Problem with SSL_CTX_new on Solaris 8

2002-07-16 Thread Steve D'Arcy

I have downloaded and installed the openssl-0.9.6d version on Solaris 8 but
when I issue the SSL_CTX_new function my program core dumps. I have looked
at the SSL_CTX_new functions and it fails doing the ssl_create_cipher_list.
Are there any known problems here?

I would also like to add that have created new directories and copied the
libs and the header files only, will this have any relevance?

Thanks,

Steve D'Arcy

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Re: is the ssl3_send_alert() function public ( part of the API )?

2002-07-16 Thread Lutz Jaenicke

On Tue, Jul 16, 2002 at 11:28:32AM -0400, Kervin Pierre wrote:
 this is actually what I thought as well.
 
 Is there a suitable replacement?
 
 Here is how the function is used...
 
 from ldap/libraries/libldap/tls.c
 
 //=
 
 static X509 *
 tls_get_cert( SSL *s )
 {
 /* If peer cert was bad, treat as if no cert was given */
 if (SSL_get_verify_result(s)) {
 /* If we can send an alert, do so */
 if (SSL_version(s) != SSL2_VERSION){
 
 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_WARNING,SSL3_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE);
 }
 return NULL;
 }
 return SSL_get_peer_certificate(s);
 }

Obviously the software is implemented to have the handshake succeed
regardless of the certificate verification result and then only
check out the certificate verification result later on.
That's what the original function of the verification routines (and callback
function). They check the certificate and have the handshake fail if
they are not satisfied with the result. By using the callback function
the application can adjust the default behaviour.

Best regards,
Lutz
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fakebasicauth doesn't like / character.

2002-07-16 Thread Oliver Bode

Hi,

I've been trying to implement fakebasicauth because I hate having to
authenticate on every reload using normal client certificate
authentication.

However I can't get it to work on openbsd. I've followed the directions at:

http://httpd.apache.org/docs-2.0/ssl/ssl_howto.html

and it just won't work - forbidden.

So I started troubleshooting the problem using just plain basic auth and it
appears that basic auth doesn't like the / character.

Can someone else verify this or tell me what I am doing wrong?

== .htaccess 
SSLVerifyClient   require
SSLVerifyDepth   1
SSLOptions +FakeBasicAuth
SSLRequireSSL
AuthName   Snake Oil Authentication
AuthType Basic
AuthUserFile   .htpasswd
require valid-user
== .htaccess 

== .htpasswd 
[EMAIL PROTECTED]:xxj31ZMTZzkVA
== .htpasswd 

I've tried md5 passwords and the encrypted password that comes out of
htpasswd password  also and nothing works.

if I just do basic auth I can only get access using the following
configuration - ie remove /:

== .htaccess 
#SSLVerifyClient   require
#SSLVerifyDepth   1
#SSLOptions +FakeBasicAuth
#SSLRequireSSL
AuthName   Snake Oil Authentication
AuthType Basic
AuthUserFile   .htpasswd
require valid-user
== .htaccess 

== .htpasswd 
[EMAIL PROTECTED]:KI5eE8rTJvs.U
# where KI5eE8rTJvs.U is the encrypted htpasswd output of password
== .htpasswd 
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Re: an advise

2002-07-16 Thread Michael Sierchio

Shalendra Chhabra wrote:

 Is SSL 3.0/TLS susceptible to Pauls Timing Analysis
 Attack???

The protocols do not address the issue in any way -- this
is an implementation problem for the Public Key Crypto
component.

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Newbie Question Re: Public Key Encryption [Please help!!]

2002-07-16 Thread J

Hi,

I am trying to encrypt a session key that I created using DES_KEY_SCHEDULE.  I am using
RSA_public_encrypt to encrypt the session key (8 bytes) with the public key using
RSA_PKCS1_OEAP_PADDING.  This creates a 64byte encrypted session key.  I send this to 
the
Server on the windows machine.  But 'Importing the Encrypted Session Key' on that 
server
fails. That's implemented using wincrypt.h functions such as CryptImportObjectEx.  

Further info: I used the public key received from the server (created using the
asymmetric_encrypt_algorithm) and I imported that using: 

rsaPubKey = (RSA*) d2i_RSA_PUBKEY_bio(pub,NULL);

Now, I use this to encrypt the session key:
unsigned char   ciphertext[512];
unsigned char   iv[8];
unsigned char   iv1[8];
RAND_seed(rnd_seed, sizeof (rnd_seed));
RAND_pseudo_bytes(iv,8);
bytecopy(iv,iv1,8);
encryptlen  =   RSA_public_encrypt (8, (*ks)-ks.cblock,
ciphertext, rsaPubKey,
RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING);
if(encryptlen == -1)
{
fprintf (stderr, ERROR: Failed to encrypt using public key\n);
goto proc_exit;
}


The length after this is 64, which is preferred.  So, after all this when I finally 
send
the 'ciphertext' chars as the encrypted session key, the server fails to import it 
using
CryptImportKey (from wincrypt.h).  The ERROR RECEIVED says:

Either the algorithm that works with the public key you are trying to import is not
supported by this CSP, or an attempt was made to import a session key that was 
encrypted
with something other than one of your public keys


If anyone has come into a similar problem or anything close, please let me know.  
Any
help will be tremendously appreciated.  If you like to know more details or are
interested in working with me on this, please let me know.

Thanx in advance,
 J..



=
- J
  | 
  - [EMAIL PROTECTED]

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Anyone using OpenSSL for a CA or PKI Deployment?

2002-07-16 Thread Wienckowski, Justin

My company is using some Windows software to run a Certificate Authority to generate 
certs for corporate employees and resources.  However, this software has proven to be 
extremely buggy and support is horrible, so we're looking at alternatives.

I'd love to re-implement our CA and directory in Unix using OpenSSL.  Anyone know of 
companies or organizations who may have already done this?  I'm finding very little 
publicized on the web, and dropping some names would help immensely.

Thanks!

-
Justin Wienckowski
TRW Intranet Team, ISP
703.345.6663
[EMAIL PROTECTED]


BEGIN:VCARD
VERSION:2.1
N:Wienckowski;Justin
FN:Wienckowski, Justin
ORG:;A971016TRG
TEL;WORK;VOICE:+1 703 345-6663
ADR;WORK;ENCODING=QUOTED-PRINTABLE:;;VAR1/2A18=0D=0A12011 Sunset Hills Rd=0D=0AReston=0D=0AVA=0D=0A20190;Reston=
;VA;20190
LABEL;WORK;ENCODING=QUOTED-PRINTABLE:VAR1/2A18=0D=0A12011 Sunset Hills Rd=0D=0AReston=0D=0AVA=0D=0A20190=0D=0ARes=
ton, VA 20190
EMAIL;PREF;INTERNET:[EMAIL PROTECTED]
REV:20020528T152500Z
END:VCARD



Re: Anyone using OpenSSL for a CA or PKI Deployment?

2002-07-16 Thread Geoff Thorpe

Hi,

On Tue, 16 Jul 2002, Wienckowski, Justin wrote:

 My company is using some Windows software to run a Certificate Authority
 to generate certs for corporate employees and resources.  However, this
 software has proven to be extremely buggy and support is horrible, so
 we're looking at alternatives.

not surprisingly

 I'd love to re-implement our CA and directory in Unix using OpenSSL.
 Anyone know of companies or organizations who may have already done
 this?  I'm finding very little publicized on the web, and dropping some
 names would help immensely.

I haven't had a chance to play with it - but you might want to try OpenCA
and see how it pans out. http://www.openca.org

Good luck,
Geoff

-- 
Geoff Thorpe
[EMAIL PROTECTED]

Pop quiz:
(1) guess the nations of the following three elected leaders;
(i) a war-mongering oil millionaire,
   (ii) a hard-liner found responsible for massacres of civilians,
  (iii) a nobel peace-prize winner.
(2) guess which countries do and do not need a change of leadership.

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Re: Anyone using OpenSSL for a CA or PKI Deployment?

2002-07-16 Thread Rakeshbabu Bobba

Hi
I am using openSSL for CA, but only for research purposes. I am not sure
whether it will turn out be a good choice for a corporation but it is good
enough for reseacrh purposes. I was given to understand that OpenSSL CA
wasn't mean't to be a full scale one. So i would suggest trying OpenCA.

I am actually using both microsoft certification services and openSSL
together.

Rakesh


 
On Tue, 16 Jul 2002, Geoff Thorpe wrote:

 Hi,
 
 On Tue, 16 Jul 2002, Wienckowski, Justin wrote:
 
  My company is using some Windows software to run a Certificate Authority
  to generate certs for corporate employees and resources.  However, this
  software has proven to be extremely buggy and support is horrible, so
  we're looking at alternatives.
 
 not surprisingly
 
  I'd love to re-implement our CA and directory in Unix using OpenSSL.
  Anyone know of companies or organizations who may have already done
  this?  I'm finding very little publicized on the web, and dropping some
  names would help immensely.
 
 I haven't had a chance to play with it - but you might want to try OpenCA
 and see how it pans out. http://www.openca.org
 
 Good luck,
 Geoff
 
 -- 
 Geoff Thorpe
 [EMAIL PROTECTED]
 
 Pop quiz:
 (1) guess the nations of the following three elected leaders;
 (i) a war-mongering oil millionaire,
(ii) a hard-liner found responsible for massacres of civilians,
   (iii) a nobel peace-prize winner.
 (2) guess which countries do and do not need a change of leadership.
 
 __
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 User Support Mailing List[EMAIL PROTECTED]
 Automated List Manager   [EMAIL PROTECTED]
 

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RE: Anyone using OpenSSL for a CA or PKI Deployment?

2002-07-16 Thread Nebergall, Christopher

The Globus project uses OpenSSL for their CA software.

http://www.globus.org
http://www.globus.org/Security/simple-ca.html

-Christopher

 -Original Message-
From:   Geoff Thorpe [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]] 
Sent:   Tuesday, July 16, 2002 12:57 PM
To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Subject:Re: Anyone using OpenSSL for a CA or PKI Deployment?

Hi,

On Tue, 16 Jul 2002, Wienckowski, Justin wrote:

 My company is using some Windows software to run a Certificate Authority
 to generate certs for corporate employees and resources.  However, this
 software has proven to be extremely buggy and support is horrible, so
 we're looking at alternatives.

not surprisingly

 I'd love to re-implement our CA and directory in Unix using OpenSSL.
 Anyone know of companies or organizations who may have already done
 this?  I'm finding very little publicized on the web, and dropping some
 names would help immensely.

I haven't had a chance to play with it - but you might want to try OpenCA
and see how it pans out. http://www.openca.org

Good luck,
Geoff

-- 
Geoff Thorpe
[EMAIL PROTECTED]

Pop quiz:
(1) guess the nations of the following three elected leaders;
(i) a war-mongering oil millionaire,
   (ii) a hard-liner found responsible for massacres of civilians,
  (iii) a nobel peace-prize winner.
(2) guess which countries do and do not need a change of leadership.

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Re: Anyone using OpenSSL for a CA or PKI Deployment?

2002-07-16 Thread Kervin Pierre

http://openca.org/ ?

Wienckowski, Justin wrote:
 My company is using some Windows software to run a Certificate Authority to generate 
certs for corporate employees and resources.  However, this software has proven to be 
extremely buggy and support is horrible, so we're looking at alternatives.
 
 I'd love to re-implement our CA and directory in Unix using OpenSSL.  Anyone know of 
companies or organizations who may have already done this?  I'm finding very little 
publicized on the web, and dropping some names would help immensely.
 
 Thanks!
 
 -
 Justin Wienckowski
 TRW Intranet Team, ISP
 703.345.6663
 [EMAIL PROTECTED]


-- 
http://linuxquestions.org/ - Ask linux questions, give linux help.
http://splint.org/ - Write safe C code. splint source-code analyzer.

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Re: Anyone using OpenSSL for a CA or PKI Deployment?

2002-07-16 Thread Götz Babin-Ebell

Wienckowski, Justin wrote:
 My company is using some Windows software to run a Certificate Authority to generate 
certs for
  corporate employees and resources.

 I'd love to re-implement our CA and directory in Unix using OpenSSL.
  Anyone know of companies or organizations who may have already done this?
  I'm finding very little publicized on the web, and dropping some names would 
help immensely.

A part of our infrastructure is done with OpenSSL

Bye

Goetz

-- 
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Sonninstr. 24-28, 20097 Hamburg, Germany
Tel.: +49-(0)40 80 80 26 -0,  Fax: +49-(0)40 80 80 26 -126



smime.p7s
Description: S/MIME Cryptographic Signature


Re: an advise

2002-07-16 Thread Manish Ramesh Chablani

Hi,

I am a newbie to security and SSL.. but thought this could help.. ( I am 
not sure if I am answering your question)
RSA_blinding_on() takes care of the attack which measures the encryption 
and decryption time taken by RSA.

hope this will be of some help,
Manish

Date: Mon, 15 Jul 2002 16:08:22 -0700 (PDT)
From: Shalendra Chhabra [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Subject: an advise
To: [EMAIL PROTECTED], [EMAIL PROTECTED], [EMAIL PROTECTED]
MIME-Version: 1.0
X-Sender: Shalendra Chhabra [EMAIL PROTECTED]
X-List-Manager: OpenSSL Majordomo [version 1.94.4]
X-List-Name: openssl-users
X-Perlmx-Spam: Gauge=, Probability=0%, Report=
X-Keywords: 

Just a short piece of information will help me in my
student life

Paul kocher had discovered Timing analysis attack on
Implementations of Public Key Cryptosystems like
Diffie Hellman , RSA etc
and also Paul was one of the designer of SSL 3.0
specifictations 

I just wanted to ask this:
when Paul had designed SSL 3.0 Spec, was  the attack
taken into account?
In short please help me reaching the conclusion that

Is SSL 3.0/TLS susceptible to Pauls Timing Analysis
Attack???

Please Reply@Earliest 
Thanks
Shalendra

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Graduate Student,
Computer Science Department, 
Indiana University
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Re: Re:an advise

2002-07-16 Thread Shalu


Yeh u are right this was a problem for Pubic Key crypto systems 
but even in the implementation of these SSL or TLS first a master 
secret is set up with the help of
pre master secret, which is done through the Public Key 
Cryptography like RSA, but I just wanted to know
if the RSA or any other public key cryptosystem that we use in 
these protocols are they suspectible to Pauls
Timing Analysis Attack or not? and If not why they are not? What 
has been done in them to take care so that
they are not suscpetible to Pauls timing analysis attack

(Paul was one of those persons only who had designed
the SSL Protocol)


Lutz: Will you also comment your comments are sometimes
very much useful to me

Thanks List
Shalendra

On Tue, 16 Jul 2002 Michael Sierchio wrote :
Shalendra Chhabra wrote:

Is SSL 3.0/TLS susceptible to Pauls Timing Analysis
Attack???

The protocols do not address the issue in any way -- this
is an implementation problem for the Public Key Crypto
component.

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Re: Getting the CERT chain

2002-07-16 Thread Patrick Powell

 From [EMAIL PROTECTED] Thu Jul 11 07:26:50 2002
 Date: Thu, 11 Jul 2002 16:20:58 +0200
 From: Lutz Jaenicke [EMAIL PROTECTED]
 To: [EMAIL PROTECTED], [EMAIL PROTECTED]
 Subject: Re: Getting the CERT chain

 On Thu, Jul 11, 2002 at 07:12:30AM -0700, Patrick Powell wrote:
  Question 1:
  
  Is there a simple way using exported (i.e. - available
  to general use via the openssl library and having definitions
  in openssl.h) OpenSSL functions to do the following:
  
 During the SSL connection process, if a user CERT has
 been presented, get the cert chain?

 SSL_get_peer_cert_chain().

Ahh!!! Excellent!  The code in
apps/s_client.c : static void print_stuff(BIO *bio, SSL *s, int full)
does almost exactly what I was looking for...


  Question 2:
 Now I just KNOW that I saw this,  and everybody is going to laugh at this,
 but:
  
 If I have found a CERT using, say, peer = SSL_get_peer_certificate(ssl)
 as in the example above,  and I have a list of CERTS in a file or
 directory (i.e. - as for the CA cert, etc), how can I check to see
 if the peer cert (in the example) is in this list or directory?
  
 I just KNOW that I saw this in some SSL or related code, but I cannot
 remember the exact details and searching has not found it again.

 OpenSSL itself uses hashes for comparison. If the hashes are identical,
 so are the certificates.

Ummm... is there an example piece of code that does the hash generation
and then checks the certs?  I just KNOW that I saw it somewhere.



 Best regards,
   Lutz
 -- 
 Lutz Jaenicke [EMAIL PROTECTED]
 http://www.aet.TU-Cottbus.DE/personen/jaenicke/
 BTU Cottbus, Allgemeine Elektrotechnik
 Universitaetsplatz 3-4, D-03044 Cottbus
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Network and System San Diego, CA 92111
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LPRng - Print Spooler (http://www.lprng.com)
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Re: an advise

2002-07-16 Thread Michael Sierchio


Kocher did work on the SSL v3.0 protocol, which corrects some errors
in the previous version.  At the risk of repeating myself, timing
or power analysis attacks are not mounted against SSL, but against
the public key operations.  Given the nature of their place in the
protocol, and that -- even if you could use a server as an oracle --
it is exceedingly difficult to time things precisely, the attack
is primarily of academic significance.

Timing analysis is of such little practical value that no one, to
my knowledge, is willing to obscure the average key agreement (DH)
or decryption (RSA) operation by adding random delays or by making
all pubkey operations conform to the upper bound, worst case time.


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Re: an advise

2002-07-16 Thread Perry E. Metzger


Michael Sierchio [EMAIL PROTECTED] writes:
 Timing analysis is of such little practical value that no one, to
 my knowledge, is willing to obscure the average key agreement (DH)
 or decryption (RSA) operation by adding random delays or by making
 all pubkey operations conform to the upper bound, worst case time.

That sounds like a oh, no one would EVER mount THAT attack
fallacy. They have a tendency to bite you in the buttocks.

I'm aware of a number of packages that use PKC that obscure timing
because the authors believed the threat to be quite real.

Perry
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Re: Anyone using OpenSSL for a CA or PKI Deployment?

2002-07-16 Thread Paul L. Allen

Geoff Thorpe wrote:
 
 Hi,
 
 On Tue, 16 Jul 2002, Wienckowski, Justin wrote:
 
  [...]
  I'd love to re-implement our CA and directory in Unix using OpenSSL.
  Anyone know of companies or organizations who may have already done
  this?  I'm finding very little publicized on the web, and dropping some
  names would help immensely.
 
 I haven't had a chance to play with it - but you might want to try OpenCA
 and see how it pans out. http://www.openca.org

Justin, if you actually try to use OpenCA, please post your experiences
to the list.  We looked at OpenCA to use in a research project here
and ended up taking advantage of a site license for the Netscape CA
instead.  The Netscape product may be huge and complex, but it is at
least well-documented and stable.  It looked as if OpenCA would have
taken more energy than we wanted to devote to that component of the
project.

I'll be following OpenCA over time.  The notion of a free CA is fairly
attractive, and if it was also well-documented, standards-compliant, and
stable, it would be compelling.

Paul Allen
-- 
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Re: an advise

2002-07-16 Thread Michael Sierchio

Perry E. Metzger wrote:
 Michael Sierchio [EMAIL PROTECTED] writes:
 
Timing analysis is of such little practical value that no one, to
my knowledge, is willing to obscure the average key agreement (DH)
or decryption (RSA) operation by adding random delays or by making
all pubkey operations conform to the upper bound, worst case time.
 
 
 That sounds like a oh, no one would EVER mount THAT attack
 fallacy. They have a tendency to bite you in the buttocks.

I didn't mean to claim that no one would ever mount such an attack --
just that there are enormous practical difficulties to getting any
timing results via SSL session key creation.

 I'm aware of a number of packages that use PKC that obscure timing
 because the authors believed the threat to be quite real.

Name them.  OpenSSL doesn't.

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