this in SAAG meetings. I don't believe we have a > published document that says this... and we should. We have a dormant > document on crypto recommendations and it should probably go in there > (and then get published!). Hope this helps. /r$ -- Zolera Systems, Securing web services (XML, SOAP, Signatures, Encryption) http://www.zolera.com __ OpenSSL Project http://www.openssl.org User Support Mailing List[EMAIL PROTECTED] Automated List Manager [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Re: Cryptology Questions
Eric Rescorla wrote: > The attack you describe: creating a document with a SPECIFIC digest, > is 2^n hard ... Eric is of course correct. __ OpenSSL Project http://www.openssl.org User Support Mailing List[EMAIL PROTECTED] Automated List Manager [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Re: Sending/Detecting CA Certificate to client
On Thu, 6 Dec 2001, Rich Salz wrote: rsalz> So the ability to trust your certificate depends on the ability to rsalz> trust DNS. rsalz> rsalz> It's like building a castle on a foundation of sand. Well, you surely have a point here. If you replicate my site and fake my dns zone then every one who resolve through your DNS, whould install your fake CA certificate, and would access with no problems to your fake site receiving your fake certs signed by your fake CA. After that you would be able to get sensitive information such usernames and passwords... So, in conclusion: I can't have a self signed CA in any way? What about to give the certificate finger print to my users? Not in an electronic way but in a piece of paper? So they could check at install time.. -- Paulo Matos --- -- |Sys & Net Admin| Serviço de Informática | |Faculdade de Ciências e Tecnologia | Tel: +351-21-2948596 | |Universidade Nova de Lisboa| Fax: +351-21-2948548 | |P-2829-516 Caparica| e-Mail: [EMAIL PROTECTED] | --- -- __ OpenSSL Project http://www.openssl.org User Support Mailing List[EMAIL PROTECTED] Automated List Manager [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Re: Sending/Detecting CA Certificate to client
On Thu, 6 Dec 2001, Erwann ABALEA wrote: eabale> I didn't say that it was technically impossible to do, but that eabale> it was a bad way to make it automatic... The end user should eabale> manually trust your CA, and he should understand what he's doing, eabale> except if you want them to behave like dogs and do whatever you eabale> tell them to do... My end users will do it manually. The only difference is that they will be presented with this action the first time they access any of my servers. My point was to make end user's life easier and at the same time force them to install the CA certificate... IMHO a lot security problems are located between chair and keyboard, but that's another issue... -- Paulo Matos --- -- |Sys & Net Admin| Serviço de Informática | |Faculdade de Ciências e Tecnologia | Tel: +351-21-2948596 | |Universidade Nova de Lisboa| Fax: +351-21-2948548 | |P-2829-516 Caparica| e-Mail: [EMAIL PROTECTED] | --- -- __ OpenSSL Project http://www.openssl.org User Support Mailing List[EMAIL PROTECTED] Automated List Manager [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Re: Sending/Detecting CA Certificate to client
You need an "out of band" mechanism. Handing someone paper with the fingerprint is good. -- Zolera Systems, Your Key to Online Integrity Securing Web services: XML, SOAP, Dig-sig, Encryption http://www.zolera.com __ OpenSSL Project http://www.openssl.org User Support Mailing List[EMAIL PROTECTED] Automated List Manager [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Re: Randomness and entropy
http://www.ciphersbyritter.com/NETLINKS.HTM#RandomnessLinks __ OpenSSL Project http://www.openssl.org User Support Mailing List[EMAIL PROTECTED] Automated List Manager [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Randomness and entropy
Title: Problem reading public file I am going to be generating a series of around 1000 random numbers using OpenSSL. .Do I set the seed just once or multiple times or even once for each random number I generate. What is the theory behind this? Any pointer to information sources on randomness and entropy is also highly appreciated. Thanks -Prathaban
Re: entry 1: bad serial number length (1)
Hi, If it is the first certificate you are trying to create except for the CA Cert, then change the value "02" to "01" As it your first user's certif. Ciao! Oliver Jaeckel wrote: > > Hi folks! I am LOST! > > For signing a cert request, I entered: > openssl ca -name Server_CA -keyfile /usr/ssl/PCA/private/CAkey.pem -in >requests/therequest.txt -days 365 > > Openssl writes: > Using configuration from /usr/share/ssl/openssl.cnf > Enter PEM pass phrase: > > I enter passphrase and get an error: > entry 1: bad serial number length (1) > > cat /usr/ssl/serial outputs 02 > Where could I start looking for an error? > > Any hint would be highly appreciated. SOrry for html crap but this freemailer cannot >suppress it. > > OJ > > > Keine verlorenen Lotto-Quittungen, keine vergessenen Gewinne mehr! > Beim WEB.DE Lottoservice: http://tippen2.web.de/?x=13 > > __ > OpenSSL Project http://www.openssl.org > User Support Mailing List[EMAIL PROTECTED] > Automated List Manager [EMAIL PROTECTED] -- # .- ...- . .-. .-. --- . ... .- .-.-.- .- -.-- ... .- # Averroes A. Aysha # Think Linux, Think Slackware! # e-fingerprint = 63:B0:7D:A1:23:BC:25:96:AE:B7:76:36:F3:07:1F:88 # .- ...- . .-. .-. --- . ... .- .-.-.- .- -.-- ... .- smime.p7s Description: S/MIME Cryptographic Signature
entry 1: bad serial number length (1)
Hi folks! I am LOST! For signing a cert request, I entered: openssl ca -name Server_CA -keyfile /usr/ssl/PCA/private/CAkey.pem -in requests/therequest.txt -days 365 Openssl writes: Using configuration from /usr/share/ssl/openssl.cnf Enter PEM pass phrase: I enter passphrase and get an error: entry 1: bad serial number length (1) cat /usr/ssl/serial outputs 02 Where could I start looking for an error? Any hint would be highly appreciated. SOrry for html crap but this freemailer cannot suppress it. OJ Keine verlorenen Lotto-Quittungen, keine vergessenen Gewinne mehr! Beim WEB.DE Lottoservice: http://tippen2.web.de/?x=13 __ OpenSSL Project http://www.openssl.org User Support Mailing List[EMAIL PROTECTED] Automated List Manager [EMAIL PROTECTED]
RE: Engine vs non-engine
0.9.6-engine supports CryptoSwift as well as nCipher, Atalla, and software. 0.9.7 folds the engine code into the main branch, reorganizes it, and adds a couple more engines. Lynn Gazis Rainbow Technologies -Original Message- From: Andy Schneider [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]] Sent: Friday, December 07, 2001 9:39 AM To: [EMAIL PROTECTED] Subject: RE: Engine vs non-engine AFAIK OpenSSL 0.9.7 is going to have pluggable cryptographic service providers (engines). 0.9.6 doesn't have this (it's all software) but 0.9.6-engine does. You can therefore use an engine based version with hardware crypto if you have an appropriate engine. 0.9.6 supports three? of engines, software, nCipher and attalla? Andy S. > -Original Message- > From: Averroes [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]] > Sent: 07 December 2001 17:33 > To: [EMAIL PROTECTED] > Subject: Re: Engine vs non-engine > > > Hi, > > One can control some crypto card as nCipher's shield, > that we use in my company.The ohter is just a software. > > Ciao! > > "Kasper (swebase)" wrote: > > > > I have an easy question. > > > > What is the difference between openssl-engine and openssl ? > > > > /Kasper > > > > > __ > > OpenSSL Project > http://www.openssl.org > > User Support Mailing List > [EMAIL PROTECTED] > > Automated List Manager > [EMAIL PROTECTED] > > -- > # .- ...- . .-. .-. --- . ... .- .-.-.- .- -.-- ... .- > # Averroes A. Aysha > # Think Linux, Think Slackware! > # e-fingerprint = 63:B0:7D:A1:23:BC:25:96:AE:B7:76:36:F3:07:1F:88 > # .- ...- . .-. .-. --- . ... .- .-.-.- .- -.-- ... .- __ OpenSSL Project http://www.openssl.org User Support Mailing List[EMAIL PROTECTED] Automated List Manager [EMAIL PROTECTED] __ OpenSSL Project http://www.openssl.org User Support Mailing List[EMAIL PROTECTED] Automated List Manager [EMAIL PROTECTED]
CRLReason
Hi list, Are ReasonCode & CRLReason CRL EXTensions implemented in openssl-0.9.6b? idem with: cRLNumber, deltaCRLIndicator, If someone have a patch for that, it would be kindy to share it. Regards -- # .- ...- . .-. .-. --- . ... .- .-.-.- .- -.-- ... .- # Averroes A. Aysha # Think Linux, Think Slackware! # e-fingerprint = 63:B0:7D:A1:23:BC:25:96:AE:B7:76:36:F3:07:1F:88 # .- ...- . .-. .-. --- . ... .- .-.-.- .- -.-- ... .- smime.p7s Description: S/MIME Cryptographic Signature
RE: Engine vs non-engine
AFAIK OpenSSL 0.9.7 is going to have pluggable cryptographic service providers (engines). 0.9.6 doesn't have this (it's all software) but 0.9.6-engine does. You can therefore use an engine based version with hardware crypto if you have an appropriate engine. 0.9.6 supports three? of engines, software, nCipher and attalla? Andy S. > -Original Message- > From: Averroes [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]] > Sent: 07 December 2001 17:33 > To: [EMAIL PROTECTED] > Subject: Re: Engine vs non-engine > > > Hi, > > One can control some crypto card as nCipher's shield, > that we use in my company.The ohter is just a software. > > Ciao! > > "Kasper (swebase)" wrote: > > > > I have an easy question. > > > > What is the difference between openssl-engine and openssl ? > > > > /Kasper > > > > > __ > > OpenSSL Project > http://www.openssl.org > > User Support Mailing List > [EMAIL PROTECTED] > > Automated List Manager > [EMAIL PROTECTED] > > -- > # .- ...- . .-. .-. --- . ... .- .-.-.- .- -.-- ... .- > # Averroes A. Aysha > # Think Linux, Think Slackware! > # e-fingerprint = 63:B0:7D:A1:23:BC:25:96:AE:B7:76:36:F3:07:1F:88 > # .- ...- . .-. .-. --- . ... .- .-.-.- .- -.-- ... .- __ OpenSSL Project http://www.openssl.org User Support Mailing List[EMAIL PROTECTED] Automated List Manager [EMAIL PROTECTED]
RE: Cryptology Questions
> -Original Message- > From: Eric Rescorla [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]] > Sent: Friday, December 07, 2001 5:29 PM > To: [EMAIL PROTECTED] > Subject: Re: Cryptology Questions > > > Bernard Dautrevaux <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> writes: > > It's even worst than that: Alice can agree with Bob to the original > > contract, and have Bob sign it. THEN she have: > >- The contract itself (which can be used to generate the > MD5 digest) > >- Bob's signed MD5 digest > > > > Then applying the birthday attack she can fiddle with the > "better-for-her" > > contract till it generates the same MD5 digest. The mere > fact the MD5 digest > > is the same makes that Bob's signature "match" this contract. > You misunderstand the birthday attack, which involves creating > two messages which have the same (previously unknown) digest. > The birthday attack requires you to create the message pair > upfront, before the signature occurs. > > The attack you describe: creating a document with a SPECIFIC digest, > is 2^n hard (where n is the length of the hash). (Assuming, of course, > that no attack better than brute force is known for the digest > in question). Oh, yes; Now I understand why this attack is O(N) when I expected such an attack to be O(2^N) as is effectively an attack as I (mis)understood it. Thanks for the clarification, Bernard Bernard Dautrevaux Microprocess Ingenierie 97 bis, rue de Colombes 92400 COURBEVOIE FRANCE Tel:+33 (0) 1 47 68 80 80 Fax:+33 (0) 1 47 88 97 85 e-mail: [EMAIL PROTECTED] [EMAIL PROTECTED] __ OpenSSL Project http://www.openssl.org User Support Mailing List[EMAIL PROTECTED] Automated List Manager [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Re: vbscript and xenroll
Arnaud De Timmerman writes: > please someone who's successfully using vbscript and the xenroll.dll > to install a user cert in internet explorer sends me his/her piece > of code i'm going mad with all the different settings 1) http://pki.ssh.com:8080/enroll.html 2) click IE enrollment 3) view source Tomi Kause <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>mob. +358-50-5911 385 SSH Communications Security Corp http://www.ssh.com/ __ OpenSSL Project http://www.openssl.org User Support Mailing List[EMAIL PROTECTED] Automated List Manager [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Re: Engine vs non-engine
Hi, One can control some crypto card as nCipher's shield, that we use in my company.The ohter is just a software. Ciao! "Kasper (swebase)" wrote: > > I have an easy question. > > What is the difference between openssl-engine and openssl ? > > /Kasper > > __ > OpenSSL Project http://www.openssl.org > User Support Mailing List[EMAIL PROTECTED] > Automated List Manager [EMAIL PROTECTED] -- # .- ...- . .-. .-. --- . ... .- .-.-.- .- -.-- ... .- # Averroes A. Aysha # Think Linux, Think Slackware! # e-fingerprint = 63:B0:7D:A1:23:BC:25:96:AE:B7:76:36:F3:07:1F:88 # .- ...- . .-. .-. --- . ... .- .-.-.- .- -.-- ... .- smime.p7s Description: S/MIME Cryptographic Signature
RE: Java toolkit for SSL???
Try Eric Rescola's site: http://www.rtfm.com/puretls/ -Original Message- From: Tat Sing Kong [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]] Sent: Friday, December 07, 2001 10:55 AM To: [EMAIL PROTECTED] Subject: RE: Java toolkit for SSL??? I'm sure I heard of one a while back called SSLava or something, but there definitely is one. Tat. > Hi, > > i tried to find a toolkit that can handle C and Java to make sure > being 100% compatible,because we have a networkclient > application written in C,and also a Browser application written in Java. > > Does anybody know a good SSL toolkit for java? > > Thanks > Larry __ OpenSSL Project http://www.openssl.org User Support Mailing List[EMAIL PROTECTED] Automated List Manager [EMAIL PROTECTED] * DISCLAIMER: The information contained in this e-mail may be confidential and is intended solely for the use of the named addressee. Access, copying or re-use of the e-mail or any information contained therein by any other person is not authorized. If you are not the intended recipient please notify us immediately by returning the e-mail to the originator. __ OpenSSL Project http://www.openssl.org User Support Mailing List[EMAIL PROTECTED] Automated List Manager [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Re: Cryptology Questions
Bernard Dautrevaux <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> writes: > It's even worst than that: Alice can agree with Bob to the original > contract, and have Bob sign it. THEN she have: >- The contract itself (which can be used to generate the MD5 digest) >- Bob's signed MD5 digest > > Then applying the birthday attack she can fiddle with the "better-for-her" > contract till it generates the same MD5 digest. The mere fact the MD5 digest > is the same makes that Bob's signature "match" this contract. You misunderstand the birthday attack, which involves creating two messages which have the same (previously unknown) digest. The birthday attack requires you to create the message pair upfront, before the signature occurs. The attack you describe: creating a document with a SPECIFIC digest, is 2^n hard (where n is the length of the hash). (Assuming, of course, that no attack better than brute force is known for the digest in question). -Ekr -- [Eric Rescorla [EMAIL PROTECTED]] http://www.rtfm.com/ __ OpenSSL Project http://www.openssl.org User Support Mailing List[EMAIL PROTECTED] Automated List Manager [EMAIL PROTECTED]
RE: Cryptology Questions
> -Original Message- > From: Michael Wojcik [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]] > Sent: Thursday, December 06, 2001 10:46 PM > To: [EMAIL PROTECTED] > Subject: RE: Cryptology Questions > > > > From: Neff Robert A [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]] > > Sent: Thursday, December 06, 2001 2:47 PM > > Indeed, collisions of messages *must* exist. However, by it's > > very nature, the other message(s) causing the collisions would, > > with almost 100% certainty, not be valid within the context it > > was used in. > This is a dubious claim. Take a look at Gideon Yuval's > protocol for using a birthday attack against a cryptographic > hash, as described in AC2 (18.1, p 430): Alice creates two > versions of a contract, one fair, the other favorable to her. > She uses a cosmetic change - eg. an extra space is either > present or not before the newline - on each of N/2 lines in > each contract (where N is the size in bits of the hash). By > toggling her change - adding or removing the unnecessary > space character - on the N/2 lines independently, she > obviously can create N/2 variations of each of her two > documents. Thanks to the birthday paradox, the odds favor > her finding a colliding pair. Then all she has to do is take > the "fair" contract from the pair and convince Bob to sign > just the hash (and not, say, make a cosmetic change to the > contract, and then hash and sign that), and she can > substitute the "unfair" contract at a later date and > demonstrate that it hashes to the value the Bob signed. It's even worst than that: Alice can agree with Bob to the original contract, and have Bob sign it. THEN she have: - The contract itself (which can be used to generate the MD5 digest) - Bob's signed MD5 digest Then applying the birthday attack she can fiddle with the "better-for-her" contract till it generates the same MD5 digest. The mere fact the MD5 digest is the same makes that Bob's signature "match" this contract. The fact this can be done afterwards has several implications: 1) As time goes, machines are faster and faster, so the attack is simpler and simpler. Just this should promotes avoiding short digests for long-lived contracts. 2) Bob can decide, as an afterthought, that it may be beneficial for him to "repudiate" a contract that he've signed, as he can play exactly the same game :-) The only solution to this, that will increase the difficulty of tampering with a contract, is requesting both parts to sign exactly the same contract, but with a mention of which is signing. For example you can have as contract: "This contract is between Bob and Alice and say that SO AND SO." Then Bob will sign: "This contract is between Bob and Alice and say that SO AND SO. Signed by BOB" And Alice will sign: "This contract is between Bob and Alice and say that SO AND SO. Signed by ALICE" The final contract being: "This contract is between Bob and Alice and say that SO AND SO." Bob's signature Alice signature Note that "Signed by BOB" and "Signed by ALICE" could be replaced by their certificates, expurged from the public key to avoid any risk of key "interference" that coudl occur when signing with the private key something that is dependant on the public key. Then the birthday attack will need to find a tampered contract that generates the same MD5 (or SHA1 or SHA-4096 if that ever exist) than the original one for both to-be-signed messages. I'm not an expert but it looks like it would be VERY difficult to find a double collision, perhaps completely defeating the birthday paradox. And anyway such a double signing is requested for a lot of contracts, as a lot of these are mutually binding; if the contract will only bind me, I'd probably arrange to get two certificates from two different CAs, with as much different optional info on each one, and sign the contract twice. Note that you must expect this kind of after-signing compromission to be possible for as long as the CONTRACT is valid, as certificate expiration/revokation is of no help here: once you've signed, you're bound to what you've signed. Or else you have to expect having to sign again regularly ;-( > In short, there's a perfectly good algorithm for finding > valid colliding documents, assuming you can and want to do > the work required for the birthday attack (2 to the power of > N/2 on average), and assuming you can make N/2 independent > cosmetic changes to each of the documents. Of course, in > actual applications those assumptions are often not met; but > simply assuming that colliding pairs of valid documents are > much harder to find than other collisions is a mistake. Especially as this is simpler and simpler as computer are faster and faster; and anyway every year there's people winning at the lottery... Regards, Bernard Bernard Dautrevaux Microprocess Ingenierie 97 bis, rue de Colombes 9240
RE: Java toolkit for SSL???
I'm sure I heard of one a while back called SSLava or something, but there definitely is one. Tat. > Hi, > > i tried to find a toolkit that can handle C and Java to make sure > being 100% compatible,because we have a networkclient > application written in C,and also a Browser application written in Java. > > Does anybody know a good SSL toolkit for java? > > Thanks > Larry __ OpenSSL Project http://www.openssl.org User Support Mailing List[EMAIL PROTECTED] Automated List Manager [EMAIL PROTECTED]
RE: Cryptology Questions
It is not the connection I was referring to but the environment that was generating the certs. Was the original user attempting to store his client's generated key pairs on his server? Then that server better be secured. Perhaps I wasn't clear on that point. However, I personally would never use key pairs generated by another to be used for identification purposes. Finally, sniffing/replaying a csr is pointless. You still don't have access to the private key to decrypt messages intended for me if that key was generated by me and remains secured by me. Nor would any CA worth it's salt sign a csr without the proper verification (and payment!) method. As an example, Verisign issues unique identifiers for each csr to an authorized requestor prior to granting the signing request. Once used, a replay is easily detected. -Original Message- From: POLIVKA-ROHRER, KEITH W (AIT) [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]] Sent: Thursday, December 06, 2001 5:53 PM To: '[EMAIL PROTECTED]' Subject: RE: Cryptology Questions Regarding key distribution, no one but the owner should have access to the private key. What reason would the server have for sending a client their public AND private key? To ensure confidentiality and integrity, the key pair should (must?) be generated by the client. It is the job of the CA to sign the certificate (which contains among other things the owner's public key). The private key itself is not contained within the cert. You should read up on certificate requests to clarify some issues. For whatever reason, if you are attempting to generate and supply both keys to you clients, you have to have a very secure environment. More problematic is that, because you have both keys, I am not guaranteed that someone at your company couldn't impersonate me if I were a client... Riddle me this, then: If the connection isn't secure enough to send the (encrypted) private key across, why is it secure enough for the credentials the server should require before signing a CSR? Alternately stated, it's much easier to sniff and replay the certificate request than to sniff the private key and decrypt it. Keith __ OpenSSL Project http://www.openssl.org User Support Mailing List[EMAIL PROTECTED] Automated List Manager [EMAIL PROTECTED] * DISCLAIMER: The information contained in this e-mail may be confidential and is intended solely for the use of the named addressee. Access, copying or re-use of the e-mail or any information contained therein by any other person is not authorized. If you are not the intended recipient please notify us immediately by returning the e-mail to the originator. __ OpenSSL Project http://www.openssl.org User Support Mailing List[EMAIL PROTECTED] Automated List Manager [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Java toolkit for SSL???
Hi, i tried to find a toolkit that can handle C and Java to make sure beeing 100% compatible,because we have a networkclient application written in C,and also a Browser application written in Java. Does anybody know a good SSL toolkit for java? Thanks Larry __ OpenSSL Project http://www.openssl.org User Support Mailing List[EMAIL PROTECTED] Automated List Manager [EMAIL PROTECTED]
find a china girl !
Title: Mail __ OpenSSL Project http://www.openssl.org User Support Mailing List[EMAIL PROTECTED] Automated List Manager [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Problem reading public file
Title: Problem reading public file
Hi!
I have a public file in PEM format generated by:
openssl genrsa -f4 -out key.pem 1024
openssl rsa -in key.pem -pubout >pub.pem
When I try to read this key with the following code:
FILE *fp = fopen( "pub.pem", "r" );
RSA *pubKey = NULL;
ERR_load_crypto_strings();
if ( PEM_read_RSAPublicKey( fp, &pubKey, NULL, "" ) == NULL ) {
cerr << "Error reading public key." << endl;
long error = ERR_get_error();
while ( error != 0 ) {
char buffer[ 120 ];
ERR_error_string( error, buffer );
cerr << buffer << endl;
error = ERR_get_error();
}
}
I always get the following error:
Error reading public key.
error:0906D06C:PEM routines:PEM_read_bio:no start line
Anyone knows what I might be doing wrong?
Thank you!
--
Filipe Custódio
Technical Architect
e-Trust Unit
Novabase
SSL_connect problem
server is ready. client call SSL_connect(ssl); in gdb,it say: 1057:error:0D06B078:asn1 encoding routines:ASN1_get_object:header too long:asn1_lib.c:139: 1057:error:0D09F006:asn1 encoding routines:d2i_X509:bad get asn1 object call:x_x509.c:102:address=135128672 offset=0 1057:error:1407E00B:SSL routines:SSL2_SET_CERTIFICATE:X509 lib:s2_clnt.c:906: what is the problem? What should I do in client? __ OpenSSL Project http://www.openssl.org User Support Mailing List[EMAIL PROTECTED] Automated List Manager [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Engine vs non-engine
I have an easy question. What is the difference between openssl-engine and openssl ? /Kasper __ OpenSSL Project http://www.openssl.org User Support Mailing List[EMAIL PROTECTED] Automated List Manager [EMAIL PROTECTED]
