Arado p2p Websearch: Bookmark Organize and Synchronize released
Hi anyone with c++/Qt skills interested to build in Qt proxy for Tor for the released new app http://arado.sf.net Bookmark Database to Sync with your Devices. It can contain as well .tor adresses for websites and services in tor. Please test it and try to run it on your webserver 24/7 Use it for your Websites.. Rss support should follow.. Thanks Quoting the release Info: ARADO is an open source Bookmark-Database for Websearch. You easily can save and organize your favourite URLs (Bookmarks). The database can be networked with your further devices like laptop, mobile phone, home or work PC, so that all added URLs are synchronized with your connected devices. The Arado websearch experience provides to search the web within all your networked devices. Website: http://arado.sf.net Download Win: http://kent.dl.sourceforge.net/project/arado/Arado-0.1.0/Arado-Websearch-0.1.0-Win-Setup.exe Download Linux/Mac: https://sourceforge.net/projects/arado/files/ ED2k: ed2k://|file|Arado-Websearch-0.1.0-Win-Setup.[contentdb.emule-project.net ].exe|12923284| 911819E92B0FB496A268B9C44A9895CC| p=6CBA12CE62F0B8D52BAFD28A5D0F8C11:94D336C072EF6B914B5A4FEA1B92C28B| h=TOGAJYNDJ3FQ2BW5XHJ7UJCD6APWY6CT|s= http://kent.dl.sourceforge.net/project/arado/Arado- 0.1.0/Arado-Websearch-0.1.0-Win-Setup.exe|/ Release v.0.1.0
Re: getting more exit nodes
Hello Alexander, and list, that is an essential idea, which is now discussed, and that start of that development is still missing. So good to hear. First, I agree (as posted earlier), that we need a tit-for-tat Tor: Everyone who wants to surf with the IP of another peer, needs to give his IP as well, so that others can surf. That was the idea of peek-a-booty software, which stalled in development. We raised the question to have a special browser with this exit-node tor implemented to jap and roger and torpark. But noone ever came up with any solution. So I appreciate the new tit-for-tat paragdim and development start: everyone who uses tor, must be with his IP an exit node. Similar archtectures were discussed for friends of friends, e.g. over http://retroshare.sf.net - there is already code (i can send or see the feature request postings with the patch) where a friend is a proxy for all his friends.. You now mention the firewall problem... here i might be allowed to suggest as well this kind of architecture, which helps in three ways: a) surfing of all friends through my IP: psiphon or retroshare patch b) installing on certain retroshare nodes a tor node, so that both are in a superpeer modus: friends can surf over rs friends and select the ip of the friend, or the tor circuit. that is a limited design, as only friends can choose that server and for the peers from the tor network choosing this exit node, it makes no difference. so for the friends it is just a normal proxy, they share with the option to step into a tor circuit. Though--- that way one RS friend in the USA would allow many friends to choose that exit-ip. or that tor-entry ip. (without the ISP logging, as RS is encrypted transfer) an now the interesting thing c) Breaking through a firewall: RS has implemented openDHT and other RS nodes work as a STUN server, so the connection can break through every firewall. The idea is now, to use any retroshare node to make the firewall breakthrough for the TOR-Client-Firefox node. That design uses not the f2f-connections, but the network only for the firewall breakthrough (initial Stun). Of course you can install as well any central STUN server. The problem with this design is, if the (central or public known) stun server is killed (or the forwarding tor server), then many client-exit-nodes (the firefoxusers) are killed. (and of course the users doing evil things to them with the ip of the client-exit node... so here is the real problem, not showing the IP of the pseudo-exit node not in the tor-server list). You request a total change to a p2p network, away from the client-server approach. That was peek-a-booty. so your idea has two main impacts: - firewall breakthrough - hidden client-exit-nodes (covered by the IP of the proxy-forwarding (stun)server) As said: the p2p network needs no serverlist, just any user as an outproxy and every user testing TOR can accuse any IP - the one with which he surfs - to shut down the exit node. Indifferent, if it is a pseudo or normal or client exit node. I would speak then of a professional server exit node and an at-home-Firefox-private-exit-node, and because of the firewall, the private exit nodes need a stun server or reflector (term from cucme) or a proxy or a forwarding server - however you want to call it. professional exit node = Tor servers (appear in the list) refelctors = Pseudeo-exit nodes Private exit nodes = Firefox users, connecting to reflectors, getting the requests forwarded from them. So the hiding of the IP of the private exit node is not the issue.. (though with your design they do not appear in the list of the (normal tor) client, but every user can surf, see the exit-ip and take it down (= test if there is a log, if not - accuse )). That is the same problem with the emule clients.. which show the IP downloading a file. Using the STUN/proxy servers or reflectors to hide them, helps, but then the target are these STUN pseudo-server. If one is down, many private or client-exit nodes are down. And how do clients find the list of refelctors? so you have the same problem in the Firefox client, which you have now in the tor client serverlist. (Note that currently, any relay must be able to connect to any other relay.) That idea is simple: 1. I agree not to make a browser plugin, but to stick it to any other always running software. Then because of the revealing cockies while switching tor on and off in the browser, it would be good to have an own browser, with different gui colours, so that users know, with that browser: I surf with a different ip. 2. Make Tor tit-for tat for that deamon. 3. Stun the deamon with retroshare (as it is a p2p stun network and not a cental stun server) and then users need to install both. (btw. the Qt gui of RS has as well a browser widget, so you can implement as well a small browser there, or link to localhost for your normal browser.) What is then the function?: e.g. all private-exits could
Re: New Tor distribution for testing: Tor Browser Bundle
Steven, i suggest to make it hardcoded default and a Must, that each user, using this browser, is as well running an tor **exit** node, tit for tat. like emule partials: upload is a MUST. That would help a lot to have more tor-exit nodes. Thanks. On Jan 30, 2008 1:52 AM, Steven J. Murdoch [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: Recently I have been working on creating a distribution of Tor which includes a pre-configured browser -- the Tor Browser Bundle. It is intended for being run off an USB flash drive, but will probably also be helpful to users who want an easy-to-setup packaging of Tor. More information and download links can be found here: http://torbrowser.torproject.org/ The bundle contains Firefox, Tor, Vidalia, Polipo and Torbutton. No installation is needed (just unpack the contents). All the components are automatically started by one double-click. The bundle is new, and contains development versions of Tor, Vidalia and Torbutton, so should be considered a testing release. I do hope it will be useful, and I'd appreciate comments, suggestions, and bug reports. Thanks, Steven. -- w: http://www.cl.cam.ac.uk/users/sjm217/
Re: filesharing with tor and offsystem online storage
Hi Robert, see the update with source and (first) makefile-description here: http://offsystem.sourceforge.net/download.html On Jan 20, 2008 8:05 PM, Robert Hogan [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: On Sunday 20 January 2008 18:19:30 Michael Schmidt wrote: Hi Robert, source is here: http://offsystem.cvs.sourceforge.net/offsystem/?sortdir=down On Jan 20, 2008 7:05 PM, Robert Hogan [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: There don't appear to be any source tarballs and looking at the cvs repository only the project members could possibly know how to put the many modules together. Yes, that's the cvs repository I was referring to above - there are no tags there and no source tarballs anywhere else. This means that there is no source distribution for any of their releases. That's annoying. I'm guessing that off_network is the main module there but why should I bother reverse-engineering their build process just to install a possibly broken cvs version? I want the latest release. It's their funeral at the end of the day but an open-source project that doesn't release source tarballs is just being silly.
Re: filesharing with tor and offsystem online storage
Hi Robert, source is here: http://offsystem.cvs.sourceforge.net/offsystem/?sortdir=down On Jan 20, 2008 7:05 PM, Robert Hogan [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: There don't appear to be any source tarballs and looking at the cvs repository only the project members could possibly know how to put the many modules together.
Re: Please run a bridge relay! (was Re: Tor 0.2.0.13-alpha is out)
2007/12/22, Roger Dingledine [EMAIL PROTECTED]: - is there a log, so that I see, if someone is entering the url? Not really. You could run Vidalia's 'bandwidth graph' and see, but Tor does its own activity too, so it would probably be hard to tell. What sort of interface did you have in mind? Like this one: http://psiphon.civisec.org/ - and no the most important thing: what must the censored user do with the url ? Quoting from https://bridges.torproject.org/ : To use the above lines, go to Vidalia's Network settings page, and click My ISP blocks connections to the Tor network. Then add each bridge address one at a time. You can read more in Vidalia's Network settings page, in the svn version of Vidalia, if you click on How do I find a bridge? We'll aim to get a new snapshot of Vidalia out soon. Thx, overead it. Is it ok if we send this thread to the or-talk list? no. ;-) Happy Christmas. Having Invisible Tor Entry Points (ITEPs) in several other applications would be great, so an Itep c++ library would be good. Though we need to rise the exit nodes too. From 1200, 500 are dead or not stable. from 700, 400 are in the EU under logging, and from 300 nodes only 60 are exit points... how can this be rised? Last Question: is a Bridge or an ITEP only forwarding traffic or as well routing in both directions? so it could be the case, that one logging exit node got data from me and I am caught because of being neighbour, so this could be changed, if ITEPs get a modus, in which they do not route, but only forward incoming traffic, and this not to exit nodes, but only to forwarding routers. then the bridge is safe from data retention law, as they are one hop behind the routing to an exit node. Could that be an option, that ITEPs are free from exit nodes contacts?
Re: torbutton webpage comments
hi eric, you make the ff-torbutton? it is not seczure, as cookiees trac you and referal pages as well and so on, if you switch off the tor button is there any solution for this ? is xerbank-browser not better? Regards Mike PS: haven´t you interest to build a FF plugin for mozilla and thunderbird of http://retroshare.sf.net or this PGP messenger into sameplace.cc ? Thanks for a feedback 2007/12/10, Eric H. Jung [EMAIL PROTECTED]: Hello, I am the FoxyProxy Firefox extension author. At https://torbutton.torproject.org/dev/, Scott Squires Mike Perry write: FoxyProxy [...] So far the author has expressed no interest in implementing [proxy-per-tab] ability. This statement is patently false. I have repeatedly gone on record as saying proxy-per-tab is a goal of FoxyProxy. I've made this at irc.mozilla.org (#extdev and various other channels), the FoxyProxy forums (http://z9.invisionfree.com/foxyproxy), and even show it as a goal for version 2.8 at the FoxyProxy proxy road map at http://foxyproxy.mozdev.org/roadmap.html. I would have added this feature a very long time ago if I knew *how* to do it. Unfortunately, it's unlikely to happen even for 2.8 (as shown in the road map) because I'm no closer to getting it to work than I was a year ago... even after much research. If you have any pointers on how to achieve proxy-per-tab, I'd be grateful to hear them. I've asked in mozilla.dev.extensions, mozilla.dev.tech.network, IRC, as well as some prominent Firefox and SeaMonkey developers (Christian Biesinger, Benjamin Smedberg, Philip Chee, Michael Vincent Van Rantwijk, etc.) Christian Biesinger and Michael Vincent Van Rantwijk had some ideas which eventually panned out. One of the problems with FoxyProxy as it relates to Tor have been documented here for a very long time (linked prominently from the front FoxyProxy web page): http://foxyproxy.mozdev.org/faq.html#privacy-01 Note that FoxyProxy has a broader audience than people wishing pure anonymity and so this problem is not an issue for all FoxyProxy users. At the least, I'd appreciate if Scott and Mike change the torbutton webpage. Moreover, I welcome you to contribute to FoxyProxy and/or help me solve the proxy-per-tab difficulties. Best regards, Eric Jung
Re: Possible to have favorites?
good idea, but why not trusted friends as stable connections for an entry point of the tor network? - Tor as a plugin of http://retroshare.sf.net please evaluate it. 2007/12/9, Christian Westlund [EMAIL PROTECTED]: While it feels like it kinda defeats the purpose with tor, is it possible to have favorites to connect through? Sometimes I need a US ip, sometimes another country. And it feels redundant to click the new identity till I get one that is. I just started using tor, together with foxy proxy, havent used anything else before. windows user. - Christian
Re: Possible to have favorites?
not default, but as an option to choose that tunnel to/of a friend, connect if you like to favourites = or trusted friends if not, then choose a random peer. 2007/12/9, Marco Bonetti [EMAIL PROTECTED]: -BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE- Hash: SHA1 Michael Schmidt wrote: good idea, but why not trusted friends as stable connections for an entry point of the tor network? For what I know (I'm not a developer) limiting the possibilities of entry/middleman/exit nodes is always a bad thing(tm) for your anonimity. However I've to admit that tor can be really handy when it comes down to choosing another geolocation for your visit to a certain web page. - -- Marco Bonetti Slackintosh Linux Project Developer: http://workaround.ch Linux-live for powerpc: http://workaround.ch/pub/rsync/mb/linux-live My webstuff: http://sidbox.homelinux.org My GnuPG key id: 0x86A91047 -BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE- Version: GnuPG v1.4.6 (GNU/Linux) Comment: Using GnuPG with Mozilla - http://enigmail.mozdev.org iD8DBQFHXHBlE3eWALCzdGwRAiiEAJ4+Pl+Y37EIVktMtw6tdMthAGfQ9wCeImjw AGLjALHwvY7nfenZUbAfEHU= =ntlD -END PGP SIGNATURE-
Re: storage privacy (was: Nice quiet, private, anonymous life??)
privacy back-up storage concept: http://sourceforge.net/tracker/index.php?func=detailaid=1833093group_id=178712atid=886242 http://forums.truecrypt.org/viewtopic.php?t=8000 2007/12/3, F. Fox [EMAIL PROTECTED]: -BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-
Re: Europaen Cybercrime Convention
just run tor on a dedecated server, install a truecrypt.org container and make if portable only in this container. if the power is off, the tor installation has gone. But I guess you mean a password protection while running? 2007/11/25, TOR Admin (gpfTOR1) [EMAIL PROTECTED]: Hi onion guys, we want to write about a few points of the European Cybercrime Convention, which became real by law in Germany last time. Sorry - we didnt read the or-talk very carefully last time. May be, it was always discussed here. By the European Cybercrime Convention anon servers are something like telephone providers. The following is important because of this fact: 1: data retention (was discussed here, in Germany real by §113 StPO) 2: Realtime surveillance by European Cybercrime Convention (article 20) The traffic data (not the traffic itself) has to be provided for the governments and secret services in REALTIME by a defined interface. Anon servers have to provide all data, which have to be logged in realtime too! Admins of anon servers have to cooperate. (In Germany this is real by the new § 100g StPO, the realtime surveillance can run for up to 3 days without asking a judge.) 3: Online-searching of servers by European Cybercrime Convention: An online searching (Online-Durchsuchung) of an anon server may be run before investigation to save relevant data, which may be not accessible after investigation. This online searching depends not on the cooperation of the admins and may be reached by repressions. (In Germany this is real by the new § 110 (3) StPO.) Thanks to K. Raven for feature out this new laws. For point 3 we recommend to be prepared. It may be possible to create a high secured account with only read access to relevant data and no read access to any important key. If someone login with this account, it may be possible to run several actions. If the situation appears, you may decide, what you want to do (give them the account data or take the repressions). But you will not have the time to create such an account carefully. Can anyone write a shot tutorial for creation of a high secured only-read-account? Greetings
Re: Surveillance rules, feature suggestion
this is a good idea, see the thread to do this over f2f, in your model this is done as well, but you need to make sure, that a middelman-only node NEVER connects to another node, which is any other node in the same law-country, So the middleman-only-node connecting to another middleman-only-node in germany is redundant, as if one is analyzed, the logs offer as well the other in the same law zone, so the hop is redundant and waste in the point of security. A german middlenode-only to an german-exit-node is a dead thing ! Only german middlenode-only-peer connecting to ANY kind of node Outside the law area is useful. the idea to use F2F would allow to have the waste of 2 german middlenodes broken, which means this is helpful to have both or more hops, even as well for using a different law-Exit node from the law-zone (do not mix up with the web-exit node) in the chain. So this means: Middelnodes in the law aerea are only useful with ONE hop and ONLY connections to law-outside-nodes. But who will determine that all in a p2p way if a node is outside, then the analyzers just need to set up a dedicated server in the USA or India and the middle-node is as well analyzed. Third, to prevent this, you then need as well several middle nodes in the law zone, which is not really a prevention, as both or all three need to log, So if the middle-node is contacting a malicious law-outside node, your are done. Here as well only F2F helps to connect to stable trusted prooved firiends in the outside-law aerea. If there is a random peer is choosen, then the middlenode as well is analyzed in the case of a trap. 2007/11/25, Smuggler [EMAIL PROTECTED]: -BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE- Hash: SHA1 Hello, I wonder if it would be a good thing to define Middleman-Only nodes. Those nodes would ONLY talk to other Tor-Nodes. They will not accept connections from non-Tor-nodes and not relay to non-Tor-nodes. While the latter is currently configurable via the exit-policy the former is not directly supported and thus quick hacks (like firewalling) reduce the speed and reliability of the network. The reason why to do this is that those nodes would not provide relaying to the public and thus imho not fall under the various EU Data retention rules. Comments welcome. Regards, smuggler -BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE- Version: GnuPG v1.4.6 (GNU/Linux) iD8DBQFHSa56OMmnRrmEoQkRAkMAAJ9iwIMcKY5unSpRXaRqasFzL5nByACfVeh/ 21anvrJOq/M/ODR6zQGEeGg= =Rqur -END PGP SIGNATURE-
Re: Tor blocking german nodes
please do not attach germany to fascism, this shows only our broen view. blocking nodes in the EU from ourside EU is nonsense and does not help the network, e.g. you are destroying the network by itself, i tis only a risk, if someone is in the EU an Exitnode. Forwarding nodes are needed and if there is no logging, this is the own risk of the mantainer. regards Mike PS: from which country are you? 2007/11/22, kazaam [EMAIL PROTECTED]: Hi, because in germany fascist laws will force tor-nodes to log their connections I'm looking for a way to blog german tor-nodes. Is there any way to do this with Tor? I found ExcludeNodes just taking nicknames and no IP-ranges which is pretty bad. Couldn't this be implemented? I mean Tor knows the IP of the nodes so why not making it possible to blog IP-ranges with wildcards like 145.253.*.* ? Then I found this old post: http://archives.seul.org/or/talk/Jul-2006/msg00079.html which has a script which grabbs the nicks of nodes from a website and puts it into ExclueNodes. But first the website it takes this info from is down: http://serifos.eecs.harvard.edu/ and second this is just a messy solution to the problem. So why not implementing an IP-based ExcludeNodes? Much would be won with it and nothing loosed.. Is there any other workaround known at the moment to block german IP's? greets kazaam [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Re: new perspektive for tor
2007/11/17, Robert Hogan [EMAIL PROTECTED]: On Friday 16 November 2007 17:04:18 Michael Schmidt wrote: Due to data retention logg needs/law in the EU, there will be no outproxy and no forwarding-nodes in the EU anymore, if they do not logg all traffic. Can someone point me to the EU directive on this? I thought this was just a German initiative. in the total EU there will be NO TOR-Outproxy from begin of 1.1.2008: So the idea is to have only forwarders in the EU - based on a security friend to friend layer with trusted friends only (tor retroshare-plugin). The hybrid nodes (tor plugins connecting AS WELL to the normal tor network layer) though must be then Outside this law aerea. And: every forwarder inside needs to know a hybrid outside the law aerea. If this is given, he can forward the packet many time on the f2f layer of his trusted friends, until any of the f2f-friends know ANY PORT to go outside to a hybrid again. So this is Matrix Reloaded with Neo, needing a Port. - World outside: routing and routing - HYBRID: World outside, slides the packet over to F2F - World inside begin: ping pong Germany pong ping Germany ping pong Germany pong ping Germany ... and many hops forwarded - World inside end - HYBRID: World outside, a friend from inside is giving the packet to a hybrid node outside - Worldoutside: routing and routing to the destination. So the new approach is to have a world outside with tor routing, and a World inside with forwarding nodes. The World inside is based on the secure trusted friend encrypted layer of http://retroshare.sf.net . Each node inside the World needs friends either forwarding or a HYBRID-friend from Outside the law. We need a board for that, to bring people from inside and outside together, as the f2f chain may be broken quick, as not every f2f user is installing the tor-plugin. But three or four routing ways in the middle is enough for a start to haver the MIXER. Then different Ports or Hybrids outside the World start the routing, some ping pong inside over f2f layer and then back outside, ideally over a different hybrid node. So the goal for nodes inside is a) to have friends forwarding for free, and b) to have at least one or two hybrid- friends to mix here the Inside-World-Entry and Inside-World-Exit Nodes. (remember the exit node is the tor node to fetch the website and the iside-world-exit-node is the node in a country without data retention law and hybrid with F2F). Here are the laws: EU, Germany and some laywer discussions, UK and Ireland and some other already have, as well USA will step into this .. so.. Russia and India is the last resort for Tor, China as well of course not. So a protocol change is needed, or a mixer, which is based on acting against the law, but this will no one do. So the trusted friend inside and the trusted friend hybrid outside will help to get a mix chain inside the law-area. Regards Richtlinie 2006/24/EG: http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/lex/LexUriServ/site/en/oj/2006/l_105/l_10520060413en00540063.pdf; Umgesetzt im deutschen Gesetzesentwurf: http://dip.bundestag.de/btd/16/058/1605846.pdf http://www.vorratsdatenspeicherung.de http://www.heise.de/newsticker/meldung/91627 vom 23.06.2007 http://www.bundestag.de/bic/analysen/2006/zulaessigkeit_der_vorratsdatenspeicherung_nach_europaeischem_und_deutschem_recht.pdf, dagegen: https://www.datenschutzzentrum.de/polizei/20070627-vorratsdatenspeicherung.pdf sowie das Bundesverfassungsgericht: http://www.bundesverfassungsgericht.de/pressemitteilungen/bvg07-082.html Bundesverfassungsgericht - Pressestelle - Pressemitteilung Nr. 82/2007 vom 27. Juli 2007 - 1 BvR 370/07; 1BvR 595/07 - http://www.bundesverfassungsgericht.de/pressemitteilungen/bvg07-082.html
Re: new perspektive for tor
2007/11/17, Olaf Selke [EMAIL PROTECTED]: in the total EU there will be NO TOR-Outproxy from begin of 1.1.2008: really? I don't intend to shut down my exit gateway located in Germany. Is there any reason I'm supposed to do so? Olaf You need to logg the traffic, you have time to get the log tools till. 1.1.2009, so one year from beginning in 2008. If you do not log, then you are aginst the law. Dunno, what the punsihment is... But as the german plice has raided several Tor servers, I would not run one, and as you are in law conflict, if you do not logg, then this is as well a problem.. so I guess in the next year more and more servers will vanish... Mike
Re: new perspektive for tor
„§ 113a Speicherungspflichten für Daten (6) Wer Telekommunikationsdienste erbringt und hierbei die nach Maßgabe dieser Vorschrift zu speichernden Angaben verändert, ist zur Speicherung der ursprünglichen und der neuen Angabe sowie des Zeitpunktes der Umschreibung dieser Angaben nach Datum und Uhrzeit unter Angabe der zugrunde liegenden Zeitzone verpflichtet. http://dip.bundestag.de/btd/16/058/1605846.pdf 2007/11/17, Olaf Selke [EMAIL PROTECTED]: You need to logg the traffic, you have time to get the log tools till. 1.1.2009, so one year from beginning in 2008. do I? According the law one has to store (speichern) collected (erzeugte) or processed (verarbeitete) data for six months. From my understanding there's no obligation to collect any data. Obviously data not collected can't be stored. I've just asked a friend working for the BSI about his opinion. He promised to check and provide me with feedback regarding Dark Side's perspective of the terms collect and store. Did any of my German colleagues on this list really bothered with reading the law? regards, Olaf
